ISSN

Volume 1 · Number 1 · June, 2017

fuwjpd.fuw.edu.nu



FUWUKARI JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT

FUWJPD

Editor
Chukwuemeka Jaja Nwanegbo

Associate Editors
Johnson U. Agbo
Tamuno Dappa

Consulting Editors
Augustine Ikelegbe
Wonotanzokan Nzeda Tagowa
O.B.C. Nwankwo
Mariatu Tenuche
Shola Omotola
Joel Patrick Dada
Olubumni Alo
Eugene Aliegba
Hassan Saliu
Stella Okunna
Kayode Omojuwa

Business Editors
Lhebade Agwadu

Copyright @ Department of Political Science, FUW
A publication of the Department of Political Science,
Federal University Wukari, Wukari Nigeria.

Disclaimer:
The authors, editors, and publisher will not accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made in this publication. The publisher makes no warranty, expresses or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Published in June, 2017 by
Department of Political Science
Federal University Wukari, Wukari - Nigeria

All Rights Reserved: No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or stored in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Printed in Nigeria by
Adima Global
07012784836

Volume 1. Number 1. June, 2017

FUWukari Journal of Politics and Development

Content

Beyond the Insurgency Scourging Nigeria's North East
OBC Nwolise

Iran and Africa: Strategic Cooperation or Awkward Diplomacy?
Nse Etim Akpan and Chukwemeka Jaja Nwanegbo

Asymmetrical Dynamics and Sub-national Legislative-Executive Relations in Nigeria
Fatai Ayinde Aremu, Adebola Rafiu Bakare, Adebola Rafiu and Kolapo Quadri Abayomi

Corruption, Conflict and Insecurity in Nigeria
Tamuno-Omi Godwin Dappa, Imere Lordmizer Nwokah and Adaona Igwe

The Legislature and the Media
Jonathan S. Maiangwa and Patience Kondu-Jacob

Oil Revenue, Armed Conflict and Construction of a Developmental State in South-Sudan
Joachim Okafor Chukwuma and Jude Odigbo

The Structure and Administration of National Assembly: Nigerian Experience
Okey M. Ikeanyibe, Tochukwu S. Nwachukwu, Desmond O. Nnamani, and Nchekwube Excellence-Oluye

Typology of Legislative Assemblies
Moses Metumara Duruji & Sunday Idowu

Establishing the Nexus Between the State and Economy in the Development Process
Obi Emeka Anthony

FUWukari Journal of Politics
& Development (FUWJPD)
2017, Vol. 1 (1) 27 - 47

Asymmetrical Dynamics and Sub-national Legislative-Executive Relations in Nigeria

Fatai Ayinde Aremu
Department of Political Science,
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria

Adebola Rafiu Bakare
Department of Political Science,
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria

Kolapo Quadri Abayomi
Department of Political Science,
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Abstract

Executive-legislative relation is central to the discourse on effective governance and political stability. The dynamics that underpin the pattern of relationship between executive and legislative arms have attracted scholarly attention worldwide. Nigeria's return to democratic governance in 1999 after long years of military dictatorship allowed the discourse to gain greater intellectual traction particularly because the legislature as an institution was the casualty of military rule. Commendable as those intellectual efforts are, there has been yawning dearth of studies on executive-legislative relations at the sub-national level. While national level dynamics are important in yielding broad insights into how governance works (or fails to work) at the aggregate level, sub-national level analysis is necessary for a deeper understanding of how governance play out further down the layer and its potential future trajectory. Besides, the question of how asymmetry of access to certain powers privileges the Executive over the Legislature is often glossed over. In this paper, attempt is made to bring the asymmetrical dynamics to the center of analysis. Thus, this study examines the determinants of stable and cooperative executive-legislative relations under different compositions. Using diverse case selection procedure, the paper categorized the States according to patterns exhibited along the models (typology) formulated in the paper. While acknowledge the fact that Executive-Legislative relations in most advanced democracies could be determined through ideological perspective(s), although one cannot rule out party affiliation from the factors that can make or mar cordial relationship. This paper, however, establishes various models of Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria, with political party as a major determining factor.

Introduction

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) creates and institutionalizes three arms of government: the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Arising from this, the Constitution specifies distinct functions for each of the three arms of government. The legislature is to make laws, the judiciary to interpret the laws while the executive implement the laws. The essence of the distribution of functions is to bring about mutual inclusiveness and cooperation in governance by promoting separation of power to avoid tyranny. Though the Constitution in principle provides for equality among the three arms of government, in practice the Executive enjoys certain privileges with respect to control over resources and access to information than the legislature and judiciary. This often seems to place the executive in higher position among equals. To this end, the principle of equality of the three arms of government becomes questionable.

Nevertheless, the legislature by its functions is very crucial in modern government. This is because it is the only organ that is generally elected and command direct mandate by the electorates. Except the President, Governors and their deputies, other members of the Executive are unelected by the people. Membership of the judicial arm is based on the acquisition of specialised knowledge and expertise in administration of justice rather than election by the citizens. In terms of representation and popular mandate, the legislature holds a unique position which confers on it certain privileges, functions and acceptability. Gidado (2012:3) opined the privileges of the legislature supersede the other arms in its oversight functions of appointment approval and scrutiny of activities of other arms (Executive and Judiciary) of government. As major part of its function, legislature lay down the basic laws, which Judiciary has to interpret and Executive has to apply in the implementation of policies and execution of laws" (Ojo, 1997:12). This is what Baron du Montesquieu in his popular treatise "The Spirit of the Laws" published in 1748 describes as the principle of separation of powers amongst the various arms of government. The point being made here is that as provided for in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), each of the three arms of government both at the Federal and State levels have distinct functions and roles to play in the Sections 4 (1 and 2) and 5 (1) of the 1999 Constitution.

Although, the constitution empowers the legislature to make laws, it does not work in isolation of the executive. This is because the law making process in a presidential system of government as practiced requires that the head of the executive arm of government give assent to any bill passed by the legislature before it becomes law. Meanwhile, the legislature also has the mandate to provide oversight over the activities of the executive. Oversight function is a major component of the activities of modern legislature irrespective of the form of government in practice (NDI, 2000). This function of oversight gives enormous powers in governance to legislature over executive. Saliu and Muhammad (2010) indicate that legislative body takes active role in understanding and monitoring the performance of the executive arm and its agencies. It is described as surveillance on the activities of the executive arm. The legislature oversees government affairs and holds the person

responsible for any actions and omissions (Fashagba, 2009). This legislative power (oversight) cross-check the executive by examining the activities of some chief executive, ministries, department and agencies of government. The principle behind the legislative oversight ensures that public policy is administered in accordance with the legislative intent.

In the exercise of their various constitutional obligations, evidence suggest that there are incidents of disagreements, conflicts, and sometimes, confrontations at the political, legal and attitudinal levels between the Legislative and Executive arms of government. Most of the disagreements emanates from the constitutionally specified roles of both institutions. In some cases, the discharge of constitutional duties runs smoothly without hitches and in other cases, the reverse is the situation. In view of this, one may need to ask that: Under what circumstance does legislative-executive relation proceed smoothly or rancorously? Bearing in mind that the cordiality or otherwise of the relationship between the arms of government largely determines the stability of government and its effectiveness in providing public good, the second question is: To what extent does the asymmetry of access to resources and information explain the pattern of executive-legislative relations at the sub-national level? It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to answer these questions using diverse case selection procedure in relation to the Nigerian experience at the sub-national level. In doing this, the paper is organized into five major sections. The first section being the introduction is followed by the review of existing related literatures on the subject matter. The third section deals with the typology of executive-legislature relations with reference to the general patterns observed in both developed and developing democracies. The fourth section serves as the major thrust of the paper where the analysis and discussion of findings was done. The paper ends with recommendations and conclusion.

Existing Studies

Legislative-Executive relation refers to the totality of interactions and transactions that take place between the Executive and the Legislative arms at a particular level of government where both institutions exist (Bassey, 2000). In practice, these interactions and transactions may involve conflict, cooperation, negotiation, bargaining and conciliation. Despite constitutional provisions which grant distinct but complementary powers and obligations to each organ, the nature of executive-legislative relations are in practice vary from one political system to another and from one state to another (Onyebuchi, 2013).

In Nigeria, the democratization process which started since 1999 has witnessed growing interests amongst scholars, legislative advocacy groups, members of the civil society organizations and practitioners on the nature of Executive-Legislature relationship in the country. This is because the democratization process has institutionalized the participation of the Legislature in the policy-making process contrary to the military era when the Legislature as a distinct institution was obliterated. Consequently, a body of literature of varying strands has evolved. A careful review of scholarly landscape reveals that though they all seek to examine in some details the nature and type of relationship that exist between the Executive and Legislature, there are variations in the subject of inquiry. For

instance, while some examined the intersection of Executive-Legislature relationship as it relates to budgetary and fiscal policy (Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba and Omoju, 2013; Central Bank of Nigeria [CBN], 2003), others looked at it from the legal and constitutional perspective with much emphasis on constitutional provisions on the functions and responsibilities of the various arms of government (Odock, 2012). Yet, some studies primarily focused on the implications of the Executive-Legislative conflict on good governance (Momodu & Matudi, 2013). Other set of studies examined the causes and consequences of conflictual relationships between the Executive and the Legislature (Bassey, Abia, Ekok, and Antigha, 2013). Another strand of scholarship focused on comparative analysis of Executive-Legislature relationship in both Parliamentary and Presidential systems of government (Onyebuchi, 2013).

In their study of the role of the Executive and the Legislature in fiscal policy management, Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba and Omoju (2013) found some grey constitutional areas that frequently result in conflict between the Executive and the Legislature especially in fiscal policy management. According to them, several areas of conflicts between the Legislature and the Executive in the budget process broadly include the budget approval, implementation, and evaluation process. For instance, because the Constitution fails to explicitly specify a time frame for the submission and approval of the budget, the Executive submits whenever it deems fit, while the Legislature argue that it needs enough time to study the budget. This, results in conflict and the negative implication of this conflict has been the inconsistency in the time frame between the Executive presentation of the budget to the National Assembly and its return for presidential assent and implementation (Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba and Omoju, 2013:67).

These conflicts exist despite constitutional provisions on specific issues around the budget process. For instance, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) empowers the President to draft the Appropriation Bill and lay it before the National Assembly at anytime in each financial year. On the other hand, it empowers the Legislature to either approve or reject the budget. The Constitution also stipulates that where the President withholds assent, the Appropriation Bill could be passed into law with two-thirds majority of the Legislators after 30 days upon which the said bill was transmitted to the executive (See section 58 sub-sections 4 and 5 of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution). In addition, the Constitution also provides that Supplementary Estimates must be approved by the Legislature. In 2012, after the President had declined assent to the Appropriation Bill passed by the National Assembly over the issue of oil price benchmark, the legislature threatened to override the President's assent after 30 days of passage of the bill, though it was later signed into law by the President.

In his work, Odock (2012) examines Executive-Legislature relationship specifically from a legal and constitutional perspective. Particularly, he set out to do the following:

a) Can the conflict, competition and confrontations between the three branches or organs of government in Nigeria on the one hand, and between the three tiers of government on the other be accounted for mainly by reference to the constitutional separation of powers or do we need to focus on the role of history and precedence in structuring these

relations as well as the inter-level relations among the tiers of government?

b) Based on the question raised above can we be justified in supposing that a focus on legislative-executive relations in the period under study is key to explaining the incidence of conflicts, competition and confrontations listed above?

c) What are the benefits of subjecting the evolution of executive –legislative relations in Nigeria to the widely used and accepted 'deference- defiance' model extensively used in the discourse on executive-legislative relations in the United States and other parts of the world as shown in the literature review?

d) Furthermore, if we assume that these relations have evolved in the direction of initial legislative deference to the benefit of the executive in the four main areas of foreign policy, the budgetary process, national security and agenda setting towards greater defiance in the more recent past, what could be the explanatory factors for evolutions? (Odock, 2012:64).

His findings indicates that conflictual relationship between the Executive and the Legislature arise from the fact the President/Governor who controls the Executive arm of government has excess and enormous constitutional powers at his disposal.

However, Odock's (2012) assertion that the President/Governor unduly intervenes in the affairs of the Legislature because the Constitution confers on him enormous powers may be faulted on the grounds that in the analysis of power, idiosyncratic inclinations of the power holder cannot be ignored given that two different individuals may operate the same constitution by following different approaches.

In their study of the implications of Executive-Legislature conflicts on good governance, Momodu and Matudi (2013:3) assert that the conflicts most often result in rancour and acrimony, physical brawling and fisticuff, which occasion undue delay in the passage of fiscal budgets, delay or total blockage of executive bills and firing of key legislative officers. The legislature on the other hand resorts to threats of culpable impeachment of the President/Governor on allegations of "gross misconduct". Consequently, the quest for good governance in Nigeria according to them has been threatened more by the unending conflicts between the Legislature and the Executive, who are often entangled in a constant battle for supremacy and control of the policy making and implementation process.

The findings of the studies examined above reveal that there is a somewhat unanimity amongst the scholars that Executive-Legislative relationship is in two fold; cordial and conflictual. The scholars also agree that conflictual relationship between these two arms of government appear more pronounced around the world than the cordial relationship, and thus attracting more attention. It is also generally agreed that in Nigeria, conflictual relationships between the Executive and the Legislature are caused mainly by the following factors: pride, personality clash and struggle for power and domination; executive dominance and high-handedness; institutional and functional overlap and conflict of roles; legislative performance of oversight function; limited conceptualization and understanding or absolute ignorance of the provisions of the constitution and their constitutional

responsibilities; greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs; lack of patriotism; corruption; poor leadership skills; and poor conflict management skills (Rockman, 1983; Momodu & Matudi, 2013).

Typology of Executive-Legislature Relations

Numerous patterns of executive-legislature relations have been identified by scholars. This is because executive and legislative arms are seen as very key to the development of democratic regime and good governance. None of the institution can function properly without engaging the other, fabricating either cordial or conflictual relationship. This relationship, according to Lijphart (1999) is inherently a power relationship and, more accurately, a power struggle. In this regards, Bernick and Bernick (2008), while considering the model of a balance of power between the executive and the legislature, summarized the relationship between the two branches into three configurations, viz: the governor is dominant, the legislature is dominant and the two are competitively structured. Bernick and Bernick (2008), however, noted that the more frequent circumstance is the last, in which the governors and legislatures have a delicate balance and changes in either branch can shift the relationship into one of the other two categories. The analysis of Penning (2003) is similar in this dimension. He views that the modes of interactions between the legislature and the executive depend on the power divisions within and between the legislative assembly and the executive. In this regard, the structural typology of Penning (2003) goes in line with what Bernick and Bernick (2008) highlighted. To Penning (2003) three mode of legislature-executive relations exist: the government dominates parliament, the parliament dominates government, and the parliament and government are balanced.

In the King's (1976) '*Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany*' typology of the mode of legislature-executive relations. This study, however, finds prominence among scholars of the inter-branch relationship of government. King's model has been seen as the most authoritative typology (as observed by Andeweg, 1992; Muller, 1993; Saalfeld, 1990; Andeweg & Thomassen, 2003; Boyko & Herron, 2009 among others). King (1976) identified five quite separate and distinct patterns of political relationship that are generally subsumed under the phenomena of executive-legislative relations. These are the non-party, intra-party, inter-party, opposition, and cross-party modes. The nonparty or private member mode according to King (1976) is an interactive mode in which the executive and the legislature interact with each other as members of two distinct institutions. The intra-party mode addresses how government ministers compete and collaborate with backbenchers from their own parties, while the inter-party mode explains the relationship between government and different parties, i.e., this mode addresses how parties form and manage coalitions. The opposition mode, on the other, hand indicates the relations between the government and the opposition. As noted by Boyko and Herron (2009), this mode of relationship addresses how conflicts between governing and non-governing parties are managed. The cross-party relationship, on the other hand, addresses how the government, backbenchers from governing parties, and the political opposition can unify on specific policy matters.

However in Nigeria, the constitutional duty of the both legislature and executive

inadvertently sets the stage for antagonism (Anyaegbunam, 2010). Anyaegbunam observed that legislature is sometimes perceived by the executive as overstepping its constitutional boundaries in the performance of oversight functions. This, the executive often sees as hindering the government from speedily meeting the needs of the public. He further explained that the legislature on the other hand, being the constitutionally ordained watchdog of the executive, views the frustration of her investigative role, as a direct affront to the people's mandate. Thus, the legislature sees the executive's uncooperative attitude as a denial of the citizenry's right to be acquainted with the executives' activities. This cycle of mutual suspicion usually degenerates into a frosty relationship between both arms of government. According to Anyaegbunam (2010), this experience in most developing countries, including Nigeria, has established three patterns of relationship: polarized relationship, cordial relationship and mild hostility. The polarized legislature-executive relationship according to him is a kind of worrisome antagonistic relationship between the executive and the legislature. While the cordial relationship is the kind which institutional disagreements over policies are resolved through healthy and mutual understanding. Thus mostly occur when legislative assemblies lost their constitutional oversight role to the overwhelming influence of the executive, thereby hampering the necessary checks and balances which should aid the social, economic and political well-being of the masses. The third pattern of executive-legislature relations is the mild hostility. This is a kind of mild and inconsistent hostility short of outright antagonism between the executive and the legislature.

However, as the patterns of relationship described above are important, its empirical application is essential, though problematic. This is because the dynamic of Executive-Legislative Relations in African context and importantly Nigeria cannot be totally divorced from other intervening variables in the realm of politics and politicking which has ethno-religious shrewdness. Several scholars' empirical outcomes have attested to keen involvement of both ethnic and religion dynamics in African politics (see Ellis and Ter Haar, 2007; Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji, 2009; Onapajo, 2012). Aside this important context, there are other variables that was omitted cum misconception in the previous studies which call for this new typology of executive-legislature relationship propose by this paper. In the King's typology of non-party, intra-party, inter-party, opposition, and cross-party modes, there seem to be some fundamental duplicity of relations and other number of problems.

The first problem of the King's typology arises from the fact that it appears more difficult to distinguish inter-party mode of relations from opposition mode. The opposition mode is first defined on the British example, i.e. as Government versus opposition front-benchers + Opposition backbenchers (King, 1976: 14). The inter-party mode is introduced later. Using Germany as an example, the inter-party mode describe three modes of relations: ministers from the dominant government party versus ministers from the subordinate governing party; ministers from the dominant governing party versus opposition MPs; and ministers from the subordinate governing party versus opposition MPs (King, 1976: 28). Thus inter-party mode contains the element of opposition mode. The defining characteristic of the inter-party mode is that the interactions between ministers and MPs are governed by

their party allegiance. Within the overall King's inter-party mode, Andeweg and Nijzink (n.d.) have distinguished 'sub-modes': King's opposition mode for relations between ministers + MPs from the governing party and opposition MPs; and for multi-party government, an intra-coalition mode for the relations between the members (ministers + MPs) of the respective governing parties. The second problem is that King's cross-party and non-party modes remain rather vague, just as the blurring situation of inter-party and opposition modes explained above. Nevertheless, King's typology was able to establish that the intra-party mode was the most beneficial and most important mode of relation in all three countries to which he applied his typology. Though, he tends to describe the mode from the vantage point of government, and for majority governments, survival is dependent of the on the continued support of 'their' MPs. This mode presupposes that there is such a governing majority. In the non-party or cross-party modes the existence of such a majority is irrelevant, only within the inter-party mode can we hypothesize an intra-party mode.

More so, in Bernick and Bernick (2008) and Penning (2003) configurations of 'the governor is dominant, the legislature is dominant, two are competitively structured' and 'the government dominates parliament, the parliament dominates government, the parliament and government are balanced' seem to fall short in describing the dynamics of relations on very keenly polarize Assembly. It is possible to have variations of relations based on the dominancy of either political party same as of the executive or the legislature heads, but what about other dynamics of relations ensued from a situation where there is no clear majority in the Assembly or where several political parties are minority. These situations will produce a relationship different from those describes by Bernick and Bernick (2008) and Penning (2003). In separate critique of typologies of King (1976), Bernick and Bernick (2008) and Penning (2003), their claims only described, it doesn't predict. It doesn't explain the outcome and the real pattern/relationship without party affiliation.

Therefore, providing remedies to these loopholes of the various studies is the strength of this paper. The paper sterilises and explains major possible range of relationships using African dynamics of politics, most especially Nigeria sub-national power play of executive and legislature. However, there are four major patterns of relationships amongst the executive and the legislature. The table 1 below explains different patterns of relations together with its causative agents:

Table 1: General Patterns of Executive-Legislature Relations

		EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE (Y)	
COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATURE (X)		**Executive Interference {Legislature is emasculated} (Yi)**	**Executive non-interference {Legislature enjoys high degree of autonomy} (Yii)**
	One Party Dominance (Xi)	Alignment, cooperation and deference (YiXi)	Accommodation (YiiXi)
	Divided/Plural (Xii)	Conflict, confrontation and defiance (YiXii)	Maintenance (YiiXii)

Source: Authors' conception.

The table 1 above describes the possible patterns of executive-legislature relations that can be tested in all democracies of the world. The table has on the upper side, Executive Interference which was represented by 'Y'. Under the 'Y', there is Executive Dominance (Yi) and Executive Non-Interference (Yii). On the left side is the Composition of Legislature which was represented by 'X'. Under it is the two common patterns of compositions: One Party Dominance (Xi) and Divided/Plural House (Xii). The typological modeling presented in the table shows that Yi interacting with Xi will generate 'YiXi' pattern of executive-legislature relations (alignment, cooperation and deference). On the other end of the scale, the intersection of 'Yi' and 'Xii' will yield 'YiXii' pattern of executive-legislature relations (conflict, confrontation and defiance).

Analysis and Discussion of Findings

As explained in the various analyses above, party composition in State House of Assemblies in relation with the party that produce the executive (governor) determine the kind of executive-legislature relations in Africa, and Nigeria in particular. This is because loyalty tends to be increased to the executive of the same political party than the opposition. Executive (governor) has always been acknowledged as the leader of the party at the state level who has the overbearing powers that determine the career progression and popularity of the member in the party and the state. The power of the executive (governor) over the state legislatures include but not limited to governors' control of political parties at state level, unlimited access to public funds of the state government, over reliance of state legislatures on executive bureaucracy and apparent lack of credible opposition at various state legislatures in Nigeria.

From 1999 to date, composition of state Houses Assembly shows a trend of one party legislature across various states. Except, the elections in 1999, which shows some mixture of parties represented at various state legislatures, subsequent elections depicted one-party legislatures in many states of Nigeria. This is more or less connected to the role of the state governors in the control of the party machineries (candidates' selection) and indeed their ability to fund elections of their favourite candidates and parties in their states.

After close study of the table 2 (See appendix I) and its executive-legislature relations, the paper posits and theorizes the possible patterns (models) of executive-legislature relations as described in the table 1 above. Sub-national (state) power relations in Nigeria can be easily categorized and thus fix into the column of patterns shown in the table 1 above as follows in table 3 (See appendix II). Though, the political shake up in 2013 that gave birth to All Progressive Congress (APC) warranted major cross carpet movement of members from one political party to another, and thus, diluted some of the data presented in the table 2 in appendix I. Some of the states studied support this paper's claims in terms of quick change in their pattern of relations caused by reality of cross carpet move of the both executive and legislators. Adamawa, Nasarawa and Akwa Ibom states impeachments moves (Daniel, 2014; Thisday July 21, 2014) and also declaring of defected legislators seats vacant (Bassey, 2015) respectively are major examples to this fact. Meanwhile, subsequent explanations will accord credence (in the categorization) where necessary.

The executive-legislature interface at the subnational level could fall into any of the following four categories, as fixed in the various box and categories (See Table 3 in the appendix), viz: cohesive relations, united relations, fragmented relations and divided relations. Four mentioned categories germinated from the direct consequences' political compositions of the executive-legislature, cohesive house, united house, fragmented house and divided house respectively. These can be explained in form of relationship expected from such association. Hence, Model 1 (Alignment, Cooperation and Deference 'YiXi'), Model 2 (Accommodation 'YiiXi'), Model 3 (Conflict, Confrontation and Defiance 'YiXii'), and Model 4 (Maintenance 'YiiXii').

Model 1: Alignment, Cooperation and Deference (YiXi)

Alignment, cooperation and deference model is what can be referred to as *Cohesive Executive-Legislature Relations*. In the *cohesive house*, there are no differences and no dissent but the House of Assembly is dominated by a political party. The other smaller parties members in the House is likely to be co-opted, accommodated or assimilated into the dominant coalition such that there is broad agreements on virtually all issues on the agenda of legislative-executive interface. This pattern (YiXi) predicts that "where the executive (governor) comes from the party that has the majority in the House of Assembly (one-party dominance, i.e. non-plural) and thus controls the House, there will be alignment, cooperation and deference pattern of executive-legislature relations". This is because the executive (governor) is the leader of the party in the state. The executive possesses the carrot and stick weapon of controlling the affairs of the House of Assembly based on the fact that he controls the party i.e. executive has control over the legislators' career progression, party

nomination, party structure, resources (state and party resources) and other privileges. The legislators are aware of these and tend to be loyal to the policy and affairs of the executive (governor). Any defiance to the executive interference will attracts stick and sanction. In this case, there is always much loyalty to the executive and party rather than the legislator's constituent. The majority members of the state House of Assembly will prefer to dance to the tune of the executive and the party rater than their constituents. The legislators in this pattern tend to be loyal to the rule of party and the governor rather than the people (ordinary citizen). In fact, Nigeria ranked at the bottom of 20 countries in 2008 for the perceived responsiveness of local governments (Bratton, 2010). This accounted for the description of sub-national legislatures under this category as 'rubber stamp', 'decorative organ' or 'extension of Governor's office' (Aremu and Bakare, 2016).

In this situation, state legislators face both direct and indirect interference that weakens their incentives to challenge governors, or party- often at the expense of their constituents. As mentioned above, the executive possesses certain powers which demands total loyalty from the majority of party members in the House. First, the executive in this pattern (YiXi) through the ties to the central government and political parties controls an array of political patronage, including political appointments and access to contracts. Secondly, the executive exert tremendous control over candidate selection during primaries for the larger contest, thus, their carrier prospect depend on the governor and the party, giving them few incentives to question governor's spending decisions and other seems anti-people government policies. Thirdly, the executive dominate the process of proposing budgets, and thus, dominates spending in the state. This explains the cordial executive-legislative relations in the states represented by (YiXi) in the table 3 above (Abia, Lagos, Osun, Kano, Imo, Kwara Akwa Ibom, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Anambra, Delta, Ebonyi) in this political dispensation.

The executive (governor) enjoys the expediency and short debate of the House on the issues (budget, and oversights) of the executive that concerns the approval of the Assembly. For instance, Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly was alleged to have passed an executive bill into law within a week (Bassey, 2015). The bill in question provides constitution backing for former governors of the state to draw up to two hundred million naira from public fund as pension. The House was said to have been under pressure from Akpabio led executive who sent the bill, to pass it into law expressly (Bassey, 2015). Kwara state also had initiated bill for the past executive (governor) pension and remuneration titled "State Public Office Holder (Payment of Pension) Bill; 2010, KWHAB" of two term preference (Vanguard March 29th, 2010). It was said that the bill was introduced by member of the House to satisfy the state god-father (Dr Bukola Saraki) who was the only two term governor of the state. The gestation period of the bill was calculated as two weeks. The passed bill has been signed into law. In another circumstances, Abia State demonstrate similar pattern to asymmetry. The observers of the activities of the Assembly view the House as an extension of the government house with the way it failed to check the excesses of the executive arm (Pointblanknews.com, 2015). The House is not known to have turned down any executive bill since its inauguration

in June 8, 2011. The communications from the executive (governor) are always passed without delay as such are hardly scrutinized.

Nevertheless, it should be known that the interference of neutral variable, like god-father, might nullify this analysis. For instance, if the powerful (god-father posture) of the party is not on the same page with the executive (governor), they can use the machinery of majority of the party in the legislature to frustrate the policy of the executive and consequently, call for the governor exit (impeachment). Political scenario in Oyo, Plateau and Ekiti states in 2006 serves as a perfect example. Despite the majority and leadership control of the House of Assembly by the Peoples Democratic Party in Oyo, Plateau and Ekiti State in 2006 respectively, Governors Rasheed Adewolu Ladoja (Oyo), Joshua Chibi Dariye (Plateau) and Ayodele Fayose (Ekiti) from the same political party were impeached. This was said occurred because of the involvement of the powerful (god-father) within the party who were not pleased with the actions and inactions of the governor (Nigeria In-Depth, 2014). In another behavioural pattern, national government executive-legislative relations cannot be said will follow this pattern because there are several competing forces that could question the excesses of the presidency at the National Assembly. For instance, the National Assembly rejected PDP edicts by refusing to amend the constitution in 2006 to allow the president another term (third term), and by also going against the party wish by electing its preferred Speaker of the House of Representatives in 2011 (Hon. Aminu Tambuwal) instead of party's preferred (Hon. Mulikat Akande). The question is "does such a legislative assertiveness exist in the states, and if so, what enables it and what undermines it? That is one of the questions this paper intends to answer. Once a legislature at the state has majority in the House, there will be alignment and cooperation without the element of defiance except there is an interference of powerful. However, the results of this pattern will overwhelmingly been weak assemblies with limited public accountability, transparency and immorality in the state.

Model 2: Performance and Accommodation (YiiXi)

This model of relationship, *United Executive-Legislature Relations*, is one-party dominance co-existing with parties with smaller number of seats in the House. Unlike the Cohesive House, there are minor dissents from the smaller parties. But, the dominant party has overwhelming majority to override such dissent. The majority party in question has no intention to override such since its executive is not interested in the affairs of the Assembly. On this note, performance and accommodation is expected to ensue. Smaller parties are left with the choice of isolation or bargaining coalition with the dominant party, if they wish to do so. In a way, the House has the unity. The likely outcome of pattern of executive non-interference (Yii) in the affairs of non-plural House of Assembly (Xi) will be mutual respect and issue-base/objective relations without party sympathy. This pattern is hard to find in the present state of Africa, and most importantly Nigeria power struggle between the executive and legislature at the sub-national level. Meanwhile, the legislature of this kind is very conscious of the action (s) of the executive, because they will be more loyal to the party than the executive. Any action of the executive that are inimical to the sustenance of the party will

be thoroughly fought by the legislature. This will halt the existing relationship pattern of the executive and legislators. For instance, the impeachment of the former Governor Murtala Nyako of Adamawa state was orchestrated because of his defection to All Progressive Party (APC) lately in 2013. The executive (governor) enjoys the patronage of the legislature since 2011 until he defected to the opposition party. The House felt the threat and initiated the impeachment to pave the way for the sustainability of the ruling party (PDP) in the state. Meanwhile to secure the majority for this move, the Speaker used persuasion, threat and gratification to lure other opposition to join the ruling party members (Daniel, 2014).

Model 3: Conflict, Confrontation and Defiance (YiXii)

This is the House that has multiple power blocs that are palpably antagonistic. The party of the executive (governor) is not the only political party with majority seats in the Assembly. It is what we referred to as *Divided Executive-Legislative Relations*. This is the category where executive-legislative relations is most unstable and the threat of impeachment is rife, except the executive party in the Assembly find a way to romance one of the minorities for coalition to control majority. This pattern (YiXii) posits that "there will always be conflicts and confrontations pattern of executive-legislature relations when the executive (governor) interferes in the affairs of the House that is highly divided among the two (2) major strong political parties or more in the state. This is because the executive (governor) has no stick and carrot weapon of controlling privileges of the party. Members thrash about, in the midst of other critical issues, to ensure that the political parties they represent obtain a considerable level of control, with the view to entrenching party interests, which would eventually sustain individual objectives, different from that of the executive (governor). Meanwhile, the opposing legislators career progression is not depend on the executive. Thus, the executive-legislature relationship as well as co-existence within the House will be conflictual. This explains the rancour recorded in the Rivers and Edo states between the executive and legislators and also within the legislature brouhaha. In this pattern, for an executive (governor) to have his way, he must be ready to form alliance in order to control the House. However, minority party will be more powerful than the contending two (2) or Three (3) political parties in the House, as it has the power to swing to either left (most powerful opposition) or right (ruling executive party). This arrangement was observed in the Seventh Assembly of the Oyo State House of Assembly, where Accord Party (AP) became a pawn that eventually aligned with Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN now APC) to produce the leadership of the House in 2011. This pattern sent a signal of caution to the ruling political party in the House and the executive. However to a large extent, the outcome of this was a pragmatic assembly with high sense of public accountability, transparency and probity in the state.

Model 4: Maintenance (YiiXii)

This pattern exists where the House is broken into factions in which no party has large enough seats to override dissent from other parties, and the executive also has no intention in interfering and as well as working following the rules of engagement. This model is called

Fragmented Executive-Legislative Relations. Elite bargaining and coalition building is key to maintaining stability. While there are multiple power blocs in the House, the power blocs are not necessary antagonistic or confrontational. Executive-legislative relations, therefore, will oscillate between stability and instability depending on the issues at stake, timing and interests. The pattern explains the resulting action when the House is keenly divided and the executive (governor) party has the minority in the House, the executive exhibits non-interference, there will be maintenance of order and peaceful co-existence. Otherwise, the executive will pay dearly as the majority party members will strike for his exit from the office.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The illustrations and evidences in this paper open another dynamics to the intellectual community that focus on executive-legislative relations. There are so many factors responsible for the various behavioural instincts that permeated the relationships and interactions among the both arms of government in Nigeria, but this study shows that political party power structure serves as major parameter determining the extent of temperature that may ensure among the executive and legislature during discharging their constitutional transactions and activities. This is because the executive (governor) is the leader of the party in the state. The executive possesses the carrot and stick weapon of controlling the affairs of the House of Assembly based on the fact that he controls the party i.e. executive has control over the legislators' career progression, party nomination, party structure, resources (state and party resources) and other privileges. The legislators are aware of these and tend to be loyal to the policy and affairs of the executive (governor). Any defiance to the executive interference will attracts stick and sanction. In this case, there is always much loyalty to the executive and party rather than the legislator's constituent. The majority members of the state House of Assembly will prefer to dance to the tune of the executive and the party rater than their constituents. The legislators in this pattern tend to be loyal to the rule of party and the governor rather than the people (ordinary citizen). Though, this trend might preferable, but its implication may not be desirable for developmental purpose. This is because this arrangement will defeat the principle of representative democracy along the doctrine of separation of power. Excessive power will be resided with the executive at the expense of good governance.

Though, United Executive-Legislature Relations is one of the preferable model but like it was predicted in the model 1, it can easily transformed to autocratic style of governance, in which the legislature will become a rubberstamp of the executive. However, model 3 is more preferable to the tenet of representative democracy and good governance. Model 3 has multiple power blocs that are palpably antagonistic, but effective in scrutinizing the activities of the executive. It is believe that this role will put the executive on toll while discharging their duty effectively. Though this category is the most unstable but it will bring in accountability and transparency in the scheme of governance. The pattern of Model 4 is also healthy but caution should be made in the interaction mode between the two arms, though executive has no intention in interfering in the workings of the legislature. Elite

bargaining and coalition building is key to maintaining stability. While there are multiple power blocs in the House, the power blocs are not necessary antagonistic or confrontational. Executive-legislative relations, therefore, will oscillate between stability and instability depending on the issues at stake, timing and interests.

References

Andeweg R. B. and Nijzink, L. (n.d.). *Beyond the Two Body Image: Relations between Ministers and MPs*. Available on http://www.unipotsdam.de/db/vergleich/Publikationen/Parliaments/chapter05.pdf. Accessed on 18th March, 2015 8:25pm.

Andeweg, R. B. & Jacques T. (2003). *"Between Electorate and Executive: Parliament as a Linchpin"*. Paper Presented at the Workshop on Delegation in Contemporary Democracies, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, March 28 – April 2.

Andeweg, R. B. (1992). Executive-Legislative Relations in the Netherlands: Consecutive and Coexisting Patterns. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17(2): 161–182

Anyaegbunam, E. O. (2000) *Assembly Handbook: A Legislator's Companion*. Lagos: FEF.

Aremu, F. A. and Bakare, A. R. (2016). Weak Legislature and the Decay of Democracy in Kwara State, Nigeria. Paper presented at the National Conference on the Dynamics of Democratic Practice in Nigeria, 1999-2015, organized by Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano on November 9-10.

Barkan, J. D. (2009b). *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies*. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner.

Bassey, A. (2000). "Issues in Legislative Affairs: A Study of Cross River State House of Assembly". *Legislative Fellow Research Report*, Ibadan: The Institute of Social Science and Administration (TISSA), Vols. 1, 2, 3.

Bassey, A. O., Abia, P. P., Ekok, O. C., and Antigha, B. U. (2013). "An Examination of Causes and Consequences of Conflicts between Legislature and Executive in Cross River State, Nigeria". *Academic journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 2(1), 179-187, May

Bassey, D. (2015). "Akwa Ibom Assembly remains illegal, NBA insists as AKHA sits, sacks another member". *The Propeller*. Available on http://propellerng.com/akwa-ibom-assembly-remains-illegal-nba-insists-as-akha-sits-sacks-another-member/. Retrieved on 26th March, 2015.

Bernick, E. M. & Bernick, L. E. (2008) "Executive-Legislative Relations: Where You Sit Really Does Matter". Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 89. No. 4.

Boyko, N. & Herron, E. S. (2009) "Inter-Branch Relations and the Use of Deputy Requests in Ukraine, 2002-2006". Paper Prepared for Presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference, September.

Bratton, M. (2010). "Citizens Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness in Sub-Sahara Africa". *Afrobarometer*

Central Bank of Nigeria (2003). "Legislative–Executive Relations and the Budgetary Process in Nigeria: An Evaluation of the 1999 Constitution". *Occasional Paper* No. 28, CBN, Abuja

Daniel, S. (2014). "Nyako's Impeachment: N250m donation splits Adamawa House of Assembly". *Vanguarg*. Available on http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/gov-nyakos-impeachment-move-n250m-donation-splits-adamawa-house-ssembly/#sthash.R2MwVnxo.dpuf. Retrieved on March 26th, 2015.

Ellis, S. and Ter Haar, G. (2007). "Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies

Seriously". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45(3): 385–401.

Federal Government of Nigeria (1999). *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.* Abuja: Government Press

Fish, M. S. (2006). "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies". *Journal of Democracy,* 17(1).

Giddado, M. M. (2012). "Constitutional Role of the Legislature: Viewed from a Nigerian Prism". *A Paper presented at the Retreat for Legislative Aides of Principal Officers of the National Assembly* organized by the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS), National Assembly, Abuja at Rockview Hotel (Royale), Abuja on 20th – 21st May, 2012.

Independent National Electoral Commission, (2011). *Report on the 2011 General Elections.* Available on http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/REPORT-ON-THE-2011-GENERAL-ELECTIONS.pdf. Accessed on March 27th, 2015.

King, A. (1976). Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1: 11-36

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy.* London: Yale University Press.

Momodu, A. J. and Matudi, G.I. (2013). The Implications of Executive-Legislative Conflicts on Good Governance in Nigeria. *Public Policy and Administration Research,* 3(8).

Muller, W. C. (1993). Changing Executive-Legislative Relations in Austria (1945-1992). *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18(4): 467-494.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2000). *Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations.* Available on https://www.ndi.org/files/980_gov_legcapacity_0.pdf. Retrieved on December 17th, 2015. 10:50am Nigeria Time

Nigeria In-Depth, (2014). *DATELINE 2006: Fayose's Impeachment : 4 Chief Judges Fired for Unconstitutionality.* Available on http://nigeriaindepth.com/2014/10/dateline-2006-fayoses-impeachment-4-chief-judges-fired-for-unconstitutionality/. Accessed 19th March, 2014 at 10:27am Nigeria time.

Nolte, I., Danjibo, N. and Oladeji, A. (2009). *Religion, Politics and Governance in Nigeria.* Religions and Development Research Programme, Working Paper 39. International Development Department, University of Birmingham. Available on http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/1644/1/Nolte.pdf. Accessed on 19th March, 2015.

Odock, C.N. (2012). "The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: A Focus on Legislative-Executive Relations from Deference to Defiance?". *Nigerian Journal of Legislative Studies* (NJLA), 4 (2): 62-103.

Ogbonnaya, U.M., Ogujiuba, K. and Omoju, E.O. (2013). "A Review of the Role of the Executive and the Legislature in Fiscal Policy Management in Nigeria". *Nigerian Journal of Legislative Affairs* (NJLA), 5(1): 58-81

Ojo, T. I. (1997). *The Nigerian Legislature: A Historical Survey* (Vol. 1). Lagos: ASCON

Oko O. (2012). The Challenges for Legislators in Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of Legislative Affairs* 4(2): 1-27.

Onapajo, H. (2012). Politics for God: Religion, Politics and Conflict in Democratic Nigeria. *The Journal of Pan African Studies,* 4(9).

Onyebuchi, R. U. (2013). Executive, Legislative Relation in Parliamentary and Presidential

Government. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, 1(3), 14-19, September

Pennings, P. (2003). Beyond Dichotomous Explanations: Explaining Constitutional Control of the Executive with Fuzzy-Sets". *European Journal of Political Research*, 42: 541-567.

Point Blank News (2015). Abia Assembly on the scale. Available on http://www.pointblanknews.com/Special_Reports/special_report_5.html. Accessed on March 26th, 2015.

Saalfeld, T. (1990). The West German Bundestag after 40years: The Role of Parliament in a Party Democracy. *West European Politics*, 13(3): 68-69.

Salih, M. A. M. (2006). *African Parliament: Between Governance and Government*. Cape Town: HSRC Press

Saliu, H. & Muhammad, A. (2010) Exploring the Parliament. *Nigeria Journal of Legislative Affairs*, 3(1&2): 73–89.

Stapenhurst, R. (2013). Parliament and the Budget: Formulation, Implementation and Monitoring. *Nigerian Journal of Legislative Affairs*, 4(2).

Thisday Newspaper (2014). Nasarawa Impeachment Saga: Dep Gov, 21 Lawmakers Relocate to Abuja. Available on http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nasarawa-impeachment-saga-dep-gov-21-lawmakers-relocate-to-abuja/184132/. Accessed on March 27th, 2015.

Vanguard Newspaper (2010). Mixed Reactions over Pension for Ex-Govs in Kwara. Available on http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/03/mixed-reactions-over-pension-for-ex-govs-in-kwara/. Accessed on March 27th, 2015.

Authors Biographies

Fatai Ayinde Aremu PhD is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Ilorin. Former Head of the Department of Political Science and a scholar of international repute, Dr. Aremu served in the executive committee of Nigerian Political Science Association. He is widely published and acknowledged in the field of international relation.

Adebola Rafiu Bakare is of the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria.

Kolapo Quadri Abayomi is of the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Appendix I

Table 2: Showing Number of Seats won by both Ruling and Opposition Parties

S/N	States	Number of Seats Won by the Ruling Party	Number of Seats Won by Opposition Party(ies)	Total
1.	Abia	24 (PDP)	NIL	24
2.	Adamawa	20 (PDP)	5 (ACN & CPC)	25
3.	Akwa Ibom	25 (PDP)	1 (ACN)	26
4.	Anambra	16 (APGA)	14(LP, ACCORD, PDP & ACN)	30
5.	Bauchi	24 (PDP)	5 (CPC)	29
6.	Bayelsa	21(PDP)	3 (KP, LP & PPAP)	24
7.	Benue	21(PDP)	9 (ACN)	30
8.	Borno	22 (ANPP)	6 (PDP)	28
9.	Cross River	29 (PDP)	1 (ACN)	30
10.	Delta	18 (PDP)	11(DPP,UDP,ACN & ACCORD)	29
11.	Ebonyi	22 (PDP)	2 (ANPP)	26
12.	Edo	19 (ACN)	5 (PDP)	19
13.	Ekiti	26 (ACN)	2 (PDP)	28
14.	Enugu	24 (PDP)	NIL	24
15.	Gombe	20 (PDP)	4 (CPC)	24
16.	Imo	15(APGA)	12 (PDP)	27
17.	Jigawa	29 (PDP)	1 (ANPP)	30

18.	Kaduna	21 (PDP)	13 (CPC)	34
19.	Kano (PDP)	30 (PDP)	10 (ANPP)	40
20.	Katsina	30 (PDP)	4 (CPC)	34
21.	Kebbi	22 (PDP)	2 (CPC)	24
22.	Kogi	21 (PDP)	4 (ANPP & CPC)	25
23.	Kwara	22 (PDP)	2 (ACN)	24
24.	Lagos	40 (ACN)	NIL	40
25.	Nasarawa	4 (CPC)	20 (PDP)	24
26.	Niger	24 (PDP)	3 (CPC)	27
27.	Ogun	18 (ACN)	8 (PPN & PDP)	26
28.	Ondo	25 (LP)	1 (PDP)	26
29.	Osun	26 (ACN)	NIL	26
30.	Oyo	13 (ACN)	14 (ACCORD & PDP)	27
31.	Plateau	19 (PDP)	5 (LP & ACN)	24
32.	Rivers	32 (PDP)	NIL	32
33.	Sokoto	30 (PDP)	NIL	30
34.	Taraba	20 (PDP)	4 (CPC & ACN)	24
35.	Yobe	24 (ANPP)	NIL	24
36.	Zamfara	13 (ANPP)	11 (PDP)	24

Sources: INEC General Elections Report, 2011and African Elections Database http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng_2011assembly

Appendix II

Table 3: Nigeria States with Peculiar Patterns of Executive-Legislature Relations

		EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE (Y)	
COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATURE (X)		Executive Interference (Yi)	Executive non interference (Yii)
	One Party Dominance (Xi)	**Outcome:** Cohesive Relations (Alignment, and cooperation 'YiXi'). **States:** Abia (PDP), Adamawa (PDP), Akwa Ibom (PDP), Bauchi PDP), Bayelsa, Benue (PDP), Borno (ANPP), Cross River (PDP), Anambra (APGA), Delta (PDP), Ebonyi (PDP), Edo (ACN now APC), Ekiti (ACN/APC now PDP), Enugu (PDP), Gombe (PDP), Imo (APGA now APC), Jigawa (PDP), Kaduna (PDP), Lagos (ACN n ow APC), Katsina (PDP), Kano (PDP), Kebbi (PDP), Kogi (PDP), Kwara (PDP, now APC), Niger (PDP), Ogun (ACN now APC), Ondo (LP), Osun (ACN now APC), Plateau (PDP),	**Outcome:** United Relations (Performance and accommodation 'YiiXi') **States:** Nasarawa (Governor is from Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) while the House is composed of PDP. Meanwhile, the moment the PDP members in the House sees the governor (executive) as a threat after the progressive merger that formed APC in 2014, they ignited impeachment move. Thus, conflictual relations.

	Divided/Plural (Xii)	**Outcome:** Divided Relations (Conflict, confrontation and defiance 'YiXii'). **States:** Oyo (Oyo state political elites understand this puzzle and form alliance with Accord party to secure the majority in the House, yet it faces some challenges of bargaining)	**Outcome:** Fragmented Relations (Maintenance "YiiXii). **State: NIL**

Source: Authors' Compilation from the various official Documents