Takeovers as an Effective Mechanism for Corporate Governance

dc.contributor.authorUgowe A.O
dc.contributor.authorIgbayiloye O.B
dc.contributor.authorOjibara H.B
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-18T12:02:16Z
dc.date.available2024-04-18T12:02:16Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractCorporate governance found itself in the forefront of the discourse in the business and academic world as a result of high level of scandals which led to the collapse of hitherto strong multinational companies which were once thought to be sure bets. The need for the prevention of a reoccurrence of such scandals and improvement on a company's corporate governance system has prompted this study. The study aims at examining takeovers regime as an efficient and effective mechanism for regulating corporate governance. It adopts a balanced approach whereby discussion is focused on the nature of takeovers, its ramifications, justifications, shortcomings and efforts of the European Unions to promote the regime within the Union. The paper found the regime to be very useful subject to certain limitations which caused the need to recommend other mechanisms for the regulation of corporate governance than takeovers.
dc.identifier.citationUgowe A.O, Igbayiloye O.B & Ojibara H.B (2015): Takeovers as an Effective Mechanism for Corporate Governance. University of Ilorin Law Journal Vol. 10; 130-161
dc.identifier.urihttps://uilspace.unilorin.edu.ng/handle/123456789/12400
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherFaculty of Law, University of Ilorin
dc.relation.ispartofseries10
dc.subjectUnited Kingdom
dc.subjectEuropean Union
dc.subjectTakeovers
dc.subjectMarket for Corporate Control
dc.subjectCorporate Governance
dc.titleTakeovers as an Effective Mechanism for Corporate Governance
dc.typeArticle

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