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Threats to Nigeria's Unity and Territorial Integrity

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Abstract

The fact is undeniable, at least for now, that the unity of Nigeria is not as given. For over fifty years, it has remained an aspiration that has been tested severally. The country has remained a multi-national leviathan comprising disparate ethnic nationalities associating involuntarily in the pursuit of, not the national agenda, but ethnic and primordial interests. Nigeria is fundamentally held together by its armed forces, sustained economically by the crude oil coming from the Niger-Delta, and controlled politically by few influential but corrupt and morally bankrupt individuals across its ethnic spectrum, who constantly recycle themselves and their progeny and relations into positions of authority. Worse still, the country is bedevilled by poor leadership, systemic corruption and institutional weaknesses, all of which impede any effort to address inherent contradictions and steer the country on the path of development. The resultant effect of these is that the majority of Nigerians have become so apathetic to the travails of the state, compounded by the fact that the ruling elite only engage in cosmetic attempts at restructuring the state to address delicate fault-lines and bring about national unity. It is against this backdrop that this article examines some of the issues that constitute threats to Nigeria's unity and territorial integrity.

Keywords: Unity, Terrorism, Security, Threat

Introduction

That this paper is titled, Threats to Nigeria's Unity and Territorial Integrity is indicative of the various multi-dimensional challenges that are currently confronting the Nigerian State. Nigeria, a country of about 150 million people and over 250 ethnic groups with more than 450 languages, is a multi-ethnic and a deeply divided state. For over 50 years, the country has been able to maintain its sovereign integrity in spite of numerous challenges to its survival. Although, the Civil war of 1967-1970 posed a serious threat to its unity, the country has managed to remain united. This is in spite of the fact that the majority of its peoples are disenchanted, and feel alienated from the state. It is believed that at the moment, the philosophical basis for the 'Social Contract' between the state and its citizens is under severe strain

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Towards the Search for an Incorrupt Nigerian: The Tale of a Drifting Nation

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Abstract

Corruption is one of the greatest threats to Nigeria's democracy and national development. It has facilitated political violence, inadequate infrastructures, and other human rights violations. It's devastating effects on the nation have manifested in lopsided distribution of wealth, malfunctioned or decayed infrastructure and degrading living conditions among a great proportion of the citizenry. The paper argued that the fight against the scourge can best be described as a drift without compass or direction. At a point, there may be concrete evidences that the anti-corruption project is moving forward. At another point, events show how confused Nigerian leaders are in the war on corruption. It submitted that the lack of political will and selective prosecutions are responsible for the woeful tale of the country's experience. The paper traced the anti-corruption efforts of successive government since 1999, bringing out the achievements and challenges of the anti-graft agencies. The paper applauded the current anti-corruption efforts of President Buhari but opined that he would not have a smooth ride in the fight against corruption because the corrupt cartels would fight back using subjective criticism, detraction and frustration. The paper suggested that the President must be conscious of his actions and that of his immediate family and staff to avoid a corrupt related action that could be used to frustrate his zeal. The paper recommended the application of all the available mechanisms of the constitution, good governance, political will and international support to uproot corruption. That the legislature should complement the efforts of the executive by further amending the laws that created anti-corruption agencies in a bid to strengthen them and not to whittle down their power to become a toothless bulldog. That the civil society should be active as whistle-blower in case of excesses from the anti-graft agencies as well as the activities of the government in discouraging the graft war by protecting its cronies.

Introduction

Since 1999 when the country returned to democratic governance, corrupt practices have been on the increase at all levels of public governance, to the extent that it is now a threat to the continued existence of the Nigerian state (Jega, 2010). Corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria that it has turned public service for many, into a kind of criminal enterprise (Human Right Watch, 2011:1). Studies have shown that corruption is one of the greatest threats to Nigeria's democracy and national development (Waziri, 2011; Jega, 2010; Imam and Mustapha 2008; Smith, 2007; Ribadu, 2006; Osoba, 1996; United Nations, 2004 and Obadan, 2001). The country's governing elite continues to squander and siphon off the nation's tremendous oil wealth, neglecting basic health and education services for the vast majority of ordinary citizens. Widespread graft has fuelled political violence, police abuses, and other human rights violations. It is pertinent to note that corruption is not only limited to public enterprise, rather it has eaten deep into the fabric of private enterprise, and it is speedily planting its roots deeply in the family setting. The devastating effects of corruption in the nation have manifested in lopsided distribution of wealth, malfunctioned or decayed infrastructure and degrading living conditions among a great proportion of the citizenry. (Alabi and Fashagba, 2010:1). These have impacted negatively on all aspects of the developmental agenda of the nation. The country cannot but therefore, respond to both domestic and international pressures to confront corruption with all possible strategies available. Paradoxically, the fight against the scourge can best be described as a drift without compass or direction. At a point in time, there may be concrete evidence that the anti-corruption project is moving forward. At another point, events show how confused Nigerian leaders are, in the war on corruption. The lack of political will and selective prosecution more often than not are responsible for the woeful tale of the country's experience.

Corruption is so prevalent and endemic in Nigeria that successive governments have acknowledged its attendant negative effects as well as the constraints it poses to development efforts. According to Akanbi (2004), the acknowledgement of the malaise of corruption made it imperative for successive governments in Nigeria since 1999 to institutionalize different anti-corruption initiatives and policies to tackle it. However, corruption is still widespread in spite of these institutionalised anti-corruption initiatives. It is worrisome that the name "Nigeria" is now synonymous to "corruption" in

the face of international community. There is always a notion of fear in the mind of anyone being approached by somebody who introduces him/herself as a Nigerian. The person will have to think twice before giving attention, not minding the status of the person approaching him/her. Nigerians are so disrespected to the extent that few people in the international community believe something good can come out from them. Politically and economically, Nigeria is consistently rated as a corrupt nation with all embassies and high commissions warning their citizen to be conscious of Nigerians' corrupt attitude at entry on the border. This contributes to Nigeria's classification in the international ranking and rating as one of the most corrupt, - at one time or the other the most corrupt - nation in the world.

Generally speaking, questions are often raised on how well government is handling efforts at combating corruption in the country. Many people have questioned the determination of government and the capacity of the existing anti-corruption laws and institutions in combating corruption in the country. According to the Human Rights Watch's (2011) in-depth report on the state of Nigeria's anti-corruption report, the key challenges which stand as obstacles for the failing war on corruption was that the Nigerian system was handling it with a kid glove. The political process is seen as an investment process, a structure that the report said guarantees corruption of new and old elected and appointed officials. That culture links up with associated political interference with the anti-corruption efforts where leading officials dictate patterns and directions of indictments and prosecutions of corruption cases.

The EFCC and ICPC established to fight the menace are on their own bedevilled by myriads of challenges which largely weaken their capacity and resolve. Staff incompetency can be cited as one the challenges confronting the institutions. Sometimes, deliberate collaboration also hinders their activities. There have been several allegations of extortion and corruption within the commissions with some commissions' operatives said to have been compromised. The current saga on the diversion of about N1trillion retrieved from Tafa Balogun -Former Inspector General of Police- and Diereye Alamiyeseigha -former Governor of Bayelsa State- by the EFCC- Chairman which the Senate is currently probing (Adetayo, 2015) depicts the trajectory. Even more serious is the lack of trust in the leadership of the commission by some foreign partners who believed the commission

leadership is part of the problem rather than solution in the fight against corruption. The United States of America was particularly loud on this count, cutting off high level contact with the EFCC when Mrs Fardat Waziri was appointed (Human Right Watch, 2011). This can be said to be responsible for an incident in which the American Ambassador threatened to walk out on the Nigeria's then foreign minister (Oluhenga Ashiru) who had arranged a meeting between the Ambassador and Mrs Waziri.

It is worthy to note that The Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission [ICPC] can be classed as largely inefficient and ineffective despite the resources and network at its disposal. If the ICPC had been as active as EFCC, perhaps the anti-corruption efforts would have recorded significant milestones. Listening to news and reading newspapers can attest to this. When last or how often is the name of ICPC mentioned in the daily news? One will even wonder if the commission still exist. No wonder some people crave for its merger with EFCC. The case of another anti-graft agency, 'Code of Conduct Bureau' was even more disappointing. Despite its powers to enforce probity among public officials, it has never recorded any meaningful achievement. The only widely known case was the one between the agency and Bola Tinubu (former Lagos State Governor) accused of operating foreign account while in office. It is sad to discover that the agency lost the case and the former governor was discharged and acquitted on the ground of lack of enough fact and evidence. To worsen the fate of the agency in the process of carrying out its statutory functions, the National Assembly also refused to pass the law regulating public declaration of assets by public officials. All these can be admitted as failure of the Bureau. Though the Bureau is currently prosecuting the Senate President (Bukola Saraki) for false declaration of assets, only time will tell what the outcome of the celebrated case will be.

In the search for an incorrupt nation, Nigerians massively voted Muhammadu Buhari in the 2015 general election having rejected him thrice (2003, 2007 and 2011). His victory at the poll hinged primarily on the notion that he has integrity and passion for fighting corruption. Since his emergence as the President, the international community has been showing interest and offering hands of fellowship with him to rid the country of the menace of corruption. Expectedly, he had since hit the ground running on the anti-corruption crusade. However, this project has not gone unchallenged. Within 100 days in office, there have been serious allegations of selective

prosecution, diversion of retrieved fund, and unclear anti-corruption policy framework, among others. Above all, while the advocates of anti-corruption crusade are accusing him of operating at slow pace, the opposing school of thought believed he is out to witch-hunt the immediate past President (Goodluck Jonathan) and his aides by limiting the prosecution to exclude former President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration. The PDP stalwarts asked the President to start the corruption fight from home (within APC). When the Code of Conduct Bureau charged the incumbent Senate President (Bukola Saraki) for false declaration of assets, the critics (majority PDP members) opined that the action is aim at persecuting the Senator for defying the party leadership with regards to the election of principal officers of the Senate. Premised on this, one will wonder what fate lies ahead of the nation against the backdrop of the saying that "If you fight corruption, corruption will fight back". Owing to these challenges, it became imperative to ask a fundamental question that: what are the obstacles responsible for the failing war on corruption in Nigeria? In view of this, this paper will attempt to answer the question by objectively examining the institutional efforts at combating corruption in Nigeria, examine the nature and character of the various anti-corruption agencies and institutions (with reference to EFCC, ICPC and Code of Conduct Bureau) with the view of critically analysing their statutory powers in relation to the exercise of such powers; and to analyse the trajectory of the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria since 1999. Finally, the paper will proffer implementable recommendations to the effect.

The Paradoxical Analysis of Corruption in Nigeria

The Transparency International Annual Corruption Perception Index consistently rated Nigeria as one of the most corrupt, - at one time or the other the most corrupt - nation in the world (See current rankings at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2014/result). For a long time now, the problem of corruption has elicited deep concerns in Nigeria. According to vision 2020 Committee Report, Corruption appears to have become a way of life, of doing things, though it is resented by a significant number of people (see Obadan, 2001). This notwithstanding, does not deny the fact that the crime of corruption in government threatens the moral integrity of a nation and hampered development (Imam and Mustapha, 2010). One cannot out-rightly discountenance the notion that the seed of corruption sowed during colonialism germinated to become a menace during the military era. This is chiefly because of the way and manner by which they

(successive military regimes) ruled without checks. After the enthronement of democratic rule, the Obasanjo government was prompted to institute various initiatives and programmes to combat corruption in Nigeria. Successive governments and administrations since 1999 have put in place one form of anti-corruption initiative or the other (Enweremadu, 2010). As part of efforts to combat corruption, the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) established the Due Process Office and other specialised anti-graft agencies and commissions like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) in its resolve to combat corruption in Nigeria.

Despite these anticorruption initiatives, one will wonder why corruption still persists. It may not be out of context if one argue that Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts is somewhat heading toward failure because it appears the menace is winning the war in the most populous African nation. The nation's denied image as an endemically corrupt nation is on display across the globe. It is painful to insinuate that only a miracle can reverse the current trend of corruption gaining upper hand in the nation's life. The dismal performance of the various anti-corruption agencies and commissions have led many to question government efforts regarding appropriate anti-corruption strategies, including the genuineness of government willingness to combat the menacing effects of corrupt acts of government officials, especially those of politicians. According to Dike (2003), Nigeria did not have an effective anti-corruption plan, despite the various anti-corruption commissions instituted by successive administrations in an attempt to transform the nation into a corruption-free society. As a result, Nigeria's place among the most corrupt nations of the world has not changed for the better. Consequently, the country has not been able to implement policies which promote good governance and facilitate the development and success of the democratic process due to the prevalence of corrupt practices.

Ironically, the institutional mechanism offered by the Constitution for the fight against corrupt practices is itself not immune from the plague. There are several instances where the legislature which is empowered by the constitution to police the executive against corrupt practices is itself wallowing in the depth of high profile corruption. To worsen the situation, the failure of the government in the anti-corruption crusade has led to pointing of accusing fingers and shifting of blame from one arm of

government to the other. While the legislature sees itself as the guardian of the country's treasure through oversight function thereby accusing the executive of abusing the office through misappropriation and mismanagement of fund, the executive in turn argues that corruption is thriving in the legislature. In the report presented to the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives, the Auditor General of the Federation, Mr Samuel Tsonongu Ukara (2011), stressed that the failure of the National Assembly to perform its constitutional role had become counter-productive to the quest by the Federal Government to curb graft and mismanagement of public funds in Nigeria. He argued that the growing cases of sleaze and fiscal indiscipline in the country had been blamed on the nonchalance and failure of the National Assembly to act on the annual reports from the nation's Auditor General. This was part of the report which the Auditor General released in October 2011 on the financial state of government agencies, institutions and bodies. Describing it as negligence of duty, the report argued that the failure of the National Assembly to act accordingly had encouraged other agencies and departments to either become nonchalant about the auditor's report, or altogether defiant about financial regulations. This, it stated, had made many government agencies to be reluctant in adhering to prescribed accounting standards, while several of them had refused to submit annual reports of their income and expenditure to the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation. The judiciary is not left out of this mess. The compromised political structure fits near perfectly into an equally controversial judiciary struggling with impropriety and inefficiency. Judges were fond of granting frivolous injunctions to delay and frustrate trials in corruption cases mostly at the request of the accused's lawyers, all to buy time or delay justice.

In September 2011, The Human Rights Watch released a 64 page in-depth report on the state of Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts and concluded that corruption appears to be winning the war in Nigeria. The records in the report are clearly dreary. Despite the propaganda, since the creation of the EFCC, for example, only four convictions were secured in high profile cases in which only one was obtained through trial while the rest were through plea bargaining (see Tribune, Saturday, 03 September 2011). Increasingly, there is a drop in the investigations of high profile cases in the last three years, especially since the current chairman (Ibrahim Lamorde) took charge. The anti-corruption efforts have been more about continuous headlines but very

few accomplishments in stemming high crime in high places. Under both Nuhu Ribadu and Farida Waziri, the report said nothing appreciable was done to tame the corruption monster.

Historical Development of Corruption in Nigeria

The emergence of high level corruption in Nigeria can be ascribed to the resultant effect of the colonial rule that lasted until the end of World War II (Osoba, 1996). One cannot overlook the fact that corruption existed in kingdoms and chiefdoms that made up the present day Nigeria, but at a somewhat minimal level. The unrestrained and authoritarian method adopted by the British colonial officials in connivance with the European Christianity missions and monopoly trading firms operating in Nigeria made the seed of corruption to germinate rapidly and become a menace. Generally speaking, the issue of colonialism, tinged on corruption in all Africa states. The colonial authorities created a fraudulent and corrupt accumulated system which facilitated the appropriation of huge surpluses for shipment to the metropolis from Nigeria peasant farmers (Osoba, 1996). This is why the so called infrastructural facilities provided by the colonial government seem good for the natives but the intended aim for their provision was to enable easy transfer of resources to their home state. For example, the railway track was designed from hinterland to link seaports. Also, the first major expressway linked the north with the south to terminate at the Apapa seaport in Lagos.

The effect of the fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system via unequal terms of trade and exorbitant taxation from meagre wages later forced the Nigerian natives to challenge the power of monopoly of the colonial master and forcing a change in the colonial project. This led to the era of decolonization. However, the period of decolonization (1952-1960) witnessed spurious power-sharing arrangements between the colonial officials and Nigeria bourgeoisies. The former remained the senior partner while the latter were no more than a junior subordinate. However, the British successfully handed over power to the surrogate Nigerian bourgeoisie and still retaining, even consolidating and enhancing the existing structures of the fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system. Thus, the Nigerian ruling bourgeoisie from the three regions and Lagos were made agents, distributors and representatives of the major foreign enterprises. These new roles as political economic decision-makers in the public domain opened the doors to

new forms of corrupt and substantial capital accumulation to major members of the Nigerian ruling class. Consequently, this resulted in the pervasive phenomenon of "10% kickbacks" where government official request for prepayment of 10% of the value of the favour being sought by members of the public (contract, license, scholarship, employment etc.) before performing the duty for which they were already being paid (Osoba, 1996).

The independence era and first republic (1960-66) witnessed the problem of capital famine among all sections of the indigenous population created by the effect or aftermath of the decolonization politicking. The founding fathers were in one way or the other capital starved which made them to abuse their positions by diverting government money to their private life. Examples are the exposure of Nnamdi Azikiwe by the Foster Sutton Tribunal of enquiry of 1956 in which he was discovered to have diverted huge sums of Eastern Nigerian government funds into his own 'African Commercial Bank' thus, solving the bank's problems of chronic shortage of operating capital and substantially enriching himself. Another instance was the G.B.A Coker commission of Inquiry of 1962 where Awolowo and his colleagues were alleged to have enriched themselves from the accumulated funds of the Cocoa Marketing Board. This era serves as the turning point in the development of corruption in Nigeria. It took the form and dimension of fraudulent award (including outright sale) of unsecured government loans, inflation of contract values, kickbacks, and straight-forward looting of the treasury by its custodians, among others. The menace of corruption at this point in time was so high that it resulted into series of conflicts in all the regions making the country more or less ungovernable. Consequently, this culminated into the Kaduna Nzeogwu military coup of January 1966 on which the military premised its reason for political intervention on corruption and abuse of office among the political elite.

The military rule (1966-75) which attempted to end misuse, ineptitude and corruption as a corrective form of governance, however, found itself wallowing in the depth of corrupt practices. It brought about high degree of kleptocracy - a situation whereby government officials had obsessive desire to steal and accumulate wealth especially when there was no economic necessity for such. The Aguiyi Ironsi regime which intended to objectively expose corrupt activities of the first republic politicians through various investigating panels ended up becoming more corrupt than the first republic administration. However, the counter coup which brought the

emergence of Gowon regime attempted to tackle corruption using different method by stripping the state through different forms of primitive and fraudulent accumulation. It took different dimension such as misappropriation of the salaries and allowances of soldiers killed in action, inflation of military procurement contracts, looting of millions of pound sterling from CBN in 1968 among others.

The post civil war period with the era of oil boom also heightened the menace of corruption in Nigeria. It brought about total lack of budgetary discipline and financial accountability. The level of corruption exceeded that of the civilian regime. The military who came into power as a corrective agent became worse than their civilian predecessors who still maintained some form of accountability and financial discipline. In the history of Nigeria, the Gowon era is seen as the most corrupt-engulfed regime during which corruption became institutionalized. This eventually provoked the Murtala-Obasanjo coup on 29 July 1975 on the ground of the unacceptable level of corruption in the government and the grave dishonour done to the armed forces by the Gowon administration (Osoba, 1996: 377).

The Murtala-Obasanjo took a drastic step toward combating corruption by establishing War against corruption and indiscipline. A commission of inquiry was set up which revealed many scandalous cases of fraudulent and unlawful enrichment on the part of many high-ranking officers, and resulted in the dismissal from office of ten out of twelve state governors and other top ranking government officials (Political Bureau, 1987). The regime was applauded for its fight against corruption and indiscipline on the ground that General Murtala despite being a military ruler declared his assets on assumption of office, and setting up of judicial commission of enquiry headed by Justice Belgore, to investigate all forms of corruption-related petitions and cases.

The second republic under the president Shagari led civilian government promised to continue the fight against corruption but ended up reversing the country back to the period of fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system. The second republic politicians adopted various techniques ranging from spurious and grossly inflated contracts, import license racketeering, NYSC rip-off, and irrelevant overseas trips which consequently made the administration lost public credibility and support. Subsequently, Nigerians received with relief and joy the news of Babangida's coup that toppled the second republic on December 31, 1983.

The Babari regime hinged its intervention on corruption as put by the public orator of the Armed Forces Sani Abacha that: "Our leaders revel in squandering, corruption and indiscipline, and continue to proliferate public appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities" (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 229-230). True to its words, the Babari regime incarcerated many politicians who were found guilty of corrupt practices. However, the Babangida regime that took over through a bloodless coup in 1985 never took a public stand against corruption. He released most of the incarcerated second republic politicians on the ground of liberal human rights agenda and set up two judicial panels to review the cases of the detainees. The regime ended up wallowing in corruption and the menace once again became a cardinal and directive principle of state and national policy and continued to sap the validity of the national economy and the creativity of the people (Osoba, 1990: 382). This trend continued throughout the period of General Abacha regime and General Abdulsalam Abubakar regime. It is sad to note that the military that seized power under the guise that the politicians were corrupt was not immune to the virus. Despite the anti-corruption crusade of the military interventionists, they were themselves caught in the web of corruption. This might not be unconnected with the oil boom, arising from the sudden upsurge in the foreign revenue in the petroleum products exports. This eventually fuelled the growth of corruption under the various military administrations.

The above scenario buttresses the argument of Dudley (1982) and Bedford (1999) in their analysis of corruption as the catalyst of underdevelopment nature of Nigeria. The former identified three explanations: the colonial legacy explanation; the corrupt leadership hypothesis; and the authoritarian regime argument; while the latter added the fourth explanation as the prevalent value system, which "glorifies and endorses corrupt and illegal means as necessary, normal and sufficient means to an end." The prevalent value system of public acceptance of corruption as a way of life compounds the problem of combating corruption. This value system inculcates corruption into the norms and culture of Nigerians which cover the eyes of the people to corrupt people. Thus, instead of condemning them, they were rather being celebrated and given the most important chieftaincy titles. Drums were being rolled whenever they appear in public. This metamorphosed to cultural embellishment of corruption, thus providing

a favourable ground for generalizing and trivializing corruption. Ariagolu (1993) opined that the value system can be attributed to the failure of the constitutional mechanism established by the 1979 Constitution to combat corruption during the President Shugu Shagari Administration. Undoubtedly, this prompted the General Ibrahim Babaginda and General Sani Abacha Military Administrations to attempt taking corruption to its nadir (Falola and Ilonbere, 1985), owing to the result of the Corruption Perception Index rating of Nigeria as the most corrupt nation in the world. Regrettably speaking, the rating of Nigeria as one of the most corrupt nations still persists even under constitutional democratic governments, and the formulation of the most robust and curative legal framework and policies for combating and preventing corruption in Nigeria (Rihadu, 2006). This persisting downward trend prompted the President Obasanjo Administration's zero tolerance for corruption as its target. This, it had pursued through:

- i. Enforcement of Laws against graft, viz. Independent Corrupt Practices (And Other Related Offences) Commission (ICPC) Act; EFCC Act; Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004.
- ii. Prosecution and conviction of high ranking Public Officials such as the Inspector-General of Police, Governors, Senators, Civil Servants, and Government Contractors.
- iii. Tracing, seizures and confiscation of all proceeds of corrupt practices.
- iv. Establishment, funding and strengthening of anti-corruption and economic crimes institutions for effective policing and law enforcement.
- v. Monthly publication of distributable revenue from the Federation Account to different tiers of government.
- vi. Institutionalizing accountability and transparency mechanism in Government's contracts, procurements accounting and auditing in public expenditures and in the oil sector.

Unfortunately, the Goodluck Jonathan's administration threw the country to the most downward depth of corruption. Several corrupt activities and impunities were carried out by the government to the extent that the president alluded to the notion that 'stealing is not corruption'. The country lost its international respect and most international agencies and countries cut ties with Nigeria as a result of the prevalence of corruption. Government

officials, representatives, civil servants and contractors openly engaged in corrupt activities with no restriction and disregard for the rule of law. The anti-graft agencies not only became a toothless bulldog but also a sleeping cat. The country degenerated to the extent that Nigerians sought for a messiah who could bring the country out of the mess. This trajectory provided Muhammadu Buhari the opportunity of returning to power as a civilian president to salvage the situation as he did in 1983. Since May 29, 2015 Nigerians have been looking forward to the Buhari administration to intensify efforts at clearing the stable of the Nigerian State of corruption. Several steps are being taken with analysts and watchers waiting to see the trend in the development or eradication of the corruption malaise.

Causes and Effects of Corruption in Nigeria (and other Developing Nations)

The menace of corruption as earlier traced is caused by factors that are inherent in the socio-political and economic system in Nigeria. It should be noted that other developing countries also suffer from the same causes of corruption. This uniformity in the causes of corruption in developing countries is not because their people are different from people elsewhere but because the prevailing and peculiar conditions in these developing countries are ripe for it (Mauro, 1996); which brought about wide spread corruption as oppose to developed countries where the menace is minimal.

In analysing the causes of corruption, Myint (2000) argued that a fertile ground for growth of a thoroughly corrupt system will emerge in a country if it satisfies the following three conditions:

- i. If it has a large number of laws, rules, regulations, and administrative orders to restrict business and economic activities and thereby creates huge opportunities for generating economic rent, and especially if these restrictive measures are complex and opaque and applied in a selective, secretive, inconsistent and non-transparent way;
- ii. If administrators are granted large discretionary powers with respect to interpreting rules, are given a lot of freedom to decide on how rules are to be applied, to whom and in what manner they are to be applied, are vested with powers to amend, alter, and rescind the rules, and even to supplement the rules by

- invoking new restrictive administrative measures and procedures; and
- iii. If there are no effective mechanisms and institutional arrangements in the country to hold administrators accountable for their actions.

From this analysis, it is not out of hand to point that all these three conditions prevail in Nigeria. These pave way for the high level of corruption in Nigeria. The causes include but not limited to: the nature of Nigerian economic activities significantly influenced by government control of economic mechanism; high level poverty which led to desperate behaviours and promotion of get-rich-quick-syndrome; low salaries (wages) which more often than not tempt employees to misappropriate or embezzle organization's fund; high risks of illness, accidents, unemployment and job security which led to insecure future. Other causes of corruption in Nigeria and other developing countries also include: Proliferation of regulations; weak legislative and judicial systems; law and principles of ethics that are poorly developed; political instability and weak political will.

On the other hand, the causal effect of corruption in Nigeria is responsible for the low investment (including foreign direct investment) that is prevailing in the economy as no investor will invest his money in a corrupt country where he is not sure of business success and high turnover. This consequently results to the winding up of existing businesses, thus reduced economic growth. Corruption also leads to shift in the composition of government spending from more productive to less productive activities; greater inequality and high incidence of poverty; reducing the efficiency of aid; and exposing the country to currency crises amongst others.

Anti-Corruption Efforts in Nigeria, 1999-2015

It is no more news that corruption has corroded the moral fabric of Nigeria as a nation thereby serving as the most antithetical obstacle to the economic and democratic progress in Nigeria. The menace manifested mainly in form of bribery, embezzlement of public funds, kick back and contract inflation, over-invoicing and advance fee frauds (popularly called 419) among others. All these contributed in no small measure to the collapse of the first republic (1960-1966) and the second republic (1979-1983). The military disrupted the two republics in Nigerian democracy on the

justification of pervasive corruption. Sadly, the military who claimed to be on corrective mission turned out to be the greatest culprits.

By the end of military rule when General Abdulsalam Abubakar led military government handed over power to President Olusegun Obasanjo, the nation was under heavy spell of corruption. As at May 1999, all types of corruption ranging from sporadic (individual) to systemic and grand corruption were competing and the whole system was wallowing in corruption to the extent that it had permeated all levels of the society and had become a way of life acceptable to most people, if not all.

It should be noted that previous governments (first and second republic, and military) did put in place several effort to tackle corruption but most measures adopted failed woefully to achieve the desired objectives. Such efforts include: Ethical revolution of President Shenu Shagari in 1981-1983; War Against Indiscipline by the General Babangida regime in 1984; the national orientation movement by the General Ibrahim Babangida regime in 1986; mass mobilisation for social justice by the same Babangida regime in 1987; and War against corruption and indiscipline by the General Abacha regime in 1996 (Akhiero, 2007). The failure of these anti-corruption programmes prompted the Obasanjo's democratic government in 1999 to realise that subtle method cannot eradicate corruption, rather a radical approach is inevitable.

Akin to the above backdrop, the first offensive institutional war against corruption was the enactment of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act in June 2000 and the subsequent establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in September of the same year. The success recorded from the activities of the ICPC marked the turning point in the history of the fight against corruption in Nigeria. In a bid to accelerate the war against corruption, the Obasanjo administration enacted the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act in 2004 which established the EFCC as a commission charged with the responsibilities to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute all cases of economic and financial crimes in Nigeria. These two anti-graft agencies were legally established through legislative proceedings without prejudice to the Code of Conduct Bureau established by the 1999 constitution. This makes the country to have three major anti-graft agencies. Below is the analysis of their activities, achievements and challenges.

The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) otherwise called the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission in full, is an agency that was inaugurated on the 29th of September 2000 following the recommendation of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The mandate is to receive and investigate reports of corruption and in appropriate cases prosecute the offender(s), to examine, review and enforce the correction of corruption prone systems and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminating corruption in public life, and to educate and enlighten the public on and against corruption and related offences with a view to enlisting and fostering public support for the fight against corruption (FRN, 2000).

The Commission is operationally into a committee system, which is put in place to determine and enforce policy directives on investigation and prosecution (Aklilhero, 2007). Section 5(i) of the ICPC Act gives the Commission enough legal mandates to effectively combat corruption by giving officers of the commission power to arrest and prosecute as the Nigerian police force. The Act goes a step higher by giving the officers power to seize any property suspected to be subject matter of an offence.

Challenges of ICPC

The Commission did not go unchallenged when it was established. The first litmus test which the Commission faced was the suit filed by the Ondo state government to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. In the much celebrated case of Attorney General of Ondo State & Ors vs. Attorney General of the Federation & Ors, the Ondo State government challenged the power of the Federal Government to legislate on corruption. The Supreme Court in a landmark judgement upheld the constitutionality of the Act and held "inter alia" that the Independent Corrupt and other Related Offences Commission Act is an enactment for the peace, order and good governance of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Any legislation on corruption and abuse of power must be of concern to every Nigerian notwithstanding that its operation will affect property and civil rights of citizens in a state. Such an enactment like all enactment of the National Assembly will be paramount force (Supreme Court, 2002).

The relief which the above cited judgement gave to the Commission did not shield the Commission from further challenge. Counsils to accused persons in other matters have continued to inundate the courts with

applications for injunctive orders to prevent the Commission from conducting investigation and sometimes to stop prosecution of cases in court. All sorts of legal antics and delay tactics are being adopted to frustrate trials in court. The Commission also suffered from the action of the National Assembly which sought to scrap the Commission for daring to investigate its leadership. The National Assembly passed a new law repealing the Act and substituting a new one in its place. However, President Olusegun Obasanjo vetoed the new Bill on the ground that there was a subsisting order of the Federal High Court which restrained him from giving assent to the Bill. The court suit was instituted by aggrieved members of the National Assembly who opposed the amendment. The National Assembly despite the subsisting court order went on to override the president's veto. However, the Federal High Court declared the new Act a nullity since it was passed in violation of a subsisting court order, thus saving the original Act.

The most recent challenges faced by the commission was the action of the Federal Government, headed by Dr Goodluck Jonathan, when he set up several ad-hoc committees to look into specific areas of national life that deserve urgent action as part of his transformation agenda. One of such committees, the Presidential Committee on the Rationalisation and Restructuring of Federal Government Parastatals, Commissions and Agencies, headed by one-time Head of Service of the Federation, Mr Stephen Oronsaye, submitted an 800-page report to the President for consideration. It recommended the scrapping of 38 agencies and merging of 52 others. In addition, it recommended that 14 others be reverted to departments and a total reduction of the 263 statutory commissions, departments and agencies to 161. Among agencies recommended for scrapping were the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC). The presidential committee said that the affected agencies should be scrapped because they perform duplicated and conflicting functions of the Nigeria Police Force. Since this report was submitted to the President on the 16th of April, scores of the populace have condemned the recommendations, especially the section pertaining to the scrapping of the three agencies said to be active (Babasola, 2012). Prominent are the Chairman of Senate Committee on Drugs, Narcotics and Anti-Corruption, Senator Victor Lar, the two past Chairmen of the ICPC, Justices Mustapha Akanbi and Emmanuel Ayoola.

Achievements of ICPC

In spite of these obstacles, the Commission has so far filed a number of criminal cases in various courts in the country. In the first three years of its existence, the ICPC received a total of 942 petitions. In August 2003, about 400 of the petitions were under investigation, and about 60 were at various stages of prosecution (Thisday, 2003). After the first four years, however, the ICPC had failed to make any major convictions. Justice Akanbi blamed the lack of progress in part on severe underfunding, in part and on the fact that the Commission was not authorized to investigate corrupt activity prior to the date the ICPC was founded (United Nations, 2004).

In June 2004, Justice Mustapha Akanbi said that although several petitions had been written against state governors, the ICPC was not empowered to investigate sitting governors involved in corrupt practices (Okenwa, 2004) because of the immunity which the 1999 constitution conferred on them. However, in August 2006 Emmanuel Ayoola said the Commission would soon issue a list of former state governors found to have violated the provisions of the ICPC Act 2000. He noted that some of them were already being prosecuted for money laundering, and said the ICPC was scrutinising the file to see whether there are cases they could pursue (Batomu, 2008).

The ICPC has prosecuted a number of prominent Nigerians. Some examples are Ghali Umar Na'Abba, Speaker of the House of Representatives (2002) (Ugbolue, 2002), Fabian Ojui, Minister of Education (2006) (Oladipo, Akinunde and Aiyeyemi 2006) and Cornelius Adebayo, Minister of Communication and Transportation (2007) (Ulayi et al 2007). In August 2009, the ICPC started investigations into an alleged N90billion fraud levelled against managers of Pension Fund for retirees in the health sector (Osajie, 2009). In September 2009, the ICPC summoned officials of the Ministry of Education linked with the alleged mismanagement of N1 billion meant for the Education Reform Programme (Medc, 2009).

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

The widespread nature of corruption prompted the Nigerian government to establish the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in September 2000 to combat public sector graft such as bribery and abuse of office by public officials. The ICPC was intended to build on the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), and its sister entity

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the Code of Conduct Tribunal, which was established in 1990 to enforce a code of conduct for public officials. Neither institution proved effective in curbing rampant public sector corruption. Amid pressure from the international community to address what then President Olusegun Obasanjo referred to as the "corruption quagmire" in Nigeria (Human Right Watch, 2011), the Nigerian government established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in December 2002 with the National Assembly's passage of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act (Obasanjo, 2003). The agency is granted broad powers to investigate and prosecute economic and financial crimes, with the intention to primarily serve as a tool to fight crimes such as money laundering and advance fee fraud.

Since its inception, the EFCC has grown into Nigeria's largest anti-corruption agency, with an annual budget of US\$60 million in 2010 and more than 1,700 personnel (Babatemi, 2011; FRN, 2010). In April 2003, President Olusegun Obasanjo appointed Nuhu Ribadu, an Assistant Commissioner of Police, as EFCC's first Executive Chairman. Ribadu was a charismatic figure who interacted well with the media and his public profile grew rapidly along with that of the Commission's work. By late 2004, EFCC investigators began pursuing high-profile allegations of public sector corruption. The targets included several of Nigeria's powerful State Governors, and the Commission pursued these investigations with considerable fanfare. In 2006, Ribadu famously told the Senate that the EFCC was investigating 31 of the 36 State Governors for graft and identified some of the governors who would be prosecuted after they left office (Ribadu, 2006a). Ribadu's public vows to hold corrupt politicians to account quickly turned him into one of the most recognizable and widely discussed public figures in the country (Ishiekwe, 2008). This effort signalled the beginning of his end in office. Political bigwigs started planning his fall. This did not catch him unaware as he said during an interview that "when you fight corruption, it fights back" (Ribadu, 2007).

After the exit of Ribadu, Ibrahim Lamorde was installed as the acting Chairman. Subsequently, President Yar'Adua appointed Farida Waziri as head of the EFCC in June 2008. Waziri's tenure was a rocky one. Her many critics alleged that she was ineffective and incompetent, and widely accused of having close relationships with corrupt political figures. She was also accused of going too slow on sensitive cases against powerful political

figures. She was eventually relieved of the office and Ibrahim Lamorde was made the Chairman of the Commission.

Challenges of EFCC

Similar to the challenges faced by the ICPC, the EFCC also suffered from the challenges of litigation to determine its constitutional power to perform anti-graft functions. It also experienced the threat of scrapping and merger as other government's agencies. However, one of the major challenges confronting the agency is 'political interference in anti-corruption cases'. The EFCC is deeply vulnerable to the whims of the presidency removed on its institutional and procedural structure. The Commission's chairman enjoys no security of tenure and can be removed by the president at will, without any form of consultation or approval from the National assembly (See section 3(2) of the EFCC Act). Experiences have shown that political pressures have always hindered the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency. The power of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation (who is a politician) to decide which case the Commission can prosecute and which to be dropped attests to this. Perhaps, this is why the Commission is accused of engaging in selective prosecution. This was the easiest challenge which the agency faced under Ribadu. The achievement of the EFCC lost its luster, largely because of the apparent political selectivity of its operations. Many of the EFCC's corruption cases seemed to be pushed forward or derailed according to the political agenda of then-president Basiango (US State Department, 2008). Such allegations grew to a crescendo ahead of the 2007 elections, when the agency presented a list of 135 'corrupt' candidates who it said should not run for office. The list was initiated by the president's adversaries and included none of Obasanjo's close allies whom Ribadu had publicly accused of corruption in the past.

Error and staff incompetence is another challenge facing the agency. The staff is said to have been damaging the prosecutions through error and incompetence. Under Ribadu, the EFCC was sometimes criticized for its penchant for high-profile arrests and public "invitations" of prominent suspects to come in for questioning before criminal investigations were completed. While these tactics earned the agency accolades, it may also undermine the investigations. As one judicial official put it, "the day you make an announcement to the media [should be] the day you have filed a case—otherwise you are just saying, 'hide your tracks, we are coming'".

(Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2011). The agency did not borrow a leaf from the mode of operation of its counterparts in other countries. For example, the United Kingdom anti-graft agency had been on the trail of the former Minister of Petroleum (Diezani Alison-Madueke) since 2013 and did not make it public until investigation was concluded in October 2015. Had the investigation been made public, perhaps, she would not have been domiciled in London which made her arrest very easy. The HRW complained that the EFCC's successes grew from a willingness to flout the law and trample on the rights of suspects. EFCC officials allegedly carried out illegal searches and ignored inconvenient court orders. Some critics, including human rights activists and defence lawyers, complained that the EFCC used Nigeria's horrible prison conditions as a way to obtain convictions—convincing courts to deny bail applications so that defendants would plead guilty rather than suffer in prison during lengthy trials (HRW, 2011).

Judicial Inefficiency and Deliberate Delay is greatly affecting the agency's effectiveness. Section 19 (1) of The EFCC Act grants jurisdiction to both federal and state courts to try EFCC cases, while section 19 (3) provides that special judges or courts should be designated to hear corruption cases, and these proceedings should be "conducted with dispatch and given accelerated hearing" (EFCC Act, section 19 (2)(b)). Section 19(2)(c) also provides that the courts shall have power "to adopt all legal measures necessary to avoid unnecessary delays and abuse in the conduct of matters brought by the Commission before it or against any person, body or authority." Despite these provisions, many of the EFCC's cases have made little progress in the courts. Most of the trials of former Governors have been dragged for about eight years. Some have gone without a single witness being called at trial. With the exception of the Lagos State court system, no other state courts or judges in the federal system are designated to hear the corruption cases—and even in Lagos State the designated judges still have to hear cases involving other matters on their docket (Jacobs, 2011). Most Nigerian courts are burdened with an antiquated physical and legal infrastructure that renders them extremely slow and inefficient. Many judges take their own notes in handwritten as a result of absence of viable electronic recording gadgets. The inconducive court environment also leads to inefficiency and delay of justice. The lawyers representing the accused are also contributing to judicial delay. They spend much time on irrelevant and trivial aspects of the case in order to frustrate the judicial proceedings.

This metamorphosed to what is seen today as the unfruitfulness of the Commission's efforts in combating corruption. Despite tremendous efforts in investigating and prosecuting corrupt people, most of the cases are still pending without headway in court. The few once that were decided were given light jail sentences in which the court will also deduct the time spent in trial thereby making the convict to either spend a few weeks in jail or go home without going to jail. A case in time is that of Tafa Balogun. In 2005 the EFCC successfully prosecuted the former Inspector General of Police. He pleaded guilty to failing to declare his assets, his front companies were convicted of money laundering, and the court ordered the seizure of Balogun's assets, reportedly worth in excess of \$150 million (BBC News online, 2005). Surprisingly, he was only sentenced to six months in prison.

Achievements of EFCC

Since its inception, the EFCC has arraigned 30 nationally prominent political figures on corruption charges and has recovered, according to the EFCC, some US\$11 billion through its efforts. Even the EFCC's critics generally agree that the agency has done a competent job of prosecuting political financial crimes, especially advance fee fraud cases. By March 2011 the EFCC had arraigned some 1,200 people for advance fee fraud, curing so far more than 400 convictions (Waziri, 2011).

Also under Waziri, the EFCC shed new light on Nigeria's scandal-ridden banking sector. Central Bank officials confirmed that they received "remedious cooperation" from Waziri's EFCC in their efforts to "sanitize the banking industry" and "rid the sector of criminals" (Lero, 2011; Sanusi, 2009). The most highly publicized of several EFCC banking cases was that of the former Oceanic Bank managing director Cecilia Ibru who was sentenced to six months in prison after pleading guilty to several counts of bank fraud in October 2010 (Reuters, 2010). The EFCC has made important progress in recovering assets that are the proceeds of crime. Since its inception in 2003, the agency has recovered over \$11 billion—of which some \$6.5 billion has been recovered since Waziri took office in June 2008. According to Waziri (2011), between June 2008 and March 2011, the EFCC recovered \$4.3 billion from the banking sector, \$903.3 million from asset forfeitures, advance fee fraud, and other related cases, \$240 million

from penalties imposed on multinational corporations and \$10 million from local businesses, and \$23 million from tax evasion.

The Achievements are categorised below According to Tenure of the Three Chairmen

Table 1: Ten Nationally Prominent Political Figures Charged under Nuhu Ribadu (April 2003 – December 2007)

S/N	Name	Office held	Date charged
1	Tafa Balogun	Inspector General of Police (2002 – 2005)	April 2005
2	Diepreye Alamieteseigha	Governor, Bayelsa State (1999 – 2005)	December 2005
3	Abubakar Audu	Governor, Kogi State (1999 – 2003)	December 2005
4	Joshua Dariye	Governor, Plateau State (1999 – 2007)	July 2007
5	Oji Kalu	Governor, Abia State (1999 – 2007)	July 2007
6	Saminu Turaki	Governor, Jigawa State (1999 – 2007)	July 2007
7	Jolly Nyame	Governor, Taraba State (1999 – 2007)	July 2007
8	Chinwoke Nnamani	Governor, Enugu State (1999 – 2007)	July 2007
9	James Ibori	Governor, Delta State (1999 – 2007)	December 2007
10	Ayo Fayose	Governor, Ekiti State (2003 – 2006)	December 2007

Source: HRW, 2011

Table 2: Four Nationally Prominent Political Figures Charged under Interim Chairman Ibrahim Laimorde (January - June 2008)

S/N	Name	Office held	Date charged
1	Lucky Igbiniedion	Governor, Edo State (1999 - 2007)	January 2008
2	Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello	Senator, Ogun State (2007 - 2011)	April 2008
3	Adenike Grange	Minister of Health (2007 - 2008)	April 2008
4	Gabriel Adaku	Minister of State for Health (2007 - 2008)	April 2008

Source: HRW, 2011

Table 3: Sixteen Nationally Prominent Political Figures Charged under Fairda Waziri (June 2008 - July 2011)

S/N	Name	Office held	Date charged
1	Babalola Bortshade	Minister of Aviation (2005 - 2006)	July 2008
2	Femi Fani-Kayode	Minister of Aviation (2006 - 2007)	July 2008
3	Michael Botmang	Governor, Plateau State (2006 - 2007)	July 2008
4	Boni Haruna	Governor, Adamawa State (1999 - 2007)	August 2008
5	Rashidi Ladoja	Governor, Oyo State (2003 - 2007)	August 2008
6	Olabode George	Chairman, Nigerian Ports Authority (1999 - 2003)	August 2008
7	Nicholas Ugbane	Chairman, Senate Committee on Power	May 2009
8	Nduki Elumelu	Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Power	May 2009
9	Ige Paulinus	Chairman, House of	May 2009

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		Representatives Committee on Rural Development	
10	Ibo Mohammed	Deputy Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Power	May 2009
11	Atahiru Bafarawa	Governor, Sokoto State (1999 - 2007)	December 2009
12	Abdullahi Adamu	Governor, Nasarawa State (1999 - 2007)	March 2010
13	Nasir El-Rufai	Minister of Federal Capital Territory (2003 - 2007)	May 2010
14	Hassan Lawal	Minister of Works and Housing (2008 - 2010)	May 2011
15	Dimeji Bankole	Speaker of the House of Representatives (2007 - 2011)	June 2011
16	Usman Nafada	Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives (2007 - 2011)	June 2011

Source: HRW, 2011

The EFCC's Convictions

Tafa Balogun was the EFCC's first conviction of a nationally prominent political figure. Charged to court in April 2005, just months after being forced to retire as Nigeria's Inspector General of Police, Balogun ultimately pleaded guilty of failing to declare his assets, and his front companies were convicted of eight counts of money laundering. In November 2005, he was sentenced to six months in prison and the court ordered the seizure of his assets—reportedly worth in excess of \$150 million (Federal High Court, 2005). The sentence struck many as light given the severity of the allegations—he stood accused of financial crimes allegedly committed at a time when he was serving as Nigeria's chief law enforcement officer (Irekepen and Murrana, 2007).

Diepreye Alamieyeseigha served as Governor of Nigeria's oil-rich but deeply impoverished Bayelsa State from 1999 to 2005. In September

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2005, he was arrested by British authority in London. The London Metropolitan Police found about £1 million in cash at his home and charged him with money laundering (BBC News Online, 2005b). Released on bail, Alamiyessigha managed to flee the UK—the EFCC says he disguised as a woman—and reappeared in his home state, claiming he had been transported there by God (Polgreen, 2005). As a sitting Governor, he enjoyed immunity from prosecution in Nigeria, but three months later he was impeached by his state legislature, and the EFCC charged him with embezzling about \$55 million in public funds (Ahemba, 2005). In July 2007 the former governor pleaded guilty to failing to declare his assets, his front companies were convicted of money laundering, and the court ordered his assets seized. He was sentenced to two years in prison and released, for time served, the day after his sentencing (Mbachu, 2007).

Former Edo State Governor Lucky Ighinedion was charged by EFCC prosecutors in January 2009 with siphoning of more than \$25 million of public funds (Agence France-Presse, 2008). He ultimately pleaded guilty in December 2008 to failing to declare his assets and his front company was convicted on 27 counts of money laundering. But the trial judge in the case, Abdullahi Kafarati, deviated from the terms of the plea agreement and handed down a very light sentence that included no jail time (HRW, 2011). Ighinedion paid the equivalent of a \$25,000 fine, agreed to forfeit some of his property, and walked free on the spot. The EFCC appealed the light sentence. In early 2011, the EFCC raided two of his palatial homes in Abuja and filed new criminal charges against the former governor (EFCC News Release, 2011). But in May 2011 the court dismissed the case, ruling that the new charges would amount to double jeopardy (Ibileke, 2011).

Olabode George was a powerful figure within the ruling party under NPPA for a time. The EFCC in August 2008 charged him with contract-related offenses dating back to his time at the NPPA (Akintunde, 2008). In October 2009, he was convicted and sentenced to two and a half years in prison after a surprisingly swift and efficient trial (BBC News Online, 2009). This was the EFCC's first and so far only conviction at trial of a major political figure—an important accomplishment.

Conclusion

The roots of corruption are deeply embedded in the Nigerian society, thus uprooting it will require the application of all the available mechanisms of the constitution, good governance, political will and international support. We opined that the Buhari administration will not have a smooth ride in the fight against corruption. However, if the President maintains and sustains his political will to combat corruption, he must close his eyes to subjective criticism, detraction and frustration which the corrupt cartels will adopt as a means to fight back. The President must also be conscious of his actions and that of his immediate family and staff to avoid a corrupt related action that could be used to frustrate his zeal. Above all, we believe that President Muhammadu Buhari may not succeed in the ongoing onslaught against corruption if he is nursing the ambition of second term through the support of the political elites. If he is interested in second term, he should fight corruption head-on and rely on the support of the masses who voted him to power in the 2015 election. Nigeria is a country that cannot survive with the drifting nature of anti-corruption crusade. Combating and preventing corruption has become a *sine qua non* for Nigeria's development; otherwise the Constitution and the government will become meaningless to the existence of the Nigerian citizenry. Corruption has become a cancerous growth that has gone from being benign to malignant in the Nigerian society. It is therefore necessary to rethink the boundary of our constitutional and governmental practices to evolve means to effectively contain, curtail and control corruption, so that it will not terminate the development and the laws that created anti-corruption agencies in a bid to strengthen them and not to cut down their power to become a toothless bulldog. The civil society should be up and doing to serve as whistle-blower in case of excesses from the anti-graft agency as well as to the activities of the government in discouraging the graft war by protecting its cronies.

Above all, all Nigerians should rise up to fight corruption from individual level to family level and subsequently at the national level. For corruption to be totally uprooted in Nigeria by enhancing the effectiveness and performance of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), and support anti-

Corruption efforts more broadly, the government should consider the following recommendations:

To the federal executive arm of Nigeria

The executive arm headed by President Muhammadu Buhari should:

- i. Having publicly signal a commitment to break with the bad practices of previous administrations, should avoid political interference with anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions;
- ii. Take steps to limit the power of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice to interfere in anticorruption cases or separate the two office and appoint a career senior lawyer to head the former while a politician may head the latter;
- iii. Increase the independence of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) through greater security of tenure for the EFCC chairman and
- iv. Enhance the Code of Conduct Bureau's effectiveness, by financially and materially empowering it to verify declared assets in and out of the country.

To the National Assembly

- i. Amend the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act to define specific terms and conditions for public access to the asset declarations of public officials, as provided by the Nigerian Constitution.
- ii. Pass the Evidence Act (Amendment) Bill to modernize the rule of evidence, including admission of electronic evidence.
- iii. Consider passage of the Special Courts (Establishment) Bill to designate specific courts to hear corruption cases.

To the Anti-graft Agencies (EFCC and ICPC)

- i. Set an example of institutional transparency by requiring all senior EFCC and ICPC officials to publicly declare the total value of all personal assets.
- ii. Investigate, arrest, and prosecute according to international fair trial standards, or publicly explain the reasons for not prosecuting politicians and government officials credibly implicated in embezzlement of state funds.
- iii. Make more proactive use of their constitutional power to compel public officials to explain the origins of suspiciously extensive property holdings and other assets.

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Impact of Social Media on Nigerian Youths

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Abstract

The impact of social media in a technological age cannot be over emphasized. Its importance has gone beyond simple social sharing to building reputation and bringing in career opportunities. Alongside these benefits however, there are other negativities that stem from the usage of social media. The study through content analysis and salient application diffused theory shows that the more people (youth especially) use the social media, the less time they spend talking to family members, causing them to be afflicted by loneliness, depression, moral degradation etc. Hence, the paper recommends that Nigerian parents, the government and the youth themselves must determinedly see to the close monitoring, installation of appropriate censorship, provision of employment, recognition and commendation of morals and originality, among others will go a long way in further strengthening the usage of the social media for social, political and economic growth to better the lots of Nigerians youth

Introduction

From time immemorial, mankind has always found a way to communicate with one another. Owing to its role as one of the most fundamental aspects of human existence, communication has evolved from what it was during the pre-historic times to what it is today. By way of definition, communication is "an interaction process through which persons or group relate to each other and share information, experiences and culture" (Jayaweera 1991, in Okuma & Omenugha, 2012). It is through such interactions that the bridges and gulfs are bridged and the world is turned to a global village. Using the diffusion theory, the paper argues that the social media which is meant to be a blessing to aid development has turned to a two-edged sword which makes it stereotypical in being the leading cause of social vices among youths.

No doubt, the social media has turned the world to a miniaturized global village where in everyone in that setting is interconnected in some

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