


THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

Osita C. Eze

This seminal work on rights, duties and enforcement mechanisms examines the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights both from the conceptual and practical perspectives. The book aims at raising awareness, deepening understanding and understanding of human and peoples rights and duties, and in particular providing more effective protection to ensure more responsible and responsive governments, and an enlightened and vigilant civil society. To achieve these, the book analyzes the various conventions, the sources of their legal validity, as well as the institutions and machinery for their promotion and enforcement.



CHALLENGES OF THE UNITED NATIONS REFORM: PROCEEDINGS OF A COLLOQUIUM

Warisu O. Alli (ed.)

This is a sensitization book produced by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs on the challenges facing the United Nations in its bid at reforming the system, including the reform of the UN Security Council. Arising from the efforts made by the UN towards addressing contemporary global challenges beginning from the year 2000, and effecting reforms within the system, this book seeks to examine these challenges and makes a strong case for Nigeria's inclusion in the UN Security Council as one of Africa's representatives. Some of the issues addressed include Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear, including a new vision of collective security, use of force, and the strengthening of the United Nations.



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Asymmetrical Dyads in Afro-Asian Nexus: A Theoretical Exploration of Japan-African Relations
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Russia and Chechnya: An Essay in Conflict and War
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Book Review:
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violent change of government... A sampling of the conflicts and wars that avaged Africa since independence will show that majority of them have occurred in countries with sit-tight, or life presidents; military heads of state turned dictators, or transformed into corruptly elected civilian presidents; and regimes that deny the rights of minorities, or privileged minorities that deny the rights of the majority groups within their territories.¹⁹

While the mantra of coups are no longer fashionable but continue to resonate across the African countries' regional and continental bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU), have adopted resolutions that ostracize any government within the member states that come in through unconstitutional means, coups and illegal means into state houses as we have witnessed recently in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and lately, Madagascar. Although not in the frame of coup, the Mbeki/Zuma political tussle in South Africa could all the same have pushed the country over the edge and one wonders what the Southern African region could have turned into with Zimbabwe already on the edge had South Africa not come out clean from the Mbeki/Zuma squabble.

South Africa did indeed, come out clean from the internecine party politics as Zuma convincingly won the April 2009 presidential elections, though the new party, COPE and the opposition parties chipped away a fear of their political base. Indeed, some lessons have been learnt from the internal dynamics of party politics within South Africa.

¹⁹ Imobighe, T.A., "Democracy, Media Pluralism, Wars and Crises in Africa: Towards Conflict Resolution in an Era of Emergent Civil Society," Luke Uka Uche, (ed.), *Mass Communication, Democracy and Civil Society in Africa, International Perspectives*, Lagos, Nigerian National Commission for UNESCO, 1999.

Asymmetrical Dyads in Afro-Asian Nexus: A Theoretical Exploration of Japan-African Relations

Aremu Fatai Ayinde*

Abstract

Using theory to analyze Japan-African relations is uncommon in the existing body of literature. This article represents an attempt to apply asymmetrical dyads theory to Japan-African relations. It aims to examine the validity of its assumptions in the light of the case study while simultaneously exploring the dynamics of Japan's African diplomacy beyond the "intellectual paralysis" that seemed to have limited the application of theory to the relationship between distant but not unlikely partners. Using pooled cross-sectional time series data analysis, the study finds that the foreign policy behaviour of sampled African states was generally expansive towards Japan corresponding to the reinforcement objective. However, contrary to the prediction of the theory, foreign policy behavior of sampled African countries was positively correlated to the relative economic strength and linkage concentration.

Introduction

In general, theorizing international relations in post-cold war context had been a subject of intense debate among scholars and practitioners in the field. The failure of theories (and theorists) to anticipate the sudden end of the cold war not only confined the hitherto seemingly unassailable paradigms, together with their revered exponents, to post-facto explanations but consequently threw them into a crisis of relevance.¹ Some analysts began to question whether international relations could or *should* be theorized in the

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¹ Heikki P. "What is it that changed with the end of Cold War? An Analysis of the Problem of Identifying and Explaining Change", in Allan, Pierre and Goldmann, Kjell (eds.), *The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992, pp. 179-225.

first instance,² hence, the otherwise moribund debate on the feasibility or possibility of theories in international relations was revived. While the debate remains potent and falls outside the scope of this article (or, perhaps, beyond the intellectual competence of the researcher), it is nonetheless useful to observe that rejecting the basis for theory in the study of international relations would be tantamount to throwing away the baby with the bathwater. After all, the utility of weather forecasting or bond speculation remains unchallenged even though both sometimes miss targets in prediction. Indeed, like weather forecasts, theoretical and systematic analysis of world affairs, as rightly stressed by one informed observer, "is not a mere academic game. It is essential for coping appropriately with the turbulent world of our time."³

More specifically, however, there has been a palpable dearth of theoretical input in the study of Japan's African diplomacy. With the exception of a few, studies on Japan-African relations have generally hollow theoretical bent.⁴ The question is why has there been paltry theoretical focus in existing studies of Japan's African policy? In answering the question, one might need to refer to the general limits of theory in international relations as well as the specific constraints in the context of Japan's African policy. The first set of the challenges could be summarized as the problems of parsimony, experimentability, replicability and predictability. In a perceptive essay by John Lewis Gaddis, he argues that the problematics of theorizing international relations stems from the unswerving (if unnecessary) preoccupation of theorists with the above issues.⁵

According to him, for international relations theorists to insist that all nations within an anarchic system practice self-help strikes us as a little as saying that fish within water must learn to swim. It is neither untrue nor untrivial "just uninteresting"⁶

Whether one agrees with Gaddis or not, it seems obvious that a quest for parsimony, a desire to decouple dependent and independent

² Gaddis J. L. "History, Theory and the Common Ground", *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 75-85.

³ Keohane R and Nye J, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. New York: Longman, 2001, p. 211.

⁴ Adem Seifdein, *Anarchy, Order and Power in World Politics: A Comparative Analysis* Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002. Osada, Masako *Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 2002; and Omoruyi L., "Japan: A Rear Entry into Great Power Rank" in *Contending Theories on Development Aid: Post-Cold War Evidence from Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001, pp. 106-128.

⁵ Gaddis J.L. "History, Theory and the Common Ground.

⁶ Ibid. p.79.

variables where replicable laboratory experiments are not effectively practicable and a claim to objectivity and commensurability in the measurement of generally value-laden and ambiguous concepts (for instance "power", "influence", "hegemony" or "democracy") continue to plague the theoretical credentials of international relations research in general and might have served as disincentives to some analysts of Japan-African relations. More specifically though, Japan's African policy (probably Japan's foreign policy in general), is afflicted with its own constraints that could have restricted its amenability to sufficient deployment of theory. One such constraint was highlighted by Edwin Reischauer thus,

Japanese decision making process may prove too complex and uncertain to produce decisions of adequate clarity...perhaps more complex than in other countries and certainly more of it proceeds out of sight...⁷

As a result of the diffusion of the sources of authority and the relative obscurity of the decisional process noted by Reischauer, subjecting the behavior of the state and the motivation that informs the behavior to rigorous theoretical scrutiny could be no less daunting. This tend to confirm Morgenthau's warning that searching for the motivation for state behaviour could be "futile" because motives are "the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike."⁸

Another factor that obfuscates Japan's foreign policy (and to a certain degree, its African policy) and makes it less amenable to clear theoretical analysis relates to the *gaiatsu* factor and its impact on policy and behavioral outcomes. Whenever Tokyo adopts a particular policy or behavioral pattern, the *real* origin or locus of decision is usually blurred by the uncertainty in the extent to which Japan's position is a product of external pressure or a reflection of governmental preference. The debate on the degree of influence of foreign pressure (mainly American pressure though) on Japan's foreign policy preferences and behavioral outcomes remains potent among contributors to the 'reactive state' thesis.⁹ For the purpose of this study

⁷ Reischauer Edwin, O. "Foreword" in Scalapino A. R. (ed.) *The Foreign Policy of Japan*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997.

⁸ Morgenthau Hans, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for War and Peace*, 3rd ed. New York, Knopf (1960) p.6.

⁹ Calder Kent, "Japanese Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State" *World Politics* Vol. 40, No.4, July, 1988, pp. 517-541; Yasutomo Dennis, *The Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. New York, St. Martin Press, 1995; Miyashita Akitoshi's *Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy*, New York: Lexington Books, 2003.

however, it will suffice to contend that *gaiatsu*, irrespective of its degree of impact, serves to further complicate the ordinarily complex level of analysis problematic in foreign policy analysis and could have made early studies on Japan-African relations less amenable to robust theoretical exploration. It would not be surprising therefore, to discover that a sizeable number of existing literature on Japan's policy towards Africa are either simply descriptive or essentially narrative in style and approach.

In spite of the general and specific constraints to the application of theory in the analysis of Japan-African relations, it may still be possible and indeed useful to attempt a theoretical exploration of the subject. As James Rosenau admonishes, even though 'it is sheer craziness to dare' to theorize world affairs, but 'dare we must'. According to him,

If we could concede confusion and always remind ourselves that our conclusion must perforce be tentative, then it should be possible to avoid excessive simplicity and intellectual paralysis...¹⁰

Rosenau extends the argument further to justify the utility of theory in offering coherent understanding of essentially incoherent international phenomena. In his words, it is through theorizing that we can hope to tease meaningful patterns out of the endless details and inordinate complexities that pervade world politics.¹¹

The argument seems persuasive and offers the initial justification and subsequent motivation for this study. Nevertheless, some critical questions remain. For instance, how can Japan-African relations be theorized? What theory (or body of theories) would provide the relevant framework of analysis? Decision making approach, for example, was found to be inappropriate because of the fluidity of such concepts as *decisions*, *decision-makers* and *motivation* which inform decisional outcomes.¹² At another level, systemic theory that should have offered another option could provide only frail foundation because it tends to exaggerate the overall impact of the system on state behaviour in addition to its questionable assumption of uniformity of

¹⁰ Rosenau James, "Probing Puzzles Persistently: A Desirable but Improbable Future for International Relation Theory" in Smith S., Booth K., and Marysia Z. (eds.) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 309-317.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 310.

¹² Buzan Barry "The Level of Analysis in International Relation Reconsidered" in Booth K. and Smith S. (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, Oxford, Polity Press, pp 198-216; and Singer J.D "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relation", *World Politics*, Vol. 14 no. 1. 1962, pp. 77-92.

nations in the international system.¹³ In analyzing Japan-African relations (and the weaknesses therein), therefore, economic theory of foreign policy was considered more appropriate because of two separate but interrelated reasons.

First, Japan's peace constitution (at least until it becomes eventually amended) confines its foreign engagement primarily to essentially economic spheres and its analysis should take cognizance of that fact. Second, the end of cold war has witnessed significant rise in the value of economic indices of state capability and influence in world affairs. This does not necessarily suggest a neglect or decline, for deterrence and compellence purposes, in the value of the military component of state power. However, it has become obvious that "intensive development through economic growth is generally preferable to military and extensive expansion."¹⁴ To buttress this argument, two cases are illustrative. In the first instance, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a product more or less of economic weakness than military vulnerability although both could be mutually reinforcing. It could also suggest that a strong or large military can not be sustained without a correspondingly sound economic superstructure. Secondly, the rise of the East Asian Tigers to global prominence (in comparison to several African and Latin American countries for example) was largely due to remarkable economic performance than their military arsenal. In either case, it is incontrovertible that economic issues relating to trade, investment, aid and general flow of financial resources across the globe have assumed greater significance in contemporary international affairs where 'soft power' appeal could be an immense source of goodwill and influence. To the extent that Japan is undoubtedly a major player in global economic arena¹⁵, the above stated arguments support the justification for the adoption of economic theory in analyzing Japan's African diplomacy and/or its limitations.

Economic theory of foreign policy seeks to explain the behaviour of states in the light of the mini-max principle of welfare needs of their respective citizenry as it relates to inter-state relations. In other words, since one of the central objectives of foreign policy is to secure the well-being of the citizenry, the behaviour of the state would be a function of its location in the global

¹³ Singer J.D, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations", Linklater Andrew (ed) *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, Vol. III, London & New York, Routledge, p. 338.

¹⁴ Rosecrance Richard, "Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and its Effects" *International Studies Perspective*, Vol. 7 No. 1, 2006, pp. 31-35.

¹⁵ Drift Reinhard *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: From Economic Superpower to What Power?* New York, St. Martins Press, 1998. Also Adem Seifudein *Anarchy, Order and Power in World Politics: A Comparative Analysis*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

economic topography. Dependent states, for example, may exhibit weak foreign policy behaviour so as not to jeopardize potential benefits.¹⁶ Indeed, there are variants of economic theory among which dependency approach (which is *not* directly central to this study though) was quite popular especially among Latin American and some elements of African academia. Another variant of the economic theory of foreign policy which forms the analytical fulcrum of this study is *asymmetric dyads*. The theory takes off with the basic assumption that inter-state relations takes place, more or less, under certain conditions of asymmetry which invariably shapes the pattern of relations between the super-ordinate and the subordinate states in a particular set of relationship. For the purpose of this article, one may simply pose the question as: how does asymmetric dyads theory fit into the analysis of Japan-African relations? Put differently, to what extent does evidence from Japan-African relations support or negate the basic assumptions of asymmetric dyads theory? In order to address these questions, the next section would examine in greater detail the general discourse on asymmetric dyads.

An Overview of the Theoretical Discourse on Asymmetrical Dyads

Before discussing the basic propositions of the asymmetric dyads theory, it is necessary to note the critical distinction between *dependence* with which the theory is more concerned and *dependency* with which it merely shares parallel points of departure. According to Caporaso, *dependence* refers to the pattern of external reliance on other actors while *dependency* is used to describe the process of incorporation of less developed countries (LDCs) into the global capitalist system.¹⁷ While they share the common attributes of structural and relational inequality, there are fundamental gaps in their respective amenability to empirical and methodological inquiry. Dependency theory is more holistic and universal, and does not lend itself to disaggregated analysis in dyadic sense by, for instance, focusing on a pair of actors. This makes it difficult to identify data with which to assess its explanatory power beyond its potent ideological statement on center-periphery relations. Indeed, given what is now known of development, as Omoruyi rightly observes, what is surprising is not that

¹⁶ Moon Bruce E., "Foreign Policy of Dependent State" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Sept., 1983, pp. 315-340; Bruce E. Moon, "Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence", *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Spring 1986, pp. 297-329.

¹⁷ Caporaso James, "Introduction to the Special Issue of International Organization on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System", *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter, 1978, pp. 1-12.

dependency theory has atrophied, but that it survived for as long as it did.¹⁸ Dependence, on the other hand, describes "the pattern of external reliance of well-integrated nation-states on one another."¹⁹ Hence, the conceptual variables of dependence would include the degree of one's reliance on another, the relative importance attached to the relationship as well as availability of alternatives or substitutes. These variables are reflected in the nature and dimension of asymmetry in the relationship between actors.

Asymmetric dyads theory, as a strand or an offshoot of the *dependence* paradigm, owes much of its contemporary development and systematic exposition to the studies conducted under the Asymmetrical Dyads and Foreign Policy Project.²⁰ The theory was designed to probe the foreign policies of subordinate states as it relates to a state's movement toward and away from a superordinate partner. It is based on the assumption that foreign policy actors are governments acting as the agents of the state, and that government conducts foreign policy in pursuit of the goals of economic well-being and political autonomy both of which compete in the relationship with superordinate actor.

According to Dolan, *et al*, it is the relationship between both goals and the constraints imposed on foreign policy by that relationship that distinguishes subordinate states from other national actors.²¹ This is because subordinate states in asymmetrical dyad expect that an increase in relations "either in scope or magnitude of exchanges and agreements will result in increased economic well-being and decreased political autonomy."²² With respect to the goal of economic well-being, an increase in relations within an asymmetrical dyad is expected to yield for the subordinate state, greater market access and capital either in the form of investment or development assistance as well as technical and managerial skills by the superordinate partner. The

¹⁸ Omoruyi Leslie, "Japan: A Rear Entry into Great Power Rank"... *op cit.*, p. 24

¹⁹ Caporaso James "Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioural Analysis" *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter, 1978, pp. 13-43.

²⁰ Asymmetrical Dyads and Foreign Policy Project was sponsored by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Initially designed to probe Canadian-US relations, the theory was subsequently reformulated and applied to other cases. See Michael B. Dolan, Brian W. Tomlin and Harald Von Rikchoff "Integration and Autonomy in Canada-United States Relation, 1963-1972", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1982, pp. 331-363; and Michael B. Dolan, Harald Von Rikchoff, Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, "Asymmetrical Dyads and Foreign Policy: Canada-US Relations, 1963-1972", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 387-422.

²¹ Dolan Michael and Tomlin Brian "Foreign Policy in Asymmetrical Dyads: Theoretical Reformation and Empirical Analysis, Canada-United States Relations 1963-1972" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3, Sep., pp. 349-368.

²² *Ibid.* p. 351.

relative emphasis placed on either of the two goals at any given time constitutes an important challenge to foreign policy makers.

From the foregoing, it is further assumed that the emphasis given to either economic well-being or political autonomy depends on the state of the domestic economy of the subordinate country and the degree of linkage concentration on the superordinate state. In other words, the emphasis on the goal of economic well-being varies inversely with the state of the domestic economy while emphasis on the goal of political autonomy varies directly with the degree of linkage concentration on the superordinate party.²³ Linkage concentration is defined in terms of the proportion of subordinate state's external relations (for instance, aid, investment or trade) is focused on the superordinate state. It follows that the higher the concentration of linkage, the higher the vulnerability of the subordinate state to alteration in the dyadic relationship. Vulnerability, according to Caporaso entails the relative availability and costliness of alternatives.²⁴ This stems from the fact that dyadic relationship is characterized by both structural and relational asymmetry. The former refers to the differential power resources available to the states which gives the superordinate partner greater influence in the international environment while the latter connotes unequal degree of involvement in the relationship.

Foreign policy, according to exponents of the theory, comprise of both objectives and behavior. In asymmetrical dyads two foreign policy objectives are identified *reinforcement* objective at one extreme end and *regulation* objective at the other. In between reinforcement and regulation objectives is *accommodation* which signifies a mixture of both extremes. *Reinforcement* is defined as a desire to increase or intensify relations with the superordinate country while *regulation* indicates a desire to limit or restrict relations with the superordinate country. *Accommodation* connotes a desire to harmonize or reconcile the competing extremes of reinforcement and regulation.²⁵ The absence of a desire for change is referred to as *maintenance* objective indicating a desire to keep the status quo in the dyad. The theory also produced a schema that merged the foreign policy objectives with particular forms of behavior as shown in figure 1 below:

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Caporaso James "Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System ...op cit.

²⁵ Dolan Michael, Von Rickhoff Harald, Tomlin Brain and Molot Maureen Appel "Asymmetrical Dyads and Foreign Policy ... op cit. p. 393.

Fig. 1 Determinants of Foreign Policy Objectives

Regulation	Maintenance
Accommodation	Reinforcement

Concentration of Linkages with Superordinate Party

<u>Relatively High</u> State of the Economy of Subordinate state	<u>Relatively Low</u> (more emphasis on autonomy goal)	(less emphasis on autonomy goal)
--	--	-------------------------------------

Relatively Strong
(less emphasis on economic well-being goal)

Relatively Weak
(more emphasis on economic well-being goal)

Source: Dolan, B. Michael, Tomlin, W. Brian, Molot, M. Appel and von Rieckhoff, H., "Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Sept. 1980, p. 422.

Along the continuum of foreign policy objectives, the theory also identified specific behavioral dimensions and actions concerned with the level of transactions, extent of policy coordination and extent of policy alignment. The *level of transactions* symbolize behavior that attempt to affect by expression of support for or concern on the level of transaction in the dyad. *Policy coordination* indicates behavior that utilizes formal bilateral institutions and/or other mediums to achieve similar or complementary policies in the dyad. The opposite of this dimension refers to the termination or refusal to utilize formal bilateral institutions or reluctance to work together to achieve similar, complementary or joint policies. *Policy alignment*, according to asymmetrical dyads theory, entails behavior 'which supports or opposes the position or policy of the superordinate nation.'²⁶

²⁶ Ibid. p. 423.

Each of the objectives is expected to elicit particular behavioral patterns. Suppose the principal foreign policy objective is *reinforcement*, the desire to expand relations with the target partner would make the government to make attempts to increase the *level of transactions* and to seek to increase opportunity for *policy coordination*. In the case of *policy alignment*, the expectation of economic gains would logically propel the government to modify or adopt supportive (rather than critical) policy towards the superordinate country. With respect to the *regulation* objective on the other hand, the behavioral pattern would be the exact opposite of the *reinforcement* objective. *Accommodation*, as noted by exponents of the theory, is a hybrid of both 'asserting autonomy under conditions of concentrated linkages and improving the economy by increasing relations with the superordinate party.'²⁷ It is a combination of conflicting aims and may produce certain traits of inconsistent behavioral patterns. With respect to the *maintenance* objective, it is likely to exist under conditions of relative economic prosperity and a relatively low linkage concentration. Under such circumstance, there would be stronger incentive to preserve the status quo. Essentially, asymmetrical dyads theory contends that behavior is a function of objectives as empirically represented in the equation below:

$$f = \{(EC, FB): FPB = -EC + u\}$$

Where FPB is foreign policy behaviour concerning the level of transactions, policy coordination and policy alignment; E is the state of the economy; C is the concentration of linkages with the superordinate country; and u is an error term.

On the whole, the theory represents a major contribution to studies of dependence and interdependence especially since these networks of relationships takes place under one form of asymmetry or another. It therefore offers a systematic framework with which foreign policy analysts could explore the various behavioral patterns that states adopt when faced with the competing goals of economic well-being and political autonomy in their relationship with superordinate partners. Nonetheless, the postulations and some assumptions of the theory raise some issues that call for further thinking. Implicit in the assumptions of the theory is the idea that asymmetrical relations necessarily involve 'contests' that generates 'compliance' (or non-compliance) of the subordinate state to the desires of the superordinate partner. This is probably because the theory, as noted earlier, originally derives (if in part)

²⁷ Ibid.

from a study of Canada-United States relations²⁸ wherein such contestation over outcomes have high historical propensity. Hence, the theory appears to be silent on non-coercive diplomacy that nonetheless takes place, more or less, within the framework of asymmetrical dyads. For convenience of analysis, some of the assumptions will be modified in later section based on the peculiarity of the case study under consideration.

In addition, the theory's orientation towards the foreign policy of the subordinate state in an asymmetrical situation pays little attention to the policy and behavioral inclinations of the superordinate state and how this could have (or not) shaped or influenced the dyadic setting. Moreover, the boundary between *structural* and *relational* asymmetry was not fully clarified in the theory. In other words, how and when does structural asymmetry produce relational asymmetry? This question is of particular interest when using evidence from Japan-African relations where it is not too clear how and to what extent the huge structural asymmetry has generated relational asymmetry. These issues tend to detract from the utility of the theory in understanding the dynamics of asymmetrical relations across board. The weaknesses notwithstanding, the theory remains useful not only because it tends to be parsimonious, but also that it is falsifiable through some empirical analysis. Having considered the basic postulations of the asymmetrical dyads theory, it is equally necessary to provide an overview of Japan-African relations before juxtaposing the evidence against theory in subsequent section.

A Brief Overview of Japan-African Relations in Contemporary Historical Context

It is difficult to establish when and how early contacts were made between Japan and Africa because, as observed by one author, 'records of Japan's contact with, or knowledge of Africa during the pre-Meiji era are rather scanty and fragmentary'²⁹ One widely shared school of thought suggests that the Japanese probably knew about Africa as far back as 16th century through the Portuguese explorers. However, the knowledge was generally unifying, 'poor, vague, uncoordinated, and at times, unreliable.'³⁰ This is because the Portuguese, through whom the Japanese knew about Africa in

²⁸ Dolan Michael, Tomlin Brain, Molot Maureen and Von Rickhoff " Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sep.), 1980), pp. 415-449.

²⁹ Agbi Olu S., *Japanese Relation with Africa 1868-1978*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1992, pp 1-2.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 1.

the first place, knew Japan by accident when in 1543 a group of Portuguese sailors had been carried in a storm to South Kyushu.

Generally speaking, the evolution of contemporary Japan-Africa relations could be divided broadly into three major phases. These are pre-1939 as the first phase, the cold war era and the post-cold war (and post-Apartheid) era as the second and third phases respectively. The first phase could roughly coincide with the period in which some Japanese businessmen took interests especially in Southern Africa. Among the early Japanese businessmen that settled in South Africa was Furuya Komahei who opened a shop called *Mikado Shoten* in Cape Town.³¹ The shop was said to have lasted beyond 1915 when Furuya and his wife, Kiyoko returned to Japan only to be closed down in 1942 when all Japanese residents were expelled by South African authorities.

Meanwhile, the pre-1939 phase also witnessed intermittent calls by Japanese vessels at South African ports *en route* Latin America. It was not until the outbreak of the First World War that significant trade relations with South Africa began to manifest³² largely because the war disrupted the European exports to South African markets. Attention gradually shifted to Japan for imports which led to the development of direct trade relations that had hitherto been conducted through European or Indian middlemen. The entry of Japanese goods into the South African market was complemented by the appointment of an honorary consul in 1910 and the establishment of a Japanese consulate in August 1916³³. Thereafter, South Africa became the important foothold for Japan's entry into African markets even though there were subsequent post-war drawbacks to the trade relations especially when supply of goods from Europe was eventually restored which resulted in series of discrimination against Japanese goods. For the rest of Africa (especially East and West Africa), relations were still conducted through the colonial administration where more pronounced discrimination against Japanese goods prevented the development of significant trade contact³⁴. Even then, the gradual evolution of the relations was subsequently extinguished with the outbreak of the Second World War.

³¹ Osada Masako, *Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 2002.

³² Morikawa Jun, *Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy*, London, Hurst and Co., 1917, pp. 32-33.

³³ *Ibid.* p.33.

³⁴ Ampiah Kweku, "British Commercial Policies against Japanese Expansionism in East and West Africa, 1932-1935", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1990, pp. 619-641.

The second phase coincides roughly with cold war era during which a combination of ideological and economic interests took the Apartheid issue in South Africa not only to the centre stage of global discourse but also Japan-African relations. The quest for strategic minerals imports from South Africa combined with Japan's membership of the capitalist bloc in the cold war politics produced, to the dismay of other African countries, less belligerent approach to the Apartheid regime. Significant rise in trade with Apartheid South Africa as well as the "honorary whites" status³⁵ that was believed to have been granted to Japan as an important trade partner served to legitimate what Morikawa termed *nigen kozo*³⁶ (double pre-occupation) of engaging with the racist regime on the one hand while avoiding the opprobrium of other African countries. The end of cold war as well as the demise of the Apartheid administration in South Africa terminated the double 'pre-occupation' and culminated in another era in the development of Japan-African relations.

Post-cold war era in the development marked what could be described as the third phase in the evolution of Japan-African relations. The end of 'double preoccupation' signaled a re-invigoration of Japan's African diplomacy through the multilateral platform of Tokyo International Conference for Africa's Development (TICAD). The debate on the relative efficacy of TICAD notwithstanding, it has consistently held every five years since the maiden edition in 1993. The consistency and gradual expansion in the number of stakeholders and participants speaks to the rising tempo of Japan's commitment to African affairs. Besides the TICAD initiative (from which the New Partnership for African Development, NEPAD, and other similar initiatives by other African partners could have taken a cue), that some African leaders were, for the first time, invited to participate at the G8 Okinawa Summit not only elevated African issues to global limelight but also demonstrated a significant transformation in Japan's approach to African diplomacy. Above all, the landmark visit by an incumbent Japanese Prime Minister to three African countries (South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya) in 2001 further demonstrates the re-invigoration of Japan's African diplomacy in the post cold war era.

³⁵ Masako Osada, *Sanctions and Honorary Whites ... op.cit.*

³⁶ Morikawa Jun, *Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy ... op.cit.*

The unprecedented developments in the third phase notwithstanding, there have been little significant change in the low level of economic relations (with respect to trade and investment in particular) and, by extension, in the substance of the overall Japan-African relations. Hence, the generally low degree of concentration of African countries in relation to Japan as will be revealed in subsequent section. Some of the factors that account for the tardiness in the development of robust economic relations include: low population density and low per capita incomes of many African countries which result in small markets; geographical as well as cultural distance from Japan; availability of quality factors like natural resources as well as cheap and skilled labor in East Asia; poor infrastructure in most African countries; lack of suitable potential partners; political instability and a history of antithetical policies towards transnational corporations and foreign investment in some African countries.³⁷ A combination of these and other factors have served as disincentives to foreign direct investment and robust trade relations with Japan and other countries. In any case, it may be of interest to explore, within the context of the limited concentration of linkage, the foreign policy behaviour of African states towards Japan. Of particular interest is to examine the extent to which the asymmetrical dyads theory offer some useful insights to the behaviour of African states towards Japan with regards to either the reinforcement, regulation or maintenance objectives. Put differently, is the foreign policy behaviour of African states expansive or restrictive towards Japan given the low degree of linkage concentration?

Asymmetric Dynamics in Japan-African Relations: Analysis of Selected Cases Selection of Samples:

In this study, Japan is the superordinate country while the subordinate countries are selected from across Africa sub-regions. At first glance, Japan might seem an unlikely (if not inappropriate) superordinate sample given its geographical and cultural distance from Africa which has (together with other factors) constrained the development of robust trade and other economic relations. However, Japan's rising global reach and commitments makes it an actor of consequence.³⁸ Indeed, Japan has been the top donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to several African countries in addition to being the largest non-regional investor in the African Development Bank

³⁷ *Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa*, United Nations Joint ECA/UNCTAD Unit, Geneva, United Nations, 1997.

³⁸ Miyashita Akitoshi's *Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy*; New York, Lexington Books, 2003.

(AfDB). Besides, Japan's contribution to international organizations, peace-keeping and peace-building initiatives as well as other multilateral diplomacy such as the TICAD lend further credence to its selection as the superordinate sample for analysis. Above all, the choice of Japan as the superordinate sample would offer an opportunity to test the applicability of the theory within the framework of non-coercive "soft power" diplomatic approach with which Japan has been noted for years.

On the other hand, in the selection of the subordinate samples, attention was paid to the geographical diversity (as opposed to the uniformity that Dolan, *et al* had suggested) of the region. Therefore, three countries each are selected East, West and Southern African sub-regions making a total of nine subordinate samples.³⁹ Attention was to the three countries visited by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in 2001 which spread across East, West and Southern Africa. Indeed, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa respectively have been described as the launch-pads or "gateways" for overall Japan's African policy⁴⁰. The time frame covered by the study is 1998-2004 (7 dyad years). This is partly because since TICAD was inaugurated in 1993, it was thought to be more appropriate to begin the analysis in 1998 (TICAD II) to allow some time lag for the initiative to have taken root.

Operationalization of Concepts and Variables

The dependent variable is Foreign Policy Behavior (FPB) while the independent variables are economic strength (E) and linkage concentration (C). The indicators for FPB include the frequency of top level official visits which could be take as a sign of (or desire to) increasing relation and policy coordination at the top level. Other FPB indicators include the total number of exchange of notes within the dyad years, agreements and other foreign policy activities available on MOFA websites, Diplomatic Bluebook and other sampled country websites. Economic strength indicators are the GDP and energy consumption of the subordinate sample in absolute and change terms. Linkage concentration are measured by subordinate sample's imports from Japan as percentage of total imports, exports to Japan as a percentage of total export and ODA from Japan as a percentage of total.

³⁹ The countries are Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania (East Africa); Nigeria, Ghana Cameroon (West Africa); South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Southern Africa).

⁴⁰ Morikawa Jun "Japan and Africa after Cold War" Adem Seifudein (ed.) *Japan, a Model and a Partner: Views and Issues in African Development*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2006.

Equation	a	E*C	ÄE*C	E*ÄC	ÄE*ÄC
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R-squared

{2}	1.468065	.0001149*			
	0.4442				

		(.0000186)			
{3}	1.47192		7.91e+07		
	0.4272				

			(1.04e+07)		
{4}	1.497556			1.61e-13	
	0.3392				

			(3.51e-14)		
{5}	1.564747				-1168187
	0.0794				
					(.1255083)

Notes: E is economic strength, C is linkage concentration, and Ä indicates the change value (the variables are explained in the text); the standard error are in parentheses; the sample size is 63. * Statistically significant.

The results show that contrary to the prediction of the theory, there is *positive* correlation between foreign policy behaviour (FPB) and the interaction of the economic strength and linkage concentration (E*C) which is statistically significant at 6.177. In other words, foreign policy of sampled African states tends to be more expansive under conditions of relatively higher economic well-being and concentration of linkage. However, only the interaction of the change in economic strength and linkage concentration (ÄE*ÄC) point in the direction predicted by the theory. The negative coefficient supports the assumption of the theory of inverse relationship where foreign policy behaviour contracts with increasing economic strength and linkage concentration. However, it is not statistically significant.

Regression Outcomes of the Separate Effects of Economic Strength and Linkage Concentration on the Foreign Policy Behaviour of Sampled African States towards Japan, 1998-2004.

Equation	a	E	C	ÄE	ÄC
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{6}	1.454207	6.18e-12 *			
	0.4534				

		(1.13e-12)			
{7}	1.430922		2507858		
	0.0797				

			(3696189)		
{8}	1.43857			3.982876 *	
	0.1955				

				(1.779105)	
{9}	1.526773				.0020392
	0.0484				
					(.0041831)

Notes: E is economic strength, C is linkage concentration, and Ä indicates the change value (the variables are explained in the text); the standard error are in parentheses; the sample size is 63. * Statistically significant.

The results of the tests of the separate effects of the exogenous variables (E and C) on foreign policy did not support the central assumption of the asymmetrical dyad theory. Both economic strength (E) and linkage concentration (C) are positively correlated to foreign policy behaviour contrary to the prediction of the theory. Meanwhile, the results of the tests indicate that only E and ÄE is statistically significant. The interpretation is not far-fetched. In the first instance, most African countries are on relatively weak economic condition. Therefore, the question for economic well-being should be important to decision makers and policy establishments which could have influenced the expansionary foreign policy behaviour. Second, since there is low existing concentration of linkage with Japan, there is less concern over the question of political autonomy hence a movement towards expansive foreign policy behaviour. In a sense, this would correspond to the *reinforcement* objective described in fig.1 where a combination of relatively weak economy and low linkage concentration on the superordinate partner produce a desire to intensify and expand foreign policy behaviour towards the superordinate country. This is probably because of the anticipation of potential gains (with respect to trade, ODA, FDI, etc) and its impact on the goal of economic well-being.

Conclusion, Limitations and Further Research

It is possible to apply some theoretical insights to our understanding of Japan-African relations contrary to the excessive (if not monotonous) application of the descriptive approach. In order to avoid the "intellectual paralysis" that Rosenau warned against, this paper attempts a modest application of asymmetrical dyads theory to explain Japan-African relations by using pooled cross-sectional time series data. It found that contrary to the prediction of the theory, foreign policy behaviour of sampled African states towards Japan was positively correlated to the relative economic strength and concentration of linkages. The foreign policy behaviour was generally expansive which corresponds with the *reinforcement* objective. It exemplifies a situation in which low level of linkage concentration combine with weak economic condition to produce a desire for expansion in foreign policy behaviour in line with prediction of the theory.

Meanwhile, there are some limitations to the application of the asymmetrical dyads model to Japan-African relations. In the first place, the low economic contact produces limited foreign policy events in a cyclical pattern. As a result, the data on FPB did not yield ample yearly variation for each sampled African country which would have enable us to apply fixed effect models to explore the changes in behaviour over time for each country. Second, systemic factors (international milieu) that might produce a movement towards expansion or contraction of behaviour of subordinate states were not adequately captured.

Above all, that most of the sampled subordinate states operate at relatively equivalent economic wavelength did not help the robustness of the analysis and findings even though deliberate attempt was made to diversify the choice of subordinate samples across the sub-regions and different levels of economic prosperity, it happened that little diversity actually exist. Future research might need to expand the samples not only at the subordinate level but also at the superordinate level for more robustness and diversified analysis.

Russia and Chechnya: An Essay in Conflict and War

Charles Adenrele Alade*

Abstract

The article is a critical appraisal of the more than a decade-long (1994-2008), bloody conflict and protracted war between Russia and Chechnya. The research shows that conflict and war had been a distinguishing and constant element in interactions between both nationalities since they came into contact with each other. Relations between Russia and the Peoples of Chechnya were long and contentious dating to the period of Russia's expansion into the Caucasus in the 17th and 18th Centuries that was the era of the establishment and consolidation of the Russian Empire. The history of the Empire was that of conquest and ethnic division. The Caucasus mountaineers had no cultural affinity with the Russians. They were equally distant to them in terms of ethnicity and religion also just as most Europeans are from the people of the Middle East. Consequently, Russo-Chechnya relations was and is still characterised by conflict and war.

Introduction

September 1, 2008 marked the 4th anniversary when Chechen separatists seized a school in Southern Russia and held hostage more than 1,200 people including men, women and mostly school children. That hostage-taking incident, which left more than three hundred dead, added a new saga to the decade-old conflict between the Chechens, desperate to assert their independence from the Russians, and the latter, bent on preventing it. The aftermath of the conflict was the bitter and protracted Russo-Chechnya war that raged on between 1994 and 2004. The more than a decade war left in its trail sufferings, loss of innocent lives and the complete destruction of Grozny, the Chechnya capital.

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