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**EFFECTS OF YOUTH RESTIVENESS AND VIOLENCE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC**

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Abstract

The role of youths in the development of a society cannot be overemphasised. This is because youths in any polity form the major part of the society; meaning that the society is incomplete without the youths and as such they form the backbone of any nation in the sense that they can change the future of any nation for better with their courageous behaviour. This cannot however, be achieved with restive and violent youths. It is quite unfortunate that one of the characteristics of Nigeria's Fourth Republic is the increasing spate of youth violence and restiveness which has characterised its socio-political and economic processes. The paper discusses youth restiveness in Nigeria's Fourth Republic pointing out the causal factors and the resultant effect of violence on Nigeria's national security. The paper therefore argues that there is a strong relationship between violence and youth restiveness. Drawing largely from data gathered through secondary source, the paper adopted the frustration-aggression theory to explain the restive and violent nature of youths in Nigeria. Lastly, the paper suggests viable panaceas for reducing, if not totally, curbing youth restiveness and violence in the country.

Keywords: *Youth Restiveness, Unemployment, Violence, National Security,
Niger-Delta, Boko Haram*

Introduction

Youths long ago play different and vital roles in communal life: they play viable roles in family vocation such as farming, and blacksmithing and weaving, etc. Youths have been a great source of power for human developmental process and also constitute manpower for production process (Danesy, 2011, p.301). Similarly, during the latter part of the colonial days in Nigeria, the youths played resonant role in politics of agitation. Danesy (2011, p.301) observed that through their writing skills, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Anthony Enahoro, Wole Soyinka, Bola Ige, Tafawa Balewa and others were able to play vibrant roles in agitating for independence from the colonial masters. In the context of Nigeria's historical experience youths have rendered valuable contributions to the struggle for liberation and national development (Chukwuezi, 2009, p.99).

During that period, there appeared to be a feeling of optimism on the youths as the bedrock of developmental processes. What however, appeared to be a feeling of optimism later turned to that of despair in the political dispensations following independence i.e. the First, Second and aborted Third Republics and particularly, the Fourth Republic. The image of Nigerian youth as portrayed by state officials and the

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general public recently is largely negative (Chukwuezi, 2009, p.99). The youths are now being perceived as a group which constitutes nuisance to the society at large. This cannot be unconnected with the fact that youths in the present Fourth Republic are becoming or have actually become restive. When youths become restive, they have a very high inclination to become violent. Questions that may readily come to mind are: Why do youths become restive? What are the dangers involved in youth restiveness? How can youths be prevented from becoming violent? And lastly, what are the measures to be taken to address the issue of youth restiveness. This paper in order to find answers to these questions examines youth restiveness in Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999-date) looking at the effects of violence as a consequence of youth restiveness on Nigeria's national security.

Conceptualising Youth Restiveness and Violence

A critical conceptualisation of the term youth restiveness requires defining the term youth and restiveness. The concept of youth however, has been subjected to various connotations. It is however important to note that there exists a form of definitional consensus on the concept of youth in terms of age. For instance, the National Youth Development Policy defines youths as people between the ages of 18 and 35 (Ajufu, 2013, p.309). In a similar vein, the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) defines youths using the same age bracket (Karim, 2011, p.210). However, Igbo and Ikpa (2013, p.131) view youths as neither adolescents nor children characterised by excessive energy that needs to be exerted, which if not guarded, is channelled to negative tendencies. Youths contribute to the structures, norms, rituals and directions of the society while also being shaped by them. They make themselves through inventive forms of self-realisation and indigenous politics of identity and they make the society by acting as political face, as sources of resistance, and resilience and as ritual or even supernatural agents and generators of morality and healing through masquerade and play (Osaghae et.al, 2007, p.3). On the other hand, they appear as 'breakers' in various ways: as risk factors for themselves through suicide, drug use, alcohol and unsafe sex, by breaking societal norms, conventions and rules and sometimes by breaking live (Osaghae et.al 2007, p.3). 'Youth' is therefore, a tension filled highly unstable category whose management is of crucial importance for societal stability and development as it is a zone of restlessness, anxiety and chaos for the youth and society. Nigerian youths are perceived as breakers of societal norms conventions and values commonly characterised as drug users, violent criminals, and involvement in violent insurgences such as the case of the Niger Delta militant group and the Boko Haram sect in South and Northern parts of the country, respectively.

Restiveness refers to a state of being obstinate or awkward. The tendency of not complying with rules and regulations and of not been willing to be guided or regulated. Youth restiveness therefore, connotes the combinations of actions, conducts and behaviour which constitute unwholesome and socially unacceptable behaviour exhibited by youths. Youth restiveness can be seen as a way through which youths realise their objectives. As noted by Igbo and Ikpa, (2013, p.13) youths are unable to stay still or are unwilling to be controlled especially because they are bored or not satisfied with certain

decisions, changed or existing laws, considered to be unfavourable. Youths are filled with energy and when this energy is positively channeled, they are highly productive and hence, are likely to contribute to the overall development of the society. But when this energy is negatively engaged, restiveness and its resultant effects are likely to occur (Igbo & Ikpa, 2013, p.131).

Violence on the other hand connotes the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal- development or deprivation (Krug, 2002). According to him, violence is associated with intent as well as committing the act itself undermining the consequence. In his own explanation of violence, Corsini (1999, p.4) viewed violence as the expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against persons or property. While Corsini's view of violence has been directed to other persons and property, Krug is of the opinion that violence can be directed to oneself. This definition seems to be more elaborate as violence directed to oneself seems to be rampant in the country. Violence directed to oneself can be divided into two; these include suicidal acts and self-abuse. Suicidal acts include: suicidal thought, attempted suicide, as well as deliberate self-injury. Self-abuse, on the other hand, connotes: excessive use of alcohol and drugs and self mutilation. According to MedicineNet (2013), nearly one million people worldwide commit suicide each year, with about 10million to 20million suicide attempts annually. About 30,000 people reportedly kill themselves each year in the United States (MedicineNets, 2013). Violence has also been described as the extreme form of aggression such as assault, rape or murder (APA, 2014). It perceived violence to be caused by frustration, exposure to violent media, and the tendency to see other people's action as violent even when they are not (APA, 2014)

Theoretical framework: The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

Various perspectives from which the violent behaviour of youths and social movements can be explained are bound. From the political perspective, violence can be as a result of failure of the social system, poor educational system and discrimination (Ittel, 2003). Sociological basis of explaining youth violence include the social learning theory, differential opportunity theory and the frustration-Aggression theory (Ittel, 2003). The frustration-aggression theory shall however, be adopted for this paper.

Aggression according to Pedneault-Salters (2009) refers to any behaviour that is hostile, destructive and/or violent. Aggressive behaviour has the potential to inflict injury or damage to the target person or object (Pedneault-Salters, 2009). Aggression has also been viewed as any behaviour directed toward another individual that is carried out with the proximate (immediate) intent to cause harm. The perpetrator must however believe that the behaviour will harm the target and that the target is motivated to avoid the behaviour (Bushman & Anderson, 2001, p.28). Frustration, according to Baron and Richardson (2004), is the blocking of ongoing, goal-directed responses. The psychological perception of frustration refers to a common emotional response to antagonism. It comes as a result of perceived resistance to the fulfilment of individual will (Miller, 1941).

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The emergence of the frustration- aggression hypothesis can be traced to the work of Dollard et.al. (1939). In their monograph on the theory, they stated the core assumption to the theory i.e. aggression is always a consequence of frustration. This implies that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and that the existence of frustration always lead to some form of aggression (Dollard, et. al, 1939) cited in (Berkowitz 1989, p.60). The proponents of this theory argued that man is motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfil destiny, but when these expectations are thwarted the consequence is frustration (Dollard, et.al, 1939 cited in Berkowitz 1989, p.60). The frustration – aggression theory has not however, gone unchallenged. For instance Miller (1941) argued that aggression was only one of a whole range of alternative responses that could be triggered by frustration. In his own criticism, Van der Dennen (undated) described acts of promiscuous cruelty and sadism or what Fromm (1974) refers to as “malignant aggression” has not being always instigated by frustration. Most of the spontaneous and aggressive acts may be responses to noxious stimuli rather than to frustration. Even though the frustration aggression theory has been criticized, it still remains one of the tenable explanations for the outbreak of violent insurgents in Nigeria in the present Fourth Republic. It has been observed that violent insurgents in some parts of the country have come as a result of the government's apathy to the feelings of people living in these areas. A vivid example is that of the Niger-Delta youths. This was aptly captured by Amaraegbu (2011, p.212) when he observed that: “the response of Niger Delta youths to the Nigerian State's neglect and apathy of oil multinationals in the region radicalised them into violent militancy”. This was further buttressed by (who) when he/she eloquently and rightly observed that:

Nigeria presents a remarkable paradox of an enormously wealthy country both in potential and real terms, serving as home to third largest concentration of poor people in the world. The country annually makes substantial revenue from oil and gas but apparently failed to provide basic services for its people (NEPAD, 2008, p.33).

The Niger-Delta militant group can be described as just one of the various militant groups which have emerged as a result of youth restiveness and the consequent violent nature of the average Nigerian in the present Fourth Republic.

Youth Restiveness and Violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

The Nigerian Fourth Republic has no doubt witnessed unprecedented experience in terms of youth restiveness and violent acts committed by the youths. Some of these violent crimes are results of ethno-nationalist and ethno-religious sentiments and according to Metumara (2010, p.92) have manifested insurgencies; in the Niger Delta region under the auspices of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta renewed demand for Biafra spearheaded by the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra, (MASSOB), the incessant ethnic clashes in the Middle Belt Region, the frequent religious disturbances and sharia instigated riots in the North as well as increasing notoriety of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in the West. These acts of restiveness and violence

which are sometimes employed to drive home their demands have led to kidnapping for ransom, ethnic militancy, murder, assassination, etc.

Two persistent sources of youth violent restiveness in the Fourth Republic has been the Nigeria-Delta militant insurgency and the Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of the country. The Niger-Delta area is reported to be inhabited by about 12million people with different cultures, languages and history. They are limited by their historical status in Nigeria and share a common identity as southern minorities (NDDC, 2004). Historically, the peoples of Niger-Delta area were at the fore front of minority agitation in the colonial and the immediate post independence periods (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, p.12). Ojakorotu and Olawale (2009, p.5) claimed that the situation has not changed as their demands' and position in the Nigerian federation remain unaltered despite the different commissions that have been set up by successive administrations to look at the question of the minorities. It has also been observed that what has exacerbated the problem of the Niger-Delta is the question of oil (Agbese, 1993, p.8). Oil which is the major mainstay of the Nigerian economy, contributing about 90% of the nation's foreign exchange earnings and revenue is produced in the region. The Niger delta region however, remains grossly under developed, pauperized, marginalized and largely a poverty zone (World Bank, 1995). The basic facilities and infrastructure of a modern society like portable water electricity, healthcare facilities, good roads, cottage industries and employment are lacking in the area (Taylor, 2007). According to Oputa panel (2005) it is this paradox of poverty in the midst of wealth of the Niger-Delta people that forms the political economy of human rights violations in the area.

In his contribution Elaigwu (2008) cited in Chukwuemeka and Aghara (2010, p.400) maintained that:

Despite being the goose that lays the golden eggs for the nation, the Niger Delta is widely regarded as a region wounded by youth militancy, fragmented by internal strife, bruised by incessant conflicts between local communities and oil production multinationals and glamorized by series of high profile kidnapping incidents. What makes Nigeria what it is today is oil, what makes Nigeria comfortable comes from the Niger Delta, but unfortunately the Niger-Deltans are not comfortable at all.

The Niger-Delta region despite accounting for about 90% of the nation's revenue has been a centre of attention for widespread militant actions such as kidnapping, murder, abduction, etc. The assertion by the then governor of Akwa Ibom state, Victor Attah, that his people were ready for war with the federal government of Nigeria over resource control, particularly the on-shore /of shore controversy between the federal government and the state governments was not between the government and the people, but a clear manifestation of the endemic nature of restiveness both among the adults and youths (Chukwuemeka & Aghara, 2010, p.401). In order to achieve their goals militant youths in the Niger-Delta region employed a variety of strategies which ranges from peaceful demonstration to violent conflicts. According to Osaghae et.al. (2007, p.16) the strategy employed depended to a large extent on the response by the state and federal government

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and tendered to gravitate towards increase of violence as the state persisted in repressive responses. The Niger-Delta region is almost synonymous with violence. In this region youth induced violence and restiveness have become a ubiquitous phenomenon.

Apart from the Niger Delta crises which is one of the major challenges facing the country in the Fourth Republic, there also exist the issue of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria. The Boko-Haram sect is an Islamic Jihadist militant organisation based in the northern part of Nigeria. The organisation's aim is to establish a purely Islamic state which is to be ruled by the Sharia law devoid of any western ideology. The group's activities in Nigeria are however, mainly concentrated in the North Eastern states of the country.

According to Onuoha (2012, p.2) the sect's members are mainly disaffected youths, unemployed graduates and former Almajiris. The phenomenon of Almajiris (street children) is a popular old practice whereby children are sent to live and study under renowned Islamic scholars in cities of northern Nigeria. They live and study in very appalling conditions, thereby making them vulnerable to recruitment into extremist sects like Boko Haram. As of 2010, Nigeria hosts about 9.5million Almajiris, with over 80 percent concentrated in the northern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012, p.2). Since 2009, the group has waged a campaign of extremist, anti-government attack across much of northern Nigeria. The insurgency killed over 550 people in 2011 in 115 separate attacks (Copeland, 2013, p.1). In total, at least 2,800 deaths are attributable to Boko Haram's violence and often rudimentary tactics (Copeland, 2013, p.1). The followers of the sect are said to be influenced and indoctrinated by the Quaranic praise that says' "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors. Boko-Haram promotes the version of Islam that makes it Haram or forbidden for Muslims to participate in any political or social activities including voting in election, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving secular education. To the Boko Haram sect the Nigerian state is governed by non-believers even when the country had a Muslim president (Ekanem, et.al 2012, p.232).

To achieve their objective, the Boko Haram sect attack, through bomb blast, Churches, Mosques, Police stations, Army barracks, schools which include primary, post primary and tertiary institutions. Aro (2013, p.1) observed that "the Boko-Haram sect attack privately-owned property without excluding innocent souls through the machinery of suicide bombers as well as slaughtering and kidnapping people, alien inclusive, which have resulted to the larger percentage of the captives". He further expressed disappointment when he stated that: "the most pitiable fact is that most of those suicide bombers are teenagers". (Aro, 2013, p.1). It is however, important to note that Islamic radicalism is not new to Nigeria following independence in 1960, the rise of radical Maitasine movement in the 1970s which engaged unemployed urban youths, led to clashes with the police in Kano in 1980, leaving hundreds of people dead (Rogers, 2012, p.1). The spate of violence and consequent destruction of lives and property occasioned by the Boko Haram extremist group cannot be compared to that unleashed by the radical Maitasine group of the 70s and 80s. The Boko-Haram extremist group have done more harm than any other militant sect in the country. Oladesu (2013, p.4) cited in Aro (2013, p.1) buttressed this when he stated that:

Since the end of the civil war no calamity of enormous proportion has befallen the fledging nation- state more than the horror unleashed by the dreadful sect, Boko Haram. Many lives and property worth billions of naira have been destroyed. Nobody is insulated from the attack. Government officials and buildings traditional rulers, police and military formation and church worshipers are targets on daily basis there is panic. The fear of the invincible agitators has become the beginning of wisdom (Oladesu, 2013:4).

The following tables show some manifestation of violent attacks by the Niger Delta militant groups and the Boko-Haram sect in the Fourth Republic.

Table 1: Some manifestations of violent attacks by the Niger Delta militant youths

S/N	Date of Attack	Location of Attack	Victims Name(s)/Type of Property	Remark
1.	June 27, 2008	Bayelsa State	Prince Igodo	The two hands of prince Igodo who was the leader of a rival militant group was cut-off by another militant group. Igodo was said to have bled to death.
2.	June 19, 2008	Bonga oil field	Jack stone	The movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND) attacked royal Dutch shell oil field in Bonga and took away Jack Stone, the U.S. Captain of a supply ship hostage.
3.	June, 3, 2008	Amassoma	Not given	Gunmen abducted 2 Lebanese employees of Setraco, a local engineering company in the town of Amassoma.
4.	May 23, 2003	Omoka village	Not given	Two foreign workers (a Pakistani and a maltese were kidnapped at Omoku Village of the Niger Delta.
5.	Mar. 4, 2008	Port Harcourt	Not given	A German employee of the Garman-Nigerian construction company was kidnapped in Port-Harcourt
6.	Sept. 27, 2007	Not given	SAIPEM (Oil Service Station)	Gunmen raided the oil service company. Saipem and abducted a Colombian and a Filipino, workers of the company killing another

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				Columbian staff.
7.	Feb. 17, 2007	Port-Harcourt	Not given	Four young Nigerians serving as missionaries for the church of Christ of Latter Day saints were abducted from their apartments
8.	Jan. 10, 2007	Bayelsa	Not given	Gunmen attacked a base operated by South Korea's Daewoo Engineering and Construction Company and kidnapped a South Korean and one Nigerian oil worker.
9.	Dec. 21, 2006	Obagi, (Rivers state)	Not given	Militants storm the Obagi facility in Rivers State and killed 3 people.
10.	Dec. 18, 2006	Port-Harcourt	2 cars	The two cars were bombed, one near Agip compound and the other near Shell residential company. There was no casualty.
11.	Dec. 14, 2006	Nun River (Bayelsa State)	Not given	Gunmen invaded the Nun River logistics base in Bayelsa State operated by Royal Dutch Shell Company and held 5 people hostage
12.	Nov. 22, 2006	Not given	Not given	A British oil worker was killed during an attempt by Nigerian soldiers to free seven hostages abducted by militants earlier the same day.
13.	Oct. 3, 2006	Not given	Not given	Seven foreign oil workers were kidnapped in a raid on a compound for expatriate contractors working for Exxon Mobil
14.	Aug. 15, 2006	Port-Harcourt	Not given	Five foreign oil workers were kidnapped from a night club in Port-Harcourt.
15.	Aug. 3, 2006	Port-Harcourt	Guido Schifforth	A 62 year-old German, an employee of Blifinger and Berger, was snatched from his car by armed men dressed as soldiers
16.	June 7, 2006	Not giving	Not given	Militants attacked a shell-operated natural gas faciity in the Niger Delta, killing 6 soldiers and kidnapping 5

				South Korean contractors.
17.	May 10, 2006	Port-Harcourt	Not given	The oil executive of Baker Hughes (an American Co) employee was killed by unidentified gunmen in port-Harcourt.
18.	Mar. 18, 2006	Not given	Oil Pipeline	Militants blew up the oil pipeline operated by Italian oil company Agip shutting down 75, 000 bpd.
19.	Feb 18, 2006	Not giving	U.S. barge	Militants attacked the Barge operated by U.S. oil services company willbros in speed boats and abducted nine oil workers.
20.	Jan 10, 2006	Not giving	Not given	Militants kidnapped 4 foreign oil workers from Shell's off shore E.A. oil field. They also blew up crude oil (pipelines, cutting supplies to Forcados export terminal by 100, 000 bpd.)

Source: Author's compilation from: Osaghae, E.E et. al. (2007) and www.africanmasterweb.com.

Table 2: Some manifestations of attacks by the Boko Haram militant sect

S/N	Date of Attack	Location of Attack	Victims Name(s)	Remark
1.	April 14, 2014	Chibok (Borno state)	Not given	Boko-Haram gunmen abducted about 300 school girls in the state.
2.	March 16, 2014	Igze	Not given	Boko-Haram gunmen stormed the North Eastern Nigerian town and killed about 100 people.
3.	Mar 14, 2014	Barga (Borno State)	Giwa Barracks	The attack was believed to be a retaliation of the pounding of the base of the insurgents in Sambisa, Barga and several other hidden places in the savannah north and central parts of the states.
4.	Mar 2, 2014	Mainok	Not given	Gunmen dressed in military uniform armed with powerful assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and explosive laid siege to the village of Mainok, killing 39 people.

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5.	Mar 5, 2014	Jacana. (Borno State)	Not given	The insurgents were said to have killed 40 people in Jakana, 35 km away from Maiduguri, Borno state capital. They burnt down the only police station standing on the Maiduguri-Damaturu highway killing two police officers.
6.	Feb 25, 2014	Buni yadi (Yobe State)	Not given	The suspected Islamist extremists stormed the hostel of the Federal Government College Buni-Yadi in the middle of the night and killed more than 30 students. The extremists set fire to the dormitories and then killed the students with matches and knives.
7.	Jan. 27, 2014	Kawuri Village (Borno State)	Not given	Militants attacked the village as a busy market was parking up, setting off explosives and setting houses ablaze. 52 people were reportedly killed in that attack.
8.	Jan. 26, 2014	Waga Chakawa Village (Adamawa State)	Not given	22 people were reported killed as a result of an attack on a Church, during service.
9.	Oct. 28, 2012	Kaduna	Not given	An explosive laden vehicle drove into a church and detonated its load ripping a hole in the wall and roof and killing seven people leaving dozens injured.
10.	Oct 6, 2012	Jalingo (Taraba)	Not given	The explosion occurred near a state television studio in Jalingo, injuring 8 people overnight.
11.	Sept 23, 2012	Bauchi	Not given	A suicide car bomber blew himself up outside a catholic church killing himself and at least two other people and injuring 46.
12.	Aug. 14, 2012	Kaduna	Not given	Explosion occurred in the hands of two men, who were travelling with explosives on two motorcycles. The blast reportedly killed four people.
13.	Jun. 17, 2012	Kaduna	Not given	A bomb exploded in a church killing 21 people.

14.	Jun. 8, 2012	Maiduguri	Not given	Four policemen and three civilians were killed in a bomb blast which occurred at the Borno state police command in Maiduguri.
15.	Apr. 30, 2012	Taraba	Not given	A bomb allegedly hit a police convoy killing 11 people.
16.	Apr. 8, 2012	Kaduna	Not given	A bomb exploded on Easter day killing about 40 people.
17.	Jan. 17 2012	Maiduguri (Borno State)	Not given	Two soldiers and four Boko Haram gunmen were killed in an attack on a military checkpoint in Maiduguri, Borno state.
18.	Jan. 13, 2012	Yola (Adamawa State)	Not given	Boko Haram sect killed four and injured two others, including a policeman.
19.	Jan. 11, 2012	Potiskum	Not given	Four Christians were killed when gunmen opened fire on their car as they stop to fuel their car.
20.	Jan. 10, 2012	Damaturu (Yobe state)	Not given	The Boko Haram militant group killed eight in a beer garden. The eight people included five policemen and a teenage girl.
21.	Jan. 9, 2012	Biu (Borno state)	Not given	The gunmen shot dead a secret police operative along with his civilian friends as they were leaving a mosque.
22.	Jan. 6, 2012	Yola (Adamawa)	Not given	Eight worshipers were killed in a shooting attack on a church.
23.	Jan. 6, 2012	Mubi (Adamawa state)	Not given	Gunmen shot dead 17 Christian women. The victims were said to be friends and relations of one of the five people killed in a hotel attack the previous day.
24.	Jan 5, 2012	Gombe	Not given	Six worshippers were killed and 10 others injured in a church.
25.	Jan 3, 2012	Birniwa (Jigawa state)	Not given	Gunmen attacked a police station in the town killing a teenage girl and wounding a police officer.
26.	Dec 30, 2011	Maiduguri (Borno State)	Not given	Four Muslim worshipers were killed in a bomb blast and shooting attack targeting a military check point as worshipers leave mosque after

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				attending Friday prayers.
27.	Dec 4, 2011	Azare (Bauchi state)	Not given	A soldier, a policeman and a civilian were killed in gun attacks on police buildings and two banks
28.	Dec 4, 2011	Maidugri (Bauchi state)	Not given	The Boko Haram sect opened fire at a wedding killing the groom and a guest.
29.	Jun 11, 2011	Police Headquarters (Abuja)	Not given	A Boko Haram suicide bomber drove into the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja killing two people.
30.	Aug. 28, 2011	UN House (Abuja)	Not given	A Boko Haram suicide bomber attack and killed 27 people.
31.	Aug 25, 2011	Gombi (Adamawa State)	Not given	Gun and bomb attacks on two police stations and two banks killed at least 16 people including seven policemen.

Source: Authors compilation from: Dunham, 2014, Niyi 2014, VOA News (2014), BBC (2014), Reuters (2012) Channelstv (2012), Guardian Newspaper online, Mhelizza (2012) and m.irinnews.org

Causes of Youth Restiveness and Violence in Nigeria

There are several factors that are responsible for youth restiveness and violence in Nigeria. According to Chukwuezi (2009, p.100), some of these factors range from individual to societal factors. Some of these include the following:

Unemployment

Unemployment is an undesirable phenomenon afflicting all under-developed regions of the earth. Many school leavers cannot find jobs and many engage in jobs in which their potentials are not fully utilised (Osinubi, 2006, p.224). The unemployment rate in Nigeria was last reported at 23.9 percent in 2011 (Osalar, undated). According to Zakaria (2006), the rising tide of unemployment and the fear of a bleak future among the youths in African countries have made them vulnerable to the manipulations of agents' provocateurs. These include aggrieved politicking and religious demagogues. He further reiterated that the absence of job opportunities in developing countries such as Nigeria is responsible for youth restiveness with disastrous consequences. In a similar vein, Chukwuezi (2009, p.100) observed that the youth constitute a large part of the unemployed. There is therefore a tendency for them to look at their plight as the making of a cruel society that does not seem to care for them. It is also believed that the activities of some of the oil prospecting companies make youth to be restive and violent. This is because these oil companies destroy the environment, disrupt production and economic activities, and dislodge social structures without commensurate compensation and/or programme of sustainable rehabilitation. The result is that while oil companies make huge profits, nothing appears to change in the areas of the communities. Instead, they

leave behind, low productivity, intra-ethnic hostilities, unemployment, poverty, prostitution and environmental degradation (Chukwuezi, 2009, p.101).

Marginalisation

This is another cause of youth restiveness and violence most especially in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Chukwuezi (2009, p.100) noted that the notion appears to have gained ground that the youths resort to restiveness because of their perceived marginalisation by the selfish elders in the scheme of things in the communities. So in order to get their share of benefits accruing to the society, the youths according to Chukwuezi (2009, p.100), resort to taking on their elders' headlong, culminating in the restiveness rampant in most of the communities today. As reported by the World Bank (1995), the Niger Delta, Nigeria's oil belt, is the home of much of the oil and gas reserves and the oil industry. There were 349 drilling sites, 22 flow stations and one terminal in early 1990s (World Bank, 2009, p.151) and according to Egborge (1999), there were about 10,000km pipelines, 10 gas plants, 3 oil terminals and 1500 oil producing wells by the mid 1990s. As at 2007, there were over 600 oil fields, 5,284 on and offshore of wells, 10 export terminals, 275 flow stations, 4 refineries and an LNG project (Lubeck, Watts & Lispchutz, 2007). With these, one would have expected the Niger Delta region would be a developed area but reverse is the case. Etemike (2009, p.151) lamented that oil has not brought prosperity, better living conditions and government attention and development. He lamented further that rather it has been accompanied by instability, insecurity, conflicts, violence, crime and social tensions (Etemike, 2009, p.152). He decried the absence of infrastructure, social services, non-oil industries and even petroleum products. He, however, expresses sadness over the wide spread neglect, social and economic underdevelopment. The region is one of the least developed in the nation (Etemike, 2009, p.157) such perceived prevention from attention for power or influence can be described as one of the strong drivers of youth restiveness and violence in the region.

Illiteracy

Quality education has a direct bearing on national prestige, greatness and cohesion. The knowledge and skill that young people acquire help determine their degree of patriotism and contribution to national integration and progress (Anasi, 2010, p.3) the consequences of inadequate education is that young people wander the streets of cities and towns. These make them ready-made source of violence and restiveness. Those who manage to complete secondary school have no opportunities for tertiary education. Therefore, it is believed that having been denied the chance to reach their potential, they are disoriented and readily available for anti-social actions.

Inadequate Basic Infrastructure

The lack of basic amenities such as access to good roads, potable drinking water, health care facilities, constant electricity supply, etc., is a causal factor of youth restiveness and violence. One of the major causes of youth violence in the Niger-Delta region is the lack of social amenities despite the fact that the region contributes the highest proportion of the revenue which accrues to the nation. Rather than attract development, oil has actually

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devastated and underdeveloped the region. Oil exploration and exportation has led to famine, intra and inter-communal and inter-ethnic feuds, conflicts and wars (Ikelegbe, 2004).

Social and Moral Decadence

Youth restiveness and violence can be described as a consequence of social and moral decadence of the Nigerian State. According to Ifaturoti (1994, p.10), this decay manifests itself in the form of various social vices and is epitomised by corruption, indiscipline, moral laxity and many other ills in the society. He further explained that since youths in Nigeria do not exist in a vacuum, they observe this unhealthy social environment and the breakdown in societal values and norms, it is from what they observe and the signal they perceive that they, in order to achieve what they perceive as societal goals, emulate the behaviour of the society. Thus, the society in this way can be seen as the source of violence, for the youths merely reflect societal behaviour in a society where persons who have achieved success through corruption are lauded, the signal sent to the youths is that corruption is an acceptable means of achieving success (Ifaturoti, 1994, p.155).

Effect of Peer Group

The influence of peer group is another causal factor of youth restiveness and violence in Nigeria. The peer groups have a significant influence on the behaviour of youths. Therefore, peer group pressure occupies a very significant position in determining the involvement of youths in violent acts. In the view of Tamuno (1991, p.114), the average age group of youth is between 15-25 years. Many youths of this age are at their most impressionistic age and they tend to imitate easily. Thus, they are easily manipulated and influenced by their peers who encourage them to commit delinquent acts on the grounds that it enhances their status and commitment in the society (Tamuno, 1991, p.144).

Ethnic Nationalism and the Formation of Religious Movements and Ethnic Militias

The quest to gain recognition and establish themselves in the mainstream politics has led to the rise of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria. According to Akinboye (2001, p.16), the desire to wrestle power coupled with other considerations have led to increased ethnic nationalism among the minority ethnic groups, while the larger ethnic groups are equally strongly attached to their peculiar beliefs necessitating increased nationalism within them, some of them operate in a way that induces violence. Vivid examples are the cases of O'odua People's Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); while various minority ethnic groups such as the Ijaw Youth Movement (IYC), Middle Belt Forum, to mention a few have been challenging the activities of the dominant ethnic groups. These competitions have ended up in ethnic militant attacks and clashes. However, it has been revealed that the youths constitute the bulk of these ethnic militias (Akinboye, 2001, p.176). The proliferation of religious movements, most especially in the northern part, also constitutes a major source of youth restiveness and violence. Such religious movements operate in a very violent and restive manner. Good examples of these are the maitaseni religious sect of the 70s and early 80s and the current Boko-Haram religious sect. These religious sects operate in

the most violent manner, unleashing horror through the use of suicide bombers and other sophisticated weapon of warfare.

The Role of the Elite

The elite class directly or indirectly promote violence and restiveness among the youths in Nigeria. In the view of Joseph (1999, p.16) the elites represent capitalists who depend on the state machinery for survival. They are also, according to Otite (1990, p.210) major players in the ethnic game of exploitation and manipulation of non-elites, usually directed towards personal/elite group interest, which mostly promotes division and hatred among people in pluralistic societies.

Effects of Youth Restiveness and Violence on National Security

Youth restiveness and violence have devastating effects on national security. Uncontrolled youth restiveness and violence leads to destruction of lives and properties; not only those belonging to government, but also those of private individuals. One disheartening effect is that the culprits of the violent and restive acts are the youths who perpetrate them. These youths who die for the sake of political elites, who at the end of the day are abandoned, become great losses not only to their families but the nation as a whole. Another effect of youth violence on national security is that in the course of doing the bidding of the political elite, the weapon that falls into the hand of the restive youths are not returned to the providers, but are kept for their personal sinister motives. These youths use such weapon to engage in armed robbery and other social vices such as: kidnapping, abduction and even murder. These consequently lead to increased crime rate and insecurity.

Furthermore, youth violence leads to reduced investment. Violence scares away investors, both foreign and local. The resultant effect is the creation of unhealthy investment environment. In addition, youth violence leads to proliferation of arms and ammunition. This threatens national security. The ethnic militias, religious sect and ethno regional groups in order to achieve their aim and objectives engage in the procurement of weapons to drive home their demands. The emergence of ethno regional groups like the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Ohaneze Ndi Igbo, among others, beside undermining the legitimacy of the State in form of its monopoly of the instrument of force, contest citizens' loyalty and obedience with the state and exacerbate social divisions and conflict (Abdullahi & Saka, 2007).

Again, violent crisis which results from youth restiveness impact negatively on the nations. Security violence which erupts produce domino effects that spread quickly to other parts of the country. The Boko Haram insurgency provides a good example. Also, violence perpetrated by the youths erodes public safety. For instance, the Boko Haram insurgency makes citizens encounter unsafe movement from one place to the other. The declaration of the state of emergency and the announcement of curfew in some northern states testifies to this.

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Conclusion: Towards Curbing Youth Restiveness and Violence in Nigeria

The Nigerian Fourth Republic has no doubt been plagued by violent activities of religious sects and ethnic militias. Even though armed insurgency is not strange to the Nigerian state, the fact remains that the re-emergence of ethnic militias and violent religious sect in the Fourth Republic has taken a new dimension. The disheartening fact is that this armed insurgencies are epitomised by youths who are supposed to be the hope and leaders of tomorrow. The paper has explained the involvement of youths in violent acts and restiveness from a frustration aggression perspective. We should bear in mind that the driving force behind the creation of these ethnic militias, most especially those of the Niger-delta region, revolves around marginalization, deprivation, neglect, domination, neglect domination of one group by the other, etc. According to Aro (2013, p.7), the militia groups in the Niger Delta emerged as a result of the peculiar problems in the Niger Delta among whom are environmental degradation and alleged political insensitivity of the State while the OPC sprang up as a consequence of the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election believed to have been won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. Youth restiveness and violence, however, has done Nigeria no good; thus, urgent steps should be taken to reduce, if not totally eradicate, the menace. Some of the following panaceas may be found useful in this regard.

Government should provide employment opportunities. As the saying goes: "a hungry man", is an angry man an unemployed youth would easily be induced to engage in violent acts with the promise of a stipend. Government can provide job opportunities by encouraging foreign investors. Again measures should be put in place to solve the old age problem of marginalisation and deprivation. In order to solve the problem of marginalization, there must be justice and equity in the distribution and allocation of the benefits which accrues to the country in general. Furthermore, government should implement policy programmes which will foster functional education that is characterised by varieties of counselling both vocational and otherwise. Lastly, the provision of basic infrastructural facilities to areas lacking them is also imperative. There should be the provision of potable drinking water, accessible roads, health care facilities, stable electricity supply, etc.

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