




# IN SEARCH OF PEACE & SECURITY IN AFRICA

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## Democratic Republic of Congo in the Great Lakes Region: Breaking the Pack of Impunity

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### Introduction

THE Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, has a long history of state decay and impunity that goes back to the early contacts with Portuguese explorers and traders in fifteenth Century that not only caused the disintegration of the Kongo Kingdom, but also set in motion the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (Stearns, 2011; Snow, 2013). The end of the illegitimate slave trade was almost coterminous with the balkanisation of Africa in 1885 and the appropriation of Congo by King Leopold II of Belgium, who presided over the over country as his personal property, until it until political power was handed over power to an unprepared élite in 1960, thus laying the foundations for a failed state. Being the second largest country in Africa after Algeria, DRC shares its boundaries with nine states; namely Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. Such a geo-strategic location brings the vast country into many regional organisations, namely the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community and the International Conference of Great Lakes Region among others. However, to some analysts, DRC is a crime infested country that must be dealt with through partition, but such a shallow response contrasts with the remarkable sense of national unity and patriotism that characterize most Congolese people (Dowden, 2008; Prunier, 2009; Englebert, 2012). Based on secondary data, this case study attempts to make sense of the conciliatory approach of the new leadership that emerged after the December 30, 2018 general elections. The chapter is organised in four sections as follows; first, is a brief historical background that traces the genesis of the country's predicament. The second is on the various economic communities, as DRC's perennial impunity is magnified by distrust at the regional level. Third, is the theoretical framework, which focuses on nonviolence as a way of breaking the

cycle of impunity and violence at home, as a prerequisite for good neighbourliness. The final section makes a case for President Felix Antoine Tshisekedi whose leadership style of persuasion and diplomacy is gradually dismantling the system of impunity bequeathed by his predecessors without engaging in witch-hunt both at home and in the region at large.

### Brief background to Contemporary DRC

Located in Central Africa, the DRC spans a surface area of 2.3 million square kilometres, out of which arable land covers 80 million hectares. It is sometimes described as a geological scandal given its abundant natural resources that have the potential to make it into one of the richest countries in the world. However, slavery, colonialism and corruption have turned it into one of the poorest countries, occupying the 179th position out of 189 countries in the world (Snow, 2013; UNDP, 2019). Omara-Otunnu (2007) contended that more than any other country in Africa, the D.R.Congo has for over 500 years served as "the bellwether of international rivalries and machinations and as a barometer for the continual human suffering of the great majority in Africa". Though absent at the Berlin Conference, King Leopold II of Belgium engaged the lobby of businessmen and deceitfully obtained the control of the Congo dubbed Free State (Sesay 1986). This private estate quickly became synonymous with impunity in terms of forced labour, starvation and death of an estimated 10 million peoples as a result of growing demand for raw materials from Africa (Pakenham, 1991; Englebert, 2012). As Dowden (2008: 365) puts it, the monarch's "predatory companies looted its rubber, ivory, timber and minerals. His agents cut off hands and heads and burned villages to force the inhabitants to deliver its riches to him." In the face of international outcry, the Belgian government whitewashed the King's crime against humanity in Congo by renaming it the Belgian Congo in 1908. Under the policy of no elite no trouble, traumatized populations were kept in check in the mines or farms without access to knowledge beyond primary education. When colonial masters eventually handed over power to unprepared elite on Independence Day (June 30, 1960), they had set the new nation to fail (Sparks 2003; Stearns 2012). In the footsteps of the Belgian monarch, subsequent successor regimes became famous for entrenching extractive institutions whereby corrupt elite would have unfettered access to the commonwealth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

It only took five days for the DRC to begin its long journey into chaos when departing officers instigated the new army to mutiny over pay increase. The Prime Minister, Patrice E. Lumumba, was dismissed from office in a CIA-sponsored coup by the army chief of staff, Joseph Mobutu on 14 September, 1960, and murdered four months later under the watch of the UN Peacekeeping troops (Burgis, 2015). In an attempt to break away from the colonial past, President Mobutu

embarked on a series of novelties during his 32 year rule. These include among other things, the introduction of a one-party system of government in April 1967, the adoption in 1971 of 'Zaire' as the country's new name, and the nationalisation of the economy in 1973, which quickly became synonymous with kleptomania (Sparks, 2003; Moss, 2007). When he died in exile in 1997, he left behind a carcass that attracted foreign troops like hungry dogs fighting each other over the leftover bones (Prunier, 2009: 337; Ferguson, 2006; Dowden, 2009).

Heading a foreign-based movement, Laurent Desire Kabila declared himself Head of State on May 17, 1997 and reverted to the old appellation (DRC). Having failed to meet the expectations of his regional allies, he was assassinated on 16 January 2001. Upon succeeding his slain father at the peak of 'Africa's World War' (2001), the young Joseph Kabila, then aged 29, was regarded as "an outsider who was handed the presidency on a platter, without having to climb his way up through the ranks of a party or army, earning the respect and loyalty of his fellows" (Stearns 2011: 323). He facilitated the 2002 Lusaka Peace Agreement that ended the civil war in DRC but at the same time allowed many warlords into a power-sharing government. Put simply, the Joseph Kabila-led government of one president and four vice presidents (1+4) institutionalized impunity by downplaying social justice and human rights, while filling political offices with the very people that had plunged the country into chaos. As Stearns (2011: 318) put it, "The former belligerents were attracted by a generous sharing of spoils; impunity and corruption were, to a certain extent, the glue holding the fragile peace together." On the whole, and despite the change of names by subsequent regimes, the fate of the country has remained the same: criminal cartels continue their business of plundering its natural resources with impunity in connivance with foreign actors. The next section discusses the country's relationships with its close neighbours because what 'goes around comes around'.

### At the Intersection of various Communities

DRC can be described as an intersection of regional communities given its affiliation with Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. Therefore, any analysis of the country's predicament would not be complete without taking into consideration its relationships with nine neighbouring states. To begin with, the project of integration in the Great Lakes region can be traced back to the creation of Central Bank for Congo, Rwanda and Burundi by the colonial authority. On September 20, 1976 in Gisenyi (Rwanda), this Belgian initiative was revived by the tripartite leaders with the creation of the *Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries* (ECGLC). By its geographic location at the centre of Africa, DRC belonged automatically to the *Economic Community of Central African States* (ECCAS). Created on 18 October 1983, ECCAS is a merger of the Central African Customs and Economic Union

(UDEAC) and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). As far as East Africa is concerned, the post independence leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, revived the British protectorate with the creation of the *East African Community* (EAC) on 6 June 1967 but this laudable initiative collapsed ten years later for a number of reasons, which include the coup d'état by (and dictatorship of) Idi Amin that culminated in the expulsion of foreign nationals from Uganda; the invasion of Uganda in 1979 by Tanzania and the overthrow of Idi Amin; the disparity in economic policies and development between pro-capitalist Kenya and Socialist Tanzania (Sesay and Mbombo, 2016). Even though its Treaty was once again ratified in 1993, EAC only admitted Rwanda and Burundi in 2007. It is worth mentioning that DRC was instrumental to the creation of the *International Conference of Great Lakes Region* (ICGLR) in 2003 in collaboration with the UN and AU for the purpose of finding lasting solutions to armed conflicts in the region.

However, relations with Congo's many neighbours have been marred by distrust over the years. The question as to why the above-named regional communities are unable to nip impunity in the bud is worthwhile. In 1994, ex-French colonies set up the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and by making ECCAS redundant, they tactically excluded Zaire. Soon after, the latter became a pariah state in Central Africa and a fertile land for the proliferation of proxy rebellions coming mainly from East Africa. Threatened by its eastern neighbours in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, DRC swiftly turned south and joined the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) in February 1998. As soon as the news of aggression reached the SADC, an emergency meeting of member states took place in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, on 18 August 1998. The next day the leaders of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe launched the 'Operation Sovereign Legitimacy' (OSL) to shore up the Kabila government, thus transforming the Congo crisis into Africa's World War that implicated many foreign troops (Prunier 2009). Since then, regional suspicions have taken over integration. According to Omara-Otunnu (2007), "A starting point for a positive approach to Congo's problems must be to ask the rulers of the neighbouring countries to commit themselves to respect the principles of human rights, democracy, international and humanitarian rule of law and respect of the territorial integrity of the Congo."

Unfortunately, most member states are headed by long-standing autocrats and ex warlords. They have succeeded in externalising the cost of fearless opposition while trading accusations that one is plotting to destabilize another. The growing rivalry between Rwanda and Uganda constitutes one of the triggers of instability in the Great Lakes region (ICG 2020). Both countries used the same guerrilla tactic of sponsoring rebellions to destabilise DRC. As if that was not enough, the two armies fought each other on Congolese soil for control of the city of Kisangani in 2000 (Stearns, 2011: 237). As Guichaoua (2016) contended,

The current turmoil is directly correlated to the system of governance specific to the region's authoritarian regimes. It includes personalized power, de facto monopoly of representation and refusal of democratic changes. Repressive apparatuses are on the rise. These include violent party militia groups and assassination squads, as well as restrictions on personal and political freedoms.

Prominent among the armed groups sponsored by Congo's neighbours is the National Congress for the Defence of People (CNDP) led by one of President Kagame's men, Laurent Nkunda. When UN reports revealed the backing of CNDP by Rwanda, Kigali pretended to arrest Nkunda in a simple tactic of recalling him back home. In the meantime, the new leadership reneged on a peace deal signed in March 2009, between the Congolese government and rebel groups and the movement became known as M23 with strong ties to Kigali and Kampala (van de Walle, 2020; ICG, 2020). The defeat of M23 by the Congolese army with the full support of the UN special brigade under the command of Tanzania in 2013 provoked not only the proliferation of many other rebel groups in east DRC, but also a war of words among regional players, which only amplified mutual suspicions (Genet 2013; Guichaoua 2016). As a matter of fact, Rwanda accused Burundi of sheltering rebels associated with the genocide that ripped the country apart in 1994, while Burundi blamed Rwanda for masterminding the thwarted coup in 2015. Whether the Rwandan government will seek rapprochement with Burundi following the sudden death on 8 June 2020 of its president, Pierre Nkurunziza, is still uncertain. However, the Hutu-led government of Nkurunziza's handpicked successor, Mr Evariste Ndayishimiye, is likely to perpetuate the memory of the one who was to become Burundi's 'Supreme guide to patriotism' (Dahir, 2020). Since impunity and distrust beget violence in its various forms, it is imperative to look for lasting solutions elsewhere. The next section is the theoretical framework used in the Chapter to explain the situation in DRC, which anchored on 'nonviolence' as a political strategy that can be used to circumvent the negative forces at work in the DRC and beyond.

### Theoretical Framework

Nonviolent Action is understood as a technique of resisting unjust policies through protest, non-cooperation and intervention. Facing a government that holds the monopoly of legitimate violence, activists put their lives on the line when they refuse to perform acts which are expected of them by law and customs (omission); they may also perform acts which are forbidden by laws and regulations (commission) or a combination of both (Sharp, 1973, 2011). Usually, protesters confront their opponents in an attempt to cause a change of heart (conversion) that will open a window of opportunity for negotiation and compromise. However, the success of any nonviolent movement depends on the commitment of individual

activists. As such, a distinction can be made between principled and pragmatic nonviolence (Atack, 2012).

On the one hand, principled nonviolence is a way of life inspired by religious belief that upholds the sacredness of human life: 'Thou shall not kill'. This divine commandment constitutes the foundation stone upon which the law of love is built: "You have heard that it was said, 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy.' But I tell you: Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you..." (Matthew 5:42). The principle of mutual love has come to be known as the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" (Matthew 7:12). This rule of love is timeless and it goes beyond the cleavages of religion, ethnicity, race and nationality. Islamic scholars underscore the relevance of nonviolence in the Quran when they refer to an internal struggle, which is expected of every Muslim to become the perfect one for the cause of Allah. In other words, conquering unbelievers with *jihad* is about persuading them with the force of argument, and thus *jihad* means nonviolent activism (Kurlansky, 2008; Gomaa, 2010). On the other hand, nonviolence is more apparent in action than in belief. Pragmatic nonviolence is a strategy for social and political change involving many disciplined activists under a charismatic leadership. Narratives of nonviolent action abound in the literature that spans over a century and focused on historic figures (Ackerman and Duval, 2000; Zinn, 2002; Kurlansky, 2008).

Displeased with the Sanskrit word *ahimsa* (no harm) because of its negative connotation, Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) fashioned a new concept, *satyagraha*, to define nonviolence as true force or inner strength that comes from striving for the truth. For Gandhi, nonviolence is the weapon of the strong that "seeks not to defeat adversaries, but to win them over through a loving, yet firm and uncompromising, adherence to the truth" (Nojeim, 2013: 94). Under his leadership, the British rule ended in India in 1947 even though the country was portioned between Hindu-dominated India and Muslim-populated Pakistan. Guided by Jesus' love of one's enemy – *Agape*, and in the footprint of Gandhi, Dr Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-68) led the civil rights movement in the US to seek not just an end to the system of segregation but the realisation of a 'beloved community' as a peaceful and harmonious integration of whites and blacks, poor and rich, Jewish and gentiles and so forth (Nojeim, 2013). Even though his many campaigns and marches did not produce the 'Beloved community' in America, they taught African Americans and disenfranchised people all over the world to confront oppression without demonising their oppressors.

Another charismatic leader whose name is less mentioned in the nonviolence literature is Nelson Mandela (1918-2013). Even though he started his resistance with nonviolence he later on identified with armed struggle against the injustice of the white minority system of government (apartheid) in South Africa that cost him 27 years behind bars (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000). However, life of seclusion on

Robben Island seasoned with hours of meditation and study brought forth his vision of inclusiveness and reconciliation. As Tutu (1999: 39) put it, "Nelson Mandela did not emerge from prison spewing words of hatred and revenge. He amazed us all by his heroic embodiment of reconciliation and forgiveness." As a matter of fact, after his release from jail in 1990 at the age of 71, Mandela became a redeeming leader who was able to not only share the Nobel Peace Prize with his political adversary, F.W. de Klerk in 1993, but also entered into a coalition government with his political rivals (de Klerk and the Zulu leader M. Buthelezi) in order to "stave off the still-present threat of civil war – one that had previously undermined other newly independent African nations" (Boehmer, 2008: 75). The list of conciliatory leaders is not exhaustive but in short, nonviolence is first of all a way of life, which is in the reach of every individual that practices the Golden Rule, be it at the bottom of the ladder or at the top of it. Being pragmatic, many activists may not even use the language of nonviolent action to describe what they are doing (Atack, 2011). The next section appraises the leadership style of Felix Antoine Tshisekedi, who was once a nonviolent activist before ascending to power. The question as to how he intends to deal with both impunity and distrust in order to project a new Congo in the comity of nations is worthwhile.

### Breaking the Back of Impunity

On January 2019, DRC experienced for the first time since Independence, a peaceful transfer of power between from one president to another, when President Joseph Kabila handed over the reins of office to the flag bearer of the main opposition party, Felix Antoine Tshisekedi. Before standing for the presidential elections, the new president who was groomed by his late father Etienne Tshisekedi in the techniques of nonviolence (petitions, mass rallies, sits-in, boycotts . . .) did not get a free pass when the latter died in February 2017 but he was voted in as the new head of the party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress' (UDPS) in March 2018. It is crystal clear that opaque elections will always produce contested results. However, in his acceptance speech, the newly sworn-in president surprised the audience by publicly stating that his predecessor was no longer an enemy but a close partner in the reconstruction of the country. Many analysts interpreted this *Thank You* message as a secret deal signed by the duo which would only prolong the system of impunity (Bisoka et al. 2020). Soon, both parties began negotiations over the formation of a coalition government. Meanwhile, He also made public his Christian faith by leading an intercessory prayer in Kinshasa stadium on 23 June 2019 for God's forgiveness: "On behalf of past and present political leaders, I implore your mercy for innocent blood shed intentionally or by mere ignorance" (Okapi 2019). As stipulated in Article 78 of the Constitution, the head of government (Prime Minister) would come from the majority in parliament. Accordingly, it

took almost eight months of closed-door negotiation before a coalition government was put in place. The pro-Kabila alliance also retained many key portfolios including the ministries of defence, justice, finance and budget among others, which begs the question as to how a defeated party in a general election can retain the majority of seats in parliament?

It is worth recalling that Joseph Kabila was not prepared to leave power at the end of his second term in office in 2016 (Mbombo, 2017). In the face of national and international condemnation, he eventually settled for continuity by proxy. In other words, before stepping down he made sure that the army, the police and the intelligence service were headed by his loyalists. As Sharp (2012: 9) argues, "Dictators are not in the business of allowing elections that could remove them from their thrones." Through an electoral commission that was bought to the outgoing regime, the pro-Kabila alliance, 'Common Front for the Congo' (FCC) was set for the continuity of the *ancient regime* by controlling provincial and national assemblies, including the senate and key ministries in the coalition government, thanks to entrenched graft in a survival economy (Bayart, 2009: 78). In the words of one analyst,

A key word in the Congolese lexicon of corruption is *enveloppe*. If you want to buy votes in Parliament to squelch the audit of your state-run company, you pass around envelopes. When you want to obtain a lucrative contract to supply the police with beans and rice, you make sure the officials on the procurement boards all get envelopes delivered to their home (Stearns, 2011: 321).

However, against this fabricated majority of corrupt elite stands a Youth league of UDPS, dubbed 'Citizen Parliament.' Claiming a popular majority, they are on the lookout in the streets of Kinshasa and wherever the President goes; they call on him to discontinue his partnership with the same individuals that destroyed the country for 18 years. Many followers would love to see Kabila prosecuted or sent into exile, his collaborators put on trial for mismanagement of public funds and crime against humanity as well as the closure of the parliament in order to get rid of the 'masquerade' of lawmakers. Turning their disappointment into frustration and even aggression, they accuse the new president of being a stooge of his predecessor, handpicked to perpetuate the system of impunity. Unfortunately, this dominant narrative of continuity downplayed the dramatic changes that are taking place and it causes many pundits

to miss out on the opportunity to study the modalities at play in one of the few political transfers of power that has taken place in Central Africa, and to learn from both its successes and setbacks, so as to refine our understanding of African democracies and how to strengthen them (Bisoka *et al*, 2020).

On his part, the newly elected president strongly believes that a coalition with Kabila's camp that enjoys a majority of seats in parliament is not constitutional but

also a price to pay for peace in the DRC (Tilouine and Joly, 2019). Below is a modest assessment of the new president as a nonviolent activist at the helm of power who seems to be gradually dismantling the system of impunity with the truth force (satyahagra). His strategy of turning adversaries into partners for the sake of peace can be appreciated at three levels: national, regional and international.

### Restoration of the Rule of Law

The merit of the willingness of the ruling party (UDPS) to share power with erstwhile adversaries in a coalition government cannot be overemphasized. It is one thing to extend a hand of friendship to an enemy, and another thing for the latter to accept the offer. Within a year, the FCC-dominated parliament has already recorded a series of unconstitutional actions levelled against the Head of State and his party, UDPS. These include: an attempt by the lawmakers to question the legality of the state of emergency decreed by the President in the fight against COVID-19; a secret vote that removed honourable J.M. Kabund of UDPS from his post as vice-president of the National Assembly; a proposed bill to bring the Judges under the control of the Justice Minister, thus limiting the independence of the Judiciary; a fast-tracked endorsement of a questionable candidate for the office of president of CENI without due process and in the interests of FCC, and many more. Working with such unreliable partners whose loyalty for Joseph Kabila remains strong required the big man rule but the new head of state has opted for respect for the rule of law.

In accordance with his campaign promises of putting the People First, *le peuple d'abord*, the new president is credited for opening up the political space with the release from jail of most of political prisoners, the return of political refugees and the freedom of the press as well as the right to engage in peaceful demonstrations. He launched the universal basic education policy that brought millions of children back to school, without paying school fees (Boko 2019). Through the reforms of the Judiciary, the third arm of government is gradually reclaiming its independence, leading to a series of trials of top officials both local and foreign, accused of embezzling public funds, including the President's Chief of Staff, Vital Kamerhe who is now serving a jail term (Tshiamala, 2020). With regard to security in Eastern DRC, a gradual reform of the military has seen the Congolese troops (FARDC) succeed with the help of the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUSCO), in the demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration of many armed groups willing to embrace peace (Ribadeau 2020). The next section examines the country's relations with its neighbours and regional organisations under the new president.

### The Good Neighbour Policy

DRC is not an island but an intersection of nations in the heart of Africa. As Dalai

Lama (2010: 268) contends; "One nation's problems can no longer be satisfactorily solved by itself alone; too much depends on the interest, attitude and cooperation of other nations." A few days after the CENI had released preliminary results of the polls, the then AU President Paul Kagame of Rwanda made a short trip to Kinshasa in an attempt to negatively influence the confirmation by the Constitutional Court of the results of the polls (Powel, 2019; IT, 2019). The cautious attitude adopted by AU was obvious when many regional leaders turned down the invitation to attend the handover ceremony on 24 January, 2019. However, within a short period of time, the newly elected leader embarked on multiple trips to all ICGLR member states in order to make peace with DRC's neighbours.

Against many voices that called for an end to diplomatic relationships with Rwanda and Uganda because of their past involvement in the pillage of the country's natural resources through proxy armed groups, Mr Tshisekedi rather insisted on the good neighbour policy for the sake of sustainable peace and security in the region. At his first appearance at an AU summit in Addis Ababa, he won the trust of his peers who elected him second Vice-President with the possibility of becoming AU President in 2021 (AU, 2019). Aware that the persistent crisis between Uganda and Rwanda would once again spill over and prolong the destabilisation of DRC, he put on the mantle of regional facilitator in the mediation process between Kampala and Kigali in Luanda in July 2019 (ICG, 2020). Not only has his policy of good neighbours revived the ICGLR, it has also persuaded the EAC to extend its membership to DRC in the coming months (Mugisha, 2019). Down south, the border dispute over control of the 13-square kilometre piece of land between DRC and Zambia is in the process of being settled peacefully by SADC, thanks to the diplomatic initiative of the new Congolese government (IT, 2020).

### In the Comity of Nations

Donor countries are likely to sponsor general elections in poor countries and as the saying goes; 'he who pays the piper calls the tune.' In the case of DRC, French Foreign Affairs Minister went on air to discredit the election of President Tshisekedi, echoing the position of the European Union (Tilouine and Joly, 2019). Again, the new Congolese leader had to swim against the high tides. In his first trip outside of Africa in April 2019, he was received by the US Secretary of State rather than in the White House. However, beyond his cold reception under the Trump administration, the newly elected leader was able to convince his hosts that he was actually the people's choice, thanks to the Congolese Diaspora that came out en masse to welcome their president (Mumbere, 2019). Not too long after, special invitations came from Belgium, France, Russia, Japan, Germany and Britain, to name but a few. As noted by one analyst, *Fatshi* has, since then put Congo back on the international stage (Herrmann, 2020). Everywhere he went on state visit,

he divided his time between official protocols and town meetings with the Congolese Diaspora. Each time, he reassured his audience of the need to work with everyone for the sake of peace and security rather than embracing retaliatory policies of hunting down yesterday's criminals.

### Conclusion

The chapter engaged the literature on the DRC as a case study. Located at the heart of Africa, DRC's vast land has been the theatre of impunity whose origin goes back to pre-independence era. Untrammelled exploitation of its natural resources, coupled with proxy rebellions, has subjected the civilian population to widespread atrocities, massive human rights violations, institutionalized corruption and extreme poverty. Since DRC is also an intersection of various regional communities, the chapter took a critical look at those organisations and found that impunity at home was reinforced by distrust among the country's neighbours, thus undermining regional integration. However, for the first time since Independence, a peaceful transfer of power took place peacefully and put the leadership style of President Tshisekedi to the test. As the saying goes; first impressions are the most lasting. A little more than a year in power, the spectrum was gradually shifting away from the impunity of the past in exchange for the rule of law through a series of policy reforms as well as improved relations with the country's neighbours, -thanks to the new diplomatic approach of President Felix Tshisekedi.

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