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## Dealing with Asian Hubs: Nigeria's External Relations with Japan and China in Comparative Perspective

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### Introduction

Japan emerged from World War II as a global economic colossus. By channeling its energy to industrial goods and de-emphasizing military production, it was able to nurture globally competitive corporations in automobiles, consumer electronics and ship-building as well as heavy machines and precision equipments. It rose to become the second largest economy after the United States both on absolute and per capita basis.<sup>1</sup> Juxtaposing these extraordinary achievements against the fact that Japan has a territory of only 377,944 square kilometers the bulk of which are mountainous and inhabitable topography that are susceptible to various forms of natural disasters like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and Tsunamis and combined with a population of just 126 million people, it is hard to find a comparable jaw-dropping case of economic prosperity amidst extreme circumstances.<sup>2</sup> Little wonder most developing countries around the world view and generally desire Japan as a model or partner in economic development. Perhaps, aware of this global admiration and aspiration, successive Japanese leaders have made foreign aid a key pillar of their external diplomacy, making Tokyo to become one of the top global aid donors since late 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

China's credential as world's most populous nation was the dominant theme in Chinese diplomacy decades after the Revolution. Being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council casting an image of the champion of the cause of Third World countries in global arena invested Beijing with some level of popularity

among countries that are desirous of a counterpoise to the dominant Western agenda in global discourse. Sino-Soviet rift and strategic containment of Taiwan led Chinese leaders to pursue an aggressive diplomatic outreach especially among Third World nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia. China's high profile engagement in the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Bandung, support for friendly regimes and rebel movements as well as generous aid packages were all manifestations of the diplomatic outreach.<sup>3</sup> Four decades of rapid economic growth following on the heels of Deng Xiaoping's reforms and 'opening up' of Chinese economy added another point to China's diplomatic resources across the globe. At one level, it serves as a model of economic prosperity without necessarily swallowing Western prescriptive pills. Second, it creates alternative access to market, source of capital and technical assistance with hitherto had been the monopoly of the West. Granting these benefits 'without strings attached' endears China to many developing countries around the world especially African States.<sup>4</sup>

In view of the awesome economic and diplomatic credentials of Japan and China, of what use is Nigeria in their external affairs? This question is a derivative of a broader question; why does Africa matter to these Asian nations and what is Nigeria's location in their African diplomatic matrix? Indeed, Africa's relevance could be seen from two main standpoints: its rich natural resource endowments and numerical strength (55 states) in international organizations such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) where the principle of one-state-one-vote holds. Japan and China are industrial giants that require steady supply of raw materials and energy to power their industrial sector. As one of the largest oil producers in the region and being the most populous nation in the continent, Nigeria is generally seen as having a key role to play as a gateway to the region not only as a supplier of highly needed energy resources but a potentially large market for industrial goods. If both states consider Nigeria to be central to their Africa strategy, it is understandable from economic viewpoint.

Tokyo and Beijing's interests in Africa are not limited to economic interests alone. By virtue of their global ambitions and strategic goals in the international system, they often desire and court African votes on issues that affect their interests. With fifty-five member states in the United Nations, it represents the single largest regional voting bloc in the organization. It is therefore prudent and makes diplomatic sense to nurture friendly relations with some countries that are capable of shaping and swaying opinion in the region. Given Nigeria's leadership position<sup>5</sup> and the general belief that it is the 'giant of Africa,' Tokyo and Beijing's African diplomatic strategy places Nigeria as one of the key countries to deal with. Therefore, it was not surprising that Nigeria was on the itinerary of the first ever Japanese Prime Ministerial visit to Africa in 2001<sup>6</sup>. For Japan, the objective has been to cultivate and sustain a favourable image that would allow it to achieve its diplomatic objectives as need arises especially to secure a permanent seat if the United Nations Security Council is to be enlarged. At various times when Japanese nationals sought leadership positions in international organizations, African votes often serve as the pivot of such campaigns<sup>7</sup>. Africa's numerical worth in international organizations was succinctly captured Japan's 2006 *Diplomatic Bluebook* thus:

*There are 53 countries in Africa, accounting for nearly 30 per cent of all the countries in the world. They carry considerable weight in the decision making at international fora, where in many cases voting is carried out on a one-country-one-vote basis. In particular, since the establishment of the African Union (AU), Africa increasingly tends to vote as a single bloc, which further adds to Africa's influence.*<sup>8</sup>

China's need for Africa transcends mere quest for votes in international organizations. The question of the status of Taiwan constitutes a defining strategic feature of Chinese diplomacy. The implication of widespread recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state implies that

China's territorial integrity and the corporate existence of China would be greatly endangered. This is particularly crucial in light of other separatist forces that Beijing has had to contend with in Tibet and Uighur regions. The strategic calculation was that if Taiwan was not effectively contained, it might embolden other centrifugal forces thereby setting off a domino effect. Africa's numerical value counts in the diplomatic containment of China especially because some African countries have demonstrated glaring vulnerability to inducement by Taiwan as shown in the diplomatic recognition it garnered in Africa.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, Chinese officials often stress the value of Africa's support not only in isolating Taiwan diplomatically but in actually restoring PRC's seat at the UN Security Council in 1971. Chinese official statement validates the relevance of Africa in China's strategic interests thus:

*We will never forget the great contributions that African countries made in helping restore the legitimate seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations... We will not forget the strong support given by African countries to China in defeating anti-China draft resolutions eleven times in the UN Human Rights Commission.*<sup>10</sup>

Resource diplomacy forms an integral component of overall China's African diplomatic strategy. As a late-comer in global hunt for resources, China contends with entrenched interests in the resource market that is founded on long term contracts. Unlike Japan which is covered by Western reach, China is faced with the challenge of seeking and securing mineral and energy resources around the world. The need for African resources is, therefore, more acute for China than it is for Japan. The quest for markets for Chinese products is also more acute than Japan's simply because Chinese brands could find easy penetration into African markets that in developed markets with more stringent and sophisticated standards. It could therefore be understood when Nigeria, the most populous African country, was one of the countries

visited by Chinese leader, Hu Jintao in 2006. China's donation of US\$200 million building to the African Union Secretariat and the setting up of China Africa Development Fund to the tune of US\$1 billion to invest in African equities as well as other initiatives fall within the strategy of building strong and friendly ties with African states.

### Domestic Context of Japan's and China's External Relations

The foregoing analysis reveals that Japan and China share certain common attributes in their African diplomacy. First, in terms of power credentials, the two countries are global giants in various domains such that one would wonder what value Nigeria (and indeed African countries) could add to the already awesome diplomatic arsenal. Effective delivery of foreign policy objectives often times require multilateral support even if the state concerned possesses all the prerequisites for executing its interests. In most international organizations, numbers count. The sheer number of African countries in those bodies and the fact that African countries tend to cluster around some core countries in presenting a common position on the global arena, Japanese and Chinese African diplomacy appear to emphasize key country approach. This is where countries like Nigeria (and a few others) occupy the center stage. Second, the quest for mineral and energy resources by the two industrial and economic giants implies that countries in Africa that are endowed with such valuable resources would attract sufficient attention in their diplomatic strategy. Tokyo and Beijing's interest in Nigeria could also be analysed from this perspective even though there is marked differentials in the degree of dependence of Japan and China on Nigeria for resources.<sup>11</sup>

Despite these similarities, Japan and China also vary in their approach to Africa and relations with Nigeria. While Japan generally subjects or subsumes its African policy and delivery within the broader purview of Western (OECD/DAC) platform ostensibly to minimize risk and refrain from infringing on the interests of entrenched

traditional powers in Africa (ex-colonial powers and the United States), China seems unencumbered by such considerations in its relations with Nigeria and other African countries. Japan's interest in Africa (especially Nigeria<sup>12</sup>) appear to have waned generally particularly in the area of trade and investment (with South Africa being the only exception) confining the relations primarily to development assistance. China seems actively engaged in all fronts ranging from trade, investment and development assistance.<sup>13</sup> The next question would be: why are similar power credentials and approaches producing different outcomes in terms of pattern and intensity of relations? To address this question, there is need to beam on the domestic context of Japan and China's external relations.

The decision making establishments in Japan and China offer plausible explanatory model for analyzing the divergent patterns of relations with Nigeria. Japan practices parliamentary democracy wherein the Cabinet is derived from the *Diet* (parliament) that is effectively controlled by the dominant political party which, for the most part of post-World War II era, has been the *Jiminto* (Liberal Democratic Party). Therefore, the party-parliament-cabinet cluster forms one layer of actors in the foreign policy decision making architecture. The Japanese bureaucracy is widely noted to be a highly influential actor in foreign policy decision making and delivery. Ordinarily, it would be expected that the *Gaimusho* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA) takes central responsibility in external affairs. In reality, the *Keizaisangyusho* (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI formerly MITI) and the *Zaimusho* (Ministry of Finance, MOF) together with other institutional actors compete for leverage in shaping foreign policy content, direction and outcomes.

"Big business" represents that third powerful arm in the 'Iron Triangle' of Japanese foreign policy establishment.<sup>14</sup> *KEIDANREN* and other powerful business groups exercise tremendous influence on the orientation of Japanese external relations whereby diplomacy follow



economic interests as dictated by the big corporations. Impliedly, Japanese diplomatic activism is a function of economic interest. Put differently, Japanese diplomacy is more active in areas where Japanese economic interests are stronger and *vice versa*. Essentially, therefore, Japanese decision making and delivery process approximates that of a corporatist state with 'fragmented authority' in which power is shared and diffused among various units in the political system and no single actor, individual or institution could appropriate the policy making process.

China's foreign policy establishment presents a starkly different decision making model in which foreign policy is almost inseparable from the charismatic personality of the Communist Party leader.<sup>15</sup> In theory, the National People's Congress (from which the Standing Committee is elected wherein the Political Bureau of the Standing Committee is appointed) is the highest authority in the State power structure. The Standing Committee, the President and his Vice are elected for a five-year term. The State Council (supervised by the Standing Committee) is the supreme executive organ and comprises of the Prime Minister and his Deputies as well as State Councilors. The Central Military Commission is the highest military organ of the state. Typically, the Communist Party leader heads the Standing Committee and chairs the Central Military Commission to exercise effective control of the state. Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) identifies the discernible structures of authority in the Chinese political system to include: 1. the core group of twenty-five to thirty-five top leaders who articulate national policy; 2. The layer of staff, leadership groups, research centers that link elites to and buffer them from bureaucracy; 3. State Council Commissions; and 4. Line ministries which implement policy.<sup>16</sup> Even though these are actors in the policy making and delivery process in China, in practice, the personality of the top officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and a few other top officials dwarfs the visibility of those institutions in the decision-making process.

Compared to Japan, China's top leadership is able to exercise tremendous leverage on policy direction and outcomes. Charismatic and visible leaders in the likes of Mao Zedong, Zhou En Lai, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and now, Xi Jinping are part of the political landscape of China. At various points in Chinese political history, they not only controlled the direction of the nation's foreign policy, they also mobilize state resources and apparatus towards its effective delivery. Over the years, ideological contest, revolutionary diplomacy, access to resources and the quest for recognition more than Japan's own economic rationality, provided the foundations of China's external relations. Beijing's African policy and its relations with Nigeria and other African countries is less susceptible to bureaucratic 'turf wars' or lengthy factional negotiation or parliamentary debates which characterize the Japanese political system. It is therefore plausible to argue that compared to Japan, China's top leadership enjoy greater leverage on foreign policy issues and this factor could help explain the readiness of China to engage African countries actively even where economic gains are not clearly apparent. The pattern of domestic decision making process is clearly reflected even in the different approach to conference diplomacy as the following discussion on TICAD and FOCAC illustrates.

#### **Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) and Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)**

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are the multilateral outgrowth of two Asian models of diplomatic contact with Africa. Both initiatives share some differences as well as commonalities. In the first place, TICAD precedes FOCAC in terms of origin. Besides, TICAD came into being via some preliminary discussions initiated by Japan at the United Nations General Assembly thereby attracting reasonable degree of international goodwill leading to the adoption of the New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) in 1991. FOCAC is more of an autonomous Chinese

initiative that evolved from the China-Africa Ministerial meetings that began in 2000 in Beijing. FOCAC holds every three years (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012) while TICAD holds every five years (1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013). While FOCAC summits and Ministerial Conferences hold alternately between a selected African country capital and Beijing (2000 in Beijing, 2003 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2006 in Beijing, 2009 in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt and 2012 in Beijing) the main TICAD summit holds in Japan while the preparatory meetings are held alternately across African country capitals and Tokyo. While TICAD incorporates a number of other stakeholders like the UNDP, World Bank, United Nations Office of Special Assistant on Africa (UN-OSAA), FOCAC does not seem to **expressly incorporate** these agencies. TICAD is often stressed as a **non-pledging platform** while FOCAC is usually an avenue to unveil new **plans for various development initiatives** and support for Africa.

By extension, the two diplomatic initiatives have **contrasting approaches** with respect to the role of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are now technically described as the *third sector*. While TICAD encourages the participation of the third sector in its programs and projects, FOCAC has yet to explicitly incorporate the civil society in its activities. Indeed, greater emphasis is placed on government-to-government exchanges in China's diplomatic style. On this premise, Japan's approach could claim a much higher ground than China which has often come under criticism for excluding NGOs and civil society. This may be a reflection of the relative status accorded civil society organizations in their respective domestic political systems. While Japan has a thriving *third sector*, China appears suspicious of the motives and activities of non-governmental organizations. On the flip side of this analysis is the fact that while government-to-government contacts may serve the immediate need of the Chinese officials, it generally leaves the relationship without deep-rooted support in the public domain. It implies that the relationship may be susceptible to changes with different political regimes. This is clearly illustrated with the threats to China's relationship

with Zambia where opposition parties often threaten to sever ties with Beijing if elected into office and in Liberia where strong subterranean moves to court Taiwan were noticeable. Suffice to say that in their treatment of the *third sector*, TICAD and FOCAC are incontrovertibly poles apart.

Although the above represents some of the key differences between TICAD and FOCAC, there are as common grounds as there are divergences. In the first place, the sponsors of these initiatives (Japan and China) are countries that share no historical guilt of colonialism in the continent. They are also countries that intend to, via these initiatives share and disseminate their own unique experience of development to African countries. The experience stems from Japan's post-Second World War indebtedness to the World Bank (until the 1990s or thereabouts) while at same time granting development assistance to developing countries. To a certain degree, this is similar to China's status as a recipient of aid while simultaneously being a donor. This imbues them with first-hand knowledge of the vicissitudes **of the struggle for economic development in the context of external dependence**. In doing so, their reservation about the "Washington **consensus**" and belief that development could be attained only through **self-help, sustained economic growth through infrastructure and human resource development**, are fundamental similarities that are common to both initiatives.

While Japan **insists** on its unique approach in its assistance to East Asia, the pressure on Japan for donor coherence and policy harmonization with respect to Africa<sup>17</sup> makes the experience of sub-Saharan Africa starkly different from that of East Asia and the outcome could be seen in the wide gulf between both regions in terms of economic development. In what appears to be a return to Japan's traditional approach to development assistance, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda at TICAD IV in Yokohama stressed Japan's preparedness to resume infrastructure development in Africa. According to him, "the infrastructure that Japan is to build must be 'people's infrastructure',

bringing prosperity to communities.”<sup>18</sup> The expectation is that private sector investment in Africa will be stimulated when infrastructure is enhanced. China is equally undergoing its own phase of increasing calls for harmonization, alignment and coordination. Indeed, the Western media have been utterly critical of China’s aid for lack of transparency and the threat it poses to donor coherence and the aid regime that has been built over time.

TICAD and FOCAC have been the multilateral platform for both countries to deal with Africa *en bloc* while emphasizing the weight of each of the core actors. Conference diplomacy allows Tokyo and Beijing to harness Africa’s numerical value by building a favourable image that enhances their diplomatic capital on the continent. Nigeria has been a consistent and prominent actor in each of the initiatives. It is however important to note that these conferences were probably established in order to leverage the shortcomings of the key country approach. This is because key country approach appear risky and unpredictable since African countries are not legally bound (and rarely) to adopt a common position with the so-called regional ‘gateways’ on issues that affect Japan and China. In a sense therefore, TICAD and FOCAC allows Japan and China to avoid reliance on key countries in their diplomatic outreach in Africa. The degree of leverage that Nigeria would ordinarily have enjoyed as a key country in the diplomatic matrix could not be the same in the context of a multilateral framework which attaches almost equal weights to all African states.

### Dealing with Asian Giants: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and the Perils of Asymmetry

In its relations with Japan and China, Nigeria operates from the lower end of the asymmetry pendulum. The gains of robust relations are likely to be higher on Nigerian side than on the side of Japan and China. In other words, Nigeria is more vulnerable to any disruption of relations than vice versa. Issues relating to trade deficit and decline, disinvestment and general decline in bilateral ties have characterized

Nigeria’s relationship with Japan over the years. The presence of relatively large population, huge market potential and abundant resource endowment has failed to elicit significant interest in Japanese business community. Geographical distance is often cited for the low level of trade and economic transactions between Nigeria and Japan. Fig 1 shows the weighted distance between Japan and major oil producers. Since Nigeria’s dominant (or sole) export commodity is oil, this implies that for Japan to significantly increase its import of Nigerian oil, it must be prepared to bear higher transaction (freight) cost in addition to risky and unpredictable security conditions in the Gulf of Guinea. Given a wide array of alternative suppliers and closer supply channels, except there is aggressive diversification of Nigerian export to include products which are needed in the Japanese economy, Japan’s import from Nigeria is unlikely to witness substantial change and issues relating to unfavourable trade balance with Japan is likely to endure into the future.




Figure 1

Data Source: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII's database).



Unlike Nigeria's relations with Japan, Sino-Nigerian relations is experiencing substantial growth. Bilateral trade between Nigeria and China reached US\$7.3 billion in 2010.<sup>19</sup> As reported by the Consul-General of the People's Republic of China in Lagos, China invested US\$7.24 billion in the Nigerian economy and created more than 30,000 jobs. Chinese firms are also actively engaged in infrastructure development projects like road construction, bridges and manufacturing plants construction.<sup>20</sup> In a way, these could be seen as manifestation of a broader pattern of rising Sino-African relations as discussed in previous sections. However, it could also be seen as a way to mitigate the consequences of asymmetrical trade relations between the two countries. As a result of Nigeria's limited capacity to export diverse commodities and in view of untrammelled import of Chinese products, Nigeria records unfavourable trade balance with China implying net loss for Nigeria. In 2009, Nigeria exports goods worth US\$897 million to China while it imports Chinese products to the value of US\$5.48 billion.<sup>21</sup>

Massive trade deficits for an economy that is already reeling in micro and macro economic difficulties could only compound the problem. If trade deficit receives adequate and sustained policy attention from the two parties, it could be reduced or eliminated in favour of the weaker party over time in the interest of the bilateral ties. The problem with Sino-Nigerian trade relations is not limited to unfavourable balance of trade. Proliferation of substandard products in Nigerian markets that are originating from China is another major issue that appears in the public discourse on Nigeria-China relations. While Chinese firms are accused of flooding the Nigerian markets with poor quality products, Chinese diplomats often insist that it is Nigerian importers who specifically request for substandard products.<sup>22</sup> In other words, it was the responsibility Nigeria's regulatory agencies at various ports of entry to ensure that substandard products are denied access into Nigerian market. Chinese diplomats absolve their state of

culpability or complicity in the proliferation of poor quality Chinese products in Nigerian markets.

Meanwhile, even if the quality of the product is standard, the issue dumping to stifle domestic industrial development remains germane to a mutually beneficial relationship between Nigeria and China. Textiles and basic appliances that could otherwise have been produced domestically continue to flood Nigerian markets to the detriment of local industries, jobs and economic development. The collapse of the textile sector and the failure of various efforts to revive it are compounded by the influx of Chinese textiles. The International Textiles, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF) convened a special summit<sup>23</sup> in Cape Town to deliberate on the threat of Chinese textiles to the industry. The Federation, apparently with full support of Nigeria, called on African governments to institute comprehensive trade and industrial policies to protect the industry. While China agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding on quota restriction on Chinese textile import to South Africa, the Chinese Embassy in South Africa expressed Beijing's position and vehemently rejected the request for extension of similar privilege to other African countries by stating that:

*The gains being made in (China's) textile sector worldwide is the result of years of investments in that sector to sharpen its competitive edge and gain comparative advantage... Any restriction aiming at China will be a distortion to the WTO's free trade principle which will definitely hurt Chinese people's confidence in WTO and their enthusiasm for the round. The unfair and discriminatory doings will never be accepted by China.*<sup>24</sup>

Indeed, Nigeria's attempt to mobilize other African countries to elicit quota restriction on Chinese textiles import did not yield the desired results. The whole saga also laid bare the vulnerability that flow from operating at the lower end of an asymmetrical relationship. While South Africa was able to negotiate and conclude a favourable deal with China, Nigeria could not achieve similar result using multilateral platform much less doing it bilaterally. A similar trend could also be gleaned from the gross disparity in the opportunities for people to



- Aremu, 'A Comparative Analysis of Japan and China's African Diplomacy in Contemporary Historical Context', *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies*, Vol. 23, 2007, p.29.
- 7 Japan's election to the non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (a position Japan has held more any other country) had drawn on African votes together with other countries' support. Again, UN agencies (e.g. UNESCO, UNHCR, etc) provide another arena where Japan utilizes Africa's numerical value to achieve its diplomatic objectives.
  - 8 *Diplomatic Bluebook*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006.
  - 9 The containment strategy has reduced the number of countries that have diplomatic ties with Taiwan to five small states. They are: Burkina Faso, Malawi, SaoTome and Principe, The Gambia and Swaziland.
  - 10 <http://www.FOCAC.org/eng/zt/zgdfzzcwj/t230736.htm>
  - 11 China seems to have much stronger drive for resources in Nigeria than Japan as shown in Aremu, *Asymmetrical Foreign Policy Behaviour of Japan and China*, (Ibadan: College Press, 2011).
  - 12 A former Japanese Ambassador to Nigeria, Akio Tanaka lamented in an interview that: "there were 2,000 Japanese working in Nigeria in 1970, now I have 100 remaining." See 'Insecurity scares Japanese from Nigeria,' *Business Times*, 21<sup>st</sup> to 27<sup>th</sup> November, 2005, p.3.
  - 13 See 'A Vote for China-Nigeria Ties, *This Day*, 27<sup>th</sup> March, 2006, p. 16 and 'Nigeria, China Trade Hits \$7.3b,' *The Nation*, 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2010.
  - 14 Jun Morikawa, *Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy*, (London: Hurst and Co 1997); Masako Osada, *Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002).
  - 15 Fatai Aremu, 'A Comparative Study of Japan and Chinas African Diplomacy in Contemporary Historical Context', *op cit*.
  - 16 K. Lieberthal and M. Oksenberg, "Introduction: 'Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model and its Limitations," in K. Lieberthal and Lampton, D. eds. *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 1-32.
  - 17 Kenneth King 'China's aid to Africa: a view from China Japan', a lead paper presented to the JICA seminar on 'China's Aid to Africa – the Beijing Summit and its Follow-up', 29th January 2007, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo.
  - 18 Address by His Excellency Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan at the Opening Session of the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV), Yokohama, Japan, 28th May, 2008.
  - 19 *The Nation*, 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2010.
  - 20 Ibid.
  - 21 "Nigeria Records \$5.48bn trade deficit with China," *The Punch*, 17<sup>th</sup> June, 2010.
  - 22 *The Punch*, 17<sup>th</sup> June, 2010. P. 15.
  - 23 The summit was attended by representatives of Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Lesotho and South Africa. See "China's New Scramble for Africa", *Public Agenda*, (Ghana), 6<sup>th</sup> November, 2006.
  - 24 Ibid.