THE OMBATSE ETHNO-CULTURAL GROUP AND COMMUNITY SECURITY IN NASARAWA STATE, NIGERIA

IBRAHIM, Ahmad Ojiriaa

09/68DA018

A Thesis Submitted to the Centre for Peace And Strategic Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ilorin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace And Development Studies of the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria

SUPERVISOR: DR P.F ADEBAYO

MARCH, 2021

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this thesis titled: "Ethno-Cultural Violence and Community Security in Nasarawa State, Nigeria: A Study of the Ombatse Militia" was carried out by IBRAHIM, Ahmad-09/68DA018, under my supervisor. This work has been read and accepted as fulfilling part of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Development Studies of the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.

……. ……
Prof. (Mrs.) O. Olademo Date
Director, CPSS

…… ……
Prof. I. A. Jawondo
Internal Examiner Date

…… ……
Dr P.F Adebayo Date
Supervisor

…… ……
Dr. S.A. Raji Date
PG Co-coordinator

…… ……
External Examiner Date

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the Almighty Allah who guided me and availed me with the lion heart to resist the temptation to abandon the program midway.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the first instance, my appreciation goes to the Federal Government of Nigeria for establishing the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFUND) under which I secured the sponsorship to run this program.

I am grateful to the Nigerian Army who graciously approved my release to pursue the Ph.D programme. The efforts of the Corps Commander, Nigerian Army Education Corps, Major General LF Abdullahi is unprecedented and highly appreciated. God is the only one that can pay you, sir.

I acknowledge the efforts, understanding and unwavering commitment of my supervisor, Dr P.F. Adebayo. Sir, your critical comments and constant review of this thesis indeed added value to the work. Professor (Mrs.) Olademo Oyeronke, the Director of the Centre, you are a God - sent agent of change whose experience and commitment has redirected the affairs of the Centre, the result of which things have taken the right shape, leading to the completion of my Ph.D. programme. God Almighty will continue to increase you in health and wisdom to enable you to steer the ship of the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, UNILORIN.

For professor Ajiboye, your patient and commitment to check and double check the entire work added value to the thesis.

Dr. Shitu Raji's advice, support and professional guidance is most encouraging and shall remain in my memory until eternity. Sir, there is no adjective good enough to express your generosity and I pray that the Almighty God reward you abundantly. Dr G.A Animasaun, you are not only a teacher to me, your professional critical comments, guidance and personal donation of related books and articles have enriched my thesis and I pray Almighty Allah always be with you at your point of needs. Professor Fayeye, Dr Mbombo, Dr Babatunde, Mr Paul, Mrs Balogun, you

are all very wonderful. Your contributions have variously added value to the work. It is my sincere prayers that almighty God reward you accordingly.

Indeed, the support, encouragement and prayers of my parents have always been a good source of my inspiration. I could go thus far only due to the prayers of my parents. May Allah forgive your short comings.

Oh, my darling wife, Zuwairatu Ahmad Agyina, your unquestionable loyalty, ever - growing love, care and support is the light that shines the path to my success. I am grateful to God who created you specifically for my comfort. God bless you.

Brigadier General Bosman, Brigadier General S. Ibrahim and Brigadier General Tsoho are senior officers of the Nigerian Army, who have not only mentored and guided me throughout the period of this program, but have served as reservoir of knowledge where I sucked them from. I pray God will pay you accordingly. In the same vein, the various 9Brigade Commanders which I have served under at different times, ranging from Brigadier General A.B. Biu, Brigadier General S. Muhammed, Brigadier General AE Attu and Brigadier General M.G. Ali are very wonderful Infantry Senior Officers who have shown undiluted understanding and support for the progress of my Ph.D program. At no time have I applied to attend to my program and my application turned down. May God bless you all.

My research assistant, Hassan Arumiyau, is an excellent and quintessential supporter whose contributions to the success of this course have been tremendous and unquantifiable. My prayer for you is that you round up your M.Sc program speedily and embark on the Ph.D. in your chosen line.

My course - mate, Major Rufai Aliyu's contributions to the success of this course cannot be over-emphasized. I appreciate your guidance, doggedness and display of uncommon tolerance

and understanding, leading to the eventual success of this program. May we live long to reap the fruit of our labour.

Mama Amina is Major Umaru Tambuwal's wife. All the times I came for one presentation or the other, you were always around to give me food and ensure my comfort to be able to rehearse properly. May Allah bless your children.

Finally, I appreciate my lovely children whose prayers have sustained me throughout my studentship. May Allah make you surpass all my achievements.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page	i
Certification	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	vii
List of Tables	xi
Abstract	xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	
1.0 Background to the Study	1
1.1 Statement of the Problem	8
1.2 Research Questions	10
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the study	10
1.4 Significance of the Study	11
1.5 Scope of the Study	12
1.6 The Study Area	18
1.7 Operational Definition of Terms	14
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	
2.1 Conceptual Issues	15
2.1.1 Ethno-Cultural Violence	15
2.1.2 Overview of Ethno-cultural Violence in Nasarawa State	19
2.1.3 The Impacts of Ethno-cultural Violence in Nigeria and some African Countries	21 40
2.1.4 The Nature of Violence and Insecurity	44
2.1.5 The Impact of Violence and Insecurity	44
2.2.1 The Relationship between Ethno-cultural Militias and Community Insecurity	49
2.2.2 Historical Antecedents to the Ombatse Conflict in Nasarawa State	55
2.2.3 Ombatse Youth and the History of Ethnic Militia in Nigeria	64
2.2.4 Re-invented Traditions/Cultural Practices used to re-unite the Eggons	67
2.2.5 Impact of Ombatse Cultural Belief on the Eggon People	73
2.2.6 Nasarawa State Conflict Management Strategies in Resolving the Ombatse Ethno-Cultural Conflict	77
2.3 Factors Responsible for the Ombatse Conflict	79
2.3.1 Redeployment Policy on Local Government Employees of June 10, 1999	79
2.3.4 Creation of Local Government Areas and Chiefdoms	93
2.3.5 The Appointment of the Chairman of the Nasarawa State Tradition Council	95
2.3.6 Citing of Lafia Town as the Capital City of Nasarawa State	95

2.3.7 The Struggle for the Ownership of Agyaragu and the Creation of Jenkwe Development Area 96
2.4 Eggon Response to "Former Lafia Division Elders Consultative Forum 98
2.5 Socio-Cultural Agenda of the Ombatse Youth Militia 100
2.6 Effects of the Ombatse Ethno-Cultural Conflict on the Economy and Social Well being of the people of Nasarawa State Southern Senatorial District. 103
2.7 Theoretical Framework 105
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.2 Research Design 109
3.3 Population of the Study 110
3.4 Sampled Population 110
3.5 Sampling Techniques 110
3.6 Instrument for Data Collection 112
3.7 Method of Data Analysis 112
3.8 Methodological Problem 113
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.2 The socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia in Nasarawa State 119
4.3 Examining the strategic approach of the Ombatse ethnic militia in achieving their socio-political interests in Nasarawa State 128
4.4 Investigation of factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse ethnic militia into violent agitation 134
4.5 Examining the effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State 143
4.6 Identifying the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crises in Nasarawa State 149
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary 154
5.2 Conclusion 155
5.3 Recommendations 156
References 159
Appendix I 165
Appendix II 178

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Historical Antecedents to the Ombatse Conflict in Nasarawa State 60

Table 4.1: Data of Respondents by Age 114

Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Sex 115

Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents by Qualifications 115

Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents by Religion 116

Table 4.5: Distribution of Respondents by Occupation 117

Table 4.6: Distribution of Respondents by Designation 118

Table 4.1 Respondents' views on the correlation between ethno-cultural movements and community insecurity in Nasarawa State. 119

Table 4.2: Respondents' views on whether the emergence of the violent Ombatse ethno-cultural militia is politically or culturally motivated 128

Table 4.3 Respondents' View on the factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of Ombatse ethnic militia into violent agitation 134

Table 4.4 Respondents' View on the effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State 143

Table 4.5 Respondents' View on the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crisis in Nasarawa State 149

ABSTRACT

The Nasarawa State of Nigeria was ravaged between 2014 and 2017 by the militant activities of the Ombatse ethnic militia in the course of promoting the socio-political interests of the Eggon ethnic group. Efforts of concerned stakeholders at resolving the crisis have remained futile. The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of the Ombatse militia crisis on community security in Nasarawa State. The Objectives of the study were to (i) identify the socio-political interests of the Ombatse militia in Nasarawa State; (ii) examine the strategic approach of the Ombatse militia at achieving their socio-political interests; (iii) investigate the factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse militia into a violent agitation (iv) examine the effects of violence activities of the Ombatse militia on community security; and (v) identify the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crisis.

Mixed research design, which combined quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques, was adopted for the study. Questionnaire was used for collecting quantitative data and Key Informant Interview along Focus Group Discussion was adopted for gathering qualitative data. 500 respondents were used as sampled population while data analysis for the study was based on the 485 retrieved data from both the quantitative and qualitative techniques. The data collected were interpreted with

the use of percentages and descriptive analysis. The validity of the instrument and reliability of the results were obtained through the use pilot study and test-retest technique respectively.

The findings of the study were that the:

(i) socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia in Nasarawa State included the creation of more Eggon chiefdoms (97%), more Eggon local governments (94%), acceptance of Eggon as indigenes of their places of abode within the state (92%), and repudiation of payment of farm royalties by the Eggon to the Alago chiefs (87%);

(ii) main strategic approaches of the Ombatse militia at achieving the Eggon socio-political interests were persuasion (92%), aggressive use of Eggon media for mobilizing folks for violence (89%), adoption of physical violence against perceived enemies (87%); and charm fortification of members against defeat (53%).

(iii) factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful agitation of the Ombatse militia into violent included non-creation of more Eggon chiefdoms (93%), non-election of Eggon as governor of Nasarawa State (86%), and non-repudiation of payment of farm royalties by Eggons to Alago chiefs (82%);

(iv) effects of the Ombatse militancy on community security in Nasarawa State were loss of lives and property (97%), security breaches (81%) and strained relationship between the Eggons and other ethnic groups (73%), and;

(v) challenges of resolving the Ombatse crisis included non-implementation of previous recommendations on the crisis (78%) and non-compromised position of the Ombatse militia on some unrealistic demands (71%).

The study concluded that the Ombatse militancy has breached community security and heightened inter-ethnic hatred in Nasarawa state without adequate resolution. Nasarawa State Government and the Eggon ethnic group should adopt better strategies for resolving the crisis.

Word Count: 492

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Study

Ethno-cultural conflict is a global phenomenon, especially amongst heterogeneous societies. For instance, countries from the post-communist societies like Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were violently engaged in conflicts along ethnic lines in their democratization process (Donald, 1993). In Africa, counties such as Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Chad, Liberia, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi just to mention but a few were also at various times of their historical development engaged in ethnic violence due to different reasons such as land resources, economic, democracy and identity superiority among others (Aremu and Johnson, 2010). Scholars over the years have advanced various reasons for this negative scenario, ranging from the consequences of globalization, socio-economic and political exclusion, among others (Crawford, 2007). Scholars such as Lapidus, et. al. 1992; Woodward, 1995; Kapstein, 1996; Schulman, 2000; and Bandarage, 2000 are unanimous on the view that issues of immigrants to the Industrial West, the quest for global information, economic liberalization and fiscal reform as markers of globalization have reshuffled social relation and, to a large extent, exacerbated socio-cultural conflicts leading to violence meted mostly on the so called immigrants by the natives (Crawford, 2007). He opines that while globalization has been called an integrating force, cultural conflict become the most rampant form of international violence as globalization gets accelerated. According to Monty and Marshall (2005), of the plethora of violent conflicts raging around the world in 2003, the Iraq invasion was the sole international war. Most of the conflicts around this period such as ones in Burkina Faso, Central African Republic of Congo amongst others were ethno-religiously triggered. Also in some Asian countries like Afgnistan, Burma-Myanmar, Philiphines and others,

the conflicts that raged and some of which are still raging like the Burma-Myanmar are ethno-religiously motivated internally (Monty and Marshall, 2005).

Where communal differences had become politically relevant in the past, the ethnic or religious sentiments are easiest to be played around in the effort to mobilize political support in the face of economic decline. Such ethnic mobilization often leads to conflict of interest between the different socio – cultural groups who scamper for the same meager resources; either economic, political or issue of cultural values. For example, in multi-cultural societies like Nigeria, Liberia, and Angola, poverty and hardship can be disproportionately allocated among various cultural groups, especially where there is a cultural division of labour in which different cultural groups are segmented into distinct economic sectors. For instance in Nigeria, while in the North, majority of the youth are engaged in menial job, including but not limited to nail-cutting, wood-breaking, pushing of wheel barrow and scavenging. In the Southern part, however, majority of the youth are involved in organized trade of all kinds, businesses in stock exchange market, communication technology, among others.

In order to appreciate and understand the nature and trajectories of ethno-cultural conflict in Africa, it is necessary to situate it in the broader context of democracy and the quest for development projects on the continent. The quest for development is concerned about State-building or State-formation process, which has the tendency to generate competition, cooperation and conflict among the various ethnic groups, in the face of scarcity, about who should control the State and direct its affairs and influence the regulation of allocation and distribution of resources against the background of presumed monopoly of physical force and policy directives.

In Africa, as observed by Jinadu (2007), there have, since the mid-1960's, been prolonged and protracted ethnic-related violent political conflicts, including in some cases, civil wars in the

following countries: Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zairê), Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger Republic, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

African casualties of ethno – cultural conflict exceed those of all other regions combined. According to Picciotto as cited in Venkatasawmy (2015), about one fifth of the African population live in areas severely disrupted by ethnic conflict. A region where almost half of all developing countries affected by conflict are located, Sub-Saharan Africa alone includes 32 (out of 47) countries affected by 126 wars since 1980 (Picciotto 2010: 2).

While acknowledging the existence of the above primordial features – tribalism, ethnic culture and religion, Nnoli (1995), Olzak (1986) have argued that all these instrumentalist features on their own do not naturally result in violent conflicts. They observed that primordial factors instigate and affect conflicts only to the extent that they are deliberately manipulated and politicised by political actors and local elite usually for their self-seeking advantages. This therefore means that, the primary objective of tribal, ethnic or religious groups does not necessarily translate into primordial or identity conflicts but rather the 'subjective choice' of the hegemonic power players and the local elite (Barth, 1969). This explanation rarely captures the general scenarios of ethnic conflagration in Africa. For instance, the ethnic conflicts in Angola made by the rebel leader Jonah Savimbi of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the war in Sera lion, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Sudan versus South Sudan conflicts though economic on the surface but are clouded with ethnic motivations and interests. The Liberian Civil War, as observed by Omeje (2007), Charles Taylor's NPFL rebel campaign to oust

the dictatorship of Samuel Doe in Liberia quickly gathered strength and degenerated into a civil unrest that lingered from around 1989-1997. Ebo, (2005: 4) as cited in Omeje (2007), notes that Doe committed several atrocities and hideous human rights abuses in his bid to hang on to power, and to promote his ethnic agenda prominent among which was the attempt to replace settler (Americo-Liberians) with his indigenous Krahn ethnic group.

Viewing conflict from the instrumentalist angle, it arises when local politicians and elite struggling for State power and the limited resources, though the use of militias and private armies from their ethno-cultural enclaves to challenge, unseat (by whatever possible means) and replace the 'prebendal state', but not necessarily to improve or transform it (Omeje 2007). Depending on the outcome and the tenacity of the principal actors, low and high intensity conflicts may ensue, which could lead to the phenomenon of failed State or collapsed State.

Social struggle against political exclusion (real or imagined) by the various diverse social entities are a serious conflict-trigger, which is common to most West African countries. Most of the perceptions and complaints about marginalisation and political exclusion are usually construed rightly or wrongly around the issue of primordial social differences with some other empirical identities, especially ethnic nationality, religion, and perhaps, increasingly, gender. There are inter-connected issues around the formation of social identities and structures of conflict. However, a major factor in ethno-cultural conflicts associated with marginalisation and political exclusion is the link with State power. Marginalised and excluded groups and communities have almost invariably attributed their predicament to the control and use of State power by rival groups to exploit, impoverish, undermine, intimidate, repress and victimise them. This further means that, the State is mostly regarded as a champion and executor of the conflict- a

perception that undermines the speedy resolution and management of the conflict. The hostile nature of prebendal and neo-patrimonial politics in some African countries seems to suggest and buttress the insinuations regarding political exclusion and the State's complicity, which mostly are being denied by the assumed oppressors and State officials. Depending on issues drawn from history and how they are connected with prevailing circumstances, incidents and feelings of marginalisation may aggregate with other social as well as natural factors to trigger conflicts of varying degrees and complications. Narrations concerning political exclusion and marginalisation of some ethno-national communities were prominent in some of the civil wars in West Africa, especially the crises in Liberia, Chad, Mali, the Casamance region of Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. They have also critically informed recent uprisings and insurgencies in Guinea, Togo, Niger and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

It is indeed, not suprising therefore that, the world has witnessed a policy-related interest in ethnic conflict in recent past due to the state building challenges which they continue to pose for domestic and international politics (Wimmer 2004: 3-13). This is particularly so in the case of post-conflict societies, emerging from divisive and usually decimating wars over the control of the state and its resources, where attention has increasingly been turned to constitutional and political engineering to avoid a relapse into armed conflict and to lay the foundations and conditions for lasting peace.

Nigeria is a country with diverse ethnic identities existing side by side with one another. As usual, conflict has almost become a characteristic feature of a plural society not only in Nigeria but in Africa. In an attempt to compete for scarce resources ranging from economic, political religious and tribal issues among others, various competing groups tend to be at dagger-drawn with each other. This scenario mostly leads to conflict of varying degrees which sometimes

results in armed conflict loss of lives and destruction of property. It was in this wise that Mallum (2005) notes that since 1945, the world has continued to be ravaged by violence, ethnic conflicts and wars, as evident in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Montenegro, and Serbs, Somalia, Uganda, Burundi, (Hutu/Tutsi) Palestine/Israelite in Middle East, Zaire, Rwanda and several others too numerous to mention. Nigeria has over the years witnessed serious ethnic conflicts in the course of history. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) affirmed thatNigeria presents a complex of individual as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub – ethnic (communal) are subtle but they constitute the major factors for the incessant violent conflicts in the country.

Nigeria has witnessed the outbreak of not less than 40 violent communal or ethnic conflicts from the first three years of the country's Fourth Republic (Imobighe (2003).Some of the prominent ethnic conflicts in Nigeria may include: Zangon – Kataf in Kaduna State, Tiv – Jukun in Wukari, Taraba State, Ogoni – Andoni in River State, Ife – Modakeke in Osun State, Aguleri – Umuleri in Anambara State, Yoruba – Hausa community in Shagamu in Ogun State, Ijaw – Ilaje conflicts in Ondo State, the intermittent clashes in Kano State, Bassa – Egibura in Nasarawa State, Eleme – Okrika in River State. Hausa/Fulani – Sayawa in Bauchi State, Fulani – Irigwe and Yelwa – Shendam, both in Plateau State and the Hausa – Yoruba clashes in Idi – Araba in Lagos State. Other very notable conflicts in the history of Nigeria also include the Odua People's Congress (OPC) in Lagos State and Share – Tsaragi in Kwara State, Tiv – Fulani in Nasarawa and Benue States, Indigene – Settler crises in Plateau State.

In the Niger Delta region of the country, the issue of oil spillage and gas flaring together with longtime developmental neglect and the excrutiating economic realities mostly attributed to SAP have in recent past triggard serious anti-oil agitations and protests among locals, civil

societies and militancy in the Niger Delta. The dominant narration of the anti-oil agitation in the oil-rich region is based on the peoples' feelings about the long standing marginalization and exploitation by the state and oil industry, two powerful forces dominated by the coalition of elites from Nigeria's major ethnic nationalities. On the other hand, the Niger Delta people hold the opinion that the latter thrives at the expense of the local communities bearing oil, essentially because they are minority in the federation. Constitutionally, ownership of oil resources in Nigeria is vested in the federal government and the latter retains a most significant share in the distribution of national resources (mostly oil- derived) between the various layers of government in the federation. Sub-regional governments the civil societies, militant agitations in the Niger Delta continue to ask for total control of oil resources and pay certain premium to the central government. It is invariably known as resource control in Nigeria.

Since the early 1990s, the anti-oil campaign has spurred a wide range of radical ethnic militia groups that have increasingly obstructed oil operations in the Niger Delta and also made the oil region very unstable for governance. Some of the ethnic militia groups include but not limited to the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Pan Niger Delta Revolutionary Militia (PNDRM), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Niger Delta Oil Producing Communities (NDOPC), Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Delta-Bayelsa Freedom Fighters, etc. The militant agitators adopt diverse violent approaches which include vandalisation of oil pipelines and installations, kidnapping for a ransom, extortion of money from foreign nationals working for different oil companies, seizure and occupation of oil sites, and so on and so forth. Also, the Niger Delta is overwhelmed with violent ethnic conflict over ownership of oil-bearing land, sharing of proceeds paid by oil companies for site acquisition

and sometimes for compensation of ecological damage, and provision of local vigilante security services to oil companies and sharing the accruing emoluments. The armed ethnic militias constitute the bulk of the combatants in the various communal conflicts.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

In the recent past, Nasarawa State has been made to contend with upsurge of ethnic conflicts; leading to destruction of lives and property. Efforts by the State Government to mitigate or manage such conflicts usually dwelt more on constituting various "Commissions of Inquiries" with specific terms of reference aimed at unraveling the reasons for the conflicts, the group of people involved, causality figures, quantifying in monetary terms property being destroyed and consequently making appropriate recommendations to forestall future occurrences.Sad enough however, the ethnic conflicts in the State appearred to be degenerating further and further. It is worrisome to state that these conflicts have among other things have oftenled to loss of human lives including the cruel murder of over 90 policemen and 10 personnel of the State Security Services (SSS) in Alakiyo, a village 10 kilometers away from Lafia, the Nasarawa State capital in 2013. These conflicts were presumed to have undermined community security in the State.

The Eggon ethnic group for which Ombatse is the militia arm in Nasarawa State has been in constant cry of marginalization and deprivation from attaining the highest political office in the State since creation of the later from the defunct Plateau State on 1st October 1996. It is important to stress that before the Ombatse conflict, the State has been enmeshed with a plethora of ethnic conflicts which have variously affected the steady growth and development of the State and also affected the hitherto harmonious co-existence between

neighboring ethnic groups. For instance, there were the ethnic conflicts between Kwale and Tiv in 2001; between the Kanuri and the Tiv at Azara where a second class chief of the town was assassinated in 2001, the Tiv and the Alago in Angwa-Atashi in 2001 (Sani, 2007). There was also the code of Agatu versus Tiv, Eggon versus Gwandara, Eggon versus Fulani and other pockets of ethnic conflicts all in Nasarawa State.

The researcher observed that from the start of the Ombatse conflict that not much has been done in terms of conducting a deliberate and organized in-depth research on the socio-economic, political and possible structural imbalance in Nasarawa State and their implications for inter- ethnic rivalry in the State. It is important to state that there were little or no studies on Ombatse-conflict in Nasarawa State. Most of the existing literature with regard to the Ombatse conflict are merely articles on pages of national dailies, magazines and memoranda by various conflict parties which were submitted to the different commissions of Inquiry into the myriad of ethnic crises in Nasarawa State. Most of such articles are perceived to be politically sponsored with vested interests and would rarely address germane socio-political, economic and structural issues dispassionately. Such therefore, would hardly entrench peace and harmonious co-existence between ethnic groups and even affect development in the state. Although it would appear as if peace has been achieved due to absence of violence over time, this peace can best be described as enforced peace which may not last due to the inability of the stakeholders to agree on certain major issues that are the crux of the conflict. The seeming peace enyoyed in the various flash points can best be described as enforced in view of the rampant deployment of security personnel at short intervals. Both the Nigerian Police and the military check points are up till date seen to be

regularly conducting stop and search in order to prevent movement of elicit weapons and also to serve as deterent to those who may want to disturb the peace of the communities. It is from this perspective that this study becomes necessary with a view to looking for ways of moving beyond enforced peace to amicable resolution of the conflict.

1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to investigate the causes and effects of the Ombatse militia violence on community security in Nasarawa State.

The objectives of the study are to:

1. identify the socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia in Nasarawa State.

2. examine the strategic approach of the Ombatse ethnic militias in achieving their socio-political interest.

3. investigate the factors responsible fir the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse ethnic militia into violent agitation.

4. examine the effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State; and

5. identify the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crises.

1.3 Research Questions

The following research questions would be answered:

1. What are the socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia in Nasarawa State?

2. What are the strategic approaches of the Ombatse ethnic militias at achieving their socio-political interest?

3. What factors are responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse ethnic militia into violent agitation?

4. What are the effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State; and

5. What are the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crises in Nasarawa State?

1.4 Significance of the Study

The study would be of tremendous importance to not only the Nasarawa State government but also the entire people of the State. This is because the factors responsible for the conflict would have been identified. The suggestions opined could assist government to achieve peace amongst the conflict parties. On the part of the ethnic groups, they would have identified areas where possible negotiations and compromise could lead to achieving lasting peaceful harmonious co – existence.

The study would unravel the extent of the damage occasioned by the conflicts, the casualty figures and the humanitarian challenges resulting from the conflict. This will go a long way to assisting the government to plan in rehabilitation programme for the affected areas and execute projects that would bring direct succour to the displaced persons who are scattered in parts of the State.The attention of the civil organization and international agencies could be drawn to the plight of this group of people with a view to getting them to

play vital roles in the prevention of reoccurrence of such conflicts and also in promoting policies and programs that will assist in this direction so as to avoid the danger of the affected people becoming a nuisance to the society.

Also important in the study is the area of security. The research hopes to identify the operational tactics; the types of weapons usually deployed, sources of weapons and possible sponsors of ethno-cultural violence. This will indeed enable the security apparatus in the State to re – strategize for better performance and to avoid collateral damages and casualties as witnessed during the infamous operation at Alakio when the perceived apprehension of the spiritual leader of the Ombatse Youths Movement led to the death of more than 90 police and DSS personnel and the destruction of their operational vehicles.

The Federal Government of Nigeria will also benefit from the research. This is because it can work with some of the findings and apply the recommendations to direct policies and projects to areas that would require them the most. The study would also serve as a reference point to other researchers in the field.

1.5 Scope of the Study

Nasarawa State since its creation on 1st October, 1996 has experienced various degrees of ethno-cultural conflicts some of which may include are not limited to the Igbira versus Bassa ethnic groups in Toto Local Government, the Alago versus Tiv ethnic groups in Doma Local Government Area, Tiv versus Jukun in Awe Local Government Area, Tiv versus Agatu in Doma Local Government Area, Tiv versus Fulani in Obi Local Government Area and also Tiv versus Mighili inObi Local Government. However, this study is to focus on the most recent Ombatse ethno-cultural conflict in the State involving the Eggon ethnic

group and other ethnic groups like the Alago, the Mighili, the Fulani, the Gwandara, the Hausa and Akye. The study will cover Ombatse ethnic conflict from 2007 to 2017.

1.6 The Study Area

The study area is Nasarawa South Senatorial District. Incidentally, almost all the communities that are engulfed in the Ombatse ethnic conflict are located within the Southern Senatorial Zone, except Nasarawa Eggon which is in the Northern Senatorial Zone. Awe, Doma, Lafia, Keana and Obi Local Government Areas constitute Southern Senatorial District and the major conflict ethnic groups such as Alago, Mighili, Eggon, Kanuri, Akye, Gwandara, Jukun and Hausa are predominabtly located in communities within the aforementioned Senatorial District. Although all the ethnic groups earlier mentioned are indigenous to the State, there is still the question of indigene and settler dichotomy. For instance, while the Eggon people were alleged by others to be settlers in Local Government Areas like Doma, Lafia, Awe, Obi and Keana, the Eggon on the other hand are laying claim to being indigenous to some the settlements in contention. Precisely, while the Alago in communities such as Assakio in Lafia Local Government, Mighili in Agyaragu under Lafia East Development Area hold that Eggon ethnic group found in these communities are alien or are recognized as settlers who have come around for farming activities, the Eggon hold a strong and different view as they see themselves as owners of the land. These and other factors have formed the basis of Ombatse conflict.

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined as they are used in the context of this research.

a. Ethno-cultural violence: Violence meted to members of other ethnic groups by members of an aggrieved ethnic group.

b. Community Security: Relatively peaceful and harmonious co-existence between various ethnic groups in Nasarawa State.

c. Ombatse Militia: Militant armed youth of Eggon ethnic group in Nasarawa State.

d. Ashim: An Eggon ancestral cult which is used for the administering of oath to youths especially in the face of an impending war.

e. Azhili: An Eggon shrine where success in war is being sought for.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section of the research is divided into three sub-sections, which are conceptual clarifications, review of related literature and theoretical framework.

2.1 Conceptual Issues

2.1.1 Ethno-Cultural Violence

Nigeria presents a complex of crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most salient and the main bases for violent conflict in the country (Osaghea and Suberu, 2005). This, according to them, is both from the view point of the identities usually assumed by citizens especially for political motives and the identities often implicated in everyday contestations over citizenship as well as competitions and struggle over resources and opportunities. Osaghea and Suberu (2005) are of the opinion that it is for the sake of emphasis and inter-connectedness of ethnic, regional, and religious identities and the fact that they are mutually reinforcing that they are sometimes compounded or hyphenated as ethno-regional, ethno-cultural and ethno-religious. This is the reason in which ethnic tensions among the three dominant groups are generally regarded to as ethno-regional. With the division of the country into six semi-official geo-political zones in the late 1990s, which not only had ethnic undercurrents but political undertones, the application of ethno-regional, ethno-cultural categories is likely to expand, but so far the old regional references remain dominant (Osaghea and Suberu, 2005).

Onwumah (2014), also shares the same view as expressed above. However, he traced communal and ethno-religions crises to the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 by Lord Lugard. According to him, before that time, the different ethnic nationalities like the Hausa/Fulani, the

Igbo and Yoruba existed independently and there were no socio-cultural, linguistic or political ties among them. However, when Lord Lugard in 1914, through executive/administrative fiat, amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates into one and proclaimed them as a country, it was a union that was lacking in socio-cultural, political and economic bonding of any kind. There was no "we" feeling or consciousness of any kind. Nigeria was not regarded as "ours" but as "theirs". The ordinary man on the street saw himself, first as a Yoruba, Igbo or Hausa and secondarily as a Nigerian. Onwumah (2014) observes that this situation was further compounded with the introduction of regions which made the northern region disproportionately bigger than the East and the West put together. The colonialists further perfected their plan of divide and rule by deliberatly pursuing different educational policies in the North and the South. Though the North had more population than the South and the West, the British pitched the regions against themselves by pursuing different educational policies for them. In the East and the West, western education was pursued. But in the North, Islamic education was pursued in the name of preserving traditional institutions. All of these stresses and strains were infused into the subconciousness of the Nigerians by the colonial masters in order to ensure disaffection and disunity. It was this disunity that led to the breakout of civil war just six years after the attainment of independence in October 1st 1960 (Onwumah, 2014). According to Olaniyi (2005), between 1999 and 2004, there were more 1,000 cases of ethnic related clashes in Nigeria in which 50,000 lives were lost. Over a million Nigerians were internally displaced, and billions of naira lost. This present research intends to queue along the thoughts expressed above in order to interrogate the socio-cultural, political and economic factors that form the bases for the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in Nasarawa State.

Ombatse, as a militia, should be seen either as the aggregation of self-interested calculations of individuals or the feeling of injustice among sections of the population bounded together by already existing ethnic ties. According to Ayuba (2012) the group defends a cause that is connected with ethnic interests of the Eggon and importantly, members of the group have access to coercive means and are engaged in numerous deadly face-offs with the police and other ethnic groups in Nasarawa State. He observes that the Ombatse have not only managed to create a great deal of popular legitimacy among the Eggon people, but have also achieved economic sustainability. The motivation for cooperation in the group includes: political interests, ethnic values, and personal bonds. Importantly, members of Ombatse are related to another by bonds of ethnicity and common purpose. Among the members of Ombatse, there is a strong belief in mystic protection in times of violence and the idea that they are immune to death because of their magical ability to repel bullets when fighters are armed with protective charms specially prepared by their spiritual leader, Baba Alakyo (Ayuba, 2012). Ombatse has developed into a group which is dreaded locally and this is based not only on their strong conviction in charms to fortify them against injury caused by metal but also the fact that they are increasingly challenging security agencies as they go about their legitimate duties. According to a report in 'The Daily Trust, 13 August 2013, the non-confrontational approach often adopted by the security agents to avoid huge number of casualties by managing such encounters has been interpreted by Ombatse as the result of the potency of their charms and this has emboldened the group to confront all perceived enemies headlong. The most dangerous dimension of ethnic conflicts in Nasarawa State is the proliferation of small arms and their use in local conflicts. Although this trend poses a long-term danger to the peace and security of the State, there has been a limited response by both the State and the Federal Governments to arrest the situation (Ayuba, 2012). Security reports indicate that

there is an emerging black market for illegal arms in the State. The Department of State Security Services (DSS) revealed to the House of Representatives joint Committee on Customs and Excise and National Intelligence investigating the massive smuggling of small arms and light weapons into the country that specifically, Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba and Plateau States act as conduits for small arms and light weapons that were used to fuel ethnic crises in some regions of the country. The Director of the DSS when making a presentation to the committee noted that some security agencies had, over a period of time, recruited people of questionable characters some of which are found to be members of ethnic cults, kidnappers and armed robbery gangs who were now in government pay-roll receiving salaries as security personnel.

The Director of the DSS further decried the role played by some States, noting they "are not helping matters when it comes to the incidence of proliferation of small arms and light weapons". Specifically, he alleged that Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba and Plateau States acted as conduits for small arms and light weapons that were used to fuel ethnic crises in some regions of the country. He also informed the committee that three- quarters of the arms used to cause the crisis in Southern Kaduna, Zamfara and Plateau States were coming from Nassarawa, Benue, Taraba and Plateau States. Specifically, he alleged that Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba and Plateau States acted as conduits for small arms and light weapons that were used to fuel ethnic crises in some regions of the country. The most worrisome aspect of proliferation of arms and its attendant implications on security was that most of the arms used by the security agents during the Alakyo operation in May 2013 were taken away by the Ombatse fighters after the massacre of the security personnel. Thus, several arms and ammunitions belonging to the security agents are still in the hands of the Ombatse fighters and thereby continue to pose a security threat to the community.

The combination of factors such as the readily available small arms and light weapons, the complacency of some personnel of security agencies in the State, the Ombatse strong belief in their mystic protection in times of violence and the idea that they were immune to death because of their magical ability to repel bullets when fighters were armed with protective charms specially prepared by their spiritual leader, Baba Alakyo (Ayuba, 2014) became the impetus for them to turn their ethnic socio-political, cultural and economic struggle into a violent one.

However, the aforementioned factors that trigger ethnic violence in Nigeria among other factors that were alleged to be the causes of the Ombatse ethnic conflict in Nasarawa State. The Eggon ethnic group has been complaining above marginalization in matters pertaining to the highest political office in the State since its creation from the defunct Plateau State on 1st October 1996. It is important to stress that before the Ombatse conflicts, the State had been enmeshed in plathora of ethnic conflicts which had variously affected the steady growth and development of the State and affected the hitherto harmonious co-existence between neighboring ethnic groups. For instance, there were the ethnic conflicts between Kwale and Tiv in 2001; the Kanuri versus Tiv ethnic conflict at Azara where a second class chief of the town was assassinated in 2001, Tiv and Alago in Angwa-Atashi in 2001 (Sani, 2007). There was also the Agatu versus Tiv, Eggon versus Gwandara, Eggon versus Fulani and other pockets of conflicts all in Nasarawa State can be described as ethnic conflicts.

2.1.2 Overview of Ethno-cultural Violence in Nasarawa State

Before the creation of Nasarawa State in 1996, the then 'Lower Plateau' was relatively peaceful. The ethnic groups in the zone had a common enemy which they generally referred to as 'Upper Plateau' which is the Current Plateau State. The typical point of contention was the issue

of socio-political and economic marginalization of the people of 'Lower Plateau' that is, the present Nasarawa State. However, just as it is widely professed that the entrenchment of the current democratic experience in 1990 created an atmosphere of intense competition leading to conflicts of varying degrees amongst ethnic groups, so also the creation of Nasarawa State provided an avenue which saw the various ethnic groups competing for scarce resources of the state. Competition for resources such as political positions, land, state and local government civil services among others, were factors that led to different ethnic neighbours engaging in serious ethnic clashes with consequences on socio-political, economic and security advancement of the State. Some of these conflicts may include the Bassa versus Igbira ethnic groups in the then Toto Local Government Area of Nasarawa West Senatorial District as inherited from former Plateau State. This conflict, according to the Judicial Panel of Inquiry report on the killing of security forces in Alakio 2014, was managed and reconciled by the first civilian administration under the leadership of Governor Abdullahi Adamu in 2000. The report further chronicled other cases of ethnic violence such as the conflict between Fulani herdsmen and Tiv farmers in 2011 around boarder communities of Nasarawa and Benue States; Fulani herdsmen and Mighili farmers in Obi Local Government and also between Funali and Agatu in Doma Local Government Areas of Nasarawa South Senatorial District in April 2012.

The judicial panel of inquiry report also captures the various attacks and counter attacks by the different ethnic organizations. For instance, according to the report, the Ombatse conflict started with skirmishes between the Alago and Eggon youths of Assakio town of Lafia Local Government Areas in the Nasarawa South Senatorial District in June, 2012, Ombatse youth alleged attack on the Mighili Ethnic Group in Agyaragu (Jankwe) in Obi local government area

on 21st to 22nd November, 2012, Ombatse or Eggon youths alleged blocking of the Nasarawa Eggon section of Akwanga-Lafia-Makurdi federal highway on 17th November, 2012 for several hours thereby obstructing free flow of traffic and committing all forms of vices against unsuspecting travelers; alleged killings of about a hundred Nigerian Security Personnel comprising members of the Nigerian Police Force and the Department of State Security Services on the 7th of May, 2013 in Alakio village in Lafia Local Government Area of Nasarawa South senatorial district. The report states that the following towns and villages were violently attacked: Kwandare and Barikin Abdullahi (B.A.D) in Lafia local government area; Agyaragu in Obi Local Government Area; Obi town, Alakio, Arikya, Shabu, Burunm-Burum in Doma local government area; Bassa and Yelma in Kokona Local Government Area. Some national dailies such as the Punch Newspaper, Thursday May 9, 2013 volume 17, No 20), Daily Trust of Wednesday, July 31, 2013, Leadership of Thursday, June 27, 2013, the Nation of Wednesday September 25, 2013, Vanguard of Wednesday, June 26, 2013; have variously captured the different ethnic conflict scenarios as mentioned above. Also, Saturday Sun of September 21, 2013 and Nigerian Tribune, Monday, 17 November, 2014 are points of reference.

2.1.3 The Impacts of Ethno-cultural Violence in Nigeria and some African Countries

Ethnic struggles for power and dominance between the cultures and ethnic nationalities within the state has varying negative effects on the citizens. Such violent conflicts create massive poverty as a result of the destruction of human and material resources; and human and capital flight from the state (Azalahu, 2013). According to him, poverty has a multiplying effect in form of anger, hunger, frustration and deprivations, which further exacerbate the crises in the State.

Azalabu maintains that ethnic conflicts in states are symbolic of liberation struggles against political and socio-economic marginalization of the less privileged groups.

In Nigeria as a whole, ethnicity, political and religious conflicts are generally caused by struggle for power, natural and economic resources, religious evangelisation, migration (Mangut, 2012). For the fact that religion is an integral component for State formation process in northern Nigeria, it is extremely hard to isolate religious conflicts from ethnic and political conflicts in the middle-belt region in particular and the country in general. This mostly results in conflicts with multi-dimensional disposition. Mutual suspicion among ethnic groups, creation of perceived safe havens, which negates the spirit of ethnic/cultural integration, has long lasting consequences on the development, peace and security of the State. The nature of politics (social relations) played, manipulation of civil service rules to favour one ethnic group or another in the State causes the pauperization of the citizenry, which as a result, turns to be a vicious circle of conflicts within the system.

Scholars are of the opinion that the historical experience of the emergence of Nigeria State makes ethnicity a most significant denominator in shaping and moulding national decisions and developmental programes. According to Adebayo and Abiodun (1998), key issues like politics, economics, education, revenue allocation and resources distribution are, to a large extent determined by, or perceived to be determined by ethnic cleavages and considerations. However, the area where ethnicity has attracted most attention is its association with conflicts in post-independence Nigeria. Where it has not caused or inflamed tension between different groups, it has been employed to explain security actions and /or indecision. However, they stressed that Nigeria is not alone in this politics characterized by ethnicity ans sectionalism. They opine that other African countries became a theatre of violent conflicts.For instance, from Burundi to

Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Sierra Leone, and Somalia to Rwanda and Guinea to Sudan, Tanzania to Central African Republic, all were bedeviled by conflict of ethnic identity. Although there are various identity classifications like race, nationhood, kinship, class, religion, language, gender, age, geographic location, cultural preferences, and occupation like military function or herders and tillers-by and large, ethnicity according to Adebayo and Abiodun (1998) is identified as the dominant axis about which conflicts have revolved.

There are three different arguments by scholars have put forward in attempting to examine the new patterns of ethnic violence in Nigeria and some African countries. The first argument suggests that violence is a mindless, an unfortunate or a return to barbarism (Mamdani 2002). The second argument associates violence to the emergence of pluralist democracy, where it is seen as a strategy by the incumbent to manipulate democracy by clinging tight to power (Kagwanja 2001). Lastly, other scholars are of the opinion that the explosion of ethnic-based violence in countries like Nigeria as exemplified by the Nigerian Civil War, Rwanda as in the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi as a clear indication of the violent past occationed by manipulation of ethnicity during the colonial era now resurfacing to haunt the post-colonial state (Mamdani 2001).

The wide spread of identity conflicts is based on the fact that ethnicity is particularly strong in traditional societies-envolving an inner passion for having a sense of belonging to a particular group with peculiar identity signs, such as myths of common ancestry, common history, same or very closely related social and cultural values, traditions and symbols, and owner-ship of identified territory (Endalew 2002).

Also, Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal in Oyebade and Alao (1998) have identified two important characteristics of ethnic conflicts. The first is that such conflicts seem to last for a long time. According to them, it is because the parties to the conflict have some unalterable or nearly

unalterable characteristics like race, religion, or language. The second is that in most situations, ethnic conflicts are often between governments and ethnic movements, i.e between "legally recognized authority on the one hand and a rather ill-defined and possibly illegal movement on the other hand". They assert that ethnic conflict does not disappear quickly. As mentioned earlier, the end of Cold War has evoked more factors that support this assertion. As noted by David Welsh in Oyebade and Alao (1998), "of the approximately 180 states presently in existences, fewer than 20 are ethnically heterogeneous (where the minority is less than 5% of the population). The bigger ethnic groups usually struggle to emasculate the seemingly smaller ethnic groups amongst them and that triggers conflicts.

Furthermore, Harff and Gurr (2004) have identified four important types of politically active ethnic groups within the modern state system. These are ethno nationalists, indigenous peoples, communal contenders, and ethno-classes. These types of politically active groups are further grouped into two. The first two are ethno-nationalist and indigenous peoples who, are according to Harff and Gurr (2004), want separation or autonomy from States that rule them. The last two, communal contenders and ethno-classes need greater access to or participation in the existing state system or structure. Gurr and Harf have enumerated the differences between the two groups. According to them, ethno-nationalists are usually independent, aspiring always to establish or re-establish their own States, and the indigenous people are concerned protecting protecting their traditional lands, resources and culture. However, communal contenders are after sharing of political power, while ethno - classes "want equal rights and opportunities to overcome the effects of discrimination resulting from their immigrant or minority status".

It is important at this juncture to state that the application of the word 'ethnicity 'as a core cause of conflict in plural societies could be confusing in some ways. In the first instance, ethnic

identity does not necessarily connote ethnic violence as some homogeneous ethnic societies like Somalia that was engulfed in war while some heterogeneous societies have continued to manage their differences and thereby living in peace with one another, as argued by Osman (2007).

In trying to explain the explosion of ethnic related violence, Arjun Appadurai (1998) attributed the intensity and spread of identity wars to the forces of globalization, noting that ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusionment and chaotic environments created by economic globalization.

Human Rights Watch, as cited in Salih (1989), believes that the new trend of political violence is a ploy by the leaders of the one-party vintage to resort to recruiting thugs and surrogates to organize violence against other ethnic movements. In this sense, Salih exposes how the Sudanese government organized ethnic militias to inflict violence on civilian population, thereby making ethnicity a dividing line in the polity. Most importantly, violent ethnic conflict is usually associated with youth movement constituting themselves into vanguards or warlords in their quest for achieving their goal. The use of tribal authorities as agents of political violence became widespread in countries as diverse as Nigeria, Malawi, Kenya, South Africa and Cameroon.

Political 'tribalism' as against the 'moral ethnicity' which can constitute the bedrock of a civic order, is characteristical of colonial politics. Peter Ekeh (1975:92) identified the difference between civic public and the primeral public as one of the Nigeria's challenge, the former taken to be immoral aspect of rights and the latter as moral and shapened by customs and traditions. According to Ekeh, Nigeria is still trying to close the lacuna created by these two different spheres which were derieved from the colonial society, which further elicited two of rights and obligations.

Borrowing from Ekeh's point, Mamdani (1996) opines that the ethnicization of politics started with the construction of ethnicity as a legal entity that was elevated over otherwise fluid and loose characteristics of populations. This process transformed race and tribe into fixed factors in the colonial legal project (Mamdani 2002). Ethnicity became part of the colonial divide-and-rule measure used for reason of political manipulation, enforcing tax collection and extraction of wealth (Broch-Due 2005; Rubin 2006). The colonial state drove a wedge between ethnic groups by giving preferential treatment to some identity groups through the appointment of local authorities or administrative staff in the colonial offices. For example, the Belgian and French ascribed the Hemitic 'race' identity to the Tutsis in Rwanda as against the 'Bantu tribal' identity of the Hutus. This wrong categorization laid the foundation for ethnic animosity and conflict which clinched to the apex in the 1994 genocide (Prunier 1997). The skillful manipulation of ethnicity by the colonial masters bequeathed Africa's post-colonial societies pitched against themselves along with the polarities of settler (migrant) and native (indigenous) lines. These have become the trajectory around which ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Kenya rotates (Mamdani 1996:201).

Africa's post-colonial States inherited these ethnic stereotypes and manipulative patterns of power play between and sometimes within specific ethnic groups, thus planting the seeds of unhealthy competition along ethnic lines. This did not help Africa as many post-colonial successive elites continued this wicked legacy of divide-and-rule to continue to manipulate their subjects and protect their power. The rise of one party states or no-party military systems enabled these rulers to keep the lid on the simmering inter-ethnic rivalry and animosity, but the democratization process and economic reforms associated with the Structural Adjustment Program 'erased the earlier post-colonial state's claim to unencumbered hegemony' (Young

2004:43). The authority of the State also increasingly came under attack during the era of globalization. As Appadurai (1998) rightly observes, globalization has engendered inequalities, uncertainties and further widen the space for suspicion which promote primitive sensibilities and recidivist principles and ideologies, encouraging the atomization of political processes. The downward trend of the hegemonic state and socio-citizenship created opportunities for rival ethnic nationalities to confront the central-state leadership and the ruling elite.

The crisis of socio-citizenship and the confrontation against central constituted authority by weaker forces resulted in Africa's new dimensions of civil upheavals. The intent of civic citizenship anchored on a multi-ethnic nation-state that truncated the post-colonial nation-building effort across Africa is everywhere being confronted by perceptions of localized citizenship based on ethnicity. From the begining, civic citizenship needed to be inclusive in term of decision-making, economic and social opportunities and political power. Meanwhile, the donimance of patrimonial systems led to the marginalization of 'outsider' identities, and engender inequality of development and widespread animosity.

The prevalence of patrimonial systems based on ethnic identities also tended to marginalise rival ethnic groups, placing barriers along their line of progress and development (El-Battahani 2007). Consequently, what were basically cultural identities changed into political identities. Through this process of transformation, ethnicity was reinvigorated into a political force, with ethnic citizenship transforming into a counter-force to civic citizenship.

With the sudden fall of the nationalist movement that set forth Africa into independence, the one-party State was imposed widely across the continent as a symbol of 'unity-in-conformity' based on the hegemony and coercive ability of a single ethnic group or a coalition of many ethnic groups. Corruption and abuse of power became the norm as pressure mounted on civil servants to

use their positions to satisfy their own imperatives of sharing resources with kith and kin in their communities. Without any sense of causion, those communities that felt marginalized from the State and excluded by the dominant identity group often resorted self-help often very violent tactics. This happened mostly when the probabilities for survival get skyrocketed by democratic competition reducing economic opportunities, means of livelihood and heightening poverty and frustration.

This already bad situation is compounded by what has been recognized as the predatory posture of the African State. This happened when the dominant elite arrogates and personalizes the State, using it as a means of amassing ill-gotten wealth and for rewarding members of their identities. As a result of raising neo-patrimonial arrangement, the identity of the group and the leader become so gigantic emasculating other identity and social groups such as the working class, women, businessmen or youth and the intelligentsia, (Richards 2005).

Nonetheless, predation has not been limited to the dominant party as ethnic group. Other group of elite not in control of power also struggle to take charge of the State as a prize and means to manipulate the privileges of power. In some situations, where non-governing elite group have failed to seize power, this usually trigger the emergence of a parallel force excercising power based on a new social construction (Biaya 2001). Many of the coups de-tat in Africa were to a largely degree, bron of desperation to win political contest in an ethnically contested political atmosphere. Indeed, militia groups like those headed by Savimbi in Angola and Sankoh in Sierra Leone reflected this Gerard Hagg and Peter Kagwanja construct in Africa. Also, with the gradual introduction of multi-party democracy in parts of Africa, opposition political parties have joined forces along their ethnic stand point (Prah 2004).

Most often, African nations have been so ineffective and unable to act with neutrality or to command authority based on a general perception of civic citizenship. Its fragile economy characterized by serious lack of resources and enabling structures and paraphernalia have deprieved the State of its capacity to confront the challenges affecting the peace and stability of its people especially as posed by rebel identity group (Faeron & Laitin 2003:80). The example of this could be seen from the inability of previous governments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which due to their fragile nature were unable to contain with rebelling identities in areas such as the Kivu Region. Ethnic groups having affliations especially by consanguinity cross-border have also aggravated the controversy surrounding central authority in the boarder areas. This is typical of the Great Lakes Region where neighboring states have hosted hostile rebel groups (Mamdani 2002).

Many fragile States in Africa lack the wherewithal to, or are mostly unwilling to act neutrally between conflicting ethnic groups. In the same vein, lack of democratic institutions like independent judiciaries, independent electoral systems has denied identity groups of credible means by which to seek redress and demand for fairness, justice and equity. The only alternative left is for people to resort to self-help violence.

Aside their fragile and weak nature, African States has accomodated existing regimes of resource - exploitation which appears to be supportive of identities becoming instruments of conflict. Broch-Due (2005:2) rightly notes that ‘as resources dwindle and relations of wealth are re-configured in the wake of violence, identities and ideas of belonging become the point of convergence of conflict and negotiation’. It is in regard to this perspective of State failure that poverty and illiteracy have been considered as causes of identity-based conflict. However, poverty and illiteracy is on its own not a trigger of identity-based violence. Indeed, many poor African

countries have not suffered any civil war or serious challenge to the State. Inequality and uneven distribution of common patrimony between and in rare occations within identities as well as orchestrated identity-based deprivation prepare fertile ground for poverty, hate, suspicion as a source of conflict. Not surprisingly, most countries facing civil wars have deep levels of poverty, often affecting specific ethnic groups. Africa's array of youth, majority of who are unemployed have become readily available implements for recruitment by rebel groups, which tend to offer promises of jobs or other economic benefits that could alleviate their poverty status. Conversely, countries like Botswana, which have sufficient wealth, above-average income and small populations have tended to be little conflict - prone.

As noted by Kagwanja (2003), the crisis of the African State has been spiked by forces of globalization, which have deepened the continents' new forms of conflict. While the expansion of globalization was expected to open up opportunities that would ameliorate the crisis of the State, it has simultaneously globalized ethnicity and localized citizenship, creating conditions for violent conflict. Appadurai (1998) among others rightly traces the roots of the brutal surge of ethnic violence in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa to the uncertainties, anxieties and chaotic environments created by economic globalization. In this respect, conflicts in Africa are not only heavily dependent on local depredation, but also on global linkages and support. It is indeed self-contradicting that the sudden return of 'identity conflict' was percieved in liberal circles as a return of barbarism to haunt globalization.

Logically, the forces of economic globalization have ubiquitously tapped into the markets of anarchy within Africa's theatres of war, producing dynamics which have escalated and sustained civil conflicts. Conflicts within the Great Lakes region just as aptly captured by the New York University's Centre for International Corporation as having much to do with a conflict

complex or connected to local, regional and global linkages. (Gerard Hagg and Peter Kagwanja, 2012)

The direct and indirect role of the forces of economic globalization in Africa's ethnic wars also tended to transform them into 'business wars'. Africa witnessed increasing involvement of mercenary companies in civil wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in ways that carry eerie memories of colonial pillage and violence. Widely cited is the role of two British mercenary companies, Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, which aided militias in Sierra Leone to secure access to mineral-producing areas in return for direct payments and commercial concessions (Storey 1999:39-56). Notably, the area controlled by Liberia's warlord, Charles Taylor, in Sierra Leone and Liberia is said to be a supplier of hard wood in commercial quantity to France in the 1990s!

The business environment occationed by the abundance of timber and 'diamonds' in West African crisis also tend to buttress the claim that markets are capable of thriving without States at all. This view of markets in corrupt States prioritizes the gains of war over and above the human rights of those entangled in these recurrent of conflict. Weakened or eclipsed by local and regional conflicts, contemporary African states found themselves stripped of most statecraft functions and sovereignty, and increasingly under untrammeled influence by business corporations, NGOs and international aid bureaucracies' (Broch-Due 2005:3).

Many African States have degenerated and are seen by their citizenry as irrelevant in view of their inability to provide and meet the yearnings and aspirations of the people due to imposed external economic reforms. Efforts have been made to establish the primary causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa. Most of the causes were attributed to colonial manipulations of the locals and successive African elites who have proven to be more decisive than the colonial governments.

First of all, the creation of artificial National boundaries which, for administrative convenience, brought together people of different ethnic, social, and religious identities sowed most of the seeds of the problem. Second, it was also often the case that most of the colonial powers deliberately and/or inadvertently, showed favoritism towards certain groups to the detriment or annoyance of the others, Oyebade and Alao (1998). They further assert that, during the colonial rule, the structures that would create ethnic tension had been well laid. However, once colonialism had sown the seed, the development of ethnic phenomenon in post-independence era was left at the mercy of African elites that took over the mantle of leadership. Their activities started with the creation of ethnically based nationalist movements which paved the way, after independence, for weak and regional political parties, seriously compromise constitutions, fragile democratic arrangement, unstable socio – economic policies, and essentially weak structures incapable of withstanding the pressure of post – independence. This, according to Oyebade and Alao (1998) created fertile grounds on which post – independence ethnicity and ethnic related tensions were to thrive in later years in Africa.

Peace scholars like Gurian (1994) and Guttenberg (1994) are of the view that ethno-political tensions right from the end of the Cold War are a progression of a trend that began as early as the 1960s. Such conflicts, scholars believe, are a manifestation of the enduring tension between states that intend to solidify and extend their power and ethnic groups that choose to defend and promote their collective identities and interests. Oyebade and Alao (1998) opine that "most often than not, ethnic tensions become more visible when other factors create stress between two or more groups".

According to the authors, the possibility of conflict among ethnic groups is always very high due to competition for scarce resources. Also, where a State lacks the skill man-power

resources required to implement programs, the resulting frustration and disappointment may lead to heightened tension among various groups. As resources continue to shrink, highly politicized groups press their demands on the State more insistently than ever.

According to Oyebade and Alao (1998:126), various attempts in redressing previous perceived injustice in a number of African countries have heightened the propensity for ethno – political violence. Some ethnic groups believe that they are victims of persecution from other ethnic groups that have received implicit State favour. An example of ethnic conflicts that are characterized by such trend in Africa sub-region is the ethnic tension in Mauritania between the government and the principal black groups, the Toucouleur and the Soninke. These ethnic conflicts are invariably between the Arabs and the black population. Though the conflicts had been raging, it became escalated in the late 1980s. In 1984, the Force de Liberation Africaine de Mauritanians (FLAM) was formed, and in June 1986, it published the "Manifesto of the Oppressed Black Mauritanian." The manifesto denounced what it called "Mauritanians apartheid" and the "Arabization of the Mauritanian society." In the view of Oyebade and Alao (1998) this tension culminated in an attempted coup in October 1987, a move which resulted in the further repression of the Mauritanian Black population. FLAM accused the Arabian authority of dismissing more than 500 black Non – Commission Officers (NCOs) from the army. The crises later had contagious effects on the neighboring state of Mali and Senegal where the Arabs in Mali and blacks in Senegal were supportive of each other's kinsmen respectively.

In a heterogeneous society, many factors could stare the quest for self-determination. Such quest or struggle usually turns out to be ethno-political conflicts. According to Oyebade and Alao (1998), a typical case in point is a conflict in South Africa especially in the run-off to the April

1994 election. In their view, the clamor for self-determination in the country was largely a legacy of apartheid. However, South Africa is believed to have faced the greatest ethnic problem in the KwaZulu/Natal province, where the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) had since 1987, been battling with the ANC. Oyebade and Alao note that the conflict produced upwards of 10,000 casualties and left thousand more people homeless. The conflict had a dimension of civil war and had almost marred the April 1994 election, (Oyebade and Alao 1998). They are also of the opinion that although, there are other pockets of areas where they clamor for self-determination by ethnic groups has threatened national security, none in the post-Cold War era seems to have a more demonstrative effect than that in South Africa.

The desire for good governance and political liberalism has brought about an upsurge of ethnically motivated conflict in Africa. When the Liberian conflict broke out, the ethnic factor was quickly introduced into it. Among those to join the rebellion against Doe were the people from Gio/Mano ethnic group. This group was believed to have suffered most from the Krahn dominated Dio regime. What however appeared to have brought ethnicity to the fore of the conflict was the massacre in July 1990 of civilians from Gio/Mano group, who were then taking sanctuary in a church in Monrovia. The massacre was perpetrated by the Krahn dominated member of the Armed Forces of Libia (AFL). After this, the perception of the war changed, and more than any other factor, ethnicity became a key issue. This got highthened considerably in subsequent years.

i. **Ethno-cultural Organizations -**These are usually ethnic movements that draw their inspirations from their various ethnic cleavages. The movements usually involve youth members of such ethnic groups who take it upon themselves to agitate mostly in a violent

form with the sole aim of pursuing their ethno – political, cultural or economic interests. These kinds of groups, according to Imobighe (2003), in Nigeria are, Arewa People's Congress (APC), the Odua People's Congress (OPC); Ijaw Youths Council (IYC) – under which there are a lot of subgroups such as the Chikoko Movement and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force – also called the Egbesu Assembly (SEA), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); Isoko Youths Movement, the Bakassi Boys, the Tiv militias, and Yan - kalare in Gombe State to mention but a few.

Also in the view of Ayuba (2014), ethno-cultural organizations are organized violence-oriented groups drawing membership strictly from an ethnic group and whose primary aim is to promote and protect the interests of the ethnic group. They represent an extreme form of ethnic agitation for self-determination and usually adopt militant posture in their agitation.

ii. Political Violence - This is a general term that is usually applied to connote violence carried-out by either persons or governments to achieve political goals. Many ethnic groups and individuals feel that political systems being practice will never respond to their collective demands. Hence, they see violence as not only justified but also necessary in order to achieve their political yearnings and aspirations. In the same vein, most governments around the globe resort to the use of violence to intimidate and harrase their populace so as to silence them. Some other times, governments use force to defend their country from external invasion or other threats of force and to coerce other governments or territories. Political violence can be looked at from a number of forms including but not limited to those listed below.

In an effort to conceptualize political violence, (Albert, 2003) analysed violence based on Galtung's theory of conflict and violence. He noted that violence could be physical, psychological or structural. He particularly characterized physical violence as a situation where there is a physical assault, whether mild or hard. It is within this context that the research examines physical violence to include the kind of bodily attacks politicians, ethnic militias inflict upon one another at party congresses, during political party campaigns, during collation of election results at various stages and when the results are finally released. It also involves the kind of attacks security agents inflict on the ethnic militias and vice versa.

iii. Ethnic Conflict - The above phrase, ethnic conflict will naturally suggest the cohabitation of more than one ethnic group in either the same community or in communities that share boundaries. Whichever of the two extremes presents natural factors that could be regarded as conflict - triggers. For instance, if on the other hand, two or more ethnic identities cohabit in the same community, they are bound to be faced with the challenges of values, cultural disharmony, economic issues and political matters. On the other hand, when different ethnic identities share boundary they also are likely to be challenged with these same issues of land, values, culture, economy and socio-political interest.

But what could be the propensity of ethnic conflict in the global community? According to Olufemi in Albert and Oloyode (2010:249) citing Ujomu (2002:213), ethnic conflict is quite possibly the most important source of conflict bedeviling the world. Also, Mallum (2005), notes that since 1945, the world has continued to be ravaged by violent ethnic conflicts, wars, as evident in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Montenegro, Uganda, Burundi, (Hutu/Tutsi) palatines/Israelites, Middle East, Zaire, Rwanda and several others too numerous to mention.

Mallum further observes that Nigeria also has witnessed its unfortunate share of grievous ethnic conflicts in the course of its history. This is clearer from the view of Oseghae and Suberu (2005) when they said: "Nigeria presents a complex of individual as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional or communal mostly form the crux of violent conflicts in the country".

Ethnic conflicts are traceable at individual, sub-group and group levels, all of which are mutually reinforcing (Brass, 1985. However, for the purpose of this thesis, ethnic conflict is to be viewed from inter-grouped perspective. This is due to the fact that ethnic groups in most African countries mediate in the relationship between the individual and the State, (Osaghae, 1992). Osaghae observes that dangerous and debilitating ethnic conflicts are seen as those emanating from competitions among groups for state power. He opines that, control of State power is of course, the subject of political competition in Africa where the state is the "producer" of all resources and benefits which, in effect, creates an instrumentalist view of politics in which the public domain is seen as a channel for individual or partisan enrichment. The linkage between the elite, state and ethnicity is summarized as a situation where the elite mobilize identities to secure political and economic resources from the State and inevitably vest the state with considerable power to influence the nature of class and ethnic identities. The State's capacity to allocate resources and to mediate societal conflicts makes it a central link in the political process, Chazan cited in Osaghae, (1992).

Osaghae (1992) identifies certain factors that make for easy ethnic mobilization by the elite. He argues that elite mobilized ethnicity is usually easier when the elite are deeply fragmented and where there are marked inequalities among the groups in terms of socio-

economic development. Inequalities especially provide the impetus for group solidarity called forth by the elite. All of these, according to Osaghae, is not however to say that the non-elite is passive and falsely conscious. The non-elite also employ the ethnic weapon in several instances, sometimes using the elite.

To conceptualize ethnic conflict therefore, it is important to understand the concept of 'ethnicity'. Thus, Ukiwo in Lemar-Chand citing (Osaghae, 1999:11) describes ethnicity as "the employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situation of competition, conflict or cooperation". According to Olufemi in Albert and Oloyode (2010), ethnicity is viewed by scholars in two perspectives mainly – "imagined and real identities". Olufemi observes that while scholars such as Owolabi, (2003), see ethnicity as imagined identities, others such as (Otitie, 2006:62) regard it as 'real'. The definition provided by Osaghae (1996) will be adopted because it identifies certain factors for which ethnicity is usually galvanized around conflict; cooperation and competition. The implication is that the study will direct efforts towards how ethnicity could be galvanized for positive competition, cooperation and not necessarily for conflict. This is in line with the belief expressed by Osaghae and Suberu (2005), that ethnic diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict. Another issue that cropped-up from the definition is that ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental. This idea is explicated by Ukiwo in Lemar-Chand (1999) to mean that ethnicity is a product of a conscious effort by social actors. Ukiwo further explains that ethnicity encompasses the behavior of ethnic groups which are groups with ascribed membership, usually but not always based on claims or myth of common history, ancestry, language, race, religion, culture and territory. The definition of ethnicity as

opined by Nnoli (1998) will also sharpen the direction of this study. The definition suggests ethnicity as a social phenomenon associated with identity of members of the largest possible competing communal groups in a political system seeking to protect and advance their interest.

iv. Violence – Generally speaking, violence is classified into three (3) broad perspectives considering its application in any given conflict situation. Violence, according to Coady, (2008) could come within the political and sociological and philosophical perspectives. However, violence in relation to this work will be in line with "structural violence" as espoused by Galtung. Structural violence according to Coady (2008) is a form of philosophical violence which explains "a great range" of social injustices and inequalities. Newton Garver as quoted in Coady (2008) observes the institutional form of quiet violence that occur when citizens are systematically deprieved of choices given the very way and manner in which transactions normally take place. This type of institutional violence against a group usually triggers physical violence as a phenomenon presented to be a sort of response and defense against the institutional or quiet violence of their society.

However, violence is not to be restricted to philosophical or structural violence alone. Regarding this research work, the application of physical violence as explained by the Oxford English Dictionary is important. It is "the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or damage on persons or property; action or conduct characterize by this". In other words, Violence could involve actions, words, and systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage and/or prevent citizens from attaining their human potential (Fisher et al. 2000). Violence can be deeply rooted into the system of relationships, within socio-economic and

political arrangements, and also in the nature of a society and of a global system. Thus, systemic violence can on the other hand be a major reason for conflict, as well as a behavioral response to a specific conflict situation.

Johan Galtung (1969), made a clear distinction between Direct Violence, Structural Violence and Cultural Violence. These ideas are connected depending on how it operates between three inter-related forms of violence (Direct-Structural-Cultural). The Structural Violence is at the left end and Cultural Violence is at the right end of the base of a Triangle invisibly while Direct violence is on the vertex visibly.

While structural violence seeks to explain the perceived "quiet violence" of State an institution against a particular ethnic group, physical violence is conceptualized to explain the forceful respond to a given action.

v. Youth Violence – Without prejudice to some definitions given by member States (A/40/256, para. 19), the United Nations General Assembly in 1985 defined 'youth' as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years. From 1985, the global statistics on youth as collected by the statistical services of the United Nations Systems have consistently used the age cohot of 15-24. By the United Nations resolution 50/81 of 14 December, 1995, when the assembly adopted the World Programme of Action for Youth to the year 2000 and after, it emphasized that the United Nations defined youth as the age cohort of 15-24. Meanwhile, it was considered also that, despite the statistical definition, the term 'youth' could vary from one society to another around the globe and also that the definition of youth have transformed continuously due to the ever changing socio-political, economic and cultural

dynamics. This research work would adopt the definition of youth as contained in the African Youth Charter where "youth" are regarded as "every person from the ages of 15 and 35 years".

To this end, youth violence in our context is to be seen as the use of persons within the age bracket mentioned above in order to cause mayhem and inflict injury and destruction of property of State or other ethnic groups with a view to achieving an ethnic agenda. The adoption of this definition of youth is justified by the responses of our respondents who agree that most of the youth who engage in Ombatse activities fall between the ages of 15-35.

iv. Community Security - Community security is perhaps best seen as people-oriented concept used to tackle issues that cause insecurity, emanating either from the angle of peace, security or development deficits. It aims at improving the relationships between ethnic groups, authorities and institutions by providing opportunities for stakeholhers to identify their security challenges, and to plan and execute collective responses (Bennett, 2014). An end-state of Community Security is reached when the mechanisms to ensure communities can articulate their security needs and subjecting themselves under the guidance of democratic norms and the rule of law taking into cognisance especially, respect for human rights. It is context-specific and value driven, placing a premium on full community inclusiveness and participation in designing and implementing activities that reflect people's actual needs. It empowers communities to hold to account for those who should be delivering their security needs (Bennett, 2014).

In line with the policy highlighted in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), Bennett describes Community Security as one of the seven dimensions of human security with people at its centre. His thought is in agreement with the opinion reached at the 2005 World Summit were United Nations Member States recognized that "peace, security, development and

human rights are inter-related and also mutually reinforcing." According to 1994 Human Development Report, Community Security involves community safety, community-based security, community policing and other ideologies that ensure mutual respect for one another. It is also about the efforts to prevent conflict and build peace and security. Bennett (2014), notes that there is still lack of consensus on whether Community Security is an end-state or a process. Should it simply address security problems, or also their diverse causes? And should it aim at transforming behaviours and relationships or is it more geared towards institutional reform?

One is of the opinion however, that Community Security has the potential to cover all of these things depending on prevailing security circumstances and how it is applied. Thus, the working definition as provided by Bennett (2014) who considered Community Security as a people-centered approach that addresses issues of human security, conflict prevention, development and state building paradigms. Community Security should encompass anything from the development of viable livelihoods to improved harmonious coexistence, improved infrastructure, and more collaboration and cooperative relationships between diverse interests. The shape and outcomes of a Community Security process should therefore be dependent on the needs and resources available in each context, and the overall safety and security situation experienced within communities.

The 2008 United Nations' Human Security Brief identifies that the level of social violence, insecurity and social dislocation is increasing in many of the communities and countries where UNDP works (Rynn, 2009). He observes that approximately 740,000 people die as a result of armed violence each year and fewer than 55,000 of the total are direct casualties of war. Violent conflict driven by political and identity issues is still very common in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan. These drivers are accompanied by a

combination of social fracture and fragmentation of armed groups, often linked to illicit economic activities and trade in illicit arms (Rynn, 2009).

The causes and dynamics of violent conflict differ according to context and interest, and may change over time. However, common features of such conflicts include a break-down of the rule of law and of governance, and increasing levels of socio-economic inequality, social fragmentation, violent identity politics and youth unemployment, accompanied by the widespread availability of small arms (Djurdjevic-Lukic, 2014).

Violence and insecurity have a major economic impact. Conflict-affected nations usually experience a downturn in the annual growth of their economies of two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and low growth rates persist long after the shooting stops. According to Rynn (2014), the typical cost of a civil war is estimated at approximately USD 65 billion dollars. The economic cost of homicidal violence, in terms of lost productivity due to lives cut short by violence, is estimated to be between USD 38 and USD 160 billion a year globally. As much as USD 400 billion a year is considered the social cost attached to violence by individuals' living in conflict-affected countries.

Violence and insecurity also have a severe social impact, particularly on vulnerable groups such as children, women and the aged. In conflict situations, the sense of insecurity that violent conflict creates undermines social bonds that are the foundations of community security and peaceful co-existence in communities. The impact of violence and the breakdown of family ties also often result in increase in the number of female-headed households (Egbue, 2006). As women often have less access to education and economic opportunities, they tend to struggle to provide for their families, which in turn can lead to further poverty and insecurity. The breakdown

of social fabrics and erosion of social values could be seen as both of the skyrocketing levels of insecurity in the society. Where social capital does exist in fragile countries, it is often of a 'bonding' nature that holds a particular identity group (whether ethnic population, political group or gang) within a community together (and can marginalize other groups), rather than 'bridging' social capital that links different groups together.

Violence by nature is fundamentally a dynamic phenomenon. It is usually triggered by series of issues most of which are resource based while others are value based. However, according to the 2005 Human Security Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), violent conflict triggered by identity and political issues are more complicated often with devastating consequences. The report indicates that in countries such as Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Colombia, the drivers of such violence are associated and incrementally muffled by many social fracture and fragmentation of armed sects, usually connected to illegal economic activities.

2.1.4 The Nature of Violence and Insecurity

The report notes that the causes and dynamics of violence differ from place to place and do change as time moves on. It further opines the common features which include increase levels of socio-economic inequality, break-down of the rule of law, lack of good governance, social fragmentation, intense identity politics, high rate of unemployment, fueled by the seemingly availability of illegal fire-arms and rise in orchestrated crime.

2.1.5 The Impact of Violence and Insecurity

Violence and insecurity have serious economic consequences. According to the UNDP 2005 Report on Human Security, nations bedeviled by war usually experience a decline in the yearly economic growth by two percent of gross domestic product (GDP). And even after seize-

fire, the low growth rate hovers around for a very long time. In monitory terms, the report state that a whooping amount of USD 400 billion annually is regarded as the social cost attributed to violence by persons' living in conflicted-afflicted nations. Armed violence also affects national economies negatively by scarring away investment which takes out resources from productive sectors. Violence also has severe social impact, most often on the vulnerable such as women and children. The UNDP Report on Human Security 2005 opines that, evidence abounds that in conflict situations, there is a high increase in the use of rape as a weapon as exemplified in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

v. Conflict Management Strategy - Conflict management as a concept is most often misconstrued as a generic term which involves all other positive efforts that affect conflicts in non-violent ways including settlement and resolution. Woodhouse et al (2008) see it a term that could also be used to refer to the limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict, rather than the durable elimination of the causes of conflict. According to Akpuru-Aja (2007), conflict management could mean the application or the operational phase of conflict resolution. The concept actually represents enforcement mechanism, strategic responses for the achievement of the ideals and goals of conflict resolution as a peace agenda. Conflict management produces better results when all elements of imposition on both parties are practically eliminated thereby ensuring mutual consent of the conflict parties (Akpuru – Aja, 2007).

According to Oseghae (1992), ethnic management involves channeling irreconcilable conflicts into reconcilable ones or keeping conflicts in check by eliminating conditions which bring them into being or heighten them. He stresses, however, that ethnic management is far

more than this. It is premised on the acknowledgement that ethnicity cannot be eliminated, a point which, according to him, Diamond (1990:58) elevates to the level of law:

"The social sciences may have discerned few laws, it is clear that conflicts occationed by ethnicity; ethnic cleavages are not easily over-come. They are not easily suppressed especially by the use of force and they are not easily assimilated or completely wiped away. However, if managed properly, its negative effects on peace and security could dreastically be reduced."

Osaghae notes that critics may argue that ethnic management negates social dynamics because it seems to assume that ethnic conflicts are sacrosanct. He observed that such an argument would fail to see that ethnic conflicts in themselves are variable, ranging from complete disappearance at one extreme to all-pervading at another, that their hows and whys change quite often, and that a good measure of ethnic management is not how much it solves the problem once and for all which is impossible, but how adequately it responds to the changing character of ethnic conflicts.

According to Osaghae (1992) conflict management involves formulas or models which, in a democratic setting, can be used to share power and give every group a sense of belonging. This democratic requirement which renders repression or subjugation of certain groups not part of ethnic management also disqualifies several of the so-called models of conflict management which are actually models of repression. Oseghae argues for instance that, of the seven models identified by Enloe (1977:147-155) which are: divide and rule, disappointment, internal colonialism, submachine, consociational democracy, vanguard

assimilation and federalism–only federalism can be taken to be democratic. Also of the six territorial and non - territorial formulas of ethnic management he lists, only three of Duchacek's (1977) model are democratic: federalism, quasi-federalism involving decentralization in the main and quota system. Similarly, according to Osaghae, that of the hegemonial and bargaining systems preferred by Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983) only the bargaining models which include power sharing through redistribution and protection of minority rights are democratic. Of the numerous classifications, for the purposes of democratic ethnic management Osaghae finds Diamond's (1990) listing of four models most relevant. They are federalism, proportionality or ethnic balancing, minority rights and sharing or rotation of power, through coalition or consensus arrangement at the centre.

Conflict management is a process and involves a whole gamut of early warning system, peace education, conflict avoidance or conflict prevention by peace making, peace keeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict confidence building measures (Akpuru – Aja, 2007).

The other is that conflict management is wholly interventionist and, as a process, it is a better option that works towards a win-win situation rather than the legal approach. This is found in the capacity building of conflict management mechanism to introduce remedies either to prevent undesirable conflict behaviour, hostile attitudes and action or to prevent a degeneration of conflict tendencies in the post-conflict phase. Remedy works at every conflict phase because concessions and humanitarian concerns are ingredients of conflict management strategies; it would delay (perhaps dangerously) the processes of mutual dialogue, conciliation and mutual concessions.

Vi Security - Security is of great importance to human existence. The concept is used differently depending on the circumstance or issue at stake. It is a broad and vague concept which is hardly agreed upon by scholars (Gallie, as quoted in Schafer 2013). This conceptual vagueness makes it hard to find a consensors for discussion. Usually, security is a dependent variable. It is always related to individual or societal value systems, (Schafer 2013). For instance, the concept is usually associated with other terms like Food Security, National Security, Regime Security, Social Security, Human Security and a host of others. One feature commonly shared by all the different forms of security is some sort of threat and the quest for protection (Williams 2008, p. 5). Every stakeholder concerned with gives talking about security assigns different meanings to the term. According to (Nye as cited in Schafer, 2013) the assumptions of the realist theory of international relations that security is the dominant concern for States, that force is the major instrument, that governments use to preserve their unity as they interact with one another. Security is said to be achieved if threats to security are eliminated managed. Nye (1988) asserts that, contrary to realist theory, social constructivism perceives security as resulting from the interactions of various actors, with social values and identities influencing these relations. In this light, security is therefore seen as inter-subjective; achieved through by a process of interaction and negotiation. If the view on security has changed, and the suspicion of one another is eliminated, security is achieved (Ulusoy 2003). Most important to be considered in this context is the distinction between security in an 'objective sense' (absence of threats) and in a 'subjective sense' (absence of fear) (Wolfers in Schafer, 2013). He notes that security is achieved once both components exist. It is in this context that in this research is to be premised. This suggests that community security in Nasarawa State is to be anchored on the process of interaction and negotiation so as to eliminate factors that create both threats and fear in the community.

Security as a concept has been looked at and interpreted narrowly for so long. It is seen as security of territory from external aggression, and also protection of national interests in foreign policy. It is seen to be more concerned about nation-states than to the citizens. The feelings of insecurity for many today stems from uncertainties about daily life more than from the fears of killings and destruction of property. Job security, social security, income security, food security, health security, environmental security, security of lives and property – these are growing concerns of human security all over the world.

Other literatures relating to the evolution of Eggon and the seeming modification and re-invention of culture to confront contemporary challenges of the Eggon ethnic group are also reviewed below.

2.2.1 The Relationship between Ethno-cultural Militias and Community Insecurity

Ethno-cultural militias are groups of ethnic movements that draw their inspirations from their various ethnic cleavages. The movements usually involve youth members of such ethnic groups who take it upon themselves to agitate mostly in a violent form with the sole aim of pursuing their ethno-political, cultural or economic interests. Some of these ethnic militia group according to Imobighe (2003), include but not limited to Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); the Odua People's Congress (OPC); Arewa People's Congress (APC), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) – under which there are a lot of subgroups such as the Chikoko Movement and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force – also called the Egbesu Assembly (SEA); Isoko Youth Movement; the Bakassi Boys; the Tiv militias; and Yan - kalare in Gombe State to mention but a few.

Various reasons, whether perceived or real, are always given for the emergence of such ethno-cultural militias. For instance, Adebanwi (2005) sees the emergence of the Odua People's Congress (OPC) in Yoruba South West Nigeria as a response to perceived ethno-cultural domination and discrimination on the part of the Hausa-Fulani 'north', and the disparagement of their cultural dignity. Subaltern Yoruba youths re-asserted the dignity of their ethnic group by 'returning to culture'. According to Adebanwi, the annulment by the Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida's military regime of june 12, 1993 general election which was widely adjudged to have been won by a Yoruba descendant - Moshood Abiola formed the immediate backdrop to the creation of the OPC, which took its name from the shortened form of that of the mythical progenitor of the Yoruba people, Oduduwa (O'odua). From the preceding socio-political events, the group concluded that the rival Hausa-Fulani had resolved to emasculate the other ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly the Yoruba. However, matters did not come to a head for the OPC founders until 1994, when General Sani Abacha, Babangida's army chief, seized power from the ambivalent Interim National Government (ING) in November 1993, 84 days after Babangida was forced to hand over power. Abacha consolidated his hold on power and appeared ready for a long haul in office. Abiola then declared himself President in June 1994, and was later arrested, detained and put on trial. The arrest and trial were seen by the Yoruba in general and the OPC in particular as the height of injustice.

The OPC ethno-cultural group battle to validate the annulled June 12 election results pitched southerners, particularly the Yoruba west, against the Hausa-Fulani north (Adebanwi, 2005). The group's activities, its perception of the socio-political process, its version of Yoruba history, and the violent perhaps violent character of its politics, led to violent clashes, initially with members of other ethnic groups, and eventually, with the Nigerian state. There was the

attempt to construct a boundary that divides the Yoruba from the Hausa-Fulani, which seems to understate the internal 'boundaries' and divisions that members of the group also constructed in their battle for legitimacy. This struggle for legitimacy is usually observed from the practices of the group, particularly in terms of rituals and violence.

Another ethno-cultural organization that propagates ethnic agenda in Nigeria is the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). It is an Igbo ethno-cultural organization that advocates the Independent State of Biafra (AFP 2 Dec. 2000). The leaders of this group see it as a struggle in progress stemming from the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 led by Emeka Odumegu Ojukwu. They afterward "surrendered defeat to the Federal government in 1970 in a 30-month civil war which was said to have claimed over one million lives (*Dawn* 29 May 2000). What was allegedly the factor that led to the civil war was also the issue of ethnic marginalization and political exclusion of the Igbos by the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Nigeria. After so many years of the declaration of cease-fire, Ralph Uwazurike re-kindled the struggle for the secession of the Igbo people of the South Eastern Nigeria (*Dawn* 29 May 2000). MASSOP at various times hosted the Biafran flag and displayed Biafra currency subtle call for the declaration of independence of the Biafran state (*Post Express* 12 May 2000; 20 Apr. 2000). According to *Dawn*, the Igbos have maintained that the need for a "New Biafra" is as a result of "organized killing of our kinsmen in Nigeria" (29 May 2000).

While the Uwazurike's struggle was characterized by peaceful agitation, a splinter group of the Biafra agitation led by Nnamdi Kanu embarked on violent campaign against the Nigerian state. Nnamdi's faction is known as the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB). IPOB at various times also threatened the nation's peace in many ways such as declaring publicly its own army,

hoisting its flag, declaration and enforcement of Sit-at-Home Protest, promoting several confrontations at check points and market places between the IPOB militia and the Nigerian Army especially during the Operation Python Dance II, nick-named 'Operation Ogueke' executed by the 82 Division of the Nigerian Army in order to sanitize and flush out unwanted elements like kidnappers, cultists, armed robbers and also to curtail the activities of the IPOB members in the South East Nigeria (Vanguard New Paper of 27 Sept; 2017). IPOB has also engaged in hate speeches vowing to storm the 'zoo' and make life unlivable for its inhabitants and their clueless leaders? However, in the struggle for the Igbo socio-political and economic emancipation, the Ohanaeze Indigbo is an elderly and most responsible Igbo association which though shares the sentiment of socio-economic and political exclusion of the Indigbo, it has continuously treaded the path of mutual dialogue and sensitization of successive government to the need to take deliberate actions that will restore the confidence of the people of Igbo extraction and give them a sense of belonging to the Nigerian project. The President General of the Ohanaeze Ndigbo, Chief John Nwodo, explained on several occations that the agitation for the restoration of Biafra is not the Igbo agenda, that the campaign for physical federalism other wise known as restructuring remains the stand of Ndigbo in the ongoing national debate regarding the future of this nation (Vanguard Newspaper, Oct. 6, 2017).

According to the President General of Ohanaeze, the call for the actualization of Biafra is a tall order considering the constitutional stumbling-blocks, noting that struggle for Biafra's restoration will not be in the overall interest of the Indi-Igbo in their socio-political and economic relationships with other parts of the country.

In response to the continuous hate speeches and threat to lives and property of northerners leaving and doing legitimate businesses and a threat to the peaceful co-existence of the entire country, some Northern youth groups under the auspices of Arewa Youth Consultative Forum, AYCF, had convoked a meeting on Tuesday, June 6, 2017 and afterwards gave a three month ultimatum to the Igbos in the 19 northern states with immediate effect to leave the region or be ready for the consequences. The groups, which issued the warning in response to the demand by some Igbos for actualisation of Biafra, threatened to forcefully evict the Igbos if they failed to leave the north by October 1. This caused a lot of tensions and various ethnic nationalities residing in either side of the divide, that is, north and south east were beginning to re-locate to their various regions while abandoning their means of livelihood. Although the threat of 'quit notice' issued to the Igbos in the north and not lead to destruction of lives and property in the north, it however heightened the tension and hate on the northerners leaving in some south east states and some south - south States like Rivers State where some northerners where alleged to have been killed. The movement order issued by the coalition of Arewa Youth reads as thus:

"With the effective date of this declaration, which is today, Tuesday, June 6, 2017, all Igbo currently residing in any part of Northern Nigeria are, hereby, served notice to relocate within three months and all northerners residing in the South-East are advised likewise,"Shettima, (2017)note that by this declaration, all pressure groups in the north are to mobilize for sustained, coordinated campaigns at their respective state to ensure every Indigbo leaves the north and was capable of balkanizing the country."

Similar to what the Ohaneze Indigbo stands for in the struggle for Biafra in the South East, a leading pan-Northern group, the Arewa Consultative Forum, ACF, reacted to the ultimatum by a coalition of youth groups in the north that Igbos should leave the North.

The ACF spokesperson, Muhammad Biu, disowned the coalition, saying Nigeria's laws guaranteed her citizens free movement to any part of the country.
It warned the youths against any act or utterances that could threaten the corporate existence of the country.

"ACF wishes to draw the attention of all concerned, to note, that our democratic system of government which is anchored on law guarantees free movement of all Nigerians to any part of the country and to also pursue their legitimate livelihood devoid of any hindrance or molestation by any group or individuals".

"Furthermore, the system allows settlement of all grievances through our elected representatives in both the National and States Assemblies and the Law courts. Any act to the contrary, is therefore, a breach of law and order that are not helpful".

"ACF appreciates the frustrations of the Northern Youth Groups with the activities of MASSOB and IPOB members, but would not encourage any act that is not in conformity with the law by any group or individuals which will do no one any good".

"ACF therefore, appeals for caution over unguarded utterances or statements that are capable of jeopardizing the unity, peace and corporate existence of Nigeria", he said (Daily post Newspaper, June 8, 2017)".

From all of the above, it could be deduced that the protracted and intensity of some of the ethno – cultural and political conflicts in Nigeria and Africa is, on one interpretation, due to opposition by marginalized ethnic groups against "ethnic dictatorship (Jinadu, 2007)." These conflicts according to him reflect the recourse of marginal and dominated ethnic groups to armed political struggle to underscore their demands for inclusion and meaningful participation in governmental processes. The violent response of the State to their demand for inclusion led them to resort to violence or armed resistance to counter the State-sponsored violence against them.

In this way, ethno-political conflicts have understandably been both the outcome and an indirect cause of the economic, political and socio-cultural crisis of the state in Nigeria and similarly in Africa as a whole (Jinadu, 2007).

From the above also, it is easily fathomed there is established relationship between ethno-cultural militia and community insecurity.

2.2.2 Historical Antecedents to the Ombatse Conflict in Nasarawa State

The creation of twelve (12) States out of the regional governments by the General Yakubu Gowon's administration in 1962 saw the Nasarawa State as part of the defunct Benue Plateau State, which comprised the old Benue Plateau Provinces. Plateau Province then, comprised the former Akwanga Division, which presently, consist of Wamba, Nasarawa Eggon and Akwonga Local Government Areas. The defunct Benue Province comprised former Lafia and Keffi, Nasarawa, Toto, Karu, Kokona Local Government Areas of Nasarawa State.

General Mutala Muhammed administration in 1976 saw the need for more States and thereby created seven more to make up 19 States in the Federation. This arrangement further split the former Benue and Plateau States respectively. To this end, the Nasarawa State of today (2019) came under the defunct Plateau State. On precisely 1st October, 1996, the military government of late General Sani Abacha went on to create more States and that incident gave birth to the present day Nasarawa State (source: the Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report on the killing of Nigerian Security Forces in Alako village, March 2014). Nasarawa State is configured into three (3) Senatorial Zones, namely: Nasarawa North, Nasarawa South and Nasarawa West senatorial districts. The Nasarawa South Senatorial District comprises of Awe, Lafia, Doma, Keana and Obi Local Government Areas. The indigenous ethnic groups of the senatorial district include the Alago, Gwandara, Eggon, Kanuri, Mighili, Tiv, Hausa, Agatu, Rindre, Akhe and Fulani. It is pertinent to mention that other ethnic nationalities such as the Yorubas and Igbos who have coexisted for decades in peace and harmony with aforementioned indigenous ethnic groups. The south senatorial zone shares boundary with Benue State in the South, Taraba State East and Plateau State in the North-east. It is the theatre of the Ombatse conflict in Nasarawa State (source: the Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report on the killing of Nigerian Security Forces in Alakio village, Mach 2014).




Figure 1: Map of Nasarawa State showing 13 Local Government Areas
Source: http://article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.phr.20140401.02.shtml

According to Afribarometer (cited in Albert and Oloyode, 2010), one peculiar characteristic of this ethnic conflict is the formation of youth's militia wings of each of these ethnic groups who usually take it upon themselves to agitate and fight including unleashing violence on other ethnic groups or agencies of State. Thus, the focus of this work would be to

discuss the factors that led to the formation of the Ombatse youth movement of the Eggon ethnic group and the relationship of the later with the "Ombatse ethnic conflict in Nasarawa State."

The major ethnic conflict that bedevilled the Nasarawa people even before the creation of state in 1996 was between the Bassa and Igbira ethnic groups in the then Toto Local Government Area of Nasarawa West Senatorial District as inherited from former Plateau State. This conflict, according to the Judicial Panel of Inquiry report on the killing of security forces in Alakio 2014 was managed and reconciled by the first civilian administration under the leadership of Governor Abdullahi Adamu in the year 2000. The report further chronicled other ethnic conflicts such as between Fulani herdsmen and Tiv farmers in 2011 around boarder communities of Nasarawa and Benue state; Fulani herdsmen and Mighili farmers in Obi Local Government and also between Funali and Agatu in Doma Local Government Areas of Nasarawa South Senatorial District in April 2012.

The situation above was rightly captured in a statement made by Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu during a broadcast to the state on July 2, 2001, when he said "…our State has been characterized by violent ethnic agitations. Relationships built over centuries have suddenly being battered. Men, women, children and the aged have been slaughtered and matcheted in a gory manner. Pregnant women were not just murdered; their unborn babies forcefully removed and placed on dead mothers. Properties of family members such as farm land, building, cars have either been looted or destroy. Several thousands of people have been rendered internally displaced in their ancestral homes. This crude violence should not be meted to even animals. The wide spread pervasiness and the intensity of such cruety have the tendency to portray Nigerina and Nigerians as barbaric in the community of nations.

Thus, the judicial panel of inquiry report also captures the various attacks and counter-attacks by the different ethnic organizations. For instance, according to the report, the Ombatse conflict started with skirmishes between the Alago and Eggon youths of Assakio town of Lafia Local Government Area in the Nasarawa South Senatorial District in June, 2012; Ombatse youth alleged attack on the Mighili Ethnic Group in Agyaragu (Jankwe) in Obi local government area on 21st to 22nd November, 2012; Ombatse or Eggon youths alleged blocking of the Nasarawa Eggon section of Akwanga-Lafia-Makurdi federal highway on 17th November, 2012 for several hours thereby obstructing free flow of traffic and committing all forms of vices against unsuspecting travelers; alleged killings of about a hundred Nigerian Security Personnel comprising members of the Nigerian Police Force and the Department of State Security Services on the 7th of May, 2013 in Alakio village in Lafia local government area of Nasarawa south senatorial district. The report states that the following towns and villages were violently attacked: Kwandare and Barikin Abdullahi (B.A.D) in Lafia local government area; Agyaragu in Obi Local Government Area; Obi town, Alakio, Arikya, Shabu, Burunm-Burum in Doma local government area; Bassa and Yelwa in Kokona local government area. Daily Trust of Wednesday, July 31, 2013, Leadership of Thursday, June 27, 2013, The Nation of Wednesday September 25, 2013, Vanguard of Wednesday, June 26, 2013; have variously captured the different ethnic conflict scenarios as mentioned above. Also Saturday Sun of September 21, 2013 and Nigerian Tribune, Monday, 17 November, 2014 are points of reference.

Table 1: Selected Incidents of Ethnic Violence between Ombatse Militia and Other Ethnic Groups in Nasarawa State

S/n	Year	Place	Ombatse and other ethnic groups	Effects
1.	2007	Asakio Lafia East	Ombatse and Alago	The Eggon people lost some of their people and their houses were burnt down (*Report of the Nasarawa State Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 2013*).

2.	2012	Bassa Area	Ombatse and Fulani	The Eggon people fled their homes, and they lost some of their people and property. (*Report of the Nasarawa State Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 2013*)
3.	2012	Asakio, Lafia East LGA	Ombatse and Alago	Some Mighili and Eggon communities, farm produce were destroyed. (Leadership [Abuja], July 1; Daily Trust [Lagos], January 19).
4.	2012	Several villages and hamlets in Lafia LGA like kwandare, Daddare, and Burumburum in Doma LGA	Ombatse and Fulani	Many were killed and the dead were mutilated by machetes. (*Daily Trust [Lagos], January 19*).
5.	2012	Allogani, Nasarawa Eggon LGA	Attempted arrest of Ombatse chairman and secretary during oath taking in the sect's shrine.	Three soldiers were shot and later in the day the Ombatse barricaded the Lafia – Akwanga, Abuja Road and smashed cars and macheted people suspected to be of enemy ethnic groups. (*Vanguard [Lagos], December 22, 2012*).

6.	2012	Agyaragu, Lafia LGA	Ombatse attack on Mighili	Very many Mighili people were killed. Over 50 houses including the palace of the village chief (The Zhi - Mighili) were burnt to ashes. (*Daily Independent [Lagos], December 12, 2012*)
7.	2013	Some remote villages in Nasarawa State.	Omabtse and Fulani	Very many people lost their lives and herds of cattle were killed. (Royal Times of Nigeria, January 14; Daily Trust [Lagos], January 19).
8.	2013	Akwanga LGA	Ombatse and Security Personnel	Several Ombatse members were killed while trying to prevent the seizure of a cache of arms and ammunition (*Royal Times of Nigeria January 14*).
9.	2013	Remote villages in Nasarawa Eggon and Lafia LGAs	Ombatse and other ethnic groups	Serious lost of lives and properties on both sides (*Sunday Trust [Lagos], February 10; Leadership [Abuja], March 22*).
10.	2014	Daddare, Assakio and other Eggon communities all in Lafia and Nasarawa Eggon LGAs.	Ombatse versus other ethnic groups	People were displaced as homes, market places were destroyed and many lives lost.

11	2013	Akwanga, Military Check-point	15 allerged Ombatse militia killed by soldiers.	The incident caused serious pannick and traffic grid-lock along the Keffi-Akwanga and Akwanga – Lafia roads respectively (EggonNews, Sept. 16 – Oct. 15, 2014).
12	2014	Alakyo in Lafia East LGA.	About 99 policemen and 10 personnel of State Security Service were killed and their dead bodies along with their operational vehicles were burnt to ashes.	This threw the country into state of mourning. Villagers particularly in Eggon communities have vacated their homes in palpable fear of reprisal attack from the police and the DSS (PremiumTimes, May 10, 2013).

Source: Researcher survey of Newspapers and the Report of Nasarawa State Judicial Commission of Inquiry on Ombatse crises 2013

2.2.3 Ombatse Youth and the History of Ethnic Militia in Nigeria

Ethnic Youth Movements in Nigeria are mostly organized violence – oriented groups which usually draw membership strictly from their ethnic groups and are established to aggressively promote and protect the interest of their ethnic groups (Ayuba, 2014). Ayuba is of the opinion that ethnic militias are extreme forms of ethnic agitation for self determination. He opines that they serve as social pressure group designed to influence the structure of power to the advantage of their group or social environment and, in so doing; they call attention to deteriorating material conditions the political and economic deprivation and also the perceived marginalization, of the Eggon ethnic group. He, therefore, asserts that an ethnic militia is an armed group with an ethnic agenda that involves the use of violence and coercion to achieve its objectives. While it is important to mention that the above viewpoint has captured the essence and motives for which ethnic militias are formed, it is important to also stress some of their characteristics of not being easily amenable to negotiation and conciliation. Such groups usually do not believe in other group opinions and, therefore, it is either they get what they want or they continue to carry out mayhem against their perceived enemy.

Other scholars see the emergence of ethnic militia groups from the angle of much freedom and tolerance that democracy provides. Hence, the current democratic experience from 1999 is seen to have given the impetus for the proliferation of ethnic extremist groups. For instance, Ezeh and Ndukaihe (2017) contend that the advent or restoration of the current democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, led to the emergence of the proliferation of many vigilante groups, ethnic militia groups and separatist groups in the country. These militant groups essentially were formed to defend and protect the interest of different ethnic groups in the country. Ezeh and Ndukaihe (2017) further suggest that these militia groups and their violent activities are more pronounced

under the current democratic dispensation than the past military administrations. Their emergence might be hinged on the relative liberal environment created by plural democracy with its degree of tolerance and openness where different shades of opinions are expressed.

Ezeh and Ndukaihe have cited Okechukwu (2003) to buttress the assertion that the freedom provided and guaranteed by the current democratic rule coupled with many years of military rule influenced some aggrieved Nigerians who later begin to take advantage of freedom of expression and association as provided by the tenet of democracy to form militia groups along ethnic/sectional/religious lines as means of seeking redress and settling of old scores. Some also were formed to serve as political pressure groups in order to be relevant in the current political scheme of things.

Indeed, the view expressed above seems to have captured the scenario that led to the emergence of the Ombatse Youth Group in Nasarawa State. However, the opinion has dwelt more with the practice of democracy as reason for the proliferation of ethnic militia groups but has somehow been unable to address the socio-cultural, political, economic and other structural factors that prepare a wet ground for the emergence of ethno-cultural militia group. This, among others, will be the focus of this research.

Otite (2012) in *Ethnic Militia Threat to Democracy and Security in Nigeria.* Otite observes that today Nigeria is enmeshed with conflicts mostly traceable to militant ethnicity", with its grave, social, economic, political and human costs. Among the most critical and indeed most violent of this new brand of political forces unleached and which many have referred to as 'resurgence' according to Otite (2012) is the intractable phenomenon of ethnic nationality/identity movements. He further observes that this development has taken on the guise of ethnic militia movements purportedly seeking to protect different ethnic interests in a country in which the State

is strongly perceived as nonchalant to the yearnings and aspirations of the ethnic nationalities in the country. Otite also posit that the successful transition to democratic rule in May 1999 unleashed a series of hitherto oppressed and inactive political forces such as the ethnic militias some of which, according to him, include the Chikoko Movement, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and the Niger Delta militias like the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA). Others that are more active and whose impacts are more felt are the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), the O'odua Peoples Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB).

While aligning myself with the submissions made by Otite as expressed above, it is important to state that his work has concentrated much on the consequences of violent ethnic conflict in terms of social, political, economic and human costs. However, there was less effort to investigate the socio-economic, political and possible structural factors that could be the trigger for the eventual emergence of ethnic militias/movements with their attendant violence against both innocent and perceived enemy. These are the gaps that this research intends to fill.

2.2.4 Re-invented Traditions/Cultural Practices used to re-unite the Eggons

a. Azhili: This is an ancestral shrine of the Eggon people. It is a worship centre where the Eggons make sacrifices to the god (*Ahogbren*) for prosperity in their businesses, educational pursuit. The Eggon usually wound go to Azhili to cry to the ancestors and the Supreme Being for peace, progress and development of their people (Eggon News December, 2011). Azhili as a shrine is to be found naturally in all Eggon communities. However, the Ombatse youths have centralized all spiritual activities in relation to its struggle to the Azhili shrine at Alogani in Nasarawa Eggon North (Danladi, 2017). Thus, the Ombatse in an interview granted to Eggon News by Mr Haruna Musa Kigbu, the Chairman of Ombatse mentioned that, on noticing some misbehaviors by the Eggon youths and lack of political unity of the Eggon nation, the Ombatse had run to Azhili and *"cried out and prayed for progress in education, farming and business. We observed the increasing rate of social crimes - theft, fornication and other ills. He also observed that there's no unity in Eggon land especially in politics. We then cried out. That was how we receive"* (Eggon News December, 2011).

b. Ashim: Also re-invented, is the traditional or cultural practice of the Eggon ethnic group during the Ombatse ethnic conflict is the ***Ashim*.** It is a term used to describe an ancestral god. It is represented by a traditionally decorated object which can only be handled by the chief priest of Azhili. The chief priest uses it for oath taking, send away evil spirit from the land. It is also used for protection, blessings and punishment for evil-doers (Danladi, 2017).

An average Eggon man or woman has the belief that there is a supreme being found beyond the sky with unlimited and omnipotent powers. He is referred to as "*Ahogbren*". *It* is a

deity of Ashim shrine who has power over everything and whose capacity to punish any other creature cannot be mitigated by any other power. The Eggons are of the belief that *Ahogbren* is everywhere, and will therefore never fail to judge and punish all wicked people (Danladi, 2017). In this manner, it is further believed that anybody who involves himself in any form of atrocity, social evils or act of wickedness is expected to await the wrath of the "*Ahogbren"* through "*Angbashim"* which is like an angel that punished offenders on the instruction of the high god.

According to Danladi, the most common symptoms of *Ahogbren's* punishment on its victim is protruded stomach. In other words, in Eggon communities, most of the male folk seen with protruded stomach will be suspected of having committed one sin or another against the deity of Ashim cult. Also, Danladi observed that with the exception of the women who are in their menopause, other younger women are not allowed to partake in any of the Ashim rituals. The young women will not eat any food prepared to celebrate Ashim and they will not go near the shrine either.

c. Idols: Other than Ashim, there are other small gods that have direct influence on, and enjoy sacrifices from, individuals, families or clans. Such gods are represented by objects like cowries, stones, calabash and some animal skins (Danladi, 2017). He further identifies other classes of gods like *Gbugwu, Lahupu, Eshu, Ennah, etc* whose duties to humans are to provide sustenance, protect and provide cure for ailments. According to Danladi, all these gods are worshipped through "*Lolo*" at the end of which important sacrifices are made. Also as a mark of honor, important festivals are annually celebrated during which only initiated men into the "Ashim cult" can freely participate and feast. It is worthy of mention at this juncture that all the ascribed individuals or clanish gods derive their powers from the most high god, *Ahogbren*. Also worthy of mention, is the manipulation of culture and tradition in a manner that every Eggon is

made to rely less on his/her clan's or individual gods for protection and successes in war while relying solely on the power of Azhili deity. In this sense, the Ombatse was able to bring together all Eggons under one umbrella with the determination to doggedly fight for a common cause.

Initiation rites into Ombatse Cult were one aspect of cultural practices that were manipulated to entice the unsuspecting and already overwhelmed Eggon people into joining the Ombatse cult en masse. The initiation rites are characterized by fetish and cultic acts involving the horn of a special undisclosed animal decorated with cowries, feathers of other unique birds which is referred to in local parlance as "*Ekpirbi Angbe*". Incantation is made in the process at the end of which the Ombatse priest who is the one that carries out the initiation rites then sounds a note of warning that on accepting such initiation, there is no room for pulling out of the cult else, one will be met with grave consequences (Danladi, 2017). Also, in an interview granted to Eggon News, 2011, the chairman of Ombatse corroborated that at the end of the initiation and before launching the Ombatse fighters into war, a bullet - proof black vest, cap, rings, amulets and a herbal powder which is also known in the Eggon local parlance as "*Ummu*" is soaked in water to be taken by them.

Essentially, these ritual practices whose efficacies seemed to have been established during some major clashes between the combined security agencies of Government and the Ombatse militia became a convincing factor for large followership from Eggon ethnic group. Subsequently, the cultural and traditional strength of Ombatse became a tool for violent political negotiation. For instance, in one of such incidents, Ombatse was said to have gone to Azhili shrine at Alogani to seek for blessings and guidance of the deity of Ashim before it set out for its campaign against societal ills which later transformed into political struggles. According to Danladi (2017), it was on one of such occasions of seeking the blessings, guidance and protection of "*Ahogbre*" in the

Azhili shrine in Alogani in 2012 that the combined patrol team of both military and police invaded the shrine and started shooting sporadically at the Ombatse people. This was, according to him, the first incident that gave impetus to the call and struggle of Ombatse as Eggon people mostly were made to believe that, though soldiers shot sporadically on the Ombatse adherents, the bullets were said to be ineffective because they couldn't penetrate any of them due to the protection that they got from the Ashim Shrine. Instead, it was reported by national dailies that during the altercation two soldiers were shot. This made most of the Eggon youths start embracing the call to join the Ombatse cult which, if - for nothing, can assure them of protection against enemies and security operatives. The fear of Ombatse even by Eggon themselves due to its strength of protection and capacity to unleash mayhem or punishment is so strong that even some clergy man of all faiths consult the Ombatse priest for protection and other related matters (Ayi in Danladi, 2017).

Principally, the firm belief of Ombatse adherents in charms, amulets, native bullet - proof and other fetish practices acquired during initiation at the 'Azhili Shrine' made them feel highly protected from the impact of any form of small arm and light weapon. This further gave them the impetus to attack not only the ethnic groups that were perceived as enemies but also to confront government security personnel with fierce courage (Premium Times, online, 22 May, 2013). This assertion is buttressed by one of the 9 police officers who survived the ambush by Ombatse as he said "the heavy fire of the security forces was futile, as bullets were not penetrating them" (Leadership [Abuja], May 10, 2013). Also as captured in Global Journal of Political Science and Administration Vol 3, No. 3, pp-58-73, 2015, "Nasarawa State became a notorious global conflict spot, when news broke that about 90 officers and men of the Nigeria Police, as well as other members of personnel were murdered in Alakyo village during the operation. During the

operative, the security personnel killed further were set ablaze beyond recognition. A senior police officer while recounting this ordeal described it as “the most cold-blooded act I have witnessed against the law enforcement agency in my thirty years of service in the Nigerian Police Force” (Premium Times [Abuja], May 10, 2013). This triggered a huge outcry in the country including large scale protests by the wives, families and friends of the deceased who dressed up in complete black attire depicting the state of mourning along Akwanga – Nasarawa Eggon, Lafia Road. This, of course, paralyzed the free flow of traffic especially those going to Jos, Abuja Lafia and Makurdi. This particular tragedy was however, the climax as there were unannounced killings, invasions, arsons and protracted bloody ethnic violence between and involving the Eggon, and other ethnic group like Alago, Tiv, Mighili, Mada, Gwandara, Bassa and Fulani.

During the Ombatse ethnic conflict, some major incidents of security breach were identified as corner - stone leading to the unity of Eggon for the purpose of negotiation of power. Some of these incidents include the massacre of the Nigeria Police and some of the Department of State Security Services personnel. The infamous invent of 7 May, 2013 leading to the massacre of about a 100 policemen and 10 personnel of the DSS was another symbolic milestone that epitomized the spiritual strength and capacity of Ombatse. According to the assistant chief priest of Ombatse in an interview on 2nd April, 2018 at his residence in Nasarawa Eggon town, this incident made the Eggon youths all over the State have unwavering confidence in the Ombatse thereby leading to many Eggon youths joining the group in order to also gain this spiritual fortification against all forms of weapons. Although it was a sad day for the government of Nasarawa State and its security agencies, it was a triumph that led to the youth of Eggon extraction, believing more strongly in what they stand to gain by joining the Ombatse cult.

In the same vein, the 2015 gubernatorial election in Nasarawa State and the numerical strength of Eggon ethnic group was another factor that gave impetus to the unity of Eggon ethnic group in the State. The Eggon has on severally occation claimed of being with highest population and therefore holding the belief that if all Eggons vote for a sole Eggon governorship candidate under whatever platform the candidate can win election without the support of any ethnic group. In an interview conducted with the Ombatse counsel in Lafia on the 6 April, 2018, the renowned barrister did not only agree with this claim but further narrated from what transpired at the Judicial Panel of Inquiry into the ethnic crises in Jenkwe, Obi local government. He stressed that the present Emir of Lafia while giving his testimony before the panel said that the 1953 census shows that 51% population of the then Lafia Division which is the present day Nasarawa State excluding Akwanga was the Tiv ethnic group followed by the Eggon ethnic group occupying several communities. He further notes that when Nasarawa State was to be created from Plateau State, there was the general belief that it was going to be created for the Eggons due to their numerical strength compared to others. Thus, it was with such belief in mind that Eggon ethnic group approached the 2015 election, that if all of its kinsmen would vote for its sole candidate, it was sure of victory. Consequently, according to Danladi, men and women of Eggon extraction were forced to be initiated and to swore before the powers of Ashim that they must not only vote, but must vote for the Eggon candidate who then was believed to be Solomon Ewuga. To this end, all have passed through the initiation process naked before the chief priest to take a spiritual bath before finally swearing before Ashim by pledging total submission to the cause of Ombatse.

It is important to recall that women especially of younger age are not allowed to participate in all forms of rituals at the Azhili shrine. But for the purpose of achieving total unity of Eggon ethnic group in its fight for the negotiation of power, every Eggon including women of

younger ages was coerced to swear before Ashim that it was only The Eggon gubernatorial candidate was to be voted for.

2.2.5 Impact of Ombatse Cultural Belief on the Eggon People

The Eggon as an ethnic group is a group of people whose traditional belief centered around “Ashim Cult”, derieving its powers over the Eggon people from their ancestors. It is also a place where administration of oath is carried out. This Supreme Being is also known as “Ahogbre” having powers over everything and with nothing beyond its knowledge. The Eggons believe that “Ahogbre” is beyond the reach of man and therefore can only be communicated to through the “Ashim” by the priest (Danladi, 2017).

Ombatse allegedly came into being as a result of a revelation received in a dream commanding the male Eggons to clense the society and rid it of immoral acts such as promiscuity, adultery, crime, alcohol consumption and smoking (Daily Trust (Lagos), November 25, 2012). In an interview with BBC Hausa programme monitored on May 10, 2013, an Ombatse adherent described the group’s major focus as to purify not only its members but the entire community from social evils such as alcoholism, sexual intercourse and stealing. He maintained that “Our members are highly moral and dedicated to their cause only” and also identified the founders and leadership of the group as - chairman being Haruna Musa zico Kigbu, group secretary - Zubairu Musa Akwanshiki, Sgt. Alaku Ehe, Shuaibu Alkali, Iliyasu Hassan Gyabo and Abdullahi Usman.

The Eggons whether Christians or Muslims, have reasonable respect for and belief in their ancestral way of worship and can easily be mustered along their tradition especially if the general interest of Eggon is at stake. The Ombatse does not have problem with the mode of prayers or worship of the two religions. It is important to resort to their traditional and ancestral belief because that is the only way there can achieve unity amongst the Eggons irrespective of

individual religious creed (Eggon News December, 2011). An average Eggon is very tolerant, accommodating and peaceful and, by extension, the Ombatse is not ordinarily a violent organization as people may want to understand. Also, Christians and Muslims of Eggon extraction are not unmindful of the fact that they were first Eggons before being Muslims or Christians. Thus, it was easy for all of them to believe in, and rally round, the Ombatse initiative having and mission to cleanse and purify the Eggon communities. The Ombatse chairman observed with dismay that, while in other ethnic groups such as the Alago, Mighili and Gwandara, the Taroh and the Ngas, it is their elders and highly placed members of the ethnic communities that go to the same shrines to pray and carry out cleansing acts for the society to achieve peace and stability. He notes however that on the Eggon side, the elders have reneged in this regard thereby necessitating the Ombatse youths to pick up the challenge of societal moral resurgence and struggle for political prosperity of the Eggon nation.

According to the President of Eggon Cultural and Development Association (ECDA), the youths are on the right course but need to eschew violence in their crusade for the restoration of the dignity of Eggon. He noted that based on the commandments handed over to them by their ancestors, the Eggon culture should be seen as one that encourages peaceful co-existence among themselves and with others. The chairman of ECDA further explained that in the commandment handed over to them, they are told not to envy others, not to malign others, not to engage in adultery or fornication"(Eggon News, January 2018).

In an interview granted to Vanguard Newspaper, December 22, 2012, the Ombatse spokesperson traced the confusion that greeted the Eggon traditional belief to the invasion of the Europeans, Christianity and the Islamic jihadist. He stressed that "Our forefathers had their own traditional way of worship before the coming of Christianity and Islam. However, the infiltration

of foreign religious elements affected our worship system. For instance, my father who is still alive practises both the traditional religion and Christianity. I also have an uncle who is a Muslim and who at the same time practises the traditional religion. I have tested the two divides. I am a Catholic and, at the same time, I believe and practise my traditional religion. As it is, it was decided to bring back the practises of Ombatse owing to the complaints we receive from time to time from our people about the vices that have pervaded our society and the State. Such vices were not experienced by our fathers as they used to narrate to us. Our communities used to be peaceful with high moral standard even under traditional religion until the coming of foreign religions and our societies gradually bedevil by societal ills like soccery, witchcraft, adultery, homosexuality, banditry and others (Vanguard [Lagos], December 22, 2012).

What is instructive, however, and which also formed the crux of community violence is the method of forceful recruitment of members into the Ombatse cult. Although it is widely believed that Eggons irrespective of their religious inclination have some degree of respect for their traditional belief system. However, most of them were averse to forceful recruitment of their children into joining the Ombatse cult (Danladi, 2017). It was alleged that Ombatse militia had procured a J5 bus which was being used to capture any Eggon youth on sight and forcefully taken to the 'Ashim oath of initiation' (Danladi, 2017). This has brought out an area of misunderstanding within the Eggon even though it has not led to violence amongst them which was largely attributed to their perception of having a common enemy to contend with, the enemy being the State Government and other ethnic groups.

The violent confrontation adopted by Ombatse has largely been anchored around the Eggon political struggle aimed at producing an Executive Governor of the State. Alozieuwa

(2016) notes that, though the Eggon agitation is succinctly captured by the Ombatse mantra, 'Our Time Has Come' OR 'This is our Turn,' the cult, according to Eggon tradition is as old as the ethnic group itself. The conflict, on the one hand was, therefore, about the struggle for political ascendency and on the other superiority battle between the Eggon and other ethnic groups in the conflict. Also crucial in understanding the suspicion of the Eggon/Ombatse by the State Government and proscription of the Ombatse by the Al-Makura-led APC State Government is the alleged forceful administration of oath on non-Ombatse adherent in the different communities in Nasarawa Eggon area between March 31, 2013 and April 7, 2013, was intended that in the 2015 elections, the Eggon would only vote for Eggon candidates irrespective of party affiliations, (Sunday Sun, online, 2 June 2013). Moreso, under the cover of spiritual revival, Ombatse recruitment drive targeted mainly the youth who were given "native charms and/or amulets 'that could ward off bullets,'" (Premium Times, online, 22 May, 2013). Ombatse members typically wear black clothing and bundles of charms to provide magical protection from gunfire.

Economic prosperity of the Ombatse leaders during the Ombatse ethnic conflict was a salient factor having to do with improving the economic condition of the Ombatse fighters, the militias have taken undue advantage of their kinsmen who are eager to join the group to gain protection, the powers and wonders of Ombatse, the Eggon youths came out from all nooks and crannies of the State to visit the Azhili shrine for initiation. According to the assistant chief priest of Ombatse, various coordinators from different Eggon communities were carefully selected to liaise with the already desperate people showing interest en masse. Capitalizing on this desperation, the chief priest of Ombatse tasked the various coordinators to collect #3,000 was each per interested persons while #1000 out of the #3000 is for the coordinator. This was seen by the various coordinators according to the assistant chief priest of Ombatse as a cheap and easy

means of getting quick money. Thus, people even nominated themselves and commenced massive collection of the #3000 while they deducted #1,000 for their effort. The assistant chief priest further recalled that while people were desperately rushing to join the Ombatse cult, the general public was astounded by the way and manner the Ombatse was gaining more ground, waxing stronger and stronger to the disbelief of the general public. This assertion was corroborated by the Ombatse Chairman, who noted that the group had a spread of more than 1000 youths and 50 coordinators across the various Eggon communities (Eggon News Vol. 8 No. 8 December, 2011).

2.2.6 Nasarawa State Conflict Management Strategies in Resolving the Ombatse Ethno – Cultural Conflicts.

It is common practice all over the world for leaders at various community levels, government at various levels to continue to seek for avenues through which members of the societies would continue to leave in peace and harmony with one another. As it has been said, conflict is synonymous with human existence but what is important is how conflicts are resolved to restore confidence, trust and happiness in the overall interest of achieving peace and security. It is in the realization of the importance of security in the lives of the people that the Nasarawa State Government has had to wake up to this primary constitutional responsibility of guaranting security of lives and property of its citizenry. Thus, the State Government introduced various measures which were aimed at resolving the Ombatse ethno-cultural conflicts which have gulp claiming thousands of lives and property of the citizens. Some of the major conflict management strategies adopted by the State Government, according to Akwe & Attah, (2018), include the provision of well over sixty (60) Hilux trucks to some of the security agencies in the State. The beneficiaries were the Police, the Army, State Security Service and the Civil Defence. Akwe &

Attah note that this measure is to enable security operatives discharge their responsibilities with ease and efficiency.

In the same vein, Government constituted various High Powered Committees to engage the various ethnic groups involved in the Ombatse conflicts. The committees were meant to interact extensively with the youths, elders and opinion leaders of the various ethnic groups with a view to understanding the various perspectives of the conflict and making recommendations geared towards achieving lasting peace and harmonious co-existence between the different ethnic groups. According to Akwe and Attah (2018), an integrated community-based conflict resolution strategy was unveiled by the administration to nip in the bud frequent incidences of violence among the various communities in the State. The proscription of not only Ombatse ethnic militia but all forms of ethnic militias was also seen as a step towards mitigating ethnic conflicts in the State.

Other measures adopted to address the festering communal crises that bedevilled the State included the constitution of a high - powered commission of Inquiry to probe the circumstances that led to the clash between Eggon and Alago in Assakio and the Migili people of Jenkwe in Obi Local Government Area. The Commission's report on the white paper has already been released by the Government. Government also established the Justice Joseph Gbadeyan led High Powered Judicial Commission of Inquiry to look into the killing of security operatives in Alakyo by the Eggon Militia group, Ombatse (Akwe and Attah, 2018). Other measures include the collaboration between the state government and the federal government which led to Federal Government's approval to establish an additional Mobile Police unit in Lafia and a battalion of the Army in Doma. The security units were meant to create a buffer between the various ethnic groups that are

constantly at dagger drawn at each other. More so, government has provided relief materials to those affected by the various crises. And these relief materials include food-stuff, corrugated iron sheets and beddings to cushion the pains and personal loss of property. The State Government made concerted efforts to convene ethnic group conferences with a view to achieving lasting peace.

The State Government also provided relief materials to people affected by communal crises in the Southern Senatorial District of the State. This is in addition to the establishment of 10 ten police units equipped with Hilux Vans fitted with communication tools to quickly respond to any distress call about any security lapse in the crisis-prone communities.

2.3 Factors Responsible for the Ombatse Conflicts

Indeed, it is said that there is no smoke without fire. Conficts all over the world, whether ethnic, religious or political are always attributed to certain factors. For the Ombatse ethnic conflicts in Nasarawa State, the following are some of the factors that gave impetus to the conflicts.

2.3.1 Redeployment Policy on Local Government Employees of June 10, 1999

Prior to the creation of Nasarawa State in 1999 from the defunct Plateau State, the state (Plateau State) used to operate a policy of posting Local Government Employees of Deputy Director and Director level to various local governments other than the local government areas of origin of such category of staff. However, on the creation of Nasarawa State, the first democratic government under the leadership of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu of

People's Democratic Party in 1999 abrogated this policy and commenced a policy which ensured that all categories of local government employees irrespective of their grade levels should be redeployed to their Local Government Areas of origin.

The Eggon ethic group saw themselves as being favoured by the former policy in view of the fact that, while other ethnic groups like the Alago, Kanuri, Mighili and others were said to have two or more Local Government Areas as their origins, the Eggon has one local government which is Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area. All the other ethnic groups were alleged to hold grudge against the Eggon because they felt Eggon people were short-changing them in terms of promotion and placement. They believed that the Eggon ethnic group were having advantage, thanks to their western education, over other ethnic groups as they (Eggon ethnic group) alone had greater percentage of the Senior Staff Cadre state and Local Government Employees. This invariably conferred on the Eggon the advantage of occupying the positions of Deputy Director and Director in the local government system. In a nutshell, therefore, the policy promoted inequitable representation of ethnic identities in the administration of Local Government in favour of Eggon ethnic group.

As mentioned earlier, the repeal of this policy in 1999 by the government of PDP under Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu was seen by the Eggon ethnic group as an attempt to get back at them by ensuring that since every local government employee was to transfer his/her service to his or her local government of origin, the new policy would have created a situation where most of its people (Eggon civil servants) got to be retired prematurely because only one local government will not be able to provide the much needed space for its

workers that must come back home in view of the new policy. This was the case because there was much less positions to be occupied by the senior officers of Local Government employees of Eggon extraction than the number of such employees. This seemingly caused serious disaffection between not only Eggon ethnic group and the PDP-led administration in the State but also between the Eggon people and the other ethnic groups which the new policy was assumed to have favoured.

The above scenario is perhaps best captured by an article by Christopher Allu published in Eggon News of May 16, June, 2013. He argued that the "Introduction of Redeployment Policy: the coming on board of Governor Abdullahi Adamu marked the beginning of the departure from corporate existence among the diferent ethnic groups cohabiting together in the State. With the policy of disintegration introduced in all the local government of the State on 10 June 1999, mutual and corporate living among the diverse groups was substituted with discrimination; trust was replaced with suspicion and love degenerated to hatred. The policy which was targeted at Eggon people came at a time Nigeria was clamouring for the integration of its people. The policy mandated local government staff to go back to their local governments of origin to work there. Within seven days according to Christopher Allu, "Eggon staff working in different Local governments were bundled with their files to Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Council, the only local government the designers and implementers of the policy felt belong to the Eggon people". Allu insinuated further that this policy of redeployment was the seed of discord that was sown in the hearts of the people of Nasarawa State and that, shortly after; various ethnic groups started ganging up against the Eggon people. The policy was no doubt the evil seed that grew to produce bitter

fruits of violence and hatred that has taken over the hitherto peaceful and harmonious co-existence among the various ethnic groups in the State.

Another dimension to the issue of local government of origin in the State is that, for the Eggon ethnic group, they could not understand why a particular ethnic group like the Alago would have up to three (3) local Government Areas (Doma, Keana, Obi) created for them. However, despite the "largeness of the Eggon population", the significant contribution of its able farmers, and its level of educational advancement which is high especially when compared with other ethnic groups in the State, they have only 1 local government; Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area. To the Eggon ethnic group, this is a clear case of inequality and marginalization and is unacceptable. On the other side, the Alago people and other ethnic groups have questioned the claims and at different fora, challenged the Eggon people to make available any scientific parameter it used in arriving at the strength of population as against other ethnic groups, including also substantiating the self-acclaimed "educational advancement as against other ethnic groups in the State. The Alago ethnic group has argued that its perceived advantage could be traced to its struggle as far back as the defunct Plateau State, where based on the strength of its concentrated population, on certain different geographical locations, various governments found the existing 3 Local Government Areas justifiable.

2.3.2 Political Factor: The creation of Nasarawa State in 1996 triggered the request for power along ethnic lines. Thus, smaller ethnic groups were seen forming alliances with the aim of clinching power and wooing democratic dividends to their people. An example of the alliances formed was one by the people of Nasarawa West Senatorial District and Nasarawa

North Senatorial District. This alliance saw to the emergence of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu and Honourable Solomon Ewuga as Governor and Deputy Governor respectively under the people's Democratic Party (PDP). Before the end of the first tenure, Solomon Ewuga who is of Eggon ethnic group later got nominated for ministerial appointment and became a State Minister of Fedeal Capital Territory representing Nasarawa State. In the spirit of the alliance, Governor Abdullahi Adamu nominated a University lecturer in person of Professor Onje Gewado, not from Eggon ethnic group but, from Wamba LGA of the same Nasarawa North Senatorial District as his running mate. This political understanding continued to blossom up to 2003 elections when Alhaji Abdullahi running for the second tenure maintained the spirit of the alliance and picked his running mate from the same Nasarawa North Senatorial District and an Eggon by name Labaran Maku who later became Minister of Information. However, this political marriage of convenience began to generate tension as people of Eggon extraction from the North Senatorial zone fielded a candidate in person of Solomon Ewuga for 2007 gubernatorial elections and expected the outgoing PDP Governor of the State Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu to support him in the spirit of the alliance. Unfortunately, the unfolding political arithmetic of PDP in 2007 gubernatorial elections tilted towards the candidate of All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma from Southern Senatorial zone. Akwe Doma, for political reasons best known to PDP, was wooed at all costs to dump his candidacy under ANPP so as to contest under PDP. This was seriously and vigorously contested by the Eggons without success.

Alhaji Aliyu Akwe later became the Governor of the State under PDP to the disenchantment and frustration of the Eggon ethnic group who felt politically betrayed at a

critical time that they would have produced the Governor of the State. Among other factors, the breakdown of the political alliance between the Nasarawa West and North was another milestone that planted the seed of discord between Eggon ethnic group and other ethnic groups who they alleged betrayed them and connived with the people of southern senatorial district who were direct beneficiaries of the new political deal.

This notion could be deduced from an article written by one Christopher A. Musa in Eggon News of August 16, September 15, 2013 where he asserted that "right from Abdullahi Adamu to the incumbent government in Nasarawa State (Alhaji Tanko Almakura), every politician had been eager to have Senator Ewuga on his side for easy ride to victory. The senator (Solomon Ewuga) is always seen as a classic politician while in need. But when it is time for government, honey-sharing, decision making and implementation, he must be discarded, rubbished and branded as the worst trouble - maker".

The view expressed by Soni Daniel, the North Regional Editor of Vanguard Newspaper published on Wednesday 8, June 26, 2013 titled "Nasarawa 2015: Maku to tackle Al-Makura", best captured this view when he states thus: " although the governor (Al-Makura) will get the CPC ticket for his re-run, he is not likely to get the support of the Eggon, apparently because of the claim by the Eggon that he promised to run for a term and then handover to one of their sons in 2015".

In a similar circumstance, Alhaji Akwe Doma as the Governor of the State after the 2007 elections began to fall apart with some political stalwarts within the PDP circle. One of such party stalwarts was Alhaji Tanko Al-makura. All efforts by the PDP machinery in the State to

reconcile them were fruitless. In this regard, the race for another gubernatorial election in 2011 began and Tanko Al-makura attempted to join the race and intended to pick PDP nomination form in the State but was allegedly denied by the party under the control of the incumbent Akwe Doma who, of course, wanted to go for his second term. This event saw Alhaji Tanko Al-makura jumping ship from PDP to Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which later merged with other political parties at the national level to form the All Progressive Change (APC). In their attempt to find new political friends, the Eggons opted to join forces with Tanko Almakura of APC to unseat the incumbent PDP Governor. Before rectifying the ensuing political bond, the Eggons have claimed that Tanko Al-makura had promised going for one term after which he (Tanko Al-makura) who was believed to be enjoying the massive support of his ethnic kinsmen 'Gwandara' and the 'Bare- Bare Lafia' would step aside and support Solomon Ewuga in 2015, (Vanguard, Wednesday, June 26, 2013). However, CPC defeated PDP at the 2011 gubernatorial elections and Alhaji Tanko Al-amkura was sworn- in as Governor of Nasarawa state on 29 May 2011.

Suffice is to say that the First year of CPC government in Nasarawa State was marred by one communal conflict or another. Ethnic conflicts such as Fulani - Mighili farmers in Jenkwe, Obi Local Government Area from 4th April, 2011 to April, 2012, the inherited crises between Fulani and Tiv in Guma Local Government Area of Benue State but which later spilled over to Nasarawa State as a result of the displaced Fulani people that took refuge in Rukubi, Akpanaja, Agbashi in Doma Local Government Area of Nasarawa State, (Weekly Trust, Saturday, March 7, 2015). What seemed to have compounded the challenges confronting the new CPC government under Tanko Al-makura was the sudden surge of ethnic violence involving an alleged Eggon

youth ethnic organization against several ethnic groups such as Alago, Fulani, Kambari or Kanuri, Mighili or Koro, in communities like Agyaragu, Obi, Asakio town in Lafia Local Government Area, the killing of over ninety Nigerian Security Personnel (police/SSS) on the 7th of May, 2013 in Alakio village in Lafia Local Government, the blockage of Akwanga- Lafia to Makurdi federal highway. Ombatse versus Fulani, Ombatse and Agatu in Ekye, Doma Local Government Area, (Weekly Trust, Saturday, March 7, 2015 and the judicial panel of inquiry Report on the killing of security forces in Alakio, Lafia Local Government 2014). The questions that beg for answers were why the upsurge of ethnic conflict at that given time? Why is it always about Ombatse (Eggon) and other ethnic groups or why is it always about other ethnic groups versus Ombatse? Was it a case of gang-up of some races to annihilate a single ethnic group or was it a case of a particular ethnic group wanting to further its socio-political and economic interest and therefore all other ethnic groups must be muzzled into giving in for the strongest to achieve its aim? Speculations from the public and political analysts have it that the Eggon have gone violent because they were beginning to suspect that the sitting governor, Alhaji Tango Al-makura was showing signs that he would re-contest for governorship elections come 2015 as against the spirit of the alliance they allegedly formed where they (Eggon) claimed he (Tanko Al-makura) promised going for one term after which the Eggon would field their candidate to be supported by the Governor, (leadership, Thursday, July 4, 2013). Also, Saturday Tribune of 26 October, 2013 alleged that the crises in Nasarawa State under Alhaji Tanko Al-makura were fuelled by people who were not comfortable with the progress and achievements of the man in power in less than two years in office were bent on distracting the governor so as not to be able to attend to the various calls from different groups that he should re-contest come 2015.

There is also another political angle which pointed accusing fingers at PDP in the State. For instance, NigerianTribune of Tuesday, 24 September 2013 explains that Nasarawa State, beginning from 1991, had been an exclusive reserve of the People Democratic Party (PDP) but the story changed when the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) rode on the crest of alleged infamies by PDP to clinch power. The personality of the incumbent governor, Alhaji Umar Tanko Al-makura made CPC gain ground in the State… and this was the reason PDP seemed to be having trouble plotting its way back to power as far as 2015 political matters were concerned. Samuel Idowu in an article which featured in the NigerianTribune, Thursday, July 4, 2013 quoted the former Governor of the State under PDP, Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu who later jumped ship to APC, as accusing the federal government of being responsible for the rising ethnic tension in the State. According to Abdullahi Adamu who at the time of this report is now a Senator, "Federal Government of PDP was initially prevaricating because the State belongs to the opposition party". He opined that had Nasarawa remained a PDP State, the growing hostility by the ethnic groups against one another would have long been nipped in the bud (PremiumTimes Sept. 15, 2013).

2.3.3 Land Ownership Factor

Land ownership practice is one other issue of contention between the Eggon and other ethnic groups in the Nasarawa Southern Senatorial District, which revolves, around indigenous ethnic groups and settlers, otherwise known as guests. According to a memorandum submitted by the former Lafia Division Elders' Consultative Forum to the commission of inquiry on ethnic violence in Alakyo, Lafia Local Government Area, June, 2012, the issue of land must be looked into from the historical perspective if justice was to be served to the various ethnic groups. Consequently, the Lafia Elders Consultative Forum divided the period of history into pre and

post colonial periods respectively. According to the memorandum the pre-colonial period saw the following ethnic groups establish their chiefdoms in the then Lafia Division:

i. Koro (Mighili) Jukun – 12th century

ii. Alago – 13th century

iii. Gwandara/ Akwe – 14th century

iv. Kanuri – 18th century

v. Hausa/ Fulani – 19th century

In administrative terms, the memorandum contended that these ethnic groups existed as independent States each with its customs, traditions, sets of rules of behavior and norms. It further contended that "the Eggons" who are also called Madan Dutse (Ombatse) were not part of the indigenous ethnic groups in this area. They (Eggon) were found only on top of the Wanahills located in a far away different territory unconnected to any of the above listed kingdoms. The colonial era, according to the memorandum, saw the arrival of the British, which created the Nasarawa province and grouping of the hitherto independent units of Doma, Keana, Lafia and Assakio as Lafia emirate and the former as districts. During this period, the (Eggons) were still resisting the colonial power. The memorandum contended also that it was only after 1910 following series of military punitive expeditions by the colonial forces that the "Madan Dutse" (Eggons) were subdued and constituted into independent districts of Mada North, Central and south, with their headquarters at Wamba.

Thus, ethnic groups of this independent district consist of North and South Mada (including Eggon) Nungu and mama inhabited by primitive pagans.

The Lafia Elders Forum also explained in their memorandum that a further cultural, economic and political separation was created between the ethnic groups under Lafia Emirate, by the introduction of provincial administration in 1929, when the independent districts of Mada North, South, Mama and Nungu were excised and moved to Plateau province, while Lafia emirate was to remain an integral part of Benue Province. The elders' forum dwelt on the history line above to arrive at the opinion that before Nigeria independence, Lafia emirate as it was then had no Eggon settlement and that all the British annual provincial reports, show that Eggons were never listed among ethnic groups existing in the old Lafia division which now consists of Lafia, Keana, Awe, Doma and Obi Local Government Areas.

For clarity, the Lafia Elders' Forum noted that the following ethnic groups have at one time or another founded kingdoms:

Ethnic groups	Kingdoms
i. Alagos	Doma, Keana, Assakio, Obi, Agwatashi
ii. Gwandara	Shabu, Riri, Daddare, Giza, Kwandare
iii. Koro (Mighili)	Duduguru, Gwadanye, Gidan Hausa, Ashigye, Agyaragu.
iv. Kanuri	Lafia,Azara,Adudu
v. Akye	Uga, Alingani, Kiguna, Gwayaka
vi. Hausa	Awe, Adudu, Tunga
vii. Jukun	Wuse, Akiri, Kekura, Arugwadu

The memorandum by the Lafia Elders Forum further referred to (paragraph 29, page 9 Lafia Division Annual Report 1943) to establish the fact that even the Tivs, Igbos and Yorubas migrated as traders into the Lafia Emirate before the Eggon in 1951. They referred to also a memo titled "Outline History of Lafia Division" written to The Resident Benue Province, Makurdi in 1951 by D.L Roberts who as the District Officer in charge of Lafia Division, who said:

"*The earlier known inhabitants of Lafia Division were members of the Koro tribe who say they immigrated here from near Kororofa (Adamawa province). The next arrivals were said to have been in the 13th century were Alago. A number of Gwandara (a tribe who*

speak primitive form of Hausa) settled among them". Beri Beri who came from Borno via Kanberi near Lau, after two false starts at Shabu and Kwandare settled in 1777 under their Chief Danama".

According to the Lafia Elders' Forum, the above quoted memorandum is a justification that the Eggons are not indigenous to the old Lafia Division. To establish their own version of how they claim the Eggons migrated to former Lafia Division, they referenced a communication between the resident Plateau Province and the resident Benue province in a Memo No 24813/2 of 15th April 1951 and attached as exhibit E1 and E2, No D 48/31 of 5th April, 1951.

Furthermore, the Lafia Elders' Forum argued that "from the Memos in the preceding paragraph i.e. Exhibit E1 and E2 in respect of the communication between the resident Plateau Province and his Benue Province counterpart, the mode of receiving and accepting immigrants is clear. According to them, the Resident Benue Province in reply to a request for resettlement Scheme in Lafia for the Eggons clearly remarked that there was no need for such a scheme as the Madan Dutse (Eggon) immigrants came as "individual householders or in small parties as guests of such previously established occupiers". The Lafia Elders' Forum further provided what they called the sequence of movements of Eggons into Old Lafia Division and the subsequent agreement entered into with regard to the conditions in which the Eggons would form on their land. Thus, they stressed that, "it is important to mention that in the said aforementioned memo (exhibit E1 and E2) the Resident of Plateau-Province in his memo to the Resident of Benue Provinces titled Eggon Resettlement Scheme observed thus:

"A considerable movement of population is taking place in the southern part of Southern Division where the Eggon people have for a number of years been moving out of the Wana Hills into the plain below. Recently the chiefs themselves have moved and it is likely that the rate of migration will now be greatly increased…."

They contended further that in "1954 when the Eggons movement was becoming intense, the late Emir of Lafia Alhaji Yusuf Musa II caused a land tenancy agreement to be entered with Eggons called "NOMAN JIDA" where they agreed to come to the area, farm and move away with their produce and return for the same purpose, the following year but with the condition that they pay some royalty to the Emirate".

The above line of argument held that the practice of "NOMAN JIDA" and other forms of land tenancy such as "rent" payable as fee either in cash, payment of royalties or payment by other services such as labour existed even during the colonial period. For instance, according to the Lafia Elders Forum, in 1927, the District Officer of Lafia had a complaint from villages of Uga, Alingani and Gwayaka all in Assakio District about their fish pool, , where immigrants resisted payment of royalties after fishing in the pool. When the matter was reported to the political officer (Mr Campbell Irons) he ruled in favour of the immigrants. Later, on appeal to the Lafia Division Officer, the verdict was reversed in favour of the host communities noting that prior to 1914 this had been the practice (para. 15-17 of the Lafia Divisional correspondence of 7th January, 1927) attached to their memo and marked as exhibit F.

This approach to land tenancy arrangement, according to the Lafia Elders' Forum, is still obtainable in communities such as Assakio, Awe, Keana, Azara and others where certain portions

of land are reserved for the local chief. Even if one is from royal family wants to use that land, he/she has to pay some royalty to the chief. They observed however, that in recent times, the Eggons being settlers are found to be resisting the payment of such royalty and that has been among other issues, the immediate cause of the conflict.

To this end, it is important to state that EXHIBITS E1, E2 and F referred to above shall form part of the Annexes of this research work.

2.3.4 Creation of Local Government Areas and Chiefdoms

From the perspective of the Eggon ethnic group, most of the issues that form the basis of the current ethnic disharmony in the State were caused by the Abdullahi Adamu (PDP)-led administration. For instance, Christopher Allu, in his article "Towards A greater Eggon Nation (8) the creation of Nasarawa State: a blessing or a curse, alleged that the creation of development areas and chiefdoms by Governor Abdullahi Adamu was another calculated attempt aimed at setting Eggon against other ethnic groups which hitherto had coexisted harmoniously together. According to Christopher Allu, "the creation of development areas and chiefdoms by Governor Abdullahi Adamu also set the Eggon against some other ethnic groups in the State. Agyaragu saw this as unhealthy to the corporate existence of the two ethnic groups". Christopher Allu went further to assert that "following the citing of the headquarters of the development area and forceful erection of the palace Zhe Mighili in Agyaragu (Angwa Anva) under tight security, the people of the area have continue leave in suspicion of one another until a non – issue of motorcycle theft resulted in violence between the Eggon and Mighili in Agyaragu/Gidinye communities on 21 – 22nd (Eggon News, May 16 – June 15, 2013).

In the same vein, the Eggons were also not happy with the creation of Assakio Chiefdom for the Alago without a corresponding chiefdom for the Eggons who are living in that area.

Christopher Allu claimed that "the creation of Assakio Chiefdom for the Alago people in 2003 without doing same for the Eggon in Assakio created enmity between the two ethnic groups. Whereas the Alagos have seen themselves as landlords and ascribed the Eggons the status of a settler, Eggon people on the other hand see themselves as the original inhabitants of the area and this has led to suspicion and hatred. The effect, according to Allu,was the violence in Assakio in 2007 and 2012 between Alago and Eggon. The persistent demand for royalty from the Eggon farmers by the Osukwo (traditional chief) of Assakio fuelled the May 31st – June 1st, 2012 violence", according to Allu.

Also, in an interview titled "Abdullahi Adamu: Biting the Finger That Fed Him" by Mathew Kuju (Eggon) in the Eggon News of July 16 – August 15, 2013, the writer traces the upsurge of ethnic conflict in Nasarawa State to the deployment policy of Abdullahi Adamu on 10th June, 1999, which according to him, was calculated at hurting the Eggons. He alleged further that in an attempt to implement the policy, some Local Government Councils sent the Eggon people packing by sending their personal files to Nasarawa Eggon Local Government knowing fuly well that Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Council could accommodate them in view of their large numerical number. Mathew Kuju therefore states "I traced the increasing misunderstanding between their neighbours to that policy. Apart from the implementation of that policy, secretly, some ethnic groups were encouraged to reclaim their pieces of land, farmland from Eggons, with some LGs ridiculously asking Eggon to apply for residence permit and not indigene certificate".

The political aspiration of the Eggon people also features in this interview and Kuju does not mince word as he claims the total disregard to the Eggon votes that made Governor (Abdullahi Adamu) Governorsof the state in 1999 and 2001 and his subsequent fielding of Alhaji

Aliyu Akwe of a different ethnic group (Alago) as against the candidature of Solomon Ewuga (Eggon) amounted to "biting the fingers that fed him" (Eggon news July 16 – August 15, 2013).

2.3.5 The Appointment of the Chairman of the Nasarawa State Traditional Council

There are other weighty and complicated issues which the Eggon ethnic group insists must be resolved in order for lasting peace to be achieved. Some of those contentious issues include the appointment of the Chairman of Traditional Council of Nasarawa State, the siting of the State capital in Lafia instead of Akwanga; (Eggon news May 16 – June 15, 2013). The Eggons believed that, in view of their numerical strength as compared to any other ethnic group in the State, their traditional ruler (Aren – Eggon) was supposed to be the President of the Traditional Rulers of the State as against the present arrangement where the position is ultimately presided by the Emir of Lafia which, according to Eggon, represents a minority ethnic group of Bri – Beri or Kambari as the case may be. With regard to Chun – Mada traditional title, the Eggon are of the view that the traditional headquarters has always been in Andaha and not Akwanga, thereby making the Eggons in Akwanga mere subjects of Chun Mada. According to Christopher Allu, this is capable of breeding suspicion and hatred between the two ethnic groups (Eggon and Mada) who have hitherto co-existed peacefully and harmoniously.

2.3.6 Citing of Lafia Town as the Capital City of Nasarawa State

The Eggons as an ethnic group are also not happy with the citing of Lafia as the state capital of Nasarawa State. The Eggons argued that Lafia was not strategically located as to make it suitable for the capital of the state, moreso that, they claimed 10 out of 13 Local Government Areas opted for Akwanga as against 3 Local Governments that supported Lafia as captal city of the state, (Eggon News, May 16 – June 15, 2013).

2.3.7 The Struggle for the Ownership of Agyaragu and the Creation of Jenkwe Development Area

One other issue in the narration of marginalization by Eggon ethnic group is the contentious factor of indigenous ownership of settlements comprising Agyaragu town and its surrounding suburbs like Agyaragu Tasha, Angwan Yakubu and Angwan Anva. The crises over claims and counter claims of ownership have festered over a long period of time between the Eggons and Mighili and have led to sharp rivalry and tension between them (Report of the High Powered Commission of Inquiry on ethnic violence in Agyaragu, 2014).

According to the report, the Migili historically hold the opinion that, through the "*Outline History of Lafia Division",* written by D.L Roberts, District Officer of Lafia Division; states that, "the earlier known inhabitants of Lafia Division were members of Koro tribe who say they migrated here from near Kororofa (Adamawa Province) the next arrivals was said to have been in the 13th Century, were Alago… A number of Gwandara (a tribe who speak primitive form of Hausa) settled among them, … Beri – Beri who had come from Borno via Kambari near Lau, after two false starts at Shabu and Kwandare settled in 1777 under their Chief Dunama". Drawing from the history account above, the Zhe Migili submitted that the Migili people are undoubtedly the original founders of Agyaragu. The Migili traditional ruler further explains how the name of the community (Agyaragu) came about i.e as an adulterated acronym from one Agya Dagu who was first met at the present location of the railway station.This man was a Migili from Gwadanye, a community of the Migili ethnic group. In their submission to the Panel of Inquiry into the Agyaragu conflict, the Administrator of Jenkwe Development Area and other stakeholders from Migili nation, as well as the "*Former Lafia Division Elder's Consultative Forum*" corroborated

this position, stating that: “the Migili (Koro) people migrated to their present land far before the collapse and disintegration of the Kwararafa Kingdom. In fact, history has it that the Migili people had settled in this area of former Lafia Division much ealier than the Alago people. And that all other indigenous ethnic groups migrated to meet the Migili people who had established an elaborate Jenkwe Kingdom. Since this time, the Migili people have established smaller city – states which were autonomous of each other… The present Agyaragu town is a land that belongs to two migili communities of Ichichene and Gidinye. Where the Railway station is located in Agyaragu was said to be a farmland belonging to one Agya Dagu, a Migili man (which, over the years, was corrupted to Agya - ragu). It was the construction of the railway line and its station in the early 1900 that hastened the development of Agyaragu town. It gradually expanded to meet up with the present Gidinye and Ichichene town(s) to form one large Agyaragu township in Jenkwe Development Area of Obi Local Government…” (Report of the High – powered Commission of Inquiry on Ethnic Violence in Agyaragu, 2014)

However, the Eggon ethnic group in the memoranda submitted to the same Panel of Inquiry posited that the ownership of Agyaragu as an Eggon settlement and that of Gidinye as Migili settlement was not in any way in contention. They noted that “it is a well known fact that Agyaragu, which is in Lafia and Obi Local government Areas has never been ruled by any Koro/Migili Chiefdom”. In the long run however, and to the displeasure of the Eggons, the government created Jenkwe Development Area with headquarters in Agyaragu. The Eggons considered this as a decision taken in bad faith… not minding the consequences that would arise. In the Commission’s opinion, the statement by Eggon regarding the Nasarawa State Government position on the creation of Jenkwe Development Area is a manifestation of the deep-seated

animosity for Jenkwe Development Area and Migilis. According to the Commission, is for this reason that at the slightest provocation, the Eggons hardly restrained themselves from venting their deep seated anger against the Migilis, (Report of the High – powered Commission of Inquiry on Ethnic Violence in Agyaragu, 2014).

2.4 Eggon Response to "Former Lafia Division Elders Consultative Forum"

In exhibits E1 and E2, No D 48/31 of 5th April, 1951 submitted by the Lafia Elders forum to the Judicial Panel of Inquiry into the killings of several policemen and state security officers in Alakio to justify the claim that the Eggon ethnic group was not part of the Lafia Southern Senatorial District before colonialism. Thus, in an article titled "If God Be for Us, Who can be Against Us?" by Christopher Allu in the Eggon news magazine of September, 2012. In this article, Allu draws from a memorandum submitted to Judicial Panel of Inquiry into the Assakio crisis by the Aren (Wakili/representative of Eggon) states on page 2 in parts that "our history supported by movement of people within the central Nigeria, states clearly that our leader, Abro – Agbi born of Arugban, the sky God, who, according to study conducted by kier Hanford, John, B. Samuel and Ron Stanford on Nigeria languages belongs to the Benue/Congo group of languages. Abro Agbi and his brothers migrated from the South East to settle at Arikya and Arugba around 400AD".

In the memorandum presented to the Nasarawa State Government by the people of Arikya Chiefdom in 2003 also averred that Arikya in Lafia was founded at around 400AD which according to Christopher Allu, was in tandem with the presentation of the Aren (Wakilin/representative) Eggon of Assakio. According to him, the two versions have clearly shown that Eggon people in the then Old Lafia Division had a history of migration into the area than any ethnic group". Contrary to the claims of the former Lafia Division Elders Consultative

Forum that Alago ethnic group founded Assakio in the old Lafia, the Eggon averred that they founded the Asssakio community. For example, Christopher Allu quoted from the memorandum of Wakilin Eggon (page 2) "that a long sojourn at Arugba, one of the descendants of Agbro Agbi, by name Eggah moved south ward and founded Asso-kyo (which means he left earlier) what is now known as Assakio in 1100AD". To this end, Allu asserts that it is a complete distortion of history for the Lafia Elders to say that the Eggons were restricted to the Wana Hills during the pre-colonial period.

More-so, in their various memoranda presented to the commission of Inquiry titled ' the Osakyo of Assakio; Alago Development Association, Assakio Branch offered parts of their history as thus: "the disintegration of Kwararafa Empire led to the Alago chiefdoms of Doma, Keana, Agwatashi, Obi, Assakio, Aloshi, Ibi and others in the present Lafia region (C. 1232 AD). Using the Alago historical anology, Allu claimed Assakio and Arikya were founded even before the disintegration of Kwararafa empire by the Eggons" (Eggon news, Sept, 2012).

In view of the two separate historical perspectives; one by Aren Eggon of Assakio and the other by the Alago ethnic group, Allu concludes that "it is disheartening and mischieveous for the Lafia Elders' Forum to claim that Eggon were not part of the then Old Lafia Division when in actual fact they are first migrants into the area through Arikya" (Eggon News, Sept 2012).

The focal point of this research, therefore, would be to unravel the root causes of the emergence of the Ombatse Youths Movement and the implications of the violence on community security with a view to making recommendations geared towards entrenching lasting peace and harmonious co-existence between the Eggon ethnic group and other ethnic groups in Southern Senatorial Zone of Nasarawa State.

2.5 Socio-cultural Agenda of the Ombatse Youth Militia

A founding member and spokesman of the group, Zachary Zamani Allumaga, explained the purpose of re-introducing this traditional worship of the Eggon ethnic group as direct response to the people's series of complaints and worries about the vices that have pervaded their society and the State. He noted that such vices were not there before. The society used to be serene and orderly till the coming of the colonial masters who came with their culture that later impacted negatively on their way of life. Some of those immoral acts in the society include murder, theft, rumour mongering, secret society, witchcraft etc (Vanguard, December 22, 2012). The Eggon Cultural Development Association (ECDA) far from professing publicly the spiritual doctrine of cleansing the Eggon ethnic group from societal ill. Daily Trust of November 25, 2012 corroborated this assertion and held that Ombatse was allegedly formed as a result of a revelation received in a dream that called for Eggon youths to clense the society and rid it of immoralities such as promiscuity, adultery, crime, alcohol consumption and smoking. It is believed in the Ombatse spirit that none of its adherents would engage in alcoholism, stealing, drug addiction, armed robbery, sexual promiscuity, homosexuality and that necessitated for the initiation of members to purify and cleanse them before becoming full members (Monitored BBC Hausa, May 10).

Ombatse, according to Eggon Cultural Development Association, literally means in Eggon parlance "Time has come". The group is a collection of Eggon Youth drawn from all Eggon communities scattered in the state especially the Southern Senatorial part. Under the spiritual leadership of one Dogo Anda, a herbalist who resides at the Ombatse shrine located on the top of Eggon hill in Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area. The spiritual leader is responsible for the provision of protective charms/Talisman to members against gunshots and any

other piercing objects. The spiritual leader is popularly known as Baba Alakiyo whose other responsibilities include but are not limited to bringing the youths together towards achieving a common Eggon agenda.

The practices and belief system of Ombatse are anchored around the biblical law which says: thou shall not kill, thou shall not convert your brother's property, thou shall not join secret society or witchcraft, and thou shall not sleep with your brother's wife or engage in actions that are detrimental to the greater goal of a community. These, according to Musa (2014), are the basic tenants of Ombatse. Anybody who knows the Eggon nation very well would know that for some years now, secret societies were so prevalent that people were living in fear.

As part of the Omabtse cultic practice, members are always to be in black clothing and wear bundles of charms to provide magical protection from gun-fire and any form of light weapon. There is little or no place for women partipation in Ombatse cultic activities as they are barred from entering Ombatse shrines. Ombatse leaders have pointed out that not all Eggons are members of the Ombatse cult but all Ombatse members are Eggons (Musa, 2014). Ombatse movement is seen as a powerful group that has highly influential members and sympathizers in many state establishments and parastatals who bear unflinching allegiance and loyalty in line with oath usually administered on members at the Ombatse shrine named "Mbase" located at the Eggon hill top in Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area. The oath, according to Musa is what observers of the Ombatse group claimed was always the prism through which members used to read presumed injustice in political power struggle and sought to restructure the political and power landscape in the State.

As a security expert from one of the Nigerian security agencies that operated during the hype of the Ombatse conflict, Musa further reveals methods of training which an average

Ombatse fighter undergoes. He notes that the initiated members of Ombatse cult undergo weapon handling training, endurance session and a blend of guerilla warfare, by suspected retired personnel from different security outfits who are of Eggon extraction. During the training, the Ombatse militia group is divided into three sections namely, the Executioner, Destroyer and Financial or Sponsor section. The executioners' section consists of those members in possession of arms and other dangerous weapons and is physically endowed to perform the task given to them. The second group known as Destroyer Section comprises those saddled with the responsibility of burning houses and destruction of property, while the third section or Sponsor group involves members who may not be physically present or seen at the scene of the incident, but provide financial and moral support to Ombatse group.

The Ombatse cult is also known for its tacit application of some methodology of attack as when it unleashed terror and violence on other ethnic groups with the intention to inflict maximum impact in its campaign of superiority over other ethnic groups for the control of political and economic power in the State. Part of the methodology include: armed attacks and assassination, arson, kidnapping/abduction etc. Through these tactics, the Ombatse has not only kill, maim, and destroy lives and property of the civil population from other ethnic groups but also kill soldiers, police and personnel of other security agencies. Ombatse movement has also been allegedly known for burning houses, destroying livestock and abducting security personnel and confisticating their weapons. A classical example of such occurred in November 17, 2012 when a group member of the Nigerian Security Forces attempted to raid the Allogani cult centre in the Nasarawa-Eggon district to arrest the Ombatse chairman and Secretary while conducting an initiation and oath-taking ceremony, and it resulted in a gun fight in which three soldiers lost their lives. Ombatse youth set up a barricade on the Lafia-Akwanga road and destroyed vehicles that

attempted to evade the barricade. Security agents endured insult from the drivers of long lines of halted cars for their inability to put off remove the barricades (Sunday Trust November 18, 2012). This raid brought Ombatse into conflict with the State.

The Government of Nasarawa State was compelled to vide a Legal Notice No. 4 of November, 2012, ban the group and put a halt to its activities.

2.6 Effects of the Ombatse Ethno-cultural Conflict on the Economy and Social Well being of the people of Southern Senatorial District in Nasarawa State.

a. Severe Social Impact

Ombatse ethno-cultural violence has caused severe social impact, especially on vulnerable groups such as children, women and the aged. As usual, these groups of victims of conflicts were most affected because very many of them lost their breadwinners; family members were scattered and children were confused, starved and became beggars in the streets of Lafia and other major towns in the State.

b. Economic Activities Paralyzed

The mainstay of the economic activities of the people of Nasarawa Southern Senatorial Zone is forming. Farm produce as destroyed; people could no longer go to farm for fear of being killed. Consequently, poverty and hunger became more pronounced among families.

c. High Scale of Social Vices

One most unfortunate and painful effects of Ombatse ethno-cultural violence was the prevalence of social vices in the communities. Young female children in Internally Displaced Camps resorted to prostitution just to make ends meet. Unwanted pregnancy became the order of

the day. The militia themselves indulged in drinking concoction, smoking marijuana and abused other substance before carrying out their heinous activities.

d. Strained Relationships

The Eggon and other ethnic groups who are in conflict have hitherto cohabited peacefully, intermarried and have enjoyed a long history of mutually beneficial relationships to the extent of affecting families that have intermarried. Mutual suspicion became the order of the day amongst family members that are of different ethnic backgrounds. People could no longer go to the same markets, same worship centres and things continued to fall apart.

e. Sudden Cultural Re-awakening among Ethnic Groups

The Ombatse cultural conflict suddenly made people who ordinarily preferred to be known for either being Muslims or Christians to identify more with their ethnic lineage. Thus, ethnic associations sprang up and the society began to hear of "Alago Youth Association, Mighili Youth Association, Gwandara Youth Association and many others". All of those were necessary in order to march the violence of Ombatse militia with corresponding violence from other ethnic groups and the communities no longer knew peace.

f. More Political Adversories for the Eggon Ethnic Group

The horrendous killings and destruction of property that knew no bounds as carried out by the Ombatse militia have done more political harm than good for the Eggon political ambition in the State. Though the Eggon pride itself on being the populous ethnic group, it is clear that its number has failed to enable it produce the Governor of the State, which is the major crux that brought about the conflict. The violent activities of Ombatse on other ethnic groups have rather complicated its chances of earning the political trust of others.

g. Poverty and Displacement

The Omabtse crises lingered from 2007 up to 2014 with devasting consequences which included the destruction of homes, farm-lands severely impoverished and displaced families most of whom could no longer go back to their ancestral homes. So many traditional palaces like that of Osakyo of Obi, the Sangairi of Daddare, the Zhi Mighilis's Palace of Agyaragu, the Sangairi of Kwandare's palaces and others were set ablaze. Schools were closed and teachers either were killed or displaced.

2.7 Theoretical Framework

This section has to do with the theories which form the bed-rock of the thesis. To this end, Economic Deprivation Theory and Frustration and Aggression Theory are adopted in order to cave out the academic direction of the research.

Economic inequality, political resources and opportunities are all together regarded as both discontent-oriented theories that lead to violent political conflict, Schock (1996). He explains that the basic assumptions of the theories are that violent political conflict within nations is contingent on the extent of economic inequality: the greater the degree of economic inequality, the greater the discontent experienced by individuals and groups. The more intense and widespread the discontent, the more likely that grievance will become clear and will somehow get translated into violent political conflict. Also, Dollard *et.al* in *Default journal (2005),* posited "that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression". In the same vein, Rummel (1977) 'Conflict in Perspective' volume 3, noted that the Frustration-Aggression theory assumes that *aggression is always a consequence of frustration*. In specific terms, the proposition suggest that the occurrence of aggressive behavior is always predicated on

the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always trigger aggression in various forms.

As to the relevance of Frustration-Aggression theory to this study, the Eggon either rightly or wrongly, believe it has being marginalized by the power that be in collaboration with other ethnic groups. The theory is relevant to the extent that the study is able to establish the frustration of Eggon ethnic group in form of its inability to protect its kinsmen from the harsh implication of the Redeployment Policy of Local Government Employees of 10 June, 1999 which necessitated massive disengagement of Eggon work force from the local government system, thereby cutting short their source of sustenance and economic viability. In the same vein, the alleged collaboration of different ethnic groups in the State to deprive the Eggon ethnic group of a democratically elected governor is considered a stumbling block to advancing the economic and political furtunes of the Eggon people. The alleged imbalance in the establishment of Local Government and Chiefdoms among other imagined and real factors formed the basis of frustration leading the Eggon youth in the name of Ombatse to carry arms against not only the perceived enemy ethnic groups but also against the State. Frustration is an interference with goal-directed behavior; 'aggression' behavior design to injure, physically or otherwise, those toward whom it is directed. The disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is part of man's biologically make-up; there is a biologically inherent tendency in men and animals to attack the frustrating agent which, in turn, is "an outgrowth of stimulus-response psychology (Gurr, 1970). Thus, the violence meted by Ombatse militia on the perceived frustrating agent, in this case other ethnic groups like Alago, Mighili, Gwandara, Jukun, Kanuri and Akye, thereby disturbing the peace and stability of the State.

Also, economic deprivation theory tends to suggest the political and economic conditions that throw-up discontent with the political opportunity theories stressing on how political structures relate with one another, and indeed, the distribution of political power and collective action. The ‘frustration’ and ‘aggression theory espoused by Gurr (1970:33) views conflict as a consequence of accumulated anger and frustration especially on the part of the disadvantaged person or group of persons. The theory suggests that interference with goal – directed behavior creates frustration, which in turn, leads to aggressive responses usually directed against the reputed frustrating agent (Dollard in Mallum, 2002). Relative deprivation "is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities". It is the gap between that "to which people believe they are rightfully entitled" and that which "they think they are capable of getting and keeping" (Rummel, 1977). He further notes that Gurr’s view on political violence results from the frustrations of relative deprivation, but only if there is normative and utilitarian justification for violence, and the dissidents' coercive power and institutional support matches the regimes.

Rummel (1977) observed that there is difference between what people want and what they rationally and justifiably ought to get within the society. This entails the existence of a gap, which some will consider as normal while others will see as deprivation. He posited further that as society is developing and conditions are becoming better off, people's wants will increase, along side with gratification. On the other hand, if there is a sharp decline in gratifications, probably as a result of sudden economic depression, which widens the gap between what people want and what they get, reversing their expectations of satisfying their wants. Frustration gradually set in and creates and heightened the tendency for violence. Violence "becomes increasingly likely

when any kind of basic need which has come to be routinely gratified suddenly becomes deprived" (Davies, in Rummel, 1977). Deprivation is relative, therefore, to previous gratifications and expectations. Davies assumes a frustration-aggression mechanism in connecting deprivation to violence. According to him, "Violence is always a response to frustration . . ." (Rummel, 1977). In the like manner regarding the greater probability of violence inherent in increase in deprivation, he opines: "The psychological basis lies in the frustration of basic needs, a frustration induced by the sudden reversal in gratifications".

Consequently, this study finds the deprivation theory relevant due to some reasons out of which is the Local Government Redeployment Policy of June 10, 1999 which led to massive retrenchment of the Eggon work force from the Local Government system. The sudden stoppage of their salaries which was their major source of sustainance was by implication a deprivation and cut in gratification. For an average Eggon person, the policy was meant to economically surfocate and systematically removes life out of them. This alone was a source of serious anger and frustration by Eggon leading to violence in the state.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter deals with the methodology of the study. To this end, the chapter will be interested in the research population, sampling, sampling procedure, instrumentation, procedure of data administration, the method of data analysis and the scoring methods adopted in the study.

3.1 Research Design

The study used the quantitative method of data generation where 500 copies of questionnaires were administered but 405 were later retrieved. Quanlitative method was also used and and data generated through this method was used to provide more and substantiated explanation of data from quantitative. The study also delved into history in order to make sense of some major issues like land ownership and other socio-cultural differences and areas of cooperation. The historical perspective also gives account of relationship between communities; explore issues surrounding the indigene-settler question and how it impacts on peace and security of the communities. The method is used to reconstruct past events based on systematic and objective information or data derived from reliable sources. The descriptive perspect has helped to describe events as they unfold leading to mutual suspicion, intolerance and hate speeches culminating into violence and destruction of property. The application of historical research design enables us interpret the contending issues and how it affects the re-occuring ethno-cultural violence in the state. Thus, data collected and analyzed to determine the grudges of the Eggon ethnic group against the political establishment vis - a - vis other ethnic groups in Nasarawa State. The data were also analyzed to show the consequences and implications of violence to community security. The analysed data also

suggest approaches which if adopted would bring about reconciliation, peace and harmonious co-existence among ethnic groups in the State.

3.2 Population of the study

The study populations are youths and elders of the various ethnic groups involved in the comflict, traditional rulers, teachers, students and farmers in and around affected communities. Politicians across all political parties, security agencies and Civil Society Organizations also form the population of this study.

3.3 Sampled Population

In view of the fact that it is impossible to interview everybody and administer questionnaire to all category of the above mentioned groups, it becomes expedient to limit ourselves to a number of recognized stakeholders who were either directly involved or were indirectly affected by the conflict.

3.4 Sampling Technique

Purposive sampling technique is adopted for the study. The fact that Nasarawa South Senatorial Zone which is the thetre of Ombatse conflict is made up of 5 local governments namely: Doma, Lafia, Obi, Keana, and Awe respectively, a hundred pieces of questionnaire were distributed in each of the Local Government. The questionnaires were evenly distributed in 10 electoral wards which constitute each Local Government with the exception of Lafia that has 13 electoral wards. The questionnaires were further divided into 10 places and were shared to 10 respondents in each of the electoral ward that make up the 4 Local

Government Areas that have 10 wards each.This brings the total number of respondents to 400. However, the same 100 copies of questionnaires were distributed in the 13 wards of Lafia Local Government as 12 wards having 7 while 'Chiroma ward'being the largest electoral ward has 16 questionnaires. The table below shows the break down of the distribution of the respondents.

Table 3.1: Distribution of Questionnaires to Respondents across Wards of Local Government Areas

LGAs	**No of Respondents per ward**	**No of Wards**	**Total No of Questionnaires per LGA**
Obi	10	10	100
Keana	10	10	100
Awe	10	10	100
Doma	10	10	100
Lafia	12 + (16 respondents in Chiroma, the largest ward)	7	100
Total number of respondents = 500			

3.5 Instrument for Data Collection

This concerns the means through which data are collected. Three basic means of data collection were deployed and they include questionnaires, interview and observation. The questionnaire has helped to determine the feelings of the people with regard to factors responsible for the Ombatse conflict and their suggestions on how democratic principles would assist in managing the conflicts. Key Informant Interview (KII) method has been adopted to obtain vital information about the recruitment process, practices and ideology of the group, initiation/membership of the group, operational tactics employed and approaches for combating the menace of the Ombatse movement. Also, opinion from people such as chiefs and community heads, Commissioner of Police, Chairmen of affected Local Government Areas, Directors of State Security Services (SSS), State Commandant of Civil Defence and Commanding Officer 177 Battalion Keffi, Nasarawa state. State government officials were interviewed to ascertain other measures taken by the government to achieve peace apart from the judicial panel of inquiry set up to investigate the conflict and ensure peace and harmonious coexistence in the State.

3.6 Method of Data Analysis

Simple percentage has been used to analyze data collection from the field. The ‘’Nominal’’ data whose attitudes according to Roy Preece (1994) are identified by name and are simple counted, for instance ‘professionally qualified’ , ‘unemployed’, ‘do not agree’ and so on. Roy Preece further observed that, ‘’these counts can be converted into percentage after analysis but their original nature should not be ignored’’. In this case, a five point Likert scale of agree to disagree (that is, Agreed, Disagree, Undecided, Strongly Agreed and Strongly Disagreed) was

used to measure the approval or disapproval rating of the various respondentswith regard to the issues raised.

For the purpose of this study, descriptive research design was also used in view its capacity to describe phenomena as they exist. It is used to identify and obtain information on the characteristics of a particular problem or issue. Descriptive research design has been found to be able to produce good amount of responses from a wide range of people. Indeed, descriptive design provides a meaningful and accurate picture of events and explains people's perception and behavior on the basis of the data collected.

Furthermore, the study utilized both content analysis and trend analytical techniques for the analysis of data. As such the information employed for analysis in the study were carefully extracted from logical chains of evidence presented in journal papers, conference papers, periodic papers, edited books, documentary materials and the completed questionnaires .

3.7 Methodological Problem

Five hundred questionnaires were administered on respondents. However, ninety five questionnaires were not returned. Respondents carefully assessed the aim of the study before they agreed to participate in the research. Most of them depending on which ethnic group they come from have expressed skepticism and apprehension which where allayed by assuring them of the protection of their identity and fairness to all.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter is concerned with the presentation and analysis of data collected from the field. A category of the data analysed concerns the demographic information of respondents. The other aspect involves the analysis of the research questions. This information are important because they will help the researcher to arrive at logical conclusions and explanations of findings.

Distribution of Respondents by Age

Value Label	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Below 20	47	9.7
20 – 25	82	16.9
26 – 30	132	27.2
31 – 35	114	23.5
36 – 40	61	12.6
40 and above	49	10.1
Total	**485**	**100**

Source: Researchers' survey 2019

The table above shows that respondents are made-up of predominantly youths of 26-30 years who constitute 27.2 % 0f the total sample. The responses from this age group are important as it provides for the understanding of the perception of the most vibrant group that is involved in the Ombatse conflict.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Sex

Value Label	Frequency	Percentage
Male	329	67.8
Female	156	32.2
Total	485	100

Table 4.2 shows that 67.8 % of respondents are male while 32.2 % are female. This indicates that both the sexes were affected and have various views and perceptions about the conflict.

Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents by Qualifications

Value Label	Frequency	Percentage
Primary Education	138	28.4
Secondary Education	314	64.7
Tertiary Education	33	6.8
Total	485	100

The table above indicates that a very reasonable percentage (64.7 %) have their educational pursuit truncated at the secondary school level. 28.4 % have primary education while 6.8 % have attended tertiary education. The implication is that their responses are most reliable because very many were able to respond to the questionnaires without external influence.

Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents by Religion

Value Label	Frequency	Percentage
Islam	208	42.9
Christianity	149	30.7
Traditionalist	128	26.4
Total	485	100

The table above shows that the respondents have cut across the various religious beliefs system in the state. Although, Muslims and Christians have the highest numbers of respondents as 42.9% and 30.7% respectively, the tradionalists perception has also been able to be captured with a reasonable representation of 26.4%. This has gone a long way to enhance the objectivity of the responses gathered thereby given the outcome and recommendations of the study a wide range of acceptability and confidence with greater implication toward achieving peaceful co-existence amongst conflict parties.

Table 4.5: Distribution of Respondents by Occupation

Value Label	Frequency	Percentage
Farmer	133	27.4
Civil Servant	166	34.2
Trader	73	15.1
Unemployed	113	23.3
Total	485	100

The table above indicates that most of the respondents are civil servants with 34.2%. However, the various occupational distributions have also responded with significant percentage of 27.4%, 23.3%, and 15.1% representing farmers, unemployed and traders respectively. This is important as it helps to capture the perception of the different occupational groups.

Table 4.6: Distribution of Respondents by Designation.

Value Label	Frequency	Percentage
Political Party Officials	62	12.8
Political Party Card Carrying Members	260	53.6
Non Party Card Carrying Members	163	33.6
Total	485	100


The table above shows that 12.8% are political party officials while 53.6 % respondents are Political Party card carrying members and 33.6 % are Non Party card carrying members. The importance of this is that the majority view about the political perspective of the conflict is been elicited. The Non-Party card carrying members are a category of respondents who gave their political perspective of the conflict without any political interest. The position of the Non Party card carrying members is like the stand of the on-lookers who do not belong to any political party that is associated with any of the ethnic groups in the Ombatse conflict. On the other hand, the views of Political Party Officials could be measured by their desire to espouse their political angle of the conflict.

4.2 Objective 1: The socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia in Nasarawa State.

Table 4.1 Respondents' view on the socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethno-political interest in Nasarawa State.

s/n	Response Distribution	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Total
	Proposition: The socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia are:						
1.	Creation Of more Chiefdoms for the Eggon ethnic group	257 (53 %)	165 (34.0%)	38 (7.8 %)	25 (5.2 %)	-	485 (100 %)
2.	Creation of more Local Government Areas for Eggon ethnic group	248 (51.1 %)	170 (35.0%)	24 (5.0 %)	43 (8.9 %)	-	485 (100 %)
3.	Appointment of more Eggon Extractions into higher political office.	262 (54.0 %)	165 (34.0%)	32 (6.6 %)	26 (5.4 %)	-	485 (100 %)
4.	Appointment of Aren Eggon as the Chairman of State Traditional Ruler.	127 (26.1 %)	271 (55.9 %)	28 (5.8 %)	59 (12.2 %)	-	485 (100 %)
5.	Acceptance of Eggon extraction as indigenes in their areas of settlements.	321 (66.2 %)	150 (30.9%)	2 (0.4 %)	12 (2.5 %)	-	485 (100%)

6.	Abrogation of payment of farm royalties to other tribes by the Eggons.	304 (62.7%)	142 (29.3%)	28 (5.7%)	11 (2.3%)	-	485 (100%)
7.	The citing of State Capital in Akwanga instead of Lafia.	198 (40.8%)	262 (54.0%)	21 (4.4%)	4 (0.8%)	-	485 (100%)



Source: Researcher's field work 2018

The table and chart above show that the creation of more chiefdoms for the Eggon ethnic group is one of their contentious demands that later snowballed into what is now referred to as 'Ombatse violence' as shown by 87% respondents. The Eggon has contended that, while some of the ethnic groups such as Mighili and Alago for which the Eggon are staying side-by-side in communities such as Agyragu, Alogani, Angwa-Atashi, Asakio among others are chiefdoms created by the state and made to be headed by the Alago and Mighili respectively. The Eggon on the other hand is left as subjects or settlers under the traditional administration of the aforementioned ethnic groups. In the view held by Eggons, this act has continued to subjugate them to the whims and caprices of the so-called indigenes despite their high numerical strength in such communities. The view is corroborated by position canvassed during a Fucused Group Discussion (FGD) in Nasarawa Eggon where a participant challenged that:

"How can Eggon be made to be subjects to Alago in Asakio and Mighili in Agyaragu where the Eggon has practically out-numbered them? Is it possible for a people to have founded a place and others who are alleged to be settlers will come and out-number them? It tells you that there is either historical corruption or government hypocracy! Eggon must be given chiefdoms in these areas to make them independent"(FGD/1/6participants/Male/Nasarawa Eggon/2 April, 2018).

The above perception is also captured vividly in the Memorandum submitted by the Wakili Eggon to the High-Powered Commission of Inquiry on Ethnic Disturbance in Assakio and it states "*the problem of Eggon in Assakio started in 2002 when Lafia East Development area was created out of Lafia Local Government Area by the Alh. (Dr.) Abdullahi Adamu led administration. It became serious in 2003 when Assakio Chiefdom was created by the same regime*" (Nasarawa State/White Paper/Ethnic Disturbance in Assakio/2012).

In the same vein, the Osoko of Assakio confirmed in an interview conducted in his palace in Asakio on the 1/4/18 that:

"*the demand for a chiefdom by Eggon people is something that is uncalled for, because they know within them that they are settlers in this community and it is because of my peoples' generousity that Eggon was accommodated and allowed to come from Nasarawa Eggon and farm. It is because we as Alago are peace loving people that overtime we have allowed Eggon not only to farm, take the proceed to their place (Nasarawa Eggon) but to whoever amongst them who wants to settle on our land should do so taking into cognizance our land tenancy agreement. So, for Eggon to now want to claim ownership of our land to the extent of asking for chiefdom amount to a very tall dream that we will not allow to happen"*(KII/Chief of Asakio/Male/Asakio/1/4/18).

Indeed, the creation of more local government areas is another demand by Eggon in their quest to meet-up some of their socio-political interest in Nasarawa State. From the data on the table above, 86.1% of respondents have concurred that Eggon ethnic group has over the years felt short-changed interms of statutory Local Government Areas given to its people as compared to other ethnic groups. The Eggon ethnic group has only Nasarawa Eggon Local Government while others like Alago having 3 Local Goverments namely Doma, Obi and Keana. This has been a source of great concern for the Eggon and until more Local Governments are created to take care of the much growing but scattered population of Eggon, it will continue to feel being marginalized. Although, 13% of respondents have disagreed with this proposition, it is cristal clear that the creation of more local governments for Eggon will partly assuage their bitterness against perceived marginalization.

This position is supported by the view expressed during an interview conducted with a legal luminary in the Lafia where he categorically stated that:

"*…of the 100% total population of all ethnic groups in Nasarawa State, Eggon would take 50%. He stressed that the Emir of Lafia, Alhaji Dr Mustapha Agwai while giving his testimony before the Judicial Panel of Inquiry into the ethnic crises in Jenkwe, Obi local government said that the 1953 census shows that 51% population of the then Lafia Division which is the present day Nasarawa State excluding Akwanga was the Tiv ethnic group followed by the Eggon ethnic group occupying several communities. When Nasarawa State was to be created from Plateau State, there was the general belief that it was going to be created for the Eggons due to their numerical strength compared to others. How come this dream has come to fussion and instead it is Eggon that appeared to be in the minority with just a Local Government…" (KII/Legal Luminary/Male/2/Lafia/6/4/2018).*

The appointment of more Eggon extraction into higher political offices in the state is another important demand that the Eggon is viewing with serious concern. Data from the table above support this claim as 88% of respondents have agreed that the appointment of Eggon people into higher political offices is important and is capable of dowsing the lingering conflict in the state. The inability of Eggon to have produced a democratically elected governor since the current democratic experience in 1999 to date is being viewed as a conspiracy of other ethnic groups against the Eggon. Although, the Eggon still complain that its kinsmen who are competently qualified to occupy certain strategic appointments are being denied of such just because of their ethnic lineage. This does not seem to bother them much as to be able to produce a governor of the state which would have taking care of other minor challenges that they face in the socio-political and economic sphere of the state. This idea could be buttress in the view

expressed by the Emir of Obi Local Government during an interview conducted in his palace. The Emir noted with dismay that:

"*The aged-long peaceful and cordial relationship existing between the Alago and Eggon people to the extent of inter-marrying within ourselves suddenly shattered just because some Eggon elites feel they must be governor of the State which is their constitutional right that nobody is denying but, which has to be achieved through the tenets of our democracy not by violence. There is no record as far as I know that any Eggon has contested under any platform and won a Gubernutorial election and was rigged. Assuming any Eggon candidate was successful but rigged, was it not appropriate to approach the court instead of brain-washing innocent youths to take-up arms against their brethren?*"(KII/Emir of Obi LGA/1/2/4/18).

The appointment of Aren-Eggon as the Chairman of the State Traditional Council is one interest the Eggon holds so dearly. Data from the above table is in support of this proposition as 82% respondents agreed that the Eggon has continued to feel highly slighted with the appointment of the Emir of Lafia as the Chairman, Traditional Council of the State. In view of the Eggon belief concerning their superior numerical strength over and above all other ethnic groups combined, it should rationally accord their first class traditional chief (Aren Eggon) the authomatic prerogative of leading the state traditional institution. In the same vein, the Eggon could not understand why the Kambari otherwise known as Bare-Bari people of Lafia who came some hundreds years after to meet the Eggon and other ethnic groups would be made to be their leader. This perception finds expression in the view expressed by a group of participants in Agyaragu where they mentioned that:

"*It is sad and unfair for a people who came far after the Eggon has established several communities and territories in this area only to be made to head our traditional ruler. It is an*

aberration and we will continue to fight for this course until something is done about it by the government. President Sani Abacha just gave this people this position only because they come from the same with him which is former Borno Empire and not for any other good reason"

(FGD/2/6 participants/Male/Agyaragu/2 April, 2018*).*

Also, acceptance of Eggon people as indigenes in their areas of settlements is an issue in the conflict as shown by the data in the above table. 97.1% respondents is in agreement that Eggon should be accorded position of indigenes in all parts of the state where they are domiciled for many centuries doing their legitimate farming activities. This alone will give Eggon the opportunity to farm without paying any royalty to the so-called indigenous chief of any particular community. It would enable Eggon to not only seek and gain employment in the various Local Government Areas where they find themselves but should afford them the opportunity to aspire for any political position in such areas. The perception regarding payment of royalty which is premised upon the understanding that Eggon are settlers instead of indigenes could be referenced from the Report of High-Powered Commission of Inquiry on Ethnic Disturbance in Assakio that: *"… another remote cause of the disturbance in Assakio…is the issue of payment of royalties. The commission found that, countrary to what the Eggon people, spear-headed by the Wakilin Eggon, believe i.e that the demand and payment of royalties is a recent thing, it was found that it is almost as old as the community under reference*."

Also, in an interview conducted with the Osakyo of Assakio in his palace consented that: "*one of the issues leading to disturbance between my people and Eggon is that the Eggon said they are indigene of this place. We found this their demand very outrageous and insensitive to our history. How can people who came on farming expedition just in recent years and we decided to accommodate them by giving them place to settle and farm and pay us royalties from their farm*

produce suddenly wake up to not only refuse to continue to pay us this earlier agreed royalties but, to even going to the extent of contesting for the ownership of the whole community. Unless the Eggon is willing to kill me and wipe my people on the surface of this earth as they have already demonstrated by their capacity to inflict violence on my people and our community, we will never surrender our ancestral land to anybody, not even Eggon" (KII/Chief of Assakio/Male/Asakio/1/4/18).

Data from the table above also agreed to a large extent that the abrogation of payment of farm royalties to other ethnic groups by Eggon is another issue in the conflict as 92% respondents are in agreement with this perception. All Eggon persons found outside the Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area is considered a settler and if he or she engages in farming activities in the area, he is traditionally required to pay royalty to the local chief as it is the case in Assakio. However, the Eggon are calling for the complete abrogation of the policy. This view can be supported by an idea expressed in a Focused Group Discussion conducted in Agyaragu. The group noted that:

" *to agree to pay farm royalties to any chief is suggestive of one being a second class citizen. No ethnic group will accept the status of a second class citizen in its own state of origin*" (FGD/2/6 participants/Male/Agyaragu/2 April, 2018).

The above perception is also expressed during a Key Informat Interview in Nasarawa Eggon that:

"…*payment of farm royalty is against the constitutional provision of Nigeria which vested the ownership of land in the State. So, why will any chief or group of persons sit down and expect to collect farm royalties from people that are also from the same state*? *This I think is not right*" (KII/Male Respondent/Nasarawa Eggon/6/4/18).


Also, data from the table above support the proposition that siting of state capital in Akwanga as against Lafia which is currently the case is being seriously canvassed as an issue in the Ombatse conflict. While 94.8% agreed with this assertion, very negligible percentages of about 5.2% disagree. The Eggon has continued to drum the idea that Lafia, unlike Akwanga is not geographically located in the centre of the State. Eggon is of the opinion that in comparison with the nation's FCT Abuja, which is geographically located in the centre of Nigeria and thereby gives it a neutral position to be a pride and treasure of all Nigerians. Akwanga in the like manner is positioned geographically at the centre of Nasarawa State and should have been made the capital city of the State instead of Lafia. This notion is being espoused in an interview with a senior civil servant in Toto Local Government where he said:

"*…although Lafia was advantaged in terms of infrastructural facilities that would ease and facilitate the take-off of the new State, Akwanga was better positioned centrally in the State which would have made it more easier for accessibility to people coming from the different part of the State. You know it was alleged that General Sani Abacha as the president of country then only wanted to favour his ethnic kinsmen who are from the same origin with him and that was why he approved Lafia as the State capital instead of the much favoured Akwanga*" (KII/Senior Civil Servant/Male/Toto/11/4/18).

Table 4.2 Objective 2: Examining the strategic approach of the Ombatse ethnic militia in achieving their socio-political interests in Nasarawa State.

Table 4.2 Respondents' view on the strategic approach of the Ombatse ethnic militia at achieving their socio-political interests in Nasarawa State.

s/n	Response Distribution	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Total
	Proposition: The Ombatse strategic approach at attaining their socio-political interests are:						
1.	Aggressive use of media for violence.	151 (31.1%)	203 (41.9%)	76 (15.7 %)	55 (11.3 %)	-	485 (`100%)
2.	Use of physical violence against perceived enemies.	287 (59.2 %)	135 (27.8%)	37 (7.6 %)	26 (5.4 %)	-	485 (`100%)
3.	Charms for fortification of members against defeat.	293 (60.4%)	105 (21.6%)	46 (9.5 %)	41 (8.5 %)	-	485 (`100%)
4.	Invocation of Eggon deities for assistance in defeating the enemies.	208 (42.9 %)	117 (24.1%)	97 (20.0 %)	63 (13.0 %)	-	485 (`100%)
5.	Inciting smear campaign against other ethnic groups.	198 (40.8%)	210 (43.3%)	67 (13.8%)	10 (2.1%)	-	485 (`100%)



Source: Reseacher's field work, 2018

The opinion as to the aggressive view of media in perpetuating violence to achieve the political interest of the Eggon ethnic group in Nasarawa State is supported by a large percentage of respondents as shown from the data in the table above. Although 27% of respondents do not hold this opinion but, 73% respondents have expressed agreement with the assertion. Eggon has gone to the extent of establishing a news paper outfit called Eggon-

News where aggressive campaign and enlightenment in both English and Eggon Language is used to reach out to all Eggon wherever they are in and out of the State to participate in the crusade of violent emancipation of Eggon. This proposition is supported by view obtained during KII in Doma. The elder stateman observes that:

"*... you know Eggon people are highly enlightened and educated and you can see how they are exploiting the use of media both home and beyond to mobilize their kinsmen in support of their course. It is sad that issues that are best resolved politically have turned out to be the causes for which we would be killing ourselves. You can see also how Eggon become the master-killers through their highly potent Ombatse youth and on the other hand, Eggon is the loudest on both print and electronic media seeking for international and national sympathy… why do you think the Eggon-News was established? Even the semi illiterate Eggon have got a part of the newspaper where their local language is being used for them to get abreast with issues around their collective socio-political and economic interests*" (KII/Elder Stateman/Male/Doma/8/4/18).

Also, data from the table above indicate that the use of physical violence against perceived enemies of Eggon was yet another strategy deployed towards achieving the Eggon socio-political interest in the state. Although, 13% of respondents are not in support of the view, 87% have agreed to the assertion. This approval rating clearly demonstrates how violence is use to attempt to force the hands of government and other ethnic groups to give up to the demands of the Eggon people. This opinion finds expression in the view obtained during FGD in Nasarawa Eggon where it was stated that:

"*… the Eggon is being pushed to the wall by those who believe Eggon people will never govern this State irrespective of their population and exposure; some people have sworn that Eggon must continue to take the position of second class citizen and so what do you espect of a frustrated person or group of persons if not for such people to naturally vent their anger on those whom they think are the cause of their predicaments!Although, no right-thinking person will approve of any sort of violence especially on innocent people, but we all know as humanbeing when frustration gets to its peak, what always follow is violence with unpredictable consequences*" (FGD/1/6 participants/Male/Nasarawa Eggon/6/4/18).

Similarly, the use of charms for fortification of members of Ombatse militia against defeat by perceived enemies is also another strategy used in the so-called fight for the socio-political interests of the Eggon as shown from the data available on the table above. 82% respondents have agreed to the claim that charms were seriously applied by Ombatse and that has instilled tremendous fear in the minds of other ethnic groups especially when it was noticed that Ombatse militia could confront and inflict great to a large number of government security agencies as exemplified by the killings of almost a hundred Nigerian Policemen and some personnel of State Security Services on 7th May, 2013 in Alakyo, a community in Lafia East Local Governments. This perception could be buttress by a few obtained during a Key Informat Interview in Nasarawa Eggon and he said:

"no any youth will go out to fight unless he passes through initiation of a sort and all necessary protective locally and traditionally prepared charms such as a bullet-proof vest, a black cap, a ring and a powder is given to him. Anybody who genuely passes through this initiation and acquired those items mentioned is fearless and can face any enemy irrespective

of his fire power. The successes achieved by the boys encouraged other young men to join in the fight because even though some of them do not want to fight but since they are feeling unsave in case of sudden encounter with any group that may want take revenge, at least they are been fortified and can withstand any aggression anywhere" (KII/Male Respondent/Nasarawa Eggon/6/4/18).

Data available from the table has also proven that invocation of Eggon deity known as Ahogbre in Ashim shrine for blessings and success in any act of attack to be prosecuted by Ombatse is a sure way to subdueing the alleged enemy. Although, 33% respondents disagreed with this notion, 67% have consented to the invocation of Eggon diety for success as a strategy for defeating and to cow perceived enemy to doing their biddings. The priest in Ashim shrine after performing all the ritual rites on the militias setting out for war will invoke the spirit of Ahogbre to bless the outing and crown their courage and doggedness to fight for their interest with success. The priest ensures and warns the fighters that so long as they have purified themselves against fornication, adultery, cultism, theft and other sundry social vices, they are assured of victory. Thus, members who have in one way or the other earlier committed such crimes are encouraged to confess and their sins atuned for before advancing for the attack. This act emboldens the militia and makes them fiece in their art of violence on the one hand. On the other hand, other ethnic groups who are the perceived enemies of Ombatse are enmeshed with serious fear of Ombatse believing that Ombatse has a special god that gives them unimaginable power and protection. Thus, on hearing the rumor of Ombatse attack, people vacate their communities and Ombatse unleashed terror and destruction on what is remaining of such communities. This view can be deduced from KII with the paramount ruler of Assakyo, the Osukwo of Asakyo on 30 Mar, 2018 in his palace where he mentioned that:

"*Ombatse militia has on 3 occasions ransacked, destroyed everything including this palace and then occupied the town for months before the security operatives recovered the town. Though, our youth were ready to face them but we are always able to prevail over them not to fall to the evil machination of the Ombatse and allow our community to be destroyed. Instead we leave the place for them but we were certain that intercention will come from appropriate quarters no matter how long and we were not disappointed and that is why you can even meet us in this palace today*" (KII/Chief of Assakio/Male/Asakio/1/4/18).

In the same vein, this idea can also be deduced from Focus Group Discussion in Nasarawa Eggon where it was said that:

"…. despite that they are predominantly Christians and Muslims, they quickly fall back to their ancestral gods for immediate intervention into any calamity that befalls them. That is why Ombatse youth will never advance and engage in any fight without first of all receiving the blessings of the 'high god', Ahogbre" (FGD/2/6 participants/Male/Agyaragu/2 April, 2018*).*

Data from the above table also reveals that inciting smear campaign was yet another strategy deployed by Eggon ethnic group in its desire to settling some it's socio-political and economic interest. While 15.9% respondents do not concur with the assertion, 84.1% believe that smear campaign was seriously deployed by Eggon to portray other ethnic groups like Alago, Mighili, Bare-Beri conniving to constitute stumbling-block against the attainment of Eggon socio-political interest in Nasarawa State. This view is further captured in KII with the Emir of Agyaragu, Lafia East Local Government. The Emir observed that:

" trivial and mundane issues such as market crises, crisis between 'Okada-Riders' and Local Vigilantees were unfortunately over-blown in the media to depict our people as intolerant and trespassers. These are conflicts that are inevitable between people who interact with one another


on daily basis and we have our traditional mechanisms known and respected by all through which we settle such dispute. Suddenly, we do not know how disputes like that became issues of media propaganda aimed at not only blackmailing us but to cause disaffection amongst the people thereby escalating tension leading to killings of human lives, destruction of farm produce and peoples' accommodations" (KII/Chief of Agyaragu/Male/Lafia East/8/4/18).

4.4 Objective 3: Investigation of factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse ethnic militia into violent agitation.

Table 4.3 Respondents' view on the factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse ethnic militia into violent agitation.

s/n	Response Distribution	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Total
	Proposition: Factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands into violence are:						
1.	Non creation of more Eggon chiefdoms.	192 (`39.5%)	114 (`23.5%)	89 (`18.4 %)	90 (`18.6%)	-	485 (100%)
2.	Denial of Eggon extraction of indigeneship at their area of settlements.	146 (`30.1%)	232 (47.8%)	54 (`11.1%)	53 (`10.9%)	-	485 (100%)
3.	Non creation of more Local Government for Eggon.	105 (`21.6%)	220 (`45.4%)	89 (`18.3%)	71 (`14.7%)	-	485 (100%)
4.	Non appointment of Aren Eggon as	133 (`27.4%)	197 (`40.6%)	63 (`13.0%)	92 (`19.0%)	-	485 (100%)

	Chairman of State Traditional Council.						
5.	Non abrogation of farm royalties by Eggon to Alago.	253 (`52.2%)	169 (`34.8%)	28 (`5.8%)	35 (`7.2%)	-	485 (100%)
6.	Conplecency of security agencies.	210 (`43.3%)	105 (`21.7%)	98 (`20.2%)	72 (`14.8%)	-	485 (100%)
7.	Non-election of Eggon extractions as Governor of Nasarawa State	313 (`64.5%)	133 (`27.4%)	21 (`4.3%)	18 (`3.7%)	-	485 (100%)



Source: Reseacher's field survey, 2018

Data obtained as shown in table 4.3 above indicate that non creation of more chiefdom for Eggon ethnic group is one of the leading frustrating factors that transformed the peaceful demands by Eggon to a violent one. Although, 37% of respomdents do not share this perspective, 63% is of the opinion that continuous government adamant posture of refusing to hearken to the calls for more chiefdoms for Eggon was among other reasons that led to the peaceful demand to

violent agitation by Eggon. The State Government since 2003 established some chiefdoms among which was Assakyo chiefdom headed by an Alago with the presumption that the chiefdom belongs to Alago people. It was since then that Eggon has continue to call on the government to create side by side another chiefdom that will headed by an Eggon extraction in order to make the Eggon independent of Alago ethnic group. The call however, continued to meet with deaf ears from governments. This among other factors was believed to have lead to the transformation of the so-called peaceful demand to violent conflict. This perception is supported by data obtained in Tudun-Gwandara in Lafia during a FGD. One of the speakers mentioned that:

"*…everybody in the State knows that an average Eggon man is a peace and loving person but it is the government that has forced Eggon to carry arms against the State because it appears nobody is listening to them. When particular people continue to make specific demands to the governments with no positive response, it only shows irresponsibility on the part of the government and such can lead to frustration and violence will deffinately be the end result. For instance, the Eggon have made several calls to the government to make it independent of Alago in Assakyo general area by creating chiefdom for its people but non of these governments is ready to do that! Most Eggon be under any ethnic group?…"*

(FGD/3/1/6 participants/Male/Lafia/5/4/18).

Similarly, it was well established that government refusal to create more local government for Eggon ethnic group is also among other factors that led to the transformation of the peaceful demands by Eggon to a violent conflict. 86.1% respondents agreed with this line of thought while 13.9% disagreed. The quest for the creation of more Local Government Areas for Eggon became more louder especially at the wake of the June 10, 1999 reviewed policy on Local Government Employees which held that all employees of senior cadre must go back to their local government

of origins. The outcome of the implementation of the policy saw to the exodus of Eggon people sent away from almost all the 13 Local Government Councils where they were hitherto serving to Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Council. Due to lack of enough space to accommodate this number of people, it then led to the compulsory retirement of very many of them. The back-lash was a continous call and judicial struggle up to Supreme Court for the re-peal of the policy, but with no positive response from the government. Consequently, the Eggon resorted to call for creation of more Local Governments to take of its teaming population across the State. The call gained more ground with the creation of Lafia East Development Area in 2002 with headquarters at Agyaragu where the second class chief of Mighili ethnic group is the traditional council head.

"*the problem of Eggon in Assakyo started in 2002 when Lafia East Development area was created out of Lafia Local Government Area by the Alh. (Dr.) Abdullahi Adamu led administration. It became serious in 2003 when Assakyo Chiefdom was created by the same regime*" (Nasarawa State/White Paper/Ethnic Disturbance in Assakio/2012).

Also, Data obtained from KII with Legal Council representing the Eggon at the Judical Panel of Enquiry into the ethnic disturbance in Assakyo. The legal pundit in his office at Old Lafia Hotel along Shendam Road noted that:

"*… the day the government announced the Redeployment Policy of Local Government Employees in this State was the day the seed of ethnic hatred and ethnic suspicion was sown. That policy took sadly took away the love and the bond that existed amongst our people and it is unfortunate that calls after calls including our success at the Apex Court of the land failed to move the government to doing the right thing"* (KII/Legal Luminary/Male/2/Lafia/6/4/2018).

Also made clear from the data in table 4.3 above is the non re-consideration of the appointment of Aren-Eggon as substantive Chairman of State Traditional Council. Although, 32%

of respondents do not believe with this perception, 68% have consented to the idea as expressed above. The contineous clamour by Eggon drawing the attention of the various State Governments to reconsider the appointment of Aren Eggon as the Chairman Traditional Council of State as against the current order where the Emir of Lafia is the Chairman has continued to fall on deaf ears. The Eggon is of the believe that oweing to its greater number of population against all ethnic groups put together, puts its First Class Chief on a pedestal to be crown the Chairman of the Sate Traditional Council.

Also, revealed from the data in the table above signifies that the non abrogation of payment of farm royalties by Eggon to Alago is among other factors that led to a transition from peaceful demand to violent conflict which is refered to as 'Ombatse conflict'. Although, 13% of the respondents do not share this view, overwhelming 87% share the prposition as expressed above. The Eggon have consistently remained adamant that it will not be cowed into taking the position of second class citizen under the guise of being settlers and thereby must pay farm royalties to the so-called indigenous chief if they must farm on the community's piece of land. However, succeeding government in the State seemed not be convinced with the position of the Eggon. The government continued to support the position that Eggon people found in communities such as Assakyo are settlers and have to go with the long standing tradition of the initial founders of the community. This perception is supported by the Government White Paper on the Report of the High-Powered Commission of Inquiry on Ethnic Disturbance in Assakio.

Government notes that:

"*… the demand for farm royalty was in respect of those who carried on economic activities (rice farming and fishing) on the royal land only. Farmers on other pieces of land, even those on the land that bordered the royal land were not included amongst those required to pay*

royalty. At this point, it is to be emphasized that tbe refusal to pay and not the demand for payment of royalty was the cause of disturbance in Assakio. The existence of this practice as earlier stated is time-immemorial in Assakio history. Government acknowledges the payment of royalty as Stated in the memorandum to the Commision by the Honorable Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs in the following words: "there is no denying the fact however, that such tributes were levied, are through local arrangements". This is corroborated by the views of His Royal Highness, the Emir of Lafia, and by extension, the Nasarawa State Council of Chiefs in response to the Commision's enquiry concerning payment of tributes. He said: it is still the practice today in Assakio where certain land is earmarked for the Chief to lease out to any interested persons for a fee. Under this practice, even if you are a member of the royal house intending to farm on that land, you must pay royalty to the Chief" (Nasarawa State/White Paper/Ethnic Disturbance in Assakio/2012).

Data from table 4.3 above also reveals that the complecency of security agency in the State also contributed to the escalation of peaceful demand to violent agitation by Eggon. While 35% of respondents do not agree to this view, 65% consented to the opinion as espoused above. This particular challenge rear its urgly head in different form ranging from leaking of security intelligence to leadership of the militia as exemplified by the incidence of the massacre of about 100 police officers and some personnel of the Department of the State Security (DSS) on their way to Alakio to apprehend the alleged spiritual leader of Ombatse in 2013. There was lack of synagy between the various security agencies and also alleged sympathy from certain top echelon of some security agencies. This view could be buttress by data obtained obtained during KII with a very senior police officer in the State. The senior officer observed that:

"… it was really sad and unfortunate that even at strategic level, we could degenerate to either reneging to participate on an already sanctioned combined operation or leaking out strategic synthesised intelligence to certain interest. This has been the bane of the Ombatse conflict, certain interests close to the corridors of power at both Federal and State levels keep sabotaging the successes of our operations thereby giving the militia the upper hand. Unfortunately again, most of the rank and file policemen who are native of the Eggon tribe have their loyalty, first, to their ethnic group before the police force and some of them were culpable of leaking out planned operations" (KII/Senior Police Officer/Male/2/Lafia/6/4/2018).

Also revealed from the data in the above table, is the non-election of Egon extraction as Governor of the State as another factor that led to the snowballing of peaceful demand to violent one. Very insignificant 8%of respondents do not agree with this opinion representing very minute population who do not believe this view. On the otherhand, 92% believe in the proposition representing very huge population who agreed that one of the factors that led to the degeneration of peaceful demands to violent agitation was the persistent failure in the attempt by Eggon to produce a Governor of the State. Ever since the beginning of the current democratic experience in 1999, various Eggon candidates have made frantic efforts under various political platforms albeit unsuccessful to clinch the highest political office in the State. This is believed to have added to the frustrations experienced by ethnic groups who are perceived to constitute stumbling-block against the attainment of such noble objectives. The above view point is supported by data obtained during FGD in Nasarawa Eggon. The group claimed that:

"*… the Eggon hsve been making effort since 1999 to support candidates from other tribes but when it is time to support the candidates from Eggon, these people will betray Eggon. This has been causing ripples and disaffection by Eggon. Candidates of Eggon have severally been*

manipulated, rigged and short-changed at different stages of democratization. This is because soime people are scared that, with the high level of education and exposure and the Eggon people, by the time they produce a Governor of the State, they will occupy everywhere and subject other people to poverty. But I think this is not correct…."(FDG/1/6 participants/Nasarawa Eggon/6/4/19).


Also, data revealed from the table 4.3 above that the siting of State Capital in Akwanga instead of Lafia as is currently the case is one of the factors that led to the transformation of peaceful sociuo-political demands to violent conflicts. While 5.2% disagree with the view. This negligeable percentage represents very few segment of the society who does not hold this view. However, 94.8% respondents agree with the perception. It represent very significant segment of the population who believe in the view as expressed. The Eggon has continued to make passionate calls for Akwanga to be made the Nasarawa State capital due to its geographical location and their consenquinient relationship with Madan-Kasa who are the native of Akwanga. Unfortunately, the demand has not been met and it is inter-alia, a factor leading to violent agitation by Eggon. This view finds expression in the data obtained during FGD in Nasarawa Eggon. One of the speakers claimed that:

"*… everybody knows that the only reason that made General Abacha to make Lafia as the State capital was because the Bare-Bari in Lafia are his brothers. We know they came from Old Bornu Empire which is where Abacha himself came from. It is clear that most people in the State prefer Akwanga but the authority that be refused go with the peoples' choice just to favour his ethnic kinsmen…* " (FDG/1/6 participants/Nasarawa Eggon/6/4/19).

4.5 Objective 4: Examining the effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State.

Table 4.3 Respondents' view on the effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State.

s/n	Response Distribution	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Total
	Proposition: The effects of violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security in Nasarawa State are:						
1.	Lost of lives	322 (`66.4%)	149 (30.7%)	8 (1.7%)	6 (1.2%)	-	485 (100%)
2.	Lost of property.	276 (56.9 %)	151 (31.1%)	22 (4.6%)	36 (7.4%)	-	485 (100%)
3.	Security breach	137 (`28.2%)	285 (58.8%)	21 (4.3%)	42 (8.7%)	-	485 (100%)
4.	Strained relationship between the Eggon and other ethnic group	298 (`61.4 %)	56 (11.6%)	78 (16.1%)	53 (10.9%)	-	485 (100%)
5.	Destruction of socio-economic activities	202 (`41.6%)	123 (25.4%)	82 (16.8%)	79 (16.2%)	-	485 (100%)
6.	Increase in the rate of social vices.	176 (`36.3%)	139 (28.7%)	105 (21.6%)	65 (13.4%)	-	485 (100%)
7.	Generation of widows and orphans	143 (`29.5%)	284 (58.6%)	35 (7.2%)	23 (4.7%)	-	485 (100%)



Source: Researcher's field survey, 2018

Data from the above table shows that the lost of lives was one of the effects of the Ombatse violent activities on community security in Nasarawa State. While 2.9% respondents did not agree, 97.1% agree with the opinion. 2.9% shows how very insignificant members of society who don't believe in the view. On the other hand, 97.1% depict the picture of unanimity of almost all members of society agreeing to the fact that there was serious lost of lives occasioned by the Ombatse violence. Lots of live were lost in the crises. In a KII conducted with the traditional ruler of Obi Local Government, the data there in could support this claim. The traditional ruler stated that:

"*… no accurate could be given to account for the number of lives lost in the wake of these crises. But, I can assure you that over a thousand of people have lost their lives…"(KII/1/Obi/Male/1/4/19).*

Also, data has proven from table 4.4 above that lost of property is another effect of the Ombatse ethnic conflict. While 88% respondents affirm this position, only 12% disagree. Despite insignificant of 12% respondents, it should be viewed as represent the few who sentimentally reject the obvious. Data from KII conducted with traditional ruler of Obi Local Government clould also support this assertion. The royal father lamented that:

"*… as for the properties lost to the crises, it worth over billion naira. And mind you, some of those properties destroyed neither belong to the Eggon, Alago, Mighili and other regarded as enemies in the State: consider those travelers on the high ways whose cars and other valuables were needlessly burnt!...*" *(KII/1/Obi/Male/1/4/19).*

Another effect of the violent activities of the Ombatse militia on community security as revealed from data from table 4.4 is security breach. 87% repomdents agreed with the view while 13% disagree. This implied that greater number of the population attested to the rampant cases of security breach especially in remote communities. Most victims of the Ombatse violence fled their communities for miscreants to occupy and harbor for committing crimes like robbery, drug peddling and rape. Most of the young boys who fled their communities have turned to security nuisance on the streets. The above view could be corroboration with the idea expressed during KII with the traditional ruler of Agyaragu. The community leader observed that

"*… other bad elements in various communities have taken advantage of families who are already in disarray to rape young girls, steal farm produce and rob our young men of their*

motor-bikes for they use for 'Okada busimess' to supplement their income from agriculture…. " (KII/2/Agyaragu/Male/1/4/19).

However, the 13% respondents who disagree with this assertion could represent the voices of few who are either sympathizers of the miscreants or those who actually do not believe that the security breaches happening couldn't be associated with the crises.

One other effect of Ombtase violent activities on community security in Nasarawa State is 'strained relationship' between the Eggon people and other ethnic groups. Data from the table above shows that 73% of respondents agree with the opinion while 27% disagree. This goes to show that majority of the populace hold this view as expressed. Thde Ombatse conflict has caused marriage dislocation; cut friendship ties and entrenched cronic mutual distrust amongst hitherto people of different ethnic background cohabiting harmoniously together in peace and love. Inter-marriages have broken down.

Data from KII with the Emir of Assakio could buttress this fact. The traditional ruler said "*… I am particularly sad with what is happening between my people (Alago) and the Eggon. This thing has affected even our children that inter-married themselves. As I speak with you, my biological daughter is married to the son of Wakilin Eggon. My grandchildren cannot visit this palace as at today! My daughter's simlings from here cannot visit her. If this is happening to members of my family, imagine the number of inter-marriages that must have been cut-short due to this conflict…"(KII/1/Assakio/Male/1/4/19).*

Distruction of socio-economic activities is yet another effect of the Ombatse violence on community security. 77% of respondents are in agreement with this view while 33% that disagree indicates that though less in percentageas compared to those that agree, there is a bit reasonable number of people who are either unaware of the said distruction of socio-economic activities or

may be that they themselves where not directly affected or chose to be sentimentally naïve. On the other hand, the 77% respondents who agree represent the overwhelming voices of those who either witnesses or were directly affected. Data obtained from KII with the traditional ruler of Jenkwe Development Area could support the above claim. The royal father mentioned that:

'*... our people are predominantly farmers but \their farms were burn completely and it did not stop at that, even their farm produce stored at home were equally destroyed; market and even schools were affected. This is what is obtainable in all communities that were attacked on both sides. The Eggon themselves are farmers and couldn't also be comfortable on their farms and I am afraid, we may be heading towards for scarcity and hunger'(KII/2/Agyaragu/Male/1/4/19).*

Increase in the rate of social vices is another effect of Ombatse violence on community security in Nasarawa State. Data from table 4.4 above showed that 65% respondents agre with the assertion while 35% do not agree. The lower percentage who do not agree with the assertion are some reasonable members of the society who consider increase in social vices as having to do with poverty and poor parental up-bringing rarher than being associated with Ombatse crises. On the otherhand, the 65% represent majority of people noticed sharp increase in the rate of social vices in the State. Grown up girls became easy raping materials, strret begging became the norm by children who lost bread-winners and most of the children became street uchings who steal-at-sight anything that could easily be turned to food.

Data obtained from KII with the traditional ruler of Obi Local Government supports this notion. He observed during the interview that:

"*it saddens me to see women carrying their little kids arroung begging from street to street; young girl being pushed by parent to sleep with anybody who could offer money at the end of the day. We have seen the parrasiness of Ombatse militia on the use of charms impacting onn*


the astronomical increase in house bugglary and robbery as youth were mearnt to believe that with charms they can do anything and get away with it" *(KII/3/Obi/Male/1/4/19)*

Generation of widows and Ophans is one of the effects of the Ombatse violence on community security in Nasarawa State. Data from table 4.4 above show that 88.1 **%** agree on the view while 11.9% did not agree. The percentage of respondents who overwhelmingly approve of this position implied the wide spread vulnerable victims in their numbers were created due to Ombatse violence. Most able men were killed and their wives, aged parents and children were left confused on how to re-organise themselves to face this brazen challenges steering them in the face. Data obtained during FGD in Lafia supports this perspective. One of the speakers noted that: "*I am always afraid of what the future portend for our children and the future of this State. These children roaming about without parents and government is not doing anything to better their lives may soon constitutes another security nuisance in the future. I just hope that all of us and the government will come to the realization that the sooner those orphans are being profiled and returned to school, the better for the society in general*" (FGD/6 participant/Lafia/3/4/18).

4.6 Objective 5: Identifying the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crises in Nasarawa State.

Table 4.5 Respondents' view on the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crises in Nasarawa State.

s/n	Response Distribution	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Total
	Proposition: The challenges of resolving the Ombatse crises in Nasarawa State are:						
1.	Non implementation of previous recommendations of various panels of investigation.	216 (`44.5%)	114 (23.5%)	103 (21.3%)	52 (10.7%)	-	485 (100%)
2.	Hardline position of the Ombatse militia on their demand	312 (`64.3%)	95 (19.7%)	39 (8.0%)	39 (8.0%)	-	485 (100%)
3.	Insincerity of the Nasarawa State Government.	165 (34.0%)	262 (54.0%)	32 (6.6 %)	26 (5.4 %)	-	485 (100 %)
4.	Weak funding of security forces	217 (`44.7%)	142 (29.3%)	38 (7.9%)	88 (18.1%)	-	485 (100%)
5.	Underneath conflict instigation by shadow parties	149 (`30.7%)	103 (21.2%)	126 (26.0%)	107 (22.1%)	-	485 (100%)



Source: Researcher's field survey, 2018

Data as shown in the table 4.5 above indicates that non implementation of previous recommendations of various panels of investigation into the ethnic disturbance in the State constitute one of the challenges. While 32% of the respondents disagree with the view, 68% agree representing the greater section of people who hold the view. 39% which though smaller percentage but indicates thatsome reasonable number of people do not believe in the view as expressed above. Various Judicial Commission of Inquiries into ethnic conflicts in the State have made far reaching recommendations most of which different governments in the State couldn't muster the political courage to implement. This view is supported by data obtained during KII with the Zhe-Mighili in his palace at Agyaragu. The royak father noted that:

"... though government is doing its best, the implementation of recommendations of various panels of investigations into the ethnic disturbance in the State, it is the wish of our people that critical aspects of the recommendations especially those that concern sanctions and deterent measures be implemented so that people on both sides will learn to follow due process of the law whenever they feel agrieved" (KII/2/Agyaragu/Male/1/4/19).

Also, revealed from data in table 4.5 above as one of the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crisis is the hardline posture of the Eggon. While 16% respondents disagree with the perception, 84% responded in the affirmative indicating a sizeable number of populations believe in the view. The 16% though negligible, indicates that there are few members of the society who do not share in the idea. The Eggon being an ethnic group endowed with elites hardly engaged in meaningless fight. They believe in themselves and usually consider their ideas as superior to any other groups' idea and this usually influence their uncompromising stand on issues thereby making disputes difficults to restore. This view is further substantiated from the data obtained during KII with Osuko of Assakio. The traditional ruler laments that:

"*... our brothers (Eggon) will never succumb to any idea that does not support their position on any given issue. If you consider the issue of payment of farm royalty, we have appeared before the Local Government Chairman, the Commissioner of Police, the Emir of Lafia, the Director of State Security Services and all of these people have approved our position but they still did not want to obey...*" *(KII/Osuko of Assakio/Lafia/Male/1/4/19).*

Also, data from the above table shows that insincerity of the State Government is another challenge for resolving the Ombatse crisis. While 12% respondents disagree, 88% agree with the proposition. As inconsequential as 12% when compare with 88%, it indicates the voice

of few who do not believe in the view as expressed. On the other hand, 88% represent a high number of people who believ that government insincerity is a challenge in the resolutionof Ombatse conflict. Government is viewed by many to be insincere due to reasonranging from inability of government to persecute the perpetrators of violence, inability to implement certain critical recommendations of the different Panels of Inquiries, using the conflict as conduit pipe to syphone State resources under the guise of security votes and refusal to obey Court Orders. This perception could be buttress by data obtained during FGD in Lafia. The spokeperson of the group observes that:

"*… politicians are never sincere sset of people. That is why they will not take decisions that may jeopardize their prospects during electioneering campaigns. If not, how else do you want to explain why government will blantantly disobey Court Orders? How would you explain how government will set up Panels of Investigations into Ethnic Disturbance by itself and will find it difficult to implement their decisions and recommendations? … "* (FGD/3/6 participants/Lafia/1/4/18).

Weak finding to security agencies is also identified as one of the challenges of resolving the Ombatse crisis in Nasarawa State. Data from 4.5 above, although, 78% respondents agree with the assertion, 26% disagree. The 26% represent the minority voice of the entire population who do not believe in the view as expressed. However, 78% represent the much greater segment of society who upholds the view above.

Nigerian Police as the leading agency in the fight against internal insecurity is obviously incapable of policing the nooks and crannies of the State due to poor logistics, insufficient

trained and skilled man power and required modern technologies that could enhance intelligence gathering. All these wouldn't be challenge if adequate funding is availed to the police. This view is better captured during KII with a very senior police officer in the state command. The senior officer noted that:

"*the police is grossly under funded and it is a great set back in achieving desired goals of securing lives and property. At the risk of giving away our position, you can research how many serviceable vehicles are in our inventory? Policemen will risk their dear lives in pursuit of criminals and militias and when they die, a fresh problem is unleashed to the family with little or no care from governments spontaneously!... "*(KII/Senior Police Officer/Male/Lafia/1/4/18).

Also, identified as a challenge in the resolution of the Ombatse conflict is the underneath conflict instigation by shadow parties. Data from table 4.5 above suggest that there is no significant difference between those who believe in this particular view and those who disagree. While 51.9% of respondents agree with the view, 48.1% disagree. The implication is clearly that some instigator who are either benefitting politically, financially are also pushing for the escalation of the crises. Data obtained from KII with the senior police officer in Lafia also supports this perspective. He mentioned:

"*though with caution that there is cause to suspect the involvement of religious organizations within and outside the State. Particularly, there is cause to suspect politicians with vested interests and also 'Gun-Runners'. But, remember our type of politics! Nothing may come out of it even if investigation reveals something…''* (KII/Senior Police Officer/Male/Lafia/1/4/18).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 This chapter involves the summary, conclusion and recommendations. The study was conducted to investigate the effect of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence on community security in Nasarawa State.

To this regard, the study sent out to identify the socio-political interests of the Ombatse ethnic militia in Nasarawa State, the strategic approach of the Ombatse ethnic militia towards achieving their socio-political interests were examined, the factors responsible for the transformation of peaceful demands of the Ombatse ethnic militia were investigated, the effects of the violent approach of the Ombatse ethnic militia in the pursuit of the of Eggon ethnic group socio-political interest were examined and the challenges associated with the resolution of the Ombatse crises were indentified.

Finding from the study revealed that government neglect of calls from Eggon ethnic group for the creation of more chiefdom for its people led not only to frustration but, to the feeling of marginalization and subsequent violence that ensured. In the same vein, the research further revealed that government lack of interest to succums to the pressure bby Eggon for creation of more Local Government Areas for its people also helped in heightening the frustration and feeling of marginalization by Eggon which result to the Ombatse violence. Also revealed by the study, is the inability of the Eggon to convince the government into appointing Eggon extractions into high political appointments is considered as brazen marginalization with attendant violence unleashe on the other ethnic groups who were seen as being favoured.

The study also revealed that non appointment of the Aren-Eggon as the chairman of the State Traditional Council was an issue that to mutual suspicion between the Eggon and other

ethnic group were alleged to have supported the appointment of the Emir of Lafia. Also revealed from the study is the recognition of Eggon as indigenes of their areas of settlements is another factor that entrenched the feeling of hate, frustration and subsequence violence by Eggon on other ethnic groups. Along the same line, the study also revealed the refusal of government to abrogate the policy of payment of farm royalty by Eggon to Alago community chiefs led to frustration and violence.

Further findings revealed that the aggressive use of media for violence, the use of physical violence against perceived enemies, fortification of Ombatse militias through the application of charms, invocation of Eggon deities for blessings and assistance towards the defeat of perceived enemies were strategies deployed by Ombatse in prosecuting the Ombatse violence with the intent of achieving the socio-political interests of the Eggons.

Other findings revealed the challenges limiting the prospects of resolving the Ombatse impasse to include the non-implementation of previous recommendations of various panels of investigation into the conflict, the hard-line posture of the Ombatse militia in the pursuit of their demands, weak funding of security agencies and underneath conflict instigators by shadow parties.

5.2 Conclusion

It is concluded in this thesis that the emergence of Ombatse ethnic militias has negatively affected community security in Nasarawa State. Its violent activities have highthened hatred and suspicion and increase the level of poverty among its victims. The conflicts also led to increase in the rate of socio-vices and crimes in the communities. Business and other socio-economic activities were negatively affected as farms produce; market places were destroyed leading to hunger, poverty and squaler. Crimes such as rape, theft, bugglary and many more became the

order of the day. Ombatse violence led to high number of vulnerable such as orphans, widows and aged parents who lost bread winners of their families.

5.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations are put forward from this study:

a. Government should constitute a high-powered committee to be charged with the responsibility of engaging the various ethnic groups in the conflict for dialogue with a view to understanding the various perceptions to the conflict and taking appropriate measures to address the conflict. In the immediate terms, however, Government is encouraged to do the following:

i. Check the excesses of not only the Ombatse ethno-cultural militia or organization but any other cultural organization whose activities threaten the peace and stability of the community.

ii. Ensure equitable distribution of resources to all ethnic groups irrespective of their political or ethnic inclination.

iii. Re-assess the 10 June, 1999 policy on the Redeployment of Local Government Employees and allow for a certain percentage of employees from each ethnic group to be represented in each local government area in order to enhance the spirit of cordial relationship amongst ethnic groups in the State.

iv. Review all policies about land tenure system in order to give equal opportunities to not only Nasarawa State indigenes but to all Nigerians to own land and engage in lawful economic activities in line with the provisions of the 1999 constitution as amended.

v. Encourage ethnic groups in the State to regularly engage other interest groups to form formidable alliance in order to advance their common socio-cultural, economic and political interests. In the event of seeming betrayal of one another, groups should continue to work out alliance with others for the actualization of their dreams instead of resorting to violence.

vi. Ensure that politicians and ethnic jingoists who sponsor violent ethno-cultural organizations are constantly identified and are made to face justice so that it will serve as a deterrent to others.

vii. Encourage ethnic groups to send their youths to school instead of allowing them to be used as cheap tools in the hands of selfish politicians who hide under the guise of ethnicity or religion, to achieve their personal aims at the expense of the peace of the community.

viii. Get youths to resist all forms of misuse of their energy to cause community disturbance by anybody whether political, ethnic or religious.

ix. Democratize the Office of the President of Traditional Rulers with a clearly spelt out tenure of office after which another election from amongst themselves shall be conducted and a new leadership will emerge. This way, all the first-class traditional rulers representing a particular ethnic group are potential presidents of the traditional rulers and therefore no particular ethnic group will perpetually see itself as superior to others.

x. Provide enabling and secured environment for the Internally Displaced Persons, provide them relief materials and take necessary measures to reassure them of their safety and security.

xi. Provide an opening for repentant Ombatse warriors to be forgiven and get reintegrated into the larger community.

xii. Constitute a Peace and Reconciliation Commission whose aim should be to foster forgiveness of one another and encourage love and mutual respect amongst the ethnic groups.

xiii. Set aside all recommendations that are tailored towards fault-finding and punishment as they only aggravate tension and hatred between the conflict parties.

xiv. Put in place deliberate mechanisms with Non –Governmental Organizations to identify early warning signals so as to enable it to be proactive in nipping in the bud any brewing tension in any part of the State.

b. The civil societies are also encouraged to do the following:

i. Concern themselves with sensitizing the public on the need to channel their grievances through appropriate institutions of government rather than resorting to self-help.

ii. Play the role of mediators between the conflict parties in view of their neutrality and the confidence they enjoy from all the contending ethnic group. To this end, credible civil societies that have national acceptance should get involved in the task of peace making.

iii. Collaborate with government agencies in order to improve the lives of internally displaced persons in the State.

iv. Collaborate with religious bodies with a view to collectively preaching peace, love, forgiveness and a sense of common humanity amongst all the ethnic groups.

v. Intensify campaign against socio-cultural practices that are detrimental to human rights and endanger the peace and security of the community. This is particularly relevant to civil societies operating solely in the State.

vi. Engage and sensitize various ethnic groups to make deliberate efforts toward positive reinvention of culture in a manner that it encourages peaceful and harmonious coexistence rather than to be used for violent political purposes.

vii. Besides all the above, the media should constantly be reminded of its social responsibility of balance reportage devoid of sensationalism and ethnic bias.

References

Adebanwi, (2005). The Carpenter's Revolt: Youth, Violence and the Reinvention of Culture" in Nigeria Author(s): Wale Adebanwi Source: *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 339-365 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876059

Akpuru-Aja, (2007). Basic Concepts, Issues and Strategies of Peace and Conflict Resolution.

Akwara, Azalahu F., (2013). The Impacts of Culture and Religion, Ethnicity, Politics and Poverty on Ethnic Violence in Plateau State of Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy

Akwe & Attah, (2018) – Nasarawa Mirror; Opinion: Governor Umaru Tanko AL-Makura: The Architect of Modern Nasarawa State.

Albert, I.O., (2003). *Re-Conceptualizing Electoral Violence in Nigeria*. CODESRIA (Yaounde, Cameroon).

Albert and Oloyode (2010) – *Dynamics of peace process*.

Albert and Olarinde (2010) – *Trends and Tensions in Managing Conflicts*. John Archers Ltd, Dugbe, Ibadan.

Alozieuwa, S.O., (2016). "The Ombatse Crisis in Nigeria: Background, Recent Developments and Possible Solutions". *Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science*

Ayuba, J.M., (2012) - "Resistance to British Rule in Central Nigeria During the Colonial Rule" in, Joseph Magnut and Terhemba Wuan (eds.): *Colonialism and the Transition to Modernity in Africa. Lapai*: Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida University.

Ayuba, J.M., (2014). "Ombatse: an Invention of Tradition and Understanding Communal Conflicts in Nasarawa State, Nigeria". ISBN: 978-1-291-95079-3

Appadurai, Arjun, (1998). Dead certainty: Ethnic violence in the era of globalization. Public Culture 10 (2), 225-247.

Arendt, Hannah, (1975). "The Origins of Totalitarianism", New York: Harcourt Brace. Assefa, H. n.d: *The Meaning of Reconciliation, in Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, People Building Peace.* Utrecht: *European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation*. http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/part1/2_reconc.htm accessed 29 Oct 2007.

Arjun Appadurai (1998). "Special issue on Identity and Cultural Diversity in Conflict Resolution in Africa". *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*. Volume 7, Number 2, 2007.

Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr (2004). "Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics", 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 19–29.

Bennett (2014). Community Security Handbook: SAFERWORLD preventing violent conflict Building Safer Lives.

Biaya, T.K. (2001). "Parallel society in the Democratic Republic of Congo" in Bekker, S., Dodds, M. & Khosa, M.M., *Shifting African identities*. Vol. II in the series: *Identity, Theory, Politics, History*, 43-60. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

Broch-Due, V. 2005. "Violence and belonging: Analytical reflections", in Broch-Due, V. (ed) 2005: *Violence and belonging: the quest for identity in post-colonial Africa*, 1-40. London: Routledge.

Coady., (2008). *Morality and Political Violence*, Cambridge University Press ISBN 9780521705486.

Crawford, B. (2007). Globalization and Cultural Conflict: *An Institutional Approach.* January 2007. DOI: 10.4135/9781446214671.n1

Danladi J.Y, (2017). "An Islamic Solution to Ombatse Ethnic Crises in Nasarawa State". Unpublished thesis from Islamic Department, Nasarawa State University, Keffi.

Dennen, J.M.G.V.D. (2005). Theories of Aggresssion: Frustration-aggression (F-A) theory. Default journal

Duchacek's (1977). *Comparative Federalism* (New York Holt, Rinehart &Winston)

Djurdjevic-Lukic (2014). *Community Policing and Community Security: Theory and Practice in Timor-Leste* (Public Policy Research Centre, Belgrade).

Osaghae, E., (1992). "*Democratic transition in Africa"*. CREDU, Nigeria, pp.436, 1992, Documents in Social Sciences and the Humanities, 978201513X

Edward, (2004). 'Under pressure FALINTIL – Forcas de Defesa de Timor Leste: Three decades of defence force development in Timor Leste, 1975-2004', DCAF Working paper No. 139, Geneva.

Egbue, N.G, (2006). "Socio-cultural factors in Nigeria Male Youth Violence": *Relationship with Education and Employment*.

Ekeh, P (1975). "Colonialism and the two publics in Africa": a theoretical statement.*Comparative studies in society and history* 17 (1), 91-112.

El-Battahani, (2007). "Tunnel Vision or Kaleidoscope: Competing Concepts on Sudan Identity and National Integration". *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 7 (2) (this issue).

Endalew, T. (2002). "Conflict Resolution through Cultural Tolerance: An Analysis of the Michu Institution" in Metekkel Region, Ethiopia. *Social Science Research Report Series*, no. 25. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. Eyo, D. 1999. *Community, citizenship and the politics of*

ethnicity in post-colonial Africa, in Kalipeni, E.& Zeleza, P. (eds): "Sacred spaces and public quarrels". *Trenton NJ: Africa World Press*.

Enloe .C (1977). *Internal Colonialism, Federalism and Alternative State Development Strategy*, Publics 101.7, No. 4 pp 147 – 155.

Ezeh & Ndukaihe, (2017). "Ethnic Militia and Violent crimes" in Nigeria: A Theoretical Overview. vol. 1 No. 1

Fanon, Frantz 1967. *The wretched of the world*. London: Penguin. Fanthorpe, R. 2006. "On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone". *African Affairs* 105 (418), 27-49.

Fischer J. Eng S, Li Y, Mulsow M (2010). "Domestic violence against women in Cambodia: Husband's control, frequency of spousal discussion, and domestic violence reported by Cambodian women". *Journal of Family Violence*. 2010;25(3):237–246. doi: 10.1007/s10896-009-9287-7.

Gerard and Kagwanga (2003). Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa: Prospects and Challenges.

Gurian, P. Holfe, J (1994). "Regional Primaries and Presidential Campaign Coverage". *Social Science Journal*, 31(1) 17-28

Gurr and Harf (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, University Press; New Jersey.

Guttenberg, P. (1993). *Imagining Development, Economic Ideas* in Peru's "Fictitious Prosperity" of Guano, 1840 – 1880, *University of California Press*.

Imobighe, T.A. (2003). Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria.

Jinadu, L.A, (2007). "Explaining & Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa": *Towards a Cultural Theory of Democracy.*

Johan, G. (1969). "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167-191.

Kaldor, Mary, (1999). New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kagwanja, P. & Ntegeye, G. (rapporteurs) (2001). "Regional Conflict Formations in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy". *Report of the Conference organized by Center for International Cooperation*, New York University, November.

Laitin, D.D and James D. Fearon. (2003). "Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war". *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), (Feb., 2003), pp. 75-90.

Lemarchand (1999). “Ethnicity as Myth”: The View from the Central Africa: *Centre of African Studies*.University of Copenhagen.

Mamdani, M. (1996). “Citizen and Subject”: *Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Marshall, Monty G. (2005). ‘Current Status of the world's major episodes of political violence’. *Report to Political Instability Task Force*. (3 February.)

McGregor, A. (2016). “Ombatse: Nigerian Religious Cult Joins War on the State in Central Nigeria”. *Terrorism Monitor* Volume XI.

Salih, M. (1989). “New Wine in Old Bottles”: *Tribal Militias and the Sudanese State, Review of African Political Economy* (45-46) 168-174.

Nnoli, O. (1998). *Ethnic Conflict in Africa*: CODESRIA.

Nye, J.; Lynn-Jones, S. (1988) - “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field”, in: International Security, 12,4 (Spring): 5−27.

Olaniyi, R. O. (2005). “Payback Time”: Ethno Religious Violence in Nigeria. 1999-2004 “ Centre for Democracy and Development” *Journal of West African Affairs* 95-112.

Omeja, K. (2007). Conflicts in West Africa.

Otite, O., (1999). *Aspect of Conflicts in theory and practices in Nig*.

Onwumah (2014). “Communal and Ethno-religious Crises and their Implications for National Development in Nigeria, Developing Country Studies” Vol.4, No.17.

Osaghae, E. (1996). Ethnicity, Class and the Struggle for State Power in Liberia. CODESRIA Monograph Series. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Oseghae and Suberu (2005). “A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria”: *Crise Working Paper* No 6.

Osman, Abdulahi, (2007). Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality? *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 7 (2) (this issue).

Owolabi K.A (2003). *Factional Tribes and Tribal Fictions: Ethnicity, Ethnocentricism and the Problem of the “other” in Africa*. Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Ltd.

Oyebade and Alao, (1998). Africa after the Cold War the Changing Perspectives on Security.

Ormeci O. (2010). *The Concept of Security and Security Studies.* Retrieved on October 7, 2013 from http://www.academia.edu/363438/_Ormeci_Ozan_2010_The_Concept_of_Security_and_Security_Studies_Caspian_Weekly

Philpott, D. (2007). Religion, reconciliation, and transitional justice: The state of the field. SSRC Working Papers. New York: *Social Science Research Council*.

Picciotto, R (2010). "Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation in Africa": *An Introduction in Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.10 no 1. Pp. 1-25.*

Prah, K.K. (2004). "African Wars and Ethnic conflicts": Rebuilding Failed States. Occasional Paper: Human Development Report 2004. New York: UNDP.

Prunier, G. (1997). *The Rwanda's Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Richards, P. (2005). "New war: An ethnographic approach", in Richards, P. (ed): *No-peace no-war*, 1-21. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Rothchild, D. and Olorunisola V.A (eds) (1983). *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African policy Dilemas,* Boulder: Westview Press.

Rubin, B.R. 2006. Central Asia and Central Africa: Transnational wars and ethnic conflicts. *Journal of Human Development* 7 (1), 5-22.

Rummel, R.J. (1977). *Understanding Conflict and War*: Vol. 3: Conflict in Perspctive

Rynn, Simon with Hiscock, Duncan (2009). 'Evaluating for Security and Justice: Challenges and Opportunities for Improved Monitoring and evaluation of security system reform programmes', Saferworld: London.

Sani, S; (2007). *The Killing Fields, Religious Violence in Northern Nigeria*.

Salih, M; (1989). New wine in old bottles: Tribal militias and the Sudanese state. Review of African Political Economy 45-46,168-174. Sen, A. 2006. *Identity and violence*. New York: WW Norton. 35

Schäfer, P.J; (2013). Human and Water Security in Israel and Jordan, SpringerBriefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace 3, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29299-6_2.

Schock, K; (1996). "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and

Violent Political Conflict". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 40, No. 1, March 1996.

Storey, Andy (1999). "Globalization and the African State": *Trocaire Development Review,* Pp.39- 56. Tan, L. 2006. *A blueprint for change: Diversity as a civic asset*.Washington: Partners for Livable Communities.

Ugwu, Anthony and Enna, (2015). "Conflict Transformation in Nasarawa State: The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Option". *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration* Vol.3, No.3.pp.58-73.

Ulusoy & Hasan, (2003): "Revisiting Security Communities After the Cold War: The Constructivist Perspective". Perceptions, No.8, (September−November); at: <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume8/September−November2003/HasanUlusoy6 Kasim2003.pdf> (20 October 2011).

Venkatasawmy R. (2015). Ethnic Conflict in Africa: *A Short Critical Discussion*

Donald L. Horowitz *et al*., eds. (2004). "Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward A New Realism", Lanham: Rowmann & Little-field Publishers.

Young, Crawford (2004). "The End of the Post-colonial State in Africa: Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics". *African Affairs* 103, 23-49.

WoodHouse et al (2008). "Peace Keeping and International Conflict Resolution": *Peace Operation Training Institute*. Bradford University, UK.
http://signaturetv.com.ng/2017/11/13/dss-fingers-security-agents-in-arms-proliferation/

Text of Broadcast by Gov. Abdullahi Adamu, on Ethnic Violence in the State, Nasarawa Broadcasting Corporation, Lafia, July 2, 2001.

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Respondent Bio Data

1. How old are you?
2. What is your marital status?
3. What is your cultural affiliation?
4. What is your occupation?
5. What is your level of income?

Section A: Interview schedule for traditional rulers

1. What class of chief do you belong?
2. How long have you being serving as a chief?
3. Can you give a brief history and the causes of the Ombatse ethnic violence in Nasarawa state?
4. How can you explain how the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence affected your people?
5. Please, could you briefly state what you consider as indicators of peace and stability in Nasarawa state?
6. What would you say are some of the socio-cultural agenda of the Ombatse youth movement?
7. What are the reasons for the violent approach adopted by the Ombatse Youth Movement?
8. What are the implications of the violent approach adopted by Ombatse Youth Movement on the peace and security of the community?
9. What are the specific roles traditional rulers have played in management of Ombatse ethno-cultural conflict in their communities?
10. What is the nature and dimension of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
11. Would you say the use of charms and other fetish materials gave confidence to the Ombatse fighters to confront the security agencies and other ethnic groups?
12. Do you think the citing of t he state capital in Lafia was to marginalize the Eggon ethnic group?
13. What is your view on the citing of the Nasarawa State capital in Lafia as against Akwanga as proposed by the Eggon ethnic group?
14. What are the challenges being faced by traditional rulers in the management of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in their communities?
15. What have been the efforts of the government in the management of the Ombatse violence in the state?
16. What are your views on the various judicial panel of inquiry constituted during and after the Ombatse violence in the state?
17. What action could you suggest to be taken on those behind the Ombatse violence in the state?
18. How effective do you think the strategies employed by the state government in the management of the Omabtse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
19. Kindly list briefly the indicators that the management strategies of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence are not effective.
20. Please, can you specify the roles played by other stakeholders in the management of the Omabtse ethnic violence in your community?

21. In your view sir, how can you say the redeployment policy of Local Government Employees back to their Local Government of Origin in 2003 affected the peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups in Nasarawa State?
22. How can you recall the genesis of the Ombatse Youth Movement and how its activities impacted on the peace and security of your communities?
23. Please sir, how can you explain the correlation between the political development in the state and the violent activities of the Ombatse Youth Movement?
24. Please, how can you briefly explain the historical claim of your people on this community as against the claims of Eggon ethnic group and how it led to the Omabtse ethnic violence in the state?
25. Generally speaking Sir, what can you say as are the effective management instruments required for peaceful coexistence in the state?
26. Would you please highlight the socio-cultural issues that you consider as factors that lead to the Ombatse ethnic violence in Nasarawa state?

Section B: Interview Schedule for security Agencies participating in the Joint Task Force (Operation Safe Haven) in Nasarawa State.

1. Please, which of security agencies do you serve with?
2. What is your rank/position?
3. How long have you been in Nasarawa State?
4. Please, could you also highlight the nature of the Ombatse conflict in Nasarawa state?
5. Please, could you also highlight briefly what led to the creation of operation "Safe Haven" in the state?
6. What part of the state is most affected by the Ombatse conflict?
7. What could you say are the factors that led to the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
8. Please, how could judge the performance of the security agencies in the management of the Ombatse conflict bearing in mind the colossal loss of lives of over 100 policemen and 9 personnel of the Department of State Services at Alakio?
9. Please, could you highlight some operational tactics adopted by the Ombatse Youths Militia in carrying out violence on other ethnic groups?
10. Is it true that ammunitions fired at Ombatse militia by security agencies do not penetrate them thereby bolstering their confidence and followership?
10. How could you describe the nature of weapons deployed by the Ombatse Movement and the sources of the weapons?
11. What are the specific roles your organization/JTF played in the maintenance of peace and security in the state?
12. Please, what are the specific conflict management strategies adopted by the State Government and how effective would you say they were considering the recurrence nature of the conflict?
13. Please, what could you briefly identify or consider as indicators of peace in Nasarawa state?
14. In the event that peace has returned to the state, what strategies would you apply to maintain peace and security?
15. Please, could you list some indicators if any, which suggest that Omabtse ethno-cultural violence management strategies in Nasarawa state are effective?
16. What could be done to enable the security agents carry out effective management of security in the state?

Section C: Interview schedule for political leadership in the state.

1. What political party do you belong and what is your position in the party in Nasarawa state?
2. How long have you been a politician in the state?
3. Please Sir, could you highlight some ethnic violence in the state that were participated by political interest?
4. Do you think Ombatse ethno-cultural violence has political undercurrent? If yes, what are the political angle to the conflict?
5. What do you think are the ethno-cultural messages the Ombatse Youth Militia stands for?
6. Could you please highlight some political decisions; actions or inactions that you consider as factor's' that led to the Ombatse conflict in the state?
7. Please, could you highlight some other factors other than political which you think have triggered the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
8. What is your view on the position of the Chairman of Traditional Council of the state?
9. Would you suggest the position becomes rotational amongst the First Class Chiefs in the state instead of remaining permanently with the Emir of Lafia?
10. Could you identify some conflict management strategies adopted by the state?
11. How effective are those conflict management strategies?
12. Would you say the Eggon ethnic group is being marginalized in Nasarawa state?
13. Could you identify some indicators of marginalization against the Eggon ethnic group in the state?
14. What are your view on the various judicial panel of inquiries constituted with regard to the Ombatse ethnic violence in the state?
15. What action would you suggest to be taken on those found culpable for instigating ethnic violence in the state?
16. What other conflict management strategies would you want the government to adopt other than instituting Judicial Panels of Inquiries in the state?
17. Please, can you identify some roles played by other stakeholders in the management of Ombatse ethnic violence in Nasarawa state?
18. How can you respond to the claim that politicians are those that procure illegal weapons used to perpetrate ethnic violence in Nasarawa state?
19. How well is lack of adherence to the principle of internal democracy leading to imposition of candidates during party primaries have led to the feeling of marginalization and subsequent ethnic tension in the state?

Section E: Interview schedule for Civil Society Organization in Nasarawa State.

1. What is the name of your organization?
2. When was it established?
3. Why was it established?
4. What is the position/rank in your organization?
5. How long have you been in your organization?
6. How do you get sponsorship for the running of your organization?
7. Please, could you briefly highlight the nature of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in Nasarawa state?
8. Which part of this state does your organization covers in the management of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence?
9. Could you briefly mention what you consider as indicators of ethnic marginalization in Nasarawa state?

10. Would you agree with the perception that Eggon is politically marginalized in Nasarawa State?
11. Would you please highlight the socio-cultural practices that you consider as factors that led to the Ombatse ethnic violence in Nasarawa state?
12. Please, could you briefly identify what you consider as peace indicators in Nasarawa state?
13. Please, what are the specific ethno-cultural violence management strategies you applied on the Ombatse conflict especially considering its reoccurrence?
14. How effective are the strategies employed in the maintenance of peace and security by the state government?
15. What are your views on the various judicial panels of Inquiries constituted on the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in Nasarawa state?
16. What action do you think should be carried out on those promoting the Ombatse ethnic violence in the state?
17. While peace is beginning to come back to the state, what strategies do you suggest to be employed to ensure peaceful coexistence in the state?
18. Please, briefly list any indicators that suggest that ethnic violence management strategies are effective in Nasarawa state?
19. What can be done to enable your organization carryout effective conflict management in the state?
20. Please, enumerate the indicators that the management strategies of ethnic-violence in Nasarawa state are not effective during any of the ethnic conflict periods?
21. Please, can you specify the roles played by other stakeholders in the management of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?

INSTRUCTION: You are kindly requested to tick in the appropriate box.

SECTION A: Bio-Data Information

(i) Gender: Male ☐ Female ☐

(ii) Marital Status: Single ☐ Married ☐ Divorced ☐ Widowed ☐

(iii) Religion: Islam ☐ Christianity ☐ Other ☐

(If other, please specify……..)

(iv) What is your Ethnic group: Alago ☐ Eggon ☐ Mighi ☐ Kanuri ☐ Gwandara ☐ Akye ☐ Hausa ☐ Jukun ☐

(v) Age: Less than 18 ☐ 18-29 ☐ 30-39 ☐ 40-49 ☐ 50-59 ☐ 60 and above ☐

(vi) What is the name of community you live in? ……..

(vii) How long have you been in the community? Born Here ☐ Less than 3yrs ☐ 3-5yrs ☐ 6-8yrs ☐ 9-11yrs ☐ 12-15yrs ☐ 16yrs and above ☐

(If not born here, please specify the exact year you came here and what prompted you to come to this community……

……..……

……

……)

(viii) What is your state of origin……

……..

(ix) What is your local government of origin?……..

(x) How many ethnic groups cohabit together in your community?

1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ more ☐

(xi) Are you a title holder? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please specify……

……

(xii) What is your highest educational qualification? ☐ SLC ☐ WASC ☐ ON☐NCE ☐ HND/BS☐ MSC/MA☐ PHD☐ Others ☐

(If others, please specify……

……)

(xiii) What is your occupation? Religious Organization Employ☐ ☐ security ☐ Agent ☐ C☐Servant ☐ Private Organiz☐ Employee ☐ ☐ Self em☐ed ☐ Trader

Unemployed ☐ Farmer ☐ Elected Officia☐ ☐ ☐rs

(If others, please specify……

……...)

(xiv) Please, where is your work place located? .....

SECTION B: FACTORS THAT LEAD TO OMBATSE ETHNO-CULTURAL VIOLENCE IN NASARAWA STATE

(i) Are you aware of the Ombatse Ethno-Cultural Violence that has occurred in Nasarawa State?
Yes No

(ii) How many incidences of Ombatse Ethno-Cultural violence do you know has occurred in Nasarawa State?
1-2 3-4 5 and Above None I don't know

(iii) When was the last incident?
……
…….

(iv) Please, can you list the places where these conflicts often occur?
……
……
…….....
.....

(v) Please, could you briefly identify what you consider as the factors that trigger the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in Nasarawa State?
……
……
…….....……
……

(vi) Poverty is responsible for the Ombatse Ethno-cultural violence?
Agree Disagree

(vii) Political marginalization of the Eggon ethnic group is a factor that triggers the Ombatse ethnic violence?
Agree Disagree

(viii) please highlight some of your reasons
……
……
……
……
…….

(viii) Competition for access to part or whole of scarce resources, such as land, water and wealth by other ethnic groups cohabiting with Eggon is a factor that led to the Ombatse ethnic violence?
Agree Disagree

(ix) The use of charms and fetish traditional rites of Ombatse gave them more confidence to confront security agencies.
Agree Disagree

(x) The use of charm and other fetish traditional rites by Omabatse created an impression that suggest they hgave spiritual protection against any small and light weapons thereby encouraging many Eggon youths to join the group?
Agree Disagree

(xi) Forceful initiation into the Ombatse was a factor for its large membership?
Agree Disagree

(xii) Condemnation of the cultural practices of the Ombatse militia by other ethnic groups is a factor that led to the conflict.
Agree Disagree

(xiii) The forceful application of the Ombatse socio-cultural practices on indigenes and non-indigenes of Eggon extraction is a factor that lead to the ethno-cultural violence in the state.
Agree Disagree

(xiv) Please identify any other factor(s) that lead to the Ombatse Ethno-cultural violence known to you:
……..……
……
(Please give reason(s) for your answer from (viii) to (ix) above……
……
……
…….)

(xv) What role did you play during the conflict?
.....
.....
.....

(xvi) What role have your relatives outside the state/country played in the conflict?
……
……
…….....
.....

(xvii) Incidences of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence are more frequent during political contestation in the state.
Agree Disagree
Please give reason(s) for your answer in (xiv) above if possible:
……..……
…….

(xviii) Local Government Employees redeployment policy to their Local Governments of origin is a factor that led to the Ombatse ethnic violence.
Agree Disagree

(xix) The citing of the state capital at Lafia as against Akwanga is another factor that led to the Ombatse conflict?
Agree Disagree

(xx) Absence of internal democracy within political parties have led to imposition of candidates thereby creating the feeling of marginalization by Eggon and others leading to Ombatse conflicts?
Agree Disagree

EFFECTS

(i) Ombatse Ethno-Cultural violence in Nasarawa state had led to serious damage to property?
Agree Disagree

(ii) Ombatse Ethno-Cultural violence in Nasarawa state had severe relations and friends between people of different ethnic groups?
Agree Disagree

(iii) Ombatse Ethno-Cultural violence in Nasarawa had led to displacement of persons from their homes?
Agree Disagree

(iv) Ombatse Ethno-Cultural violence in Nasarawa had led to the death of many persons?
Agree Disagree

(v) What other effects could you say the Ombatse Ethnic violence in Nasarawa State has caused on people?
…….....
..

(vi) Do you think the conflict has caused high scale of social vices?
Agree Disagree

(vii) The conflict has paralyzed economic activities of the people.
Agree Disagree

(viii) Ombatse conflict has strained relationships between people of different ethnic groups who hitherto were living harmoniously.
Agree Disagree

(ix) The conflict has influenced sudden cultural reawakening among ethnic groups.
Agree Disagree

(x) Ombatse conflict has caused more political adversaries for the Eggon ethnic group.
Agree Disagree

(Xi) Ombatse conflict has created acute poverty among the people of the Nasarawa State Senatorial Zone.
Agree Disagree

MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

(i) Government should constitute a reconciliatory commission to look into the socio-cultural economic factors that triggers the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in order to set the tone for mutual understanding, forgiveness and harmonious coexistence between Eggon and other Ethnic groups in the state.
Agree Disagree

(ii) The relevant government organization and security agents should ensure that all law breakers on subject matter are timely and appropriately tried. If convicted, appropriate punishment must be carried out?
Agree Disagree

(iii) How effective were the Judicial Panel of Inquiry previously constituted in resolving the Ombatse ethnic violence in the state?
Very Effective Effective Not Effective

(iv) How effective were the JTF (Operation Safe Haven) in resolving the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
Very Effective Effective Not Effective

(v) How effective was the creation of new chiefdoms in resolving the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
Very Effective Effective Not Effective

(vi) How effective were the inter ethnic groups reconciliatory meetings in resolving the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
Very Effective Effective Not Effective

(vii) How effective was the police intervention in resolving the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in the state?
Very Effective Effective Not Effective

(viii) In general, how effective is the strategies employed in the maintenance of peace and security in Nasarawa state?
Very Effective Effective Not Effective

(ix) Please, briefly list any indicator showing that the conflict management strategies is effective by the Nasarawa State on the Ombatse ethnic violence
……
……
……
…..

(x) How were people affected by the conflict cared for?
Properly cared for Not properly cared for Not cared for at all

(xi) Where are the victims of the Ombatse ethno-cultural violence in Nasarawa State situated?
IDP Camps Religious Organization Premises Traditional Rulers Premises Schools
Properties of Philanthropists Others, Please specify……

(xii) Who cared for the affected victims?
Government Religious Organizations Civil Society Organizations
Traditional Rulers Youth Organizations Individuals/Family Members NEMA Ethno-Cultural Associations
Other(s), please specify……
……

(xiii) There should be regular enlightenment of people on peaceful co-existence through the media, public lectures, seminars, conferences and hand bills, among others.
Agree Disagree

(xiv) Ethno-Cultural Associations/Movements must be duly registered and their activities monitored by relevant government agencies.
Agree Disagree

(xv) Have there been attempts to resolve the conflicts?
Yes No

(xvi) If yes, who made the attempts?
Government Religious Organizations Civil Society Organizations Traditional Rulers Youth Organizations Individuals/Family Members Other(s), please specify……
……

(xvii) Please, specify some of the actions taken:
……
……
…….....

(xviii) Which level of government has effectively resolves the Ombatse ethnic violence in Nasarawa State?
Federal Government State Government

(xix) Which of the state government regime was seen to have planted the seed that generated Eggon ethnic group animosity against others and which consequently created the Ombatse ethnic violence?
Governor Abdullahi Adamu (1999-2003-2007) Governor Aliyu Akwe Doma (2007-2011)
Governor Tanko Almakura (2011-2015) All of the above

(xx) Imposition of candidates thereby undermining the principle of internal democracy within political parties especially during the 1999-2003 and 2007 party primaries were also aimed at marginalizing the Eggons?
Agree Disagree

(xx) Since the Ombatse ethnic violence became more pronounced during the first tenure of Governor Tanko Almakura (2011-2015), would you say his government conflict management strategies were effective?
Agree Disagree

(xxi) Please, kindly give reason(s) for your answers in (xix) above
……
……
……
……
……

(xxii) What efforts were done within the community towards curbing Ombatse Ethno-Cultural violence in Nasarawa state?
……
……
……
……..

(xxiii) What is the name(s) of such organization(s) that are responsible for actions in (x) above.

(xxiv) Please suggest other measures to prevent Omabtse Ethnic violence in Nasarawa state……
…….....
.....

(xxv) Are there local conflict management methods that you think have not been used adequately to managing the conflict?
Yes No

(xxvi) If yes, what are they……
……

(xxvii) Do you think that civil society organization like religion, ethnic, social, elders, women society have roles to play in helping to manage the conflicts.
If yes, what role……
……
Thank you for your co-operation.

IBRAHIM, Ahmad Ojiri

INSTRUCTION: You are kindly requested to tick in the appropriate box.

SECTION A: Bio-Data Information

(i) Gender: Male ☐ Female ☐

(ii) Age: 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and above

(iii) Which of the security agencies in do you belong?
NA NAF NPF DSS NSCDC NIS NPS

(iv) What is your rank/position?
……..

SECTION B: Technical Research Data

(i) How long have you been in Nasarawa State?.....

(ii) Have you participated in the security operations on the Ombatse ethnic violence in Nasarawa state?
Yes No

(iii) If yes, how many major incidences of the Ombatse ethnic violence have you partake in the operation's'?

1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 and above None

(iv) From your experience on the field, the Ombatse Ethno-cultural violence in Nasarawa State is mostly between the Eggons and which ethnic groups?
……
……
……
……

(v) Which part of Nasarawa state is mostly affected by the Ombatse Ethno-cultural violence?
(a) Nasarawa west senatorial zone (b) Nasarawa South senatorial zone
Nasarawa

(vi) From your experience which political period do you think the Ombatse Ethnic violence frequently occur?
(a) During Party primaries (b) During Campaign of Gubernatorial elections
(c) After campaign of Gubernatorial elections (d) Ahead of campaign for gubernatorial elections (e) I do not know
Please give reason(s) for your answer in (vi) above: ……
……

(vii) How are you notified when Ombatse Ethnic violence erupts in the state?.....
.....
.....

(viii) What combat strategic action(s) do you take after the notification?.....
.....
.....

(vix) What operational challenge's' would you say most have led to the infamous massacre of over 100 policemen and 9 personnel of the Department of State Security Services at Alakio village in March 2014 in the state?

(a) Lack of adequate preparation (b) Lack of synergy between security agencies
(c)Lack of intelligence gathering (d)Lack of appropriate logistics and equipments
professional misconduct (e) Lack of appreciation of enemy power

(x) How long do you stay in the field during the crisis?.....

(xi) What are the conditions that call for your withdrawal from the field?.....
.....
.....

(xii) What actions do you carry out on those found causing troubles during the Ombatse Ethnic violence in the state?.....
……
……

(xiii) When there is no crisis in Nasarawa State, what kind of activities do you do in ensuring peace and security within the state?.....

……
……

(xiv) What are the challenges encountered with the general populace in bringing lasting peace during the Ombatse Ethnic violence in the state?.....
……
……

(xv) What are the challenges encountered by your organization during the course of maintenance of peace and security in Nasarawa State?.....
……
……

(xvi) In what ways do you think your colleagues will improve in ensuring lasting peace in Nasarawa
State?.....
.....
.....

(xvii) What do you think your organization can do more to bring an end to the Ombatse Ethnic violence in Nasarawa State?
.....……
……
……

(xviii) What efforts are expected of the government for your Task Force to curb the recurrent Ethnic violence in the state?.....……
……
……

(xviv) In summary, what do you think are the causes of the Ombatse Ethnic violence in NasarawaState?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

(xvv) In summary, what do you think need to be done by the government and relevant stakeholders in bringing peaceful coexistence in Nasarawa State?
.....
.....,……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
Thank you for your co-operation.

IBRAHIM, Ahmad Ojiri

APPENDIX II

Pictures identifying some gory scenes of the Ombatse Conflict



Figure 1: picture of vehicle burnt during the Ombatse confict in Asakio.
Source: Field trip, March 2018.



Figure 2: Pictures of vehicles burnt during the Ombatse conflict in Asakio.
Source: Field trip, March 2018.



Figure 3: Picture showing Nasarawa State Governor and his entourage on a sympathy visit to the palace of the Emir of Obi LGA**.**
Source: Nasarawa Broadcasting Service Archives.



Figure 4: A destroyed house at Agyaragu during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Field trip, March 2018.



Figure 5: A destroyed house at Agyaragu during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Field trip, March 2018



Figure 6: A burnt down Petrol Filling Station in Asakio.
Source: Field trip



Figure 7: A Burnt down filling station in Asakio
Source: Field trip



Figure 8: Section of Alago community destroy during Ombatse conflict in Asakio.
Source: Field trip



Figure 9: Some sections of Eggon community burnt to ashes during the Ombatse conflict in Asakio.
Source: Field trip



Figure 10: Some sections of Eggon community burnt to ashes during the Ombatse conflict in Asakio.
Source: Field trip



Figure 11: Eggon community in Asakio that was raised down during the Ombatse conflict. *Source: Field trip*



Figure 12: A burnt down house in a section of Alago community in Asakio.
Source: Field trip



Figure 13: A section of Alago community destroyed during the Ombatse conflict in Asakio.
Source: Nasarawa Broadcasting Service Archives



Figure 14: A section of Osakio of Asakio's palace that was set abaze during the Ombatse confict**.**
Source: Nasarawa Broadcasting Service Archives



Figure 15: A section of Osakio of Asakio's palace that was set abaze during the Ombatse confict.
Source: Nasarawa Broadcasting Service Archives



Figure 16: Some sections of Alago community destroyed in Asakio during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Nasarawa Broadcasting Service Archives.



Figure 17: Some sections of Alago community destroyed in Asakio during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Field trip



Figure 18: Some sections of Alago community destroyed in Asakio during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Field trip



Figure 19: Some sections of Alago community destroyed in Asakio during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Field trip



Figure 20: Section of in Asakio burnt houses during the Ombatse conflict.
Source: Field trip




Figure 21: A house burnt down in Kadora town during the crises.
Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 16.



Figure 22: A house burnt down in Kadora town during the crises.
Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 16.




Figure 23: A house burnt down in Arikya town during the crises.
Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 16.




Figure 24: A house burnt down in Arikya town during the crises.
Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 16.




Figure 25: A house burnt down in Arikya town during the crises.
Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 16.




Figure 26: A house burnt down in Kadora town during the crises.
Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 16.



Figure 27: A destroyed house during the Ombatse conflict in Obi town.

Source: Field trip




Figure 28: The palace of the chief of Arikya that was burnt down by the machenaries.

Source: Eggonnews Sept 16-Oct 15, 2014, pp 15.



Figure 29: Some bodies of police personnel killed and buried but later exhumed by authority.

Source: Ombatse, a text authored by J.M. Ayuba, 2014.



Figure 30: A security operational vehicle burnt at Alakyo.

Source: Ombatse, a text authored by J.M. Ayuba, 2014.




Figure 31: Some police officers killed during an encounter with ombatse at Alakyo.

Source: Ombatse, a text authored by J.M. Ayuba, 2014.



Figure 32: A visit by the Inspector General of Police to survivors of the Alakyo massacre at specialist hospital Lafia.

Source: Nasarawa Broadcasting Service Archives



Figure 33: *Some Eggon Elders and Youths at the Azhili shrine during Initiation*

Source: Eggon News Vol. 8 No. 8 Dec. 2011



Figure 34: Some widow of police officers killed protesting in Lafia.

Source: Ombatse, a text authored by J.M. Ayuba, 2014.



Figure 35: The Zhi Migili's palace destroyed during the Ombatse conflict.

Source: Ombatse, a text authored by J.M. Ayuba, 2014.



Figure 36: An exhumed car belonging to a slain traveler identified as Mr. Gidado. *Source: Ombatse, a text authored by J.M. Ayuba, 2014.*