




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Good Governance and Crises in Cote d'Ivoire: Opportunities and Challenges for Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

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Abstract

Until recently Cote d'Ivoire was a country regarded as a "peace garden" of the West African region because it was the most stable among the countries of the region, with over three decades of political stability. However, as a result of drastic drop in the price of cocoa in the world market in the 1980s which resulted in serious economic crises and coupled with the introduction of the concepts of Ivories and Non-Ivories in the political landscape of the country in 1990s, the country was engulfed in an open conflict in 2002. The resulting conflict assumed international dimension with varying degree of interests from various nations, international bodies and organizations. This paper provides political-historical examination of the root causes of the conflict and assessment of the efforts of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in managing the conflict. The paper posits that even though, the organization is equipped with proactive mechanisms for addressing conflict in the region, it is challenged with logistical and financial resources as well as internal problems of member states which hindered the operation of the management of the conflict. The paper recommends that ECOWAS should rather be assisted with necessary logistic and financial assistance by international bodies to combat any conflict situation in the region instead of direct involvement of these actors in the conflict of the region which has hindered effectiveness of the organization

Keywords: Conflict, Crisis, Partnership, Complex Political Emergency

Introduction

West Africa is a sub-region in the continent of Africa which is blessed with both human and materials resources. Among the regions in the continent, it is the most populous and heterogeneous in nature. The sub-region covers an area of 6.5 million square kilometers and consists of 16 States excluding Cameroon and Chad, which are usually categorized as Central African states. With an estimated population of over 280 million

people, the sub-region accounts for approximately 30 percent of the entire population of Africa (World Bank, 2016). West Africa presents a wide range of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, political and religious differences and therefore refers to as crossroads of Africa. Nigeria alone has about 250 ethnic groups. Members of some ethnic groups are spread across borders. For instance, the Yorubas can be found in Nigeria, Benin, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire; Hausas in Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger; Kanuris in Nigeria, Niger and Chad; the Wolofs in Senegal and the Gambia; Mandigos in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia; the Ewe in Togo and Ghana and the Fulanis in virtually all the states in the sub-region. This has come about as a result of the arbitrary demarcation of West Africa by European colonial powers in the Berlin conference of 1884. Thus West Africa is today divided into Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone States. The French precarre [backyard] states are in the majority and this include Niger, Senegal, Benin, Togo, Burkina faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali and the Anglophones include Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia and the Lusophone, Cape Verde. The heritage, human diversity and natural resources of West Africa should be a source of pride and assets to the sub-region. However, instead, West Africa has endured many years of inter and intra states conflicts that have deprived the sub-region of a modern political and economic development due to the death and displacement of millions who would have served as necessary tools to attain the drive to maturity. In fact, the region has been labeled one of the most Complex Political Emergencies (CPE) of the world. (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999)

Apart from East Africa, West Africa is next in line of regions riddled with conflict and poverty in the continent. The bequeathed colonial legacy notwithstanding, bad governance, ethnicity, minority rule, dictatorship, greed, corruption, sit tight leadership problem, and fight for power and wealth have led to the disruption of the traditional societal relations, thus peace eludes the sub-region. Lack of political pluralism has caused deep-seated unrest in Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso. Frequent 'coup attempts' in Mauritania are adding to that country's problems between the Arab ruling class and the marginalized black population. In 1997, Guinea Bissau became engulfed in a bitter struggle for power between mutinous sections of the army and the government of President Nino Vieira. Cote d'Ivoire, which initially was stable economically and politically, was plunged into a civil war in September 2002, due to ethnic politics and bad governance thus the region

is labeled dysfunctional regional order. The unstable nature of countries of the region compelled ECOWAS to move beyond its economic aim and objectives, to include stability and security as a priority for the region and to institutionalize conflict prevention management and resolution as a core activity. Protocols were established by the sub-regional organization to tackle the endemic menace in the sub-region.

It is against this background that this paper traces the trajectory of the organization efforts in curtailing the conflict in the region with emphasis on good governance and entrenchment of democratic principles as the bases for peace and development in the region. The paper is divided into four segments. Introduction formed the first segment, followed by theoretical framework. The third segment encompasses the root causes of Cote d'Ivoire crisis, efforts of the regional organization in managing the crisis and the challenges posed to regional economic and political development. The last segment contains the conclusion and recommendations. In its methodology, the paper adopted historical - empirical analysis with extensive review of literature on the subject matter. Relevant information about the topic was obtained from published books, journals and policy papers on Cote d'Ivoire crisis.

Theoretical Framework

Conflict is a phenomenon that is an important part of human existence and a natural part of our daily lives. Conflicts that take place within a society as a result of several factors and therefore it is difficult to point to a single factor as being responsible for order within a society, it is as difficulty to point to a single explanation for the emergence, escalation or protraction of conflict whether violent or otherwise (Falleti, 2006). This work will be theoretically grounded on the structural conflict theory as it presents multivariate factors to the explanation of conflict.

This theory has two main sub-orientation. The first is the radical structural theory represented by the Marxists dialectical school with exponents like Marx and Engels, V.I. Lenin, etc as leading figures. The second is the liberal structuralism represented by Ross (1993) and the famous work of Galting (1990) on structural violence. It further sees incompatible interests based on competition for resources, which in most cases are assumed to be scarce, as being responsible for social conflicts (Collier,

2002). Theorists like Karl Marx, in his thesis "Historical materialism" present conflicts as mostly tied to economic structures and social institutions. The main argument of the structural conflict theory is that conflict built into the particular ways societies are structured and organized. The theory looks at social problems like political and economic exclusion, injustice, poverty, disease and exploitation, inequity etc. as sources of conflict. Dummoye (2007) concurred with this argument as the bases of explaining conflict in Africa when he observes:

it should be reiterated that ethnic differences do not constitute threats to political stability and economic underdevelopment as such; the existence of ethnicity is not enough to provoke conflicts, but economic underdevelopment, poverty, and the struggle for scarce resources provoke ethnic conflicts.

Best (2006) also agreed that economic competition is the main causes of conflict in Africa and indeed in West Africa when he asserted that: in existential terms, the immanent linkage between conflict and underdevelopment crisis is non-linear, but dialectical underdevelopment crisis breeds conflict and conflict in turn sustains the quagmire of economic crisis in Africa.

Structuralisms maintain that conflicts occur because of the exploitation and unjust nature of one class by another etc. This case is made by radicals like Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Joseph. Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, who blame capitalism for being an exploitative system based on its relations of production and the division of society into the proletariat and the bourgeois.

The Marxist tradition has been extended by neo-Marxists, mostly of the Underdevelopment and Dependency School, most of them from the developing countries. Some of the best known theorists are Andre Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, as well as Emmanuel Walterstein who expounded the "world system theory". This group of scholars seeks to explain the reasons for development and underdevelopment and why the third world is not developing. They situate their analysis within the world capitalist system, and accused the system of being structurally exploitative, retarding development for the Third World.

Liberal Structuralists like Johan Galtung, who propounded the theory of negative peace and positive peace to buttress how structural conflicts can occur in society. The solution to this type of conflict, to the Marxists is that the contradictions will end in a revolution, civil war, or some forms of violence leading to the overthrow of the exploitative system, thus the conflicts and violence occurring in the West Africa sub-region could be analysed and explained in this regard. Liberal structuralist call for the elimination of structural defects with policy reforms. The emphasis of structural theory is to explain how the competing interests of groups tie conflict directly into the social economic, and political organization of society as well as the nature and strength of social networks within and between community groups.

For instance that in situations where economic and political discrimination and weak kinship ties are the defining characteristics of a society, the chances that negative forms of conflict will result are highest than in situation where the conditions are the exact opposite. However, most of the conflict that are occurring in West African States are mainly caused by kinship ties, underdevelopment and competition for economic and political resources. In Cote d'Ivoire for instance, there is great dichotomy between the people of the North and South in term of religious and economic endowment. This analogy can be best illustrated in the level of political stability enjoy in countries such as Ghana in West Africa and South Africa Republic in South Africa compare to countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In other words, when social, political, economic and cultural processes are monopolized by a group, it creates the conditions that make people to adopt adversarial approaches to conflict. Structural theory is remarkably strong on the immediate and underlying factors that lead to conflict. It presents a large number of such factors that make the emergence and escalation of internal conflicts possible. While economic and social factors are more common, political and institutional factors (the structure of the state, discriminatory political institutions, intergroup politics and elite cohesion of fragmentation); security factors (national security dilemma, regional military environment, refugee regions, cross-border criminality, and civil military relations) as well as ethnic factors; (demography and physical geography), are equally as critical. Structuralists present factors such as those explained above as the major motivating factors that explain the emergence of destructive conflicts between individuals and groups. In most cases problems of overpopulation,

economic underdevelopment, social and political institutions, as well as demographic factors that put pressure on human settlements and available resources are the main factors for the emergence of internal conflicts.

Causes of Conflict in West Africa States

Conflicts originate from different sources for different reasons in different geographical areas. Alley (2004), pointed out that, "root causes can arise from poverty, political repression and marginalization, prolonged failure of state functions and unequal distribution of resource benefits which in combination provide the seedbeds to internal conflicts". Realists argue that conflict has always existed because it is inherent in society structure, conflict is present today and that there will be conflict tomorrow. They consider conflict to be the norm and view human nature as essentially egoistical, aggressive and greedy. To liberalists, on the other hand, human nature is good and they assume that the development of human and a peaceful society can only occur when antagonist's ideals are reformed.

Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his report on the sources of conflicts in West Africa, identified four broad sources namely; Historical legacy; Domestic politics; External factors and Economic motivation. On historical legacy, Kofi Annan, noted three issues. First, when most of the African states attained independence in the 1960s, they inherited colonial structures, with the challenge of building the state and the nation. Secondly, the distortion of the political economy of Africa was aimed at satisfying the need of trade within the metropolitan rather than to support the balanced growth of an indigenous economy. Thirdly, the super powers supported and sustained undemocratic and oppressive regimes during the cold war for their own selfish reasons. Consequently, at the end the cold war Africa without any support strategic value, is left to fend for itself the absence of external economic and political support meant that only few African regions could sustain the economic life style to which they had become accustomed and to also maintain permanent hold on political power (Ochoche, 2002).

At the domestic setting of his analysis, Annan posits that the main source of conflict is the nature of political power in many African states, which is based on winner-takes all especially in the context of national wealth and resources, prestige and abuse of office. Annan noted in his analysis that the external and economic factors are the interplay of foreign

countries and their interest that often intervene in African conflicts seeking to protect their different interests. These interests, Annan argues are not always the same as those of the warring parties. Most of the time, many like the international arms merchants, see conflict as an opportunity to do business and make profit.

What perhaps is pertinent in the understanding of West African conflicts are the factors that make them profoundly intractable. Three possible explanations can be adduced:

- The issues at stake (whether political power, self determination, resources or religion).
- The players involved and their ability to negotiate and reach compromises.
- Linkages across frontiers which include external forces, interest and the availability of arms (Maas, 1996)

The interplay of the above determines the extent of containment, management and resolution of most conflicts in West Africa. One clear example that can be cited here in the protracted conflict in Ivory Coast.

In the same vein, following the colonization of various African territories, kingdoms and states, they were geographically defined by the various colonial overlords. Most of these boundaries did not take in considerations the affinities and ties of the peoples of these kingdoms and territories. The basic consideration was the interest of the colonial overlords. The configuration of various African kingdoms and territories into nation-states laid the foundation for conflict. Thus, after many of these African nations fought the war for freedom, the independence they got became the source of ethnic conflict. Adedeji, (1999) rightly observed this when he stated:

.... Africa is a vast and varied continent made up of countries with specific histories and geographical conditions as well as uneven level of economy development. The causes of conflict in Africa reflect the continent's diversity and complexity. Why some causes are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, other have a significant international dimension. Notwithstanding these differences, African conflicts show a number of cross cutting themes and experiences

Adedeji, further in his analysis opined that competition for economic resources is an important factor in conflict, but is not the only one. Firstly, he argues that "competition for resources typically lies at the heart of conflict. This accounts for the intensity of the struggled for political power in many of African countries" Adedeji, (1999). This may explain the competition amongst the elite in a stable political environment. It does not follow, however, that competition for economic resources is the cause of all conflicts in West Africa. Secondly, and at a slightly different level, Adedeji argues that universally, conflicts are the result of lack of security – a psychological fear of political uncertainty. "Throughout the world, conflicts are the consequences of the fear of the future, lived through the past". It is the "collective fear of the future based on a history of social uncertainty, due to the failure of the state to arbitrate justly between or provide credible guarantee of protection for groups, resulting in emerging anarchy and social fractures" Adedeji (1999). But where there is political stability and the fear and uncertainty of anarchy is absent, it may be logical to draw a conclusion that competition for political power amongst the elite is driven by competition for resources. But then how many African countries have this kind of solid long-term political stability.

In a UN report (2001) it was stated that "Hunger anywhere threatens peace everywhere". Poverty and deprivation were seen as fundamental causes of violence conflicts and civil violence. It was noted that when government fail to meet the basic needs of the people, such state easily become prone to conflict. Similarly, Albert (2011), expressed that conflict arises from four sources: competition for inadequate (or perceived to be inadequate) resources; contradictory value system; psychological needs of groups and individuals (self-actualization and respect) and manipulation of information. Albert further highlighted ten issues that generate conflicts: scarcity of resources; value differences; ideological differences; culture shocks and differences in culture; power; human right violation; perceptions.

Perhaps, the most enduring, if not the most accurate, image of Africa from 1990s has been that of the continent of conflicts and violent battling for survival. Africa stands out as a continent of distinctively violent and conflicting politics, a continent where conflicts makes the everyday life of the people even more demeaning than other poor parts of the world.

Challenges to ECOWAS Efforts in the Management of Cote d'Ivoire Conflict

Ivory Coast is an integral member of the Economic Community of West Africa States, ECOWAS. The organization was founded as a forum to integrate the economies of West African states, but is has, since it first set up a peace-enforcement force (ECOMOG) that intervened in Liberia in 1990, taken on the role of a regional security organization. The reaction of ECOWAS to the events in Ivory Coast was informed by the fact that the violent overthrow of the legitimate Government of President Laurent Gbagbo is a gross violation of the basic principles of the African Union, including the Algiers Declaration of July 1999, which established a framework for reaction to unconstitutional change of government. The attempted coup d'etat also contravened the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which prohibits the recognition of any government that came to power by the overthrow of a democratically-elected government or by unconstitutional means.

There was also the fear of a possible spill-over of the violence across the borders. Soon after the crisis broke out, Ghana, together with Nigeria and Togo, sent a delegation to Cote d'Ivoire to express solidarity and support to President Gbagbo and to assure him that ECOWAS would do whatever it could to ensure that democratic and constitutional order prevailed in Cote d'Ivoire. President Gbagbo was also urged to do everything possible to ensure peace, stability and reconciliation in the country. Although efforts were made to hold elections at the end of October 2005 as provided in the Pretoria agreement, they couldn't be conducted on ground that all requirements were not available and President Gbagbo also insisted that rebels had not disarmed while rebels also allowed to stay in power till October 2006 by UN and AU on the recommendation of ECOWAS leaders to avoid a constitutional crisis in the country.

The search for a peaceful solution to the conflict continued with the dialogue between Brigadier General Philippe Mangou of FANCI and Soumaila Bakayoko of FAFN. These chiefs met on several occasions in Bouake town and Yamoussoukro city with the aim of finding a solution especially about how the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process can be implemented and belligerent forces be united. Following continued dialoging of the chiefs of staff, soldiers due for DDR

started gathering at identified sites for DDR exercise in both sides of the rebel's territory and government's territory.

Presidential elections have been cancelled on two occasions and the reasons given have been lack of preparations. In accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is required to be conducted prior to presidential elections however it had not taken off on those occasions, thus affecting elections schedules. The then, UN chief Kofi Annan stated that, "elections for October 2005 could not take place because political leaders and parties were not cooperating and the electoral commission had not been constituted".

At the beginning of the year 2007, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso in his capacity as the conflict mediator invited the warring parties to his country. The agreement – reached in Ouagadougou, capital of neighbouring Burkina Faso, on 4th March – between President Laurent Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles Secretary-General Guillaume Soro commits both sides to honouring all United Nations Security Council resolutions 1721 on the issues, including the need to abide by free, fair and transparent elections. It also tackles other key issues such as disarmament, reform and restructuring of the armed forces and the restoration of State authority throughout the country (Obi, 2007). President Gbagbo named rebel leader Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister on 29th March 2007 in a major step towards implementing Ouagadougou accord. The buffer zone between the government controlled south and rebel controlled north was lifted on the 16 April 2007 in accordance with the Ouagadougou accord. France also announced that it would pull out 500 of its 3,500 peacekeeper from Ivory Coast following the new peace deal.

The multiple peace agreements have failed to end the civil war in Ivory Coast even with the involvement of international actors and mediators however, the Ouagadougou accord which brought about the appointment of the former rebel leader as the Prime minister, the establishment of a joint command center composed of government military officers and former rebel commanders and the lifting of the buffer zone is a significant move towards the direction of achieving peace in the country so long as the accord is fully implemented.

Several developments however conspired to lead to the postponement of elections fixed for 2009. These included questions about the neutrality of appointed electoral officials, controversies trailing the voter

registration process and the doubt about the DDR process. The facilitator of the Ouagadougou Agreement, backed by ECOWAS, AU and UN agreed to the postponement of elections. In January 2010, President Gbagbo dissolved the CEI based on his concerns about its neutrality, prompting immediate protest from opposition parties and their supporters. The situation however calmed down after Bakayoko from the opposition PDCI was appointed the new head of the CEI. Thus, the elections were held in 2010 in the midst of growing tensions between the government and opposition in October, and the run-off in November, of the same year with the Special Representative in line with UNSC Resolution 1795 endorsing the electoral process and the results proclaiming Al-Hassan Outarra the President-elect. Gbagbo's recourse was to seek refuge in the nationalist position as he had done on occasions throughout the peace process when he felt that his interests were threatened. Thus, he rejected the results as announced by the CEI and dismissed the endorsement of the results by the Special Representative. In its attendance was Young-Jin Choi, the UN Special Representative to Cote d'Ivoire, and Mahama Ouedraogo, the Representative of the AU President, in Abuja. In a communiqué released on December 7, 2010, ECOWAS condemned Gbagbo's refusal to accept the results as announced by the CEI, urged him to do so and yield power without delay (ECOWAS issues another statement on December 20th, condemning Gbagbo's ultimatum to the UNOCI and French forces to leave Cote d'Ivoire, calling on Gbagbo to reconsider his confrontational stance towards the international community (ECOWAS, 2010).

On December 24 at another extraordinary ECOWAS Head of State and Government Summit in Abuja, it was decided drawing on the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol that in the event that Gbagbo fails to heed the immutable demand of the ECOWAS, the Community would be left with no alternative but to take other measures, including the use of legitimate force, to achieve the goals of the Ivorian people (Aning and Aduobi, 2011, p.134). On the basis of Article 22 of the 1999 Protocol, the Summit "after reviewing the situation in Cote d'Ivoire directed the ECOWAS Committatend tee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) to commence planning for a military intervention to oust Mr. Gbagbo should all other means fail. The UN endorsed the ECOWAS position through the UN Security Council Resolution 1967 of January 2011, and further strengthened UNOCI with additional troops (from

UNMIL) while condemning Gbagbo's anti-UN rhetoric and asking him to respect ECOWAS demands to hand power to Al-Hassan Outarra.

On March 25, following Gbagbo's refusal to attend another ECOWAS summit in Abuja called on the UNSC to authorize the immediate implementation of the Authority decisions of December 2010 on the use of ECOWAS legitimate force to oust Gbagbo, asked the UNSC to strengthen UNDCI's mandate and directed the ECOWAS President to support Outarra's government. It also invited the AU Commission to implement the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council of March 10, 2011 to dispatch a High Level Panel of Five Presidents (each representing each of Africa's sub-regions) assisted by a joint AU – ECOWAS facilitation team be dispatched to mediate the Cote d'Ivoire crisis (ECOWAS, 2011).

By the end of March, it was obvious that the AU High Level of Five (later Four after Compaore withdrew) had also collapsed following Gbagbo's outright rejection of the High Level Panel's peace proposals. Gbagbo increasingly turned to national sovereignty and the Ivorian constitution to defend his refusal to give up power in defiance of ECOWAS-AU peace proposals. He also defied targeted international sanctions against himself and his inner circle, and stepped up anti-UN and anti-French rhetoric as the post-election crisis continued to fester. The security situation degenerated further as clashes broke out between Gbagbo and Outarra's supporters, while the later remained holed up in a hotel protected by UNOCI and French peacekeepers. It was in this context of the deteriorating security situation, attacks on civilians resulting in a humanitarian crisis marked by arbitrary killings, displacement and refugees streaming into neighbouring countries, that UNOCI, French peacekeepers and Republican forces routed Gbagbo's forces and captured him, paving the way for Outarra's ascendancy to the Presidency.

ECOWAS has grown in stature and is gaining dignified salience as a regional organization or (to use the UN Charter terminologies in Chapter VIII) regional arrangement acting for the Security Council with regard to measures under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter. However, ECOWAS success record in Cote d'Ivoire could not be compared to that of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Cote d'Ivoire's conflict has been determined by the rule of the United Nations which has been axed on the initial intervention of ECOWAS. Her partnership with France and other international organizations really impaired it achievement and thereby relegated the Community to the

background in an exercise that it suppose to be at fore front. There were many factors that accounted for this such as lack of required finance, logistical and operational problems, the politics of distrust among the member states. Though ECOWAS deserves credit for 'cutting its teeth' as it were, on these hot experiences and assuming its responsibilities in close cooperation with the UN. Olonisakin (2002) observed:

In considering the extent to which ECOWAS has played a role in responding to conflict, in West Africa, one is often apt to forget that the Organization was in its origin meant to foster economic integration and only got into the of peace and security by default

In the same vein, Musa (2006) argues further on this:

with subsequent missions, however, ECOWAS responses to crises became more rapid and an incremental projection of professionalism was clearly visible in later interventions in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Liberia again 2003 and more recently, in Cote d' Ivoire. Moreover, serious thought was now given to the development of robust institutional frameworks for conflict management from then on, ECOWAS leaders raised peace and security matters to the same status as development agenda and enacted new statutes to reflect the new realities

Conclusion and Recommendations

Unlike other African destructive conflicts such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia, the conflict in Ivory Coast received prompt intervention by ECOWAS troops and other partners therefore there wasn't much destruction especially in the southern region such as the administrative capital Yamussoukro and Abidjan capital city. With the current positive signal of concluding the conflict, peace-building projects or activities, beside those which have been going on amid the civil war, ought to be established to rejuvenate the society which has suffered for more than four years of crisis.

Although there were strong argument against the international organizations and foreign powers involvement in resolving African intra-state crises, the Ivorian conflict requires the involvement of the international, regional, the civil society and local actors to work hand in hand if peace is to be restored and be sustained in the country. Part of the infrastructure was destroyed by the civil war and peace-building activities requires funding.

therefore the international and regional organizations ought to give financial support towards the conduct of peace-building activities such disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants which has failed to take off for a long time and the reason among others which are given happens to be financial constraints. The civil society and local actors have been instrumental in the post-conflict peace-building activities in other regions such as in the Liberia post-conflict period and in the Uganda's northern region conflict, therefore equipped them to play a big role in the Ivory Coast post-conflict period in its efforts to realize a viable peace. ECOWAS as a body needs to be more proactive in its response to bad leadership among its member states. In this regard it is expected that Early Warning System of the Commission should be strengthened logistically to make it more effective and instead of establishment of four centers across the region, the Commission should establish the center at every member state to monitor and report the adherence to democratic principles of the members. The hybrid partnership between ECOWAS, France and other international actors needs to be reviewed in such a way that ECOWAS will not continue to act as alien in an issue which is primarily its traditional responsibilities. The organization only needs to be encouraged logistical and financially in the performance of such exercise.

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