ISSN 2141-9744

Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies

Volume 25, 2015

A SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION

Contents

Global Order, Global Security and the Role of the Humanities 1
Is-Haq O. Oloyede

Music as a Tool for the Promotion of Global Peace, Security and the Ordered World 27
Olufemi Akanji Olaleye

Islamic Hermeneutics on Gender and Culture: An Index for Peace and Security 41
R. S. Adeleke

Intercultural Hermeneutics: Our Caucus against Their Caucus in Sustaining Religious and Political Development in Nigeria 55
Abiola Ayodeji Olaniyi

Save the Ship: De-Marketising the Economy of Urban Violence in Nigeria 65
Isiaq Abdulwaheed Atanda, Aluko Opeyemi Idowu & Adedoyin Festus Fatai

Representations of Desert Arabs as Colonial Subjects in the Contemporary French Novel: A Study of *Desert* by Le Clezio 79
Alani Souleymane

Disengaging Disorder and Engaging Order in the Mass Media 91
Oji, Ruth Karachi

Mobility, the Nigerian Pentecostalism and Yoruba Folklore: A Comparative Analysis 105
Sàláwù, Ìgbékèlé Samuel

Jesus' Concept of Righteousness and Justice in the Gospels and their Implications for Peace and Security in Nigeria 121
Olubayo O. Obijole

God Made Man versus Man Made Gods: Othering/Ordering Religious Language and Usages as a Quest for Global Peace in Hosea 2:16-18 139
Olugbemiro Berekiah

Biblical Usage of *Shalom* and *Eirene* and its Implications for Global Peace and Security 151
Samuel Oluwatosin Okanlawon

EDITORIAL BOARD

Professor A.B. Ekanola - Chairman
Professor A. Ojebode – Editor
Professor O. Oha – Member
Professor C.B.N. Ogbogbo – Member
Professor S.A. Odebunmi – Member
Dr. B. Lanre-Abbas – Member
Dr. R. Sanusi – Member
Dr. A.A. Lewis – Member
T. Gbadamosi – Business Manager

EDITORIAL ADVISERS

Professor Jane Plastow, University of Leeds, UK
Professor James Gibbs, Bristol University, UK
Professor Niyi Osundare, University of New Orleans, USA
Professor Dan Izevbaye, Bowen University, Iwo, Nigeria
Emeritus Professor Ayo Banjo, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Published by
Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
© Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, 2015

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS, THE FACULTY OF ARTS, UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN, NIGERIA.

ISSN: 2141 - 9744

Printed by Sapphire Prints
08034892535 . 07016864877

POLICY

IBADAN JOURNAL OF HUMANISTIC STUDIES is an annual publication which serves as an interdisciplinary forum for the presentation and discussion of issues of broad humanistic relevance. It is not intended for the publication of the results of specialised research, unless these can be set within the wider context of culture and society. Preference will be given to articles related to the African experience and environment, but there is also room for issues that embrace the larger international order or human culture from which the African world may derive valuable comparative insights. The copyright for reproduction of articles published in the journal belongs to the Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. However, the responsibility for obtaining copyright permission for the fair use of any published material is that of the individual author, as the faculty accepts no liability whatsoever for any failure to do this. Only articles prepared strictly in accordance with the following guidelines will be considered.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Manuscripts should be sent as Ms Word attachments to ijhs@ui.edu.ng (copy ayo.ojebode@gmail.com). They should be typed double-spaced in A4 format, using Times New Roman 12 font size, and should very strictly not exceed seven thousand (7000) words in length. Articles far in excess of that length will not be considered. A 250-word abstract should precede the paper. Bibliographical references should be collected together at the end and alphabetically arranged in accordance with the in-house style of this journal: *Author's name (surname first), year of publication, title of paper, title of book journal, place of publication and publishers.* The author's full name (with surname underlined) institutional affiliation, brief bio-data, phone number and e-mail address should appear only on a separate page attached. Illustrations and heavy graphic works are not encouraged, unless absolutely indispensable to the argument. Books for review or review articles should also be forwarded to the editor through the journal's e-mail address indicated above.

5

Save the Ship: De-Marketising the Economy of Urban Violence in Nigeria

ISIAQ ABDULWAHEED ATANDA, ALUKO OPEYEMI IDOWU & ADEDOYIN FESTUS FATAI*

Abstract

This paper contributes to the discourse on the challenges, possibilities of imagining order and the other in a globalizing world plagued by disorder and otherness. It epitomized a market of violence traded by some actors for personal satisfaction regardless of the havoc within the community. These actors should be identified and redefined so as to incorporate their goals in a model that can solve the issues of disorder in Nigeria. The Research questions poised are why is the organized market for violence persisting in Nigeria? What are the resultant effects on the average Nigerian? The methodology adopted is descriptive statistical method which analyses the perceptions of two thousand four hundred Nigerians on the level of safety and trust in the government. The survey was originally conducted by Afrobarometer. The theoretical framework adopts Merton's strain theory. Recommendations are directed to both the government and the general populace on the need to strengthen the security level and to breakdown the buying and selling process in the market for urban violence in the polity. No society is free of violence but the level can be minimized and controlled through identifying the actors and prosecuting them appropriately.

Keywords: Disorder, Economics, Market, Urban, Violence, Demand and Supply

Introduction

When people die as a result of violence or terrorist acts, the expectation is that of general dissatisfaction, besides condemnation and despair about the perpetrators of such occurrences. This expectation, however, is untrue when it is considered by the sponsors of such act as they stand to gain from the actions of their agent and the outcome on the society at large. Urban violence in this regard is thus a form of collusion between

* Political Science Department, University of Ilorin, Nigeria abdulwaheedisiaq@gmail.com

certain agents who carry out the intent of their principal, with established objectives or gains from violence. Several examples of this set-up exist in Africa, Latin America, Asia and part of Europe. Nigeria as a point of reference in this work also has her own share of this menace. Taylor (2002) argues that post-apartheid political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, is broadly the result of ongoing political divisions, a failure to confront past wartime divisions and their legacy, and the corruption and *politicization* of security services and the judicial system. This is in itself a structure of anger and unacceptability of political results or outcomes, which has thus led to fragments that are at odds with occurrences in the country. This has given space to (or even encouraged) a spiral of political revenge and retribution, which has resulted in the death of approximately 2,000 people in the region since the first democratic elections were held in 1994 (Taylor, 2002). This is the case in most nations of the world today.

Generally, inter-group power struggle in urban communities usually identifies victims of the incidence of resulting violence as well as the advocates or sponsors of these incessant acts in the community. These can be inferred on the structure formed to depict a form of supply of violence as well as demand for violence. Akparanta (1994) gave an attempt to provide reasons for urban violence in post civil war Nigeria, arguing that following the war, there was an abundance of guns in private hands and times were hard economically. This means that a form of licensing was carried out, which clearly established the fact that private individuals especially youths who end up as gangs and cult groups can begin to sell themselves as instruments via which those who need violence as a tool can carry out their ambitions. Accompanied by deterioration in the standard of education, and the lack of specific training in areas relevant for sustaining both the agricultural and the industrial sector, many youths went astray. He equally argued that the continuously unpredictable political atmosphere and lack of progressive management of the economy brought about galloping inflation, and concentration of wealth in the hands of the few who were in positions of public authority fuelled a sense of hopeless desperation among the masses. This is enough for a set-up of aggrieved individuals who would end up as suppliers of violence to those who need their services at a reasonable cost for which their missions would be to kill and destroy lives and properties of their targets as well as innocent individuals who fall victim.

The poor economic condition of the country is not a sufficient excuse or justification for the alliance of the supply side of the market of urban violence. According to Albert (1994), the many causes of urban violence in Africa include: high population growth rates with its attendant unemployment, poor wages, poor living conditions, urban culture shocks, and poor quality of urban management that is manifested in the crisis in health care, transportation, housing and employment. A very good example of set-ups responsible for the supply of urban violence in Nigeria is the

phenomenon of street gangs, known as "area boys" in Lagos (the country's commercial capital), and this has been the focus of some studies (Omitoogun, 1994; Adisa, 1994). "Area boys", as explained by Adisa (1994) are youths who graduate from petty thievery to drug pushing and charged with drug delivery to consumers. These are known as "strikers", a nickname gotten from the basics of their operations. The condition of the society in terms of poverty and unbearable living conditions has by sympathy led them to submit to gangsterism. Adisa (1994) explained that area boys once conditioned are fools of others and are used for extortion, organized street violence, political campaigns, and enforcers by operators of night clubs, restaurants and brothels. Rival outfits engage each other in gang warfare on the streets. They are strongly associated with the drug trafficking and subsequently, many of the area boys end up as users.

However, despite this societal structure conditioning supply of violence setups, there is a stronghold from whence continuity abounds for these setups. This is because of the existence of a ready demand for the availability of the supply of violence in Nigeria. No doubt, there is a backing from certain government officials, basically politically elected representatives of the people who covert with their agents for free access to certain equipment in form of aiding and abetting. Consequently, such collusion usually attracts grave and negative outcomes on the peaceful populace of the polity. The question therefore is, why is the organized market for violence persisting in Nigeria? Secondly, what are the resultant effects on the average Nigerian? A detailed analysis of this should result in a rethink on the administrations of governance in Nigeria and Nigerians at large as regards the existing structure of agents and principal relationships in the market of violence in this nation and the world at large. This is the critical and independent examination done in this study.

Understanding the Market for Urban Violence in Nigeria

For occurrences of violence in a society, there must be corresponding causes at any point in time. Cathy et al (2008), argued that there is what has been referred to as the 'multiple complexity' of urban violence, in relation to the causes of and the actors involved in such conflict. Just as there are many different types of urban violence that can be categorised as political, social, economic and institutional, so also, the causes of such violence are multiple and need to be understood from a holistic perspective. Consequently, different types of urban violence intersect and overlap, while a range of actors perpetrate various forms of violence. The existence of any of these forms of violence is embedded in a form of market, in as much as there are gains and pains on the demand and supply sides respectively. Hence, as identified by Irma et al (1999), it is now acknowledged that the causes of urban violence must be viewed from a multi-disciplinary and multi-scalar

perspective. For instance, the cause of violence in Lagos may not necessarily be the same cause of violence in Kano; however, actors in such urban violence may relate and pursue similar objectives. Although different academic disciplines tend to focus on particular aspects of the underlying causes of urban violence, it is widely recognized that no single factor underpins its emergence. Instead, these range from psycho-social theories linked with socialisation processes to much wider macro-economic trends that relate to poverty and inequality. Subsequently, it is important to view the causes from a combination of structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual levels, all of which are interrelated (WHO, 2002).

Interestingly, there is a confirmation of the above on occurrences in the Nigerian scenario. Given years of military decadence, there is a socially formulated culture of violence pervading cities in the country. Manifestations abound such as the violent activities of the *Oodua* People's Congress (OPC), an ethnically based association, which has been a focus of studies by the Human Rights Watch Group in 2003 and also by Akinyele in 2001. The focus of such societies is what this paper tag as the supplier of the strength buyers of urban violence need to carry out specified targets at varying times. This is because the OPC in her own capacity is motivated by the decadence of the society and is by instinct compelled to succumb to the survival syndrome that influences her decisions. Why then do we wonder at the increasing supply of young minds to such society? Other groups have also emerged in the ethnic divisions of Nigeria such as the *Igbo* Peoples' Congress (IPC), the *Arewa* Peoples' Congress (APC), the *Ijaw* National Congress (INC), The *Egbesu* Boys of Africa (EBA), and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of *Biafra* (MASSOB). These represent the supply side of the analysis in this paper.

Demand and Supply: An Analysis of Urban Violence in Nigeria

The Theory of Demand and Supply in simple microeconomics is applicable to several markets such as the labour market, with individuals representing the supply side and firms representing the demand side; while in the commodities or goods market, the individuals represent the demand side while the firms represent the supply side. This model is applicable to the analysis made in this paper.

The price 'P' paid by those who gain from urban violence is determined by a balance between the volume of available youths ready to die for the sake of money (supply S) and the desires of those with purchasing power (demand D). The diagram shows a positive shift in demand from D_1 to D_2, resulting in an increase in price (P), amount charged by those willing to die, mostly Nigerian youths and quantity sold (Q) of the product i.e. Urban Violence.



Suppliers in the Market for Urban Violence = the OPC, APC, IPC, EBA, MASSOB, other thugs and cult groups not recognized at a national or state level. No man calls himself to death, but one is called to be paid. Demanders in the market for urban Violence = Politicians, Religious Fanatics, Foreign government, Businessmen, etc. Price paid in this market = determined by the quantity demanded and supplied by both parties at different times. This has implication for peace times and violent times. Where DD > SS we have a high price charged. This is because certain times when politicians need to use thugs or ethnically violent groups for their purpose; it is evident that they are willing to pay more and vice versa at times of peace. Is this not why our purse as a nation gets drastically reduced if not emptied when election period comes knocking?

Furthermore, the determinants of supply of urban violence going by our market model include:

1. **Production costs**: How much does it cost thugs, ethnically motivated violent groups, unemployed youths to be produced for the supply of their lives to carry out killings, maiming, riots, etc.? Production costs are the cost of the inputs; primarily labor, capital (transportation and logistics), and materials (guns, bombs, etc). They depend on the technology used in production, and/or technological advance as is the case with the constant recruitment of young minds currently going on the world over by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al-Qaeda, etc.
2. **Firms' expectations about future prices:** Since majority of the Nigerian youth are not employed but exposed to recruitments and vulnerability by and to such groups, they are easily deceived to engage in urban violence.
3. **Number of suppliers**: In the places where the number of youths willing to die for the sake of money is not enough, of course there

will be shortage of supply and this will definitely lead to a price hike i.e. more cost to those who gain from violence and vice versa.

The determinants of demand are:

1. **Income**: The model for demand and supply clearly explains that with higher income you can buy more of a product. This is equally applicable to the market for urban violence. This is because with more income in the hands of certain individuals, they are capable of funding more violence in the society.
2. **Consumers' expectations about future prices and incomes**: When those who gain from violence observe that the economy is not working, they are at liberty to expect more supply and a consequent reduced price.

Merton's Strain Theory

Merton's Strain Theory is a theory derived from Emile Durkheim's Anomie Theory, which is the theory of formlessness and abnormality in the society. It is a modern day example of why people commit crime in the society (Merton, 1938). It is a societal way of super- imposing ideals of becoming rich or wealthy at all cost. This could be by hard work or by sheer luck. This therefore makes the individual to feel dejected and irrelevant if he is not able to break even as the society dictates. This eventually leads to criminal tendencies and the ill and unethical advancements to make wealth in the community. Keel (2008) noted that this in turn, would make these unfortunate individuals develop a sort of strain; this strain afterward would make the individuals adopt criminals, or conformist's behaviours.

This theory believes that there are five different ways an individual may adopt toward societal demands. They may conform to it, become innovative, ritualistic, retreaters, or rebel against society itself. The conformist accepts the way things are and try to achieve success by legitimate hard work. The conformist is the most common type of response to strain and it could be someone who is trying to achieve a modest amount of wealth by hard work. Conversely, the innovator in a bid to achieve success in a deviant or criminal manner, break rules in order to try to achieve the societal standard of 'good living'. However, this is usually through violence and other criminal activities. Ritualistic is when an individual gives up the societal success and tries to focus on what he already had. Retreaters would give up on all the dreams. Rebels are simply against the notion of how to get successful so they wish to replace the system with something else.

Bourguignon (2002) and Agnew (2012) extrapolates that the evidence of strain theory in the developing countries is poverty. Poverty is a factor that contributes to criminal activities. The hypothesis that crime is a phenomenon due to poverty is a known fact in the criminal justice studies (Akers and

Sellers 2013). Violence against the society is a prominent feature of strain effect on an individual. Therefore, there are some social and political policies which are available in order to try to prevent crime, these are available to people who have a low socio-economic status.

Methodology and Findings

An assertion that is worrisome over the years until the 2015 general elections is that made by *The Economist* (2011), "results in Nigerian elections come in two separate columns. One records the votes cast at polling stations; the other the number of people killed around the time of the election". This is a stigma of inherent violence by the actors in the market for violence in Nigeria. However, this calls for resiliency on the part of Nigerians, both the class of electorates and those elected to de-marketise this market as well as give another set-up that establishes a market for peace. The question is, what is the nature of operations in this market and implication on Nigerians?

Be that as it may, a descriptive statistical technique is adopted as the methodology for this paper. This is used to analyse the data so as to have a comprehensive knowledge of the nature of urban violence in Nigeria. Thus, the survey carried out by Afrobarometer (2013) on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria is employed to advance and analyse the discussion on the urban violence structures in Nigeria. The data obtained which entail a total sample size of two thousand, four hundred (2400) participants perceptions is discussed to achieve the objective of this paper and to comprehend the existing pattern of relationship between those who gain from violence and those who supply it and why. The data are presented with frequencies and percentages, and the critical analysis of each figure follows respectively with the information they contained. The figures are presented in sections in line with the objectives of the paper.

Distribution of respondents into Rural or Urban Areas

Do you come from a rural or urban area?

Table 1

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Urban	1046	43.6	43.6	43.6
Rural	1354	56.4	56.4	100
Total	2400	100	100	



Figure 1
Source: Afrobarometer survey on The Quality of Democracy and Governance, Round 5, 2013 http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-by-country-n-z/nigeria/item/482-nigeria-round-5-data-2013

The figure above shows the distribution of respondents based on their region. This is needed to help us comprehend the nature of violence and its spread as it relates to their regional distribution. 43.6% of the respondents live in urban area, while 56.4% of the respondents live in rural area. This is true because areas that are developed in Nigeria usually lack enough space to accommodate the rate of migration into the cities and this on its own has made the urban areas choked with all sorts of migrants from the rural area to the urban area. This encourages more violence in the urban area than in the rural areas.

Police Stations in your area

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	1435	59.8	59.8	59.8
Yes	965	40.2	40.2	100
Total	2400	100	100	

Table 2 *Source: Afrobarometer survey on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria, Round 5, 2013*



Figure 2

The respondents were asked about the nature of security in their area and if police protection is usually imminent in their area. 59.8% which is a large proportion of the respondents representing Nigerians in their own opinion do have police stations in their area to supply police protection adequately in times of violence. Also, 40.2% have police stations in their area. The emphasis will now be on the nature of the response of police in cases of violence.

Soldiers/Army in your area

Table 3 *Source: Afrobarometer survey on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria, Round 5, 2013*

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	2045	85.2	85.2	85.2
Yes	355	14.8	14.8	100
Total	2400	100	100	

Soldiers are generally regarded as the solution to violence in Nigeria. This is because there is by assertion an infiltration of the Nigerian Police Force and some other paramilitary in the country. But for the discipline in the Nigerian army, there would have been an outbreak of disorder. Respondents

will be shortage of supply and this will definitely lead to a price hike i.e. more cost to those who gain from violence and vice versa.

The determinants of demand are:

1. **Income**: The model for demand and supply clearly explains that with higher income you can buy more of a product. This is equally applicable to the market for urban violence. This is because with more income in the hands of certain individuals, they are capable of funding more violence in the society.
2. **Consumers' expectations about future prices and incomes**: When those who gain from violence observe that the economy is not working, they are at liberty to expect more supply and a consequent reduced price.

Merton's Strain Theory

Merton's Strain Theory is a theory derived from Emile Durkheim's Anomie Theory, which is the theory of formlessness and abnormality in the society. It is a modern day example of why people commit crime in the society (Merton, 1938). It is a societal way of super- imposing ideals of becoming rich or wealthy at all cost. This could be by hard work or by sheer luck. This therefore makes the individual to feel dejected and irrelevant if he is not able to break even as the society dictates. This eventually leads to criminal tendencies and the ill and unethical advancements to make wealth in the community. Keel (2008) noted that this in turn, would make these unfortunate individuals develop a sort of strain; this strain afterward would make the individuals adopt criminals, or conformist's behaviours.

This theory believes that there are five different ways an individual may adopt toward societal demands. They may conform to it, become innovative, ritualistic, retreaters, or rebel against society itself. The conformist accepts the way things are and try to achieve success by legitimate hard work. The conformist is the most common type of response to strain and it could be someone who is trying to achieve a modest amount of wealth by hard work. Conversely, the innovator in a bid to achieve success in a deviant or criminal manner, break rules in order to try to achieve the societal standard of 'good living'. However, this is usually through violence and other criminal activities. Ritualistic is when an individual gives up the societal success and tries to focus on what he already had. Retreaters would give up on all the dreams. Rebels are simply against the notion of how to get successful so they wish to replace the system with something else.

Bourguignon (2002) and Agnew (2012) extrapolates that the evidence of strain theory in the developing countries is poverty. Poverty is a factor that contributes to criminal activities. The hypothesis that crime is a phenomenon due to poverty is a known fact in the criminal justice studies (Akers and

Sellers 2013). Violence against the society is a prominent feature of strain effect on an individual. Therefore, there are some social and political policies which are available in order to try to prevent crime, these are available to people who have a low socio-economic status.

Methodology and Findings

An assertion that is worrisome over the years until the 2015 general elections is that made by *The Economist* (2011), "results in Nigerian elections come in two separate columns. One records the votes cast at polling stations; the other the number of people killed around the time of the election". This is a stigma of inherent violence by the actors in the market for violence in Nigeria. However, this calls for resiliency on the part of Nigerians, both the class of electorates and those elected to de-marketise this market as well as give another set-up that establishes a market for peace. The question is, what is the nature of operations in this market and implication on Nigerians?

Be that as it may, a descriptive statistical technique is adopted as the methodology for this paper. This is used to analyse the data so as to have a comprehensive knowledge of the nature of urban violence in Nigeria. Thus, the survey carried out by Afrobarometer (2013) on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria is employed to advance and analyse the discussion on the urban violence structures in Nigeria. The data obtained which entail a total sample size of two thousand, four hundred (2400) participants perceptions is discussed to achieve the objective of this paper and to comprehend the existing pattern of relationship between those who gain from violence and those who supply it and why. The data are presented with frequencies and percentages, and the critical analysis of each figure follows respectively with the information they contained. The figures are presented in sections in line with the objectives of the paper.

with 85.2% say that there is no military presence, unlike their counterpart with 14.8% who say that there is presence of military. These 14.8% are people who live where there are military cantonments and military barracks.



Figure 3 *Source: Afrobarometer survey on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria, Round 5, 2013*

Respondents were asked about their living standards in the country. This question is needed for this paper because it is established that psychologically and sociologically, if a young man or a middle aged man is disordered, he is prone to give in to breaking of law and order or join a terrorist group so as to earn a living. Most of the respondents agreed to fairly live well in the country, while 27.3% of the respondents fairly live badly in Nigeria and as such manage to survive. 15.2% of Nigerians live very badly. This percentage of the respondents agreed that they struggle to survive and by implication may give in to odd jobs in as much as it will provide a good living condition for them.

Do you trust police to help you during violence?

Table 4

Source: Afrobarometer survey on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria, Round 5, 2013

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not at all	1268	52.9	52.9	52.9
Just a little	737	30.7	30.7	83.5
Somewhat	291	12.1	12.1	95.7
A lot	96	4	4	99.7
Don't know/Haven't heard enough	8	0.3	0.3	100
Total	2400	100	100	

During violence, most Nigerians do not trust police intervention. This is because there is a general ideology that the police are not well paid, and as such, usually collect bribe. However, this assertion may not be true when their salary is compared with other government security agencies. This perhaps informs us of a problem of integrity on the part of the police. This may cause them to partner with the suppliers of violence who are in a way funded by some known but unknown personalities.

Ethnic group treated differently

Table 5

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Never	671	28	28	28
Sometimes	841	35.1	35.1	63
Often	542	22.6	22.6	85.6
Always	311	12.9	12.9	98.5
Not applicable	6	0.2	0.2	98.8
Don't know	29	1.2	1.2	100
Total	2400	100	100	

From the figure above, respondents are asked whether in Nigeria, some ethnic groups are treated differently. This question by Afrobarometer in their 2013 survey is needed to help us determine why some ethnic groups are more violent than others. This is true in the militancy of the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgency in the North. 35.1% of the respondents agree that some ethnic groups are sometimes treated differently while 22.6% of the respondents agree that some ethnic groups are often treated differently. The influence of this on the peace process and violent structure in Nigeria is paramount in relation to the poor ecnomic situations in the country.

Violence never justified Vs. Sometimes necessary

Table 7 *Source: Afrobarometer survey on the quality of democracy and governance in Nigeria, Round 5, 2013*

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Agree very strongly with 1	976	40.6	40.6	40.6
Agree with 1	877	36.5	36.5	77.2
Agree with 2	379	15.8	15.8	93
Agree very strongly with 2	142	5.9	5.9	98.9
Agree with neither	5	0.2	0.2	99.1
Don't know	22	0.9	0.9	100
Total	2400	100	100	

From the figure above a relatively high percentage of the respondents agreed that violence is not a justified means to solving it, while a reasonable percentage also agreed that violence may be necessary sometimes. This has a negative implications on the nature of violence in Nigeria as well as the view of those who supply and demand violence in Nigeria. This is because there will be a form of attack and counter attack by those who are agreed and thus support the use of violence.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Violence is inevitable, but it should be minimized and prevented at least to its barest minimum in a number of ways. This paper has examined a number of salient issues in the market established for urban violence in Nigeria. It has explained both the causes and the implications for a sustainable peace using Afrobarometer survey round 5, 2013. It explained in details why the market persists and what can be done to save the ship of the Nigerian state from hitting the rock.

As a matter of fact, the demand and supply of urban violence is a universal phenomenon particularly where individual goals are different, and as such play an incompatible role in the advancement and actualization of their interest. It should, therefore, not be surprising that ethics may lose its values in this kind of purposive market, as regards will be lost for law and order as well as lives and properties of the ordinary man.

This is not unconnected with the fact that, what is considered morally wrong may be socially, economically and politically right for the traders of this market. To avert this ugly situation, government needs to be completely alive to its primary responsibility in terms of security, employment for the youths, monitoring the class structures, as well as incorporating and modelling people into governance. The government should be responsible rather than being an ordinary representative.

It is worthy of note here that the market discussed in this paper is a perfect market without government intervention. This is because the actors in this market are solely private agents and interact based on their own selfish interest. They are thus motivated by the pay-offs and succumb only to higher considerations. A reasonable and basic recommendation is a de-marketisation of this market. De-marketising this market will therefore involve an 'absolute' government intervention in the workings of the market for urban violence. This will lead to a breakdown in the supply chain of the market, as the government reasonably provides an alternative but encouraging support to those who supply violence in Nigeria thereby discouraging effectiveness in the workings of the market. Where there is shortage in supply, the demand side suffers. The politicians and other agents

who make use of violence to disrupt governments and the workings of its parastatals will have to pay too high a cost and with a most likely poor result or outcome.

References

Adisa, J. (1994); "Urban violence in Lagos" in Isaac Albert; Jinmi Adisa, Tunde Agbola; and G. Herault (eds.) *Urban management and urban violence in Africa* Proceedings of an international symposium on Urban Management and Urban Violence in Africa Vol.1 and 2, on 7-11 November, Ibadan: IFRA (French Institute for Research in Africa).

Agnew, R. (2012): Reflection on a revised strain theory of delinquency *Social Forces* Vol 91 No1

Akers, R and Sellers, C. (2013); *Criminological theories: Introduction, evaluation, and application* (6th Ed.). New York City: Oxford University Press

Akparanta, B. (1994); Reasons for urban violence in post-civil war Nigeria in *Urban management and urban violence in Africa*. Vol.1 and 2 eds., Isaac Albert; Jinmi Adisa, Tunde Agbola; and G. Herault , Proceedings of an international symposium on Urban Management and Urban Violence in Africa held at Ibadan, 7-11 November, Ibadan: IFRA (French Institute for Research in Africa), pp. 109-114.

Albert, I. O. (1994); Urban violence in contemporary Africa. Some theoretical explanations in *Urban management and urban violence in Africa*. Vol.1 and 2 eds., Isaac Albert; Jinmi Adisa, Tunde Agbola; and G. Herault , Proceedings of an international symposium on Urban Management and Urban Violence in Africa held at Ibadan, 7-11 November, Ibadan: IFRA (French Institute for Research in Africa), pp. 9-20.

Arriagada I. and Godoy L. (1999); 'Seguridad ciudadana violencia en America Latina: diagnóstico y políticas en los anos noventa', in *Social Policy Series*, no.32. See also Cathy McIlwaine, 'Geography and development: violence and crime as development issues', in *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 23, no. 3

Bourguignon, F. (2002); *Crime as a social cost of poverty and inequality: A Review* Retrieved from http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/facets/facetsp189-209.pdf

Edelberto Torres-Rivas (1999); 'Epilogue: Notes on terror, violence, fear and democracy', in Keel, R. O. (2008); *Structural Strain Theories* Retrieved from http://www.umsl.edu/~keelr/200/strain.html

Koonings, K and D Kruijt (1999), *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America*, Zed Books, London.

McIlwaine C and Moser C. (2006); 'Latin American urban violence as a development concern: Towards a framework for violence reduction', in *World Development*, vol. 34, no.1, pp. 89-112.

McIlwaine C and Moser C. (2004); 'Drugs, alcohol and community tolerance: an urban ethnography from Colombia and Guatemala', in *Environment and Urbanization*, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 49-62.

Merton, R. (1938); Social structure and anomie *American Sociological Review*, Vol 3 No 1

Nigerian Elections (2011); Ballots and Bullets, Political Violence Reaches New Heights, *The Economist*, http://www.economist.com/node/18561189

Omitoogun, Wumi (1994); The area boys of Lagos: A study of organized street violence in *Urban management and urban violence in Africa*. Vol.1 and 2 eds., Isaac Albert; Jinmi Adisa, TundeAgbola; and G. Herault , Proceedings of an international symposium on Urban Management and Urban Violence in Africa held at Ibadan, 7-11 November, Ibadan: IFRA (French Institute for Research in Africa), pp. 201-208.

Taylor, R (2002); "Justice denied: political violence in KwaZulu–Natal after 1994", Violence and Transition Series Vol 6. Available at http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papvtp6.htm

The Afrobarometer Network, 2013. "Afrobarometer Survey." http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-by-country-n-z/nigeria

UN-Habitat (2007); *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security*, Earthscan, London.

World Health Organisation (2002); *World Report on Violence and Health*, Geneva

Repr
Conte

Stere
Frer
usu
focused o
novel of
postcoloni
and diffe
Fanon's d
establishir
nomadic
while the
conversely
themselve
out an ecc
the colonis
wretched
representat
underpinn
mentality, a

Key words
Clézio
."Ea
(Ru

Introductio

As t
progress, re
journeys to
Montesquie
Persanes (172
America in
colonial rule
the basis of t