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Editorial Comment

Political Science Review is published by the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin. It is published twice a year and feature articles on issues that are global, national and local both at the theoretical and practical levels within the discipline of political science and related fields.

This edition covers a variety of issues both at the theoretical and practical levels. The first article by Victor Adetula centres on **Qualitative Methods and Perspectives in Political Science Research in Nigeria** where he advocated for the use of ‘mixed methods; that identifies with ‘methodological pluralism’. This is followed by an array of articles that focus on conflict and its dimensions in Nigeria, public policies, domestic politics and international relations. The array of articles makes the edition a stimulating intellectual engagement.

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QUALITATIVE METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

A point that has often been emphasised by scholars is that Politics relates to all aspects of human behaviour. This paper is an attempt to examine the qualitative perspective in the study of politics against the background that the world has recorded remarkable growth and development in the theories and methods of studying politics and widespread influence of the ‘behavioural revolution’ on the development of political science discipline globally. It is argued that it is possible to study politics using qualitative methods and perspective without compromising the laws of logic and criteria of truth. This is because, knowledge produced through qualitative methods is no less useful as the one produced using quantitative techniques. The paper advocates for the use of ‘mixed methods’ that identifies with “methodological pluralism”, and also recognizes the benefits of qualitative methods and their contributions towards the development of the study of politics.

Introduction

The study of politics is a genial field which deals with all aspects of human behaviour. This makes meaning since the polity is generally acknowledged as having policy jurisdiction over everything man does. This wisdom finds easy expression in the claim by Professor Harold. D Lasswell that all human interactions and behavior is relevant to politics (1948). Therefore, students of politics are expected to function as ancient philosophers in their efforts to explain political actions, using whatever knowledge and insights available to them from all fields of human knowledge. The starting-point of politics is the basic social fact that people have wants and needs, which they cannot satisfy by individual efforts. The strong desire to satisfy their needs and wants often dispose people to form groups of various sizes and scope. Out of these patterns of human behavior emerge the need to allocate power and resources allocate resources which is the central to politics. The allocation of power and resources within groups, organizations and society make conflict is imminent. Thus, the essence of politics is conflict and how to resolve.

The scope of the study of politics is indeed immense. Scholars of politics have continued to engage themselves with the primary question about the nature of polity. While some choose to focus on the political institutions as

key agencies of social control and social change, others are putting the emphasis on the influence of extra-political factors or conditions on political events and institutions. The study of politics today globally has witnessed significant development and progress. The world has recorded remarkable growth and development in the theories and methods of studying politics. But while the subject matter covered by the study of politics has expanded significantly, that many scholars have concentrated on only very few easily recognized. For instance, many scholars of politics from the global North hardly take scholarly notice of Africa as a subject matter. Admittedly in Europe and North America, few scholars occasionally show academic interest in Africa which they refer to as Area Studies or Comparative Politics. Notwithstanding Africa still matters in the study of politics. If nothing else, people still live in Africa and there are political problems requiring in-depth study for appropriate solutions (Adetula, 2014).

The academic history of Nigeria reveals several instances of enlightened discussion on the social use of the social sciences in the country. Arguably the prolonged military rule in the country helped in some ways to spur the political science community into action; to demonstrate the essence of social responsibility of political scientists. At different times political science scholars in Nigeria, using their umbrella organization, the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) expressed concerns for the “responsibility of political scientists in Nigeria”. Unfortunately many of the “Presidential Addresses” at the NPSA forum did not give serious consideration to methodological issues as they affect the field of political study in Nigeria. Admittedly, as the theme of the responsibility of political scientists in Nigeria became more dominant in the political science discourse in the late 1970s, questions on methods and techniques of political analysis also attracted some attention. Of particular interest is the proceedings of the 1979 Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) which was later published as *Political Science in Africa Critical Review* (1983). This anthology reflects a host of diverse opinions on the teaching of Political Science as well as modes of inquiry and analyses in political science research. The various contributors to the book raise questions on the study and teaching of Political Science in Nigeria, and Africa in general. However, most of the questions raised on the methods and techniques of Political Science are still largely unresolved to date.

This contribution is not, strictly speaking, a teacher’s manual on how to carry out political science research using qualitative methods. Rather it is a contribution to a review of status and benefits of qualitative perspectives and methods in the study of politics in Nigeria. Thus, while in this article we take adequate notice of the widespread influence of the ‘behavioural revolution’ on the development of political science discipline globally, we argue that it is possible to study politics using qualitative methods and perspective without

compromising the laws of logic and criteria of truth. We argue that knowledge produced through qualitative methods is no less useful as the one produced using quantitative techniques. We also note that the debate about the scientific merits of qualitative research has never lacked attention. Regularly questions are asked about forms and varieties of qualitative methods, the absence of clear boundaries between quantitative and qualitative research, the and the erroneous assumptions that the values of qualitative research can be measured using conventional scientific criteria associated with the natural science disciplines. In this paper therefore we explore the specificities of the orientation, character, procedures and processes of qualitative techniques in the study of politics in Nigeria. What are the use and benefits of qualitative approach in political inquiry and political science? What are the vital aspects of the qualitative techniques and processes in political science research in Nigeria? What are the key elements of qualitative techniques?

Emergence and Development of Perspectives

In order to understanding the evolution and development of political science research in Nigeria we must necessarily understand the development of Western-styled social science first in the Europe of Industrial Revolution and its exportation to other places including Africa. The process of knowledge production generally cannot be divorced from the real circumstances in which they emerge. The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century in Europe produced tendencies and changes that had implications for the development of both the natural sciences and social sciences in a particular form that was first experienced in Europe and later exported to other parts of the world. The Industrial Revolution resulted in high unemployment in Europe as machines replaced labour power in the factory systems. This and other social problems such as poverty, disease, child labour, poor conditions as well as the rise of two antagonistic social class - the industrial bourgeoisies and the proletariat – set social thinkers to search for explanations and suggestions.

The search for solution to these new social problems associated with Industrial Revolution led social thinkers toward a new science which borrowed substantially from the principles of the natural sciences. It was in this context that the social sciences began to evolve within European industrial society, with each brand acquiring its own systematic method of data collection, sustainable analytical tools, and the appropriate conceptual equipment. Both teleological perspective and positivism exerted significant influence on the growth of social sciences and contributed to its parochialism (see Ake, 1979 and 1984). Unfortunately these features have been celebrated as the foundations of the ‘objective’ and ‘value-free’ Western social science. The introduction of ‘objective’ and ‘value-free’ social science in non-western societies like Africa was remarkably success mainly because it has a distinctly development thrust

(Ibid) Western-styled social science was packaged as agents and catalysts of change and development. This conception of social science became so popular in the post-second world war and indeed very useful in the promotion of the values of western capitalist industrial societies even far beyond their national frontiers. Claude Ake explained the main thesis of the western social science and branded simply as ‘imperialism’:

Societies were classified and compared in the framework of a developmental continuum and those classified as underdeveloped were studied with reference to the possibility of movement up the continuum of development, a movement which would also represent the effacement of their enormous liabilities. However, while the conceptual and theoretical tools of the received social science was perfectly capable of elaborating on the problems of order, it was quite unsuitable and indeed inimical to the elaboration of change especially the revolutionary change that the liquidation of underdevelopment appeared to call for (Ake, 1984).

The conception takes development “as a particular kind of change” in the western capitalist societies, and that the non-western societies in quest of development must go for the “replication of institutions characteristic of western capitalist industrial societies, even though such societies differed in their social organizations and structures” (Jinadu, 1984, 7). Conceived in this way, the relationship between the ‘imperialist’ social science and development appears very vague and the goals and benefits of development unreachable. According to Thandika Mkandawire, while the developmentalist orientation rivets on ‘development’, it alienates the people as “we are unable to pay adequate attention to a whole range of aspects of our people’s lives, for they are seen as ‘barriers to development’” (Mkandawire, 1993, 131). In this way what the ideology of ‘developmentalism’ did was to permeate the social sciences in non-western societies. This in turn has limited immensely their scientific development and also their potential contribution to human wellbeing as a whole range of processes that are central to the people’s development - their history, their culture, their identities, their economies, their hopes, and aspirations etc. are scarcely addressed in social science research. The Nigerian experience vividly illustrates these points made above. Political science is a post-independence disciplinary creation in many African countries including Nigeria. The success of the ‘behavioral revolution’ in Europe and North America led to the increased urge to ‘export’ European social science. It was in this context that some European countries, notably the United States initiated programmes of assistance towards promoting social science disciplines in the newly independent countries. This was the beginning of the establishment of most social science disciplines in many newly independent states including Nigeria.

The development of Western social science (as against indigenous social science knowledge Ake, 1987; Fadipe, 1991; and Hountondji, 1997)¹ began in Nigeria during colonial rule, and it was essentially in response to the need of the colonial authorities that needed to study “native” populations and institutions to be able to control them and handle the problems of encountered in “native administration” (Ukwu, 1996). It was this that resulted in the sponsorship of some historical and anthropological studies, and eventually the founding of research institutes and institutions for the training of social scientists.

This was the context in which the various disciplines of social science emerged as academic disciplines in Nigeria. By 1957 the first Faculty of Social Sciences in the country had been established at the University College, Ibadan, and it was named Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences. Others followed in Lagos, Usukka, Zaria and Ife. An analysis of the curricula of the older universities which include those of Ibadan, Nsukka, Lagos and Ife reveals deep conceptual and theoretical allegiance to the ‘developmentalist’ social sciences. The colonial government, in order to check opposition to its oppressive rule, encouraged and supported the study of government, administration and order as opposed to a study of politics broadly. The same goes for other social science disciplines. For example, instead of sociology which is a study of modern society, it was anthropology, which represented the study of primitive societies that received emphasis. Similarly, the study of economics was preoccupied with the distinction between the ‘underdeveloped’ country and the ‘developed’ country, and how the former will change to the latter by following the path of development experience by the western societies.

Since its introduction in Nigeria as an academic discipline, over five decades ago, the discipline of political science has become well established in the country that nearly all the existing universities (aside from a few universities

¹. The view that knowledge of social relations which is central to basic and applied social and economic research was not developed in pre-capitalist societies, as espoused by Claude Ake (1987) is no longer tenable in view of such testimonies as in the works by Nathaniel A. Fadipe on the sociology of the Yoruba (1991). In pre-capitalist Nigeria for instance the various nationalities had their own ‘social sciences’ which were incorporated into their educational and belief systems. Evidence abounds also that early ethnographic studies benefited greatly from some of these indigenous knowledge which, agreed, were not written but existed in the indigenous socialization processes of the people. Thus the claim that no social science knowledge existed in Nigeria before colonial era requires modification. However, the introduction of Western styled social science came with colonization in Nigeria. For comparative views on knowledge production in traditional Africa societies, see Hountondji (1997).

of technology and agriculture) in the country have Department of Political Science. For most part of the 1960s, these social sciences held sway in Nigeria. However, towards the end of the decade of the 1960 and by the early 1970s social scientists especially those in the universities had begun to ask ‘unusual’ questions and some proffering alternative frameworks of analysis that challenged the dominant western social science. The period of the 1970s witnessed the emergence of alternative radical social science analyses, mostly wrapped in radical Marxist phraseology and variants of dependency theory. Somehow these were restricted to the university campuses and the disciple of political science was deeply involved in the growth and development of the political economy perspective which sought clearly to free social science scholarship for its imprisonment within the wall of empiricism and the policy prescriptions that never went beyond recommendations for efficient administrative management of the state apparatus and intellectual advocacy for reforms. Clearly this perspective never became popular with the first generation of political science scholars at Ibadan (‘the Ibadan School’). Notwithstanding, the University of Ibadan pioneered concerted efforts at developing a radical school of social thought in Nigeria. Between the University of Ibadan and University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), a new political economy approach emerged as alternative to various strands of the “bourgeois social theories”. Also, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the Ahmadu Bello University (fondly called ‘FASS’), established in 1962, acquired a radical intellectual tradition that makes the ‘ABU School’ stands out as a ‘radical post’.

Two broad perspective dominated the political science scholarship and research in Nigeria. The mainstream liberal perspective is associated mostly with the early generation of Nigerian political scientist, many of who received their training in Western Europe and North America. Adele Jinadu had explained the influence and essence of the mainstream political scientists and other social scientists in Nigeria either in the academics, teaching on in the field, carry our research in the context of “a policy science whose goal is viewed more as a status quo/reformist vocation than as transformative or radically critical one” (Jinadu, 1981 cited in Ukwu, 1996). The second perspective is the radical and critical analysis that questions the existing system, its assumptions and goals. Often debates between the two dominant perspectives/frameworks of analysis have condescended to personality conflicts, factionalization, struggles for power and leadership positions, and over-politicization of academic discourse in many universities to the disadvantage of the theoretically and methodologically development of the discipline.

The political economy perspective is by far the most popular framework of analysis among political scholars in Nigeria today. This perspective examines the relationship between politics and economics in modern societies at various levels - national, regional and global levels. The central

assumption is that all political-economic relationships are affected by society, culture, geography, and demographics. It is understandable therefore why the political economy perspective is indebted to a wide range of disciplines, and which also explains frequent reference to it as both multi-and interdisciplinary. In this way the political economy perspective challenges scholarship that emphasizes 'professional specialization'. It underscores the point that the division of work among historians, sociologists, economists, and political scientists does not make for better understanding of the social facts and the historical process which formed the structures of the phenomena that scholars seek to understand. A foremost political economist, Claude Ake, put it succinctly that:

...the connectedness of the economic structures, social structures, belief system and political system demands an interdisciplinary approach to the study of society. If society is so connected it cannot be studied in any depth without drawing on each of the specialised social science disciplines used for studying the various aspects of man and society (1981, 5).

There are different perspectives in Political Economy. It is not uncommon to read about liberal/neo-liberal political economy school, dependency school, Marxist political economy, class analysis etc. These perspectives to large extent determine the methods of inquiry adopted in studying social phenomena and also in prescribing policies. Notwithstanding, the use of these perspectives has "methodological implications" which compel its adherents which are largely "the student of society" to "pay particular attention to the economic structure of society and indeed use it as the point of departure for studying other aspects of society" (Ake, 1981, 1).

Forms, processes and benefits of qualitative methods

Research is a process of thinking through ideas and reflecting on questions in a systematic way. It is simply a careful inquiry or investigation aimed at collection of facts and information which are synthesized and organized logically and coherently for application as and when necessary. Thus, as a systematic process, research involves collecting and analyzing data and information on a given subject in order to satisfy a particular objective. Research can take different forms, and it can be conducted in "a formal and structured manner", or can be "undertaken in the form of the reflection of an individual" (Bundu, 1992). Whichever form it takes, and regardless of the discipline or subject, the aim or purpose of the research is a driving force for its process and outcome. For example, the purpose of research "may simply be to identify and define an issue more precisely, the relation between that issue and other things, factors underlying a phenomenon, or research may be for the prediction of

possible mutations or the basis of an inter-play of specific forces” (Bundu, 1992). Also, research may be conducted to evaluate public policies and development projects or programmes with the view to determine their utilitarian value, justify their relevance, or demonstrate citizens’ satisfaction with them.

For the policies and actions of governments to be meaningful, and also for them to achieve the desired ends and goals, they must be data-based and well-informed. Undoubtedly social science has greater potentials to impact on the process and outcomes of policy-oriented research. The social sciences consist of “complex of disciplines concerned with the behaviour of man in society and of social institutions” (OECD, 1966, 21), which study man, his environment and behaviour, and they are also concerned with the study of human behaviour whose operational setting is society (cited in Mabogunje, 1973). The production of knowledge and understanding of social relationships is therefore essence of social science enterprise. Therefore, an in-depth understanding of the inter-relationship between social science research and policy in Nigeria with the view to make it more mutually rewarding deserves scholarly attention. The inter-relationship between policy and research was underscored by a foremost Nigerian development economist, Pius Okigbo, who was evidently was disturbed by the frequency of “educated guesswork”, “individual hunches” and “intuition” in the management of the national economy. According to him, rational calculations that are based on data should be encouraged, and that the “experts have a crucial role to play in bringing together data from different sources and re-arranging them in such a way that the policy makers i.e. the Government – can see them from different perspectives” (1986, 3). That is, policy process ought to benefit from “established facts intelligently assembled and properly interpreted”. Gabriel Olusanya, a leading Nigerian policy scholar and researcher aptly summarized this concern:

Policies cannot be based on impressions or theories that have not been subjected to empirical test. Such policies will certainly not address the issues properly and will, therefore, fail to achieve their objectives.... Indeed the failure of many policies in developing countries is due partly to lack of objective findings or facts on which such policies are based, because of either low level of consciousness as regards the value of data- accurate data – and information or the lack of capacity to carry out the necessary inquiry that will lead to acquisition of such information and partly to lack of executive capacity, even when proper policies have been worked out (1989, 233).

Okigbo had indeed warned against leaving the challenges of modern societies in the hands of “economic astrologers, sorcerers and witch doctors (1986, 4). In order to adequately support the policy environment to respond promptly and effectively to the needs and demands in the modern societies, social research

generally and policy research in particular needs to take advantage of the benefits of systematic intellectual investigation of political, social and economic aspects of modern societies. The organization and deployment of knowledge in this systematic way enhances the formulation of sound policies as well as the designing of appropriate development programmes. These tasks can be undertaken using both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

Qualitative method is simply a scientific process through which scholars and researchers undertake deeper observation of a phenomenon for the purpose of studying it in its totality. In effect, qualitative method helps researchers to get deeper insights and understanding about a phenomena. Forms, dimensions and phases of qualitative method may include focus groups (group discussions), individual interviews, and participation/observations etc. Other sources of qualitative data include oral tradition, folklore, music and other cultural sources. In some circles qualitative methods are defined as less rigorous processes of investigation when compared with quantitative. This is erroneously. To regard both qualitative and quantitative methods as 'opposing sides' in a contest is misleading. This conception complicates the work environment for researchers and scholars who in practice should be less concerned about making a clear separation of the two.

A better guide for social researchers generally would be to focus on what qualitative research entails as well as its use and benefits. The use of qualitative methods suggest that the frameworks of knowledge, tools, and methods are not through processes that are based on quantification but yet obeyed the rules and logics of science in the process of knowledge production. The idea that the processes and products of all scientific activities cannot be isolated from the total environment in which they thrive makes clear justification and adds value to qualitative research methods especially in terms of their advantage of being able to capture social processes and contexts that do not easily lend themselves to quantification and statistical analyses. Take for example the ethnographic approach to qualitative research. Its use and application in Nigeria dates back to the colonial period. The emphasis in ethnography is on studying an entire culture. It is useful qualitative data gathering research technique that help to investigate a society with focus on its cultural values and traditions which in turn determines other social processes and institutions including the form of government and political behavior, and political culture. The use of ethnographic method requires the researcher to stay in the research location or community for the purpose of observing the phenomenon being investigated. The visit of the researcher to the research location is a necessity for participant observation. This process contributes significantly to the reliability and accuracy of the research procedures.

Field research is often associated with qualitative methods. During the field work qualitative data are collected based on the study problem which may be

through means participant, focus group discussions, observations etc. Field research provides opportunity for using anthropological and qualitative data research techniques which help researchers to pay careful attention to every details of daily life and the experiential 'feel' of the data. Researchers often keep field diary of observations. Sufficient physical presence of the researchers in the research locations communities was very important, not only as a necessity for participant observation, but also in contributing to the reliability and accuracy of other research procedures. Participant observation was identified as a useful anthropological and qualitative data research techniques, for its careful attention to every details of daily life and the experiential 'feel' of the data it produces. There are activities especially by some marginalized groups that are ordinarily not visible.

Field research as a qualitative research technique is quite broad. It entails a method of gathering qualitative data from the research location which may be a community, country or region depending on the research problematic, as well as the scope and focus of the research. The important thing to note about field research is that the researcher moves to the research location to observe the social phenomenon or social process that is the object of the research. This approach enables the researcher to be at the centre of the social processes and events being investigated. In this way the researcher can gain better insights and understanding that come with lived experience. Close observations of events and developments in the research locations is made possible through field research which may entail participant's observations, informal interviews, and focused group discussion (FGDs).

Field work involves a number of processes including opportunities to conduct interviews with individuals and groups on the perceptions and interpretations of events and developments by the citizens. It also make possible event analyses. Interviews can be conducted with identified key players and stakeholders. The idea is to be able investigate the research problematic with attention to the citizens. It is assumed that this approach allows for comprehensive and adequate understanding of the social phenomena and processes being studied. It should be possible also to obtain first-hand information on a number of issues related to the research problem.

A Case for Mixed Methods

The world is undergoing greater changes than it ever has before. This has implications for political inquiry and research. These changes which are at different levels - global, regional and national - are giving birth to pressing issues that are today key problems for inquiry and political research. On the experience of Nigeria, the themes of nationalism, nation-building, modernization, ethnicity etc. that dominated political discourses in Nigeria up to the 1970s have been replaced by more pressing issues of today e.g. governance, transparency and accountability, globalization, geopolitics, global and regional

peace etc. To be able to answer the questions that surround the new issues in political research, there is need to transcend a Political Science of mere 'description of how things are', to include in our systematic study of politics and political life. Failure to develop appropriate methodologies for conducting research leaves the country at the mercy of diviners and other media of the celestial bodies (the sun, moon and stars) to address and resolve political questions around 'who gets what and how'. Without any prejudice against the use of qualitative techniques (where applicable, especially as complimentary techniques), if appropriate theories of public life are to be developed, one must be able to make broad claims, based on large, generalizable, quantities of data. Political Science such as can identify with the development and application of statistical investigation and mathematical modeling techniques should be encouraged our universities and other institutions of higher education.

The interrelationship of Political Science with its neighbouring social science disciplines has complicated the task of scholars and students in the field. Most modern political scientists often incorporate theories and findings from other academic disciplines into their research. As a matter of fact many research questions posed by political scientists can only be answered with references to works, concepts, and methods which come from other social science disciplines where knowledge scientific method of social research has advanced so well. Contemporary research in political science calls for inter-disciplinary collaboration. This however requires the development of a common language. The way to create a common language is through being tolerant of other disciplines' data and methods, regardless of their level of sophistication. It is within such framework that political sociology as a sub-discipline can apply sociological generalizations to the analysis of political institutions, and political psychologists would draw intellectual sustenance from psychology, applying it to investigate political attitudes and behaviour. It is certainly not our argument that interpretative and critical – theory approach to political research be replaced with "mindless number crunching". To the contrary, we see quantitative and qualitative methods as mutually reinforcing programmes of research.

Future progress in the study of politics in Nigeria is likely to depend on the way we encourage and assist our students to apply a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative methods in the research. Beyond borrowing from the neighbouring social science disciplines of Sociology, Economics, and Psychology, there is need for scholarship in Political Science benefit from the analytical tools, frameworks and methods in the Humanities. For example, archival materials are of vital importance to researchers in the humanities because they contain primary source materials which are necessary for original research undertakings. Colonial reports on chieftaincy matters and boundary disputes can be a useful source of data for political analyses. Also of importance to political analyses is historical research method which is very useful for

investigating of events, developments, and experiences that have their roots in the past. Analysis of a number of political phenomena which include electoral behavior, voting patterns, and sectarian conflicts can benefit from with historical data.

The use of quantitative data and method in political science research in Nigeria is remarkably limited. For instance, while in the disciplines of economics, sociology and psychology, teachers, as well as their students, are, at least, appreciative of quantitative measures, the discipline of political science is seriously lacking behind; only a few students of politics ever practice quantitative social science. Billy Dudley, writing over four decades ago in Nigeria, noted that the extension of political study “into such field as psychology and psychiatry, biology and even pharmacology” ...has been matched by increasing use of different tools of modern philosophy to the employment of sophisticated mathematical models (1975,3). It was Dudley’s expectation that “the new concerns of political study” and interests in quantitative techniques would grow. He wrote that: “It may not be too-far-fetched to say that within the next decade the innumerate political scientists (1975, 3). True to his words, Billy Dudley, pioneered ‘mathematical politics’ in Nigeria with his generous use and application of games in the analysis of the Nigerian politics (see Dudley, 1973). The monumental work by Dudley – *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria*—for long has remained a reference for quantitative political methodology in Nigeria. But somehow there are nearly no disciples among Nigerian political scientists

The interrelationship of Political Science with its neighbouring social science disciplines has complicated the task of scholars and students in the field. Most modern political scientists often incorporate theories and findings from other academic disciplines into their research. As a matter of fact many research questions posed by political scientists can only be answered with references to works, concepts, and methods which come from other social science disciplines where knowledge of statistics and quantitative techniques has advanced so well. Contemporary research in political science calls for inter-disciplinary collaboration. This however requires the development of a common language. The way to create a common language is through being tolerant of other disciplines’ data and methods, regardless of their level of sophistication. It is within such framework that political sociology as a sub-discipline can apply sociological generalizations to the analysis of political institutions, and political psychologists would draw intellectual sustenance from psychology, applying it to investigate political attitudes and behaviour. It is certainly not my argument that interpretative and critical theory approach to political research be replaced with “mindless number crunching”. To the contrary, I see quantitative and qualitative methods as mutually reinforcing programmes of research. However, future progress is likely to depend on the way we encourage and assist our

students to apply a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative methods in the research.

Conclusion and the way forward

In this article we draw attention to some aspects of the intellectual characteristics of the discipline of political science in Nigeria, as well as some challenges of the discipline with special focus on use and benefits of qualitative methods. Admittedly the increasing concerns about methods and perspectives in political science scholarship stems from a sense of unease with the current state of theory and method in the study of politics in the country. We reiterate the position that the production of knowledge through qualitative methods is possible and should be encouraged, and that the view espoused by some behavioural political scientists inclined to quantification that unless qualitative methods cannot help obtain accurate knowledge about the complexities of political life is no longer tenable (see Varma, 1975).

The development of Political Science as an academic discipline is still on in Nigeria. The community of political science scholars in the country has not produced an intellectual leadership core that could develop what could be called the 'Nigerian perspectives on the study of politics' or the 'Nigerian approaches to Political Science'. It is possible to point out that two broad perspectives dominated the political science scholarship and research in Nigeria; the mainstream liberal perspective, and the radical perspective with both reasonably inclined towards Political Economy approach. But it is still not possible at this point to talk of the Nigerian School of Political Science. Or to put it in another way, Nigeria has not yet produced a Nigerian approach to Political Science. Arguably, the colonial origin and the predominance of Western orientation in political science scholarship in Nigeria is partly responsible. Both in the design of curriculum and development of concepts and tools, there should be conscious efforts to question the brand of Political Science what was handed over to the first generation of Nigerian academics through imperialism, and which is currently sustained through neo-colonial links.

The concept of interdisciplinary research sounds beautiful and attractive, but on the evidence of practice within Nigerian research community, this has proved hard. Academic disciplines in Nigeria are so fixated on their own academic standards and very intolerant of others having access or making input into their research endeavours. Nevertheless, most issues on development process require cooperation between various disciplines, especially if they are issues defined not only by academics, but also by society-at-large. The opinion of the Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences expressed in a document titled *Open the Social Sciences* is useful for Nigerian political science scholars and other social science researchers. That is, the division of work of

work among sociologists, economists, political scientists does not make for better policy oriented social and economic research:

To be historical is after all not the exclusive purview of persons called historian. It is the obligation of all social scientists. To be sociological is not the exclusive purview of persons called to sociologists. It is an obligation of all social scientists. Economic issues are not the exclusive purview of economist. Economic questions are central to the any and all social scientific analyses. Nor is it absolutely sure that professional historians necessarily know more about historical explanations, sociologists more about social issues, and economists more about economic fluctuations than other working social scientists. In short, we do not believe that there are monopolies of wisdom, or zones of knowledge reserved to persons with particular university degrees (quoted in *The Nigerian Social Scientist*, 1/1 September, 1998, pp. 9-10).

So far in this article we have demonstrated our association with the benefits of qualitative methods while not downplaying the merit in quantitative techniques. The intention is not to discredit the use of quantitative data and techniques in political inquiry. We advocate for a balance use of quantitative and qualitative techniques. It is worthy of note that the social science community in Nigeria is never found wanting whenever it becomes necessary to turn a critical search light on itself. We recall here many instances of enlightened discussions on the social use of social science knowledge, and also the re-definition of the social responsibility of social scientists. However, while we celebrate the rising consciousness in respect of the role of social scientists as agents of social change, it is equally important to note that social science disciplines in Nigeria are still confronted with challenges relating to theory building.

Finally, we advocate for the use of 'mixed methods' that identifies with "methodological pluralism", and also recognizes the benefits of qualitative methods and their contributions towards the development of the study of politics. We support adequate official attention to the development of the science of politics in Nigeria. Our concern is rooted in a conviction that teaching and research in politics should satisfy two main criteria: its scholarly soundness and its policy relevance. Thus, there is a sense in which this contribution in this article represent a form of self-correction and a change of attitude from previous seeming indifference to methodological issues in the study of politics in Nigeria. Self-correction is necessary for the development of any discipline, especially in these modern times.

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THE MAKING OF ACTORS AND VICTIMS OF COMMUNAL CONFLICTS: SHARE-TSARAGI IN RETROSPECT

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Abstract

In the year 2015-2016, violent communal clash in Share-Tsaragi was on the increase, unprecedentedly recording the highest number of casualties in kwara state expressed in number of damages to lives and property. Despite the efforts of successive governments to manage the communal crises in Share-Tsaragi, the crises rather than mollify, at different times often resurged. This work examines the causes and stages in Share-Tsaragi serial conflict as well as the sprouting of actors and victims of the conflict particularly in the most turbulent year (2015-2016). The research uses snowball interview method to access information from primary source, mostly indigenes of both communities who were direct actors or victims of the crisis. Consequently, 20 respondents were interviewed, 10 respondents from each community which cut across community leaders, eyewitnesses and direct victims. The study adopts descriptive analytical method of analysis to arrive at its findings. It was discovered that; quest by the two communities to control land resources in the area was the primary and remote cause of the violent clash. The study recommends that victims of the communal conflict should be adequately rehabilitated to dissuade the mind of revenge or reprisal attacks. The violent actors should be appropriately punished to serve as deterrence to others. There should be continuous inter-communal dialogue and implementations of vital recommendations by previous commission of enquiry, particularly permanent demarcation of boundary, these will go a long way to curb recurring crisis in the dispute area.

Keywords: Communal Conflict, Conflict Actor, Conflict Victim, Conflict Management

Introduction

At a time in the history of Share and Tsaragi communities, the socio-economic interactions of the two communities were in order and there were cordial relationships. They once had a single market and engaged in social activities, they inter marry and live in peace with each other (Ndajoko, 1999). However conflict started manifesting in the year 1978, though before this period, there were minor clashes between the two communities on disputed land in 1976 and 1977, but that of 1978 resulted to stoning each other during one of

the Muslim festivals. At this phase, the conflict was noticeable. Also, there were claim and counter claims, though, there was a commission of inquiry set up by the government but there was no tangible effort to transform the conflict (Tijani, 2008). The escalation stage of the conflict was in the year 2000 where lives were lost and properties destroyed. The poor handling of the year 2000 crisis led to the crisis of the year 2008 that also resulted in loss of many lives and properties in the two communities. There were commissions of inquiry, boundary adjustment committee and stakeholders' forum set up by the government to resolve the crisis, but little was achieved.

Meanwhile, in the year under study, 2015-2016, the violent communal clash was recorded to be of highest number of casualties in kwara state expressed in number of damages to lives and property (Abdulkadir, 2020). This underpinned the objective of this study to examine the causes and stages in Share-Tsaragi serial conflict as well as the sprouting of actors and victims of the conflict particularly in the most turbulent year (2015-2016). Like most communal crises in Nigeria, the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis passed through four stages, and this theme will be discussed under these four stages; Latent Stage, Manifestation Stage, Escalation Stage and Management Stage. This is to facilitate better understanding of the crisis, how it has oscillated from time to time and efforts put in place to manage it.

The researcher adopted interview method to access information from primary source, mostly indigenes of both communities who were direct actors or victims of the crisis, and eyewitness accounts. It was discovered that; quest by the two communities to control land resources in the area; ethnic identity and need to resist domination from rival community; coming together of the two groups because of Baruba expansionist War; the Fulani jihad that forced the Tsaragi people to leave their initial base in Sakama; non implementation of previous commissions of enquiry reports by the state government; the position of Share community that Justice Mbanefo push previous report aside; the position of Tsaragi community that Justice Mamman Nasir's report must stand; extension of Share junction beyond its original place were among the remote causes of the crisis. While the immediate causes include; cutting of economic trees that are of interest to Tsaragi people by Share indigenes; dispute over farmland, particularly the Kange Farm where Tsaragi farmers were chased away by Share indigenes; reprisal attack on the indigenes of Share by Tsaragai indigenes; as well as allegation that the state government aligned with one of the fighting communities .

Theoretical Framework

Frustration and Aggression theory is adopted to guide the discourse in this work. The theory was unveiled by John Dollard, Neal Miller et al(1939) and was later advanced by Miller in 1941. The argument of the frustration and

aggression theory is that, aggression is the result of frustrating a person's effort at reaching a particular goal. The interpretation of this is that aggression is the end product of frustration.

The theory had been used by social scientists to explain the cause of many civil unrest, violent conflict, outright war and terrorism. The theory relates to the behavior of individual or group as it connects to response given to a perceived negative factor or impediment to a targeted goal. It also explains a relationship of attack and counter attack between individual, groups or larger society as it was seen in Share-Tsaragi communities.

The circumstances in Share-Tsaragi crisis featured series of claims and counter claims laid by both communities alleging each other of frustrating their lives, hence using that as a justification for their aggression. As noted, violent conflict occurred on four (4) different occasions within eight (8) months in the year under study leading to imposition of curfew at four (4) different times. The situation portrays that the behavior of both communities within this period was under the influence of frustration from both ends. The attempt to express and resist being frustrated necessitated the aggression inform of attacks by both communities. As one frustrates the other, it receives attack, and as the other attacks, it receives counter-attack, this kind of situation underpinned the postulations of the frustration and aggression theory. While the frustration/aggression theory was acknowledged for its strong articulation on the genesis of most crisis, it has also been criticized on the basis that it failed to justify other crises that erupted spontaneously without notification and those caused by agitators and terrorist formations.

Overview of Communal Conflicts in Nigeria

Hardly would one see any state in Nigeria that is yet to experience communal crises. Nwanegbo (2009) alluded to this in his work, *Inter-Communal Conflict in Igbo land (South-Eastern) Nigeria: A study of Aguleri-Umuleri conflicts*. He noted that most communal crises were influenced by a lot of factors cutting across; land and boundary, chieftaincy, solid mineral deposit, communal prides and religion. Nwanegbo extended his work to understanding the genesis of the conflict, government's resolve to curtail it and offered recommendations. Parts of the recommendations offered by him in containing the conflict were the need to re-integrate the youth and empower them as well as create platforms for continuous re-orientation of the youth. One stumbling block the researcher noticed in his recommendations is the exclusion of the adults and women in the empowerment and re-orientation process. We see re-orientation as what is needed by everyone irrespective of status or background because man often forgets and conflict could also be caused by adult men and women.

In a study related to poor orientation, Philips (2000) studied the crisis in Zango-Kataf and documented that the remote cause of the conflict is the

violent nature of Atyab people whom he described as naturally hostile, as most of them are animists. Although, Philip did not pay attention to empirical confirmation of this oral tradition, particularly assessing the Katafs' side of the story, poor orientation could contribute to peoples' ill feeling about others. Nevertheless, the researcher's observation of the Katafs shows that they are not animists, most of them are now devoted Christians and strictly guided by Christian believe. Meanwhile, a study of Share/Tsaragi settlement over a century was done by Tijani (2000). He narrated how the intergroup relationship between the Yoruba and Nupe people in the twin settlement was the primary reason for the quest to control land resources. He did not avail us the knowledge of how the relationship soured. The initially good relationship which later went bitter gave birth to ethnically demarcated residence and political structure in an attempt to align with their different ethnic identity. Tijani's work is close to that of Adams (1910), who illustrated the genesis of communal conflicts across Nigeria, tracing it largely to boundary dispute. Thence, Adams refused to inform us about the cause of boundary dispute itself. As most of the land boundaries were manipulated by British colonialists for their interest. As a British Army Colonel, Adams ought to know that what existed today as communal clashes across Nigeria have deep roots in colonial administration.

Similarly, Otite and Albert (2001) gave an historical excursion into most communal conflicts in Nigeria. Tiv-Jukun, Ife-Modakeke, Ijaw-Itsekiricrises were among those discussed with some selected cases from different regions of the country. Share-Tsaragi and Offa-Erinle crises in Kwara state were part of his review. The work among others earlier stated came up with recommendations for the government on ways of handling the crises but insufficiently talked about the victims and actors and specific recommendation to residents of the affected communities, hence the gap in the literature which underscores this study. It is therefore necessary to revise the work with a view to including specific recommendations for the victims and actors in the affected communities on ways to conduct themselves, prevent future occurrences and manage the ones at hand.

The Study Area

There are different variations lending their voices on the history of Share-Tsaragi. Most of the narrations however, showed that the intergroup relationship between the Yoruba and Nupe people in the twin settlement was primarily influenced by the pursuit to control land resources (Mabogunje: 1971, Ndajoko: 1999, Tijani: 2008). The development gave birth to ethnically demarcated residence and political structure in an attempt to align with their preferred ethnic identities.

Some historians claimed that the Yoruba were the first to settle at the present site of Share in the year 1818 A.D. They were the Igbomina Yoruba

group who came as hunters probably hunting for ivory. They left Ahun, their home place and first settled at Sakama, a place in the eastern part of Share. Another version claimed that the Yoruba left Oyo-Ile, (the capital of the Old Oyo empire) when it dispersed due to the Bariba expansionist wars in 1816 (Tijani, 2008). The Bariba army attacked Igboho which was then the capital of the Old Oyo Empire. Oyo forces were defeated hence the civil population dispersed into different directions, some of them that went eastward were the ancestors of the Igbomina Yoruba who left Ahun and settled at Sakama.

Another version of the tradition claimed that the first settlers at Share were the Nupe, who left Atagara, settled at Sakama and later in the nineteenth century were driven by the Fulani Jihad to Share. At Share, the Yoruba people came and stayed with them, but because of cultural differences the Nupe people established a segregated settlement (Ndajoko, 1999).

It was observed that the Baruba expansionist war and the Fulani Jihad had a double effect of bringing Yoruba and Nupe together as refugees in Share and Tsaragi as well as create cultural disparity that eventually led to the segregation of their settlements, thus Share-Tsaragi a twin town of Yoruba and Nupe was established in an approximate range of less than a metre, a borderless twin town it could be called. This arrangement was functional and harmonious at the beginning having both fled from war fronts (Tijani, 2008).

The Share-Tsaragi Conflict

Generally, there are four stages which conflict passes through, like most communal crises in Nigeria, The Share-Tsaragi crisis will be discussed under these four stages (Latent Stage, Manifestation Stage, Escalation Stage and Management Stage). The latent stage of Share-Tsaragi communal crisis started with the taking away of the Native Authority from Tsaragi and subsequently the declaration of Share as the headquarters of Ifelodun Local Government area which led to the re-organisation of communities and transfer of nine villages to Share. The Tsaragis claimed the villages originally belong to them. Since then, the two communities have been laying claim to the historical ground of being the first settler in their respective domain (Ndajoko, 1999). At this stage the conflict is not known to the outside world and the members of various communities. The socio-economic interactions of the two communities were in order and there were cordial relationships. They had a single market then and engaged in social activities, inter marriage and they live in peace with each other (Ndajoko, 1999).


The manifestation stage of the conflict was in 1978, though before this period, there were minor clash between the two communities on the disputed land in 1976 and 1977, but that of 1978 resulted to stoning each other during one of the Muslims' festivals. At this phase, the conflict was noticeable and visible. Also, there were claims and counter claims, though, there was commission of

inquiry set up by the government but there was no tangible effort to transform the conflict (Tijani, 2008).

The escalation stage of the conflict was in the year 2000 where lives were lost and properties destroyed. The poor handling of the year 2000 crisis led to the crisis of the year 2008 that also resulted in loss of many lives and properties in the two communities. There were commissions of inquiry, boundary adjustment committee and stakeholders forum set up by the government to resolve the crisis. However, little was achieved. The year 2000 to 2008, was used by the major stakeholders for de-escalation process by stakeholders, but ineptitude of the stakeholders brought about the crisis of the year 2008 (Tijani, 2008) and that of 2015-2016 which was unprecedented in the area and had serious effect on the socio-economic situation of the two communities.

The present situation in Share-Tsaragi communal crisis could be regarded as conflict management stage which is likely to sustain the peaceful atmosphere if the major stakeholders are committed to the course. This stage has equally witnessed more intervention of third party initiatives different from that of the government in the management of the crises. Media organization, school of higher learning and some religious groups are now part of the mediation process. Therefore, if adequate care is not taken there could be a swing back to the old order in the nearest future. This is because, the seating Governor of Kwara State during the 2015-2016 crisis was Alhaji AbdulFatah Ahmed, an indigene of Share, who tried to balance his position as the governor and the steps taken on the communal crisis. This was the worry of the Tsaragis during the conflict period, a situation that made them to boycott the enquiry process by the judicial commission set up by the state government.

Graphic 1: Charts Showing Stages of Share-Tsaragi Communal Crisis



INTERPRETATION OF CODES

LS	Latent Stage
MS	Manifestation Stage
ES	Escalation Stage
DE/MS	De-escalation/Management Stage
RES	Re-escalation Stage
RDEMS	Re-Descalation and Management Stage

Source: Researcher's Field Work, 2018

The 2015-2016 Share-Tsaragi Serial Crises: A Retrospect

The researcher closely monitored happenings that were connected to 2015-2016 Communal crisis between Share and Tsaragi and the followings were documented;

Date	Events
19/20 December 2015	In the 19/20 December 2015 clash, four people were killed, while forty others were injured and over fifty houses burnt, as Tsaragi and Share communities vowed to terminate each other.
December 20, 2015	Kwara State Government imposed 24-hour curfew as communal clash worsened, the clashes between the two communities continued despite government's imposition of a 24 hour curfew.
December 23, 2015	Kwara State Government relaxed curfew in Share, Tsaragi, and set up a Judicial Commission of Enquiry.
January 5, 2016	The Judicial Commission of Enquiry was officially presented mandate by the State government and commenced work.
January 7, 2016	The Judicial Commission of Enquiry was rejected by Tsaragi. Tsaragi elders addressed a press conference in Ilorin where they rejected the judicial commission of inquiry set up by Governor Abdulfattah Ahmed. The Tsaragi forum was led by Alhaji Abdullahi Idris. Alhaji Idris claimed that following the state and local government creation of 1976, the federal government constituted Justice Mamman Nasir Boundary Adjustment Commission. The commission visited the two communities and its recommendations were accepted by the federal government. A white paper was issued on the report by Kwara State Government. In 1995/96, the federal government again set up Justice Mbanefo Panel. The panel visited Kwara State, during its public sitting, Share Community requested the panel to review Mamman Nasir commission's recommendations and Justice Mbanefo replied point blank that the earlier concluded boundary adjustment issues remained closed and done with. Mbanefo panel's refusal to review the aforesaid report resulted in another communal disturbance between the two communities in 2000. Alhaji Idris noted that; In the light of the one-sided disposition openly displayed by Governor Ahmed, the Nupes of Tsaragi community have no reason whatsoever to participate in another inquiry,

	more so when the recommendations of all the previous commissions/panels on the crisis which have been adopted by the government of Kwara State have not been implemented (Idris, 2016). While explaining that the Nupes of Tsaragi community and its environs are committed to peaceful coexistence with their Share Igbomina neighbor, Alhaji Idris concluded that they have instituted an action in court to challenge the governor's action.
January 10, 2016	Governor Ahmed denies taking sides in Share/Tsaragi communal clash at a press conference after being alleged to be biased by the Tsaragi community.
February 29, 2016	Judicial panel submitted its report to the state government.
February 29, 2016	Governor Abdulfatah Ahmed promised to find lasting solution to the Share/Tsaragi communal clashes. The Governor made the promise when he received the report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry into communal clash between the two communities. He assured members of the commission that government would thoroughly study the report and implement the recommendations copiously in order to find lasting solutions to the communal clash. I have no doubt that the recommendations in the report will provide lasting solutions to the communal clash between Share and Tsaragi, Let me at this juncture assure you that the commission's report will be thoroughly examined and the recommendations implemented to the fullest (Ahmed 2016). The Governor also appealed to the people of Share and Tsaragi to embrace peace, draw in strength and encouragement from their diversity to foster development. While presenting the report, Chairman of the Commission, Justice Suleiman Akanbi, said 23 memoranda were received from both communities while witnesses were also invited. While expressing optimism that there would be lasting solution to the perennial clash if the recommendations of the commission were fully

	implemented, Justice Akanbi added that members of the commission had already visited the scene of the clash as well as the traditional rulers of the two communities.
On the 23rd of March	Share Community protested police 'silence' over Share/Tsaragi communal clash in Kwara state.
December 8 2016	National Boundary Commission visited the state. On Thursday December 8, 2016 Director General, National Boundary Commission, Dr. Mohammed Ahmad and his team were on an advocacy visit to the State. They briefed the State Government on the activities and efforts made by the Commission to solve various problems relating to boundary disputes. Doctor Ahmad said the Commission received several petitions on the age-long inter-local government boundary dispute between Share and Tsaragi Communities. He explained that the Commission was in the State with the intention of finding lasting solution to the problems and canvassed for the State government's support to participate actively in the lined up programmes that would be jointly agreed on by the Edu\Ifelodun Inter-Local government boundary dispute committee. In a swift response, Kwara State Government stressed need for permanent demarcation of disputed areas to curtail the crisis. The State Governor, Alhaji Abdulfatah Ahmed who was represented at the meeting by his Deputy, Elder Peter Kisira, reiterated the commitment of the State government in encouraging settlement of land and boundary disputes with preference to litigation. The Governor informed the visitors that the state government had instituted an administrative panel of enquiry headed by the Emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Ibrahim Zulu-Gambari, with a view to ameliorating the sufferings of the victims as well as find out the remote and immediate cause of the crisis. He added that government has equally followed it up with the constitution of Implementation\Reconciliation Committee made up of traditional rulers and other opinion leaders aimed at finding a lasting solution to the dispute.

Source: Researcher's monitoring of trends in the 2015-2016 Share-Tsaragi communal crisis

Findings on the victims and effects of the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis

The Share-Tsaragi communal crises recorded a lot of effects on properties and lives of the people of the area. Respondent 4 who informed the researcher that he was the one that categorically wrote a letter to the Divisional Police Officer, Share on 26th of October 2015 on the need to clear the bushy parts of the Community LGEA school Share, as it constitutes threat and used as hideouts by criminal elements, said he had full Knowledge that the area is a controversial place to execute such act single handedly. He therefore consulted law enforcement agency, particularly the police before they carried out the bush clearing. A copy of the letter addressed to the police as well as the pictures of the burnt school was shown to the researcher by the respondent. The respondent claimed to see Tsaragi people assaulting Share people which consequently led to gunning of one Akande Shasili and Abdulganiyu Ajibare. Both victims were rushed to University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital where Shasili was later referred to Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital, Ile-Ife for surgery. On 20th December 2015, a gunshot started from Tsaragi. Tsaragi youths were seen invading Share, shooting, looting, burning and destroying properties. One Nurudeen Usman from Share was killed in the process while others sustained various degrees of injuries. He noted that there was massive destruction of lives and property in Share during the incidence while not even a single property was destroyed in Tsaragi.

In another Interview with Respondent 5, a retired civil servant, it was made known that Nupe youths of Kange Village mounted a road block on his way to Ilorin, the Kwara state capital, on 20 December 2015 at about 7:30am. Accompanied by his friend, their vehicle was searched and he was asked to turn back. While driving back, his vehicle was fired, bullet pierced through the back and front screens. He reported the matter at the Share Divisional Police Headquarters. When questioned whether he was sure those that attacked him were not armed robbers, he said he was very sure that those that attacked him were Tsaragi youths because he heard their conversation in Nupe language at the search point. He tendered the picture of the damaged vehicle and estimated the cost to be 150, 000 Naira.

Respondent 6, a 30 years old man who said he is a vulcanizer (sic) also gave similar account and added that in the process of trying to rescue some of the children collecting firewood, he was macheted on the leg by Tsaragi All Progressives Congress youth. He lamented how all the perpetrators of the attack were yet to be brought to book.

Also Respondent 7, when asked about the destruction of the properties of Muslim Community Junior Secondary School, Share, confirmed that on 20th December, 2015, Some Tsaragi youths who were armed to the teeth invaded Share through the school due to its proximity. He said the school was set ablaze alongside properties at Olujide compound which is in close range to the school.

Respondent 8, also gave similar narrative. He said that the school was surrounded by bushes which could deter the pupils from the village from coming to school as a result of fear of kidnappers, hence the community leaders were approached for approval to cut the trees and bushes around. He was however surprised to see Tsaragi youths set the whole school ablaze on 20th of December 2015. He could not give the estimate of the damages done to the school as at the time of interview. Respondent 9, narrated how his residence situated at UMCA Jerusalem Share, was destroyed on the 20th of December by armed Tsaragi youths. He said he ran for his life on seeing the attackers from a far distance, but by the time the soldiers took control of the situation and he returned home, his house has been burnt down completely. He gave a rough estimate of the damaged properties to be 1,895,000 Naira.

Another eye witness of the crisis, Respondent 10 while giving account of the incidence said the UMCA's auditorium was vandalized and properties were looted. He put the cost of the vandalized properties at 459,000 Naira. He said he was preparing for church service on that day (20th December 2015) when he heard gun shots behind Muslim Primary School, Share, which made him to run for his life. He also claimed to have seen, APC youths in Tsaragi, pointing towards his house, consequently his house was vandalized and his properties looted. He noted that over 200 people were victims of the share attack just as he appealed to the state government to assist all the victims of the attack as most of them are still battling to recover from the shock unleashed by the crisis.

Respondent 11, a 53 years old clergyman, narrated how his residence was destroyed by Tsaragi youths during the crisis. He said his properties were destroyed before the soldiers came to rescue the situation. He estimated the total loss, including his burnt house at N9,700,000.00. The reverend father added that the development had rendered his family homeless and his body had developed hypertension as at the time of interview.

Respondent 12, a 38 year old trader, in her ordeal narrated how her house and shop were looted by Tsaragi youths on 20th December, 2015. She said she was in her house around 4:30am that day when she heard gun shots from Tsaragi axis of the community. She and her husband panicked and started running helter-skelter. By 10am, Mobile Police urged the Share citizens to return to their houses as the situation was under control and they complied. Later on, when she got out, she saw one Danjuma looting her shop. She also watched her house being set ablaze by the mob. A sum of properties worth N943,390,00 were stolen and destroyed from the shop and her house. When asked about what gave her the conviction that it was Danjuma that looted her shop? The woman said she knew him before the incidence and that Danjuma was her customer and he usually comes from Tsaragi area. Respondent 13 said his apartment, a six (6) bedroom bungalow and his car along with other items worth Twenty five million

three hundred thousand naira (N25,300,000.00) were destroyed and his family was consequently rendered homeless due to the ill-fated occurrence. He also showed us pictures of his burnt car and building.

Respondent 14, narrated how Iyeru Okin microfinance bank located in Share was attacked. According to him, he was not present in Share during the crisis, he however received narratives of how it happened from his staff, hence, he believed that the attack was not done by Share indigenes because the bank had existed in Share for over 7 years and there was no hostility of any form encountered from them. He noted that the bank lost properties worth Eight million naira N8,000,000 to the attack. Respondent 15, a Coca-Cola distributor also showed us pictorial evidence of her burnt shop. She said that she lost One million one hundred and ninety thousand four hundred naira (N1,190,400) to the attack because the day's proceeds were burnt along with the shop and the truck was also vandalized. Respondent 16, 64 year old Muslim Cleric explained how a mosque, Olupako Mosque was destroyed and the mosque looted. The total loss was estimated at One hundred and thirty one thousand naira (N131,000). He identified the perpetrators as Nupe speaking youths from Tsaragi.

Conversely, most respondents from Tsaragi were of the position that, the crisis had far reaching effect on them compared to the people of Share. For instance, Respondent 17 alleged that Kwara state Governor, Abdulfatai Ahmed took side with Share people in the crisis. She also said that the; Nigerian Police, Department of State Security and The Nigerian Army of Kwara state formation were used by the state government to maltreat indigenes of Tsaragi community, noting that five Nupe Farmers; Madu issa, Aliyu issa, Alhaji Saba, Muhmini and Kadiri were killed on their farm land in *Daruby* Share youths and the security operatives failed to apprehend their killers.

Respondent 18, a resident of Emi worogi who described the situation as unfortunate, alleged that Share had been able to exploit the majority status of Yoruba in Kwara state and the fact that the state governor is from their community to oppress the Nupes of Tsaragi. He said Nupes have been drawn into crises since 1978 when they did stone throwing immediately after the Muslims' eid festival followed by that of year 2000 when they introduced fire arms and the crisis of 2008 when half of Tsaragi township was burnt down and the latest in 2015. In all these crises the Kwara state government used the Nigerian Police formation, the Directorate of the State Security Service and the Nigerian army as apparatus to suppress the Tsaragis. He narrated how he and group of others were arrested and detained by the Divisional Police in Share for several days and were transferred to the State Police headquarters in Ilorin before they were granted expensive bail. He recalled that in the last crisis, the Nigerian Army was deployed to keep peace after the imposition of curfew, the early rain came and Nupe farmers went to their farm but were arrested and transferred to Ilorin. The Army Captain in charge of the troop (A Hausa

speaking officer) who felt that farming should be allowed was immediately transferred and was replaced by a Yoruba speaking officer who abides by the instruction of the state government, hence, prevented farming by the Nupes. The respondent alleged that the Kwara state government had displayed sentiment in the issue of farming by the Nupes as it maintained that a court judgment had been secured by Elemosho of Share as a land owner and so Nupes can no longer farm in their ancestral farms that they have been farming for hundreds of years. He added that the step was an overturn of a superior decision by Justice Mamman Nasir (National Boundary Commission) noting that an area court cannot re-adjudicate a matter already decided by a superior court.

Respondent 19, a 66 year village head lamented how indigenes of Tsaragi were treated with contempt and made to suffer by Kwara state government. He made mention of a letter written to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari on 28th Jan. 2016, complaining injustice against indigenes of the area of which the presidency reacted to the letter by giving a directive meant to bring about peace. He alleged that the Kwara State Governor, AbdulFatah Ahmed treated the Presidential directive with contempt. He said Nupe farmers were prevented from farming as the new farming season got started, not only that, they were being detained in Nigeria Police cells as criminals while the police fold their arms in Share as they continue farming and even cut down economic trees. He recommended that the Federal Government should urgently implement the Boundary Adjustment Decisions of both the Federal and Kwara state Governments in order to enthrone lasting peace in the area.

Respondent 20, a 46 year old bricklayer noted that the episodes of November 2nd and 3rd 2008 civil disturbance cost Tsaragi Community over 200 million naira as he personally lost about 500 thousand naira worth of property to the crisis. He accused the Kwara State Government of not coming up with enough compensation on the damages, adding that the relief materials doled out by the government were hijacked by politicians.

Actors involved in the Communal Crisis

It is expedient to also acknowledge that the conflict led to the making of some actors within the community. The researcher was able to identify the principal actors involved in the communal fracas, before reaching out to them with a view to understanding their own side of the story, and most important, facilitate peace in the areas through recommendations. In fact most of the actors documented here were gathered from snowball method of interview. For ethical reason, this work therefore classifies the actors in the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis to non-violent and other actors while their names were also withheld and coded. The classification done here was equally alluded to by reports of judicial commission of enquiry. The commission recommended some of the actors for

commendation while some were reprimanded. Others were adjudged violent and deemed fit for punishment base on the gravity of their offences.

The non-violent actors

i. Olupako of Share

The paramount ruler of Share displayed high level of maturity during the crisis especially when the enquiry team visited the area. At his palace, he received the judicial commission with warmth welcome and prayed God Almighty to bestow the Commission with the required wisdom and knowledge to succeed in their task. He equally offered suggestion on how to achieve sustainable peace in the area;

What we want is the erection of a physical boundary demarcation because this is the only thing that can put an end to the crisis and members of both communities will be able to decide which side of the wall they wish to live and farm.

The above statement is a pointer to the fact that Oba Olusokun is cautious of his environment, and a lasting solution to the dragging crisis is more admired by him, hence the need for above suggestion. He equally suggested that the Yoruba and Nupe farmers should be relocated away from the disputed farm land to other separate areas to continue their farming activities.

ii. Etsu Tsaragi

The posture of the king of Tsaragi, Etsu Tsaragi displayed towards the incident was not distant from that of a statesman who preferred peace to violence. This was represented by his response to interview by media group and other government officials particularly when the commission of enquiry paid him a courtesy visit precisely on Monday, 8th February 2016 (Bello, 2018).

He welcomed the visitors and acknowledged the respect accorded to his personality by the commission. He said;

You deemed it fit to honor us with this visit. We deeply appreciate. Let me give my suggestion which I believe will assist the Commission. What we want the government to do is to create an enabling environment where the two communities will be talking. Let there be joint youth committee meeting from both communities, let there be joint elders forum from both communities and thirdly, there should be another committee where my chiefs and the chiefs over there will be the apex committee and will also be talking, there is no way if everybody is talking, the youths are talking, the Emir is talking, the traditional rulers are also talking, do you think there would be problem?

From the above address given by the Etsu of Tsaragi, it is evident that he is more interested in peace than war. Even though he has been accused of being the mastermind of the crisis, the Etsu never made an indicting statement which could be used by anyone to substantiate allegation against the royal father. While expressing dismay over the incidence, describing it as barbaric, he said that he has never been able to use his official car with the inscription of Etsu Tsaragi since the crisis broke out. He however claimed that the crisis has been happening right from the country's return to democracy in 1999, adding that politicians took advantages to create problem as it was not like that during the military era. The Etsu noted that, in the past, the youth of the community were easy to control by the traditional rulers in their domain, as a small word of caution was enough to frighten them away from violence, unlike now when they take instructions from their political godfathers.

iii. Walin Tsaragi

He is a former commissioner for works and Agriculture in Kwara State. As a two-time commissioner and a traditional title holder, he remains in the position of a leader advocating peace. In an interview with the researcher, he narrated how he used his office as commissioner for works to mobilize water projects to Share against all odds. The step according to him was to build peace between the two communities, since the Share community was aware that the water works was facilitated by an indigene of Tsaragi. He was equally in the fore front of peace move, when he led Tsaragi indigenes on a peace negotiation visit to the Emir of Ilorin in his palace. These acts portray him as a lover of peace and a peaceful actor in the crises.

iv. Balogun of Share

He informed the researcher that as one of the high chiefs in the Share Traditional Council, on several occasions he was instructed by the King of Share, to lead the community's delegation to the inter-communal peace dialogue put in place by the two communities.

v. Spokesman of Tsaragi

As the spokesperson of Tsaragi community, he approached the media several times to make their position known with regards to the crisis. Even though he insisted that Government should revisit some of the recommendations of previous commissions of enquiries, his press statements were devoid of inciting statement and even called on his people not to take laws into their hands.

The violent Actors

Violent Actor 1

The actor by his behavior contributed to the communal crises between the two communities. The 2016 Judicial Commission of enquiry also attested to this position. Also from the evidence gathered from group discussion unfolded by the researcher, the area where trees were cut on 25th October, 2015 was a contested area between Tsaragi and Share. Albeit, the actor, a Local Government Chairman is supposed to be the Chief Security Officer of the Local Government, he never considered that before issuing a unilateral approval to Share community to cut the economic trees despising the resolutions of the joint peace and security meetings of Edu and Ifelodun Local Government areas in which (he) the chairman himself was a signatory to the initial peace agreement. His attitude in this view prompted Share Community to resume cutting of the trees precisely on 19th December, 2015 ignoring the resistance of Tsaragi community on 25th October, 2015. The development consequently led to horrific attack by the rampaging Tsaragi youths between 19th and 20th December, 2015.

Violent Actors 2 and 3

The actions of the Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) of Share and that of Tsaragi provoked the already tensed situation. This is because as DPOs, they are supposed to be neutral and seek ways of arresting the conflict as well as its perpetrators in their divisions, they however, assumed the role of a conflict magnifier rather than pacifier. This we found out was done in loyalty to their respective host community.

Even at the hearing conducted by the Commission of inquiry, the two DPOs did not hide their sentiments against the other community as they were seen attacking each other with offensive words and claiming that their respective host community is not guilty. The situation led to a confusing atmosphere making the court looks like a laugh arena when everybody burst into laughter. This type of professional misconduct between the two senior police officers is a pointer to the fact that they were part of what complicated the crisis.

Share and Tsaragi Youth

There are a number of youth from both communities that were largely responsible for the crisis in the area. Right from the first crisis which broke out in 1978 till the latest one in 2016 the youth were the major agent of violence as they were readily available to fight for their native home. Some of these youth even took community decision to their hand as they often neglect the advice of their leaders. This is evident in the interview granted by non violent actors 2 and 4. Further investigations revealed that actions of the following youth (their

names withheld but coded because of ethical consideration of the research) contributed to the crisis;

Violent Actor 4

From the interview granted to the researcher by cross section of Share indigenes, violent actor 4 was described as a notorious trouble maker who is readily available for any form of conflict. He was alleged to be in possession of fire arms during the dreadful crisis. However, he was recommended for prosecution by the Justice Sulaiman Akanbi's commission of enquiry as evidences against him were affirmed under the fire of cross-examination by the panel (KWJCI, 2016).

Violent Actor 5

Evidences before the Justice Sulaiman Akanbi's commission of enquiry show that (One of the Youth leaders of the All Progressives Congress) planned and masterminded the December 2015 crisis. Being a youth leader in a political party, he had possession and control of large percentage of the youths. The fact that he took his family to Bacita on 19th December 2015 based on evidences before the commission showed clearly that he had knowledge of what will happen on Sunday, 20th December, 2015.

Violent Actor 6

He was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms by the commission of enquiry (KWJCI, 2016). What will make a person possess firearm without due approval by constituted authorities if not for perpetration of heinous act, even if it is for self defense, a license should have been issued to that effect. Whereas, it is not even one arm, but numbers of arms, this shows the actor could not have been exonerated from the allegation of being a violent actor in the Tsaragi-Share communal crisis. The judicial commission of enquiry also found him guilty of playing a negative role in the crisis, not a witness of truth as he lied to be sick and was in the hospital during the crisis but could not tender before the commission any evidence of admission to any hospital.

Violent Actor 7

Another difficult nut hard to crack is one of the youth leaders of Share-community and was the immediate factor behind the 2015/2016 crisis. He led the Share youth in the cutting of the controversial economic trees of Tsaragi people. Findings reveal that there were efforts made by the elders of Share community to stop him from cutting the trees which proved abortive, as he resisted all forms of plea from the community elders. Violent actor 7 was equally found guilty of illegal possession of firearms by the commission of enquiry.

Implications of Share-Tsaragi Crisis

The communal crisis had far reaching implication on; intergroup relations, the larger society and the economy. The findings as supplied by government officials are in approximation but they could provide basis to show case the degree of threat facing development in the conflicting communities and the state in general, due to diversion of huge resources meant for other developmental projects to conflict management. Government mobilized finance for the military, police, judicial commission of enquiry and rehabilitation of victims of the Share-Tsaragi communal crisis. Large percentage of the said amount falls under security vote; an amount that is particularly devoted to state security under the discretion of the state governor as spelled out in the Nigerian constitution.

Some youths in Share-Tsaragi were found guilty of homicide before the Judicial Commission of Enquiry while majority have turned manufacturing of local arms as well as distribution and consumption of hard drugs to their job. The value system was equally eroded. A high chief in Tsaragi confirmed that in the past, youths listened and took instructions from community elders, but nowadays, it is the youth that dictate what to do for the elders, noting that most of them are either under the influence of fire arms in their possession or hard drugs (Respondent 3).

Studies show that although women are often not targeted in conflict directly as men, women experience as much mortality in the long run (Philips, 2000, Lawal, 2011). Women also suffered seriously from lack of maternal health care due to protracted communal conflict. Also, recorded in conflict times is significant numbers of rape, hence HIV and other STDs could be more pronounced. Reduction in individual opportunities and cutting down on potential actualization. When there is no peace, people can hardly organize any forum to discover raw talents or benefit from the grounded ones. Services such as tourism and transport were also affected. All these had devastating effect on government's agenda in Share-Tsaragi and it sought all human and material resources to arrest the repulsive condition. This step taken by government naturally cost huge amount of money that could have been dedicated to other developmental activities like hospital development, schools, good road networking, electricity and human capital development.

The exposure to violence and subsequent displacement left individuals psychologically disorganised. In some cases, the situation ended up in communal trauma. Some times when the heat of communal conflict is high, institutions of civil societies, family, community and inter-community links are severed and a culture of violence spreads. The obliteration of mutual trust leads to more opportunistic or predisposing causes that are more likely to make the conflict resurface in the future. The people of both communities are naturally waiting for another conflict day to revenge previous affront on their part or

loved ones. The impacts on children were severe, it led to poor socialization or loss of societal value and reduced educational opportunities, as it destroyed educational infrastructure, reduced spending on schools and teachers, prevented children from attending classes and some even dropped out completely because the disputed area is along the Community LGEA School where the conflict started.

Conclusion

As distilled from most of the interviews granted, the immediate cause of Share-Tsaragi crisis was the incursion of Tsaragi youths into Community LGEA primary school, Share, when some indigenes of Share were cutting down economic trees acclaimed to be of interest to Tsaragi people. With the interest premised on land ownership, findings revealed that the crises have oscillated from stage to stage, time to time, actors to actors, as well as different patterns and dimensions with negative consequences that have devastated lives and properties of the communities worth millions of Naira.

While, it is evident that the Share-Tsaragi crisis has recorded one of the highest number of casualties in Kwara state in recent time expressed in quantities of damages to lives and property, there exist some other damages caused to the psychological disposition of residents of these communities particularly women and children which cannot be quantified but ended up with far reaching socio-political and economic effects on the entire communities. It is therefore important for government and other stakeholders not to relent in organizing continuous inter-communal dialogue for residents of the two communities. The victims of the communal conflict should be properly rehabilitated to dissuade the mind of revenge or reprisal attacks. The violent actors should be adequately punished to serve as deterrence to others. Vital recommendations by previous commission of enquiry, particularly permanent demarcation of physical boundary should be implemented to restore citizens' confidence in reconciliation process. The Local Government functionaries and the traditional rulers should be included as members of commission of enquiries and reconciliation team. This strategy will give people of both communities some sense of belonging as they see their kinsmen in the peace building committee. The youth should be engaged by the state government through gainful employment to keep them away from violence. These recommendations when effected could go a long way to curb the recurring communal conflict between Share and Tsaragi.

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PUBLIC POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A FOCUS ON NIGERIA

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Abstract

The study examines public policy and development in Africa with a focus on Nigeria. It relied on secondary sources of data as veritable tools for its analysis. Findings revealed that while the state of development conditions public policy, the public policy process that is, formulation and implementation give direction to the development process. The gap of the study is that public policy in Africa and Nigeria should be people and development oriented. The study concludes that public policy is yet to bring needed development into Africa (Nigeria inclusive) that will meet the felt needs, yearnings and aspirations of their citizens because of the non-existent of certain institutions and classes. The study recommends that for public policy to succeed in bringing needed development into the entire continent (Nigerian inclusive) unrealistic goal setting, corruption and complex governmental structures should be done away with.

Introduction

The multi-faceted nature of development demands an equally multi-dimensional approach in handling. This is particularly true of African states which without exception are grappling with problems of development. The term development is preferred to underdevelopment since the former connotes a process while the later depicts stagnation. In Africa where the state is prominent but lacking in hegemony, public policy has been and remains a central approach to issues of development. Due to multiplicity of factors some of which are historical and some contemporary, African states do not possess the economic infrastructure capable of supporting self-generating growth and development. In much of Europe and America, revolutions started the process of modernity understood as development. Such major replacement of old orders with new ones completely changed the political, economic, social and cultural foundations of societies, including an increased tendency for outward expansion of influence (Janis, 2018)

The absence of a replication of those processes in Africa coupled with the non-existence of certain institutions and classes created a state and economy deficit in developmental capabilities. The state via the public policy instrument

despite its weaknesses is therefore perceived as almost solely responsible for giving direction to change and development that is capable of meeting the felt needs, yearnings and aspirations of Africa and all Africans (Janis, 2018)

Without succumbing to cyclical- reasoning, it could be argued that while the state of development conditions public policy, the public policy process that is, formulation and implementation give direction to the development process. In this study the cyclical process is examined and two concepts have arisen from it; in trying to grapple with the understanding of the concept of development in its total sense, there are structural and institutional differentiations that are embedded in its strict sense (Parsons, 2015) in this sense therefore, public policy is seen as a product of the condition of institutions especially of the state. Put differently, the nature of public policy of the state is a function of its level of development. Secondly, the nature of the state in terms of history, values, social make-up circumstance, resources, philosophy and ideology as well as sovereignty create the public policy process that in turn defines the direction of development (Parsons, 2015)

The leaning of this study is however on the second issue. Its main focus is therefore an examination of the potentials of public policy in Africa serving as a development instrument specifically. The objective is an examination of the public policy process in Africa, referring to the inputs and components as well as the policy conditioning factors operating in African states. The state of development in Nigeria and Africa is here seen as a direct result of the outcome of policy choices within specific circumstances (Parsons, 2015)

The study made use of secondary sources of data as veritable tools to understand public policy and development in Africa with a focus on Nigeria. The choice of this method was informed by the outstanding qualities and expert submissions that enhance efforts of findings and obtaining understanding of people's opinions and beliefs (leaders and the led) about how important public policy is in giving direction to change and development in any society of the world. The data for the study, therefore, were sourced from textbooks, published articles, newspapers dictionaries, encyclopedias, journals, internet, periodical, seminar papers, speeches and magazines.

Theoretical framework

The study used the modernization theory as its theoretical approach. The choice of this theoretical perspective is significant for this study because its propositions capture the various elements of development problems or challenges confronting the area of study. Modernization theory had its earlier apostle like Marx Weber whose thesis rested on the relationship between Protestantism and the development of capitalism and concentrated on cultural and psychological prerequisites of modernization. The other stream of influence runs from the thoughts of Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim to the

contemporary sociologists such as Neil V. Smelter and Talcott parsons. But the man whose theoretical postulations gained great currency in the modernization school has remained W. W.Rostow and his famous work, the Stages of Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto published in 1960. The book proposes a theory of economic growth as an alternative to Marx's theory of development.

For the purpose of this study, we will focus on the theoretical postulation of Rostow. This is because of its popularity in the modernization school and also the fact that some aspects of the theory have been used in the attempt by government in developing world like Nigeria to chart a path of development.

The major assumptions of Rostow's stages of economic growth are that the economic change and transformation of any society have both political and economic consequences for development. This period of change is divided into stages and it is in this that a transition from under-development takes place and which all countries must necessarily pass through. For him therefore, all societies at all times could fall into a particular stage of development. These stage categories are the mere traditional society, the pre-condition for a take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of mass consumption (Rostow, 1960)

He further posits that these stages are not mere generalizations of sequence of development of modern societies but they have inner logic and continuity that propel transition from one state to the next. Indeed, the stage-growth theory to him constitutes both a theory of economic growth as well as a general theory of development and modern society and history. The United State of America is shown as the idealized model of development and less developed countries are advised to remove social and ideological obstacles so that development could take place and transfer of western technology, rationality, values, ideas and cultures are seen as propellants to this course. (Rostow, 1960)

A lot of criticisms have been leveled against this theory by Andre Gunder Frank and other scholars but despite the apparent shortcomings of this theory, it has clearly shown that internal factors are responsible for the underdevelopment of the third world.

Conceptual clarifications

Two key terms in the topic require theoretical appreciation to define parameters with which the chosen variables are identified. These are public policy and development.

Public policy is defined differently by different scholars to suit their various circumstances and perceptions. There is however a point of convergence and consensus that is, the actions of government. Action here represents both action and inaction. What is done and what is not done by a government represents its policy. Kelly (2019) defines it as a proposed course of action with envisaged opportunities and obstacles. To Lynn (2016) it is the goal and

assumptions that underline government actions or guide such actions. These definitions have explained some important terms that give character to public policy. Opportunities in the first and goals and assumptions in the second definition imply expectations. Public policy is not directionless but it is driven by specific expectations. These expectations could have their sources either in the policy making and implementing machinery or from the society it seeks to serve. (Ripley, 2019)

The expanded role of the modern state has increased the scope of expectations from public policy. Beyond its traditional role of providing defense, the modern state provides welfare, subsidy, performs regulatory functions that is, law and order maintenance, and more important for African states, development and administrative functions. These varied functions deriving from goals and expectations are of varied consequences to those affected. The resultant consequence largely constitutes a measure of or the extent of success of public policy. It can be safely stated therefore that public policy on one level is defined as goals and expectations (Simon, 2019)

Secondly, actions implying public policy are a process, a long series of more or less activities or steps and not just a discrete decision. Lastly, consequences as mentioned in the discussion connote outcomes. The policy making process ends in outcomes which are the output of the formation and implementation structures in any political system. Cornea (2018) defines public policy as a purposeful course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matters of public concern. In summary therefore, public policy is the actions of government directed at particular goals and expectations and which produce outcomes. (Cornea, 2018)

Development according to Rodney (1972) is a social process and a social process that depends on the effort of a man to deal with his environment so as to take care of his social needs. It also indicates a high degree of role differentiations and specification.

In its physical and economic dimensions, development as demanded of public policy connotes balanced management of the economy in terms of resource utilization and provision of opportunities. The creation of opportunities here refers to several issues. The first being the provision of basic functional infrastructure which covers power and communication, housing and safe environment as well as security. Another opportunity revolves around issues of self-actualization, that is, human resources development and employment Lynn (2016)

A developed society or system guarantees human dignity and enlightenment as well as being one that addresses the issue of poverty, deprivation, exploitation, gross inequality nepotism and human rights abuse and marginalization. Economic development in its technical sense requires a sectorial complementarities and coherence with each sector filling its share of

the gross domestic product (GDP) and contributing to an overall economic equilibrium. It also involves high savings and investment level as well as trade, (Lynn, 2016). Development also has to do with the level of institutional differentiation and maturity of structures where there is little or no role duplication or clashes and where institutional organization is clear, specific and result oriented (Lynn, 2016)

Review of related literature

Clark (2018) views the policy making process as “ series of steps taken by government to solve problems, make decisions, allocate resources or values, implement policies and in general, to do the things expected of them by their constituents”. The process is complex and involves a lot of task that require a definite order to accomplish or to meet expectations. It is a process of goals, actions and outcomes. The process begins with goal setting which could be more or less clearly defined. In Africa there is emphasis on elaborate goal setting by the state in mostly multi-year development plans. In Nigeria, the pattern or process of goal setting is repeated each time a new administration comes to power. That is why Alkali (2017) remarked that public policies and development plans change about the same frequency as the regime change.

Kelly (2019) posits that usually development planning in Africa revolves around three models depending on the colonial heritage of the country, the type of planning used by their colonial masters and the specific economic and social structures in the state. At one end of the spectrum are countries that engage in detailed central planning of both the public and private sectors such was Nigeria before deregulation. In the middle are those that adopt a consultative planning method that involves both the private and public sector planning officials. The last model relies more on the private sector with government formulating only the broadest goals possible, this is called macro-planning and the deregulated Nigerian economy is moving towards this planning method.

According to Mendie (2019) the models can be placed on a socialist-capitalist continuum. Regardless of the exact model followed by planning agencies in Africa, they have often exhibited a tendency to set unrealistic goals that are frequently followed by failure and a decline in public morale. Hirschman (2019) observed that government decision-making can fit into any of these categories:

1. Where capabilities outrun motivation, that is, the technical solution to a problem surfaces before the problem becomes critical. In such a case, the goal envisaged are usually within the reach of the power setting it.
2. Where motivation outruns capabilities, this is where and when a problem becomes critical rapidly, in which case the outcome is usually failure. The Niger Delta consistent uprising is a case in point.

Anderson (2015) posits that planning and goal setting in Africa usually are of the second type which makes the policy process failure prone. Since motivation runs ahead of capabilities the tendency frequently is to have high and unrealistic goals (Mendie, 2017)

Hughues (2019) maintains that four reasons account for the tendency to have high and unrealistic goals. First is the intensity that accompanies political debate that leaves little or no room for moderation. Second, there is the tendency to be incomprehensive in goal setting leading to grandiose projects. Third, unrealistic goals are set because decision makers lack sufficient and reliable information on which to base their calculations. The information problem is caused partly by inadequate data gathering and partly by deliberate distortion of statistics for political reasons. The results of the 2005 census were largely rejected in certain states in Nigeria as a result of the distortion of reality. Lastly, goals are incorrectly set because of suppression of dissent. The tendency for African states, even those with democratic pretensions is an exclusive policy process. The scope and width of consultation is usually narrow and restricted to the government loyalists and the ruling party. This is what Janis (2018) called “group think”. He argues that where the social cohesion of groups imposes a dissent free atmosphere such that contradictory opinions are suppressed, policy makers are most prone to serious errors of judgment. The Buhari administration is notorious for such errors of judgment. For instance, in the area of security architecture overhauling, opposition party advises him to change service chiefs but he kept them for a very long time before he reluctantly changed them. Thus completely disobeying the three types of public policy which are the distributive, re-distributive and regulatory policies operating in Nigeria.

Difficulties in goal setting

The complexity and difficulty surrounding the setting of goals is replicated in many forms at the level of policy implementation. That is, the point of taking action. Broadly, we categorized them into those that are administrative in nature, the economic constraints and then the political problems of implementation (Drucker, 1969)

The administrative constraints encompass the numerous problems connected with the administration of development plans and specific projects. This includes long delays and inflation, inferior construction, uncoordinated projects and a general complexity and confusion owing to duplication of roles with all its attendant consequences. The explanation for this lie in three reasons:

First is the lack of trained experts to administer vital programs and projects which lead to poor project preparation especially in areas such as economic

feasibility and engineering supervision of projects. The second refers to the lack of political support from civil servants and bureaucrats especially when they see certain projects and programs as not directly benefiting their respective ministries. The third reason is in the causal ways African bureaucrats and politicians manipulate statistical data to conform to political requirements. For instance, committees in the National Assembly can pad the budget for personal gains. Equally true is the fact that in order to raise their monthly allocations, local government councils and members of state assembly in Nigeria inflate almost all the vital statistics on which such allocations are based (Bello, 2018)

Another crippling constraint of policy implementation in Africa is economic. The funds for critical programs and projects are scarce and unpredictable. In most cases, receipts are exceeded by expenditures. Even where some windfalls make new revenue available unexpectedly, increased needs will absorb the new revenue as fast as they become available. In recent time, the price of crude oil increased significantly above budget projection but no significant impact was experienced as regards government expenditure not to talk of now that the price of crude oil is far lower than the conventional benchmark. Attempts at increasing taxes to argument revenue and reliance on external aid only create more administrative problems that further add to the complexities of government business as it is today in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. (Bello, 2018)

Political constraints within Nigeria for instance appear to be most decisive though others are not by any means less important. These political constraints according to Clark (2018) can be subsumed under the phrase “the soft state” to him most African states are soft states to one degree or another. This type of state is characterized by corruption, bribery, kickbacks, arbitrary enforcement of the law, abuse of public office, embezzlement of public funds, impunity and non-adherence to the rule of law. For instance, Buhari’s Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) is accused of exercising selective justice, this is because while some corrupt political office holders are arrested and severely dealt with, others are allowed to go scot free provided they decamp to the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC). Political corruption of the policy process in Africa has had adverse consequences on the quality of life of citizens. In Nigeria, both under civilian and military regimes, the level of corruption has remained high and it remains a basic explanation for the concept of the failed state.


As the World Bank (2019) observes that, due to corruption, most laudable policies are frustrated by actions or inactions of corrupt officials in the areas of the provision of basic health facilities, industry, agriculture that will guarantee food security which is first in human hierarchy of needs,

education, and provision of portable water etc. The poor state of infrastructure especially roads is a function of deliberate misappropriation or outright embezzlement of public funds where supervision agents who believe in deceiving the public for personal advantage are bribed to approve inferior jobs.

According to David (2017) the failure prone nature of the policy process in Africa has been examined at the level of formulation which involves goal setting, the level of implementation and the impact on the lives of citizens. The last stage in the process which is the evaluation of outcome is also fraught with the same failure in most cases because the set objectives are not realized and so they do not add values to people lives.

Nachmias (2019) argues that in evaluating policy outcomes, African governments compound the problems of the first two stages by their inability to evaluate policies quickly and adequately so as to be able to locate mistakes and to remedy errors. To achieve this objective, the concept of feedback in the policy process which means any information about the impact of past and present policy choices useful in making new decisions about future policy directions is necessary. This is because as feedback delays and inaccurate, African states will not respond to mistake quickly enough to prevent them from causing adverse consequences.

In the process of public policy making, a number of phases are discernable. These include initiation or conception of policies, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. These processes can be represented graphically as shown below. (Dye. 2017)



According to David (2017) certain factors condition feedback in Africa, these include, the limited communication media which inhibits the free flow of information that is vital to policy makers in their attempt to understand their own societies. Poor feedback is also caused by the lack of autonomous associations and institutions that can work to obtain information about the

impact of policies on their members, to assess the cost and benefits of this impact and to communicate this information to public officials. The policy evaluation tools that are so familiar to officials in developed countries such as think- tanks, university research facilities and laboratories, and investigative journalism that are virtually unknown in Africa even the conventional feedback mechanism such as political parties and interest groups are fragmented, not trusted or ignored or controlled by the government.

There is a deliberate discouragement of multi-party system in most African states. Even where such exists, one two or three of such parties are strong enough numerically and financially to make any meaningful impact or challenge the excesses of the ruling party. In Nigeria for example, it is only Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that is acting as a check to the excesses of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC). However, Nigeria for instance, is a multi-party state but clearly lacks the political vibrancy that should typically characterize such differentiations in political expression. (David, 2017)

David (2017) concludes that the flawed policy process that lacks access to feedback on outcome has therefore failed to meet up the demand of development that will in turn meet the yearnings and aspirations of citizens by guaranteeing better standard of living as well as socio-economic and political development like their foreign counterparts.

Implications for development

It has already been observed that the role of policy in development is central especially given the circumstances within African countries such as the flawed and failure prone policy process however; the development challenge becomes difficult to meet. The situation is one of repeated policy failure which automatically translates to setback and stagnation of the development process. The development elites have constantly demonstrated the inability to make decisions that could induce development in the short, medium and long-run which prevents African countries from meeting up with the development pace of their counterparts in other parts of the world (Ake, 1985)

Our focus in this study as stated in the topic is Nigeria. To this end, an attempt will be made in this section to examine few policy positions in the past and present in some of the key points identified earlier as a policy process.

This examination will also try to highlight some development indicators as noted earlier with regard to the extent to which policy defines and directs such indicators and advance reasons why many policies failed to succeed in Nigeria.

Policy failure in Nigeria

Before Nigeria attained independence in 1960, British colonial government had no systematic plan for rural and agricultural development.

Olujimi (2016) asserts that the overall development policy was the extraction of surplus from the rural areas to meet imperial priorities. Rodney (1972) earlier on posited that capitalism was naturally interested only in the most profitable primary commodities. Aweto (2019) maintains that Nigeria lacks consistency in policy formulation and implementation as a result any policy initiated by a particular regime or administration is phased out at the exit of the regime. Ezedinma (2018) argues that the first National Development Plan of 1962 to 1968 in which agriculture was listed sadly emphasized commodity crop production. According to Olatunbosun (1982) the 1962-1968 and 1970-1974 National Development Plans showed interest in some devoted crops only.

Alkali (2017) maintains that since independence there has been a distinct lack of continuity in Nigerian agricultural policies and programs such policies have changed at about the same frequency as government. Some of these programs are: 1973 National Accelerated Food Production Program (NAFPP) initiated by the regime of General Yakubu Gowon. The 1975 Agricultural Development Project (ADP) initiated by the regime of General Murtala Mohammed. The 1976 Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) initiated by the regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo, the 1976 River Basin Development Authority as well as the 1978 Land Use Decree by the same Obasanjo Military Government. The 1979–1983 Green Revolution Programs (GRP) initiated by the civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari. The 1984 School to Land (STL) program initiated General Buhari regime. The 1985 Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) initiated by General Babangida regime, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) as well as the National Land Development Authority (NALDA) by the same Babangida regime.

It can be observed from the policies and programs enumerated above that as the government changes, agricultural program or project is phased out and replaced with a new one by an incoming administration. Thus, inconsistency in policies and programs, have constituted one of the major hurdles to development in all facets and spheres of our economic and social life in Nigeria (Olaitan, 2016)

The privatization and deregulation policy prominent in Obasanjo's administration can rightly be described as ambitious with very high goals. By 1999; Nigeria was settled on the economic course of privatization and deregulation. This it was believed to create the impetus for economic growth by freeing the energy of the private sector. Laws were enacted to repeal or amend legislation that inhibited competition or conferred monopoly on public enterprises in the petroleum, telecommunications, power and mineral sectors. Specifically in the petroleum sector, there was the liberalization of the importation of petroleum products, deregulation of the downstream sector allowing distributors and marketers to freely set prices in line with market forces. Given the importance of petroleum in productive and daily life, these

measures together with the strengthening of regulatory framework for the petroleum market were set to eliminate shortages that had impeded economic activity. This experience however did not yield much of the expected result (Mendie, 2017)

The realization of set objectives of the policy is rather low on account of several issues. The social and political setting within the country together with poor economic performance has crippled the privatization process which is replete with corruption and lack of transparency. Liberalization of importation of petroleum products is yet to be realized as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) still remains the major importer. Automatically, the second goal of deregulation has failed as government still set prices. This situation has created hardship, economic down-turn and strikes. Consequently, the price of petroleum products have increased and gone beyond the reach of the ordinary Nigerian thus increasing hardship and the number of the new poor (Mendie, 2017).

Adebayo (2019) maintains that policy failure in Nigeria also relates to the fact that policy choices are not borne out of the felt needs, yearnings and aspirations, desires, values and circumstances of those that these policies are meant to serve. They are also not borne out of careful thinking and sincerity of purpose with the intension of implementing them to the latter and in the best interest of all citizens. (Olatunbosun, 2020) Most times, decisions are taken with military fiat, under hot debate or confrontation without adequate understanding of what is required to solve the problem. Recent pronouncement on the Niger Delta problem indicates this scenario. Although the crisis has lingered for a long time now, successive policies have failed to address it completely. Mendie (2017) questions the credibility of the present master plan and road map in the Niger Delta. To him, a credible master plan should address issues of unemployment, education, road network, electricity supply, and a total commitment to the development of the entire region. Measures such as sending of Joint Task Force (JTF) such as the Operation Python Dance or whatever name they go by are described as belligerent attitude that is completely misplaced and will not solve the problem.

The recapitalization of bank in Nigeria is another policy issue worthy of mention. As a technical restructuring measure, recapitalization has stabilized the banking sector and improves services. This stability potentially can engineer economic productivity through the provision of investment funds. However, the general macro-economic stability that could guarantee this has not been sufficiently provided via policy. A recent fundamental economic stabilization measure proposed by the Central Bank of Nigeria was supported by the federal government for mostly political and power reasons. Although the merits of the proposal were still not completely ascertained, it was at least an attempt to look at the bigger picture. Macro-economic issue also includes inflation, under-

utilization of both human and material resources, and above all, unwillingness to access indigenous remedies for local problems. With predominance of the institutions of global economic governance in Nigerian economic management, her economic policy will remain symptomatic without real cure to economic problems. The Buhari administration's diversification policy into agriculture so that petroleum does not remain solely a major source of our national income, has failed woefully because the target groups who are the rural farmers are not adequately mobilized financially. Most times these funds are hijacked by politicians and bureaucrats. Also the lives and property of these farmers are not adequately protected for example, they are always attacked by kidnappers, herdsmen and boko haram, and killing scores of them, for instance, 43 of them were killed by Boko Haram in a single day precisely on the 29th November, 2020 in Borno state. The consequences of all these is that, there is serious hunger and poverty on the land hence many Nigerians today especially rural dwellers live below poverty line as reported by the United nations in April, 2021. (UJO, 2018)

The way forward

Public policy presupposes a distinction between private or corporate policy. Private concerns aim at making profits while the public aims at providing services. (IMF Website, 2020) In Africa with particular reference to Nigeria over the years, most of our public policies are neither people nor development oriented however; public policy can either bring or halt development. It is discovered that policy makers place high premium on personal interest over and above public interest while making these policies, this results into white-elephant projects that will not meet any need, programs are half-way executed and funds meant for them are cornered into private pockets for private use and the objectives of bringing development or creating an enabling environment by helping the people to help themselves is never realized. It is only a change of attitude by our policy makers where policies should be formulated and implemented with sincerity of purpose that will bring needed development to the people (Adedeji, 2018)

Conclusion

The main objective of the study is to ascertain the level of development or under-development in the entire continent of Africa and specifically in Nigeria as a result of public policy. Consequent upon the findings of the study the following conclusions have been drawn. The picture presented of Africa and Nigeria appears negative and bleak. Policy with potentials of creating and directing change and development has failed in this process because of the nature of the state and the nature of the policy process itself. The factors that condition policy are what enable or disable it. A certain correction of the flaws

in the process is therefore imperative. This is because public policy can bring development or mar it permanently.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the discussions involved and conclusion thereafter drawn, the following recommendations are hereby proposed:

1. For public policy to succeed in Africa and Nigeria, unrealistic goal setting should be avoided.
2. Public policy can bring development only with the existence of certain institutions and classes
3. All public policies should be people and development oriented
4. Public policy should be formulated and implemented with sincerity of purpose placing the Africa and Nigeria's interest over and above personal interest.
5. Corruption, inefficiency and complex governmental structures should be eliminated.
6. The nature of the state in terms of its history, values, social make-up, ideology, philosophy and sovereignty create public policy process which in turn defines its direction of development. Thus weak states in Africa (Nigeria inclusive) should be strengthened.
7. The slow state of development in Nigeria and Africa seen here as direct result of the outcome of policy choices within specific circumstances should be overhauled.

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**POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMMES IN NIGERIA:
PROPELLING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OR AGGRAVATING
POVERTY?**

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Abstract

Poverty Alleviation is the capacity of any government to empower its people in order for its people to have the capacity to make choices, participate in decision making and serve as agents of change in such ways that propel national development. However, this paper brought to light the implications of ineffective poverty alleviation programs on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. Some of which include the emergence of criminal gangs who are viable instruments for violence and armed conflicts, pervasive illiteracy, social upheaval, ethnic strife, anarchy and insurgencies. Qualitative technique was adopted and the findings from this paper was that one of the causes of ineffective poverty alleviation programs was grand corruption which makes nonsense of most of the government's poverty alleviation programs that trigger development in Nigeria. Corruption and the lack of understanding of the poor people's condition among the powerful political elites in sub-Saharan Africa makes the implementation of most poverty alleviation programs unable to bring about development. This paper therefore suggested that since corruption is a major cause of ineffective poverty alleviation that truncates development in Nigeria, there is an indispensable need for good governance that is serious and committed to curbing corruption at every level by being responsible and accountable to the people so that poverty alleviation Programmes can have more impact on the socio-economic development of the states.

Keynotes: Good Governance, National Development, Poverty alleviation, Poverty, Violent conflicts

Introduction

Nigeria is a country of paradoxes, tremendously blessed with a wide variety of abundant natural resources yet poor. Nigeria has an array of mineral wealth which are also some of the world's scarce precious gems ranging from

gold, lead, zinc, lime stone, oil/gas, marble, gemstone, amethyst, aqua marine, ruby, sapphire, soda ash-coal, clay, glass sand, gypsum, iron-ore, kaolin, uranium, manganese, phosphate, barite, dolomite, feldspar, talc, bitumen, coal, salt, diatomite etc (Brown & Stephen). Paradoxically, the citizens are poor in the midst of abundance. According to Awoniyi, Mufutau and Oladeji (2014) in 1999, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) declared that out of 182 countries surveyed using indices such as life expectancy, education, income and purchasing power, Nigeria was ranked 158th in position. In 2013, another survey was conducted among 186 countries using the same indices and Nigeria was ranked 153rd. This is far below her rank in 1998. Again, the UNDP in 2016 classified Nigeria as the 152nd poorest nation on human development index. By 2018 the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty rose to 86.9 million which represents nearly 50 % of its estimated 180 million population (Kazeem, 2018).

Over the years, successive governments in Nigeria have tried to address the problem of poverty through various programmes having identified poverty as one of the major obstacles to national development in the country. In a bid to tackle this impediment to development, the Nigerian government of various administrations embarked on different poverty alleviation programs such as Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) of 1976 under the military administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo, the Green Revolution of 1982 under the civilian administration of Late President Shehu Shagari, Directorate of Foods Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFFRI) under the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida, Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOUWIN) under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, the Seven Point Agenda under the administration of Late President Musa Yar'Adua, Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) under the administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo, up to the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) under the administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo were all attempts made by various governments in the country to curb the menace. However, instead of advancing economically, Nigeria has degenerated into one of the poorest countries of the world (Igbokwe, Ighodalo and Oteh, 2012) with more people becoming poorer every day.

In 1960, the poverty level in Nigeria was about 15% but by 1980, it reached 28.1%. In 1985, the poverty level was 46.3 but dropped to 42.7% in 1992. In the 1999 and 2000 UN Development Reports, Nigeria, rather than advancing had deteriorated further as 87% of the population was below poverty line and the country was rated 154 on the world's marginal poverty index out of 172 countries (Igbokwe, Ighodalo & Oteh, 2012). This development is extremely disturbing, considering the socio- political implications as well as the social upheavals that could result. The unwholesome phenomenon of poverty has become an internationally recognized challenge of the 21st century and has become a great concern to individuals, families, corporate organizations and

governments at all levels. This raises the question why the efforts made so far by previous administrations failed to curb the vicious trend of poverty.

Concept of Poverty

Poverty occurs when individuals do not have access to adequate shelter, water, food, amenities and services that could enable them to live and work effectively and to conform to customary behaviors in the society. Essentially, Poverty is a state in which a person is having insufficient spendable resources to maintain a standard of living deemed by international standards to be adequate Dauda (2016). Norbert(2005) reiterated this position when he stated that poverty is a condition or situation where persons or groups of persons are unable to access basic elementary requirements for human survival in terms of food, clothing, shelter, health, transportation, education and recreation. Yunus (2016) corroborated this position by stating that the poor are individuals or groups who lack or are deprived of food, shelter, health facilities and freedom to achieve the inherent potential of their capabilities, which determine their present and future existence and survival. He further reiterated that poverty is the absence of a certain level or at least a minimal level of affordability to health care, nutrition, sanitation, rest, shelter, literacy, intellectual aspirations, positive freedom, enjoyment, dignity and security. The totality of these values determines a good standard or otherwise

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopted the use of social exclusion theory to analyze the phenomenon of poverty alleviation in order to propel a clearer understanding of the issues involved. The pioneer of the social exclusion theory is Sophie Bessis (1995) and this theory emphasizes that Social exclusion is the consistently intentional effort in which individuals or groups are systemically hindered from having a chance to attain economic advancement that are usually accessible to members of a different group and in which are necessary for social integration within that particular group e.g. housing, health care services and political participation .Alienation resulting from social exclusion can be a consequence of an individual's low social status, family background or educational attainment. Essentially, whoever appears to deviate from the norms of a particular group can become socially alienated (Gans,1971). The resultant effect of social exclusion is that victims of social exclusion are obstructed from being fully involved in the socio-political and economic life of the society in which they are part of and therefore cannot benefit from the poverty alleviation Programmes because they do not belong to a higher social status based on social class, education or race. Social exclusion is ultimately an issue of deprivation of what other social groups have within the society and which are considered as rights and entitlements (Dauda, 2016).In the light of this, social exclusion sheds

light on a wide range of social inequalities. The factors connected to social exclusion range from exclusion from social institutions, debarring of some individuals or groups because of their low educational attainment, homelessness and poor social networks. Hence, this theory is relevant to this paper because it analyzed the reasons for exclusion and in access to basic requirements that enable individuals and groups to escape the poverty trap.

Causes of Poverty in Nigeria

According to Taiwo and Agwu (2016) there are two broad schools of thought to causes of poverty-Low economic growth and Market imperfections. The low economic growth is associated with increased unemployment and underemployment when the income of those affected may generally not be sufficient for them to maintain adequate standard of living. Market imperfection on the other hand has to do with institutional distortions which would not make for equal opportunity to productive assets. They include ignorance, culture and inequitable income distribution. The following have been identified as causes of poverty –Inadequate access to employment opportunities, Inadequate access to assistance for those living at the margin and those victimized by transitory poverty because of floods, pest, drought and war, inadequate participation of the poor in the design of development programmes ,poor maintenance culture or failure to retain and maintain existing structures, leading to deterioration in rural , urban and highway roads and township slums and drainages. They can be summarized below

1. **Environmental Degradation:** A classic case of this cause of poverty is readily seen in countries like Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia in Africa. Misuse or overuse of land which results in deforestation, desert encroachment and blight in an excessive shifting cultivation system of agriculture are destructive of endowed land resources, swelling the population of the poor as well as deepening the incidence of poverty. It is the same effect that oil spillage produces from mindless exploitation of crude oil
2. **Structural Shift in the Economy:** Inadequate macro-economic management policies usually result in an unwholesome shift in economic activity. Nigeria is a good example of such structural shift. Before the advent of crude oil, it was a well - balanced economy with five principal export commodities namely cocoa, palm produce, rubber, groundnuts and cotton. The country's structural shift occurred when undue concentration was given to crude oil to the neglect of agriculture which provides jobs for the rural poor. In the progress, the economy became monoculture while mass poverty became the lot of the rural sector, with the consequent rural-urban drift which also swelled the number of the urban poor. The south

East Asian countries (Malaysia and Indonesia) present good cases of efforts at preventing undesirable structural shift

3. **Inadequate commitment to Programme Implementation:** Much of the policies and programmes in the Development Plans of the 1970s and 1980s, in Nigeria for example, were not faithfully implemented even when the country did not suffer lack of funds. This failure contributed to deepening poverty. Specifically, the failure to adequately implement the Structural Adjustment Programme after 1990 worsened the lot of the poor, as this led to continued worker's retrenchment and general economic hardship
4. **Debt Burden:** In several developing countries of the world, the debt burden has grown to a crisis level and is assuming increasing importance as a cause of poverty. The major factors that escalated the situation in developing countries include mismanaged lending and spending, corrupt leadership, harsh conditionalities associated with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment policies among others. In such countries, the amount of resources used to service the debt (internal and external) is enough to provide some sort of socio-economic development. The aftermaths are that the productive sector such as agriculture, manufacturing etc are constrained leading to low productivity, low capacity utilization, underemployment and low purchasing power, thereby subjecting the masses to abject poverty. In Nigeria, it is reported that at the end of December 2000 external debt stood at 28.5\$ (about 80% of GDP). The amount required to service this debt annually is enough to hamper government expenditure for the provision of social and physical infrastructure for the poor. The World Bank reported in 2002 that "Nigeria's yearly bill on debt services had been in the range of \$3.0 to \$3.5 billion. The actual debt service outlay for 2000 was over \$1.9 billion, which translates to about 4 times the Federal Government's budgetary allocation to education and about 12 times the allocation for health". Except for the debt relief enjoyed in 2006, Nigeria debt burden was enough to impoverish even the generation yet unborn (Egbide, 2015).
5. **Uneven Global Resource Distribution:** One of the reasons responsible for poverty include the uneven distribution of wealth around the world, which sometimes results from differentials in natural endowment and sometimes from technological advancement and differences. While the developed nations of the West and Europe enjoy relative sufficiency because of their level of development and ability to conquer their economic environment to their advantage. Associated with uneven resource development is the structure of the economies of developing nations, which are essentially primary production, based in foreign trade orientation. Another major factor in the global economic system is the capital deficiency of developing nations, which constrains them in attempts to fully exploit and utilize their

natural resource. Much of natural resources needed for poverty eradication require huge capital investment, high technology and specialized personnel which are in very short supply in the developing nations. Chikeleze (2005) further emphasized the crucial role investment must play in poverty alleviation. He noted that a nation must divert part of its output away from consumer's goods to producer's goods. Its people must divert part of their expenditure away from immediate needs to savings. But unfortunately, the chronic poverty cycle makes the escape from this pit extremely difficult since people are more concerned with meeting their basic survival needs of food, housing and clothing with little or no thoughts for savings and investments.

6. **Population and Unemployment:** Another factor that contributes to poverty include high population without commensurate resources to sustain it. High population density puts a lot of stress on the available resources since a certain number of people are normally supported by a given quantity of resources. Anything in excess of a reasonable ratio automatically results in a sharp contest for the available resources and results finally in the emergence of a poor class that is the outcome of the struggle for limited resources. Usually associated with high population is the issue of unemployment which refers to the non-utilization of that part of the labor force which is available, capable and willing for productive employment while the unemployed members of the society is maintained from the earnings of the employed, they do not add to wealth creation. First they are part of the consumption group and secondly the society is denied their positive input to the economy in wealth generation due to lack of employment opportunity. The sharing of the available and limited resources between the employed and the unemployed spreads its thin over a wide area with each sharer having hardly enough to meet his or her basic needs. This is especially true with societies where kinship relationship is very strong with compelling responsibility towards one another.

Poverty Alleviation Programmes

There is always a saying that the only way a man can be emancipated economically and otherwise is not to give him fish but teach him how to fish. Hence, Poverty alleviation has been recognized as an important and sustaining aspect of any economy. It contributes in immeasurable ways towards creating new jobs, wealth creation, income generation and consequently poverty reduction in a nation (Obadare, 2016). Having understood the vital role of poverty alleviation in any nation, it has become apparent why the issue of poverty alleviation has remained at the front burner of government policies all over the world particularly in Africa (Fatile & Adejuwon, 2013). The fundamental reason for creating a nation state is to improve the living conditions

of its citizens. This makes Poverty alleviation a basic national objective with its core element as the continuous promotion of the welfare and standard of living of the people. In essence, poverty alleviation has been seen as a pre-condition for natural development. Hence, Poverty Alleviation is therefore the capacity of any government to empower its people in order for its people to have the capacity to make choices, participate in decision making and serve as agents of change (Ighodalo, 2012). On the other hand poverty alleviation is the gradual process of improvement by government that creates the platform or stepping stone for the poor to participate, contribute and benefit from growth. This implies that poverty alleviation policies and Programmes cut across sectors and regions and inclusive of the large part of the work force that poor men and women make up. Furthermore, policies for maintaining improvement such as those with the objective of strengthening institutional capacity, promoting democratic and effective governance should increase poor people's incentives, opportunities and capabilities for employment so they can be involved in and benefit from growth. Igbokwe-Ibeto, Ighodalo and Oteh (2012). Therefore, for any country to foster economic growth and development, poverty alleviation is an inevitable ingredient.

Poverty alleviation in a broader perspective refers to governmental designs aimed at tackling the wider causes of poverty. The first requirement is to identify the poor and their basic needs. These basic needs may be described as fundamental necessities which would of course, differ for different types of poverty (chronic or transitory), for different parts of a country, and over different periods of time. Poverty alleviation is one of the essential responsibilities of government especially one with developmental objectives whose aim is to economically empower the populace so they can satisfy their basic necessities of food, nutrition, health care, education, shelter, clothing, transportation and employment. Corroborating this, he further stated that poverty alleviation is a successive plan of action by any government which is broad based covering economic, social and other dimensions of poverty in an integrated fashion. Generally, poverty alleviation involves certain factors like

1. Economic component, to promote broad based economic growth and create employment and income- generating opportunities for both poor and non-poor but, perhaps, with the poor receiving special attention. Employment – generating projects may include labor-intensive public works projects and support for micro-enterprises (e.g. through credit) which are normally labor-intensive
2. Social services component to provide education, health and sanitation services, clean water, nutrition, physical and socio economic infrastructure, power supply, transport and so on. These Programmes are often targeted at the poor.

3. Safety-net component, to provide relief for the old, disabled and destitute and to provide targeted assistance to the transitorily poor.

Basically, poverty alleviation as an institutional arrangement is designed by government to improve the living standards of its citizens. Against this backdrop, poverty alleviation is also one of the instruments set in place to check deprivation and lack of basic necessities. This implies that one of the priorities of any government is to improve the living standards of its people. Beyond this they are specific action-oriented interventions that mainly benefit the poor. Poverty alleviation derives from the efforts or abilities of government to harness human and natural resources for the improvement of living conditions. It is the process and result of improving the wellbeing of the people, for all persons within the national economy, that the government is considered successful in its poverty alleviation Programmes. In spite of Nigeria's enormous potentials and beautiful alleviation Programmes by successive governments, the Nigerian governments have failed to live up to expectations in alleviating poverty. While high-sounding Poverty Alleviation Programmes have been a common phenomenon with each administration's assumption into power, the high rate of poverty still persists because according to Fatile and Adejuwon (2013) they stated that what accounted for this failure was because the poverty alleviation programmes were mostly not designed to alleviate poverty because they lacked clearly defined policy frameworks with proper guidelines for poverty alleviation. This has led to distrust of government's Poverty Alleviation Programmes by the people and sank the people into deeper poverty, unemployment and lack. Many Nigerians cannot satisfy their basic necessities because successive governments have failed in their poverty alleviation plans thereby making the people susceptible and vulnerable to hunger diseases and other health hazards (Ighodalo, 2012). However, poverty is not restricted to Nigeria alone, all over the world there is the issue of poverty but in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, the intensity is higher and it has assumed a frightening dimension.

In a continent devastated by famine, drought and diseases, the failure of successive governments seem to add to the litany of crisis besetting Nigeria. This is particularly alarming because imperialist penetration and exploitation of Nigeria have already done a lot of damages to the people. The attainment of independence in 1960 was expected to bring some succor to the people in terms of upliftment in their standard of living. But this could only have happened if people friendly policies were pursued and realized. This was not to be, as successive governments particularly under the military paid lip services to Programmes aimed at producing food and feeding the nation. The discovery of oil, dealt a serious blow to the structure of the economy as it relegated agriculture, hitherto, the main stay of the Nigeria economy to the background.

Poverty alleviation is one of the core fundamentals of any serious government as it enhances human productivity needed for development .In a society where poverty is low, the people can afford to satisfy their basic necessities ,human capabilities and potentials begin to expand ,brain drain reduces, people are able to make their leaders accountable to them, conquer shorter life span, have access to renewable resources needed for decent living and consequently bring about sustainable development. Sustainable development implies that sustainable development is the kind of improvement that satisfies the necessities of the present without forfeiting on the ability of other generations to meet their own needs and this is why poverty alleviation cannot be overemphasized because the success of any administration is the success in curbing poverty through its poverty alleviation Programmes and policies. Based on the above, poverty alleviation is the governmental processes concerned with human empowerment and cushioning the society to trigger development. It is a part of government's responsibility that seeks to enhance the quality of life of its citizenry by providing economic, social and educational empowerment in order to reduce poverty to its barest minimum. Its focus is to transform and develop innate potentials of the people for a lasting sustainable development. Unfortunately, the realization of this goal by successive government has been a mirage in Nigeria since political independence (Opaoluwa & Akanni, 2014).

It is generally agreed that poverty alleviation encompasses government's ability to achieve increase in productivity, increased employment and minimum acceptable levels for food, shelter, education, health, communication and improved housing. This implies that poverty alleviation involves the eradication of mass poverty, equitable distribution of resources and development of appropriate skills. Poverty Alleviation is a process of change or improvement involving transformation in order to reach a common set of development goals based on the needs of the people. It is usually a broad-based socio-economic empowerment mobilization so as to enhance their capacity to cope effectively with the daily tasks of their lives and with changes consequent upon this, the improvement of the living standards of the people on a self-sustaining basis. It entails a Programme of activities directed at increasing the efficiency of the people such that the youth output energy is released, quality of life and productivity are enhanced, education and sanitation are promoted while poverty propelling practices like forced child marriages are eliminated . Poverty alleviation is a planned change by any government for which a policy plan is adopted for improvement and/or transformation of the populace to bring about real development. This means that there must exist active collaboration between government and the people as only such a collective attempt can improve the quality of life of the populace and significantly reduce the rate of illiteracy, brain drain, malnutrition and rural-urban migration. Poverty alleviation requires

government effort in eradicating poverty through provision of infrastructural and social facilities that will improve the standard of living. The infrastructural and social facilities that will aid the standard of living include a myriad of complex large scale formal and informal organizations whether public or private that will accentuate higher employment opportunities (Okhiria & Obadeyi, 2015).

Poverty alleviation means a planned empowerment Programme of action by government through nationally formulated policies. This involves self-help through community mobilization and participation, technical assistance through a large pool of federally recruited professionals and integration of various specialists through a systematic approach to development. Therefore, for positive results poverty alleviation by government has to start from the people their needs and aspirations, the extent of their contributions and resources available. This will make for maximum achievement of planned Programmes. Poverty alleviation has many dimensions to it. It is basically the provision of infrastructural and social facilities that will promote educational access to all, employment opportunities, decent and affordable housing, affordable and accessible medical care, electricity, roads and access to mobile communication. The bottom line is that poverty alleviation are intertwined and dovetailed into one another which propels development. For instance, access to education aids employment and increase in industry, trade and commerce, open doors to roads, water supply, electricity, health services and telephone services. This simply means that the activities of one sector affects those of others just as products of one sector are useful to the other sectors. If a farm settlement is established, there will be need for farm inputs to enhance yields. There will also be need for a school where farmers' children or other worker's children will receive education, there will also be need for medical facilities for their well-being, and there will be need for a market where surpluses arising from their production will be sold to earn an income for the procurement of their other needs. All these will promote mutual and interwoven employment opportunities and consequently trigger development. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, the obvious outcomes or manifestations of poverty alleviation are not really felt and therefore poverty has begun to pose a threat to sustainable development and security (Igbokwe, Akhake & Oteh, 2012).

The goal of poverty alleviation is to achieve rapid increase in the nation's productive capacity with a view to improving the standards of living of the people. It is the promotion of economic growth and the provision of social amenities to enhance the standards of living of the population. Apparently, poverty alleviation enhances the quality of life and helps to permanently lift the people out of poverty. This suggests that poverty alleviation is also the strategic use of instruments by government such as education, economic development, health and income redistribution to improve the livelihoods of the people. It is the efforts or means of reducing the magnitude of poverty in terms of proportion

of the population living below the poverty line. This also means that it is a policy intervention of government in ameliorating the poor quality of the life of citizens. The contribution of government in empowering the societally vulnerable in a country is what poverty alleviation is all about. It can also be seen as a means to reduce poverty, improve equality and produce jobs (UNDP,2016). Poverty alleviation is a governmental instrument for triggering long –term economic growth and enabling the populace to live a better life. In the same vein, IMF (2016) sees poverty alleviation as economic support or policy Programmes that reduce poverty. They are prepared by governments especially in low income countries generally through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders. Similarly, it involves the strategic use of tools such as education, economic development, and health and income redistribution to improve the livelihoods of the people by government and or internationally approved organizations. It also seeks to remove social barriers to income growth among the poor. Poverty alleviation majorly has to do with means through which the government aims to revamp and reconstruct the economy. The high incidence of poverty in Nigeria has made poverty alleviation an important policy option. In addition, it is a set of socio-economic measures that are intended to permanently lift the populace out of poverty. By socio-economic measures we mean enabling the poor to create wealth for themselves as a means of ending poverty forever through infrastructure and skill acquisition that will enable the populace to be able to provide the basic necessities of life in which they will be able to live above a specified minimum income level. It furthermore means that it is the modes or strategies being adopted to eradicate poverty by government in a society. This suggests that it is more or less strategies or approach aimed at dealing with widespread poverty of a society. This implies that poverty alleviation are Programmes or methods that adopts education, provision of skill acquisition, food, water and health infrastructures and supplies to eradicate poverty and cushion development. In other words, these are socio-economic policies often used to promote economic growth that will permanently lift as many people as possible out of poverty (Taiwo and Agwu, 2016). Poverty alleviation means curtailing poverty through investment in education by government, provision of employment opportunities at all levels, provision of accessible health care services. Better put, it is the political will of government to provide housing assistance, affordable health care services ,promotion of local community entrepreneurship ,skills and job security .It is also more or less an eradication of poverty by government through creating good jobs, equality in educational opportunities for both men and women, raising the minimum wage, supply of loans and other financial services to the poor farmers and the unemployed ,access to health care services ,clean water and sanitation .

An Appraisal of the Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the poverty alleviation measures implemented so far have focused more on growth, basic needs and rural development approaches. They can be looked at from two perspectives; that is those in the pre SAP era and those in the SAP era.

The Pre-Structural Adjustment Programme Era

During this era, poverty reduction was never the direct focus of development planning and management. Government only showed concern for poverty reduction indirectly. For example, the objectives of the first National Development Plan in Nigeria included the development of opportunities in health, employment and education as well as improvement of access to these opportunities. These objectives, if achieved could no doubt lead to poverty alleviation. Similarly, the Fourth National Development Plan, which appeared to be more precise in the specification of objectives that are associated with poverty reduction, emphasized increase in real income of the average citizen as well as reduction of income inequality, among other things. During this era's national development plans, many of the programmes which were put in place in Nigeria by the government (either wholly or in association with international agencies) had positive effects on poverty reduction although the target population for some of the programmes were not specified explicitly as poor people or communities (Michael & Nathan, 2015). Some of such programmes are, the River Basin Development Authorities (RBDA), the Agricultural Development Programmes (ADP), the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS), the Rural Electrification Scheme (RES), and the Rural Banking Programme (RBP). Most of these programmes were designed to take care of such objectives as employment generation, enhancing agricultural output and income, and stemming the tide of rural – urban migration, which no doubt affected poverty reduction. Despite some significant degree of success made by some of these programmes, most of them could not be sustained. In fact, with time, many of them failed as a result of diversion from the original focus. For instance, the Rural Banking and the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme at many stages failed to deliver the desired credit for agricultural and rural transformation because a lot of savings were mobilized in the rural areas only to be diverted to urban areas in form of credits/investments. Other notable poverty reduction related programmes that were put in place in Nigeria before the advent of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) include Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) set up in 1976, Free and Compulsory Primary Education (FCPE) set up also in 1977, Green Revolution established in 1980, and Low-Cost Housing Scheme. Both OFN and Green Revolution were set up to boost agricultural production and improve the general performance of the agricultural sector among other things. These programmes made some laudable impacts;

they enhanced the quality of life of many Nigerians. But the programmes could not be sustained due to lack of political will and commitment, policy instability and insufficient involvement of the beneficiaries in these programmes.

The Structural Adjustment Programme Era

Conscious policy effort by government towards poverty alleviation began in Nigeria during the era of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The severe economic crisis in Nigeria in the early 1980s worsened the quality of life of most Nigerians. The government made a determined effort to check the crisis through the adoption of SAP. However, the implementation of SAP further worsened the living conditions of many Nigerians especially the poor who were the most vulnerable group. This made the government to design and implement many poverty alleviation programmes between 1986 and 1993. Also, under the guided deregulation that spanned the period 1993 to 1998, more poverty reduction programmes were put in place by government identified them as: The Directorate for Foods Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFFRI), the National Directorate for Employment (NDE), Better Life Programme (BLP), People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN), Community Banks (CB), Family Support Programme (FSP) and the Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP).

Government and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Nigeria

The first was the Farm Settlement Option introduced in 1960's. The intention of the Nigerian government was to develop both the export and cash crops. In 1972, the scheme collapsed but birthed the National Accelerated Food Production project. The projective was to create an avenue for testing and adapting agricultural research findings and making such available to farmers. In 1973, Agriculture Development Project (ADP) was established to provide credit facilities for the development of agricultural projects, in order to promote integrated rural developments. It was partly financed and executed by the World Bank, but became moribund after a brief spell. *Operation Feed the Nation* came on board in 1976 to arouse in Nigerians, the habit of cultivating food and cash crops in order to be self-reliant. It only succeeded in arousing the awareness of increasing food production without any appreciable increase in agricultural production. In 1977 the Rural Banking Scheme was designed to bring banking nearer to the people at the grassroots through granting of credit facilities. In addition the Federal Military Government in 1978 introduced Austerity Measures by banning the importation of some goods and placing others on license. Government expenditure was greatly reduced and emphasis was placed on the consumption of made-in-Nigeria goods. But the measures were relaxed in 1979.

In 1980, the Shagari government introduced the Green Revolution Programme. To realize this Programme, the River Basin Development Authority was formed to assist agriculture and farmers. However, there were many schemes put in place in 1986 by the Nigerian government to alleviate the suffering of the poor. Firstly, there was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), designed to put the economy back on the path of recovery. Nigerians were taught to look inward for local sourcing of raw materials. One of its objectives is to lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary or minimal inflationary growth. Later the *National Directorate of Employment (NDE)* was introduced which was targeted at the unemployed youths, to train and provide financial guidance. The sole aim was to provide employment, with emphasis on self-reliance and entrepreneurship. There was also the *Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI)* which was targeted at the rural areas. It was sustained through the provision of feeder roads, rural water supplies and rural electrification. DFRRI was formed for community development and social mobilization, community self-help projects, adult education, home economics, rural development, data collection and analysis, and the provision of rural housing and infrastructures.

In 1987, the government introduced the *Better Life Programme (BLP)* targeted at the rural women; the thrust of the Programme was self-help and rural development Programmes, skill acquisition and health care. There was also the *National Policy on Science and Technology*, meant to boost the development of indigenous technology. In order to give succor to the industrial revolution sweeping through the country the Federal Government set up the *Science and Technology Fund (STF)* and the *National Economic Recovery Fund (NERFUND)* in 1989. This was further boosted, same year, by the establishment of *People's Bank of Nigeria*, targeted at the underprivileged in the rural and urban areas, to encourage savings and to grant credit facilities to small businessmen and women. Community Banking started in 1990 to meet the rural residents' micro enterprises in urban areas through the establishment of banks within a defined geographical area to meet the yearnings of the community. The *Family Support Programme (FSP)* was another poverty alleviation Programme launched in 1994 and targeted at the families in the rural areas. It was supported with health care delivery, child welfare (Baghebo& Emmanuel, 2015) youth development. *Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP)* was another of the series of poverty alleviation Programmes introduced in 1997. It was targeted at the rural areas through granting of credit facilities to support the establishment of cottage industries.

The poverty alleviation Programme from 1999 was the *National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP)*. It focuses on the provision of strategies for the eradication of absolute poverty in Nigeria. NAPEP is complemented by the National Poverty Eradication Council (NAPEC) which is

to coordinate poverty reduction related activities of all the relevant Ministries, Parastatals and Agencies. The poverty reduction-related activities of the institutions under NAPEP have been classified into four - Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES), Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS), Social Welfare Service Scheme (SOWESS) and Natural Resources Development and Conservative Scheme (NRDCS). Since the inception of the civilian administration in 1999, the following policies have been adopted in poverty alleviation Programme.

- i. Trade and payment liberalization.
- ii. Tariff reform and rationalization for the promotion of industrial diversification.
- iii. Deregulation and greater reliance on market forces particularly in the downstream activities of the crude oil industry.
- iv. Adoption of appropriate pricing policies of all commodities and
- v. Adoption of measures to stimulate production and broaden the supply base of the economy.

Other schemes and Programmes that have been implemented in the past include the following.

- a. The People's Bank Programme (PBN) established by decree No 22 of 1990. It was designed to extend credit services to the poor.
- b. The Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), responsible for the rehabilitation and provision of urban roads, water, health facilities, educational materials and agricultural facilities.
- c. The Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Development Committee (OMPADEC) which provides development aid to the oil producing areas.
- d. National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) for the provision of agricultural infrastructures.
- e. The Nomadic Education Programme - to raise the literacy level among the nomadic groups.
- f. River Basin Development Authorities (RBDA) for the development of the basins of the country's major rivers.

The list has not been exhausted here but in all there are over twenty of these institutions and Programmes established by the government in Nigeria with a view to reduce the incidence of poverty. However, it is sad to observe that all these efforts have not produced the desired results as they have only achieved modest successes while the level of poverty still remain high. (Michael and Nathan, 2015). Several reasons have been given for the failure of these institutions and Programmes. First, the fact that some of the functions of these agencies and Programmes have been duplicated leading to unnecessary plurality of influences and interests. Secondly, in some cases, the implementation

agencies have been wrongly identified and as such roles and functions have been wrongly allocated. Thirdly, contended that in some cases, there is the non-existence of the right or appropriate implementation agencies thus creating gaps in the implementation trend. Again, there is the problem of poor management, poor accountability, high level of corruption and dishonesty, pursuit of parochial interests, poor staffing, incompetence, lack of commitment, among the rank and file of the workers in many of the implementation agencies (Ighodalo, 2013).

An Appraisal of How Poverty Alleviation Programmes Have Propelled National Development Or Aggravated Poverty

Poverty in Nigeria is massive, pervasive and chronic, engulfing a large proportion of the society (Uma & Eboh, 2013). In Nigeria, human conditions have greatly deteriorated (particularly in the last decade) with real disposable incomes dwindled and malnutrition rates on the increase. Aiyedogbon and Ohwofasa (2012) emphasized that the situation is more critical considering that in spite of the vast resources committed to poverty alleviation by every successive administration, no obvious achievement has been accomplished in this direction. Despite the various poverty alleviation programmes by successive governments, and the huge budgeting outlays attached to these programmes, the rural areas and the people have remained poor. Some of the features of this poverty are lack of basic social amenities, malnutrition, disease and ignorance. Dauda (2016) noted that grand corruption makes nonsense of most of the government poverty reduction programmes in Africa. World Bank (2001) noted that corruption and the lack of understanding of the poor people's condition among the powerful political elites in sub-Saharan Africa makes the implementation of most poverty alleviation programmes ineffective (Yunus, 2016). Nigerian successive government have not instituted adequate social security that could enable the majority of the people to live in conditions of dignity and be free from hunger. It is argued that all these problems resulting from policy inconsistencies, lack of political will, bureaucratic red tape, lack of transparency in business of government, lack of consumer oriented consultations in policy initiation or formulation, lack of capacity for policy implementation, obstacles arising from political and social considerations, poor leadership, inadequate support institutions and resources for policy implementation; all these are exacerbated by political instability and social crises. With these score cards, Nigeria will not be able to sustain a stable political system which would be supported by its citizens for accelerated Development, which means that Nigeria would not be able to offer the desired leadership expected in West African sub-region and Africa in general; and the central role as a development center and pole in international affairs would remain a mirage.

A number of factors have contributed to the failure of past poverty alleviation programmes and efforts. Some of them are:

1. Lack of targeting mechanisms for the poor: most of the programmes do not focus directly on the poor.
2. Political and policy instability: this has resulted in frequent policy changes and inconsistent implementation, which in turn have prevented the continuous progress of the programmes.
3. Severe budgetary, management and governance problems: these have afflicted most of the programmes, resulting in either uncompleted, broken down and abandoned facilities, which are most times unstaffed and unequipped.
4. Overextended scope of activities of most institutions resulting in resources being spread too thinly on too many activities. DFRRI and BLP, for example, covered almost every sector and overlapped with many other existing programmes.
5. Lack of accountability and transparency: these made the programmes to serve as conduit pipes for draining national resources.
6. Inadequate coordination of the various programmes: this resulted in each institution carrying out its own activities with resultant duplication of effort and inefficient use of limited resources.
7. Most of the programmes lacked vision for their sustainability.
8. Absence of agreed poverty reduction agenda that can be used by all concerned Federal Government, State Governments, NGO's and the International Donor Community.
9. Lack of cooperation among the three tiers of government.
10. Inappropriate programme design reflecting lack of involvement of beneficiaries in the formulation and implementation of programmes. Most beneficiaries were not motivated to identify themselves sufficiently with the successful implementation of the programmes.

Implications of Ineffective Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Nigeria.

Ineffective poverty alleviation Programmes in Nigeria has brought about unemployment and lack of quality education for children of the poor which has consequently forced many of them to work as laborers at the lowest income levels. Many of them engage in street vending and hawking. They hawk mostly small household goods, cheap clothing, drinks and water packed in polythene bags. Essentially, the inability of government in effectively alleviating poverty has led to low income experiences such as health and safety hazards, housing problems, material deprivation and others thus propelling them to venture into violent crimes. For instance, Dauda (2016) sees the emergence of the boko haram insurgency in the Northern Nigeria as an implication of the low impact of poverty alleviation. He noted that majority of the youths that really engage in violence and mass killings are those from poor backgrounds who had no opportunity to be beneficiaries of government's poverty alleviation

programmes and worst of all had no western and genuine Islamic education. They are mostly the children of poverty stricken illiterates with no hope for the future. In essence, the lack of impact and effectiveness in alleviating poverty by successive administrations has a lot of destructive implications that recommends maximum governmental and non-governmental efforts towards its eradication. These destabilizing effects of ineffective poverty alleviation by government impacts the individual poor, the economy and the society at large.

Conclusion

The purpose of every poverty alleviation Programme is to bring about national development and reduce the level of violent conflicts in the society as much as possible. However, the level of sincerity and commitment by the political class towards bringing an end to pervasive poverty determines how fast development occurs and faith in government is restored. In the light of this, it has become expedient for government to put an end to all its deceptions and lip service towards poverty alleviation Programmes to avoid looming annihilation and genocide.

Recommendations

1. There is need for the people as well as the civil servants and some government officials to change their value system, orientation and mindset with respect to public resources. If they see public resources as a vehicle to actualize governmental projects in alleviating poverty to its barest minimum instead of seeing it as a means or opportunity for self-aggrandizement, many of the poverty alleviation will have tremendous impact on the citizenry and consequently bring about a multiplication of industries and a reduction in poverty and its attendant consequences (anarchy)
2. If any nation is to alleviate poverty, there is need for its electorate as a matter of necessity to choose leaders based on ideology and sound moral and ethical principles and not based on religious or ethnic sentiments. Ideological principles usually stand the test of time than any other factor. Hence it is very cardinal that the electorate must be very mindful of the kind of people they elect as the leaders will determine either their destiny in escaping the poverty trap or being further consumed by poverty.
3. There is need for the eradication of unnecessary unofficial or unconstitutional offices that have no significant impact on the citizens but drains funds meant for developmental projects. An example is the office of the first lady as these offices on many occasions have been used to engage in white elephant projects, ostentatious living, revelry

and large scale corruption. If these is implemented, it will go a long way in cutting down waste and provide opportunities for economic development

4. The glorification and open display of sycophancy of corrupt leaders by the followers and the media need to stop. This vile and repulsive habits create narcissistic and sociopathic leaders who forget that they are servants to the people and so it gives some leaders the false impression that they are not responsible or accountable to the citizens who put them in power with their votes. Hence, they develop impunity and justification to engage in compulsive grand theft without caring about developmental and empowerment projects that will bring about a reduction in poverty.

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**POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY DOMINANCE IN NIGERIA'S
POLITICAL PROCESS (1999-2019)**

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Abstract

In any democratic society, political parties continue to play an important role. Since May 29, 1999, the PDP and APC have dominated Nigeria's political landscape. This study investigated the factors that contribute to a political party's dominance in Nigerian elections, as well as examined what has happened to opposition political parties within Nigeria's dominant party systems. Content analysis was utilized to assess the data acquired from secondary data sources such as textbooks, journals, and other internet sources. The study found that a party's dominance in the Nigerian electoral process is due to factors such as unequal access to state institutions (election management bodies, security agencies, and so on), financial resources, and the mass media. The ruling party has been responsible for undermining Nigeria's opposition parties since the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999. Therefore, opposition parties have utilized techniques such as co-optation, alliance, and cooperation in order to stay relevant in Nigeria's political process. Finally, the study recommended that, since the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have already prohibited the use of the military in elections, the National Assembly should establish new laws prohibiting the use of the military in elections in accordance with best global practice.

Keywords: Political Parties, Democracy, Election, Nigeria, Playing field.

Introduction

Political parties are an aspect of mass politics that was accompanied in the 19th century by the emergence of a representative government and the liberal expansion of the right to vote (Heywood, 2007). Until then, what was commonly referred to as a faction or parties were little more than groups of like-minded politicians, usually grouped around an important leader or family. What was popularly called court parties at the time was developed in autocratic

monarchies as a result of the struggle for influence among respected personalities and advisors.

In the late 1950s, around 80 percent of countries around the world were ruled by political parties. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the number of political parties declined due to increasing cases of military rule, especially in developing countries (Africa, Asia and Latin America). The emergence of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and military rule have led to the resurgence of political parties in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Political parties are important actors in modern politics today, so their contribution to democracy cannot be overstated. It is important to note that the absence of political parties is only perceived in political systems where they are suppressed by authoritarian rule.

Today in today's democracy, political parties are important electoral actors worldwide, not because of their roles or functions in any political system (such as representation, elite recruitment, goal-setting, socialization and mobilization, government formation, and the pooling and articulation of interests), but also because of the complexities Interrelationships between and between parties that are critical to the organization of the functioning of democracy. However, political parties can sometimes be democratic or authoritarian in their modus operandi, depending on how they seek political power. In some cases, political parties often seek political power through revolutions or elections. Over the years there have been various political parties with different ideologies ranging from right, center, left, or disavowed political ideology as a whole (Heywood, 2007: 272).

As a result, political parties have been heavily attacked by political critics for failing to articulate the new and more diverse aspirations that have emerged in modern politics and fail to solve the growing challenges of poverty and ethnic rivalry. Political parties have also been criticized for being hostile to military rule and economic interests within the state (Jega, 2007). However, the emergence of political parties in Nigeria dates back to 1923 when the Nigerian National Democratic Party was founded by Herbert Macaulay. Since then, various party systems have been introduced in Nigeria, ranging from two- to multi-party systems. Nevertheless, since Nigeria's return to democratic rule on May 29, 1999, Nigeria has adopted a multiparty system with one dominant party.

By and large, Nigeria is currently enjoying the longest period of democratic rule since its independence in 1960. However, one major source of concern among political experts and election stakeholders has been the single-party domination style that has characterized the Nigerian electoral process and resulted in a winner-take-all democracy. Against this background, this study seeks to investigate the factors that favor one-party dominance in the Nigerian

electoral process as well as examine what has happened to the opposition political parties within the dominant party systems in Nigeria since 1999.

Theoretical Framework

There are several theories for studying political parties and the political process in democratic literature. One of the notable theories about political parties and political processes that tries to address the shortcomings that characterized orthodox theories of political parties and the political process such as elite theory, group theory, Marxist theory, to name a few, is the political parties theory developed by Bawm Cohen, Karol, Masket, Noel, and Zaller, (2012). Bawm et al. (2012) developed a theory of political parties in which political parties are viewed in the prism of interest groups and activists who are the main actors, and coalitions of groups have developed common agendas and candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas.

It is important to note that the theoretical stance of Bawm et al. (2012) differs greatly from leading theories such as elite theory, group theory, and Marxist theory, in which political parties are controlled by electoral political gladiators. According to Bawm et al. (2012) their theory of political parties is important because parties that are dominated by interest groups and activists pay less attention to voter preferences and even exploit the voters' lack of attention in politics (Bawm et al. 2012: 571). The theory of political parties by Bawm et al. (2012) is less important for this study, however, as it is unable to explain, prescribe, and predict why democracies have failed to provide equal leeway to political candidates. It is against this backdrop; this study adopts the uneven playing field theory from Levitsky and Way (2010).

Levitsky and Way (2010: 57) note that an uneven playing field describes itself as a political system in which the incumbents (the ruling parties) are unlikely to resort to electoral violence or fraud to retain political power, but the electoral playing field in a that it will be difficult for the opposition parties to compete cheaply on a fair electoral basis (DeJager &Meintjes, 2013). Levitsky et al. (2010) postulate once again that the uneven playing field is characterized by a political system in which the ruling party manipulates the electoral process in such a way that discrepancies arise with regard to access to resources, media or state institutions, which makes it difficult for opposition parties to get involved organize and compete for political office (Levitsky et al, 2010: 57).Greene (2010: 24) argued in his contribution that ruling political parties will continue to win every election under the unequal conditions because they have direct access to state resources, media and state institutions, which they withhold from opposition political parties. This weakens the opposition parties.

The unequal playing fields theory developed by Levitsky et al (2010) was used by Greene (2010), De Jager et al (2013), Akor and Momoh (2017) in their study of single party dominance in Mexico, South Africa and Botswana, in

which they explain how state institutions such as electoral administration bodies, governmental media, police, military and other security agencies have been used by the ruling party to conduct elections that, in most cases, distort the electoral process in favor of the ruling party's electoral process in order to dominate the Uphold ruling parties. Hence, this theory is important for this study as it explains how past and present ruling parties since Nigeria's return at the 29th process to maintain and maintain their dominance in Nigeria's political process, creating an uneven playing field for candidates (political parties).

Conceptual Review: Political Party and Faction

Edmund, Burke (1790; 1968) described a party in the late 18th century as a group of men who agreed on a certain principle that everyone agreed on. According to Heywood (2007: 272), a political party is defined as a group of people organized with the aim of gaining government power through elections or other means. Again, Heywood (2007) identified four distinctive features that distinguish political parties from interest groups or social movements by including: they run and win elections to form a government or win a political platform; they are organized bodies with formal membership in possession of a card; they have a broad subject and focus on addressing each area of government policy; it combines common political preferences and a broad ideological identity.

According to Lunch et al. (2017: 312) a political party is a group of like-minded people who seek to achieve their common goals by running candidates in elections and thus being appointed to public office. Furthermore, Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1991) define a political party as an association of people who have similar views about what the social and economic priorities of a community or society should be and who come together to set those priorities by taking control of it attain the machinery of government (Derbyshire et al 1991: 139). Bawm et al. (2012: 571) see political parties in the context of the United States as a coalition of interest groups and activists who try to win over and use the government for their respective goals, which range from material self-interest to high-minded idealism.

By and large, political parties are seen as a coalition of pressure groups and activists whose ultimate goal is to run and win elections in order to form a government. The term faction is usually used pejoratively, while fractionalism is often used pejoratively, suggesting debilitating power struggles. In the past, the terms party and faction were used synonymously in the literature on democracy research. Today the word faction is often used to denote a section or group within a larger formation, usually a political party. Factions are often stable and permanent, and sometimes have formal organization and membership, weapons and organizational status compatible with those of their host party. In this case, a faction is viewed as a party within a party (Heywood, 2007).

Literature Review: Political Parties and Political Process

Over the years academics and scholars have carried out various researches on democracy and party politics. For example, Good (2010) examined General Ian Khama's presidency in Botswana through militarization. Meintjes and Jager (2013) examined the nature of winners, losers, and the playing field in southern African democracy. Similarly, Dode (2010) examined the prospects of political parties in consolidating Nigerian democracy. However, an early study by Eldersveld (1964) also examined the behavioral analysis of political parties. While Dudley (1968) examined the role of parties in northern Nigeria. Omotola (2009) questioned the relationship between Nigerian political parties and political ideology. However, less emphasis has been placed on factors that promote one party's dominance in the Nigerian electoral process and a critical analysis of what has happened to the opposition political parties within the dominant party systems in Nigeria since 1999, using the theory of Levitsky and Way (2010) an uneven playing field.

The study by Panebianco (1988) examined the organizational structure and the balance of power among political parties. Pulzer (1967) examines the nature of political representation and elections in Great Britain. Randall and Lars (2002) examined the institutionalization of parties in new democracies. In her study, Scarrow (2000) examined the concept of affiliated political parties in the context of party organization in a changing electoral environment. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding factors that promote a party's dominance in the Nigerian electoral process and a critical analysis of what has happened to the opposition political parties within the dominant party systems in Nigeria since 1999, using Levitsky and Way (2010) theory of an unequal playing field.

Simbine (2002) examined the role of political parties in securing democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Here, too, Simbine (2003) examines the participation of women in political parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic with a focus on the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Sklar (2004) examined the power of Nigerian political parties in an emerging democratic state in Africa. However, these scholars explain the factors that promote one-party dominance in the Nigerian electoral process and explain what has happened to the opposition political parties within the dominant party systems in Nigeria since 1999, using the unequal playing field theory of Levitsky and Way (2010). Inokoba and Zibima (2014), in their study of the militarization of the Nigerian electoral process and the political disempowerment of Nigerian women, examined the role of electoral violence as a restrictive and militant factor against the active participation of Nigerian women in the country's electoral politics. Orji (2015) assesses the 2015 parliamentary elections in Nigeria by examining critical issues that influenced the conduct of the elections and the critical post-election questions raised by the election results. However, the studies by Inokoba and Zibima (2014) and Orji (2015) do not examine the various factors

that promote a party's dominance in the Nigerian electoral process and do not explain what has happened to the opposition political parties within the dominant party systems in Nigeria since 1999 using Levitsky and Way (2010) theory of an unequal playing field.

Page and Tayo (2018) examined the playing field ahead of the Nigerian elections, assessing the prospects of the two main parties, reviewing future presidential candidates, assessing the readiness of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and examining how social media and new social movements could promote the election influence. Saka and Amusan (2018), however, argued in their study of the politics of the coalition of opposition parties and the struggle for power in the parliamentary elections in Nigeria 2015 that the party politics in Nigeria from 1999 until the parliamentary elections in 2015 was almost dominated by the then political space ruling People's Democratic Party, PDP. They argued that the united front presented by the opposition elements under the banner of the nascent All Progressive Congress was instrumental in the change of ruling parties at the national level that Nigeria experienced in 2015. Against this background, this study would like to make a contribution to body of literature on party politics.

Classification of Political Parties

Over the years, scholars and researchers alike have attempted to classify political parties into various categories. For instance, Gunther & Diamond (2003) Political scientists have created typologies and models of political parties in an attempt to capture the basic characteristics of the partisan groups under study. As a result, today's literature is filled with many types of parties, some of which have become 'classics' and have been used by scholars for decades. One of the leading scholars who have attempted to classify political party was Maurice Duverger (1954) who attempted to differentiate what he called "Cadre Parties", that consist of individuals within the high echelon of the society, and he termed the second type of party as the "Mass Party", which consist of large segment of the society. Again, he identified the third type of political party as the "Devotee Party"; which its leadership consist of individuals with charismatic qualities. Kirchheimer (1966) advanced four types of party models, namely Bourgeois parties, Class-Mass parties, Denominational mass parties and Catch-all people's party. Katz and Mair (1995) identified what they called the Cartel Party in which public financing of political parties and the expanded role of the state, induce parties to seek primarily to perpetuate themselves in power and avail themselves of these resources.

Ugo (2000) cited in Adebayo (2006: 64) classified the formation of political parties in Nigeria into the first generation of political parties that is the pre 1945 parties such as Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM) formed in 1923 and 1936 respectively. The

second-generation political parties emerged between 1945 and the end of the first republic such as National Council of Nigeria Citizen, (NCNC) the Northern People Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG), the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU). The third generations of political parties were the parties of the second republic (1979-1983). The fourth generation of political parties is from 1999 till date.

However, Gunther and Diamond (2003) identified 15 different variants of political parties and categorised them into three broad groups based on; the nature of the party organisation, whether it is elite based or mass based; the programmatic orientation of the parties, whether they are ideological or clientele oriented and their behavioural norm whether pluralistic and democratic or hegemonic in viewpoint and procedure. Van De Walle and Butler (2007) in their submission have identified three types of parties in Africa's emergent democracies. First are political parties that survived the transition from the single party period to the multiparty era and still continue to play important role in politics in their various countries. Prominent among these parties are the United National Independence Party, (UNIP) in Zambia and the Kenya African National Union, (KANU) in Kenya. The second type of political parties are what van De Walle and Butler regarded as historic parties. These types of political parties that have been established for years and have entered a period of dormancy only to re-emerge at the dawn of the third wave. The third categories of political parties identified by van De Walle and Butler are the new parties that emerged in the course of the third wave of democratic transition in Africa.

By and large, in recent years political parties' formation especially in Nigeria are defined relation to their organisation than of functions, with shows that emphasis is placed on the structural requirements for political party registration such as national outlook and spread, internal organisation, recognition and registration by INEC (Danjibo & Ashindorbe, 2018).

Party dominance and Nigeria's Political process

Since Nigeria's return to democratic rule on May 29, 1999, politics at all levels of government has been dominated by the ruling party, leaving the opposition parties with little democratic leeway. Several factors have also been put forward for this mismatch in Nigeria's political process. First, the unequal access to election management in this context is the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Under Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended in 2011) provided for the appointment of the chairman and members of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

Pursuant to Section 154 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In exercising his power to appoint the chairman or member of the INEC, the President declares that the President will consult the

Council of State and will require reappointment confirmation by the Senate. However, the structural weaknesses of the INEC in managing and conducting elections in Nigeria, particularly under the current democratic dispensation, were captured by Ekweremadu (2011), who rightly noted that the recurring pattern of electoral violence was found in most elections in the Fourth Republic. One clear indication of Nigeria is that voters have lost confidence in the ability of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct free, fair and credible elections in the country (cited in Momoh 2017: 25-26).

One of the effects of the appointment of the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on Nigeria's political process is to give the executive the power to influence the decisions of the head of the electoral empire according to their political interests. This will largely reveal the political process in favor of incumbents. Second, the use of security agencies, particularly the military, in holding elections. In addition, security is essential to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections. From the basic security of the voters at rallies and election campaigns to the protection of the result forms, the entire electoral process is characterized by security considerations. Security is critical in protecting electoral staff, locations, and processes; to ensure that voters carry out their civil duties without fear or hindrance; in creating a level playing field for all political parties and candidates seeking support; in protecting domestic and foreign observers in the performance of their duties and obligations and in maintaining the overall integrity of democratic and electoral processes (Agoha, 2015).

Moreover, the use of the military in holding elections in Nigeria has been heavily criticized in various forums for always showing the electoral process in favor of the incumbent (Momoh, 2020). This claim is supported by Onapajo (2014) who alleges that the incumbent in Nigeria influenced the election results against the will of voters in his favor on several instances, particularly during the holding of elections between 2007 and 2011. He added that the incumbent could do this through government sponsored electoral violence backed by Nigerian security agencies. For example, the 2014 gubernatorial elections in Ekiti or Osun are a classic case of explaining the use of security authorities; the military in particular when conducting elections can undermine the electoral process.

Also, there are various court rulings by the Federal Court of Justice and the Higher Regional Court that described it as a deviation from the core principles of a democracy that is based on the principles of political equality, participation and representation. The use of government funds to fund elections in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon. Elsewhere in Botswana, government funding for political parties, particularly the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), is not a new phenomenon. Ntuanne, (2012) rightly stated that the BDP seemed open-minded before the presidency of Khama (introduction of state

funding for political parties) and is now more inclined to support that the ruling BDP has the state funds to finance its rallies, Campaigns and Programs. In Nigeria, the use of state funds to finance party meetings and election campaigns is not a new phenomenon, but has been a phenomenon since Nigeria's return to democratic rule on May 29, 1999. This has left the political process in favor of the incumbents and opposition parties.

The 1999 Constitution, the Election Act passed in 2010, and the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) provide clear guidelines on campaign funding in the country. None of these legal frameworks provide for public funding for political parties; In fact, they prohibit donations from companies in the country as well as from individuals and corporations abroad. To ensure effective administration of campaign finances, electoral law limits the amount of money candidates and their parties can receive in the form of contributions from individuals or groups of people during the campaign. Sections 88-93 of the Election Act regulate campaign financing. Section 91 (2) (3) of the Act sets a cap on campaign spending for presidential and governorate candidates of N 1,000,000,000 and N 200,000,000, respectively. In addition, Section 91 (9) of the Act states that no individual or other entity can donate more than one million naira to a candidate. Section 38 (2) of the CAMA also expressly prohibits companies from making donations or donations of their property or funds, directly or indirectly, to political parties or political associations or for political purposes. Electoral Act 2010 as amended in 2011 (cited in Hassan & Yusuf, 2015, 10).

Over the years, especially during the election campaign, political parties do not have access to state-owned media such as radio and television stations, even in Nigeria's democracy. This is because opposition parties are often limited to access to state-owned media facilities. In some situations where they are given access, opposition parties are typically charged higher fees or are completely denied access to broadcast their programs. In countries like Botswana, political parties do not have equal access to the media (Akor et al. 2017). State-controlled media are perceived as an appendage or mouthpiece for the ruling party and with planned reporting to the opposition parties.

In a related development, Ntuane (2010) posits that in Botswana democracy, reporting on political events or programs of opposition parties by the state media is often rejected, even if such political events or programs promote national unity (Meintjse & Jager, 2013). In addition, the restriction on private media facilities was tightened by the Media Practitioners Act of 2009. The situation in Nigeria is not much different, as both Botswana and Nigeria operate a dominant party system that tends to show similar characteristics when it comes to the state's attitude of its own media towards the opposition parties. Although the passage of the Freedom of Information Act by the Parliament of Botswana in 2011 is a right in the right direction and the Freedom of

Information Act in 2015 by the National Assembly in Nigeria changed little or nothing to the disposition of the ruling parties to opposition parties.

The introduction of the constituency-based First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system is a major obstacle for opposition parties in Nigeria. This system was beneficial to the ruling party as it gave ruling parties the opportunity to acquire a significantly larger proportion of seats in the National and State Houses of Assembly. Holm (1996) argues that opposition parties under the first-the-post system (FPTP) are unlikely to win an election because it weakens opposition parties by delimiting constituencies, especially when opposition parties have more support (cited in Meintjes et al 2013). This first-past-the-post system (FPTP) can remain in place, however, as the delimitation commission, which often re-evaluates these constituencies every 10 years and increases them, if necessary, recommendations are static as the parliament does not provide for discussing its decision.

Opposition Parties and Democracy in Nigeria

The decline in the role of opposition political parties in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, has attracted academic attention in recent years (Akor et al. 2017). However, less emphasis was placed on how opposition parties managed to survive in Nigeria in the context of the dominant party systems that shaped Nigerian democracy. The ruling parties that have ruled Nigeria since 1999-2015 (Peoples Democratic Party) and 2015 until today (All Progressive Congress) are responsible for weakening the opposition parties in Nigeria. The inability of opposition parties to form an alliance to produce a consensus candidate has further aided the APC's dominance in Nigerian democracy compared to the pre-2015 general election, which saw a significant number of opposition parties form an impressive alliance in the presidential election to be won in 2015. In addition, the divided nature of the opposition parties in Nigeria greatly helped the ruling All Progressive Congress party, particularly in the 2019 general election, although the overall popularity of the APC declined ahead of the 2019 general election and seats in the states and in the National Assembly as the votes of the Opposition parties remained divided among many candidates.

The democratic stability that Nigeria has enjoyed since 1999, despite all these challenges facing the opposition parties in the country, the opposition parties probably embody the spirit of sportiness, despite the unequal framework conditions that shaped the democratic area of Nigeria. Regardless of the fact that the opposition party can win the parliamentary elections in Nigeria, it must convince citizens that it has the ability to change the country, especially in the face of the current socio-economic and political challenges afflicting the country. It is also noteworthy that opposition parties also adhere to democratic rules in most political competitions in many African countries (Meintjes & Jager, 2013). This was made possible in particular in situations in which

opposition parties felt marginalized in political competition and their supporters often incited protests (Meintjes & Jager, 2013).

Yet despite the structural imbalance in Nigeria's political system, which has severely hampered the opposition parties, it is somehow a way out, as Meintjse and Jager (2013) rightly state that even under the current circumstances it has been shown that the opposition could take their seats as well in the states as well as in the National Assembly, if they could work together in the elections. Again, Meintjse and Jager (2013) added that cooperation between opposition parties does not allow them to split their votes. In their opinion, this can be achieved through an electoral pact in which the entire opposition nominates one opposition candidate per constituency.

Saka et al. (2018) have argued, however, that the attempt to negotiate a coalition prior to the elections for a few years in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria in 1999 that included AD, ANPP and a breakaway faction of the PDP came in the period leading up to the 2007 general election does not materialize. In the same way, talks on a united front through an alliance ahead of the elections between the then Congress of Action of Nigeria, ACN and the Congress for Progressive Change, CPC, towards the 2011 general election might not see the light of day.

Here, too, Saka et al. (2018) argues that there are cases where political parties in the Fourth Republic were involved in forming an alliance before the elections, and the outcome has been rewarding. For example, the All Peoples Party, APP, and then Alliance for Democracy (AD) merged as the 1999 presidential election drew near. The result of the alliance between these parties enabled the AD to spawn the Presidential Flag Bearer (Chief Olu Falae) while the APP elected the Vice President (Umaru Sinkafi). Similarly, the AD formed an alliance with the PDP to support former President Obasanjo's bid for re-election in the 2003 general election by not presenting a candidate for election. In return, the PDP protects the interests of the AD and ensures the re-election offers of the party governors in the six southwestern states.

The political and economic elites have also played an important role in funding the governing parties in Nigeria since 1999. The motive behind it, however, was to pursue her personal interest, either to get a contract or to get an appointment. In order for the opposition parties to remain relevant in Nigeria's political process, they have adopted strategies such as co-optation, coalition and cooperation. For example, in recent years in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, opposition parties have formed a coalition or alliance in accordance with Nigeria's 2010 Electoral Act, which provides for steps that must be considered legal prior to a merger of the parties and registration of the product of the merger, Section 84 (1) of the Electoral Act 2010 provides that: "*Any two or more registered political parties may merge on approval by the Independent National*

Electoral Commission following a formal request presented to the Commission by the political parties for that purpose”(cited in Saka et al 2018: 209).

In addition, the law also provides that political parties that intend to merge must notify the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of their intention 90 days before the parliamentary elections. A written request for merger is then sent to the chairman of the commission and is jointly signed by the national chairman, secretary and treasurer of the various political parties proposing the merger and accompanied by the following: (a) A Special resolution of the national convention any of the political parties proposing a merger to approve the merger; (b) the proposed full name and acronym, statute, manifesto, symbol or logo of the party together with the addresses of the national office of the merged party; and (c) proof or payment of administrative expenses of N100,000.00 or as may be determined from time to time by law of the National Assembly (Saka et al. 2018: 210).

Co-opting, coalition and cooperation between the political parties in Nigeria especially ahead of the 2015 general election after an extensive series of consultations between the partners in the merger agreement on February 6, 2013 namely; the Congress of Action of Nigeria (ACN); the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) have announced the formation of the All Progressive Congress (APC) in accordance with all the requirements for formalizing the merger set out in the Electoral Act, as amended in 2010 On July 31, 2013, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) approved the merger of the parties under the name All Progressive Congress (APC), which ended the dominance of the PDP in the democratic region of Nigeria after 16 years of dominance.

Conclusion

Democracy in Nigeria under the current democratic dispensation is characterized by one form or another of individual party dominance. This study therefore examines the factors that favor a party's dominance in the Nigerian electoral process. It was found that the ruling parties in the democratic process in Nigeria have maintained their dominance over the country's political processes over the years due to the ruling party's access to state institutions such as the military and other security forces, the electoral administration body (INEC), state-owned media and government funding, which confirms Levitsky and Way (2010) theory of an unequal playing field. This study argued that because of these advantages enjoyed by most of the ruling parties in Nigeria since 1999 to date, the political process has been shown in favor of the ruling parties. This study also further examines what has happened to the opposition political parties within the dominant party systems in Nigeria since 1999. This study argues that the ruling parties have been responsible for weakening the

opposition parties in Nigeria since 1999. She goes on to argue that despite these opposition parties' strategies, Nigeria's political process leaves much to be desired when it comes to a viable opposition party.

Recommendations

First, since existing court rulings by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have banned the use of the military, the National Assembly should pass additional laws that further prohibit the use of the military in holding elections in accordance with best global practice.

Besides, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should, among other things, ensure that electoral procedures are more strictly adhered to at all levels of government in the country by introducing measures to reduce inconsistencies often associated with its implementation processes.

Again, the National Assembly should amend sections 153 and 154 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which give the executive the power to appoint the chairman and staff of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), more of an independent body, created by an act of the National Assembly associated with the appointment of the chairman and other staff of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This ensures, among other things, that INEC does not come under the executive branch of the government. Hence, the manipulation of its key officials will be minimal, if not entirely eliminated. To this end, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) could decide in the interest of the country without political interference from the executive arm of government.

In addition, the National Assembly should enact laws that control political finances by regulating donations and spending, public funding of political campaigns, disclosure and transparency of donations and spending, and sanctions and penalties for non-compliance. Consequently, the National Assembly should pass a law prohibiting the government party or opposition parties from funding political parties from state resources. However, the issue of political party funding is a controversial issue among political analysts. It is important to note that there is no clear specification in the constitution of many political parties in Nigeria for state funding for political parties, but it has been observed that this gives the ruling parties in Nigeria money for their programs, rallies and campaigns a benefit to the ruling parties to other political parties.

Also, there is a need to restructure the political parties in Nigeria to allow for internal democracy. The lack of internal democracy has resulted in a fractionalization of the party, while those who are not satisfied with the style of leadership often form a different political party. Internal democracy within the various political parties in Nigeria should be based on credibility and transparency, not choice.

Furthermore, freedom of the press is key to maintaining democracy. So the nice thing about democracy is that it makes it possible to articulate different views. This usually happens when citizens express their views on governance. Indeed, the government needs to make room for constructive criticism from citizens so that the government sees gray areas where it needs to be improved.

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**DISPLAY OF PRIMORDIAL SENTIMENTS AND IDENTITY POLITICS
FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF TRUE DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA**

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Abstract

The paper addressed the display of Primordial sentiments and identity politics for the achievement of true democracy in Nigeria. The findings revealed among other things that primordial sentiment is a critical factor affecting not only nation building, but also democracy in Nigeria. The paper holds that primordial sentiments pervade political parties arrangement, government policies, political appointments and in extreme cases legal processes. Primordialism was indicted as being responsible for the dearth of national patriotism, values and respect for democratic culture. Against these findings, the paper recommended the following: a holistic approach to addressing national and nationality questions in Nigeria. This should involve the establishment of real equality, friendship, and fraternal cooperation between peoples. It aims at the abolition of the exploitation of one region by the other. More so, federal government in Nigeria should put in place measures that would help to create confidence in the people that the government really cares for them. Government should be responsible and accountable to the people. These efforts, among others, which will help to de-politicize ethnicity would naturally instill an image of patriotism which shall in turn foster national integration.

Keywords: Primordial, Identity Politics, Achievement, Sentiment, True Democracy

Introduction

It is a fact that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic nation state with socio-cultural differences between its component ethnic groups. This cultural dissimilarity has been manifested by, for instance, the differences in language, diet, dress and types of social systems. Shrewd observers have noticed that even the globalization of democracy has not significantly diminished these differences. This situation has been due to a number of reasons, including the politicization of ethnic sentiments in all facets of the governance process in Nigeria. Primordial sentiments which arise principally from the hostility that derives from competition between ethnically different peoples for wealth and power has continued to influence key political and economic decisions and policies in Nigeria. Thus, five decades after Nigeria gained independence; the Nigerian diverse social structure in terms of her heterogeneity has not changed significantly (Abubakar, 2007). The diverse nature of the society has made identification with the 'nation' a difficult task. Over the years, primordial sentiments coupled with identity consciousness in the socio-political terrain of Nigeria has continued to breed abysmal performance of political machinery revolving around vicious cycle of agitation for political disunion and dismemberment making democratic consolidation and nation building an exercise in futility. Therefore, politics has become a pontificated investment in prebendal socio-linguistic ecology of Nigeria with its adverse effect on Nigerian nascent democracy. The problem of Nigerian democracy revolves around the multiethnic and socio-linguistic structures emanating from British colonial legacy. The diverse socio-classes welded without effective consultation has been considered as the origin of political hostility and animosity that continue to inject bitter politics in Nigerian democratic governance (Akwara, 2008). The emergence and entrenchment of ethnicity in the country's politics has its manifestation within the various democratic experiments. The feeling of belonging and rejection became the basis for distinguishing individuals within the polity as evidenced in the behaviour of political elite. With lack of cohesiveness and threat to the unity of the country, ethnic consciousness increased in scope (Ezuonu and Korieh, 2010). Today, identification is easier at both family and ethnic levels. A consequence of this is that many of the citizens may never develop a proper concept of nation. These kind of ethnic group relations signify a negative dimension that no doubt affects the democratization process.

Conceptual Definition**Primordial Sentiment**

Primordialism argues that ethnic identity is ascriptive, in that membership is assigned at birth and thus difficult to change. It posits that ethnic ties are inherent in us as human beings and we have deep natural connections

that connect us to some people and produce natural divisions with others whether based on race, religion, language or location. Primordialism appeals to emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate distinctive explanations for group mobilization.

Primordialism perceives an ethnic group as an objective entity and ethnic identity for them is singular, timeless and fixed with distinct social boundaries. Ethnic differences are perceived as ancestral, deep and irreconcilable and as such ethnic conflict stems naturally and inevitably from 'ancient hatreds' between ethnic groups. Primordialism calls for emotional attachment and ethnic solidarity from members of the ethnic group and invariably provides for a basis for their ethnic consciousness. The ideal of primordialism is characterized by absolute loyalty and solidarity to one's ethnic group and its goals.

Therefore, primordial sentiments cannot be ruled out in national political development. For example primordial attachment has been found to be one of the preferred bases for fragmentation of hitherto autonomous political units in the independent states of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Nigeria when they were reorganized into their present political units. Unarguably, primordial attachment plays a significant role in socio-political and economic development of ethnically divided states by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to primordial ties; which in other words means that people have the ability to construct and deconstruct the social political and economic realities around them; hence, the comfort and sense of belonging that stems from ethnic group identity ((Omilusi, 2015).

Identity Politics

Identity politics is a term that describes a political approach wherein people of a particular gender, religion, race, social background, class or other identifying factors, develop political agendas that are based upon theoretical interlocking systems of oppression that may affect their lives and come from their various identities (Mary, 2009). The notion of identity politics derives from the combination of two words, identity and politics. Identity means the state or quality of being identical, or the same. It follows that a group of persons may have certain traits, features, cultural realities, economic status etc. that bind them together. These markers distinguish a group from other groups and place that group on a different pedestal depending on how it asserts its identity in its relationship with other groups. The assertion of the group's identity may not be a wishful thinking, it finds expression within the context of the group's identifiable interest and it is concretized and actualized by not only the availability of resources at the group's disposal, but also the effective and efficient mechanism of resource distribution.

On the other hand, politics is the allocation of resources through institutionalized means for the harmonization and protection of the various interests in a social formation. Thus, each group strives for the available resources in order to protect its interests and assert its identity. The social formation is characterized by competition among the various groups which, when not properly and fairly regulated, can destabilize the political system and threaten the corporate existence of the various interest groups. Therefore, identity politics refers to the conscious efforts made by a group to protect its interest and assert its identity. It also means that political arguments that focus upon the self-interest and the perspectives of social minorities or self-identified social interest groups and the way in which people's politics are shaped by certain aspects of their identity such as race, class, religion, sexual orientation, or traditional dominance.

It appears to be more glaring that a group tends to assert its identity when in most cases there is an oppressive mechanism usually in the form of a political structure designed to oppress, subjugate, exploit, and relegate it to the background. This view was succinctly captured by (Young 2000), when he said that identity politics, as a mode of organizing, is intimately connected to the idea that some social groups are oppressed. Consequently, it can be seen as the politics of group based movement claiming to request the interests and identity of a particular group, rather than policy issues relating to all members of the community.

In most cases, identity politics can be deceptive. This is because instead of being seen as the politics of recognition since it demands recognition on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has previously been derived, most leaders of certain groups hide under the guise of identity politics to exploit and marginalize members of their own group for their selfish interests. Unfortunately, this makes the group more susceptible to exploitation, oppression, and marginalization by other groups. Given this circumstance, the group becomes entangled in what may be referred to as victim politics - a situation where a group identifies itself as oppressed and seek either to end that oppression, or to use that oppression to justify their actions in other spheres. Thus, they constantly struggle to extricate themselves from the clutches of supremacist politics, a situation where groups seek to dominate other groups for what they see as the "legitimate" reason (Watts 2008).

The emergence of modern concerns with ethnicity and social movement led to anthropological postulations about identity. Notable in this regard is the Eriksonian understanding of identity which focused on the uniqueness of individuality which makes a person distinct from others. It refers to the qualities of sameness in relation to a person's direction to others and to a particular group of people. This view was reinforced by the trend in sociological thought which explains the manner in which the individual is affected by and

contributes to the overall social context. The above view according to Young, (2000) led to the crystallization of two approaches of interpreting the concept of identity. The first is known as essentialism, also referred to as primordial approach, which holds that identification with a particular group is a natural and fixed thing, defined by objective criteria such as common ancestry and common biological characteristics e.g. sexuality. Whereas, the second is the social constructionist theory which holds the position that identity is formed by a predominantly political choice of certain characteristics. Therefore, it questions the idea that identity is a natural thing characterized by fixed, supposedly objective criteria (Young, 2000).

Granted that people with different backgrounds can join an interest group to protect their own interest, it is also evident that people with the same physical or biological features gravitate around avowed interests which pull them together. Thus, it is not necessarily because one is a black man that one joins a movement for black nationalism, more importantly is the consideration of the interest of the blacks vis-à-vis other races. The moment the interest fritters away such categorization or movement becomes superfluous (Young, 2000).

Democracy

The term "democracy" means different things to different people and that conclusion is accepted by most commentators. Indeed, there is a wide range of perspectives as to the meaning and content of democracy as well as to the conditions of its realization; all of which vary depending on the proponents' philosophical, ideological, political, cultural, social, and economic perspectives. This range of perceptions go from the higher conceptual plane as expressed, for example, by the great thinkers of western civilization and by other great non-western political philosophers, to the practical means of application as expressed by contemporary experts. To be sure, however, the antithesis of democracy as recognized by almost all post 1900's political thinkers, are the ideologies of fascism, communism, and totalitarianism. Conceptually, there are three basic paradigms which are addressed by contemporary commentators. They are: (i) the universality or relativity of democracy; (ii) democracy as a process or a condition; and (iii) democracy as methods and modalities or as substance and substantive outcomes. Historical experience reveals, however, that all these paradigms are equally valid because democracy can be all of the above.

Democracy and Nation-Building

Democracy and nation-building are fundamental for development. For a democracy to survive and flourish, a critical mass of its citizens must possess the skills, embody the values, and manifest the behaviours that accord with democracy (Akwara & Ojoma, 2013). They must know enough about the basic features of a democratic political system to be able to access it when their

interests are at stake and they must believe in the importance of certain key democratic values, such as tolerance for divergent viewpoints and support for the rule of law. They must also be willing and be able to participate in local and national policies. They must believe that their participation is important to the continued viability of the democratic political system. In most mature democracies, citizens have had the opportunity to absorb democratic beliefs and practices over a lifetime. As they participate in family and neighbourhood life, join local organizations, move through the educational system and are exposed to a free and independent media, citizens have the opportunity to absorb and practice the basic norms of a democratic culture and nation building. In countries emerging from long periods of authoritarian rule like Nigeria, this preparatory experience is largely missing. While many informal democratic practices may exist at the community level, citizens are unlikely to have much knowledge about formal democratic structures and processes and may be unaware of the opportunities that exist for advancing their interests at the local, regional, or national levels (Ismagilova, 2008). Furthermore, after many years of arbitrary rule in Nigeria, citizens may have unrealistic expectations about what democracy is able to achieve and may experience difficulty adjusting to the competition, compromise and loss that are inherent parts of the democratic political process. Without values such as political tolerance, trust in democratic institutions, and respect for the rule of law, this more competitive aspect of the democratic process can be severely destabilizing, particularly if it ignites or exacerbates economic, ethnic, religious, or regional tensions. In new fledgling democracies like Nigeria, leaders need necessary knowledge to gain the skills, values, and behaviours that are necessary for stable and effective governance.

Addressing Primordial Sentiment for true Democracy in Nigeria

Having dealt with the factors that accounted for the predominance of ethnic nationalism in Nigerian politics, our next task will be to examine the impact of this phenomenon on the ongoing democratic dispensation.

First, the interplay of primordial sentiments has meant persistent threat to political stability. There are cries of marginalization and impeachment all the time since the inception of the present Republic in 1999. Again, this has also meant a threat to the consolidation of democracy. For it is going to be difficult to consolidate democracy in a country that is politically unstable.

Second, the predominance of the spirit of ethnic nationalism also gave rise to the emergence of ethnic militias all over the country - the common ones are – Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) for the Yoruba nationality, Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) for the Hausa/ Fulani nationality, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) for the Igbo nationality and numerous others in the Niger Delta Region. The emergence of

these ethnic militias has also meant an increase in the level of political violence, riots and conflicts.

Third, the interplay of primordial sentiments has also made the sharing of the national revenue a much more volatile and sensitive issue. In Nigeria, the centre is the primary source of private wealth accumulation. So much resource lies with the government at the centre. This consequently makes the struggle for control of power at the centre so fierce, competitive and intense, thereby undermining nation building, accountability and democratic justice.

The current on shore/offshore dichotomy in the principle of derivation also aggravated the already tensed situation. This offshore/onshore dichotomy is now seen as an indication of contempt and hatred for the ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta who believed that they are already marginalized, traumatized and exploited. Finally, the interplay of ethnic nationalism has also divided and fragmented the civil society in Nigeria.

Oyadare (2004) contended that the problem in Nigeria is traceable to the heterogeneity and the adversarial nature of the civil society itself. The civil society in Nigeria is relatively weak, parochial in outlook and divided most especially along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. If the civil society is divided, it is obvious that it will have some adverse effects on the nascent democracy in place. The fact that the problem of ethnic nationalism continues to stare us in the face is an indication that something is wrong somewhere with the Nigerian state. Unfortunately, the lack of national consensus has affected democratic culture especially in the present Fourth Republic. Evidently, the dominance of primordial sentiment has promoted a political culture laden in political violence, assassination, manipulation of electoral process amongst others.

Primordialism has also resulted in situations where political elite and even the citizens concerns has become how to amass wealth and misappropriate the commonwealth of the state. The elite and indeed the Nigeria state have without doubt become a specific modality of class domination.

Primordial sentiment has further produced an essential feature of state dominance. The domination of the state results from the fact that the state lacks autonomy. The limited autonomy means that the state is weak to perform adequately the essential functions of the state. The state is thus unable to mediate the struggle between classes and even within classes. The net effect of this is that politics, essentially the struggle for control and use of state power becomes warfare. Power is thus overvalued and security lies only in getting more and more power. This helps to explain why the state equally lacks legitimacy. The government in power is thus necessarily based on a very narrow range of interest. Without a veneer of legitimacy, the government is delinked from the society. This makes the government including the dominant class

utterly disinterested in promoting national integration and development, but only in keeping its hegemony.

The need to hold on to its hegemonic interest means that state resources are used to satisfy and promote the interest and values of those who support the ideals of the ruling class. Thus, since the people see the state as an alien force, they make no commitment to its policies; rather they seek to exploit them to their own advantage through various means including the use of violence, primordial sentiments and many other anti-democratic values. It is in this crossroads that the current crisis of democracy plaguing Nigeria manifests the most.

Problems Posed by the Absence of National Identity and Integration on True Democracy in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the formation of a sense of national identity has been an uphill task because it involves the alteration of primordial loyalties and rapid development of consensual political consciousness within a context of diffuse unconsciousness. Often, this alteration creates ethnic cleavages between the various ethnic groups. This leads to national symbols to vie with local or tribal symbols. This also leads to divided loyalties and loyalty to sub-national unit becomes primary (Iyaji, 2000). This problem has become acute in Nigeria because ethnic or national boundaries are defined by historical, linguistic, religious and cultural boundaries. Since the creation of this sense of national identity is being championed by the ruling elites of the various groups' in the country, the sense of national identity by the members of the various groups becomes bi-focal. It focuses on the personalities of the charismatic leaders; and on emotionally charged symbols (Verba, 2008). And when these happen, the sense of national identity thus created is fragile, rejected on the onset, and fades when the symbols and personalities are no longer there.

Personality crises result from the vacuum thus created by the exit of the personalities and leadership crises ensue. In Nigeria, since colonial days till date, this sense of national identity has been more or less focused on the personalities of the ruling elites of the various ethnic groups as they serve more or less as symbols of ethnic unity and integration for the particular ethnic group (Iyaji, 2000). This manifests in the decoration of any indigene that gets a national appointment with traditional titles and ethnic reception by his/her ethnic group. One dimension of the problem with primordial sentiment on nation building and democratization process in Nigeria is that it makes most Nigerians not to be patriotic. Right from 1960, patriotism, as far as Nigeria is concerned, has been thrown into the river and ever since, it was replaced by individualism, personalism, sectionalism, nepotism and parochialism. To worsen matters, you hardly could find loyalty to a cause, in an average Nigerian. The highest levels of patriotism are expressed at the sub national levels. Again, most students of

politics will readily agree with John Locke and others that a nation compels patriotism and loyalty when the citizens perceive it to be representative of, and pursuing their common good.

A tentative hypothesis therefore would be that where a nation does not take sufficient care of its citizens, the level of patriotism is likely to be low and vice versa. As to why this should be the case, two plausible reasons have been adduced. First, ethnic nationalism was already well developed before the nationalist era. Ethnic loyalty was something that made sense to a lot of people, and its utility was already demonstrated in the urban areas, where ethnic associations catered for the needs of new immigrants from the countryside. Secondly, the appeal to ethnicity was very likely to be successful in a society with little industrialization and a rudimentary development of secondary associations (Ake, 1978).

In another instance, Ake (2000) argued that the civil society in Africa is so rudimentary that political society is not constituted as a “public”, a unity of abstract legal subjects and solidarity of complementarities and reciprocities arising from their self-seeking. Instead of political society being one public, it is segmented into a plurality of competing and alienated primary publics, because people are alienated from the state and tend to give their primary loyalty to ethnic, sub-national or communal groups rather than the state. In the theoretical model of patriotism, allegiance and loyalty of a typical Nigerian illustrated below, one is able to see what an average Nigerian stands for in his or her relationship with the Nigerian state. First, a typical Nigerian thinks of ‘self before others. And when he or she thinks of others, the thought is about members of both the nuclear and the extended families. From that level a typical Nigerian think of people from his or her native town or village and then to the level of the ethnic group. And from the level of the ethnic group, the loyalty, allegiance and patriotism of a typical Nigerian moves to that of the religious group (Oyadare, 2004). This is because most Nigerians are very religious and have very strong emotional attachment to one religion or the other. This is the more reason why ethno-religious violence is very common in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The vast majority of the citizens of this country have always reduced the national question to contradictions and antagonism between the various ethnic nationalities in the country. In other words, they see the national question in terms of inter-tribal hostilities only. But the national question is far bigger and more complex than this. The national question is a big complex of political, economic, ideological, legal and other problems that arise during a people’s struggle for liberation and for favourable internal and external conditions for further development; and also in the course of establishing equal, friendly relations between peoples. The national question is always subordinate to the

main problem of the socioeconomic development of the society, and has a different content and significance at various stages of a nation's development. As such, it should involve the establishment of real equality, friendship, and fraternal cooperation between peoples. It aims at the abolition of the exploitation of a region by the other. This must be discussed to bring about equity and justice in the allocation of the nation's resources to create the sense of belonging on the peoples of the country and to foster national integration. It is only when the various groups and peoples in the country are involved in the formulation of governmental policies and their implementation; get a fair share of the nation's resources; and are not considered as peoples whose values, opinions and feelings do not matter in the country that they can cultivate the necessary sense of belonging and identity with their fellow citizens and the governments at all levels; and work in unity toward the building of a united and strong nation-state in which all will be proud to belong. As must be stated, it has become very necessary to address the issue because of the deepening ethno-nationalism in the country which has resulted in the proliferation of ethnic organizations (militias) and violent ethnic clashes.

Recommendations

1. The federal government in Nigeria should put in place measures that would help to create confidence in the people that the government really cares for them. The government should be responsible and accountable to the people.
2. It should respect the rule of law, reduce poverty if it cannot be eradicated; provide functional infrastructural facilities; improve on the security situation in the country and check corruption and conduct free and fair elections across the country; and punish people who violate the laws.
3. In addition, those issues which engender resource competition and the character of the Nigerian state need to be addressed. This is because the Nigerian state as presently constituted is seen as an arena for accumulation of wealth. The fault-lines of ethnic and religious divisions in the country make it easy for the elite to manipulate and politicise ethnicity, to advance self interests given the weak and distorted political economy of the country where a large army of vulnerable unemployed and disillusioned population abound.
4. There is a need for a national programme of empowerment of the country's vast poor to remove the conditions that make joining ethnically based militant organization possible.
5. To sustain such a programme, there is need to enthrone a truly democratic government in the country. For this to happen, civil society groups, the media, community based organizations and religious

organizations have to collaborate in enlightenment programmes and citizen mobilization that engages the political system to become more citizen oriented. These efforts which will help to de-politicize ethnicity would naturally instil an image of patriotism which shall in turn foster national integration

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PIRACY AND OIL THEFT IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: THE NIGERIAN MARITIME SECURITY OPTIONS AND RESPONSES

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Abstract

For close to three decades, there has been continuous increase in the wave of piracy and oil theft in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). International Maritime Bureau (IMB) states that there have been around 996 pirate attacks recorded on oil cargo vessels since 2012. While much of the piracy questioned the maritime security of the Gulf of Guinea states, the security challenges is fuelled largely by lack of a clear cut security agenda and policing strategy. This is supported by the political economy of oil exploration, political disorder and instabilities that govern the regional oil industry especially in Nigeria where oil theft and bunkering is the order of the day and regime of booming black market in the region. Considering the absence of a philosophical, institutional and operation maritime security framework, the security challenges and the capability or skill to police the regional waters are seen to be beyond national or regional intervention. To this end, the objectives of this paper are: first, to examine the how political dynamics and the regime of oil bunkering and theft feed into the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea with particular attention to Nigeria; second, to assess the regional operational capabilities of Gulf of Guinea states in addressing piracy and oil theft; third, to assess its implications on global security and identify a need for a global/regional maritime security components that will accommodate the security interest of Gulf of Guinea States. The study employs qualitative research methodology and deploys both primary and secondary sources of data. It also employs content analysis as the techniques of analysis. The paper finding out that the incidences of oil theft and piracy and the inability of the GoG states to police the waters off the region in informed by number of issues of which weak state capacity and the contested problem of demarcating what constitutes international and territorial water which sometimes limit state policing reach are but important. The paper therefore recommends that there is a need to come up with a regional maritime security arrangement to manage the crisis of piracy and oil theft.

Keywords: Maritime Security, Gulf of Guinea, Piracy and Oil Theft

Introduction

The phenomenal rise in the activities of piracy, armed robbery against ship and oil theft in Gulf of Guinea (GoG) in particular and the Horn of Africa waters has constituted one of the emerging security threats for the contemporary maritime industry. For close to three decades, the rising trend of sea piracy and armed robbery against ships has dominated the maritime security engagements. The security challenge has also occupied a central position in the writings of maritime security experts especially members of International maritime Organisations (IMO). Their position have basically centred on the dynamics, trends and strategies to confronting the security challenges posed by the dominant and near unchallenged activities of the bandits on the territorial waters and high seas.

For close to five decades, Africa's security challenges have been enormous. However, the sudden emergence of piracy as one of the security challenge is not unconnected to her numerous challenges in governance and development. Prior to the late 80s, cases of piracy and sea robbery were few and unheard of but the challenges of post-Cold War politics, democratic governance and the attendant crisis of state building led to series of intra-state conflicts which engulfed some states that were under the military and one man dictatorship. Some of these states including Somalia capitulated and descended to a failed state. The result of the Somalia state led to the emergence of sea piracy in its territorial waters and the Gulf of Aden. Thus, in the late nineties and twenties, piracy in the Horn of Africa became an internationally acclaimed security threat. By the mid-twenties, piracy and other maritime crimes on African waters overtook waters off Southeast Asia of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines as the traditionally dangerous hotspots of global piracy, much of the international attention and efforts at countering piracy in Africa have been on Somali maritime piracy (Onuoha, 2012).

As at 2000- 2007, piracy off the Somali coast accounts for more than half of pirate attacks recorded annually in Africa , if not globally. For instance, there were 439 piracy attacks worldwide in 2011, more than half of which were attributed to Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of Oman (Alessi, 2012). By 2012, the International Maritime Bureau reported that piracy attack in Somalia has reduced considerable while the GoG witnessed unprecedented surge (Mukunda, 2012). In fact, about one hundred and two incidents of piracy and armed robbery were reported for the first quarter of 2014 (IMB, 2014), many of these occurred dangerously in the Gulf of Guinea waters. Comparatively, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia waters reduced drastically to the Gulf of Guinea. Surprisingly, the spike in attack on ships in the Gulf of Guinea has surpassed that of the Gulf of Aden and Somalia waters. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) report, there have been around 996 pirate

attacks recorded on oil cargo vessels since 2012, this cost West Africa region up to \$950 million in 2012 alone. In recent years, between 2015 to 2017, there were 90 reported cases of piracy mainly kidnapping within the coast of West Africa (Ocean Beyond Piracy (OCB), 2018). Unfortunately, half or about two third of these piracy occurred within the Nigerian sea borders. While much of the piracy questioned the maritime security of the Gulf of Guinea states, the security challenges is fuelled largely by lack of a clear cut security agenda and policing strategy. Though, the GoG comprises of many countries along the coast of Angola to Senegal, nevertheless, it is important to state here that significant number of piracy that occur in the region are within the Nigerian territorial waters. The question therefore is, why has the Nigerian water posed as a major maritime security challenge in the GoG region?

From the above question, the paper argues that the increase in the maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is predicated on the numbers of factors which include: one, the outburst of militias grouping in the coastal region of Nigeria, two, the absence of accountability and ungoverned oil industry. While these two factors appeared to be more germane other factors like the global competitiveness of the energy sector and the internal resource-poverty dynamics of the Nigerian nation. The study therefore aims to add to continuous intellectual dialogue on the challenges of piracy activity in the GoG and also examine issues in the piracy in the region. Furthermore, the paper proposes a combinational of Comprehensive Triangular Maritime Security (CTMS) approach and the Private-Stakeholders Maritime Security (PSMS) approach in managing maritime security in the GoG. By extension, the paper draws out the gaps in the strategy and reinvents a more effective regional/global security response to the piracy and oil theft in the Gulf of Guinea.

To achieve the stated objectives, the paper is structured into five sections. The first section begins with the introductory part of the GoG security challenge. The second section focuses on the understanding of the Gulf of Guinea, piracy and other conceptual issues. In the third section, maritime security, piracy and oil theft are given bolder attention. The fourth critically assesses the various national, regional and international responses and examines the gaps and proffers new approach. The last section concludes the study.

A) Understanding the Gulf of Guinea in the Context of Geography, Piracy and Oil

Most definitional analysis of GoG begins from its geographical perspective. The region is first defined in geographical terms as of the Atlantic Ocean southwest of Africa. It comprises about twenty three countries from West and Central Africa to the coastal region of Angola. To be precise, it comprises countries of Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo

(RDC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Fig 1: The Map of Gulf of Guinea 2017



Source: Gulf of International Maritime Bureau, 2017

With its rich and vast natural resources, the region's geostrategic and maritime potentials are quite attractive. The region has huge natural mineral and marine resources such as oil, diamond, gold, and fishes, among others. In particular, it is home to huge hydrocarbon deposits. The recent forecast by experts that oil production in the region is likely to surpass that of the Persian Gulf by 2020 (Onuoha, 2015) has made the region an attractive region among the global energy buyer. Presently, about 70 per cent of Africa's oil production is concentrated in the West African coast of GoG. As oil discovery and exploration continues in the region, global investment or trading in the region has gone beyond imagination. It is suggested that Western oil companies will invest between \$40 billion and \$60 billion in the GG alone over the next 20 years. It is estimated that deepwater drilling will account for 25 percent of

offshore oil production by 2017, compared to just nine percent in 2007 (Onuoha, 2015:372). By 2020, oil production in GG is expected to surpass the total production of the Persian Gulf nations: 25 percent of the global production as compared to 22 percent from the Persian Gulf (Paterson, 2007:28). Among the major oil-producing countries in the region are Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, and Gabon. Since Chad's oil is connected to Cameroon, analysts are wont to add Chad as a player to the region.

It hosts substantial natural gas and vast mineral deposits which remain largely unexploited, to which should be added fisheries reserves estimated at over 1 million tons with a yearly production of about 600,000 tons (Associated Press, 2013, cited in Onuoha 2015). Presently, the oil production in the GoG has increased due to new discoveries. According to a report, about 15 countries are producing oil exceeding 5.4 million barrels per day in 2016. Oil supply from the Gulf of Guinea region in 2016 was equivalent to 27 per cent of EU consumption and 29 per cent of total US petroleum consumption in the same year. (Dododawa, 2016). Nigeria and Angola account for 47 per cent and 34 per cent of total Gulf of Guinea oil supply respectively

As of June 2018, Nigeria produces was about 2.0 million barrels per day (bpd). Angola is the second-largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa behind Nigeria, producing about 1.7 million bpd (NNPC, 2018), both countries account for 47 per cent and 34 per cent of total Gulf of Guinea oil supply respectively. Equatorial Guinea produces about 346,000; Republic of Congo, 274, 400 bpd; and Gabon 241, 700 bpd. Cameroon's oil production has been on the decrease in recent years and produces around 60,000 bpd, a 3.4 per cent increase compared with the previous year (Reuters, 2016) The DRC's oil production is approximately 25,000 bpd in 2018, while crude oil production in Cote d'Ivoire is estimated to hover around 44,000 bpd in 2013 as new discoveries are developed (see table 1). Discoveries of oil have been made in Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Sierra Leone. On the shore of Sierra Leone, an oil field "Venus", stocking around 200 million barrels, was discovered in September 2009 (Basedau, and Mähler, 2015).

Table 1: Some Oil producing countries in Gulf of Guinea

SN	Oil producing countries	No of Barrel per day (bpd) Estimated
1	Nigeria	2.2 million
2	Angola	1.7 million
3	Gabon	241, 700
4	Cameroun	60,000 bpd 2012
5	DRC's	25,000
6	Cote d'Ivoire	44,000
7	Ghana	80,000
8	Sierra Leone	NA (1,000)
9	São Tomé and Príncipe	30000
10	Ghana	200,000

Source: Author's compilation 2018

Ghana formally commenced with commercial oil production from the Jubilee oilfield, which holds approximately 800 million barrels of oil. Production in Ghana has since jumped from 7,000 bpd in 2009 to 78,000 bpd in 2012, and to 204,000 bpd in 2018 (Energy Information Administration, 2013, The Finder, 2018). Although intense exploration activity continues in other West African countries such as Benin, Togo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which awarded 8 new oil blocks in 2016 to teams of investors, no substantial oil production takes place or substantial discoveries have been made. The region's untapped oil reserves hold the prospects of supplying significant quantities of oil to the global economy in the years ahead. Each day, the Gulf of Guinea ships 1.5 million barrels of its oil to the US, as well as 1 million barrels to Europe, 850000 barrels to China, and 330 000 barrels to India (Onuoha, 2016).

It is important to note that oil is not the only reason why the GoG is strategic important, its geographical location as maritime route for commercial shipping from Europe and America to West, Central and Southern Africa counts as relevance. Its proximity to Europe and North America for the transportation of the low-sulphur crude oil from the region further raises its importance in the global supply of energy. The region is also an investment destination. For example Nigeria, Ghana and Angola are regarded as investment friendly as return on investment is always high. Furthermore, the region's rich fishing and other marine resources are attractive to fishing trawlers who come to the region from all over the world. This is partly due to its poorly governed and controlled waters. Couple with this is the rich forestry, agricultural and mineral resources which all contributed to its marketability and sudden rise as a potentially economic hub.

As rich and strategic the GoG is, the region's waters has become the second most dangerous globally after the Gulf of Aden (IMO, 2016). In other words, the two most dangerous routes for ships and vessels are in Africa. The reason for this is connected to the internal crisis of the countries in the region particularly the intra-state conflicts within the region. For example, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Nigeria have all been engulfed in one conflicts or the other. As Onuoha (2016) noted the region accounts for about half of small and light weapon in the continent, a result of years of conflicts. Soares de Oliveira (2011) also noted that some states that have achieved a combination of international respectability, disastrous governance, and regime stability are many in the region. This he referred to as "successful failed states." Majority of these states is generally poor in terms of known measures of human development index although they are potentially rich in natural resources endowments. The region has high levels of poverty, unemployment and corruption is confronted with a litany of security threats-high circulation of arms, oil theft, sea robbery, piracy, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, among others. Perhaps, the most daunting is the **lingering militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta of southern Nigeria accounts for half of the security challenges and about 80 per cent of oil vandalism, theft and illegal refinery. It account for** 1,000 attacks a year and significant disruptions of Nigerian oil supplies. At least there were 90 attempted piracies or armed robberies at sea were reported in 2017 (OBP, 2018) Numerous expatriate oil workers have been kidnapped, and the Gulf of Guinea remains a major trafficking route for cocaine. Though, the Gulf of Guinea faces several security challenges, the issues of piracy and oil thefts have been more challenging.

The debate on what constitute piracy is understandable, however, the paper attempts , to define piracy within the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101). Considering this, what constitute armed robbery on the sea have deepened the debate on an acceptable definition of piracy. As stated, the paper, considers the UNCLOS and definition of Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships to include an act of armed robbery against the ship, kidnapping and other acts of criminality perpetrated in the territorial waters and high seas especially where the capacity for the safeguarding of the territorial water is beyond the sovereign state. In detailed terms, the UNCLOS defines piracy as follows: "Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

- (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
- (c) Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or(b)."

In addition, the definition of "Armed robbery against ships" is given by the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (resolution A.1025(26), annex, paragraph 2.2), as follows:

- (a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
 - (b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above."
- (IMO, 2017)

Both the definitions of piracy and armed robbery against ship appeared similar. They both use threat, act of illegality and violence against ships on territorial waters or high seas. In this paper therefore, both piracy and armed robbery against ships will be taken as same. Although, what constitute high seas and territorial water seem to be contentious in real terms, the legal document on maritime security of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines 'Territorial Sea' as extending up to 12 miles from the shore; and 'High Seas' as everything beyond this limit. It contends that the territorial waters are within the jurisdiction of the littoral state and the laws give the states powers over the territorial waters. The difference therefore is such that Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy in such a way that it is possible only on the high seas, outside the 12-mile range, whereas criminal actions within territorial seas are classified as armed robbery against ships. The difference is one of jurisdiction and not the act.

In spite of the gaps in their definitions, historically, piracy has been an issue in maritime security. It is a universal crime that cut across all international waters but with different degree of criminality. This point gives any state power of jurisdiction to prosecute pirates especially when involved in policing, prosecuting and trialling of pirates or sea criminals. However, criminality within the 12-mile limit naturally confers responsibility on the coastal states. This distinction becomes more important when the issue of private maritime security companies and armed personnel aboard ships are involved.

Maritime Security, Piracy and Oil Theft in the Gulf of Guinea

Global attention has been on the Gulf of Guinea because of its strategic relevance to global energy development. As it stands, the region currently produces about 5.4 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d). In spite of its energy contribution, the region has lately been dominated by high level of deadly piracy cartel. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for nearly 30% of attacks (427 of 1,434) on African waters between 2003 and 2017, and that proportion is increasing (Chatham House, 2016). For instance, 53 cases were recorded in 2011 compared with 39 in 2010, and a number of cases go unreported. In 2017, a total of 90 incidents were recorded in attacks off the West African coast (OBP, 2018). The region recorded more than 40 piracy attacks in the first three quarters of 2016, with 132 crew taken as hostages and seven vessels hijacked – six tankers and an offshore supply vessel (OBP, 2018, ICC, 2016). The Gulf of Guinea accounted for all crew kidnappings worldwide, 52 of them off Nigeria, and two off Togo (ICC, 2016). .

Nigeria, the main source of piracy in the region (see figure 2), accounted for 29 piracy incidents, including two hijackings, 11 ships boarded, 13 vessels fired upon and three attempted attacks. Pirates, often heavily armed and violent, are targeting vessels and their crews along the coast, rivers, anchorages, ports and surrounding waters. In many cases, they ransack the vessels and steal the cargo, usually gas oil. The crisis in the Niger Delta of Nigeria has been primarily responsible for piracy and oil theft. The region was the initial epicentre of maritime crime. For decades, oil production has paradoxically created poverty in the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general (ICG, 2016). It has created social tensions and environmental pollution. Oil income has, in large part, only benefited central government, oil companies and local elites. Those excluded from the system turned to violent action. Forced to bypass the state to gain access to even a fraction of this wealth, they have organised illegal activities, including siphoning off crude oil, clandestine refining and illegal trade in fuel. The constant increase in the value of the industry has allowed these activities to prosper and economic crime to spread.

Fig 2: Map showing pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea



Source: Pirate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (courtesy Oceans <http://cimsec.org/pirate-horizons-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/gog-mapUSLIVE>)

The weakness of the government to respond appropriately and general inadequacy of the maritime policies and legal framework of Gulf of Guinea states and the lack of cooperation between them have allowed criminal networks to diversify their activities and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast and out on to the high seas. Crime does not affect only the oil industry; it has diversified to include piracy and increasingly audacious and well-planned sea-borne raids. Criminal groups have learned quickly and appeared along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and Togo, taking advantage of troubled socio-political situations.

In 2012 most attacks were against chemical, oil and gas tankers. In total, over the last 10 years, there have been 108 attacks in international waters, 173 in territorial waters and 270 in port areas. Since 2002 there have been fluctuations in the number of attacks reported, and despite much talk about rising piracy in the region, reported attacks decreased by 10% from 2011 to 2012. Types of piracy in the region include attacks directed at cargo, attacks carried out for logistic purposes (e.g. to steal fuel, food and other resources to keep the piracy operations going) and mugging. This is markedly different from the piracy taking.

A 2016 report by the EU Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) noted that pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are more violent than Somali pirates (Barrios 2015). This may be due to their greater level of familiarity with weapons, as many pirates are former members of militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. The Gulf of Guinea region additionally has a large number of firearms available from previous armed conflicts that are

being re-circulated through the region. According to a UNODC report, criminals can get weapons from the local security forces, buying or renting them from corrupt elements in the police and military (Chatham House 2016)

Oil piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is conducted by well-organized criminal gangs, mostly operating from Nigerian waters. As argued by Malaquais (2016), recent pirate attacks “is the organized, sometimes highly sophisticated, illicit taking of oil. They steal the oil, make a couple of black market circles of the stuff, and then deposit it back into the global supply”. In other words, the “oil is stolen (ship to ship) and sold on either directly to other ships or into the black market onshore, with the attacks sometimes coordinated from motherships or using other forms of structured off-shore organization”.

The Director of the IMB, Pottengal Mukundan, provides further comparative insight:

The attacks off West Africa follow a different *modus operandi* from pirate activity in other parts of the world. In addition to armed robbery, the more serious attacks involve hijacking of product tankers to steal a part of the cargo. The majority of the attacks usually involve a high level of violence against the crew. After the hijacking the product is transferred on to a smaller vessel to be taken and sold illegally in the region” (IMB, 2017).

The current focus on oil vessels is not unconnected to the hike in oil price, especially in Nigeria, which presents a ready market for the distribution and (re)sale of stolen oil cargo. There were at least 90 tanker attacks in the Gulf of Guinea between 2010 and May 2017, resulting in some 30 hijackings (OBP, 2018).

The wider maritime security issues that the IMO is concerned about are illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, which is a massive problem and probably far more important in West Africa than piracy; and illegal trafficking of guns, oil, humans and stolen goods, which is another major factor affecting Africa’s sustainable development. The fishing business in this area has an estimated value of \$10–23 billion (OBP, 2018). In most West African countries this represents much of national incomes; moreover fish provides over 50% of the edible protein consumed in the region. The current fishing levels off the coast of West Africa are unsustainable; and the destruction of the fishing grounds creates a security problem.

Maritime Security Options and Responses to the Gulf of Guinea Challenge

There is increasing strategies from major stakeholders in managing the security challenges in the GoG. There are presence of war ship and navies patrolling the region. American, British and French navies occasionally join patrol, and this is usually done in collaboration with the African regional

countries. Since 2001, the heads of the Gulf of Guinea states have been taken action (individual) but their 2016 meeting appeared to be more decisive as they resolved to take collective action. The leaders agreed on a code of conduct for sharing information and committed to build a maritime regional security centre in Cameroon (Vircoulon and Schneider, 2016). Following the success of the navy-heavy patrolling approach in Somalia water, the same approach may likely work in the Gulf of Guinea but must be supported with local initiative. This paper therefore suggests a combinational of comprehensive triangular maritime security (CTMS) approach and the Private-Stakeholders Maritime Security (PSMS) approach (Ayodele, 2016)

Comprehensive triangular maritime security (CTMS) approach: This approach consists of a combination of approaches that takes root from national policy framework, regional as well as the international response.

The National Response: The national response approach focuses on strategies from the national security and policy framework of the coastal state. It targets its territorial waters and designs appropriate national policy objectives that tackle the causes as well as the problem. It takes cognisance of the factors fuelling piracy and at the same time outlines appropriate policy toward solving the problem. For example, the rise of piracy in the region is closely associated to Nigeria's domestic crisis and its ungoverned oil industry. In fact, the emergence of Niger Delta militancy and the environmental degradation promoted to a large extent the piracy activities. Similarly, the Nigerian oil industry has been badly mismanaged to the extent that crude oil exploration has suffered immense loss. Illegal activities like oil bunkering, pipeline vandalisation and crude oil stealing have all feed into the piracy issue. It is therefore pertinent that any response must factor these issues.

Beyond policies, there is also the designing of a new national maritime architecture which appeared to be outside the understanding of the coastal states. This architecture should include the security agencies and paramilitary agencies. It should include high level of intelligence, policing and early warning mechanism. For example, the high incidents of piracy and other maritime crimes in the region have prompted the Nigerian government in to expand the mandate of its military Joint Task Force (JTF), *Operation Restore Hope*, which was initially established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta into a maritime security force, codenamed *Operation Pulo Shield* (Onuoha, 2015). The mandate of the *Operation Pulo Shield* include, among others, elimination of pipeline vandalism, crude oil theft, illegal oil refining and illegal oil bunkering, piracy and all forms of sea robbery within its area of responsibility. Some other states such as Ghana are also taking measures in the form of increased policing, installation of surveillance systems, and acquisition of vessels for maritime patrol.

From a bilateral perspective, two nations can decide to pursue a similar course of action. As mentioned earlier, the Governments of Nigeria and Benin Republic set up a combined maritime patrol of their waters, codenamed ‘Operation Prosperity’ in response to increase in piracy. The bilateral cooperation was the first of its kind in the region, and has helped reduce pirate attacks in Benin waters. The success of the Operation prosperity has informed the decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to explore the possibility of expanding it into a regional maritime framework. The proposed regional maritime framework to be known as ‘ECOWAS Pilot Zone E’ intends to build on the success and lessons of Operation Prosperity to fight piracy and maritime criminality in waters of Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo.

Regional Response: At the regional level, within the framework of its peace and security polices, ECCAS has created a regional maritime security centre and organised joint training exercises. However, states do not find it straightforward to organise joint funding or coordinate their efforts. Maritime policies are embryonic and symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooperation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political tensions and distrust of neighbouring states toward Nigeria. At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. There must be collective response based on a dynamic cooperation between the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that would take the initiative in promoting security and adopt a new approach based on improving not only security but also economic governance. Collaborations at the regional level to improve maritime security have also come in the form of joint training exercises among Navies of the states in the region. Years back, the Nigeria Navy hosted *Obangame Express*: an annual naval exercise of Africa, US and Europe. The maritime training exercise attended by 12 nations – Nigeria, United States, France, Italy, Spain, Cameroun, Ghana, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo, Benin Republic and Republic of Congo – was aimed at enhancing and sharpening the capacity of the navies and coaster guards

The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the increase in the number of international initiatives must not obscure the fact that rising crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly due to poor governance. Most states in the region have been unable to control economic activities in their maritime zones and in international waters and ensure the development of their coasts. This collective failure has created a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed on the needs and resentments of local communities.

A range of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms to improve governance of the economy and security sector, comprehensive and

effective maritime public policies and practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of intent. A long-term response is needed because, although piracy is a recent phenomenon in the region, its root causes are much deeper. Create legal regime for the enforcement of maritime law. And for the law to be effective, it was agreed that basic capacity for maritime domain awareness should be developed in each member-state, and that member-states initiate the integration of maritime domain awareness efforts through equipment and procedural interoperability.

The region should collaborate on the development of capability for effective response and capacity for maritime domain awareness coverage within individual and common sea areas of member-states in the GoG. They resolved to facilitate the establishment and activation of a common maritime information sharing mechanism through the establishment of inter-regional coordination centre to act as centres of excellence on capacity building for maritime domain awareness in the GoG.

Generally, the regional maritime security approach should:

- i. Develop effective capacity for Maritime Domain Awareness and response capability among member-state navies and coast guards just as effective and collaborative surveillance of the maritime areas of the GoG was necessary.
- ii. Implement a common maritime information sharing mechanism amongst navies and coast guards and other relevant agencies
- iii. Be pursuant to the agreement reached at the summit of Heads of Government of ECOWAS, ECCAS and GoG Commission in Yaounde, Cameroun, Summit of the Gulf of Guinea Heads of State and Government on maritime safety and security in Cameroon to establish an effective framework to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea.
- iv. Sustain the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) on a periodic basis while the Nigerian CNS made a strong case for the implementation of the resolutions taken so that the conference will not be seen as a mere talk-shop.

International Response: A global approach to tackle the root causes of piracy is also necessary. This would ideally be linked to development cooperation projects and security sector reform. EU civilian and military assistance could be useful in support of the training of national coastguards and navy officers, the use of equipment and the development of information-sharing practices. Though the strategy that will work in the Gulf of Guinea should be regionally owned, but if it is to be successful, it should not be narrowly focused on military solutions only. The West and other powers with strong stake in trouble-free oil transport, should move quickly to support the African initiative, while

encouraging its shift to a more comprehensive, multilateral approach including developing new strategy to strengthen capacity of all agencies (military and civilian) involved in maritime governance. Support can also come from Western powers (U.S., France, U.K.) and emerging nations (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) with economic interests in the region by providing financial support and security expertise to assist local initiatives.

Private-Stakeholders Maritime Security (PSMS): The second approach to managing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea should involve the Private security Companies or institutions, stakeholders, International maritime organisation etc.

In general, the International Crisis Groups recommends a road map to maritime security for the Gulf of Guinea states through the following:

- i. Combat crime in the hydrocarbons and shipping sectors by conducting research into the illegal trade in fuel in order to identify the companies involved in illegal activities.
- ii. Boost job creation along the coast, in particular by protecting artisanal fishing, stimulating the local fish processing industry, providing professional training for vulnerable sectors of the population (former combatants and unemployed youth) and reinvesting assets seized from fuel smugglers in development projects.
- iii. Strengthen maritime law enforcement through professionalisation of naval forces, maritime law enforcement bodies and port authorities, which should increase their technological capacity and intelligence networks to monitor all activity in their exclusive economic zones.
- iv. Maintain navy patrols in mooring zones and territorial waters day and night and carry out regular surveillance flights.
- v. Work closely with the UN's International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and shipping industry to draw up Best Management Practices (BMP) advising ship owners, captains and crews on anti-piracy measures.
- vi. Set up a national inter-agency anti-piracy task force to investigate, arrest and prosecute pirate gangs on land and at sea.
- vii. Accede to all necessary international legal instruments including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, integrate these conventions into national law and train personnel responsible for implementing them, especially in the judicial system.
- viii. Sign bilateral agreements at the presidential level between direct neighbours to facilitate extraditions and enable close cooperation

between navies, maritime administration agencies and police forces in counter-piracy work.

- ix. Organise in the near future joint surveillance operations in especially dangerous zone a) Nigeria, Benin and Togo should agree to expand the joint Operation Prosperity to include Togo's territorial waters; b) Nigeria and Cameroon should conduct joint patrols on their maritime borders.
- x. Participate fully in efforts by ECCAS and ECOWAS to draw up a regional maritime security strategy and share resources.
- xi. Strengthen inter-regional cooperation by: a) organising a Gulf of Guinea summit at which heads of state should sign the Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS and ECOWAS on Maritime Security in the Central and Western Maritime Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa; and b) making the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) to be set up in Ghana an information collection and dissemination tool for the Gulf of Guinea and transforming the regional training service for maritime security planned by ECCAS into a training centre for the whole region.
- xii. Coordinate international support through a multinational maritime affairs committee for each country and ensure that foreign interventions are aligned with national strategies.
- xiii. Assist national maritime affairs committees in designing comprehensive maritime policies that address the immediate threat and root causes of maritime crime; and support coastal states in their efforts to create jobs.
- xiv. Impress upon Gulf of Guinea states the need to treat piracy as a transnational organised crime that demands a coordinated response including naval operations, investigative police work and prosecution of suspects; and design programmes to strengthen the capacities of all maritime law enforcement agencies.

Conclusion

Indeed, there are numerous engagements by global, regional, national experts, government officials to address the security challenges in the GoG. There is a growing awareness among the political and military leaders of the Gulf of Guinea on the importance of maritime security in the region are encouraging. However, the critical challenge lies in the will of enforcement, power of implementation and courage of execution of all plans. Piracy like any other organised crime has a complex and highly structured network. It involves high level (international, governmental and military personnel), it is profitable

and takes huge will power for government to break the cycle of piracy network especially the ones that involve stealing of crude oil.

Having argued that the ungoverned oil sector in Nigeria, Niger Delta militancy, pipelines vandalization and oil bunkering, poverty and youth unemployment are the factors that feed into piracy and oil theft, it is therefore imperative that the Nigerian situation must be fixed before piracy can be managed in the region. If the situation persist in Nigeria, it is almost impossible to see a reduction in piracy act. In other word a more stable and economically prosperous Nigeria will lead to the end of history of piracy and oil theft. Support must be given to the Nigerian state oil sector governance and development.

Given the regional collaboration between ECCA, GGC and ECOWAS, there must be a periodic comprehensive review, updating and possible harmonization of their (domestic) legislation pertaining to piracy and other maritime crimes to plug legal loopholes that criminals can exploit to avoid conviction. Such robust legislation will contribute to effective prosecution of pirates and individuals financing or facilitating illicit maritime activities. The limited naval and coastguard capacities of Gulf of Guinea States coupled with the presence of huge foreign investments in the region demands that the international community sustains critical interventions to improve maritime security in the region. While issues of national security and sovereignty have often frustrated efforts at global or regional approach in dealing with maritime insecurity, the escalation of piracy is making collaboration possible amongst regional political and military leaders that once viewed partnership with suspicion and apathy. The international community therefore should support the region with capacity building of maritime security forces, maritime awareness facilities and vessels to enhance presence at sea towards combating maritime criminality. It could also assist in fighting maritime criminality through the adoption of an international instrument that will, among other things, prohibit trade in stolen oil and blacklist shipping lines found to be involved in maritime illegality.

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CHINA-DJIBOUTI'S BILATERAL RELATIONS: A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE THREATENING SOVEREIGNTY?

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Abstract

Bilateral relations remain a controversial concept as regards its impacts on the developing nations. This paper investigated China's financial assistance for Djibouti's infrastructural development focusing on the threat it poses to its sovereignty. It adopted descriptive research method, extracted information using secondary sources of data and used dependency theory and realist theory as its theoretical frameworks of analysis. The paper observed that bilateral relations has evolved over a period of time and is rapidly connecting the economies of countries within the international political economy, trying to benefit the less developed nations. It however, contended that within the context of bilateral interaction, the developing nations have limited powers to challenge the big powers with their hegemonic and economic injustices. Specifically, it averred that the terms of agreement of Chinese financial assistance have certain provisions meant to ensnare Djibouti, which makes it somewhat detrimental to its sovereignty. The findings revealed that the infrastructural investments injected by China into Djibouti's economy are staggering thus capable of placing Djibouti in a debt-trap. The paper thus recommended, among others, that the leadership of Djibouti should sum up the political will to confront the problem of underdevelopment by sourcing funds from its domestic environment. It should also embark on massive industrialisation and diversification of its economic base with a view to increasing its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and thus become self-reliant.

Keywords: Bilateral relations, China-Djibouti, Financial assistance, Sovereignty, Threat.

Introduction

Bilateral relation is regarded as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that cuts across economic, cultural, social, technological interactions as well as political relations of nations and has attracted wide attention of the social scientist, journalists, diplomats, and other stakeholders (Hettne, 2005). It is a process of transforming the developing nations of the world in contemporary era into more developed entities in a rapid manner. It is one of the instruments of enhancing the development of nations globally today, especially in the economic sector, trying to increase the relevance of synergy of efforts of nations in the development of nations worldwide. It is therefore, perceived as a mechanism of banishing poverty and bringing development and posterity to the developing nations of the world (Ugwuja, 2016).

Though bilateral relations in form of financial assistance for infrastructural development could be said to have contributed to the development and progress of many nations, nevertheless, it has not added more value for many developing nations (Hamidu, Jelilov, Isik & Akyuz, 2020). For instance, developing nations of Africa remain perpetually engrossed in a crisis of politics and underdevelopment, either because of the strings attached to these financial assistance (Mahlaba, 2019) or due to the fact that more often than not, the big capital nations always exploit the weak nations through capital imperialism (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011) and the concomitant debt-trap clauses or conditions contained in the financial assistance agreement (Addis, Asongu, Zuping, Addis & Shifaw, 2020). Thus, many African nations that entered into financial assistance agreements with big powers have often been manipulated by them. This is basically owing to their relatively weak position in consideration of their share in the global trade and wealth (Seteolu & Aje, 2018). Many African nations such as Kenya, Zambia and Uganda that went into these dealings have been in a precarious situation.

The economies, politics, culture and technical advancement of developing nations like Djibouti are perceived as being characterised by narrow resource base, mono-culture and disarticulation, among others. Invariably, the country could not raise sufficient capital to adequately finance its infrastructural development. Hence, developed nations and the international financial institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) are prescribed to help developing nations improve on their infrastructural facilities and expand their industrial base. Bilateral relations are thus conceived as instruments of helping a poor or developing nation to develop, empower its citizenry and banish poverty. Scholars like Furukawa (2018), Haderiansyah, Habibah, Setiawan and Hayat (2020) and Were (2018) argue that the process of implementing this financial assistance for infrastructural development often pose serious challenges to the economic and political sovereignty of the developing nations because of the terms of its contents, its overbearing exploitative nature and the concessional clause, which often sweeps away the developing nations' sovereign power over their economy, politics and security.

In line with the quest for development, Djibouti through bilateral relations accepted financial assistance for infrastructural development, especially its transportation facilities like roads, rail system and sea ports from China. This assistance is in form of loans and grants. With a view to safeguarding its investments in Djibouti, China pressed for the establishment of a military base in the country. When it became perceptibly difficult for Djibouti to repay its debts, China began to influence the decisions-making process of Djibouti's leadership, thereby intervening with its sovereignty to the detriment of the country. Against the background of the foregoing, this paper examined China's financial assistance for Djibouti's infrastructural development focusing on the threat it poses to its sovereignty.

Conceptual Clarifications

Bilateral Relations

Bilateral relation is regarded as relations involving two independent nations having equal status. It cuts across various segments of governmental business, ranging from economic, social, technological, cultural and even political dimensions. It is often held that no nation, no matter how powerful in terms of its economy and military might or the development in politics could be an island on itself. It is bound to interact and relate with other nations of the world no matter the miniaturisation of its dimension. This is basically due to the comparative advantage of every nation on the production of goods and services. This is why advanced democracies and developed economies like the USA and China for instance, still find it more convenient to relate with the small nations of the world.

Financial Assistance

Financial assistance is often regarded as all forms of assistance be it capital, goods and services rendered is directed towards fast-tracking the overall development of the individual, group or a nation but perspectives on financial assistance are as multifarious as scholars and financial analysts. Financial assistance, in bilateral or multilateral dealings, which is often interchangeably referred to as foreign aid, is regarded as international transfer of capital, goods or services from a donor-country or international organisation for the sole purpose of assisting the citizenry of the recipient country to live a meaningful life. At times, it may involve technical advice, training and other resources like military equipment. Suffice to say that most of the financial assistance offered by China to Djibouti is for infrastructural development.

Infrastructural Development

Literature is replete with different perspectives on the definition of infrastructure (Baldwin & Dickson, 2008; Aschauer, 1989). Infrastructure is conceived as basic facilities which enhance and sustain production and

distribution of goods and services. They include transport facilities like roads, rail system, sea ports and airports. Others include water supply, telecommunications equipment, as well as energy generation, transmission and distribution equipment. Invariably, infrastructure constitutes the backbone of production and distribution systems (Nedozil, Obasanmi & Ighat, 2014). Therefore, any investment in infrastructure is expected to hasten trade and connectivity within the domestic environment of a nation and the outside world.

On the other hand, development has been offered various definitions by many scholars like Seer (1972), Anderson and Woodrow (1988) and United Nations (1987). Generally, it is regarded as improvement in human conditions, but specifically, it is an attack on the evil confronting the modern world today, which includes malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, diseases, slums, inequality and insecurity. In essence, it is directed towards living a long and healthy life, getting educated and enjoying decent standard of living.

Infrastructural development therefore implies the development of infrastructure such as the roads, rail system, sea port and the airport. It also involves the improvement in the quality and expansion of water supply, power generation, transmission and distribution and that of the communication sector. In view of the significant role which infrastructure plays in the development of the citizenry and the nation at large, any deficit in such vital sector will no doubt hinder or retard the growth and development of Djibouti. This realisation therefore necessitated Djibouti's search for funds and specifically the Chinese loans for its infrastructural development.

Sovereignty

There are varied perspectives about the concept of sovereignty and this has given rise to several definitions of the concept in different contexts. Sovereignty simply means to rule over as derived from old French concept (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros & Jones, 2003). Sovereignty is described as those characteristics of the state, by virtue of which it cannot be legally bound except by its own or limited by any power other than itself (Jellineck, cited in Agarwal, 2009). It is conceived as the sovereign political power vested in him whose acts are not subject to any other and whose will cannot be over-ridden (Grotius, cited in Agarwal, 2009). By implication therefore, the sovereignty of a nation, which vested in its leadership cannot be influenced by foreign countries, bodies and institutions.

Sovereignty exhibits certain characteristics such as permanence, exclusiveness, inalienability, all-comprehensiveness and indivisibility. Others are absoluteness, originality, unity and imprescriptibly (Agarwal 2009). Therefore, in accord with the foregoing, Wall (2012) averred that sovereign state should be able to make its political, economic and social life following its values and without external effect or coercion. In exchange, it has a moral obligation to protect and extend its

citizens' political, economic and social rights. Karen (1999, cited in Onwe & Nwogbaga 2015), thus concurred that sovereignty is expressed as the authority of the state, based on recognition by other states and non-state actors, to govern matters within its own borders that affect its people, economy, security, and form of government.

Sovereignty could therefore be perceived as the quality of state power to be supreme in relation to any other existing social power within its territorial limits and independence compared to the power of any state or international body. This is in tandem with the perception of Vrabie (1995, cited in Maftai, 2015) that sovereignty consists in the quality being expressed in the State's right to freely determine, without any interference from the outside, the purpose of his activities internally and externally, the fundamental tasks, which it has to fulfill and the necessary means to achieve them, respecting the sovereignty of other states and international law provisions.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopted two theories, namely dependency theory and realist theory as framework of analysis for this work. It is worth emphasising that while the dependency theory explains Djibouti predisposition to development and essence of accepting China's loans, the realist theory gives an insight into the economic and political calculations of China in the Djibouti-China bilateral deal.

The dependency theory emerged in the 1950s from a programme organised under the supervision of Raul Prebisch, President of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UNCLA). The programme sought to proffer a lasting solution to economic backwardness of the underdeveloped countries, which exported primary commodities to developed nations. These developed nations then manufactured products out of those commodities and sold them back to the poor countries (in high prices) (Sule, Yahaya, Ating & Rabiou 2019).

Prebisch prescription suggested that poor countries should embark on programmes on import substitution to stop importing finished products from the rich countries. The poor countries can still sell their primary products, but they do not need to buy almost everything from the rich countries. This situation will enable them to boost their foreign reserves and domestic earnings. The theory came to be seen as a clearer explanation of the apparent poverty, dependency, and backwardness of the poor countries of the world (Etudaiye, 2014).

Other scholars such as Paul Baran (1957), Andre Gunder Frank (1978), Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Dos Santos, and Emmanuel Wallerstein from the Latin America joined the debate in the mid and late 1950s. African scholars such as Samir Amin, Walter Rodney, Bade Onimode and Claude Ake (1981) also contributed to the illumination of the theory in the 1960s. Assumption of this theory is based on the fact that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same

coin and that it is the long-standing relationship between developing nations and Europe that led to underdevelopment of the former by the latter. Therefore, imperialism has been the major cause of dependency of developing nations through capitalist domination of an asymmetrical trade, which resulted in the present predicaments of developing nations in the present era of bilateral relations.

From the foregoing above, the theory suggests that underdevelopment emanated from the failure of developing nations in utilising their resources for their benefit. It also advocates that poor countries are dependent on the capitalist world because they were being forced into such relationship, which made them incapable of competing freely at the international market. Equally, it blamed the diversion and exploitation of resources of the poor countries on the collaboration of the local elite (Sule, Yahaya, Ating & Rabi, 2019).

In its application to this paper, it is assumed by the theory that developing countries were underdeveloped and made dependent on capitalist countries because of the unequal economic and political relationship that took place through bilateral relation that started many years ago. Thus, the theory identifies and analyses why the present bilateral relation still maintains such structure and its effect on the sovereignty of developing countries, keeping these countries poor, underdeveloped, subservient, dependent and backward in all ramifications.

The dependency theory has been criticised for its low level of policy implications. The solutions preferred by the theory as an anti-dote seemed impracticable and have failed woefully. Many poor countries attempted the approach but the forces of bilateral relation overwhelmingly compelled them to change. Hence, the theorists are over-ambitious in their pragmatism concerning how the Third World countries can approach development issues and economic problems. Furthermore, the theory has totally neglected the beneficial aspect of the relationship between the poor countries and the capitalist ones in the relationship (Sule et al, 2019; Brewer 2001). In spite of these flaws, the theory is still relevant to this study in the sense that it is the drive for development that constrained Djibouti to seek assistance from China thereby entering into a relationship of dependency.

On the other hand, the origin of realist theory, which emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international relations is often traced to Niccolo Machiavelli while its early modern form is traceable to Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* of 1651 (Elshtian, 1992). Modern realism as a formal discipline in international relations did not arrive until World War II while its evolution was partly fueled by Hans Morgenthau (*Politics among nations*). Other scholars that contributed to our understanding of the theory include George F. Kennan, E. H. Carr, Raymond Aron, Barry Buzan, John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz (Osborn, 2009).

Realists assert that the state is the principal institution that can guarantee stability and order in any anarchical environment. Therefore, sovereignty is an uncompromising value, the product of an independent political community, which acts as the sole authority over its territorial arrangement. From the viewpoint of power, force justifies the decisions taken within the state, which competes in a rational way with other states to stabilise the system. It corresponds to a fixed vision of international reality based on political geography that disregards the real capabilities for action by other actors or through institutional collaboration (Manfredi-Sánchez, 2020).

Some advocates of this theory argue that a dominant state can bring stability to world order. The hegemony state (presently the US or G7/8) maintains and defines international rules and institutions that both advance its own interests and at the same time curtail conflicts between other states. Thus, bilateral relation is usually designed by nations, usually big powers, as a strategy in the struggle for economic and political power between several competing states in contemporary international politics. In such debate, emphasis is placed on the activities of states like Britain, China, France, Japan and the USA. Thus, the realists highlight the issues of power, power struggles and the role of states in instituting global relations (Pooja, n.d). Therefore, from realists' perspective, bilateral relations reflect the hegemonic influence of the major powers in international politics and they tend to see proximity creating vulnerability, which leads to conflict (Mearsheimer, 2001).

The realist theory has been criticised on many grounds. For instance, bilateral relations to some extent are considered to be antithetical to territorial states. States, they say, are not equal in bilateral dealings, while some are dominant; others are subordinate in the process. But the realists fail to understand that everything in bilateral relations does not come down to the acquisition, distribution and exercise of power. Also, bilateral relations have cultural, ecological, economic and psychological dimensions that are not reducible to power politics. (Pooja, n.d).

In contemporary world, nations strive to maximise opportunities and benefits derivable from bilateral dealings and it is always considered within the framework of national interests. Big nations like China therefore tend to be guided by the desire to realise their national interests without necessarily minding the consequences such realisation might inflict on developing nations.

The dependency and realist theories are applied in this paper with a view to justifying that Djibouti leaders see the adoption of dependency theory as way of getting out of their developmental challenges and achieving their infrastructural development goals. However, in the realist view, the big nations like China see the opportunity of engaging in bilateral relation with Djibouti as an avenue of attaining their national interest in terms of economic gains, influence and prestige at the international arena.

History of China-Djibouti Bilateral Relations and Djibouti's Quest for Financial Assistance

China-Djibouti diplomatic relations began in 1979 and emphasis is placed on bilateral relations because of Djibouti's intention of fast tracking its infrastructural development. China's efforts at assisting Djibouti started with donation of city facilities such as hospital, government buildings, and sporting equipment. Though China did not focus on humanitarian aid, which is critical to the citizenry, its infrastructural contributions are no doubt evident (Wana et al, 2020). However, in spite of these early infrastructural initiatives, the bilateral dealings between the two nations were relatively scanty.

The scenario changed after the late Djiboutian president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon's three visits to China between 1979 and 1999. By the early 2000, the tempo of diplomatic interactions and bilateral engagements increased significantly. As a result of the changes in the geo-politics of the region, for instance, the breakaway of Eritrea from Ethiopia, which necessitated the cutting away of its expanding economy from the Red Sea, Djibouti took the advantage to become the gateway port to inner Africa and the Red Sea in the 21st century.

Suffice to say that China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has strengthened its maritime trade expansion in the Middle East tremendously while its anti-piracy efforts have equally increased its naval presence in the region from 2008. These Chinese aspirations were heartily accepted by the current Djiboutian president who came to power in 1999. President Guelleh of Djibouti wanted to maximize the opportunities provided by the Chinese initiatives in the region to hasten infrastructural development and expansion of investment in Djibouti with the aspiration of turning Djibouti into "Africa's Singapore" (Brautigam, 2020).

Suffice to say that many developing nations of the worldwide including Djibouti that are considered to be resource-deficient have enormous infrastructural challenges and therefore rated low in development index. Those that even possess vast resources in terms of natural and agricultural are constrained to sell their products at a ludicrously low prices, hence could not easily earn good foreign exchange earnings sufficient to finance their infrastructural development.

The economies of Djibouti like many developing nations are often confronted with a lot of challenges such as narrow resource base, mono-culture, disarticulation and the fluctuating prices of products at the international market, among others, which reduce their ability to inwardly raise sufficient funds to finance their infrastructural development. The nation is therefore constrained to look elsewhere for financial assistance to provide infrastructural facilities for their growing population. Thus, it sought assistance from China.

Of the loans secured by many Djibouti to finance their infrastructural facilities, the Chinese loans for infrastructural development appear to be the

most controversial. Chellaney (2017) conceives Chinese loans as debt-trap diplomacy, which offers generous loans to finance infrastructure in the developing nations in order to entangle them in an unsustainable debt-trap and ultimately debt peonage, which compromises their sovereignty. In the light of the foregoing explication, some nations have lost their critical assets to China or have been forced to make concessions to China, which compromised their sovereignty as a result of loan repayment challenges (Furukawa, 2018; Haderiansyah et al, 2020). Instances of this include China's take-over of Sri Lanka's Hambatota port (Furukawa, 2018), Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda International Airport in 2018 and National Power Corporation and Broadcasting Corporation (Guardian Editorial Board, 2021). Also, Kenya's Mombasa port was taken over by China in a bid to recoup its loan when these countries defaulted are clear instances worth mentioning (Hellenic Shipping News, 2019).

Nature of China's Financial Assistance to Djibouti's Infrastructural Development

Though tiny with an estimated population of 1,015,960 in 2022 (Worldometer, 2022), Djibouti lacks the natural resources required for financing its infrastructural development, which is in deficit of alarming proportions. These infrastructural deficits include epileptic power supply, inadequate water supply, pothole-ridden roads and undeveloped sea ports seriously begging for attention.

Traditionally, much of the financial assistance to developing nations generally and African nations in particular has always come from the West and the International financial institutions like the World Bank, IMF and the Paris Club. However, much of this financial assistance has impoverished these countries the more, possibly due to the stiff conditionalities or 'strings' often attached to these facilities. The unpalatable experience of African nations generally (Glen, 2014), especially with the IMF induced Structural Adjustment Programme (Lawal, 2014) is still fresh in memory. These conditionalities expect the benefactor nation to reduce its expenditure on education, health and housing, retrench its workers leading to high unemployment and high inflation rates. The implementation of these conditionalities has often resulted in more terrible challenges and violent conflicts for many borrower nations. These are probably the reasons why African nations, Djibouti inclusive have turned to China as an alternative to the West and its financial institutions in search of financial assistance.

However, it is acknowledged that the Chinese loans contain unusual features such as sovereignty immunity clause, confidentiality clauses, which forbids the nation from stating the amount involved in the loan, prohibiting borrowers from revealing the terms of the loan, giving authorization for lender-controlled revenue account, cancellation, stabilization and acceleration clauses, which are designed to influence the domestic and foreign policies of recipient

nation, informal collateral arrangements, which prioritises repayment of Chinese loans over and above others. These conditionalities are opaque and no doubt interfere with sovereignty of nations (Were, 2018; Gelpert, Horn, Morris, Parks & Irebesch, 2021).

Though to the unversed, financial assistance is sought for the altruistic goal of transforming the recipient from poverty to prosperity, literature on the discourse however, offers a conflicting perceptions on its impact on the recipient politically, economically and socially. While some scholars contend that the injection of aid into the economies of African nations has engendered developmental relations mutual respect within a context of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient nations (Naim, 2009; Moyo, 2009), others such as Adisu, Sharkey and Okoroafor (2010) averred that Sino-African aid relationship has been one-sided, benefiting mainly China.

While some scholars are of the opinion that financial assistance helps to grow the economy of the recipient nation, they did not consider the political context of the facility. One of the factors in the broad category of political context is the issue of sovereignty of the recipient nations. Two schools of thought abound concerning the impact of financial assistance on sovereignty. Scholars of one of the schools of thought like Williamson (2018), Itmi (2018), Williams (2000), Harvey (2003) posit that aid is intrusive to policy choices of the recipients and hence limits their policy autonomy and sovereignty. It thus perceived as a neo-imperialist tool in the hands of donors (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). This is why Wrighton and Overton (2012) opined that through aid, donors operationally undermine states' sovereignty via the exercise of conditionalities and aid dependency.

Sovereignty is often compromised when financial assistance is used to pressurise the recipient country to accede to requests from the donor, which are not in tandem with its interest. For instance, the USA used its financial power in form of aid to pressurize other countries not to support communism in the era of the Cold World (Ifeoma, 2008) without minding whether such aid was beneficial to those countries. Also, China uses aid to dissuade nations from establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, or break relations with it if it has been established. Invariably, a lot of behind the scene arm-twisting takes place in donor-recipient relationship.

A lot of apprehension is being entertained about China's financial assistance in relation to the sovereignty of Djibouti. The first of such apprehension relates to the issue of sovereignty immunity clause enshrined in the terms of the loan. The clause states thus:

the borrower (Djibouti) hereby irrevocably waives any immunity on the grounds of sovereignty or otherwise for itself or its property in connection with any arbitration proceeding pursuant to Article 8(5), thereof with the enforcement of any arbitral award pursuant

thereto, except for military assets and diplomatic assets (Guardian Editorial Board, 2020).

Furthermore, the seizure of a nation's asset is no doubt tantamount to erosion of sovereignty. The Zambia's loss of control of its National Power Corporation and Broadcasting Corporation as a result of default in loan repayment is a classical example of a nation's loss of sovereignty over its critical assets (Guardian Editorial Board, 2021).

The acceptance of the loan term prohibiting the disclosure of the content of the contract is an interference with popular sovereignty through which the citizenry make their leaders accountable. Governance is meant to be open, transparent and accountable while government issues are expected to be discussed in the public domain.

The issue of the seniority clause, which requires borrowers to give priority to the repayment of Chinese loans above other creditors, is against the financial policy autonomy and by extension, the sovereignty of nations. It is in fact interference in the management of the country's debt or the disposal of revenue as the government deems fit.

Another clause of the Chinese loan agreement, which is detrimental to sovereignty, is that the nation's institution, which the loan applies, for instance, sea port authority, as in the case of port development has to submit its strategic plan for the approval of the Chinese Exim Bank. This is the designated institution of the Chinese government that could authorise withdrawal of funds from the account of that investment. Uganda's nasty experience in the case of its Civil Aviation Authorities readily comes to mind in this regard.

Impact of China's Financial Assistance for Infrastructural Assistance on Djibouti's Sovereignty

Though some scholars argued that bilateral relation in terms of financial assistance for infrastructural development contributes immensely to the development of nations globally, other scholars contends that it had hindered the development and growth of a lot of nations, bringing misery to the developing nations of the world (Furukawa, 2018; Haderiansyah et al, 2020; Were, 2018), particularly, the less industrially and technologically developed African countries. One of such countries is Djibouti, which is situated in the Horn of Africa. Given the controversy which Chinese financial assistance for Djibouti infrastructural development has generated, it becomes imperative to investigate the phenomenon with a view to ascertaining whether it interferes with Djibouti's sovereignty or not.

It is instructive to note that much of the developmental projects of that country were financed and handled by China. It is pertinent to emphasise that Beijing's long-term economic interest has become more pronounced after President Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. The vast resources base, rapidly expanding markets and therefore, emerging flourishing economies of

Africa made it attractive region for investment. This development encouraged China to inject billions of dollars in the form of infrastructural investments, foreign loans and aids to African governments through its triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCA) that was established in 2000 (Eom, Brautigam & Benabdallah, 2018).

Due to its strategic location, the World powers began to turn their attention to Djibouti. Countries like USA, France, Japan and China are all contending to have their presence felt in Djibouti because of its strategic geo-political location. This location has been at the centre of international attention for the last the decade (Horn Policy Brief, 2018). For instance, the US established a permanent military base – Camp Lemmonier – on the African continent in Djibouti, for the purpose of accommodating troops operating in that region and the Middle-East at the beginning of terror war in 2001. These troops, which were estimated to be about 4,000, were conducting naval operations, anti-pirate operations, drone strikes and counter-terrorism operations into Somalia and Yemen, among others (Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 2018).

France also established a military base in Djibouti consisting of about 2,000 troops, forming its largest military base in Africa while Japan's only foreign military base in the world is located in Djibouti since 2011 (Horn Policy Brief, 2018). In addition, both Italy and Turkey have military presence in Djibouti. The import of this development is that the presence of many contending foreign powers in such a small country might heighten tension between these powers and even Djibouti. Suffice to say that the different foreign powers have different motivations for putting up the military base and their reaction to the local politics of Djibouti are definitely bound to differ based on the varying vested national interest to be realised by these competing foreign powers.

Above all, in an attempt to use their military base, these foreign powers are likely to come in conflict with the leadership of the host country, who may perceive their action as contradictory and inimical to the realisation of its national interest, thereby, threatening the sovereignty of Djibouti. For instance, the America authority did not request for permission or approval of the government of Pakistan before making use of its military base to attack Osama bin Ladin in Pakistan (This Day, 2011), thus infringing on the sovereign rights of Pakistan's government over its territory.

It is pertinent to emphasise that Djibouti's geostrategic location is critical to the emerging Sino-African relations. It could be recalled that formal diplomatic relations between the two states began in 1979 but gained impetus within the past decades after a large flood of Chinese-financed infrastructure investments and the establishment of Beijing's force oversees military base on Djibouti in 2017 (Eom et al, 2018).

From the point of investment, China perceives Djibouti as an access to greater Africa and its major trading partners. The vintage position of Djibouti, with its proximity to the maritime trading route linking Asia, Africa and Europe, its port facilities and relative political stability provide an ideal transit point for Sino-African trade. It therefore, places the country at a critical nod in Beijing's Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the maritime component of the BRI initiative. China's prominent investments in key Djibouti's infrastructure are illustrated in Table I.

Table I: China's Investment in Infrastructure in Djibouti

S/N	Nature of Investment	Amount	Nature of Assistance	Year
1	Refurbish Ethiopia-Djibouti railway link	US\$1.51 Billion	Loan	2015
2	Doraleh Multipurpose Port			
3	Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipeline			
4	Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (4,800 Hectare Project)	US\$3.5 Billion		2018
5	Construction of Djibouti City Stadium	US\$11 Million	Loan	1991/1993
6	Construction of Palais du Peuple (People's Palace)	US\$10 Million	Loan	1983/1985
7	Food Aid	US\$0.5 Million	Grant	1994
8	Construction of 55 homes	US\$2.6 Million	Loan	1996/1998
9	Construction of wing of Peltier Public Hospital	US\$0.45 Million	Loan	1997
10	Provision of Equipment (military, sports, computers, etc)	US\$5 Million	Grant	1981/2000
11	Construction of Ministry of Foreign Affairs	US\$2.41 Million	Grant	2001/2002
12	Provision of sanitation trucks and equipment	US\$0.678 Million	Grant	2003
13	Construction of Omnisport Centre (Dikhil)	US\$0.91 Million	Grant	2004
14	Art Centre (Girls' orphanage)	US\$0.622 Million	Grant	2004

Source: Compiled by Rosenje, Ogundele & Adeniyi, 2021.

A cursory examination of Table 1 above reveals that the volume of China's financial assistance for infrastructural development in Djibouti is enormously staggering thereby making the relationship between power projection and economic

power as fundamentally tight (Kennedy, 1989). Scholars often argue that power projection can be cloaked in economic development. Large scale Chinese's investment in the economic and infrastructural projects of Djibouti could therefore, be regarded as power projection that is clandestinely designed to serve China's interest rather than that of Djibouti.

In spite of the volume of finances and resources injected by China into the infrastructural development in Djibouti, visible distortion is discernable in its economy. Though the large amount of foreign aids might keep the country afloat temporarily, it should be pointed out that it does not cultivate self-reliant indigenous development (Wan, Zhang, Xue & Xiao, 2019). If one examines the quantum of funds pumped into Djiboutian economy by China, the enormity of such makes it uneasy for repayment, which may constrain China to take over the management of these resources with a view to recouping her funds. This approach could therefore, be regarded as a road to Kigali in reference to the sovereignty of Djibouti. African countries like Kenya, Zambia and Uganda have suffered this fate in the hands of China (Hellenic Shipping News, 2019; George & Lendon, 2018; Horn Policy Brief, 2018).

This perception is corroborated by Mearsheimer 2001, Friedberg 2011 and Deng 2015 who argued that when China grows more preponderant, it will leverage its growing might to impose its will on other states in favour of her interest. They contended further that the relationship between China and developing nations will not always be win-win situations. In concurrent to this, China's Foreign Minister in the first decade of the 21st century, Yang Jiechi bluntly reminded his regional counterparts at the 2010 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Hanoi that China is a big country and other countries are small countries (Pomfret, 2010, cited in Horn Policy Brief, 2018).

In view of the emerging imbalance bilateral relationship between Djibouti and China, a lot of financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank (ADD) warned Djibouti to be conscious of its public debts, which they emphasised, has rocketed from 60.5 per cent of GDP in 2014 to 80 per cent in 2017 (Horn Policy Brief, 2018). Possibly due to the quantum of China's financial presence in Djibouti's economy, some scholars have conceived it as neo-colonial behaviour amounting to the practice of using capitalism and globalisation to influence a developing country (Zhao, 2014).

This bilateral-relation has created a form of dependency, which limits for Djibouti critical decision making and constrains it to accommodate the interest of China that may be detrimental to Djibouti's interest such as repaying China's loan before that of any other country. This situation erodes the powers of Djibouti leadership and fosters loss of its sovereignty to China's increasing assertiveness over the last decades, which invariably poses serious challenges to Djibouti's sovereignty. As a result of this, the Fund for Peace categorised Djibouti as being in a very high warning risk of state collapse (Fund for Peace, 2018).

As a result of some of the grants and aids, loans and bilateral trade agreement entered into with foreign powers, especially China, Djibouti's arms have been twisted and its leadership constrained to doing the bidding of China such as repaying China's debt ahead of any other repayment consideration. This has invariably constituted interference in the internal affairs of Djibouti. For instance, there is always the tendency of foreign powers using their military bases in Djibouti without any resort to seeking approval from Djibouti's government. This has always been the situation in the big powers' power-play not minding the national interest of Djibouti.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper explored the threat of China's financial assistance for infrastructural development to Djibouti's sovereignty. It reviewed the concepts of bilateral relations, financial assistance, infrastructural development and sovereignty, and traced the evolution and trends of bilateral relations in relation to Djibouti. The paper revealed that bilateral relation is initiated for the benefit of both the lending and borrowing countries. However, the paper revealed that bilateral relations often limits the powers of the developing nations to challenge the hegemonic, unjust and plethoric economic injustices of lending nations and this constitutes a major threat to the sovereignty of the developing nations.

Furthermore, the paper divulged that the infrastructural developments made by China in Djibouti's economy and the funds injected into it are staggering. The military bases established in Djibouti by big powers such as China, US, France and other nations also threaten its sovereignty as it is being feared that any of the major powers could use its military base without the express approval of Djibouti's government as was the case of the United States using its military base in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden. After-all, what matter most in international politics is the realisation of national interest.

The paper thus concluded that the dwindling income generation possibility accentuated by Covid'19 pandemic and other perceived economic downturn facing Djibouti may make it default in the repayment of these enormous loans. This may inevitably constrained China to take over some of these infrastructures leading to the erosion of a large chunk of Djibouti's sovereign powers as a nation. This is thus a warning signal to other African nations like Nigeria to be cautious of and not fall a prey to the financial assistance of the great powers, which are crafted with terrible conditionalities. In order to ensure that Djibouti does not fall into China's trap, the following recommendations are made:

1. Djibouti should promote Pan-Africanism by creating stronger regional ties through extensive trade agreements, military cooperation, and good neighbourliness, with a view to strengthening its domestic economy and enhancing its infrastructural facilities.

2. The leadership of Djibouti should sum up the political will to confront the problem of underdevelopment by embarking on massive industrialisation and diversification of the economic base with a view to increasing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the nation, expanding its infrastructural facilities and becoming self reliant.
3. Djibouti needs to look inward for indigenous policies and programmes of development that are peculiar to them and avoid total reliance on and acceptance of China's hidden clauses on loan negotiations.
4. Djibouti should reduce dependence on foreign powers keeping an eye on the public debt because dependency limits critical decision-making and makes countries more likely to accommodate the interests of foreign powers that may be detrimental to the host country.
5. Djibouti should leverage and reduce foreign troop presence towards avoiding potential neo-colonial situation and as well design a mechanism to mitigate a potential attack and clash of interests between rival military bases.

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THE INTRICATE OF GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Globalization as a development concept and strategy is all-encompassing and transnational in orientation and strategy with far-reaching implications on the social-, cultural, economic and political development of every nation, especially the developing nations. The major concern of Development administration is to achieve accelerated development in developing nations to meet up with the developed nations. Achieving the objectives of development administration given the trend in globalization seems to be a major challenge in Nigeria. The quest to achieve development seems to be a herculean task in Nigeria, despite its endowments in human and natural resources. Using qualitative data derived from secondary sources, the paper examines the trend or intricacies in globalization as it affects efforts at achieving the objectives of development administration in Nigeria. Content analyses of the data collected reveal that globalization no doubt has its positive and negative impacts on the Nigeria Economy. However, the negative impacts are more obvious with great consequences on the quest to achieve the objectives of development administration in Nigeria. The paper suggests that the government should exercise the political will to encourage indigenous industry and technology by creating the right environment, among others.

Keywords: Development; Development Administration, Globalization, Nigerian Economy

Introduction

The quest to achieve development constitutes the primary goal of every country in the world. The focus is to achieve accelerated development in a competitive environment brought about by globalization. The trend in globalization, especially, the ongoing revolution in ICT, has greatly influenced human behaviour, governance of the state, institutions whether public or private

among others. The world has become a global village due to the nature of international trade which transits all border barriers. The I.C.T (i.e. the internet) has made communication very easy, thus making the world much closer to each other and international trade and other economic, political and social activities easier. However, globalization seems to have divided the world into two globes (i.e. the powerful and the weak). The powerful are developed highly industrialized nations of the world, while the weak are very poor and non-industrialized, developing nations. The differences between the two poles are obvious especially in the international market as reflected in their bargaining power, economy and trade, utilization of innovative technology among others. The gap seems to be getting wider every day despite the quest by the developing countries like Nigeria to accelerate the pace of development and catch or meet up with the developed nations through development administration.

The whole idea behind the emergence of development administration is the concern for achieving development especially, in the developing countries. It is an array of functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernization and industrialization (Abdulsalami, 1998:6). It is an organized effort to carry out Programmes and projects thought by those involved to serve developmental objectives (Riggs, 1965). Development administration aims to achieve accelerated development objectives in countries bedevilled by diverse social, economic political and administrative constraints. The goal is to overcome those barriers to enable them to catch up with the developing countries. This implies that the strategies involved must be unique and adaptable to the socio-cultural, economic and political realities of the countries involved. The initial strategies were imported into the countries and as such alien to the needs of the people targeted. Thus, they seem to have failed to make the desired impact. This is so judging from the development indexes, i.e. poverty, unemployment, inequality, improved health care delivery, education, infrastructural development, low rate of technological development and industrialization, high rate of insecurity, political stability, good governance, low standard of living, among others.

Globalization as a development strategy is envisaged to help these countries achieve their developmental objectives and goals through cooperative or collaborative efforts of state and non- state actors and agencies of the world. The idea was that through collaborative participation of state and non- state agencies and actors of the world, it would be easier for the developing countries to catch up with the developed ones. Achieving these development objectives seems to be an illusion considering the current trend of globalization. Despite the economic potentials and other forms of collaborations with the developed countries in form of policy ideas, programmes and projects, trade partnership among others, it seems to achieve development equal to that of the developed countries seems to be a mirage. It seems the divide or gap in development

between Nigeria and the developed nations is becoming wider and coupled with what seems to be an unending and devastating nature of the economy and that of the wellbeing of the Nigerian citizens. The issues or reality now is how the developing countries including Nigeria can overcome the challenges posed by globalization to achieving a unique and homegrown development strategy. The questions are: What are the challenges posed by globalization in the efforts at achieving the objectives of development administration in Nigeria? What are the factors responsible for these challenges? How can the country overcome these challenges?

The major objective of this study is to examine the challenges posed by globalization in achieving development objectives in Nigeria. The paper is qualitative research, whereby data collected are qualitatively derived from official publications of international organisations and agencies (both states and non-state (i.e. NGOs) etc), official publications of the government, journals, conference papers, books, and unpublished works, all in hard and soft copies.

Conceptual Clarification

Globalization

The concept of globalization has been vigorously debated among scholars due to the multidimensional nature of the concept. It is a multidimensional phenomenon that not only touches the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of any society but also reshapes the traditional way of studying the social world and human nature (Robinson, 2005). From the economic angle, globalization is viewed as a step towards a fully integrated world market (Strange, 1996). Globalization assumed the world as a global village or a 'borderless world' and driven by private-sector firms, rather than the government (Ohmae, 1990). From the political front, globalization is a march away from the conventional defined concept of the state, with territorial sovereignty and the emergence of non-governmental power players in the world order (Falk, 1997). It emphasizes the territorial demarcation of state jurisdictions and other associated issues of governance, economy, identity and community (Schulte, 1997).

Globalization is often associated with 'intensification of the worldwide social relations', global economic integration, de-territorialization and time-space compression (McGrew, 2008). However, its definition is often more associated with the socio-economic conditions and relations of different countries. Economic "globalization" is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labour) and knowledge (technology) across international borders (IMF, 2002).

Globalization is seen as a continuing process of capital accumulation in modern capitalism that has been going on for centuries, (Farazmand, 1999). In a related manner, Yusuf (2003) defines globalization as a process of creating a global market place in which all nations are increasingly forced to participate. Globalization is the increasing breakdown of barriers and obstacles to the worldwide diffusion of economic ideas, doctrines, products, services, and practices originating from the Western industrialized nations, especially the United States of America USA, (Abutundu, 2000) It is a means of changing the ways of production organized as required by the general dismantling of trade barriers and the free mobility of financial and productive capital (Garrea, 1998). The International Monetary Fund (2000) also reiterates that globalization denotes greater integration of goods, services, and capital between countries in the international system. It is the internalization of production, finance and exchange (Pearson and Rochester, 1998). Aluko (2003) defines globalization as ‘the growing interaction in world trade, national and foreign investments, capital market and the ascribed role of governments in national economics. An all-encompassing definition is given by Massimba et.al. (2004), who see globalization as “an extensive integration of education, production, trade, finance, information across states and societies such that these economic, social-cultural and often political consequences of actions in these realms become increasingly undifferentiated and impact each other across national and regional boundaries”

It is obvious from the above definitions that globalization is focused on economic relations which invariably affects socio-cultural and political relations among states. However, the economic relation portrays a systemic domineering attribute in favour of the economic powerful ones. The operational definition of globalization emphasizes the socio-economic aspects of globalization.

Development Administration

The herculean task of achieving national development, especially in a developing country has been a major concern of governments (both developed and developing) countries and international organizations. In most of these developing countries, the major concern of government is to provide essential social services that will alleviate poverty, unemployment, inequality, squalor, and other necessities of life that will enable the citizens to live a decent life. This is unlike the developed countries where the citizens have attained a high level of a decent life and the pressure on the government is to provide more social services to sustain their high standard of living. The major concern of the government of developing nations is how to surmount these development challenges, achieve some level of modernization and accelerated development that will equal that of the advanced countries. However, achieving the above objectives requires vibrant, strong, and systemic strategies that will match the

conducive environment found in developing countries. It was in line with this reasoning that the idea of Development Administration was initiated. Development Administration focuses on development characterized by innovation, systemic planning, and environmentally friendly, social values and reengineering. It entails an array of functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernization and industrialization (Riggs, 1975). Although development administration was prescriptive from the outset, it has been realized that for the strategy to succeed, it has to put into consideration the socio-cultural, political, economic and administrative realities of the environment it operates.

Meanwhile, to have a proper view of the concept, we need to examine some definitions as given by scholars in the field of development administration. Esman (1969) defines development administration as those activities of government that promote economic growth, strengthen human and organisational capacities, and enhance equality in the distribution of opportunities, income and power. Development administration is the management of policies, programmes and projects to achieve development goals and objectives (Gants, 1979). To Schaffer (1969), development administration is concerned with development policies, programmes and projects in those conditions in which there are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting these demands. The implicit in the above definition is that development administration is a unique developmental strategy systematic initiated and planned, and implemented to overcome the diverse challenges inhibiting all efforts at development in developing countries. This requires an understanding of the peculiarities in these countries in terms of its socio-cultural, political, economic and administrative milieu. This requires a movement from *status quo* to radical change orientation, prescription to experimentation, imitative to innovation, assumption to experiment, and a game of chance to systematic planning and above all, it should be inward-looking rather than outward-dependent.

Development Administration and Globalization (Theoretical Analysis)

Globalization in developing countries has a long history, but its impact on the development of these countries is now a source of concern. Friedman (2004) categorizes the history of globalization into three phases covering specific periods. They are: Globalization 1.0 (1491- 1800); Globalization 2.0 (1800- 2000); and Globalization 3.0(2000-present). The first phase, which he termed globalization of countries, lasted from 1400 until World War I. Over this period, the world shrunk from “Size Large” to “Size Medium”. The second phase of globalization, the globalization of companies, lasted from the end of World War II until the year 2000, as the world shrank from “Size Medium” to “Size Small”. The third and the last phase of globalization called the

globalization of individual is shrinking the world from “Size Small: to Size Tiny”. (Friedman, 2004). According to Friedman, Globalization 3.0 has shrunk the world. It is creating new opportunities and causing new pains. This implies that there are two major players in the globalized world. Those developed countries creating and enjoying opportunities of exploitations and those developing countries feeling the pains of these exploitations. This unequal and exploitative relationship informed the basis of this paper.

One of the critics of globalization is Leo Fink. According to him, the Thomas Friedman –style of globalization has failed and there is the need to replace it with what he calls “Internationalism”. The School rejects the liberal globalization promulgated by Friedman and Mark Zuckerberg or the Pseudo-Protectionism proposed by Trump and Le-Pen. It advocates a new form of international trade, investment and technology transfer that puts workers’ representatives at the decision-making table. It advocates trade relations that bring wages in cheaper-labour countries into closer alignment with those of their developed trading partners. The School advocates an “Internationalism” similar to the original socialist internationalism which centres on Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. To him, what is required today is a similar citizen’s initiative from a variety of source i.e. discrete identity groups, religious communities, labour unions, and professional associations to push a worldwide democratic agenda (Fink, 2017).

The above analysis constitutes the theoretical framework of this paper. This study dwells on the unequal relationship existing between Nigeria, a developing country and some developed countries as a result of the trend in globalization. It examines the socio-economic and political consequences of this relationship in its quest to achieve national development through development administration.

Most developing countries are former colonies to developed Western nations who plundered their colonies for raw materials and human resources that will serve their fast-growing industries in the aftermath of the industrial revolution in 1800. These colonies served as a market base for the products manufactured from these industries. This was the earliest manifestation of globalization and every development strategy or agenda was based on achieving this goal. The second phase was the period when the multinational companies dominated the colonies. Even when the colonies had achieved some level of political independence, they were not economically independent as they still relied on the industrialized countries for survival. The third phase constitutes the period in which the domineering powers of the developed countries continue unabated. The developing countries, including Nigeria, are left to bear the brunt of this form of globalization.

The Intricacies of Globalization in Nigeria

The world is divided along two poles, the developed and the developing nations. The developed nations constitute the highly industrial and modernize, advanced in technology, and prosperous. The developing nations, on the contrary, are still struggling to find their feet in terms of industrialization and economic prospects. Keohane &Nye Jr (2000) also categorized countries in the world into two, i.e. thick and thin. To him, the thick countries are the most influential and neck-deep in the globalization process and they are economically advanced and they are considered as world powers. They include the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan among others. The thin countries according to Keohane .et.al are the less influential ones who only partially participate in the globalization process. They are predominantly made up of countries in Africa and Asia commonly referred to as developing countries. According to Olatoyegun (2009), the relationship between the thick and the thin countries is a mutual one to the extent that the thick ones rely heavily on the labour, raw materials, and even market of the thin ones to survive. While the thin ones, in turn, rely heavily on the manufactured products, technology, and capital of the thick ones to survive.

Most of the developing countries are bedevilled by numerous and diverse developmental challenges as they struggled to overcome the barriers of economic retrogression, poverty, unemployment, inequality, illiteracy, insecurity, low level of infrastructure and inadequate essential socio-economic goods and services like health care, electricity, water, education, good and modernized transport system among others. Development Administration as a development strategy is aimed at bridging the gap between the developing and developed nations. The whole idea behind development administration is to achieve development objectives in countries that are bedevilled by diverse socio-cultural, economic, political and administrative barriers to be like the highly developed countries.

Globalization as a development strategy emphasizes collaboration among nations to achieve development. Economic integration remains the major focus of globalization. The degree of integration, however, differs from country to country and the level of involvement of a country in the processes also determines to a large extent, the level of impact whether positive or negative on a nation. As rightly asserted by Akingbola (2008), the symbiotic relationship between globalization and national development of a country emphasizes all steps taken by a country's leadership to enhance the welfare of its citizens in the face of integrated national economies. *However, the developing nations require their homegrown strategies in collaboration with that emphasize through globalization.*

According to Abutundu (2020), globalization implies the increasing breakdown of barriers and obstacles to the worldwide diffusion of economic

ideas, doctrines, products, services and practices originating from Western industrialized nations and the United States of America. Globalization is the growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people and information (Peterson Institute of International Economic, PIIIE, 2018). In terms of trade relations, the relationship has been that of trade imbalance existing between these two poles. Globalization, no doubt, helps to facilitate trade relations between countries, but the trade relations between the developed and developing nations are often characterized by exploitation and unequal bargaining power. During the colonial era, the country provided free labour to the British plantations through the slave trade in addition to cheap raw materials, while they received in return expensive finished goods (Ikpejor, 2010). In most of the colonies, the emphasis in the area of agriculture was the planting of cash crops that served as raw materials required in their industries using free labour. These raw materials were transported at little cost and turned into finished goods in the industries located in their countries. The finished goods were transported back to the colonies and sold at exorbitant prices. The same trade relations applied in the area of solid minerals. Trade imbalance continued even in the post-colonial era and until today and has taken different dimensions.

Today, international capitalism has become a world order. In other words, the capitalist system has now been graciously accepted as the world economic and political system. This is because virtually all the countries of the world including the so-called strong socialist states like China and Russia are now benefitting from the spoils of capitalism in the form of globalization. The losers are the developing countries who are struggling to tailor their economic and development realities in line with that of capitalism which is contrary to the peculiarities of their environment. Most of these countries are being forced to adopt capitalist ideas or tenets like privatization, revitalization, deregulation, liberalization, democracy among others. The fact remains that the political, economic and social realities in most of these countries including Nigeria are contrary to these tenets of capitalism. These ideas which seem to work efficiently and effectively in most of these developed nations constitute an albatross in most developing countries including Nigeria. Globalization is an advanced form of capitalism today and inevitably in all countries in the world. Nigerian experience with privatization has not yielded the desired results. Apart from the communication sector, efforts at privatizing, liberalizing and commercializing other sectors have resulted in a huge financial loss to the Nigerian economy. Even the Public-Private Partnerships introduced in some sectors of the economy like the ports authority, electricity, and petroleum sector is still a shamble. The amount still allocated by the government to all these

sectors does not justify the efficacy of the Public-Private Partnership in ameliorating the problems in these sectors.

The capitalist idea of free trade has further strengthened the trade imbalance among countries of the world. The current management of the economic policies is in the hands of the Britton Woods and its sisters. The economic policies emanating from them are structured in a way that it protects the interests of the industrial societies. To Iwara, (2004,21), the odds are heavily tilted in favour of the industrialized world given that the current participation of Africa in world trade is only two percent. The activities of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) among others are tailored to protect and ensure the hegemony of the developed industrial countries and not to the benefit of the developing ones including Nigeria. Singh (1985) argued that

the applicability of free trade is limited in the case of developing economy, where a vast segment of the productive resources are still unexploited, with the acute problem of unemployment. A free trade regime to him will further compound these problems by weakening the domestic industries, especially those that lack sufficient competitive powers.

Furthermore, on the trade imbalance between the developed and developing nations, Lumumba (2019) frowned at the trade relationship between the USA with a GDP of 14-15 trillion enterings into a bilateral trade with Lesotho with a GDP of 2 billion. According to him, the revenue generated by a city in the USA alone is more than the revenue generated by Lesotho.

However, developing countries like Nigeria bear the brunt of these economic relations. The world superpowers like Britain, USA, France, Germany, Russia, China and Japan among others have, via globalization, developed their economies by exporting their goods and services to the developing countries without barriers. Nigerian borders until recently were open to the importation of all kinds of goods and services. The agony is that most of these goods are substandard and hazardous to the health of the citizens. Fake items like medical supplies, car parts, food and cosmetics brands, and electrical goods are usually imported into the county. The Nigerian market has become one huge market for expired and substandard food, drugs and sundry products due to the failure of the regulatory agencies (Independent, 2019). The World Health Organisation (WHO) report indicates that one in 10 drugs sold in Africa are fake or substandard. These drugs include the ones that kill or maim (Vanguard, 2019). The same report indicates that counterfeiting has continued unabated in Nigeria and this was not the case some few years back when it witnessed a decrease from 40 percent in 2001 to 16.7 percent in 2015. Also, the West African Health Organisation (WAHO) Report indicates that up to 30

percent of medicines and treatment products circulating in the Nigeria markets are fake and substandard (Vanguard, 2020).

Data from the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration (NAFDAC) reveals that fake foods and drugs worth N4.7 billion were destroyed in 2018 (Vanguard, 20019). Also, not less than 1.32 billion worth of such unwholesome drugs and goods were destroyed in 2019 and 80 percent of them are drugs, while others were cosmetics and other regulated products. (Nairametrics, 2019). WAHO blamed the menace of fake and substandard products on porous borders around the country, which serve as illegal entry points for these products. Nigeria according to WAHO still imports 70 percent of drugs needed for the treatment of common ailments. Furthermore, WHO Report adduces the high incidence of fake products to the lack of political will to implement the National Drug Distribution Policy, chaotic drug distribution system, porous border, illegal importation of counterfeit drugs, weak policies, high corruption perpetrated by officials of regulatory agencies, among others. States notorious for the illegal activities according to Nairametrics, (2019) include Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States of Nigeria.

The irony is that the country has all it takes to produce many of these goods being imported into the country. The importation of all kinds of goods into the country also has a devastating effect on the local industries in Nigeria. As advocated by WAHO, the local manufacturing of drugs production is the only panacea for the total eradication of fake drugs in Nigeria. Thus, globalization has crippled small scale industries in the country. The reliance of indigenous industries on the importation of raw materials from abroad to feed their industries has created unprecedented illusions, and the disappearance of local industries because of exchange rate fluctuations and crack in the world markets.

The local industries are the losers of any fall-out in global economic recessions over the years. For example, Nigeria in the 1970s and 1980s was home to Africa's largest textile industry with more than 180 textile mills and employing over 450,000 people. This industry was supported by the large scale production of cotton in the northern part of Nigeria. Presently, fewer than 30 textile factories are operating in Nigeria, down from 250 in the 1980s. The Ajaokuta Steel Company which was established in 1979 by Shehu Shagari with the Russian expertise is nonfunctional up to 2020. The popular groundnut pyramid in Kano which was once a key part of the Nigerian economy has become non-active/ functional as the site is now a football pitch.

The partnership or collaboration existing between Nigeria and the developed nations which is usually termed "free trade" as a result of globalization is detrimental to the flow of capital with negative consequences on economic growth and development of the local industries in Nigeria. It implies

that there has been an international transfer of income from the poor to the rich countries and that the gains from international trade have gone more to the developed nations at the expense of the developing nations, thereby reducing their level of income and hence their capacity for development (Oloyemi, 2010). Capital flight is a large-scale exodus of financial assets and capital from a nation due to events such as political or economic instability (Boboye, 2012). Financial globalization allows the free movement of capital from one country to the other. This has increased the rate of capital flight from Nigeria to other countries of the world. Many studies undertaken to assess the implications of capital outflow or capital flight on the Nigerian economy indicates a negative impact on the economy (Boboye, 2012, Ifedayo & Olawale, 2015, Igwemma et.al, 2018). According to Bredino et.al. (2018), Nigeria loses about \$10billion annually to capital flight, which is the highest compared to other countries, especially countries that are contemporaries with Nigeria, like Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa. This negatively affects the GDP and reduces the capital available for investment in the country that can be used to boost economic activities in the country. It also increases the debt profile in the country. The effect of external debt on the rate of capital flight has been a concern. A situation where the money comes in in the form of external debt and gets out of the country in the form of private investment or capital flight has been a major issue in Nigeria. Due to the high rate of corruption in Nigeria, external borrowing has been a major conduit for capital flight in Nigeria thus affecting national development.

The globalization has further divided the nations into two i.e. the producing and the consuming nations. The developing countries are mere consuming nations of goods produced by the developed nations. Most of these developing nations including Nigeria are exporters of primary products and importers of manufactured products. They export primary products to the industrial developed nation who in turn turned them into finished goods and export them back to the developing countries. For instance, Nigeria is a major producer of crude oil being the fifth largest producer in the world (Nordeas, 2020).

Unfortunately, despite the availability of crude oil, it still depends on developed nations for essential commodities produced from crude oil. Crude oil products imported into the country include petrol, diesel, kerosene, gasoline among other related products. The irony is that the country has five crude oil refineries capable of producing these essential crude oil products. But unfortunately, most of the refineries are either producing below capacity or are completely grounded. The high importation of petroleum product further aggravates the high rate of importation in the country which has increased overtime.

According to the Economic Complexity Index, Nigeria, being a commodity-dependent economy, is the 52nd largest importer in the world and commodities like wheat, corn, rice, raw sugarcane, dairy products consume over \$22bn of foreign exchange annually (Proshare, 2017). According to Adesanoye (2018), a total of \$44.32 billion worth of goods were imported into the country, from 2010 to 2017. The total import as of December 2019 according to statistics was N1.759 billion. Statistics indicate that goods imported include manufacturing products, 54.4 percent; solid minerals goods, 63.8 percent; raw material goods, 13.2 percent; energy goods, 68.5 percent; and agricultural goods, 1.4 percent. A breakdown of the imports shows that industrial goods, with 27.8 percent, capital goods 23 percent, food and beverages 17 percent, fuel and lubricants, 14 percent, transport equipment and parts 12 percent and consumer goods 7 percent. Also, the share of the import per continent indicates that 43 percent of the total imports are from Asia, 34 percent from Europe, 15 percent from America and 7 percent from Africa (TRADING ECONOMICS, 2019).

To Adesonyu (2018), the high taste of foreign goods among Nigeria is a major attribute of this high importation. Nigeria virtually imports all kinds of goods, including common products like matches, blade, toilet tissue, toothpick among others. Nigeria has become a dumping ground for second-hand products including clothes, shoes, electronics, and household facilities among others. Nigeria imports virtually every good into the country even though these products can be locally produced within the country. Most of the products have been banned from being imported into the country by the government but, they still find their way into the country via illegal routes

The effects of high importation include forex scarcity due to demand for importation which, in turn, depreciates the value of the naira; unfavourable trade balance; the collapse of local industries; loss of jobs; and high cost of goods produced in Nigeria due to inflow of low-priced foreign goods imported into the country (Adesanoye, 2018). The high rate of goods importation has helped to kill the local industries, paralyzed indigenous technology and increase the prices of goods and services. The cost dimensions of importation as enunciated by the World Bank (2014) include preparation of relevant documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, custom's brokers' fees, terminal charges and inland transportation among others (Trading Economics, 2014). The high cost of importation naturally results in high prices of imported goods. The country is a mere consuming nation with grave consequences on the economy and national development in Nigeria. Most Nigerians do not see the need to patronize made in Nigeria goods since these goods or services whose prices compare with the ones imported into the country are substandard. Therefore, they result in patronizing foreign products. This idea has stunted economic development in the country because small and medium

scale enterprises will not get the required patronage which can help them to produce more. Agyapong (2010) asserts that MSMEs contributes over 65 percent of total employment in high-income countries, 70% of total employment in low-income countries and 95% of total employment in any economy. To him, MSMEs account for 84% of the total employment rate in Nigeria. The collapse of MSMEs in Nigeria has further aggravated the unemployment and poverty rate in Nigeria.

According to PIIE (2019), there are three dimensions of globalization, which include technology, transportation and internal cooperation. At the heart of globalization is the advancement in science and technology. With the revolution of information technology, globalization is considerably changing human behaviour, governance of state and administration of businesses much greater than the industrial revolution transformed the agricultural society. One of the indices by which a nation's growth and advancement can be measured is by her technological endowment and not by the level of her endowment in natural and human resources. A nation's economic efficiency is determined, measured, compared, classified and ranked by its technological advancement (Isioto et al, 2017). Technology is the driving force of globalization. It is a major distinguishing factor between the developed and the developing countries. At the heart of globalization is the advancement and transfer of technology. Yusuf (2003) believes that through the internet, globalization allows access to ideas on new things and best practices in all areas of endeavours. For instance, new design, production technology, new managerial practices etc., are made available to people, thereby enabling them to change their old practices. Lack of technological advancement has affected all efforts at industrialization, transportation, infrastructure, economy, science, education, agriculture, administration among others in Nigeria. Factors responsible for this include the relegation of indigenous knowledge, transfer of inappropriate technology, selfish control of transfer of technology by the donor nations, lack of purposive leadership, neglect of research and innovation, among others.

But the fact remains that Nigeria lacks indigenous technology that can meet up with her own developmental needs. Various factors are responsible for the lack of indigenous technology in Nigeria. They include porous infrastructural base, a high index of corruption, lack of purpose leadership, Government attitude towards policy implementation, deficient industrial policies after independence among others (Isioto et. al, 2017). Globalization has led to the overreliance on foreign technology to the detriment of the indigenous ones including the areas where the country has a comparative advantage. Most of the technology required to achieve or accelerate national development are imported into the country from the developing countries thereby subjecting the country to the control and dictates of the developed nations.

It is expected that when multinational corporations invest in a country, they create employment opportunities. They account for increased income and expenditure in the community of the host country thereby stimulating growth. Workers also get benefit from technology transfer as new machinery are imported into the host country. This was not the case in Nigeria. A study undertaken by Momoh, (2015) on the activities of Multinational Corporations in Africa indicates that Africa has lost huge resources to the high level of corruption and illicit deals perpetrated by the MNCs and corrupt government officials. These MNCs according to him offer bribes to government officials in African countries to secure contracts. The same study shows that within 1994-2002, Halliburton, one of the MNCs operating in Nigeria, gave more than \$180 million bribes to some top Nigerian government officials to secure contracts. The proliferation and activities of these multinational corporations in Africa have raised a significant question on how to deal with the impact of multinational corporations on Africa's development (Zekeri, 2015). In Nigeria, these multinational corporations in collaboration with some unscrupulous private and public servants are known to have involved in the illegal extraction of solid minerals and oil thereby shortchanging the revenues which should accrue to the country. Also, they are involved in money laundering activities by transferring illegal money gotten through corruption by public officials in the country to their metropolitan countries and used to develop their industries. For instance, the Late Gen. Sani Abacha was able to loot N1.073 trillion which were saved in a Swiss account and was recently recovered. According to Ambassador Robert Balzerretti, the head of Swiss delegation to GFAR, in an interview with BBC asserts that the Swiss government has paid 700 million dollars of Abacha loot to the Nigeria government in the last 10 years. To him, an outstanding 320 million dollars which constitute the last part of the money on Swiss soil will be remitted in the next 2-3 years (BBC News, 2017) The late General was able to loot this huge amount of money in collaboration with foreign firms and their governments.

Also, the role of the international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Chinese Bank has further subjected the developing countries to the dictates of the developed countries. These financial institutions were established to safeguard the interest of both the developed and the developing countries, but according to Isa (2010), they are guilty of collaborating with the former at the detriment of the later. In given loans to Nigeria, these financial institutions give stringent conditionality that is alien to the peculiarities of the environment and detrimental to the development of the nation and the general wellbeing of the citizens. A vivid example is the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) imposed on Nigeria by the World Bank and IMF in 1985. The conditionality not only destroyed the economy of Nigeria but brought untold hardship to the majority of the Nigerian citizens. The

country up till now has not recovered from the negative consequences of SAP. The country has continued to dance to the tune of these international financial institutions as they dictate the country's developmental policies and programmes. Also, these loans are not judiciously utilized and thereby adding to the huge debt burden the country is battling with. As at April 2019, the total debt was N23.3 billion and more than 15 percent of the annual budget is used to service these loans.

Conclusion

Globalization has come to stay and it will remain until the world finds a better means of collaboration. The fact is that the world has become a global village where all the countries of the world are growing and developing as a single unit. With globalization, the world is seen as a system in which all subsystem(countries), even though they are independent, must co-exist and collaborate to enable whole system (world) operate well (develop). In conclusion, the effect of globalization on development administration in developing nations, especially in Nigeria, is in both negative and positive dimensions. In the positive, it can bring about employment opportunities, increase in income and expenditure, stimulation of growth and new technological innovation. The ICT through technological advancement has made communication, trade and other forms of collaborative activities in the world easier and faster. Yusuf (2003), believes that through the internet, globalization allows access to ideas on new things and best practices in all areas of endeavours. In the same vein, Bayo (2000) and Salimono (1999) assert that globalization offers developing countries like Nigeria the opportunities to create wealth through the export-led growth, expand international trade in goods and services and gain access to new ideas, technologies and institutional designs. This implies that the benefits of globalization are expected to permeate every political, economic, technological and socio-cultural facet of Nigeria. But unfortunately, this has not been the case in Nigeria.

The negative dimensions of globalization are more vivid in the country. These include the killing local industry, unnecessary importation of fake and substandard goods, lack of indigenous technology, high rate of corruption in collaboration with foreign firms and their government, erosion of self-confidence on indigenous goods and services by the citizens and their government, high health risk associated with some goods, among others. Nigeria is now at the mercy of these advanced nations for its survival.

Recommendations

Given the findings and conclusions, the paper, therefore, recommends the following;

1. There is the need for a paradigm shift from the kind of public administration based on maintaining *status quo*, rigidities, and legalities to a dynamic, flexible and change and market-oriented one. The government should borrow a leaf from operations and *modus operandi* of the market and result-oriented public service in China. China has now dominated the world economy using its public service.
2. Similar to the above, merit should be placed above other considerations in recruitment and appointments into the public service institutions. Also, there is the need for the adequate reward for labour that will boost the morale of the public officials to sincerely put in their best in their various callings.
3. The government political –will is required to make the Nigerian educational system more qualitative and effective. The fact remains that qualitative education is the driving force of globalization. Nigeria cannot compete favourably in the global world without its citizens acquiring sound and qualitative education. Even the drive towards indigenous technological advancement, research and development is based on a qualitative educational system. Quality and sound education would enable Nigerians to participate and be a major player in the global world, rather depending on foreign initiatives and expertise. Also, effective education requires investment in terms of finance, manpower, infrastructure among other resources.
4. Investment in Research and Development (R&D). The dynamism inherent in the emergence of new technology makes it important for the Nigeria government to make Research and Development (R&D) an utmost priority. R&D is a major ingredient of technological advancement. Technological advancement remains the weapon to be a key player in the global world. Nigeria cannot compete favourably in the international arena despite her resource endowments without advancement in technology. Technological advancement is required in the quest to achieve industrialization and self-reliance.
5. Also, there is a need to develop indigenous technology. The owners of technology will not give it free. No knowledge is new, old knowledge is recreated and modernized. So, it is not a crime to improve on our indigenous technology by borrowing and building on the ones from the advance countries. China and other Asian Tigers did it and today they are giants in the modern world. Therefore, the government should encourage and support creativity and innovation to develop indigenous technology.
6. The government should ensure that plans, policies and programs geared towards achieving national development should be home-grown. A sound –economic policy that is self-reliance is especially

required for Nigeria to make progress that will affect the standard of living of the citizens. It should be suitable and adaptable to the peculiarities of the environment and in consonance with the needs of the people and the intended beneficiaries. Any form of policy imposition by a foreign government or international institutions based on whatever guise or condition should be rejected.

7. Modern infrastructure development is a necessary ingredient to achieve industrialization and economic development. There is the need to develop a modern transport system like roads, railways, waterways, airways, power and communication.
8. The need for a more proactive and sincere approach to the fight against corruption. There is a symbiotic relationship between corruption and underdevelopment in Nigeria. The little gains that could have been derived from globalization were erased by the high level of corruption in the country. As such, government at all levels needs to be courageous and sincere in leading the fight against corruption in the country. This is required in every facet of the nation to achieve national development and be taken seriously in the world.
9. Nigeria requires proactive, knowledgeable and visionary, honest and selfless leaders to drive the wheel of progress in the country. Good governance is what is required to develop Nigeria. Countries like Singapore, Indonesia, China, North Korea, and Rwanda among others, have achieved greatness because of the kind of leaders they have overtime. Some of them are now major players in the international arena. Nigeria can be great with the right kinds of leaders that possess these attributes.
10. Finally, there is a need for value re-orientation. Nigerians require the right values to develop as a nation. There is the need to imbibe the value of hard work, creativity, honesty, loyalty, selflessness, unity of purpose, the quest for merit, among others. These values among others constitute the building blocks for laying the right foundation for a just society and national development.

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**THE DEMISE OF PARTY SUPREMACY IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH
REPUBLIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE**

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Abstract

The principle of party supremacy is the kernel with which political parties streamline their members behind their collective/general decision on a particular programme. In particular, those who flew their flag to earn their positions in the legislative and executive arms of government were usually expected to implement and not deviate from such decisions. At its sacrosanct best, party supremacy should however not violate the tenets of democracy and the constitution of the country. The objective of this paper is to examine how the issue of party supremacy degenerated to personalization of power and authority by the President and Governors in the Fourth Republic which ultimately enthrone domination of the executive in the power equation. The methodology of this paper was the qualitative approach using the Key Informants Interview (KII) technique and consultation with Books, Journals, Newspapers and other literature. The major finding was that in the era of President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 -2003, he appropriated the levers of power by using the proximity of the Chief Executive to the purse, security and bureaucratic apparatuses to overwhelm the structure of the ruling party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). He also interpolated the wishes and intention of the presidency to dictate the conduct of executive-legislative relations. This inadvertently resulted in imbalance of power between the legislature and the executive which replicated itself at the sub-national level in the country as the Governors also exercised sovereignty over the state legislatures. The paper recommended that equity and consultation rather than dictation under the cloak of party directives should fester in the executive-legislative relations. This is panacea to build the critical institutions of democracy to engender rapid socio-economic and political development.

Keywords: Party, Supremacy, Personalization, Power, Democracy, Constitution

Introduction

A political party is an association of people who relate for the purpose of winning political power and forming the government. It serves as the platform for electoral contest in the global democratic community. In this quest, it sponsor candidates for elections and also nominates candidates for appointments when the government is formed (Olaru, 2015). This is true in both the developed democracies that are old in existence or developing democracies that have a nascent history. In the presidential experience of Nigeria that began in 1979, political parties were given the central position in Section 201 of the 1979 constitution which provided that "No association other than a political party shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at any election". In order to establish the place of a political party further in the political schema, part 2, section 65 (1)c of the 1999 constitution provided that anybody that aspires to contest to the National Assembly can only do so if "he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party". Similarly at the sub-national level, part 2 (c) section 106 sub-section (d) provides that 'a person shall be qualified for election as a member of a State House of Assembly if he a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party'. The centrality of the political party in the country's democracy is therefore sacrosanct.

Nigeria is currently, in its Fourth Republic. One of the requirements of party politics is that the principle of party supremacy has to be entrenched, guided and guarded because it is the most significant instrument that preserved the sanctity of the executive and the legislature. They serve as the benchmark to ensure checks and balances of power between them and promote the effective and efficient delivery of the dividends of democracy to the people. Ever since the presidential system was introduced in the Second Republic in Nigeria in 1979, the principle of party supremacy was upheld and it was the bastion upon which the national government was run by the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the eleven they controlled, the five under the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the three of Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP). However, it was observed that this fundamental precept of democracy is now overtaken by the dominance of the executive arm of government. Therefore, indiscipline and disrespect to party directives appear to have overrun the political landscape in the recent times. Cross carpeting and poor governance system have continued to reign and individualization of power has become the order of the day. It is against this background that this paper examined how the political party structure was subsumed under the Presidential Villa at national level and various Government Houses at sub-national level in the Fourth Republic.

Overview of Party Supremacy in Nigeria

The principle of party supremacy that was practiced at all levels in the first presidential experience in 1979, began at the top and percolated the other

levels of government. According to a key respondent that served in the upper chamber from 1999-2003, the national caucus of the ruling party (NPN) from 1979-1983, was headed by the national Chairman of the party Chief A.M.A Akinloye (Salman, 2021). It also included the President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari; Vice President, Chief Alex Ekwueme; President of the Senate, Chief Joseph Wayas; the Senate Leader, Dr Olusola Saraki. These memberships which spread across all the regions/zones of the country took decisions for the two political arms of government at the time. That is, the executive and legislature as well as the party itself after which it usually handed it over to all the sectors for implementation. According to him, while the enviable collective leadership was triggered at the top in 1979 at the threshold of the introduction of the Presidential system of government, success of the style in enshrining party supremacy can be credited to the effective democratic ethos and sublimity of President Shagari who allowed it to occur. Unlike President Obasanjo of the Fourth Republic who had no prior political experience, President Shagari rose to the top under a democratic system which enables him to gain political experience on different posts. For instance, He was a parliamentarian and Minister in the First Republic under the Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa. But at the threshold of the 4th Republic in 1999 when President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office he overthrew party supremacy, individualized power and authority and enthroned dictatorship of the executive. Salman noted that this epitome of democracy;

was subjugated in the Fourth Republic under President Olusegun Obasanjo because of the background of being a retired military general and Head of State from 1976 to 1979. He grew up in the hierarchical structure of the military and was not ready to share power with anybody (Salman, 2021).

It should also be noted that during the Second Republic, the participation of old politicians like Malam Adamu Ciroma, Dr Olusola Saraki, Umaru Dikko, Chief Richard Akinjide, Chief Adisa Akinloye and in particular President Shehu Shagari who grew up within the etiquette of party supremacy gave premium to it and ensured that it was sustained. The Third Republic, which later became moribund, was operated as a diarchy under first under General Ibrahim Babangida and later Chief Ernest Shonekan, which was also sacked by General Sanni Abacha in a military coup d'état. His successor after he died, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, organized a transition programme to usher in the Fourth Republic of full civilian administration. However, the Fourth Republic had a civilian government that was more or less managed by the remnants of the military regimes and those who were active participants of past military junta that seized power and ruled by force. For instance, there was Chief Obasanjo as President who was a retired military General and former Head of State between

1976 and 1979 and many others. These were people who had spent all their lives in the military. For them to change that psyche of command structure was, therefore, difficult. Salman (2021) concluded, therefore that:

For a man who came into office as a former General, and it is said that when they get to that level, they are tin gods and it is always said that you don't query a General, you don't disobey a General because his word is law. The beginning of the problem for our young democracy was on how to deal with the issues of separation of powers, rule of law, party supremacy, especially with respect to the choice of Senate President and Speaker of House of Representatives. Ordinarily this matter ought to have been resolved before elections. But probably in view of the hurried nature of the short transition of General Abdulsalami Abubakar who was on the seat as Head of State for nine months, too many ends were not tidied up.

Another issue was that the General Abdulsalami Abubakar military regime inherited a barrage of challenges when his predecessor General Abacha died suddenly. Indeed, the nation was at the precipice, tension was high, the trust in government was low and national cohesion was weak. Similarly, the fall out of the annulment of June 12 elections, in which the SDP candidate Chief M.K.O. Abiola was at verge of winning, had caused serious commotion in the nation. Thus, the transition programme was rapidly was conducted. The electoral management body under Abacha, NECON, was dissolved and replaced with Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In fact, the Minister of Information under the regime, Chief John Nnia Nwodo stated categorically during a conference that the 1999 constitution was drafted by a team of 44 persons selected by the military regime (Nwodo, 2021). He further disclosed that the 1999 constitution was not promulgated as at May 29, 1999 when the Fourth Republic was birthed (Nwodo, 2021). Also, there was deliberate involvement of the military in political parties affairs which ensured that the three leading political parties in that era PDP, APP, AD were streamlined to produce two presidential candidates. And both of them were of the South West extraction, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of PDP and Chief Olu Falae of APP/AD. This was to appease the region where Chief Abiola came from.

Party Supremacy in the Fourth Republic

Nigeria's Fourth republic began in May 1999 with the swearing in of Chief Olusegun Obasajo as head of the executive arm and formal inauguration of the National Assembly in June of same year. Salman (2021) revealed that upon inauguration, when Chief Obasanjo became elected as the President, he made it clear to the winning party, PDP that he could not work with some of the

people suggested for leadership of the National Assembly. That according to Salman was the beginning of the problem which brought in Evans Enwerem as the President of the Senate and Salisu Buhari as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, this was peace of the graveyard because shortly after that there were infighting and a lot of allegations came up on certificate forgery in the two chambers.

So Chuba Okadigbo and Umar Ghali Na'Abba came in. But it didn't go down well with the President who wanted to ram down the throat of every one of us on who was to be our head ... After Okadigbo, Anyim Pius Anyim finished the first term while in the second coming of Obasanjo he had two Senate Presidents in Adolphus Wabara and Ken Nnamani. So within eight years there were five Presidents of the Senate. Definitely, nothing can typify instability and the regression of the supremacy of the party more than that when there is no certainty of leadership (Salman, 2021).

He concluded that this occurrence was because of the individual personality and character trait of the number one person that relegated the party and the legislature in this republic (Salman, 2021).

The above position was corroborated by another key informant who affirmed the punctuated status of party supremacy under President Obasanjo (Baraje, 2021). To him, the party was the critical factor because it serves as a platform for any elected office holder.

According to him;

In our constitution there is no room for independent candidature. Similarly those appointed are largely expected to be party members, although technocrats and non party members can be chosen. In a democracy ... it is the party that is sending you out to propagate and deliver the messages that was contained in the manifesto which contains all the plans and focus of what the party wishes to deliver to the masses before elections. In fact it was the instrument of campaign before they were voted into power. Practically and realistically, is the party that is voted into power not an individual (Baraje, 2021).

He observed further that the relationship between the party, the legislature and executive headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007 was not democratic and normal in party politics. This is because, the party used to take permission from the executive (President) before they issued statements or before a candidate of the party is finally elected or before they were selected to occupy positions – a situation which was supposed to be the other way round. Indeed, the constitution of the PDP provides that members of

the party in the executive and legislative arm of government are subjected to the party because they used the party platform to get to where they were (Baraje, 2021). Thus, they are errand boys of the party who deliver the covenant that the party had with the people and can be recalled and re-educated or re-orientated anytime the party discovers that there is an anomaly or that its message is not being properly delivered.

In demonstration of the supremacy of the party, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa recalled then President Thabo Mbeki from the headship of the government and replaced him with his Vice, Kgalema Mphahlele from September 2008 to May 2009. It may thus, be argued that, the lack of party supremacy was what gave rise to the confusion in the nation where the party is woven around Governors in the states and President at the national level. Baraje (2021) revealed that this abnormality has created a situation where the office of the National Secretary was the engine room of the party because executive arm of government (Presidency) made it to be more powerful than the office of the Chairman. The chairman was just the political head. The secretary made the policies and executes it. The only thing he has to do was to notify the office of the National Chairman. This was made possible because the party under President Obasanjo had relocated the supremacy of party from "Wadata Plaza which is the headquarters of the party to Aso Rock which is the seat of the government".

It is of note that what occurred at the national level to deflate party supremacy also reigned at the states level. At this level also, the Governors who were the head of the executive arm of government completely took over the party structure and established dominion not only over the party, but even the legislature and the judiciary as well. While recalling how President Obasanjo assumed the headship of the party, a key informant stated that:

At one of the meetings of the National Executive Council (NEC) in 1999, Chief Solomon Lar who was a First Republic legislator and Second Republic Governor of Plateau state and who knew the workings of party politics and how things were run, was on his way to enter the hall. But President Obasanjo, who expected that he should come in last, asked why the meeting did not start, he was told that the leader of the party was coming in. He was furious and said 'who is the leader. I am the leader here. Governors where are you', and as they stood up he told them to go and take over the party in their states. That was what destroyed the party supremacy and party politics at the sub-national level till today because the Governors went home and took over the parties in their states and relegated the structure of the party to the background. So the party became an extension of the office of the Governor just as it were at the national level (Salman, 2021).

However, the tide of events changed when late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua assumed the office in 2007. In fact, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua subjected himself to the party. According to Baraje, a former national secretary of the party (2021);

the first day that the National Chairman and myself, were to have meeting with him, I insisted that the meeting should hold at the Chairman's office and His Excellency, Mr President, came to *Wadata Plaza*, our national secretariat. Throughout his lifetime, he was always coming every week to give us report of what the government was doing. ... At our party meeting with the President Yar'Adua, he gave us his words again and again that he was a party man and would uphold the fundamental principle of party supremacy. At the following NEC meeting, he announced that henceforth at any party gathering that involved him and the party, the party comes first. So in the protocol whenever we had any political gathering it was usually Mr Chairman of PDP, the National Secretary, members of NWC then, Mr. President. In fact we gave him a standing ovation that day.

In order to reciprocate this realization from Mr. President, members of the NWC of the party and principal officers in various arms of the government who are members of the party pay courtesy visit to the President every week and engage in sporting activities with him. Thereafter, they relaxed together with the President of the Senate and Rt. Hon. Speaker together with the principal officers of the party and all members of NWC of the party. They talked about the party and all national issues and give directives there to resolve problems and determine the way forward. As noted by Baraje (2021), 'the next day you will see it being implemented by whichever of the organs that had responsibility to do it'.

For him, it was a bad sign post to party supremacy when the President and Governors assumed leadership position in their relationship with the party that sponsored them into office. A situation where you get to a state and they say the leader of the party is the Governor, what can be more interfering. He maintained that even in South Africa during his understudy of the ANC "the President goes to the party secretariat to give report of his progress in government while the ANC leadership puts the party manifesto in their front and they would be marking the promises of the party fulfilled by him as he mentioned it."

It is important to note that the taking over of political parties by Governors at sub-national level was a clear negation of the institutional theory as espoused by Guy-Peters (1999) who propounded that each institution of democracy should be distinct and enabled to play its role distinctively. The Governor is the head of the executive arm of government and the political party

is expected to be clinically piloted by the chairman of the party if the citizens were to derive the dividends of democracy that was envisaged. Unfortunately, this perversion of executive dominance of both the party structure and the legislature that became profound since 1999 has remained pervasive.

Implications for Democratic Governance

Part of the consequences of this malfeasance was that disrespect to party directives became high and governance process got weak. The twin product of this scenario was the exacerbation of conflict within the society. In spite of the remedial efforts that was initiated by subsequent administrations after President Obasanjo, the kernel of party cohesion and coordination which is anchored on party supremacy continued to be loose, and it had pervaded the political landscape. In 2011 during the era of President Goodluck Jonathan, the PDP zoned the position of the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the South West. In their party arrangement, they believe that there was the need to spread the top positions in the government by using the leadership of the legislature to balance the executive. President Jonathan was from Bayelsa in the South-South zone; the Vice President Alhaji Namadi Sambo, was from Kaduna state, in the North West. The President of the Senate was zoned to the North Central; the Speaker of the House of Representatives was allotted to the South West; Secretary to the Government of the Federation, South East; Head of Service, North East. However, the elected members went different to the party directives in the Lower House. While Hon. Mulikat Akande Adeola, of Orire North/South federal constituency of Oyo state in the South West was the party candidate, Hon. Aminu Waziri Tambuwal that represented Tambuwal/Kebbe constituency of Sokoto state in the North West was elected as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Like a floodgate this peculiar occurrence appeared to have triggered greater instability in governance.

The party structure and the executive arm of government which had acted at the behest of the Presidency under Goodluck Jonathan “went into frenzy in its efforts to upturn the decision of the leadership installed by the members”. Given the humongous bureaucracy and the security apparatus under the control of the president who is concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, so many intrusions were made into the legislative activities. Apparently a bad lesson was picked from the era of Obasanjo who, at the height of his desperation to monitor, influence and control the members of the National Assembly, deliberately installed surveillance camera at the chambers. It was done by the security agencies to scrutinize the contributions of the elected officials and report to the president to enable him decipher which ones he considered right or wrong. Aside from this action being a negation of the principle of parliamentary immunity, it was also tantamount to invasion of their freedom of speech. The Jonathan government, on November 11th, 2014, through

the security agencies closed the gate of the National Assembly and forced the members of the House of Representatives to the jump fence. The security operation was carried out with ease because the President was in the control of the security agencies. It was his jurisdiction to appoint all the Service Chiefs of the military and paramilitary services. Aside from this action casting the country in bad light around the globe, governance suffered because distrust and suspicion was heightened between the executive and the legislative arms of government (Vanguard, November 14, 2014). The level of schism between them got exacerbated and degenerated to low ebb, that President Jonathan, away from the past shied away from physically going to the Chambers of the National Assembly to present the 2014 and 2015 budgets. Instead he dispatched the Minister of Finance Dr (Mrs) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to deliver on behalf of the executive arm of government. (Premium Times, December 17, 2014). The implication of this is that activities in the house was not immuned from the erosion of party supremacy. Related to this is the high rate of indiscipline among members of the house which saw them taking a different position on issues different from positions of the party.

Due to the personalization of power that had gained momentum and the level of indiscipline that had crept into the polity, cross-carpeting became the order of the day also in the distortion of democratic governance. Again, this malfeasance began under the President Obasanjo era. The height of it was when the then Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, while being on the seat that he won on the platform of PDP in both 1999 and 2003 presidential elections, moved on to contest the 2007 elections as the sitting VP on the ticket of ANPP against the official candidate of PDP, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. By 2014, there was massive decampment of some serving PDP Governors of Adamawa, Rivers, Sokoto, Kwara states to a newly formed agglomeration of ACN, CPC, ANPP, a group from APGA and PDP Numerous Senators, members of the House of Representatives and members of different Houses of Assembly of some states. It is trite to state that chapter 5 Part 1 section 68 (1) g .of the 1999 constitution provides that any elected member that decamps from the party on which platform that he won election shall lose his seat. However, in the same section, the provision that a decamped member of the legislature would not lose his seat if there was a division within his political party made it contentious. The fluidity of this provision left it to varying interpretations. It also led many Nigerian political actors to 'deliberately instigate crises within the party that they belong in order to eat their cake and have it'. They would abandon the original political party that sponsored them and carry that mandate to another party and also retain their seats.

At the conclusion of the 2015 elections and apportionment of positions, the APC which won the presidency and the majority of seats in the National Assembly embroiled itself in lengthy fireworks which suggest a demise of party

supremacy in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. This manifested in antagonistic position between the two arms. For instance, on several occasions, the National Assembly refused to act on nominations forwarded to it by the President for consideration in line with the 1999 constitution. They include members of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Federal Emergency Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA). Perhaps the lowest point in the executive-legislative relationships between President Buhari and the 8th NASS was in the number of bills that were passed, but vetoed. This was despite that the legislations were considered important and significant to national growth and development. In a survey carried out by Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement's (YIAGA) Africa Centre for Legislative Engagement and published by All Africa News on October 3, 2019 the 8th Senate passed 172 bills into law while the House of Representatives passed 343 bills all of which amounted to 515. However, according to an analysis by the Daily Trust newspaper April 6, 2019, President Buhari declined assent to over 63 of the bills that were passed. According to Hon. Timothy Simon Golu who represented Pankshin/Kanke/Kanam Federal constituency in the 8th legislature, the President withheld his assent due to the fact that he sees the National Assembly as an enemy and competitor, rather than a partner in progress. This opinion was shared by the presidential candidate of National Conscience Party (NCP) Dr Yunusa Tanko who insisted that the veto showed the conflict and lack of harmony between the executive and legislative arms of government (Daily Trust April 6, 2019; Business Day, July 4, 2019).

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is critical to note that the overwhelming influence of the President at the national level and Governors at sub-national level on the ruling party structure which has become the rule rather than the exception in the Fourth Republic was a clear negation of the institutional theory as espoused by Guy-Peters (1999). He propounded that each institution of democracy should be distinct and enabled to play its role distinctively. This way, suzerainty of the party structure can be assured. However, the Nigerian situation have suggested a demise of party supremacy in the sense that the President and Governor at the states are the *de facto* head of the executive and legislative arms of government. Whereas the political party structure is expected to be piloted by the Chairman of the party *de jure* and *de facto* as it were the case under the NPN government when Nigeria made its entry into the presidential system in 1979, this situation of executive dominance of both the party structure and the legislature that became profound since 1999 has remained pervasive. Given this scenario and the impact it has on governance, this paper recommends that it is auspicious to

define and entrench party supremacy within the context of party – government relation. Also, the general views of the party leadership should be upheld at the highest level of the decision making structure. This is because, it is an anathema for the Chief executive either President or Governor to assume leadership of the party, personalize the position and exert the humongous power of office to exercise domination over the political party structure and the legislative arm of government. The consequences of the personalization of power and authority, no doubt, have had its negative effect on governance. The government would be reduced to an individual enterprise. Finally, this paper therefore agreed expeditiously with the assertion of Muhammad (2013) that democratic consolidation and governance would suffer when there is conflict rather than harmony between the executive and the legislative arms of government.

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COMMENTARY

**UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF SMALL AND LIGHT WEAPONS
ON NIGERIA'S SECURITY SITUATION***

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Abstract

The article examines the concepts of light and small weapons in the context of Nigeria. The author of the paper argues that there is a correlation between the availability of these weapons and the pervasive regime of insecurity in Nigeria. Of course, the paper also shares the perspective that politics and militarisation of low-intensity conflicts have both combined to raise the profile of light and small weapons in the country. Some cost(s) have attended their availability. One of these is the unending war against insecurity that diverts resources from other critical sectors and the second is that Nigeria is now a major warehouse for these weapons in West Africa. It therefore recommends that the place of dialogue should be enhanced in the governing process of the country instead of the recourse to militarisation of issues.

Introduction

Let me start this keynote address by thanking the Governing Council, Management, Staff and Students of the Kogi State Polytechnic for the opportunity to address this conference in the month of August, 2021. More specifically, I want to thank the organizing committee for the conference for choosing me as the Keynote Speaker. Members of the committee deserve my commendation because as a man who has organized some conferences in my University, UNILORIN, I know the amount of hardwork that is required to organize a conference of this magnitude.

The theme of this conference is apt and relevant to Nigeria given the kind of security challenges facing us and of which, the availability of small and light weapons has played a major role in bringing about and in sustaining them.

As we all know, the security challenges remain one of the major issues with which both the Federal Government and sub-national governments are battling with. Almost all our States have military presence in one form or the other, helping the frontline internal security management agency – the Police, to maintain law and order. Yet, despite their presence, the security climate is still worrisome and frightening, as cases of insurgency, kidnapping/ransom-taking,

secessionist movements, vandalism, farmers/herders' conflicts and other forms of insecurity are still on the increase

While noting in this address that the Nigerian state has been trying its best to contain these security challenges, the reality confronting us is that the security challenges are not giving any signs of disappearing anytime soon. Insecurity has therefore, become an issue that is being discussed in the country as every part of Nigeria has stories to tell on the regime of insecurity facing us.

In this connection, the point needs to be made that one vital missing link to note is that the country is still soaked in the traditional approach that had worked in the past, but that is increasingly proving unworkable based on the realities of our time. This entails applying strongly, the military approach whereas much of the spate of insecurity we face shows a complex mix of criminality-cum-political issues fueling their manifestations.

I strongly believe that the various papers that have been slated for presentation at this conference will reveal more, the dimensions of the security crisis that we face as a nation and the shapes of responding to them by the Nigerian State. In the process, other innovative and creative efforts of mitigating them will come out to help our levels of government in tackling them.

At this point, let me single out the ever-dynamic Rector of Kogi State Polytechnic, Dr. Usman Ugbo for the blessings he gave to this conference to hold in the school. His approval and commitment to the successful hosting of the conference are good testimonies to the fact that he is poised to register the Kogi State Polytechnic as one of the current navigators that is out to find solutions to the myriad of problems confronting our nation. Mr. Rector, I say well done!

Some Comments on Small and Light Weapons

I am aware that a competent person has been chosen as the lead paper presenter whom I know will do justice to the concept of small and light weapons. All the same, in order to put this keynote address in a proper context, I still feel that there is need for me to make a generalized submission on the concept.

In the literature, there is no precise definition given to small and light weapons, as the various authorities on the subject matter, including the United Nations, African Union and other sources have given it many definitions.

However, in this keynote address, I want to view the concept as dangerous weapons that can inflict pains and injuries on innocent persons for the purpose of criminality or in achieving some political objectives. They can be as small as cutlass to more dangerous weapons that are more easily available.

I must remark here that though differences exist between small, light weapons and the high-grade weapons such as bombs, drones and others, the reality is that much of the difference that borders on availability and scope of damage they can cause are fast disappearing as the incidences of *boko haram*,

ISIS and other terrorist and armed gangs have revealed. There is somewhat relaxation of control over the use of weapons across the world as there is a preponderance of merchants of arms and individuals and groups that need their products are on the increase.

It is instructive at this point to note that with respect to our nation, governance and the whimsical way it has been handled is the major causative factor for the rampant conflict situations being witnessed in the country and the upsurge in the number of non-state actors that are trying to cover the space that is left unprotected or uncovered by state's governance apparatus.

Simple functions such as provision of water, good education, shelter and other basic amenities have not been provided in most cases. This reality, coupled with economic and political exclusionary policies that are being pursued, have raised the level of attachment to small and light weapons by our men and women of destabilization and criminality for which our nation is yet to find a way of bringing them back to normal life.

In the world today, over one billion small and light weapons are in circulation with a more conservative figure of about five hundred million of them found in West Africa and Nigeria alone, accounts for about seventy per cent of the total number of small and light weapons that are available in the West African sub-region. This should surprise no one. Several reasons account for this high figure for Nigeria that one even suspects to be a more conservative one.

In our understanding of the phenomenon of small and light weapons in Nigeria or anywhere else in the world, three important issues need to be borne in mind. These are: availability, legality and usage. The world is raising concerns about them now because increasingly they are more rampantly available like Coca Cola. The persons and groups permitted to access them by law are being competed with or conditions set for possessing them are no longer being respected. In most cases, the small and light weapons are being used for non-permissive ends. In addition, they are inflicting injuries on innocent lives and the State institutions that are meant to protect the population.

One singular development that has, in a way, turned our country's security upside down is the culture of violence that has been entrenched. Any little thing that happens, Nigerians, these days, have a tendency to recourse to violence. There is a perspective that has implicated the security forces that always use disproportionate amount of force to deal with emerging security issues in the land. The disposition of the political leadership that suggests allowing issues or more appropriately, early warning signs to fester and become cancerous before actions are taken is a major trigger that promotes the recourse to the use of weapons in resolving issues in Nigeria. Also, the manner of communicating with the citizens on matters of national importance that is often laced with emotions is another issue to interrogate on why there is an unusual

urge for acquisition of small and light weapons. Quite unfortunately, an increasing number of the citizens have come to believe that unless one follows the path of violence, no attention can be attracted from the government on any issue that calls for mediation.

One observes that failure by Nigerians, especially the government to be attuned to democratic dictates in its governance approach has cultivated the ground for the violence approach. To be sure, most of the issues that have promoted the military approach, one argues, are not what cannot be resolved through dialogue or what Political Scientists call citizens' engagement once the government is perceived to be neutral about the issues. What one has observed is a tendency where the state is seen as an interested party; perceived to be on the side of some of the groups. Resultantly, the aggrieved groups have sought to seek for redress or self-help through the ill-conceived self-determination rhetoric that has a gaze at resorting to weaponizing their engagement with the state. And given the conducive atmosphere for purchasing of small and light weapons in Nigeria, little restraint is being exercised in deploying them. This has contributed in no small measure in sustaining the regime of insecurity in the country.

Non state actors with their abnormal confidence level have sprung up across the land that are engaging the state in a battle of wits and control of instruments of coercion with dire consequences. The most notorious of them all are the bandits who operate at will. They have scaled up their activities by demonstrating their airpower and openly collecting ransom, not minding the legislation that attempts to criminalize the payment of ransom by parents and relations of the abducted persons to the bandits.

Two explanations have been offered by the state. Instead of marching on them through the military, the state has urged unarmed citizens to defend themselves against the arms-bearing groups. With what? One would like to ask. The second line of argument is that the state is hesitant to do anything because of the heavy casualty that will accompany the decision to march on the bandits by the military. Meanwhile, the bandits and insurgents are growing in more confidence through their abductions and kidnappings of defenceless Nigerians, especially the school children in the face of repeated assurances of being on top of the situation by the state.

The point to note is that the control which the state should have on the instruments of coercion has repeatedly been questioned, while the allegiance of a segment of the population is gradually shifting to the agents of insecurity by withdrawing intelligence from the state to the non-state actors that do not accord much respect to the state and its institutions. The incubator of this scary scenario is the prevalence of small and light weapons in the country. The topic on the lips of Nigerians is; why is the military that the state has confidence in has not been able to do much in lessening the tension being caused by violent groups in our

country? The reasons for this are multi-faced but suffice it to say that the institution itself has many internal contradictions coupled with the unhealthy political environment both of which have greatly distorted its professional handling of all the issues involved.

Small and Light Weapons and Nigeria's Pervasive Regime of Insecurity

It is increasingly important to talk about small and light weapons in addition to the scary data that are available because they fuel and sustain insecurity that is a source of worry to all Nigerians with some external inconveniences for the nation. For instance, the age-long herders/farmers conflicts in Nigeria have assumed global importance partly because the issue has been made a phenomenon especially with the AK47 being made easily accessible to persons/groups in conflicts with which more destruction is being caused.

Boko haram has also become deadlier because the small and light weapons have come under the easy reach of the insurgents. Moreover, some secessionist groups that are giving Abuja sleepless nights are being empowered by the easy access they have to weapons. We cannot forget banditry and kidnapping that have invaded our national culture with devastating consequences for Nigerians.

Consequently, the efforts of government at all levels are being made ineffectual. Today, courtesy of small and light weapons, Nigeria ranks high among countries with a high level of insecurity, leading some western countries to be regularly issuing travel advice/warnings to their citizens. In the recent past, western countries are found to be issuing travel warnings to their citizens to avoid certain parts of the country and to take precautionary measures, while in other parts of Nigeria facing serious security threats.

All the measures being taken by the Nigerian state at managing insecurity, including establishing a Centre/Commission for the control of small and light weapons in May 2021, and closing down of some land borders, have not succeeded in stemming the tide of insecurity in the country. Therefore, if there is any issue to tackle, it is the uncontrolled flow of weapons to the country.

Some implications can be drawn for Nigeria on the issue of small and light weapons. One of these is the potent threat they pose to Nigeria's existence as a nation. Intergovernmental relations have been assaulted due to the blame game between the federal and the states as the agents of destabilization are being emboldened to continue with their trade that is aimed at tearing apart the unity that has existed in the country. Ethnic mutual suspicions are now rife, leading to social discomfort or disequilibrium among the various ethnic groups in the nation.

Two, the economy is suffering due to the anti-Nigerian activities that are being aided by the availability of the kinds of ammunitions that are now in

circulation in Nigeria. The national economy is contrasting, leading to more borrowing due to a reduced level of productivity in the nation.

Three, the bond that should naturally exist between the people and their governments is breaking down due to what some Nigerians are doing with the weapons in their possession. Four, Nigeria is becoming a butt of joke in the international system partly due to the increasing level of kidnapping of school children by bandits. Definitely, more work is required to change the narrative on insecurity in Nigeria.

Some Recommendations

Based on the entrenched regime of insecurity in Nigeria aided by the availability of small and light weapons in the hands of wrong persons which they are now using to torment the nation, I offer the following recommendations on how to stem the tide:

1. The real issue to address in Nigeria in reducing the propensity to acquire arms is the governance structure in the country. As long as security management is in firm control of the Federal and the sub-national governments are being turned into onlookers, there is little chance for a perfect security regime to be assured. The states and local councils, the level of misgivings about their capacity to perform notwithstanding, should be more incorporated into the security architecture. Given the size of Nigeria, the resort to one unitary internal security control system cannot cope with the modern realities of our existence.
2. Equity, justice and fairness need to be extended to all Nigerians by the levels of government in the country. The feeling of alienation from governments, especially the Federal Government, is not a good tendency in our country.
3. A responsibility and accountable system of governance is important in addressing the supply side of insecurity that the availability of small and light weapons has given impetus to.
4. Our leaders need to mind the way they communicate with us. There is clearly a preferred communication style that democracy preaches that is totally different from the way our leaders communicate with us.
5. Undue delays in responding to demands being made by citizens, no matter how irritating they may be to our leaders, should be avoided so as not to drive them to the extreme path in seeking to acquire weapons in advancing the causes they so much believe in.
6. Governmental actions on issues of concern should always be considered from the point of our diversity as a nation. There are many sensitivities that our governments, especially the Federal Government,

- needs to consider in taking its actions. There is also the need to make actions to be proportionate to the needs for them.
7. Youth unemployment has reached an epidemic level and there is a real need, not cosmetic, to address the issue. The current efforts of the Federal Government in addressing it are like a drop in the ocean.
 8. Our land borders and other entry points need to be more monitored to control the inflow of small and light weapons into the country.
 9. There is the need to take a second look at the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons and services. Although well intended, the operationalization of the protocol has made the nation to be an attractive destination for trafficking in small and light weapons across the West African sub-region
 10. . Above all, the prevalence of small and light weapons is a reaction to some issues in the country. Finding agreeable solutions to the issues of concern in the country would go a long way in stemming the tide against the propensity to acquire them and the deployment of the same weapons to cause instability and criminality in our nation.

Conclusion

Nigeria, no doubt, is being threatened by the availability of small and light weapons and their deployment for illegal, criminal and political ends. The porous borders and an avalanche of contentious issues necessitating their deployment for wrong reasons are standing in the way of national security. Government at all levels have been trying to contain the implications of the easy availability of weapons in the country but not much success has been recorded. The missing link is the heavy confidence that the Federal Government has in the military approach that has led to the feeling of despondency among Nigerians. This, in turn, has encouraged the temptation on the part of some Nigerians not to key into government's efforts at controlling the inflow of small and light weapons and the resultant war against agents of insecurity that has ensued.

Some recommendations were made in this paper in controlling the propensity and the deployment of illicit weapons to cause mayhem in Nigeria. I conclude this keynote by maintaining that the availability of small and light weapons in Nigeria is a symptom of a disease that the country has not yet found a cure for. Once the correct therapy is applied to the main disease which, in my view, is the inclement governance environment, the phenomenon of small and light weapons that is incubating insecurity would be on a downward trend.

I wish the conferees fruitful deliberations and being able to come up with the right compass that can navigate our country away from the path of agitated security concerns to a path of stability, good governance and prosperity.