


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AL QAEDA AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The world today is inundated with the emergence and prevalence of many terrorisms and terrorists' activities each precipitated on and pursuing different and sometimes conflicting agenda. The argument which this paper wants to project is that for a scholarly understanding of terrorism, there is need to differentiate between politically motivated terrorism and its counterpart, the religious motivated terrorism. In this regard, while the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) may be credited with the internationalization of politically motivated terrorism, at least the ethno-national political dimension of it, the Al Qaeda could be credited with internationalizing the religious dimension. Of course, this is not to argue that there have not been instances of religious terrorism before the emergence of Al Qaeda but that religious terrorism now has a reference point in Al Qaeda. The Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria has shown that the Al Qaeda ideology has not only spread to other parts but have had sufficient salience and appeal as to become a model for other budding religious terrorist cells. The paper is essentially a theoretical one.

Keywords: Al Qaeda, Internationalisation of Religious Terrorism, Boko Haram, PLO.

Introduction

Going by the present level of escalation and trend, terrorism will remain a major policy issue for the 21st century. Interestingly, the escalation in incidents and the trend all point to the fact that no part of the world is any safer than the other part. Terrorism is fast becoming the trademark and tradecraft of all insurgents who have any perceived grievances against any government. While this is true, however, where opinion differs is what future perpetrators of terrorism will look like and what methods they will use in prosecuting their grievances in the future (Laqueur, 2008). For instance, the methods use by political terrorists are different from those by

religious terrorists mainly because the political terrorist is not interested in the 'scorched earth' or what Imobighe (1987) has called "graveyard technique," in which nothing is sacred and all weapons are sacrosanct and could be used. In other words, the political terrorist leaves room for negotiation whereas the religious terrorist believes in an apocalypse total war of eradication in order to hasten the return of a god which will bring bliss to the faithful and reward the unfaithful. Thus, while political terrorists may not deviate from the use of their traditional weapons and methods of terrorism such as bombing, kidnapping and hostage taking, others such as weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass disruptions such as biological and chemical weapons or even nuclear or radiological weapons may become weapons of choice for religious terrorism and may dominate the future attempts of these people. However, a more worrisome phenomena and which this paper is concerned about is that there are certain emerging trends that seem to characterize international terrorism. This trend has generated some fears and it is necessary that scholars begin to address it now. The continuing rise of Islamic extremists and the few successes, especially in the wake of 9/11, they have recorded have led to the fear of a new generation of violent, anti-state and western ideals terrorists. The rejuvenation and spread of religious terrorism to other parts of the world including Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria and very recent, Mali, point to three major facts among many. First is that religious terrorism has become internationalized, it is no longer localized to a particular part of the globe or region, second is that the tactics employed by future terrorists will become more complex, and finally, is that more casualties will be involved in acts of religious terrorism especially with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The advent of what is now considered as modern international terrorism occurred on July 22, 1968 as an ethno-nationalist terrorism albeit with a religious undertone. As Hoffman (2006:63) had pointed out, the event that precipitated it was the hijacking of an Israeli El Al commercial flight en route Rome from Tel Aviv by three armed Palestinian terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), one of the six groups that constituted the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). This particular incident was significant mainly because it provided an avenue for making a bold political statement which was the trading of the passengers for some PLO terrorists imprisoned in Israel. Second was that the plane was specifically and deliberately targeted because of its national symbolic value, thirdly the terrorists hoped that by so doing, they could force their avowed enemy, the state of Israel, to enter into negotiations with them despite the Israelis declaration and policy pronouncements to the contrary. It was hoped that this would afford them the recognition they so wanted. Finally was that through this symbolic targeting, the terrorists discovered that they had the power to create a major media event especially when innocent civilians were involved.

Thus, with the El Al hijacking, the nature and character of terrorism demonstrably changed. Terrorists now discovered the possibility of travelling from one country to another to carry out attacks, thereby internationalizing their grievances and struggles. They also discovered that targeting innocent civilians and citizens of

other countries has the desirous effect of attracting attention and publicity "than 20 years of pleading at the United Nations" as Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO's chief observer at the United Nations had stated in an interview in 1976 (Schmid and Graaf, 1982:32). As Hoffman (2006:64) had noted, "the success achieved by the PLO in publicising the Palestinians plight through the 'internationalisation' of its struggle with Israel has since served as model for similarly aggrieved ethnic and national minority groups everywhere, demonstrating how longstanding but hitherto ignored or forgotten causes can be resurrected and dramatically thrust onto the world's agenda through a series of well-orchestrated, attention-grabbing acts." This fact was confirmed with the statement credited to George Habash, the leader and founder of PFLP, that "for decades world opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now" (Hirst, 1977:304).

The argument and trajectory which this paper has chosen for itself and intend to pursue is that while the PLO may be credited with the internationalization of political terrorism, at least the ethno-national political dimension of it, the Al Qaeda should be credited with internationalizing the religious dimension. Of course, this is not to argue that there have not been instances of religious terrorism before the emergence of Al Qaeda but that religious terrorism now has a reference point in Al Qaeda. To put forward this argument using the Boko Haram as our example, this paper is divided into six sections. The introductory section is followed by the second section that sought to contextualize and explain the concept of terrorism. The third section shows how political terrorism differs in certain respects and aspects from religious terrorism, while the fourth section focuses on the emergence of Al Qaeda, its philosophy and background which seems to be shrouded in much secrecy. This section further investigates the internationalization and the attraction which the Al Qaeda's ideology has, and before concluding, we interrogate the Boko Haram phenomenon with a view to highlighting the similarity in their *modus operandi*.

The paper is basically a theoretical analytical exposition which is anchored on and driven by two theoretical groundings – Social Movement and Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC). Tarrow (1999:2) has defined the term "social movement" as "those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents". As Tarrow (1999:3) has argued, collective action can take many forms, from brief to sustained struggle or revolt, from institutionalized to disruptive and from humdrum to dramatic, it however become contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to official means of airing their grievances, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge the state's authority or elites. Contentious collective action therefore forms the basis of social movements basically because it is the only means by which the oppressed can draw an unresponsive state's elites' attention to their plight, or better articulate their grievances and confront the better-equipped opponents or the state. Contentious collective action brings ordinary

people together under the same umbrella, for the same purpose and to confront opponents, elites or authorities.

The greatest weapon available for all social movements with collective contentious behaviour is disruption. Social movements employ the power of disruption basically because this draws attention more quickly to them; enable the social movement to spread uncertainty while giving them the necessary leverage they need against powerful opponents such as the state. Thus, the power of disruption becomes the strongest weapon of contentious social movements. However, as Tarrow (1999:98) has noted, the sustenance of disruption depends on a "high level of commitment, on keeping authorities off balance, and on resisting the attraction of both violence and conventionalization." When faced with high level of disruptive activities by social movements, the state coercive apparatus; the police and the military are brought in to subdue the social movement. Violence therefore becomes the most visible and the ultimate weapon of collective contentious action.

Protracted Social Conflict (PSC), according to Edward Azar (1991:93), results from "the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation." PSC deals with relationship between intra-state actors such as communities, tribes and ethnics. The traditional preoccupation with inter-states relations is seen as obscuring the more realistic domestic relations among ethnic groups. Thus, the distinction between domestic and international politics is rejected as being rather "artificial" because "there is really only one social environment and its domestic face is the more compelling" (Azar & Burton, 1986:33). Thus, the role of the state in the domestic relationship among intra-state ethnic actors is to satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs and by so doing prevent or promote conflict (Azar, 1990:10-12).

The Many Faces of Terrorism

Going by Laqueur's (2003) submission that there are "many terrorisms", then, the answer to the simple question "What is terrorism?" may not be that simple as there may be many answers and ways to answer it. For instance, it could be answered by attempting a historical excursion of how the term has emerged and evolved until now (Hoffman, 2006:3-20). It could also be answered through an excursion of the different definitions of the term by both scholars and government functionaries and bodies or through an investigation of how specific regions or parts of the globe perceive it. In this regard, the American definition will differ from the British or German or even Israelis conceptions of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006:21-41, Rapoport, 1992:1061). It could be answered by attempting to identify crucial components of terrorism which distinguish it from other forms of insurgencies such as guerrilla warfare, conventional wars, riots and so on (Combs, 2003:11-15; Merari, 2007:12-51). It could also be answered by attempting to delineate between the many types (White, 2002:10-17). All these dimensions to a 'simple' word merely add to the confusion inherent in understanding and conceptualizing it. However, as Sinai

(2013:2) has opened the most fundamental starting point in any terrorism study is how to define it.

Issues abound about what should be an acceptable definition of terrorism. The first set of issues is that for any definition to be acceptable, it must differentiate between attacks against civilian non-combatants and armed military. In this case, the definition must also include armed military targets and noncombatant targets, the term 'non-combatant' meaning civilians and military personnel who are unarmed or not on duty. Emphasizing on this differentiation, Ganor (2005:20) has argued that the deliberate targeting of civilians in order to achieve political objectives is what distinguishes a terrorist act from guerrilla warfare where military units are targeted. The second issue is that an acceptable definition of terrorism must include the mass destruction component of terrorism, as demonstrated by the attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, 3/11 in Madrid, and the recent but various ones in Paris, Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria. The third issue is that in defining terrorism, it is also important to state who is a terrorist. However, on the other hand, to be sufficient for any definition of terrorism is the fact that the definition does not necessarily need to include the magnitude of the violence and the number of casualties involved in the attack, hence, cases of a 'few' casualty or a single casualty in the case of assassinations, may also qualify as long as the perpetrator has political (or religious) motivation for his action. Second is the fact that to qualify as a terrorist attack, there need not be any foreign links. As Burton (2013:6) has argued, terrorism does not belong to any ideology or group. It is a tactic, one that can be used by anyone to pursue any political goal. Finally, in order to qualify as terrorism, an attack does not have to be part of a larger conspiracy; it can be carried out by a single (lone wolf) individual and only as long as the attack is based on a political ideology shared by a larger group. The case of Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab is a point of note.

Scholars are, however, agreed that the origin of the word 'terrorism' can be traced to the period of the French Revolution (1793-94) at which point it acquired a positive connotation because it was associated with the ideals of virtue and democracy. With the hijacking of the revolution by extremists, the term 'terrorism' became synonymous with the abuse of office and power with overt 'criminal' implications (Laqueur, 1987:11). Since then the semantic pendulum of the term has swung from one end to another. For instance, until the 1930s, terrorism was used to refer to violence directed against governments and their leaders which changed, after the 1930s, to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. With the end of the Second World War, terrorism regained the revolutionary flavor it earlier enjoyed before the 1930s when it became linked to agitations and violent revolts against imperialist states' domination of states in the Third World. Thus, 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' became synonymous with revolutionaries and the violence committed was considered justified "wars of liberation" (Gearty, 1997:11-13). At this point, the distinction made by Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974 between a revolutionary and a terrorist becomes pertinent. He declared that "the difference between the

revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist" (Laqueur, 1976:510).

All through the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism continued to be viewed within the context of the revolutionary but now expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside of colonial and neocolonial framework as well as radical ideologically motivated organizations such as the PLO and the Basque ETA. The advent of the Cold War further broaden the concept of terrorism to include massive clandestine plots by both sides to destroy each other and renegade foreign governments such as the regimes in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya various sponsoring of terrorist acts. Thus, the term 'terrorism' became expanded and associated with covert warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger and stronger ones without the direct risk of retribution (Jenkins, 1983, 1985). By the early 1990s, the meaning of terrorism became more complex with the addition of narco-terrorism, a term which was defined as the "use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations" and used by nations identified as the "Marxist-Leninist regimes" of the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Nicaragua (Ehrenfeld, 1990:ix, xiii). Within this same period emerged what later came to be called as the 'gray area phenomenon', a term used to refer to "threats to the stability of nations by non-state actors and nongovernmental processes and organizations" (Manwaring, 1993, xiii), a term used to describe violence in areas where control shifted from legitimate governments to new half-political, half-criminal powers (Raufer, 1992:1). By this, the meaning of terrorism has shifted from an individual phenomenon of sub-national violence to include non-state conflicts.

However, it was not until after the 9/11 incident that terrorism was redefined from its narrow perspective as implying only political acts to include acts perpetrated by religious groups. This marked the advent of modern, globalised and international religious terrorism. Most modern definitions by scholars and government bodies of terrorism take their cue from this period. For instance, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives". The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that terrorism is "any activity that involves an act that; is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and ... must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping." The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives." Not surprisingly, the definitions betray the priorities and interests of the different governmental bodies. For instance, given the specific mandate of the FBI, it is not

surprising that its definition address the psychological aspect of terrorism, stressing on the intimidatory and coercive aspect of terrorism. The Department of Defense definition seems to be the more complete than the others because it focuses on threat as much as the actual act of violence and the targeting of the whole society as well as the government even though the definition did not distinguish between attacks on military combatant and non-combatant civilians.

Scholarly definitions are a little more instructive and tend to converge towards some commonality. For instance, scholars are agreed that in any understanding of terrorism, three components are essential. First is that it involves the use of or threat of violence, thereby emphasising physical violence as a defining feature. Second is that the violence must be carried out in furtherance of some broader political or social objective. Third is that it does not matter who the victims are basically because "terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victims or objects of the terrorist attack" (Hoffman 2006). In the same vein, academic definitions of terrorism seem to converge around three factors; the perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and the target(s) of the violence (Badey, 2007:1). The perpetrators are seen as fanatics, disaffected groups or minorities who employed terrorism as a tool to oppose the rule and the oppression of an established and militarily superior power (Nicholson, 2003). The victims are seen as innocent people who have no part or are directly involved in the struggle and the struggle or target is political. In military parlance, such victims are referred to as 'collateral damage'. Thus, Howe (1976:14) will be correct to state that;

To qualify as a victim of a terrorist today, we need not be tyrants or their sympathisers; we need not be connected in any way with the evils the terrorist perceives; we need not belong to any particular group. *We need only to be in the wrong place at the wrong time* (emphasis ours).

The targets of terrorist attacks are random, and it is this randomness that creates fear. Combs (2003:10), reflecting the consensus on these three points, define terrorism as "involving an act of violence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims and political goals or motives." Jenkins (1980:2) has argued that terrorism should be defined "by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause." Shimko, (2008:319) has defined terrorism as "the indiscriminate use or threat of violence to advance social, political, economic, or religious objectives by creating a climate of fear." Nicholson (2003) had defined terrorism as "the deliberate killing of non-military personnel in order to pursue a claimed political goal through exertion of pressure on a society". Hoffman (2006) has also included "political change" as the desired end result of terrorist acts in his definition. Rourke (2008:316) has defined terrorism by attempting to highlight the features common to it thus; "terrorism is (1) violence; (2) carried out by individuals, non-governmental organisations, or covert government agents or units; that (3) specifically target civilians; (4) uses clandestine attack methods, such as car

bombs and hijacked airliners, and (5) attempts to influence politics." Kegley and Wittkopf (1999:189) have defined it as "criminal acts and threats against a targeted actor for the purpose of arousing fear in order to get the target to accept the terrorists' demands." Combs (2003, 8-13) has suggested a number of definitions. In particular, she summarises terrorism as "a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatisation of the most proscribed kind of violence – that which is perpetrated on innocent victims – played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes". Deriving from all the definitions both official and academic above, it is clear that terrorism involves specific acts of violence, an audience, the creation of a specific mood; that of fear, the presence of innocent victims and political motives and goals.

Delineating Between Political and Religious Terrorism

A major point that this paper is pushing for is to delineate for both practical and scholarly purposes between political and religious terrorism. However, although both by virtue of their activities qualified as terrorist groups, there are certain fundamental differences which separate or characterise a religious terrorist group from its political counterpart. Although both employ the use of violence but they differ in certain specific respects that make it important for a better understanding of their differences. As Kittrie (1981:300) had noted, for a terrorist action to qualify as being politically motivated, it must "challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties." On the other hand, religious motivated terrorism (Boko Haram) differs from political terrorism primarily on the basis that; first, while political terrorism attempts to find a resolution within the life times of the perpetrators, religious terrorism outlives their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and the time limit of their struggle is eternity. Second, targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military, political or economic values but rather they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness both by its brutality and suddenness.

Third, the constant recourse to a 'god' to justify their action has the power of 'satanising' the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism 'godly'. As Juergensmeyer (2004: 34-38) had noted, this is a kind of "perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators' views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war". The effect of this, as he had also noted, is "not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battles". Fourth is that the targets of religious terrorism and violence also have the tendency to assume and acquire a similar religious mien, explanation and perspective. For instance following the 9/11 attacks, the song, "God bless America" carried a new religious implication and signifying a counter 'religious' phase and perspective to the anti-terrorism posture of America. As a matter of fact, the then US President, George Bush further whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the 'religious image' of America's "righteous cause" as combating and bringing to an end the "absolute evil" of its enemies.

Fifth is that the 'divine' nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between 'good' and 'bad', 'truth' and 'evil', the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful resolution in this lifetime. Sixth is the spiritual dimension of the war which makes it to go beyond the confines of human law and ideal of morality. Society's law are subordinated and in extreme cases are deemed non-existence or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. The belief and perception here is that society's laws and limitations are of no relevance when one is obeying a higher 'divine' authority. Seventh and finally, the end result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness on the part of the perpetrators who often times are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life.

The Al Qaeda Phenomenon and the Internationalisation of its Ideology

A number of theories have been advanced as to the origin of the Al Qaeda movement and the name. The name 'Al Qaeda' (the Base) had become the focus of media attention since the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and has achieved a near mythical status by the fact that prior to the 9/11 incident, Osama bin Laden had never uttered the name. However, the origin of the name had been attributed to Abdallah Azzam who coined the term *al-qaeda al-sulbah* (the solid base) in 1988, in his bid to refocus his ambition of the re-conquest of the Muslim world (Migaux, 2007:314). The killing of Azzam in Peshawar in 1989 created a leadership vacuum which brought Osama bin Laden into the limelight as one who would later give an impetus of a different sort to Al Qaeda and a new direction to the jihadist strategy (Migaux 2007:314). Bin Laden's main grouse and which he was able to sell to other movements subsequently was his opposition to the presence of Christian troops on Saudi soil which was necessitated by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi army in 1991 and which left the Saudi regime vulnerable to the invading Iraqi army. To prevent the possibility of a Saudi invasion, more than half a million international coalition soldiers, mainly Americans, were stationed in Saudi territory (Migaux 2007:315). Two of Islam's three holiest sites are situated in Saudi – Mecca and Medina, the third being Jerusalem occupied by Israel since 1967. This development was unbearable for bin Laden who viewed it as a humiliation for all Moslems; the land of the prophet defiled by infidels. For bin Laden and other Muslim nationalists like him, the mere presence of Americans presented a two-fold act of aggression: the occupation of Saudi Arabia by infidel soldiers was seen as evidence of America's desire to plunder the country's wealth under the pretext of protecting it. America having thus humiliated all Muslims became their principal enemy and was also deemed responsible for the present state of apostasy of Saudi's authorities. This formed the thrust of bin Laden's ideological stand and which was translated into a religious ideology by Al Qaeda.

Rather than remain in Saudi, bin Laden, like the Prophet, chose exile and sought refuge in Khartoum, in Sudan. There, the dissemination of Al Qaeda's ideology among other radicalized segments of the Middle East population was

effective with bin Laden's denunciation of the occupation of the holy land by infidels receiving tacit support and approval by some religious groups. The handing over in 1994 by the Sudanese government of the Venezuelan terrorist; Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (a.k.a. Carlos the Jackal) made bin Laden to know that he was no longer safe in Sudan and fled to the mountains of Afghanistan (Migaux 2007:315). It was from there that he issued his first fatwa on August 26, 1989 for the American forces to leave Saudi Arabia. With his appointment as Al Qaeda's emir or commander by the Majlis al-Shura consisting of three Egyptians who were his personal friends; Muhammad Aref, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abdel Rahman Rajab, bin Laden declared a jihad against United States in 1998 by issuing a second fatwa, calling on all Muslims to "kill Americans, military and civilian and plunder their money" (Migaux 2007:315). This fatwa led to the creation of many sub-networks and extremist movements in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kuwait and even in far remote areas such as Nigeria, Sudan and other countries. In Nigeria, for instance, the Taliban (students of religion) connection in many of the religious terrorists' attacks has not been denied. Since 1993, Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for many of the attacks against American interests and citizens although such attacks bore the imprints of its Egyptian, Saudi, Somalia and even Pakistani accomplices.

As a person, bin Laden showed no evidence of personal ambition and this, backed by his experience and personal charisma, his numerous ties with radical Saudi ulamas, and his wealth, all earned him the needed respect to control such an organization that has no discernible structure but to which mujahideen movements all over the Muslim states held allegiance. His message was purely Salafist, calling for support for all oppressed Muslims, including Asian and Chechen Islamists and the Palestinian people. This call not only internationalized the Al Qaeda's ideology, but also united all struggling or aspiring jihadist into one single unified body of jihadists. These various sub-networks were able to draw inspirations from Al Qaeda's activities, and by so doing justified their own local actions as belonging to a worldwide body of insurrections against infidels. Al Qaeda's goal is to spread terror using limited means. Its targets are chosen to give it the advantage of surprise over its opponent. Al Qaeda and its accomplices are engaging in psychological warfare. Its goal in terrifying the infidel world with threats made in the name of Islam is to force the Muslim world into a clash of civilizations.

The classical work edited by Chaim Waxman (1968) announced, as the title indicated, the end of the ideology debate. This neo-liberal stand was further confirmed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the publication of Fukuyama's (1992) seminar work, *The End of History*. The contention is that ideology has little or no significant relevance to the societies anymore especially in the wake of the present stream of globalization. Nothing could be more misleading than this. States intervention in the economies of businesses based on neo-liberal economic ideology shows the futility of a non-ideology society debate. The reality of political violence based on ideological differences among states, citizens against states, states against citizens and citizens against citizens belie the stand that there is an end to ideological debate. To execute the various struggles and conflicts, the political insurgents have a

choice among various types of methods of insurgency such as or a combination of forms generally known as irregular or unconventional wars such as revolution, coup d'état, guerrilla war, terrorism, strikes, riots and "intifada"; a term that has gained recent publicity in reference to the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-controlled territories. The PLO has internationalized guerrilla wars and terrorism as the most prefer among the arsenals available to the ethno-nationalist insurgents.

Although virtually all religions of the world has been linked to violence at one time or the other in their history, of all of them, the link between terrorism and Islam has made it mandatory to interrogate the connection between Islam and terrorism. As Lewis (2003:3) has observed, "it is difficult to generalise about Islam" primarily because "in one sense it denotes a religion, a system of belief and worship; in the other, the civilisation that grew up and flourished under the aegis of that religion". Thus, the term 'Islam' denotes more than fourteen centuries of history, a billion and a third people, and a religious and cultural tradition of enormous diversity. Islam actually became prominent and represented the leading civilisation in the world during the interlude between the decline of the ancient civilisation of Greece and Rome and the rise of modern western civilisation of Europe. Historically, the rise of European civilisation eclipsed the prominence of Islam hence the tendency among Muslim to see western civilisation and all of its trappings as evil and America as its bastion. This tendency had always been reflected in many of the pronouncements made by Osama bin Ladin, especially in his videotape of October 7, 2001 where he alluded to the "humiliation and disgrace" that Islam has suffered for "more than eighty years." Like every nation or religion, the Muslim peoples are aware of their history, they are shaped by it and their awareness dates back to the advent of Islam. However, going by White's (2000:7) submission, religious violence centers around three sources; (1) the feeling, expressed as a religious obligation, by some religious group to purify the world for a new epoch. White has called this "religious eschatology," (2) the feeling that a religious group has been specifically chosen and so may destroy others in the cause of righteousness. This type of feeling leads to zero-tolerance of others who are not of the same religious belief and (3) some people may become so consumed with a particular cause that they create surrogate religious belief to advance it. These three seem to make up the ideological stance and belief systems of Al Qaeda.

In pursuit of these beliefs, Muslim fundamentalists have adopted the method of terrorism as a predominant way of expressing grievances more than any other religious tradition in the past decade. However, not all acts of political violence perpetrated by members of a particular religious group qualified to be labeled religious violence. This is because issues of race and ethnic differences can lead to violent acts that can, and most often are, coloured by religious differences as is the case in Nigeria. This, therefore, makes the relationship between religion and political violence a complex issue. The basic reality of the past and present decade have actually shown that religious terrorists have employed violence as a means of achieving political, economic and social objectives. In this respect, religion is seen and used as a means rather than an end in itself thereby making religion ideological.

As an ideology, religion and religious beliefs have displaced other ideologies as a rallying call for collective actions. Where other ideologies have failed, religion seems to have succeeded. As an ideology, religion therefore justifies polarisation based on its system of beliefs. As an ideology, religion therefore serves similar functions as political ideologies and these are (1) polarise and mobilise populations toward common objectives; (2) create a sense of security and belongingness by providing a system of norms and values to which all members could identify, and (3) provide the basis for the justification and rationalisation of human or members' behaviour. While there is nothing intrinsically violent in ideologies, they, however, provide the basis for differentiation and polarity among populations and organising political dissents which inevitably could lead to violence against those perceived as non-members. Thus, while religion may not be the sole cause of political violence, it provides an effective basis for organising political dissents and polarising the population. In this respect, religious violence seems to be directed against the secular state and its government.

Scholarly definitions of ideology seem to correspond to the way religious beliefs and tenets are now used to mobilize people for and against particular causes and justify actions in furtherance of those causes. Aron (1968:27-47) has defined ideology as a "pseudo-systematic formulation of a total vision of the historical world," while Bell (1968:96) sees it as the "conversion of ideas to social levers ... It is the commitment to the consequence of ideas ... What gives ideology its force is its passion ... For the ideologue, truth arises in action, and meaning is given to experience by the transforming moment." LaPalombara's (1968:320) definition seems to capture the very essence of ideology as linked with religion when he defined it as tending "to specify a set of values that are more or less coherent and that seek to link given patterns of action to the achievements or maintenance of a future, or existing, state of affairs." Parsons (1951:349) further explained that;

An ideology is a system of beliefs, held in common by the members of a collectivity, that is, a society, or a sub-collectivity of one – including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society – a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented and their relations to the future course of events.

While secular politics and religious piety are separated in other nations, in the Muslim nations, there is no such separation. Both religious truth and political power were indissolubly associated; the first sanctified the second, the second sustained the first. Ayatollah Khomeini was once recorded as saying that "Islam is politics or it is nothing." (Lewis, 2003:7-8). This statement, more than anything else, determines the dual character of the Islamic or Muslim nations. On one hand, it was a polity; a

characteristic that successfully became a state and an empire, and on the other hand, it was a religious community, founded by the Prophet and ruled by his appointed deputies who were also his successors. Thus, with the death of Mohammed in 632 C.E. the Muslims' perception of their historical existence is the religious task of spreading God's revelation until the rest of the world comes to its acceptance. Islam is therefore not only a matter of faith and practice, it is also an identity and a loyalty which for many transcend all other forms of identity and loyalty. By reifying the past, Islam becomes associated in the minds and memories of Muslims with the exercise of political and military power. It is as a result of this that Islam becomes the most effective symbol and slogan for mobilisation, whether for or against a cause or a regime today.

The Boko Haram Phenomenon

Basically, religious terrorism in Nigeria have historically taken two forms; intra-religious violence which limits to between fundamentalist and orthodox Muslims alone and inter-religious violence which is between Muslims and Christians. According to Lewis (2003:31), Islam recognizes that it is lawful to wage war against four types of enemies: "infidels, apostates, rebels and bandits. Although all four types of wars are legitimate, only the first two count as jihad. Jihad is thus a religious obligation." Classical Muslim jurists have always distinguished between offensive and defensive warfare. It is only in offensive warfare that jihad becomes an obligation of the Muslim as a whole, meaning armed struggle for the defense or advancement of Muslim power. Behind this is the presumption that jihad will continue, interrupted only by truces, until all the whole world either adopts the Muslim faith or submit to Muslim rule. Thus, in its simplest form, jihad means a holy war against infidels and apostates, infidels being nonbelievers and apostates being those seen as having renegade on their beliefs and teachings of Islam as contained in the Quar'an and the hadiths. It was on the basis of apostasy that the overthrown of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and assassination of President Sadat of Egypt two years later were justified. It was on the basis of apostasy that the various intra-religious clashes in the Northern part of Nigeria especially Kano, has occurred such as the Maitatsine riot of 1980, the Bulumkutu, Jimet and Gombe battles of 1982, 1984, and 1985, the Shiite attacks of 1996 and 1997 among many others (Albert, 2004, Ukanah, 2011).

It is also on the basis of these intra-religious clashes that there is an academic need to distinguish between Islamic fundamentalism or radicalism and fanaticism (Agara and Okhokere, 2011). Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such. A religious fanatic is one that holds firmly to the tenets of his faith, observing all its laws and ordinances but without attempting to use force to convert others to his way. He may live a solitary life, may be isolated and worse still, live in seclusion from the rest of the world but he would never use extra-legal means to turn, convince or force others into accepting his faith. On the other hand, religious fundamentalists or radicalists have gone a step further than the fanatics by taking their religious tenets to the level of an ideology, a set of religious

values that act as social levers imbued with passions and which act as patterns of action to the achievements or maintenance of a future, or existing state of affairs. Thus, fundamentalists are not averse to using every means possible including violence and force to make others accept their faith. Fundamentalists are anti-Western in the sense that they regard the West as the source of the evil that is corroding Muslim society although their primary attacks are directed against their own rulers and leaders. As Armstrong (2007:4) had equally noted;

Fundamentalism represents a rebellion against the secularist ethos of modernity. Wherever a Western-style society has established itself, a fundamentalist movement has developed alongside it. Fundamentalism is, therefore, a part of the modern scene. Although fundamentalists often claim that they are returning to a golden age of the past, these movements could have taken root in no time other than our own. Fundamentalists believe that they are under threat. Every fundamentalist movement – in Judaism, Christianity and Islam – is convinced that modern, secular society is trying to wipe out the true faith and religious values. Fundamentalists believe that they are fighting for survival and when people feel their backs are to the wall, they often lash out violently.

Islamic fundamentalism has enjoyed several advantages over other competing ideologies. First is that it is readily intelligible to both educated and uneducated Muslims. It offers a set of themes, slogans and symbols that are profoundly familiar and therefore effective in mobilising support and in formulating a critique of what is wrong and a program for putting right what is wrong. Second is that religious movements are easy to ferment under despotic or autocratic rulers who may forbid meetings and other gatherings but not public worship. As a result, only religious opposition groups are the ones that can have regular meetings and have a network outside the control of the state. Thus, as the experience of the Middle East and North Africa have shown, the more oppressive the regime, the more it inadvertently helps the rise and emergence of religious fundamentalism by giving them a virtual monopoly of opposition. Muslim fundamentalists can be identified as those who squarely placed the troubles of the Muslim world today at the doorstep of modernisation which they see as eroding authentic Islamic faith and values. For them, the remedy is to go back to the old faith and value system including the abolition of all laws and culture borrowed and adopted from the West. In its stead, they would argue for the restoration of the Islamic Laws (the Sharia) as the effective law of the land. Viewed from this perspective, the ultimate struggle is not against the intruders but against the Westernising traitors and rulers who had abandoned the true faith for the foreign one.

It is within this rubric that we can begin to contextualise and even begin to understand the present Boko Haram phenomenon. It is also within this context that Boko Haram fits into the global religious fundamentalist terrorist war that seems to be

pervading the world today. Anything less will only succeed in obfuscating and further shroud Boko Haram in a mystery which it does not deserve. Although the Boko Haram movement is enjoying notoriety which is shrouded in secrecy and much confusion about its origin, purpose, and identity of the leadership, its aim and ideological underpinnings are not. They are an extension of the broader war of attrition against everything western and the modern state system. Thus, of all the religious violence Nigeria had ever experienced till date, the Boko Haram debacle has surpassed them all both in terms of casualties and targets, commitment, reach (membership) and dexterity of its attacks.

Boko Haram belongs to one of the many sects in Islam and it is based largely in the North Eastern part of Nigeria. The group emerged as Sahabab group in 1995 and its leader then was Abubakar Lawan who later left the group to University of Medina for further study. The leadership of the group was later conceded to Muhammad Yusuf who immediately upon taking up the mantle of leadership changed the doctrine of the sect and came up with the appellation; Boko Haram. At the initial stage, the sect was limited to Borno, Yobe, Katsina, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe and Kano states, but is now known to have members and sympathizers in virtually all of the other northern and middle belt states of Nigeria. The name Boko Haram was not original to the group. It has been known severally as the 'Yusufuya sect' while others called it *Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna*, or *Khawaarji* or even *Jamaatu Ahlisunnah Lidda'awatiwal Jihad*. It is this last name the group approved of (Sanni, 2011:17-41). Yusuf was professed to have been mentored by Sheik Jafar Mohammed with whom he fell out on the basis of his militant doctrines and later declaring his mentor as an apostate, a death penalty in Islamic terms and the Sheik was subsequently shot dead on the eve of the 2007 election while leading the dawn prayer in his mosque at Kano. Although Yusuf himself had been reported as describing his movement as a non-militant group of youths who are simply bent on upholding the words of Allah, he nevertheless did state that they would rather die than to succumb to the present corrupt system in the country.

The popular name of the group projects its doctrines, aims and objectives, the ideological polemics of the group itself. 'Boko' is a Hausa term popular used for Western education or learning (that is book). It is actually a derivative from the Hausa 'Boka' (meaning 'sorcerer'). 'Haram' is Arabic for everything deemed as taboo, and so combined together, 'Boko Haram' actually translates to meaning Western education (and of course, everything connected to it including the civilization it fosters) are taboo. This captures in essence the basic doctrinal and ideological stand of the group. As Sanni (2011) has muted, the group emanated from an orthodox teaching slightly resembling those of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and later accepted the ideology of Al Qaeda which shaped their doctrine of acceptance of everything western as an aberration or as un-Islamic. Their belief systems hold that banking, taxation and jurisprudence, the entire framework on which the modern state structure is built, are completely deemed infidel. The mixing of boys and girls under the same shade and the theory of evolution are all haram and so the system that allows these must be destroyed and annihilated. Boko Haram in selecting its target

has kept to the broad target priorities of Al Qaeda which are American and Israeli Jews first, the British Jews and then French Jews and so on. The unifying factor here is that they are Western and Christians. As Hoffman (2008:207) has elaborated, in order of importance, the primary targets of Al Qaeda which Boko Haram has adopted are;

Americans, British, Spanish, Australians, Canadians, Italians. Within These categories there are further distinctions: businessmen, bankers and economists because money is very important in this age; followed by diplomats, politicians, scholars, analysts and diplomatic missions, scientists, associates and experts, military commanders and soldiers and lastly, tourists and entertainment missions and anybody that was arned by the mujahideen not to step in the lands of Moslem.

Of recent was the targeting of students worshipping in church on a Sunday service in Bayero University, in Kano and the bombings of two churches in Jos and the warning by the Boko Haram that all southerners and Christians should leave the north forthwith. This is in consonant with the broad strategy of Al Qaeda as quoted above.

Conclusion

In concluding, it is important to point out a familiar trend in the internationalization of the al Qaeda ideology. Historically, experience has shown that Islamist groups tended to bud locally and assumed global outlook only later. All the groups now affiliated with al Qaeda either predate the birth of the present global jihad or grew out of local causes and concerns and have now gained prominence by aligning under the logo of al Qaeda. For instance, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb started in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, an offshoot of a militant group that has roots from Algeria's civil war in the 1990s. This portrayed the general trend even in Somalia, Kenya and Nigeria where at various times religious militants and groups have terrorized parts of the country. By stepping up violence and claiming allegiance to al Qaeda and now ISIS, religious terrorist groups like Boko Haram have only shown that they have internalized the prevailing ideology of the larger body and therefore transiting from local concerns to international global groups with affiliation globally. The implication of this, of course, is that they have, by so doing, placed themselves on the target lists of governments and law enforcement organizations worldwide.

It is disheartening that after much experience of religiously motivated pogroms, so called 'Nigerian experts, political and social commentators and politicians' are still clamouring for similar solution to the problem of Boko Haram in spite of recent investigations that have pointed out that "poverty does not cause terrorism and prosperity does not cure it" (Laqueur, 2008:211). Reducing poverty in the Third World and Nigeria in particular, is a moral, political and economic imperative but to assume that it will be decisive in stopping or reducing instances of

terrorism shows a myopic and naive understanding of terrorism. The difference between political induced and religious motivated terrorism is very tangible. This difference is what is not so clear to the 'Nigerian experts and politicians' arguing for concessions and discussions between government and the members of Boko Haram. For instance, if the issue at stake is a demand for autonomy or territory or accommodation within the federal system, then a compromise through negotiations might be achieved as was the case with the Niger Delta militants. But it ought to be recalled that Al Qaeda was founded and 9/11 occurred not because of a territorial dispute or the feeling of alienation and marginalization but because of a religious commandment – jihad and the establishment of a worldwide Muslim state. This is also the case with the Boko Haram movement. Appeasement may work in some cases as the amnesty granted to the Niger Delta militants, but will not work in the case of religious terrorism with eschatological dimensions, the total annihilation of all nonbelievers. This kind of violence can only be 'appeased' by greater violence, a strong and solid network of intelligence gathering and international collaboration among states.

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FULANI HERDSMEN MILITANCY, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF LIVELIHOOD IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study examines the tripodic linkage between the Fulani-herdsmen militancy, environmental security and sustainability of the livelihood of Nigerians. The study was analyzed within the prismatic compass of the theory of the state while data was generated from documentary method of data collection. Fundamentally, we note that while the existing studies particularly from the developing countries have mainly focused on the nexus between resource-driven conflict and food security, little effort has been made to extend the frontier of scholarly research on the implication of the Fulani-herdsmen uprising on environmental security and sustainability of livelihood of the people. Through a systematic analysis of the available data, the study found that the unrestrained activities of the Fulani-herdsmen threaten the environmental security and survival of Nigerians. Similarly, we believe that the state's complicity in aiding and abetting the destruction of land resources has further increased the environmental vulnerability rate. Meanwhile, the study recommends among other things, the legislation of environmental laws that mitigate both the natural and anthropogenic activities that endanger the environment as well as threatens the survivability of the people. We also believe that the privileging of the safety of the lives of the citizens over narrow, sectional and class interest should be the preoccupation of government in a pluralistic state like Nigeria.

Keywords: Sustainability, Fulani Herdsmen, Environmental Security, Livelihood, Vulnerability Rate.

Introduction

Throughout the pre-Cold War era, the concept of security has been traditionally perceived or associated with the whole gamut of processes defined in terms of the capacity of the coercive apparatus of the state to uphold sovereignty, defend territorial integrity, ensure stability and peace as well as pursue armed conflict. Nevertheless, the end of the cold war in 1990s marked a paradigm and fundamental-departure from the state-centric, state-centered or national security (military capability of state) approach, ideologically rooted in the theoretical orientations of political realism, to human security usually defined as people or individual-centered. Evidently, the need to jettison the traditional conception of security and embrace the people-centered approach owes largely to the admixture and convergence of various factors including the failure of liberal state building through the instruments of the Washington Consensus; increasing number of internal violent conflicts in Africa, Asia and East Europe; the increasingly rapid pace of globalization; the exponential rise in the propagation and consolidation of democracy;