MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE DYNAMICS OF WARFARE IN ILORIN, 1800-1920

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF ARTS, UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN, ILORIN, NIGERIA

MAY, 2018

DECLARATION

I, ALABI, Oladimeji Mohammed hereby declare that this thesis titled: Military Technology and the Dynamics of Warfare in Ilorin, 1800-1920, is a record of my research work. It has neither been presented nor accepted in any previous application for a higher degree. All sources of information have been specifically acknowledged. In addition, the research work has been ethically approved by the University Ethical Review Committee.

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Sign Date

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this doctoral research work was carried out by ALABI, Oladimeji Mohammed, (Matric No.03/68CQ001) Department of History and International Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.

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DEDICATION

To all lovers of quality education.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page		i
Declaration		ii
Certification		iii
Dedication		iv
Acknowledgement		v
Table of Contents		vi
List of Tables		x
List of Figures		xi
List of Maps		xii
Maps		xiii
Glossary		xvi
Abstract		xix

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1	Background to the Study	1
1.2	Geographical and Historical Descriptions	3
1.3	Statement of the Problem	5
1.4	Objectives of the Study	7
1.5	Justification for the Study	8
1.6	Scope of the Study	10
1.7	Methodology and Problems	11
1.8	Theoretical Framework	15
1.9	Conceptual Clarifications	17
1.10	Literature Review	28
	Notes and References	44

Chapter Two: The Military and Ilorin Emergence as a Polity up to 1823

2.1	Ilorin before Ààre Afonja	51
2.2	Oyo Influence on the Evolution of Ilorin Army	53
2.3	Al Salih's Invitation and Influence on the Emerging Army	56
2.4	Demise of Ààre Afonja	59
2.5	Emergence of the Emirate System in Ilorin	62
2.6	Validating the Emirate in Ilorin	64
2.7	Abdulsalam's Effort to Sustain Ilorin as an Emirate	66
	Notes and References	68

Chapter Three: Military Technology: Ilorin Weaponry and Cavalry System from 1800

3.1	Sources of Weapons in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century	71
3.2	The Blacksmith Industry and the Ilorin Military in the Nineteenth Century.	74
3.3	Physical Weapons	79
3.4	Armoury	90
3.5	Spiritual Elements in Ilorin Military	91
3.6	Influence of Islam on Ilorin War Efforts	102
3.7	Significance of the Cavalry Force in Ilorin Military Expeditions	110
3.8	Sources of Horses for Ilorin Cavalry in the Nineteenth Century	115
3.9	Cavalry Accoutrement and Horse-keeping Technology in Ilorin	118
	Notes and References	128

Chapter Four: War Strategies and Field Operations of the Ilorin Army up to the 1890s

4.1	Military Strategies and Tactics in Ilorin	136
4.2	Internal Diplomacy and Cohesion in Ilorin	138
4.3	External Diplomacy and Alliances in Ilorin War Efforts	140
4.4	Reconnaissance and Knowledge of the Opponent	145
4.5	Fortification and City Walls	147
4.6	Force Structure and Deployment of Troops	150
4.7	Command and Coordination of Troops	154
4.8	Ilorin Wars of Survival, 1800-1840	157
4.9	Wars of Expansion and Consolidation from 1840	170

4.10 Efforts to End the Offa Campaign 177
4.11 Ilorin-Ibadan Rivalry over Ekiti Areas in the Nineteenth Century 179
4.12 British Intervention in the Ilorin-Ibadan Crisis from 1890s 183
4. 13 British Conquest of 1897 and its Implication for Ilorin 185
Notes and References 187

Chapter Five: Imposition of Colonial Rule and Ilorin's Reaction, 1897-1920

5.1 Administration of Fiefs in Ilorin before Colonial Conquest 195
5.2 The Balógun and Ilorin Political Economy 198
5.3 Resistance to British Rule Led by Balógun Ali Inakoju Alánàmú in Ilorin 202
5.4 Emir Suleiman's Collaborative Approach to the British 204
5.5 British Divide and Rule Tactics and Imposition of Colonial Rule on Ilorin 209
5.6 Deposition of Balógun Ali Inakoju Alánàmú in 1902 and its Impact 211
5.7 Reforms and District Administration from 1908 213
5.8 Colonial Taxation and Reaction of Ilorin People 217
5.9 British Reaction to Grievances over Taxation and Expenditure 220
5.10 British Involvement in the Struggle for Succession in Ilorin Emirate 222
Notes and References 225

Chapter Six: Impact of the Nineteenth Century Military and Warfare on Ilorin

6.1 Impact of Migration and Ethnic Plurality on Ilorin 230
6.2 Migration and Military Leadership 234
6.3 Economic Impact of the Military on Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century 236
6.4 Social Impact of the Military on Ilorin 239
6.5 Impact of Ilorin Military on the Non-metropolitan Areas 247
6.6 Fief-Holding under the British and its Economic Implication 254
Conclusions 258

Notes and References 263
Bibliography 268
Appendix 280

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Land allocation in Ilorin Metropolitan Districts in the 19th Century 196

Table 2: Land Allocation: Incorporated Settlements of Ilorin Emirate in the 19th Century 197

Table 3: Reorganisation of Districts and Villages in Ilorin Emirate under Colonial Rule in 1910 216

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1: *Kumo*- club 82

Fig. 2: *Palaka*- catapult 83

Fig. 3: Prototype of Nineteenth Century swords in their sheath 84

Fig. 4: Assorted swords commonly used in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century 85

Fig. 5: *Doje* a short-handled fighting weapon with a barbed iron blade 86

Fig. 6: Arrow-heads with different blades 87

Fig. 7: An assortment of spears fixed on a shield made of elephant hide 88

Fig. 8: Yoruba Accoutrement and weaponry 89

Fig. 9: Samples of amulets and bindings used in warfare 101

Figs. 10 : A- Holy Quran, B- wooden and metal slate, C- Local Ink (*Tadawa*) 108

Fig. 11: A cavalryman wearing a coat of chain mail with his spear in the right hand 114

Fig. 12: Prototype of Nineteenth Century shield, lances and body armour 121

Fig. 13: Body Armour made from strong threads and worn the warrior's chest 122

Fig. 14: Different weapons and cavalry accessories preserved in the Armoury 123

Fig. 15: Prototype of Nineteenth Century Saddle with bow and Arrows 124

Figs. 16: A- Iron Stirrup, B- Iron Bits 125

Fig. 17: Locally made saddle (*Gaari)* by Nupe people in Ilorin 126

Fig. 18: Central Sudan type of Saddle 127

Fig. 19: Durbar procession in Ilorin 244

Fig. 20: A cavalry officer in ceremonial outfit ready for Durbar outing 245


LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: Territorial Limits of Ilorin Emirate as at 1920 xii


Map 2: Territorial Limits of the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th Century xiii

Map 3: Hot Spots in the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th Century xiv


MAPS



Map 1: Territorial Limits of Ilorin Emirate as at 1920, Source: Danmole, H. O. "The Frontier Emirate: a History of Islam in Ilorin" Ph.D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1980.



Map 2: Hot Spots in the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century, Source*:* Muri, A. M. "The Defence Policy of the Sokoto Caliphate 1804-1903". Ph.D. Thesis, Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto, 2003, p. 300



Map 3: Territorial Limit of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century. Source: Johnson, M. A. S., *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 97.

GLOSSARY

Àdá (Y) = cutlass

Agédéngbé (Y) = a kind of sword in Yorubaland

Ajélè (Y) = messenger or representative of the Emir or King

Àjesára (Y) = herbal fortification

Ajọ (Y) = cotton wool for lighting lamp used by warriors

Akata (N) = Nupe term for a compound

Akesinrin = one who trains or grooms the horses

Alágbẹdẹ (Y) = blacksmith

Alápini (Y) = head of *egúngún* masqueraders

Alángúá (Y&H) = ward leader

Alkali (H) = jugde

Allahu Akbar (A) = God is Great!

Amir (A) = Emir

Anjemin (A) = Yoruba information written in Arabic texts

Apo (Y) = casing for arrow and swords

Ásúde (Y) = fabricator of bronze, copper and zinc into various implement

Ààayá (Y) = munition

Baálẹ (Y) = a provincial chief

Baba-kékerè (Y) = intermediary between the people and the Ilorin leadership

Babaláwo (Y) = diviner

Balógun (Y) = military commander

Bàntẹ Ogun (Y) = warrior's spiritual loin cloth

Caliph (A) = head of a Islamic state

Ciroma (H) = official title usually given to a senior prince

Egúngún (Y) = masquerade

Erú (Y) = slave

Esin (Y) = horse

Èsọ (Y) = royal guard

Èwù Ogun (Y) = war garment

Hantu (Y&H) = liquid spiritual substance made from text from the Quran

Ìbon (Y) = gun

Idà (Y) = sword

Idà olójú méjì (Y) = double edged sword

Ifá (Y) = oracle

Ìkokò (Y) = hyena: the name given to the Bariba Warrior-King in Ilorin

Ìlàri (Y) = a royal messenger of the *Aláàfin*

Ìpàǹpá (Y) = mercenary: a person hired for ahoc military service

Itakudimo (Y) = "the arena of death" the spot where *Eleduwe* the Bariba king was killed in Ilorin

Iwose (Y) = Muslim fortune telling

Jama'a (A&H) = congregation

Kakaki (H) = trumpet

Lallafa (H) = nose-band for horse

Liffida (H) = quilted armour

Likkafa (H) = stirrups

Linzami (H) = bits

Madaki/Madawaki (H) = cavalry commander

Magaji (H) = heir, in Ilorin it refers to leader of a compound or quarter

Mai yaki (H) = warrior

Mashi (H) / *Oko* (Y) = spear

Mujahid (A) (pl. *mujahidun*) = Muslim fighter or Jihadist

Muhrib (A) (pl. *muribatun*) = bandit

Oba (Y) = king

Odù-ifá (Y) = oracle panegeric

Ọfà (Y) = arrow

Ogun (Y) = war

Ojà (Y) = market

Ológun (Y) = warrior

Òpá-Ogun (Y) = war staff

Òpẹlẹ (Y) = the string holding the sixteen main verses of the oracle

Opón Ifá (Y) = platform on which oracle is consulted

Orisaala (Y) = a traditional worship in Yorubaland; also kown as *Obatala*

Orò (Y) = a traditional cult in Yorubaland

Ọsẹ (Y) = oracle verse which represents victory or success

Òyẹkú (Y) = oracular verse which represents longevity

Ribat (A) = garrison or frontier stronghold

Salat Istiqah (A) = prayer offered by Muslims to seek God's favour for rain

Sango (Y) = a powerful Oyo King turned god and worshiped in Yorubaland

Sarkin (H) = leader

Tadawa (H) = local ink for writng

Tambari (H) = a big ceremonial drum

Tira (Y) = Yoruba term for Arabic writings and Islamic books

Ummah (A) = congregation

Wala (H) = Wooden slate used for writing portions of the Quran for recitation

Wathiqat (A) = message or letter

Yàrá Agbára (Y) = charms room

Yàrá Erù-Ogun (Y) = weapons room

Yemoja (Y) = a traditional worship of river goddess

Key (A) – Arabic
(H) – Hausa
(Y) – Yoruba
(N) – Nupe

ABSTRACT

Several scholarly works have been undertaken on warfare in Yorubaland and the Sokoto Caliphate. Both were events of the Nineteenth Century in which Ilorin was involved. Aspects of military technology, strategies, tactics and the structure of the Ilorin army in this period have been quite inadequate in the literature. More information is required on the role of groups like Fulani, Hausa, Nupe, Bariba and Kanuri in weapons production and field operation during Ilorin wars in the Nineteenth Century. The work, thus, explores the link between technology and warfare in the Ilorin wars of survival, expansion and consolidation from 1800 to 1920. The objectives of the study were to: (i) investigate the sources and types of weapons (physical and spiritual); (ii) examine inter-group relations and local technology in Ilorin military system; (iii) interrogate the force structure of the Ilorin army; (iv) assess military strategies, tactics and defence mechanisms; and v) analyse the impact of the military and warfare on inter-group relations and cultural integration among Ilorin people.

A historical and multi-disciplinary approach was adopted for this study. This encompassed a careful and orderly collection, collation and evaluation of primary data comprising oral interviews and archival sources. This was complemented with a systematic and critical analysis of secondary data from published books, gazettes, journal articles, unpublished dissertations and studies obtained from libraries, Documentation Centres and Research Institutes.

The findings of the study were that:

i. weapons and horses were sourced through trade, limited local breeding, and importation from Sokoto, Borno and Nupeland. Physical weapons included clubs, swords, lances, bow and arrows while *okigbe, asaki, egbe, ayeta, afeeri, arina, ilerukanmi*, various kinds of bindings and amulets and some verses from the Quran were employed as spiritual elements in Ilorin warfare;
ii. groups such as Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Kanuri and Bariba contributed men, materials, intelligence, and physical and spiritual weapons through blacksmith, Muslim scholars and traditional healers to support the Ilorin army in its encounters;
iii. the force structure comprised infantry and cavalry while the fighting troops were made up of professional soldiers, elites, free-born volunteers and slaves all drawn from the metropolis and the outlying territories of the emirate;
iv. Ilorin war strategies included diplomatic alliances, espionage, divide and rule, while tactics used were cavalry, attack and retreat, siege warfare, guerrilla war, mob attack, and aerial incendiary as considered appropriate for any particular battle and;
v. reminiscence of Ilorin military technology and warfare was indicated in the naming of compounds, emergence of several warrior-personalities, and the yearly durbar of horses known in Ilorin as *Berende*.

The study concluded that diversity was a strength in Ilorin military technology as various groups supplied both physical and spiritual weapons, strategies, tactics and intelligence in the course of her wars. By the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, Ilorin military strategies succumbed to pressure from the British leading to the imposition of colonial rule. The study recommended the preservation of the relics of the Nineteenth Century Ilorin wars for further historical reconstruction.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Military technology and warfare have witnessed steady transformation over the years because of man's continuous quest to conquer his environment. As the tools of conquest became more sophisticated and varied, the frequency of warfare also increased in response to man's economic, social and political pursuits. Thus, from the use of simple weapons like stones, bones of animals, clubs, slings, machete, lances, lancets, bow and arrows, military technology advanced to the use of guns; the musket, single fire rifles, revolver, cartridge guns, to machine guns, and then to the use of scud and ballistic missiles. With time, warfare graduated from the use of conventional weapons and took a more destructive dimension with the emergence of the *almighty* nuclear weapons. The United States' use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagazaki in 1945, during the Second World War, signified the fundamental role of military technology in the balance of power in the international system.

From thence, nations have continued to strive to perfect their offensive and defensive capabilities, to the extent that at a point in the military competition, weapon technology reached the level of *Mutually Assured Destruction* (M.A.D.),[1] particularly among the contending blocs of Western and Eastern ideologically inclined nations under the leaderships of the United States and Russia respectively. This indicates a strong connection between warfare and technology. Even in the pre-modern world, technology played no less important roles in military activities as indicated in the histories of the Ancient societies in Europe, Asia, the Arabia and Africa. It is on the premise of this reflection that this study explores the inevitable link between technology, strategies, tactics, inter-group relations and the military; and how these elements shaped the trends of Ilorin warfare in the Nineteenth Century.

The Nineteenth Century remains a remarkable epoch in the history of Yorubaland due to the protracted nature of the wars, which engulfed the region at the period. These wars were precipitated by the collapse of the Old Oyo Empire and the struggle by the various Yoruba states for the control of the area; that is, finding a successor to Oyo's authority. The arrangement in which Oyo dominated Yorubaland was undermined by the loss of authority, and various states, hitherto under the empire's grip, rivaled in a long standing warfare, which is popularly described as the Yoruba Civil Wars of the Nineteenth Century.

Scholars like Akinjogbin and Ayandele are quite emphatic in their argument that the collapse of Old Oyo Empire was not caused by the invasion of the Fulani.[2] According to the authors, the Old Oyo Empire collapsed eight years before the first Fulani attack on Gobir, which was the first Hausa kingdom won by the *Jihad* of Usman dan Fodio. In this regard, greater credence were given to internal factors like the over-bloated size of the empire and internal political crises resulting from rivalry among Oyo's ruling class, particularly the overbearing powers of the Basorun Gaa as the fundamental causes of the empire's collapse. However, it could be argued that activities of the Fulani group in Ilorin in the early Nineteenth Century, aggravated the empire's problem and to some extent, contributed to the dispersal of its inhabitants in different directions.

Meanwhile, African history is replete with accounts of states, which owed their survival to military prowess in the pre-colonial period. For instance, the exploits of the armies of the ancient empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai in the Western Sudan cannot be disregarded in history. Also, the Zulu kingdom in Southern Africa, the Ashante Kingdom, Benin Kingdom and Old Oyo Empire all present records of military exploits too magnificent to be ignored in any discourse of state formation and sustenance in pre-colonial Africa. However, these states were aided by military technologies, strategies and tactics in the course of their campaigns and achievements.

In the same vein, Ilorin's history in the Nineteenth Century largely revolved around its military as scholars[3] have described the town as a 'city of warriors' during the period. Ilorin's case was a model of the role of the military in state formation and survival in Pre-colonial Nigeria. Indeed, the army was strongly tied to the political structure because it performed both offensive and defensive functions in her society. The town was an Old Oyo military outpost, located in the extreme north of Yorubaland under Àáre Afonja, commander of the Oyo imperial army. This was based on the empire's political arrangement that the *Kákánfò* be stationed in the most troubled spot in the territory, or better still, area considered potentially menaced and susceptible to external invasion.[4]

The Nineteenth Century could safely be described as a revolutionary period in Ilorin's history, not only because of its role in the collapse of the Old Oyo empire, but more fundamentally, due to its subsequent rise to prominence and participation in the Yoruba warfare of the period. Three inter-related themes, which affected Ilorin during this period, can be identified. These

are: *Àáre* Afonja's efforts to make Ilorin independent of Old Oyo; Fulani ascendancy in the area, which ultimately culminated in a new political order - the Emirate; and the nurturing of the young Emirate, which led to several battles of survival, expansion and consolidation. All these cannot, however, be fully achieved without the military, which this study focuses on.
During the first half of the Nineteenth Century, Ilorin was primarily a city of soldiers, in which individual and corporate fortunes turned upon success in war. This also ensured the flow of captives that could raise individuals in the title-holding order and opened up new farm land for city houses and provided apprentices for craftsmen.[5]

Based on the above background, this study explores the trends in Ilorin military with reference to aspects of military technology such as weaponry, fortification, strategies and tactics, diplomacy, alliances, heterogeneity and the trends in her warfare from 1800 to 1920.

1.2 Geographical and Historical Descriptions

Ilorin, the capital of Kwara State, is situated in the transitional zone between the forest of the South and the savannah to the North of Nigeria. Thus, the town is fondly referred to as the gate-way between Northern and Southern Nigeria. The town lies on latitude 8.30^0 North and Longitude 40^0 38 East.[6] Its middle belt position and relative ease of access are its definite assets. It is about 300 km from Lagos, Nigeria and the coastline, and only about 160km from Ibadan, Africa's largest city.[7] The Ilorin Emirate consists of a strip of territory situated on the right bank of River Niger from Jebba to a point opposite Idah comprising about 24,000 kilometres. The highest hill in the town is Sobi hill, with a height of about 1,200 ft.[8] The hill is a granite inselberg domical in shape. The town experiences three marked seasons; the hot dry season, the wet season and cool dry season. A number of rivers and streams run through the town such as Abata, Asa, Aluko and Amule. The largest river in the town is Asa, on which the Asa Dam is built.[9]

Geologically, Ilorin city is underlain by Precambrian Basement Complex rocks. This type has undergone many processes of metamorphosis and magmatic intrusion. Generally, the geology of the town is dominated by sedimentary rocks, primary and secondary laterites and alluvial deposits. These types of deposits are weak and therefore, readily yield to agents of erosion.[10]
On the soil surface, the town is largely covered by ferruginous typical soil from crystalline acid rocks. This type of soil has a sandy surface above the clay deposits. It is characterised by low water holding capacity and light texture on the surface. This, therefore, predisposes the

soil to both drought and erosion. On the other hand, the clay deposits beneath the surface soil result in soil water logging during the rainy season, thereby reducing the depth of the soil. Indeed, the presence of the clay soil in Ilorin helps the blacksmiths in the construction of their workshop while supplying the raw-materials to potters found in few locations in the town.[11]

Ilorin town is divided into four large quarters: the Emir's quarters, comprising the household of the Fulani royal families and their subordinates; the Fulani quarters, under Balógun Fulani containing many Fulani households' the Gambari quarters under Balógun Gambari with a mixed population of Hausa, Nupe, Beriberi (Kanuri of Borno), Bariba or Batonu (popularly known in Ilorin as Bruba), and Gobirawa and the *Oke-Imole* quarters under Balógun Alánàmú and Balógun Ajikobi and other Yoruba chiefs including the descendants of Afonja.[12]

Historically, Ilorin is a Yoruba settlement. Its people claimed descent from Oduduwa. The earliest settlers of Ilorin were Yoruba from Old Oyo Kingdom. Subsequently, Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Kanuri, Bariba or Batonu (known as Baruba in Ilorin) and other Yoruba migrants were attracted to the area from around the Eighteenth Century.[13] *Ojo Isekuse*, an itinerant hunter from *Gambe* near Oyo-Ile, was said to be the first Yoruba man to settle in Ilorin.[14] At the time of Ojo's arrival, the place now known as Ilorin was mostly virgin land inhabited only by a hermit *Bariba* family at a place which is still called *Baruba* near Idi-Ape in Ilorin. At this time, Ilorin was characterised by stones which were used by Ojo in sharpening his hunting instrument, (somewhere at the heart of the town) located at *Bamidele* compound near Idi-Ape. The act of sharpening iron (*Ilo irin, in Yoruba),* later became the name of Ojo's town.[15] Ojo was later joined by another hunter, Emila, who hailed from Ela, in Oyo. It is said that Ojo had no child and Emila's son was always disrespectful to him. As a result of this act of disobedience, Ojo grew annoyed and fled to Shao, where he died.[16]

Another mythological explanation suggests that Ilorin is a derivation from *Ilu-Erin* which literally translates as "the town of elephants".[17] This particular mythological postulation was given some credence by the reported killing, in 1824, of an elephant in the outskirts of the town, at a place henceforth called Oko-Erin, which, at present, is the location of Kwara State Stadium Complex. However, the killing of a single elephant could not have provided enough grounds to have named the Ilorin the town of elephants.

In the early eighteenth century, Laderin arrived to settle in Ilorin from Old Oyo, as a result of the power intoxication and totalitarian authority of Basorun Gaa, and pushed the settlement into greater light. He had come to the town with his large retinue of followers. In the long-run, Laderin died and was succeeded by Pasin who, while in Ilorin, challenged the authority of Basorun Gaa in Oyo-Ile.[18] Gaa, encouraged by his ambition to strengthen his influence in Ilorin, ordered his soldiers to pursue Pasin, who was eventually caught at Ola. Alugbin succeeded Pasin, who was later succeeded by Afonja, the *Ààre OnaKákánfò* of Oyo. Other settlers in Ilorin at this early period included *Mallam* Solagberu, a great Islamic cleric who settled at Oke-Suna; Olufadi, a Fulani leader and cattle herdsman, who erected his tent at a place where a mosque was later sited in front of the Emir's palace.

Afonja had, thus, inherited the land of Ilorin from his late forefather, Laderin. He met some Muslims at Oke-Suna quarters under Solagberu. He invited *Al-Salih* (*Sheik* Alimi), a Fulani Islamic cleric, from Kuwo to Ilorin. Afonja had counted on the efficacy of the spiritual support of the *Sheik* as an Islamic priest, who normally prayed for him anytime he was going to war. The fame and influence of *Sheik* Alimi rapidly increased due to his Islamic activities. He soon gained the support of some Muslims at Oke-Suna, Olufadi and Gambari. They all affirmed him and accepted his authority as their Muslim leader.

Meanwhile, the mutual relation between Afonja and Oyo nobility had turned sour, leading to their conspiracy against the *Ààre*. This made the relation between Afonja and the Fulani to become stronger. The *Jamaa* (disciples) of Alimi supported Afonja in waging war against, and defeating Oyo, in particular, and gaining some Yoruba areas from the Empire. It was not very long, however, after the death of *Aláàfin* Aole that the misfortune of Afonja began in Ilorin. He gained some eminence initially after breaking away from Old Oyo, acquiring additional territories but eventually lost the friendship of the *Jamaa* (Muslims) in Ilorin, who formed the strength of his military. The accord between the *Kákánfò* and the *Jamaa* eventually, turned into animosity and ended in a civil strife, in which Afonja was killed and a Fulani dynasty emerged in Ilorin.[19] History reveals that *Sheik* Alimi concentrated on Islamic activities with his disciples in the mosque to discuss issues of religion and other related matters after the death of Afonja. Alimi too died and Abdulsalami, his first son became the first *Emir* of Ilorin.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Several scholarly works have been undertaken on warfare in Yorubaland and the Sokoto Caliphate, which were events of the Nineteenth Century that involved Ilorin. Yet, there has

been continued interest on the subjects because accounts of the events suggest that more investigation is required in some aspects of the military and warfare. Indeed, authors have called for further research on the *Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century*, specifically suggesting more research into the traditions of the various group that participated in the war other than the Yoruba.[20] Besides, there is need for further studies on aspects of tactics and training of soldiers, sources and types of weapons, fortification and defences, role of local industries in military and warfare, spiritual weapons, military diplomacy, inter war relations and other aspects of Ilorin wars in the Nineteenth Century.

In the same vein, quite a lot of studies have been conducted on different themes on Ilorin in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[21] Even though these works traversed various aspects of Ilorin's history in the two centuries, military technology, strategies and tactics have enjoyed narrow coverage in them. For instance, Indigenous Textile in Ilorin is the focus of R. A. Olaoye's work; H. O. Danmole explores the History of Islam in Ilorin, A. O. Banwo's study examines the impact of British Colonial Rule on the Ilorin Emirate's economy from 1900-1960 while Intergroup Relations was the theme of S. Y. Omaiya and A. L. Olumoh's works, just to mention a few. Even though, the authors recognised the pivot role of the military in Ilorin society of the periods they explored, aspects of military technology, strategies and tactics, and the impact of multiplicity of groups on Ilorin military were mentioned in passing, understandably because this was not the focus of their studies. Thus, these themes constitute part of the research problems or gap in knowledge, which this study investigates.

Furthermore, there is the need to examine the changing phases of Ilorin warfare in response to historical trends in the Nineteenth Century. This becomes imperative against the backdrop of the town's involvement in wars of survival, expansion, consolidation and defence, at different periods in the century. An understanding of the nature, motives and strategies of the wars is therefore crucial to determine the actual period when Ilorin's war of expansion changed to defence. R. J. Gavin, in a study titled: "The Impact of Colonial Rule on the Ilorin Economy, 1897-1930", noted that by 1850, Ilorin had practically ceased to be an expanding military power.[22] However it is possible that Ilorin military remained active till the end of the Nineteenth Century. This is because the military careers of some notable warlords in the Emirate like Karara, the Balógun Gambari and Ali Inakoju, the Balógun Alánàmú, fell within the latter part of the Nineteenth Century.[23]

Ilorin Emirate's emergence in the transitional zone between two geographically and culturally divergent environments also put the state in the midst of both internal and external challenges, being an Emirate located in Yorubaland, with a heterogeneous composition of groups like Yoruba, Hausa (Gambari), Fulani (Felata), Nupe (Tapa), Kannike (Borno) and Bariba.[24] This study, thus, investigates the role of the military in bringing these diverse groups together during this early period and how this comradeship enhanced inter-group relations and the survival of the Emirate.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This work explores military technology and the dynamics of warfare in Ilorin from 1800 to 1920. Its general objective therefore, is to examine the place of technology, strategies, tactics, diplomacy, spiritual and other elements on the changing nature of Ilorin wars in the Nineteenth Century and the trends of her battles from the struggle for survival to campaigns for expansion and consolidation to the imposition of British rule.

Specifically however, the work:

Investigates aspects of military technology such as sources and types of weapons used by the Ilorin army. This includes the extent of local contribution to the supply of weapons and external involvement. Thus, notable localities where blacksmithing was practiced in Ilorin were visited for firsthand information through interviews on the types of weapons used for prosecuting the wars in the Nineteenth Century.

It assesses the role of spiritual, mystic and metaphysical weapons in Ilorin wars in the Nineteenth Century in relation to their sources, types and the people associated with them in the course of Ilorin wars.

Evaluates the place of cavalry in Ilorin war efforts with specific focus on the involvement of the local people in managing the cavalry force, particularly in aspects of horse-keeping and production of the technology required by the cavalry like saddle, foot gears and other paraphernalia of horse soldiery.

Examines the impact of ethnic plurality on the strength of her military, given the cosmopolitan nature of the town. This is aimed at determining the effect of inter-group relations on Ilorin

military in the course of the wars and how the ethnic balance eventually produced a unique identity for the community in spite of its diverse background, that is, *"Ilorin people and Ilorin culture".*[25]

It explores Ilorin war strategies, tactics, military maneuvers, movement and military organisation and how wars were fought using other means such as diplomacy, treachery, divide and conquer, alliances and cooperation in response to the changing nature and motive of campaigns.

Examines the role of religion (Islam) in Ilorin wars; particularly, the place of the Nineteenth Century Jihad in the southward expansion of her Emirate from 1823. This is aimed at assessing the impact of Islam on the war efforts, as both an evangelising and political tool for extending the town's authority over some southern Yoruba groups.

It also considers the social, economic, political and religious impact of the Nineteenth Century wars on Ilorin. The study, therefore attempts to advance human knowledge on military studies with particular reference to Ilorin society of the Nineteenth Century.

1.5 Justification for the Study

The role of Ilorin in the Yoruba warfare and the caliphate system, both in the Nineteenth Century, made the town a major character in the two events. The respective studies of both J. F. Ade Ajayi and R. S. Smith on the Nineteenth Century Yoruba warfare, in which Ilorin played a prominent part, suggest that more information could still be revealed on the activities of the town in the various wars. In fact, J. F. Ade Ajayi writes:

> This account of the warfare of the Yoruba in the Nineteenth Century is preliminary and tentative. Much remains to be done in compiling and comparing the records and traditions of the individual kingdom, and there may well be much to learn about these wars from Fulani and Dahomey sources.[26]

Ajayi's recommendation for further investigation of the Yoruba warfare is thus a strong basis which justifies this new study, particularly in the aspect of sustenance of Ilorin military in the course of its campaigns in the Nineteenth Century. This becomes more expedient because of the compelling need to explore Africa's pre-colonial history. Indeed, the challenge with African history is not the lack of evidence of its past, but largely, the inadequacy of

documentation and publicity of the relics of its people and their activities, especially in the pre-colonial period.

European writers had earlier argued that Africa had no history, claiming that history only began in Africa with their visit. In this regard, the postulation of E. H. Carr, "that the social milieu in which a historian has developed, has a significant influence on his historical outlook," is quite appropriate.[27] Little wonder therefore, that European scholars and writers, who have been trained in Europe, read books written by European scholars like W. F Hegel,[28] Hugh Trevor Roper and others, who made various misleading remarks about Africa's past, and observed the paucity of written sources in Africa, came the conclusion that Africans had no history. Perhaps, the following assertion by a Professor of modern history at Oxford University, sums up European derogatory remarks about Africa's past:

> Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history…But at present, there is none, there is only the history of Europeans in Africa…the rest is darkness, and darkness is not a subject of history.[29]

The declaration above is typical of European argument of lack of history in Africa prior to their arrival, and constitutes part of the challenges, which prompted this study. A renowned African historian, Ali Muzrui, in a book titled: *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, makes a case for the study of Africa's military history; that is, how traditional African states fought their wars, and the type of military organisation they employed. He believes that military history is still an underdeveloped field of study and calls for futher investigations into that aspect of African study. He submits that perhaps the warrior tradition can contribute immensely to the enormous evidence of Africa's past and further change European writers' opinion about the continent's past.[30]

It is on this premise that this study becomes further justified in investigating Ilorin military in the Nineteenth Century Yoruba warfare and the town's emergence as a frontier Emirate in the caliphate system. It is on record that the fall of the Old Oyo Empire was partly caused by the activities of the Ilorin group. By the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the Old Oyo Empire was one of the greatest states in West Africa. Its authority covered not only a substantial part of Yorubaland but even transcended the shores of Nigeria to Dahomey.[31] Regardless of the internal problems in the empire, the fact that Ilorin contributed to its collapse, and was a potent

force in the Yoruba wars that followed in the Nineteenth Century, makes this study justified in investigating the factors that enhanced the military success of the community.

This study is also justified in showing the connection between technology, inter-group relations, diplomacy, economy and military in the quest for state formation, nation-building and consolidation in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century. The actors in the events of the greater part of the period under consideration were Africans making their own history. Contrary to the racist *Hamitic* Hypothesis[32] which always reflects in European accounts on Africa, this study presents a historical account based on primary and secondary sources, to support the claim that military history is a strong evidence that Africa, and indeed, Nigeria, had a rich history prior to European arrival in the country, using Ilorin as a case.

The Justification of this study also rests on its periodisation, 1800 to 1920. The Nineteenth Century is crucial in Ilorin history. Its first half witnessed a number of significant themes which included the struggle by *Ààre Afonja* to assert Ilorin as an independent polity from Old Oyo, the arrival of *Al-Salih*, a Muslim Fulani scholar and his influence on the city, and several battles of expansion and consolidation. The last years of the century witnessed British conquest of the town in 1897 and its incorporation into the Northern Protectorate. The terminal date of the study (1920) is also significant because by that period, the British had succeeded in instituting colonialism in Ilorin after removing major oppositions.

Nevertheless, the military is *sine qua non* in all the events enumerated above, thus making this study justified. Lastly, the study is justified as a contribution to existing literature on the military history of pre-colonial Nigeria in general, Yoruba warfare of the Nineteenth Century in particular and also serving as a documentary on Ilorin military in the period.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study explores military technonolgy, strategies, tactics and the reaction of Ilorin to the dynamics of warfare from 1800 to 1920. 1800 is significant as the starting point because it recorded the evolution of the Ilorin army. More specifically, the influence of various immigrating groups on the development of weapons in Ilorin began to be visible in the period.

To this end, factors like weaponry, strategies, tactics, alliances and diplomacy, which sustained Ilorin military throughout its wars of survival, expansion and consolidation in the

Nineteenth Century, were evaluated. Ilorin Emirate, by the middle of the Nineteenth Century had extended to the border of *Borgu* to the northwest, Ogbomoso to the south and *Ekiti* to the east. Its sphere of control also extended beyond the Ibolo District of Offa and environs and parts of the *Igbomina* territories. The Emirate also shared common borders with Bida, Shonga and Lafiagi.[33]

Furthermore, the Nineteenth Century is the focus of the study because there was a gradual change in the approach to defend the town; that is, from confrontation to cooperation. 1920 was chosen as the terminal period of the study because by that date, major oppositions to the imposition of colonial rule had been suppressed and Ilorin Emirate had effective come under British rule. All these themes are the focus of the study.

1.7 Methodology and Problems

A method simply refers to the tool employed by the researcher in gathering information for his study. This is however determined by the specific area of research being undertaken. Since this study is a historical research, which relied heavily on primary sources, the qualitative method, involving oral interviews, was the most paramount tool adopted. Other elements of primary sources, particularly the archival materials, were used to ensure originality and contribution to knowledge. However, the methodology entailed the procedure for the research, how knowledge was gained about the research problems and how information was gathered to fill the identified gaps. For instance, oral interview was considered the most appropriate in this study because it afforded the researcher the opportunity to discover new facts about the research problems. It was also used to query existing findings with a view to either upholding or rejecting them. Through this procedure, the researcher was able to draw a distinction between his method (which is the tool of the research) and methodology (which is how the method was used to achieve the research objectives). Thus, methodology in this study comprised the method and how it was used to achieve the research objectives.

This began with visits to the library for literature appraisal and harvest of information on the subjects; that is, military technology and warfare generally, and specifically on the Nineteenth Century Ilorin history. At the library, the extent of research on these subjects was ascertained and the researcher was furnished with vital background information. Furthermore, the books consulted by various authors of the relevant previous works served as useful guide for the new study. Having discovered the extent of work on the subjects, and areas of gap in knowledge,

the researcher proceeded on a fact-finding mission to the National Archives in Kaduna and Ibadan. In the archives, Gazetteers, Letters, Correspondences, Provincial Records and Residents' reports, which are relevant to the research, were gathered to provide primary data for the study. Here, the check-list in the archives became a little easier to use, since the library had earlier been visited.

i. Archival Materials: The researcher visited the National Archives in Kaduna and Ibadan, as well as the Arewa Documentation Centre, Kaduna for relevant materials. Nevertheless, since the relevant materials were mostly compiled by Europeans, who also had their own bias regarding Africa's past, the documents were subjected to critical analysis. The archival materials however equipped the researcher with the first set of primary data that were further queried during oral interviews.

ii. Oral Sources: This involved interviews in Ilorin and some communities which fall under its authority in the Nineteenth Century. Different people were interviewed on the same subject at different locations for cross-examination of facts. The target respondents comprised of, but not limited to, families of people involved in the campaigns as warriors, smiths, Islamic clerics, traditional charms makers and other activities related to the military during the period under study. Some of the people interviewed are the *Ààre* family, *Balógun* Fulani, Alánàmú, Ajikobi and Gambari. Others are Maiyaki, Ologun Jimba, Kannike, Zarumi Ogbondoroko, Seni, and Oku Ajanaku, to mention a few. In addition, the researcher visited some areas in the Ekiti, Ibolo and Igbomina areas for oral interviews on their relation with Ilorin in the course of the Nineteenth Century warfare. Few of these are Aiyedun in Ekiti Kwara; Offa in the Ibolo area; Oro, Oro-Ago and Isin Land in the Igbomina axis. Interviews were also conducted with the blacksmiths in and around Ilorin to elicit information on their roles in Ilorin war efforts, especially in the area of weaponry, either in fabricating or repairing weapons during the period.

To forestall the shortcomings of oral tradition, which include distortion, conflicting reports, lack of precision in chronology/dating and sometimes, amnesia, documents from the researcher's earlier fact-finding missions to the national archives were used to cross-check responses. Documents, which directly or indirectly deal with military technology, local industries connected to military, battles, weapon procurement, training, tactics of war, war

finances and other relevant information on the Nineteenth Century wars, were used as checks on the information from the interviews.

iii. Secondary Sources: Written materials on different aspects of Nineteenth Century Ilorin history, the Yoruba Wars of the Nineteenth Century, Jihad and the Sokoto Caliphate, and other related themes of Nigerian history were examined and utilised in the course of the study. Others were books on military technology, war management, tactics, and inter-group relations considering the cosmopolitan nature of Ilorin during the period under consideration. Prior to the researcher's sojourn into the facts-finding tour (field-trip), the perusal of some relevant library articles, theses, Journal, conference and seminar papers as well as pamphlets assisted a great deal to generate (foundation) questions for the first round of oral data. The study also made use of some Arabic sources (published and unpublished), which were quite pervasive on the history of Ilorin in particular, Yorubaland and the Sokoto Caliphate in general. Indeed, an Arabic source known as *anjemin* provided quite useful information on different aspects of Ilorin history in the Ninteteenth Century ranging from military, political, economic and social to the cultural life of her society. The *anjemin* sources were Arabic texts of mostly Yoruba content. They were therefore interpreted before being used in the study.

A multi-disciplinary approach was also employed to accommodate relevant information from other related subjects on issues of military, technology and warfare. This approach was adopted in view of the complex nature of the topic. In this respect, information were sourced from cognate disciplines like Geography, Sociology, Archaeology, Arabic language and Islamic Studies to give solid background to the study, especially in the area of theoretical and conceptual clarifications. Facts from these disciplines were adopted and combined with the historical method to give a comprehensive analysis to issues raised in the study.

The data was analysed with a combination of approaches involving chronological, descriptive and thematic presentation to give the research a thorough blend of the benefits of various methods and also to achieve a robust discussion. The chronological approach enabled the reader to follow the sequence of the events; that is, the trends in Ilorin military techniques and warfare in the course of the Nineteenth Century. This approach further permitted the arrangement of issues from their generic to specific contexts to eliminate ambiguity, repetition

and confusion in the presentation. Documentary sources and archival materials obtained from the National Achieves in Ibadan and Kaduna were used to complement oral sources.

Other sources like myths and legends in Ilorin history were employed in the study. The researcher found these accounts of the early history of the town quite useful, especially those, which explained the mystical activities of some of its warriors. Although mythical and legendary stories do not, in most cases, have scientific evidences to substantiate their claims, they have remained inevitable oral sources in Africa's history, especially in the reconstruction of the pre-literate periods. Ilorin's history has quite a good number of myths, from which this study also obtained information and most of their claims were verified through oral interviews within and outside the town.

The methods adopted were considered the most appropriate for this study because of the periodization, 1800 to 1920. Information for the reconstruction of this period in Nigeria's history largely depends on oral interviews, archival sources and systematic analysis of published sources. The research methodology, thus, revolved around constant assessment of the sources in relation to the research problems and objectives while the findings were also tailored towards making valid conclusions.

Howover, the researcher encountered some challenges during the field work. For instance, at the archives, some files merely carried relevant headings with their contents already removed. Also, some files had become mutilated or very weak, perhaps due to their old age or long usage. This problem was tackled by allying with some staff of the archives, who made efforts to search the materials in other files with relative success.

Another major problem encountered was in the area of oral interview during field work. Most respondents were reluctant to let out information without a price. They always demanded financial reward as precondition for giving the required facts. In this regard, the researcher's earlier visits to the libraries and the archives became very useful. This initial knowledge lessened the monetary demand from the respondents, having become aware that the researcher was not totally ignorant on the issues at hand. Similarly, there were several failed appointments, particularly by the royal houses, who were always constantly engaged in Emirate functions in the Emir's palace and other places in the town. Furthermore, some interviewees were hesitant in giving information on Ilorin military and its wars, claiming that

"it is a sensitive subject" which required serious caution. Conversely, there were respondents who, in a bid to impress the researcher, tried to embellish their submissions.

In another dimension, since this research concerns Ilorin military and its warfare in the Nineteenth Century, the researcher had to also visit some southern Yoruba communities, which were either directly or indirectly involved in the wars. These include the Ibolo, Ekiti and Igbomina groups. This brought new challenges for the researcher in term of distance, cultural differences and logistics to facilitate the field work. Other problems encountered were unwillingness of respondents, concealment of facts during oral interview, suspicion, difficulty in gaining access to direct descendants and informants, lack of good transportation, limited resources, irrelevant points or responses, emotional outbursts and overzealousness on the part of few respondents.

However, these problems were tackled with the researcher's reliance on multiple interviews, patience, perseverance and the use of research assistants to cover areas which could not be reached personally. These research assistants were however given a research guide, which was compiled in consultation with the project supervisor, and served as their working manual. Their findings were thereafter subjected to critical appraisal before being accepted and utilised. The researcher also relied on some qualities like diplomacy, politeness, patience, perseverance and objectivity in tackling anticipated problems.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Even though it is difficult to trace the origin of warfare in pre-colonial African societies, from the Nineteenth Century, when revolutionary theory came into being, scientists have proposed theories of social evolution, which relate the origin of war to various levels of political setup and human relations. Spencer,[34] a social scientists, opines that leadership first developed from the military and was transferred to political society. According to him, military developed first before the political system.

In the same manner, Banislow Malinouski maintains that warfare preceded society and was used as a mechanism of organised force for the purpose of national objectives.[35] Lawrence argues that because man has exhibited his warring tendencies since ancient time, it is not surprising that the first recorded histories, the first written accounts of the exploits of mortals, are military histories. For instance, the earliest Egyptian hierroglyphs record the victories of the first Pharaoh, the Scorpion King and Narmer. The first Cuneiform recounts the adventures

of the Sumerian Warrior-King, Gilgamesh. The earliest written parts of the Books of Moses, the J-Strand (called so because in its passages, the name given to God is Yahweh or corruptly, Jehovah), culminate in the brutal Hebrew conquest of Canaan. The earliest annals of the Chinese, Greeks and Romans are concerned with wars and warrior kings. The argument here is that war has been a part of man since before civilization and recorded history.[36]

Whatever the validity of these theoretical arguments, they have in common one idea; that is, societies generally become socially and politically more developed through time and as societies developed, they came to wage war in more efficient ways. Such advancement in the system of warfare is largely due to the continuous discovery of better and more sophisticated fighting tools, that is, innovation in military technology, and improvement in the techniques of warfare. Thus, this study employs a theoretical basis, which argues that the trend of events in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century was dictated by the changing nature of her military, war strategies and weapon system.

In the same vein, A. Gurr, in his study, *Why Men Rebel*,[37] provides an integrated social science theory of political violence, which incorporates both psychological and societal variables. Gurr's theory rests on three pillars. First, he traces the primary causal sequence in political violence to the development of discontent. Second, he calls attention to the factors, which lead to the politicisation of that discontent. Third, he discusses the actualisation of violent action against political objects and actors.

This theory maintains that central to the development of discontent, its politicisation and actualisation in violent action is the concept, Relative Deprivation (RD).[38] Relative Deprivation is defined as a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. If we regard "value expectations" as the goods and services, and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled, "value capabilities" will be likened to the goods and services and lifestyles they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. In this view, societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities also increase the intensity of discontent.

This study adapts this theory of discontent arising from Relative Deprivation to explain the slave revolts in the Old Oyo Empire, which undoubtedly contributed to the collapse of the great empire. The violence, which followed appropriately completed the circle of agitation and rebellion of the Hausa slaves against their masters in different parts of Yorubaland and

contributed to the rise of Ilorin military. This theory also found relevance in the struggle by other Yoruba groups to shake off Oyo's dominance in the early Nineteenth Century, having realised the empire's weakness.

The same theory can be used to explain later events in which, the Yoruba groups felt dominated by the "new comers" (Fulani) and became preoccupied with how the latter could be dislodged from Ilorin. Internally, the contrasting relation between the Emir and the Balóguns in the late Nineteenth Century also had a strong touch of discontent, especially after the arrival of the British, who seemed to have favoured the former by giving him what appeared as powers of sole traditional authority, a status that adversely affected the latter's influence in the Emirate.

Another relevant model employed by this study is the Technology Determinist Theory. This is a reductionist theory that presumes that a society's technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values.[39] Technology Determinism is believed to have been coined by Thorstein Verblen (1857-1929),[40] an American sociologist and economist. The first major elaboration of a technological determinist view of socio-economic development came from the German philosopher and economist, Karl Marx, whose theoretical framework was based on the conclusion that human relations are primarily influenced by changes in technology. Marx specifically identifies productive technology as the major determinant of the nature of social, cultural and economic relations in the society. This position has become elaborated by events in the contemporary society with continuous advancement in technology, which has been bringing corresponding changes in human relations. This is further elevated by trendy, innovative and fast-changing technologies in various sectors of human society, including the military. Technological Determinism has been summarised as "the belief in technology as the governing force in human society".[41]

This theoretical postulation is adopted to explain the fundamental role of technology in driving the success of the military. This study believes that even though numerical strength, valour and determination were strong factors in pre-colonial warfare, technology was a major factor of success in several battles. This contention is based on the fact that warriors needed weapons, tactics, (also largely dictated by the type of implement available) and other logistics for reconnaissance and transportation, which all contributed immensely to success in military campaigns.

1.9 Conceptual Clarifications

Warfare, which is one of the primary concerns of the military, was a common feature in the pre-colonial history of many Nigerian societies, including Ilorin. Warfare refers to armed combat between communities. The concept of war has been subjected to various interpretations. In the array of definitions, the most quoted are those by Carl Von Clausewitz, a famous Prussian Army General, who sees war more or less as a continuation of politics, which intends to compel an opponent to accept and fulfill one's wishes. He states: "War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means…War can never be separated from political intercourse, should it be, then all the threads of different relations are broken and we have before us, a useless thing without an object."[42] Indeed, war or the use of naked force to achieve desired goals has been proved to be a permanent feature of human society. However, wars are never fought for illusory ends; rather, armed confrontations have varying motives, ranging from political, social, economic, ideological to territorial expansion.

Diplomacy is another important concept in this study. This remains a viable alternative to physical confrontation. It is a fundamental means by which foreign relations are conducted and foreign policies, implemented. The basic object of diplomacy is to enable men to live with their neighbours, a feat which requires a measure of accommodation of the interests of others. Above all, the concept is concerned with the questions of peace and war, and then such matters as the conclusion and observance of treaties, the making, maintenance and breaking of alliances, the establishment of boundaries, the development and protection of trade, and the payment of tribute.[43] Diplomacy is more of peaceful means and negotiations on issues to arrive at mutually beneficial conclusions. Diplomacy is however not a modern creation, rather a means of international relations, which had been part of states' interaction even in pre-colonial Africa. It is the primary instrument of achieving foreign policy among states, at the failure of which, war becomes inevitable.

Technology, even though, has a broad application, this study adopts the description of the concept from two perspectives; that is, as both the process and product of man's ingenuity in the course of the struggle to conquer his environment. In this sense, the submission of Bhagavan is very relevant to this study as it captures the main essence of technology. He postulates: the concept of technology we use is a broad one. It has two parts; the first contains all kinds of tools, machines, vehicles and buildings, while the second part comprises all kinds of knowledge required for the use, maintenance, repair, production, change and innovation of

the first part. We refer to the two parts respectively as "equipment" and "technological" knowledge. Technological knowledge is often split into two types, the knowledge of how to do things (know-how) and the knowledge of why certain things have to be done in certain ways (know-why).[44] Bhagavan further suggests the use of skills and knowledge interchangeably because both can be taken to mean the ability to identify a problem, what is required to solve the problem, and to create a device (implement) or process (knowledge) to solve the problem. This clarification enables us to appreciate the main features of any given technology and the historical antecedent, which stimulated its emergence. If this is related to military enterprise, we see technology as a great necessity in warfare because wars could not be fought with bare hands. Even in the Ancient world, some form of tools, however crude they might be, were employed in battles.

Related to the above is the concept of indigenous technology. This refers to a knowledge of technology that is locally generated, maintained and transferred through a systematic process of participating in the production process, observing the challenges inherent therein, experimenting with solution(s), and re-adapting previously identified solutions to the process. Olaoye maintains that indigenous technology embodies various aspects of technology developed by or with active participation of the indigenous people through the harnessing and utilization of local materials and natural resources.[45] It makes the heaviest use of abundant indigenous resources, locally produced tools and equipment. Indeed, it is a self-reliant technology that is capital-saving, rather than capital-using, labour using rather than labour saving, and one that could be operated, controlled, repaired and maintained locally.[46]

Indigenous technology also refers to all that it takes (in terms of mental and material energy), for man to set in motion, the natural forces of his entire body to make natural materials available in forms useful to his own life. It represents all man's efforts to influence and control natural materials to aid his survival as a social being, and all his attempts to solve essential, but specific problems in his life.[47] For instance, the early man lived in the midst of ferocious carnivorous neighbours; and his quest to survive in this hostile environment prompted him to device objects for protection, which later became the first set of hunting instruments. Indeed, early man's struggle to conquer his environment led to the emergence of the first tool industry, comprising of stones and pebbles, which were later replaced with stronger and more durable iron implements during the metal age.

Military Technology is largely concerned with the implement used in war and how the military was organised. It simply refers to the application of technology for use in warfare. Military technology can, in a broad sense, be described as the collection of equipment, vehicles, structures and communication systems, which are designed for warfare. With the advancement in knowledge, military technology has also come to take more specific application as the kinds of technology that are distinctly military in nature and not civilian, usually because they lack useful civilian applications, or are dangerous to use without military training.

Meanwhile, military technology has continued to expand from its limited scope in the ancient period when stones, clubs, slings, arrows, lances, swords, bracelet and other related weapons were used in warfare, to encompass modern high-tech implement like Fly-by-wire, Tomahawk Missiles, Stealth Aircraft, Combat Drones, Space Weapons, and Nuclear Weapons. These technologies have not only increased the rate of occurrence of warfare, but they also transformed the tactics used and the magnitude of destruction and calamities it bought to human societies. While this description of military technology suffices for modern warfare, its emphasis and categorisation of certain implements of warfare as being only applicable to the military may present problem in our consideration of pre-modern warfare, which made use of simple implement like sticks, bones, swords, bows and arrows, lances and so on.

Therefore, for this study, the concept of military technology generally includes all items employed as weapons by the Ilorin army for its campaigns during the pre-colonial period. This also encompassed the tactics, strategies and other paraphernalia of the military such as means of transport, communication, deployment of weapons and defence mechanisms. It comprises all physical amd spiritual objects locally assembled by warriors for use in battles. Thus, this categorization takes significant cognizance of the indigenous capability of the people to fabricate weapons at minimal costs since the materials required were available locally. Indeed, this local capacity and affordability made traditional weapons to be accessible to a large number of people in Ilorin at the period.

The weapon assemblage encompassed items made of stone, wood, leather, rope, iron and its related constituents like copper, bronze and brass. In this sense, blacksmiths, wood-carvers, tanners and leather workers were highly involved in the production of the indigenous military

artIfácts for the warriors. Furthermore, this weapon system combined physical objects with spiritual element to increase its efficacy. This found extensive usage during the pre-colonial period and even remained with the people after colonialism as indicated by the Agbekoya Farmers Revolt against the government of the Old Western Nigeria in 1968. That encounter was a sterling example in the use and potency of tradiotnal military technology in Nigerian history and only re-enacted what transpired in pre-colonial Ilorin and most parts of Yoruba society.

(i) Some Elements in Warfare

As a practical term, **strategy** is perceived as an exclusive field for the generals. It is more about the preparations prior to engagement. **Tactics** on the other hand unlike strategy, transcends the pre-field frontier; it extends deep into the battle field. In terms of its application, tactics is left in the hand of individual field commanders to handle. This makes tactics more of an affair, which is not necessarily left only in the hands of a general. So while strategy deals with the whole gamut of warfare prior to actual contact with the enemies, tactics on the other hand is about field action.

> The two fields have traditionally been terms of different dimensions; strategy dealing with the wider spaces, long periods of time and large movements of forces; tactics dealing with the opposite. Strategy is usually understood to be the prelude to the battle field, the leading of troops up to the time of contact with the enemy….Strategy gives tactics its mission and wherewithal and seeks to reap the results. But tactics have also become an important conditioning factor for strategy and as it changes, so does strategy.[48]

In terms of their field application, strategy and tactics may appear to overlap, though in some cases even tend to complement each other, making them not necessarily mutually exclusive. Strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out the proposed course of the various campaigns, which compose the war, and regulates the battles to be fought in each.[49] Certain guiding principles were inherent in pre-colonial warfare. Apparently, while some of the principles remain permanent in warfare, few of them became obsolete with the scientific and technological breakthrough. These principles include the objective of the war, economy of forces, maneuver of troops, simplicity of operation, freedom of action, flexibility and annihilation of the enemy. Others are, secrecy of plans, security, effective intelligence, offensiveness, morale of troops and good management of men.[50]

Because Ilorin's warfare fell under two main epochs in the Nineteenth Century, her objectives in the different campaigns also changed with trends of these periods. In the days of *Ààre* Afonja, the main object was to achieve independence for Ilorin from Old Oyo Empire. This however changed after the death of the Yoruba generalissimo, to a more elaborate one under the Fulani leadership. The religious factor (*Jihad*) became a major driving force in the campaigns of the state, especially after its establishment as an Emirate, leaning more to the Sokoto philosophies. Other motivations were booty sharing and political consideration. In the Sokoto caliphate, the main objective in the *Jihad* wars was to sanitize and clean the society of its social, economic and political weaknesses, all with the sole aim of pleasing Allah and nothing more. War is not fought, it is argued, either for the show of wanton prowess, aggrandizement or material desire. The Sheik's *Bayan and Abdullah's Diya ul-Hukkam* are emphatic on this. Muhammed Bello and the Sheik emphasised the economy of forces or mass concentration of troops during battle operations. The need for, and indispensability of a strong centre during engagements has been emphasised.

> It is prudent to place the most stout-hearted of your men and the fully armed heroes in the centre, for no matter how the flank might break, people's eyes remain fixed on the centre, for so long as its flag and its war drums beat, it remains for those on the flanks a stronghold in which any defeated man may take refuge.[51]

The issue of mass concentration brings us to that of the troop's maneuver. Commanders under this principle are advised to always be cautious when they approached or sighted the enemy. Furthermore, the enemy should be engaged from an advantage position. In Bello's opinion, when facing the enemy, the commander should turn away from the position in which the sun faces him and his troop directly.[52] Regarding secrecy in warfare, the Sheik noted that, 'war is a matter of trickery'. He added that the enemy must never be underestimated no matter how weak and small it appears to a commander.

> It is prudent on the part of the king not to under estimate his enemy, though he be lowly; not to be heedless of him, however insignificant he might be. The enemy is like fire; if you got it where it is starting, it is easy to put it out; but if you ignore it till the blaze has got firm hold, it is difficult to extinguish.[53]

Good management, furthers Abdullahi, depends on the proper estimation of the enemy, effective use of spies. Military intelligence therefore is crucial in winning the war. It is observed by that, the first step in a battle is that of dispatching intelligence officers into the enemy camp or town to gather information. (Bello was appointed by the Sheik to spy against Gobir prior to the Tabkim Kwatto encounter.) Spies are the think tank of war; they mix courage, wit and brain in their assignments. The commander may bribe his way to tap information about the enemies. Tricks or lies could be resorted to by spies to squeeze out information on their foes.[54]

Annihilation as an objective of war was not very much encouraged by the Jihad leaders except in forced circumstances. That was why the use of fire outrageously, catapult and other missiles of destruction were curtailed.[55] Also, the mutilation of corpses wittingly was also not sanctioned, though execution was permitted especially of spies, conspirators and male adults, who took arms against the *mujahidun* (Holy warriors/Jihadists). The Sokoto military thinkers also considered security element. The Sheik was of the view that a leader must not disclose his identity once in the enemy territory or battlefield. The horse he rode, clothes worn and even the camp where he resided, ought to be changed occasionally. It is perhaps, for security considerations that even booty must not be shared in the enemy territory. It is feared that the enemy might use the situation to fall on the gullible Muslim army.[56]

Personnel management and the morale of troops also enjoyed considerable attention from the leaders of the Sokoto caliphate. This was done to instill discipline and high morale among soldiers. When sharing booty, it is noted by the Sheik that a rider (the cavalry man) be given two shares from the booty while the infantry man receives only one. This formula must have been arrived at from the fact, that a horseman had his mount to feed. Furthermore, in war situation, the horse also became a partner whose contribution was no less important as that of the warrior by its swift movement and strength.

Soldiers' remuneration was also considered in the Sokoto Caliphate being an issue of great prominence. It is opined that even if the treasuries were empty, the leaders must borrow to foot their troop's bill. Payments made to each soldier should be sufficient enough to carter for his needs. And where a soldier dies in active service, the state must take care of his children until they are mature enough to support themselves, even his wife too is to be supported until she

married again.[57] This arrangement must have greatly boosted the morale of the army and increased their motivation individually, and increase the cohesion of the Muslim soldiers.

War should be waged with a cardinal objective in view. It is this that gives military campaign its perspective; in this case, once a campaign realised the outlined objective, hostilities have to be suspended. Unity of command is another element of warfare. Here the emphasis is not the basis or goal of fighting the war but how various units or commands may operate harmoniously in the battlefield. Operations against the enemy units, whether dispersed or converged, are subjected to a unit commander, who links up with the central commander. The third element, the economy of forces or mass concentration, deals with maximum utilisation of troops during vital operations. Troops are to be concentrated when a serious operation is to be had. The principle of economy of force consists of assigning for auxiliary and preparatory task from among the basic detachment and at the same time, of assuring oneself at the decisive moment the possibility of bringing into play these auxiliary detachments in order to deal a concentrated blow (against the enemy).[58]

Maneuver: this principle deals with the way in which a great sense of flexible movement may be exercised. Emphasis on the principle of maneuver is more on the need to outflank from one wing, so that a single envelopment is achieved, and the outflanking is from both flanks, a total or double envelopment is attained. Maneuver proves an effective strategy not only in offensive, but also in defensive or withdrawal moves. A good commander must be one who could penetrate the enemy line to achieve a surprise attack, he knows how to maneuver and withdraw his men to avoid heavy causalities. Manoeuver as a principle in warfare is important in achieving surprises, it also remains the key element in guerrilla tactics.

The other principle of tactics and strategy is surprise. This involves taking the enemy when it is least expected. Night attacks and ambushes are meant to surprise the enemy. The element was employed by Ibadan in the encounters with Ilorin in the battle of Osogbo around 1840, as well as in the Jalumi war in 1878.[59] Rear and flank attacks are carried out for surprise purposes. Surprise attacks produce cheaper victory and so all commanders try to use it, and at the same time guard against it. Because war is tricky, surprise remains an effective key to victory.

Military commanders of pre-colonial West Africa employed the element of surprise in their military strategy. For instance, King Agaja of Dahomey, according to a tradition, which Akinjogbin pronounces 'quite credible, preceded his attack on Whydah in 1727 by suborning his daughter, a wife of king Huffon of Whydah, into pouring water over the gun powder in her husband's arsenal. Again these Dahomeans deliberately spread false reports about the route to be followed by their armies and generally approached an object circuitously, often doubling back on their tracks in order to take the enemy from an unexpected position.[60]

Security of the soldiers: the army's main concern is to preserve itself and to destroy the enemy. It is said that all the guiding principles of military operations grow out of one basic principle, to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy.[61] It is for the desire of security that troops are not exposed to unnecessary peril. In modern warfare, dug-in pits and fox holes are designed to keep soldiers secured against the enemy. Similarly, bankers and camouflage uniforms are for same security considerations. The rational is that, the more a soldier feels secured from the enemy missile, the higher his morale and above all, his desire to continue with the struggle. Insecurity on the other hand breeds desertion, dissension, discouragement and disunity among soldiers in the force.[62]

Simplicity of plans: this is another fundamental element in field operation and in the weapons used by the soldiers. At all times plans must be kept simple to be easily understood by all members of the troop and care must be taken to ensure that the plans were discreet to prevent being undermined in warfare. Troops must not be saddled with cumbersome and complicated battle plans, which might make things difficult in operation. Likewise the weapon system ought not to be that sophisticated to cause time wasting and operational difficulties in the field. The principle of freedom of action on the other hand entails independent decision on crucial operational issues, which desired immediate solution. A field commander is not to be tied down to pre-conceived plans. He must have enough freedom to decide and find the best way out of strategic and tactical predicaments, as dictated by the battle conditions of the moment.

Secrecy: high emphasis must be placed on confidentiality of military strategies, tactics and procurement of logistics before and during operations. In warfare, it is strategically important to keep every bit of information related to field operations under lock and key, this includes the number of soldiers to be used in operations, the route, types of arms and the period of the

attack. All these are essential ingredients of the tactics, which if properly guided, could facilitate victory, and when carelessly divulged, could result in calamitous defeat for the army. Information about all these aspects of the army are highly invaluable and constantly sought after by either of the opposing parties.

Military intelligence as an art of studying the enemy's intentions, calculations, strength and weakness, is also a very important tool of strategy in warfare. In this regard, scouts, spies and reconnaissance teams are used to study and report every important detail about the enemy. This is secretly carried out without giving the slightest opportunity to the foe to know that he is under surveillance. Military intelligence reports reduce the risks and hazards of war. A good intelligence officer is often more important than even an army commander in saving lives of soldiers and hastening victory through his reports and information.[63] Persistent offensive move against the enemy is also an element in both strategy and tactics. This is done to deny the opponent any breathing space and eventually be forced into defence; or may lose initiatives which will make the attacking force to determine the course of events. The enemy could thereafter capitulate under continuous attack.

(ii) A Brief Reminiscence on Warfare and Military Technology

Warfare, over the centuries, has progressed from primitive hostilities between tribal communities to struggles between agrarian economies, and further, to conflicts among industrialised societies. Mankind has progressed successfully from arrows to rifles, guns, tanks, aircraft and missiles. Scientific and technological advances, though slow and gradual in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were dramatic in the twentieth century and this trends also reflected on the nature of warfare in the various centuries. The development of the iron clad ship in the 1860s, the machine-gun in the 1890s, the manned aircraft and the tank in the 1920s-1930s, the aircraft carrier and radar in the 1930s-1940s, are some of the important signposts in the evolution of military technologies. Each of these developments had varying impact on the conduct of warfare. Alvin and Heidi Toffler postulated that "the way we make war reflects the way we make wealth". They also believe that technology has always been exploited to make wealth as well as to make war.[64]

Certain cultural developments have affected military technology and the conduct of warfare. These developments have however changed over time and as they did, the nature of warfare also improved with them. For instance, the first use of stone tools probably began during the

Paleolithic Period. The earliest stone tools are from the site of Lomekwi, Turkana, dating from 3.3 million years ago.[65] The earliest evidence of warfare between two groups is recorded at the site of Nataruk in Turkana, Kenya, where human skeletons with major traumatic injuries to the head, neck, ribs, knees and hands, including an embedded obsidian bladelet on a skull, are evidence of intergroup conflict between groups of nomadic hunter-gatherers 10,000 years ago.[66]

Humans entered the Bronze Age as they learned to smelt copper into an alloy with tin to make weapons. In Asia, where copper tin ores are rare, this development was delayed until trading in bronze began in the Third Millennium BCE. In the Middle East, and Southern European regions, the Bronze Age follows the Neolithic period but in other parts of the world, the Copper Age is a transition from Neolithic to the Bronze Age. Even though the Iron Age generally follows the Bronze Age, in some areas, the Iron Age intrudes directly on the Neolithic from outside the region, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, where it was developed independently.[67]

The first large scale use of iron type weapons began in Asia Minor around the 14th century BCE and in Central Europe around the 11th century BCE, followed by the Middle East, about 1000 BCE, and India and China. The Assyrians are credited with the introduction of horse cavalry in Warfare and the extensive use of iron weapons by 1100 BCE. Assyrians were also the first to use iron-tipped arrows. [68]

In the discourse of pre-colonial Nigerian states, the role of the military was prominent because most of them were states, which relied heavily on the efficacy of their army to survive. To a large extent therefore, there was a fusion of military and politics. In fact, those who subscribed to the 'cyclical theory of history' believe that military and politics cannot be separated. The proponents of this theory argued that during the pre-colonial period, military commanders shared political power with their kings.[69] In some cases, rulers or kings often served as the commander of their armies. Therefore, because of its role, the military was attached to the political authority of most pre-colonial societies. However, it must be emphasised that the military, which emerged victorious in a given war, most often, would set up the machinery of government in the conquered territories; and in this way, the frontiers of the victor is extended. Therefore, whoever controlled the military also controlled political power.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that it is the combination of the military, political and socio-economic system, which rendered the society stable, created awareness among

members, and promoted the well-being of individuals in the society. In Kanem-Borno for example, the military was part and parcel of the political system that existed in the empire, and it was an important instrument by which the *Mai*'s territory could be extended. The decision to go to war was taken by the *Mai* in consultation with his title holders or officials; he also decided when to raise the army. Similarly in Old Oyo Empire, decision to go to war was squarely vested in the hands of the *Aláàfin*, who after due consultation and divination, issued war command to the warriors. This implies that the kings were Commanders-in-Chief of their army, without prejudice to the authority and position of the army commanders on the field. The integration of the military and political leadership as well as the invocation of warrior values in these states, were carefully cultivated, with an overlay of the divine right of rulers in order to ensure the survival and viability of these states.[70]

The case of Old Oyo Empire perfectly fits into this conclusion. Apparently, before Oranmiyan, who has been described as "primarily a political adventurer," the Yoruba had no common political head. It was Oranmiyan, also reputed as 'a very brave and warlike prince' who, after the foundation of Oyo, had set in motion the political federation of a number of chiefdoms and principalities, which appear to have exhibited a remarkable cultural homogeneity. He is said to have started his campaign with a bodyguard of '150 well trained soldiers'.[71]

The Oyo Empire therefore, like those of Bunyoro, Buganda and Zulu, was a conquest state from whose inception the military played a crucial role. The warrior ideal was thus, relentlessly cultivated in her society. The *Aláàfins*, like the earlier *Abakamas* of *Bunyoro*, were required to be great warriors and to exhibit militant leadership as well. *Aláàfin* Ajaka, for example, was at one time, deposed by the Oyo *Mesi* (Council of state) for his lack of militarism and was replaced with Sango, *Oranmiyan's* son, who was known to have demonstrated war like characteristics.[72] Also, among the non-conquest states, the function of the military was, indeed paramount and assured, at least in wading off external invasion and protecting the territory of the state. Conceivably, *Àare* Afonja inherited this military charisma and this encouraged him in the mission to create a sovereign political entity in Ilorin.

1.10 Literature Review

Several topics on different aspects of Nineteenth Century history of Nigeria, Yorubaland and indeed Ilorin, have enjoyed considerable academic and scholarly commentary from

professional and non-professional historians, as well as from indigenous and foreign authors. This is more so because the Nineteenth Century was unique for the array of events it witnessed. Authors, for instance, have written extensively on change in trade pattern and economic activities among the diverse peoples in Nigeria; changes in political structure; change in social pattern and religious revolution as well as Afro-European relation leading to colonialism.

Two remarkable events, in which Ilorin featured prominently during this period, are the Yoruba warfare of the Nineteenth Century and the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio that produced the caliphate system. Thus, literature to be reviewed in this study will revolve around these themes, and be broadly grouped under the following headings. Literature on warfare and Inter-group Relation; Literature on Nigerian History; Unpublished materials.

Literature on War and Inter-Group Relations

Notable literature in this category found to be relevant and reviewed include the work of Donald E. Gelfand and Russel D. Lee titled: *Ethnic Conflict and Power: A Cross-National Perspective*. This book covers a wide range of issues in conflict and inter-group relations in different parts of the world.[73] It provides the researcher with a general knowledge on inter-group relations and its implications. The book however concentrates on conflicts resulting from inter-group relations, while paying less attention to the factors that promote unity among groups for peaceful cohabitation.

Archer Jones's book, titled: *The Art of war in the Western World*, examines situations in different parts of the Western world on issues of war and conflict. It dissects the rudiments of war, its nature, its complexity, the various stages and changing face of conflicts among the Europeans. The book further analyses the progress of warfare and military technology from about 2,500 years ago, when the Greeks and Macedonians first supported their spears with slings, arrows and javelins. Various indices of warfare, such as the tactics, logistics, strategy and weaponry, were explained while attention was paid to their development and improvement over time.[74]

The comprehensive nature of the book as well as its showcase of development and changing nature of war at different eras in Europe, gives this new study a background understanding that

warfare is dynamic and follows the trend in a particular period in history. Indeed, according to the author, each war came with particular lessons and experiences, which serve as improvements on subsequent encounters. This can be drawn to explain confrontations and inter-group relations in Nigerian environment in the pre-colonial period, particularly the Yoruba Wars of Nineteenth Century and the Fulani Jihad, both being epochs in warfare and intergroup relations in the period under study. This book is quite relevant to the study, as some of its positions could be employed to explain Ilorin's military in the Nineteenth Century. It is a general appraisal of warfare in human society, and as such quite relevant to a study of Ilorin military of the period. The book is also useful for a comparative assessment of the trends in warfare in the Western world and Nigerian environment.

William Weir's book titled: *50 Weapons that Changed Warfare,* x-trays the influence of innovation in weapons production and its impact on the nature of warfare. The work believes that every new invention or innovation came with a change in the style of combat, even though, such change was always temporary because of the exigencies of contemporary time. Indeed, according to the book, most of the weapons that changed warfare eventually became obsolete. New weapons, which replaced old ones themselves, became obsolete with the passage of time.[75]

This book explains how the earliest warriors probably used various items as weapons. These include sticks, stones and bones of animals, which were employed to smash, pierce or inflict other bodily injuries on the enemy. Thus, from these simple beginning, man evolved the bow and arrow, spears, lances and later, guns of various capacicity, armour and body protectors for warriors, until the heavy attacking weapons like tank, anti-tank, bombs and nuclear arsenal emerged. The book provides elaborate position on the invention and innovation in various weapons, which makes it relevant to this new study. However, its generalised content makes treatment of some weapons shallow.

Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-colonial West Africa by R. S. Smith,[76] is a relevant text that critically evaluates peace and conflicts from African perspective before the advent of colonial rule in West Africa. The book gives different incidents in various parts of West Africa as examples in inter-group relations. Some case studies in Yoruba wars were given to illustrate how wars were prosecuted in the traditional environments and some of the mechanisms for resolving the conflicts were highlighted. Indeed, the book uses inter-group relations as an

apparatus for determining peace and conflict situations. The work vividly depicts the processes of war and diplomacy in pre-colonial West African societies. The work provides an outstanding argument that diplomacy had been a strong aspect of relations among West African states with the exchange of ambassadors, representatives and envoys which facilitated trade, political and social relations among them. Specifically, the book provides this study a better understanding of the situation in the great Old Oyo Empire in the early Nineteenth Century when the Fulani proclaimed their rule on Ilorin, which was hitherto part of the ancient empire. Indeed, the failure of Oyo to reclaim Ilorin after several attempts, through both war and diplomacy shows the limit of the two approaches in resolving issues.

Perhaps, the heterogenous nature of Ilorin society proved an advantage in the ensuing confrontations with Old Oyo. In Ilorin, a conglomeration of forces was not only plausible but also considered profitable against a common adversary, in spite of the diverse backgrounds of the Ilorin group. This indicates unity in diversity, in the face of hostility, and a unique factor in Ilorin's diplomacy. However, because the book focusses on the whole of West Africa, only passing statements were made about Ilorin in the book, which justifies this new study as further documentation to contribute to knowledge.

The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa,[77] a book edited by Ali. A. Mazrui, is an expository and analytical presentation of pre-colonial military issues in different parts of Africa. This is predicated on the fact that African societies varied enormously in their military organistion. The collection of essays in the book is therefore interested in the meeting point between culture, war and politics among different African societies. The book argues that pre-colonial African states'politcal organisations were strongly tied to the efficacy of their military, as opposed to European prejudicial opinions that Africa had no history prior to their arrival. Issues explored in the work include the Warrior and the State in Pre-colonial Africa, the Masculanity of War, the Cultural Root of Aggressive Behaviour, Warrior and Culture, Warrior and Liberation and so on. The main position of the book is that pre-colonial African states fought their wars for no less important motives as those in other parts of the world; and that even though weapons of war were quite similar, made of iron, variation could occur in their fabrication as dictated by the peculiar local environment.

The Warrior Tradition provides a good foundation for this study on the causes and impact of warfare as well as the nature of pre-colonial military organisation in different parts of Africa.

It also gives further basis and justification to this new study as a contribution to Africa's military history, which is still considered a relatively new subject in historical studies.

Africa and the Wider World: Africa Since the Scramble, by the trio of B. Barkindo, M. Omolewa and G. Babalola, examines inter-group relations between Africa and Europe since the period of Industrial Revolution up to the stage of neo-colonialism, otherwise called globalization.[78] The book underscores the imperial factor in Afro-European relation and illustrates the struggles by the natives in various parts of Africa to shake-off the colonial yoke through their resistance to foreign rule, and the extent of success and failure of such missions. The book specifically emphasises the economic factor in this unequal relation between Africa and Europe, analysing the features of colonialism in both settler and non-settler colonies.

This book is primarily useful for an understanding of the European motives in their relations with the Africans, especially from the economic point of view. It provides general evaluation of the European mission especially from the late Nineteenth Century as dictated by the Industrial Revolution, a factor which speedily led to loss of sovereignty for most African traditional States. However, the book focuses more on economic relations while military issues such as African military organisation, indigenous military technology and resistance enjoyed little coverage.

The Growth of African Civilisation: The Revolutionary Years of West Africa Since 1800, by J. B. Webster, A.A. Boahen and H. O Idowu, is a basic textbook on different aspects of institutional changes across West Africa. This book traverses the entire West African kingdoms and chiefdoms, showing their military, economic, social and political organisations. Part one of the book discusses the Islamic revolutions in West Africa of which the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio remains the most extensive. Part two of the book examines the collapse of the Old Oyo Empire and the Yoruba civil wars of the Nineteenth Century. The major wars in the Yoruba imbroglio were evaluated and their implications for the region.[79]

This book is quite relevant to this study as it discusses the Jihad in Hausland and the warfare in Yorubaland; both, events in which Ilorin played prominent roles. The book illustrates the changes that make the Nineteenth Century to be referred as the revolutionary years in West Africa's history. It thus provides a background understanding of the events, particularly the Yoruba warfare and the Jihad of Nineteenth Century.

Economic History of West Africa, by G. O Ogunremi, deals with various aspects of West Africa's economy from the pre to post-colonial period. It gives wide analysis of the structure and diversities of West African economy. The book provides background knowledge to the history of most West African group's economy. This book is mainly an economic perspective to the study of inter-group relation. The strength of the local economy was clearly illustrated in the book, ranging from agriculture, mining, local industries, intra and inter-regional trades, transport and communication.[80]

The book is relevant to the study of Ilorin's economy in the Nineteenth Century as the community was involved in the inter-regional trade of the period as an *entreport* in the long distance trade between the north and south. However, military as a factor in pre-colonial economy was not given a curious attention in the work. The case of Ilorin in the first half of the Nineteenth Century provides enough proof of the significant role of the military in building the economy.

Literature on Nigerian History

In this category, relevant literature on the general history of Nigeria were examined with reference to Ilorin, where and when necessary. *Yoruba Warfare in the 19th century*, co-authored by J.F. Ade Ajayi and R. Smith, gives an account of the military activities in various parts of Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century. This book examines issues such as causes of the Yoruba wars, composition of the army, weapons of war, fortification, strategies and tactics of war at the various camps. It also explores some case studies in the Yoruba wars of the century such as the battle of *Osogbo* c.1840 between *Ibadan* and *Ilorin*, the battle of *Abeokuta* c.1851, the *Ijaye* wars c.1860-62, battle of Ikirun c.1878 and so on. According to the book, the *Osogbo* war was the "turning point" in the long list of campaigns between the Yoruba and Fulani groups. Ibadan, after defeating the Fulani at *Osogbo*, emerged the leader among the states claiming to succeed to the power of Old Oyo.[81]

This book is very useful to the present study because it gives background information on the rivalry and competition among the various Yoruba groups to inherit the power and influence of Old Oyo, after its fall. The high point of the book, in relation to this study however, is the demonstration of the struggles between Ibadan and Ilorin, and the eventual defeat of the latter at Osogbo.

This book however tilts more towards the Yoruba axis in its accounts, though understandably, it focuses on Yorubaland, but since the Fulani groups were equally involved, a more detailed account of their military roles would have given greater credence to the book. Indeed, this weakness was indicated by the authors, when they acknowledged that "much remains to be done in compiling and comparing the records and traditions of the individual kingdoms……there may well be much to learn about these wars from Fulani and Dahomey sources. Furthermore, there is the need for more works on the oral tradition of the wars in Ijebu Ode, Ilorin and the non-Yoruba states".[82] Indeed while it is true that the book discusses Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century, some factors, which sustained Ilorin military participation in their campaigns, like the town's multiplicity of groups, diplomacy, Islam and element of spirituality and cavalry, need further examination.

War and Peace in Yorubaland 1783-1893, edited by I. A. Akinjogbin, evaluates different issues on the Nineteenth Century warfare in Yorubaland. The book states that between 1826 and 1840, no less than eleven battles were fought between Oyo and Ilorin armies in pursuit of various motives. It maintains that the idea of professionalising the military in Yorubaland remained obscure until the Nineteenth Century.[83] This was because most Yoruba societies relied on paramilitary, termed, *Ológun*, Ò*gúngbè* and *Ìpàǹpá*. They were usually not subjected to serious military training rather they were ad-hoc groups mainly recruited from hunters and able bodied men in time of war and often quickly disbanded thereafter. However, by the Nineteenth Century, this changed because of the series of struggles that characterised the period.[84] During this century, the military was pushed to the forefront of Yoruba politics. This same opinion was expressed by J. F. A. Ajayi, who contends that the professionalisation of the military in Yorubaland was largely encouraged by the emergence of the cavalry force.

Thus, a new military aristocracy emerged forcing the traditional political constitution to begin to change. Peoples concern for the security of their lives put the military in more favoured and respected position in Yoruba societies of that time. Subjects began to question the ability and significance of the institutions that could not guarantee their safety and lean more on the military for the highly cherished protection. The well-known example of Ibadan where military republicanism evolved is a case in point.[85] There emerged powerful warrior personalities such as Oluyole, Ibikunle, Ogunmola, Latoosa and Ajayi Ogboriefon who rose to prominence not by the possession of beaded crown but of swords and guns.[86] Other examples in Yorubaland are Lisabi in Egbaland, *Ogedengbe*in the Ekiti, Fabunmi *Oke-Imesi* to mention

but a few. These men were not of the royal class but their military credentials earned them respect, popularity and acceptance in their respective societies. In Ilorin, the *Balógun Alanumu, Ajikobi, Gambari, Fulani* and several personalities demonstrated equally great bravery and military craftsmanship at various times during the town's military escapades in the Nineteenth Century.

Oguntomisin, writing on *Military Alliances in Yorubaland in the 19th century*,[87] opines that generally, the Yoruba kingdoms/towns hardly fought wars alone. The preponderance of wars during this century must have also precipitated the emergence of more alliances. Perhaps the most elaborate of the alliances were the Ife-Ijebu Alliance against Owu in 1821, the Ijaye Egba Alliance in 1860 and the EkitiParapo Grand Alliance against Ibadan in 1878.[88]

For Ilorin, however, the Ekitiparapo Grand Alliance seemed more significant because of its motives. In the first place it was essentially intended to clip the wings of Ibadan, who had in the course of its expansion, subdued several Yoruba kingdoms.[89] It was also considered as a means of obtaining booty but the more important reason was to re-impose Ilorin's control on her former Igbomina vassals and bring Ekiti towns under her political sphere.[90]

This was an astute strategy in Ilorin's expansion to the *Igbomina* and *Ekiti* territories in the southern part of Yorubaland. It would be recalled that it was Ibadan that halted Ilorin's southward advancement into Yorubaland in 1840 at the battle of Osogbo. The above alliances represented part of Ilorin's diplomatic manoeuver in the course of the Yoruba civil wars in the Nineteenth Century and a relevant theme to this research.

The Origin and British Colonial Impact on the Cosmopolitan Community of Ilorin in the 20th Century, by S. Y. Omoiya, explores the factor of ethnic plurality in Ilorin and its impact on the emergence, later in the town, of a unique culture and identity, which is a hybrid of different ethnic groups. The work examines the history of the town and demonstrates how the colonial authority boosted the influence of the Emir, placing him above the *Balóguns*, in order to achieve their colonial objectives.[91]

The book is quite germane to this study as it gives background information about inter-group relations in Ilorin and the impacts of colonialism on the leadership structure in the community. It is quite useful in understanding the dynamics of Ilorin leadership hierarchical structures, particularly at the onslaught of colonialism in the beginning of the twentieth century. However, since the book focuses on inter-group relation, particularly between the British and the Ilorin people, military and warfare enjoyed a limited coverage.

Ilorin: The Journey so Far, is a book by L. A. K. Jimoh, which documents various aspects of Ilorin's history from the founding of the town up to 1994, when the book was published. The book analyses events between Ilorin and Old Oyo, the arrival of Al Salih, popularly known in Ilorin as Sheik Alimi, the entrenchment of the Emirate system, various wars of survival, defence and consolidation fought by the town. It goes further to give the genealogical tree of quite a number of families in Ilorin and gave the origin of some of them. The author supported his argument with the works of renowned scholars on Yoruba history like Samuel Johnson, R. A. Adeleye, and J. A. Atanda, while also using revelvant documentation from European gazetteers to give more credence to his claims. Jimoh's work also covers aspects of Ilorin contemporary history and efforts of the people of the town in social and political development.[92]

While the strength of this book lies more on its detailed treatment of contemporary issues, its discussions of topics on pre-colonial Ilorin are not explicit enough. For instance, details of how weapons and horses were obtained were not given in the book. This is a fundamental lacuna, given the importance of the military to Ilorin society of the period, and thus, further justifies this new study.

Culture and Civilization, a book edited by the trio of L. Thompson, D. Adelugba and Egbe Ifie, gives a comprehensive examination of the concepts of culture and civilization in relation to issues such as environment, literature, arts, government, technology, religion, language and so on. This book provides an insight into early African civilization. It also examines some early Nigerian civilizations, where the Nok Culture, Igbo-Ukwu, Oyo, Benin, Hausa States, Kanem-Borno States and the Niger-Delta states, were discussed.[93]

The strength of the book lies in its treatment of culture and civilization as concepts that permeate all aspects of human society. Its discussion of these concepts in relations to different areas of activity is quite relevant to this study. The book's evaluation of early Nigerian cultures and civilizations on pages 148-157 was not only succinct, but also very useful. Indeed, cultural practices and civilizations have impact on the military of the society.

However, since the book's focus is culture and civilization, the military was not given the requisite attention. This flaw becomes more apparent when one considers the military as an

important apparatus for keeping the balance of the power and leadership structure of the society, particularly in the Nineteenth Century when warfare was a recurrent feature.

Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate, by J. P. Smaldone, is a book that examines various aspects of military campaigns during the Jihad period in the caliphate. The book gives a historical picture of Sudan's warfare from the early period, formation of states, and Hausa states up to 1800. On the Jihad, the historical antecedent which led to the Jihad was given, while attention was also paid to military organisation in the caliphate. Other issues discussed in the book are types and conduct of wars, weapons and military tactics. Political and military relationship and war economy were also examined. The author shows that the main problem in the caliphate's defence was in the inability "to defend such vast expanses of territory from a single centre, especially since the dual capitals of Sokoto and Gwandu, were located in the western part."[94]

Even though issues discussed in the book are quite relevant to this new study as they provide general insight to the Sokoto Caliphate, the discussions are mainly over-view of events, thus, detailed information on the specific Emirate's military organisation and warfare strategies were not accommodated. Indeed, accounts of physical military combat dominated the discussion while other aspects of warfare like diplomacy and military alliances, were not given proper coverage. Furthermore, Ilorin's case as a unique Emirate with a multicultural content was not directly presented in the accounts of the book.

Groundwork of Nigerian History, edited by Obaro Ikimi, is one of the comprehensive and authoritative scholarly works on Nigerian. This book covers different spectra of Nigerian history in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The book, written by experts on different aspects, is divided into chapters for thorough analysis of Nigeria's past. The 615 page book treats topics such as "Nigeria before 1800", in which the evolutions of many Nigerian tribes up to 1800 were examined. The Benin Kingdom, Yorubaland, Igboland, states and peoples of the Niger-Benue confluence, Kanem-Borno, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and many more.[95]

The researcher found the book's discussion on Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century particularly useful as it assisted in examining the role of the military in state formation, using Old Oyo Empire as a model. Indeed, Oyo's ascendancy was largely ensured by her strong military, which enabled the empire not only to subdue some Nigerian societies, but was also

instrumental to her conquest of Dahomey. Indeed, by 1750, the Aláàfin was emperor of a territory that included, the Oyo Kingdom, the Egba and Egbado, some parts of Igbomina, the Ajase Kingdom, the Weme Kingdom, the Dahomey Kingdom and parts of Tapa and Ibariba.[96]

Elsewhere, the book examines the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio of the Nineteenth Century and its implication for the Nigerian societies. It resulted in the emergence of a centralised state of enormous size, in the area which later became northern Nigeria- the Sokoto Caliphate, while also resulting in dynastic change in few others. The case of Kanem-Borno is a glaring example where leadership shifted from the Sayfawa to the Elkanemi group. In Ilorin, a similar scenario occurred with authority shifting from the Yoruba to the Fulani group. This provides a strong basis for the study to examine the factors which enhanced Ilorin's cohesion at this period, in spite of its diverse cultural background.

West African Traditional Religion, by the duo of J. O. Awolalu and P. A. Dopamu is a 358 page, twelve chapter book, which explores various aspects of traditional religious practices among natives in West Africa, with a particular emphasis on Nigerian groups. The book pays special attention to the nature and features of African traditional religion among different groups in West Africa. Beginning with the concept of God as the Supreme Being, who oversees and determines the affairs of man, which according to the text, is a universal belief among the various people. It goes further to examine the attributes of God in Africa tradition. Other subjects considered in the book include God and society, cults and secret societies, magic and medicines, life and death, life after death, man's final end and divine judgment. The position of the authors is that regardless of the increasing influence of modernisation or civilization, and the impact of foreign religions (Christianity and Islam), traditional religious practices would continue to subsist and be relevant among West Africans.[97]

This text is quite relevant to the new study, especially on issues of spiritual and metaphysical powers as they relate to the military and warfare in pre-colonial Nigeria generally, and Ilorin, to be specific. Since the warriors of the period believed in, and attached so much significance to spiritual preparation in the form of divinations, consultations and offerings, including rites and sacrifices before proceeding on war missions, the book provides a basic background information on these themes. Because warriors relied on various incisions, charms and amulets, in the form of waist-bands, hand-bands, charmed war garment and other accoutrements of warfare, which were believed to offer protection, and spiritual power during

warfare, this book is also relevant. In spite these areas of relevance however, since the work is not directly on military technology, spiritual and metaphysical powers as they concern warfare were, expectedly, glossed over by the authors.

Managing Ethno-Religious Relations in Nigeria: the Ilorin Example, 1823-2003, is a book by A. L. Olumoh, which examines the challenges of Ilorin multi-ethnicity, its fluctuating impact on her society, and how the seemingly implosive situation was managed from the period of the Emirate's establishment up to 2003. The book uses Ilorin's peculiar example as a cosmopolitan community to demonstrate that in spite of ethnic diversity, Nigeria's multi-nationality can be turned into strength for development, as witnessed in the town from the inception of its Emirate system in 1823. Various issues were treated in the book and found germane to the current study. These include: the origin and role of the *Balóguns*, the approach of the Emirate's leaders to achieve and sustain harmony among various groups, as well as other issues in inter-group relations in Ilorin Emirate from the days of Emir Abdul-Salam to 2003.[98]

This textbook however, concentrates more on political relations, true to its title, while issues of the military and its technology are not exhaustively discussed, which further justifies this current study. This becomes more expedient given the fundamental role of the military in sustaining Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century, and the position of the *Balóguns* in this regard.

African Indigenous Science and Knowledge System: Triumph and Tribulations[99] is a collection of essays in Honour of Prof. Gloria Thomas Emeagwali, published by the Historical Society of Nigeria and edited by O. Akinwumi, O. O. Okpeh, C. B. N. Ogbogbo and A. Onoja. It is a conglomeration of ideas and findings in different aspects of indigenous science and technology by scholars in history and related subjects. Areas covered in the work include the concept of science and technology, knowledge system in Africa, science and religion, African architecture, soap production, weaving, agriculture, architecture, land tenure, crafts and other traditional technological practices in Nigeria.

The book is quite relevant to the current study in emphasising that the Nigerian people are creative and that their creativity transcended the colonial period, even though their activities were affected by colonialism. However, issues of military technology and the role of

indigenous medicine on warfare were not adequately explained in the book, a lacuna, which further justifies this new study.

A Reconsideration of Hausa History before the Jihad[100] by F. Fuglestad, was detailed in tracing the ancestry of the pre-Jihad Hausa *Sarakuna (sing. Sarki meaning King)* to one or another migrant Muslim clerical group or individual. The migrant cleric-merchants (*Wangarawa*) met a 'kinship' pattern of political organisation and modified them into 'kingship' due to superior military acumen and organisational abilities. The *Wangarawa* must have done this, according to Fuglestad, due to some reasons. First is the need to protect and promote the Trans Saharan trade; being one of the trio duties of a *Wangarawa* (others being travel and clerical life). Second is the institutionalisation of a sophisticated, cosmopolitan and centralised polity. Thirdly, Fuglestad opines that the *Wangarawa* might be expanding a pre-existing *Wangarawa* polity only to consume the Hausa polities of the fifteenth century. In exemplifying this position, Fuglestad cites the pre-Emirate political histories of Gobir, Kano, and Katsina amongst others, whose oral tradition as well as chronicles point to the same fact.

Even though the aboriginal tribal and religious leaders (*durbi* in the case of Katsina) still wielded considerable power and influence, especially in the selection of a *sarki*, the appointment of any of them (*the Durbawa*) into the *Sarki's* court later came to be the dictate of such *Sarki*. The nature of these polities, where the two authorities, viz the *Sarki* and the *Durbi*, exercised political powers is termed '*contrapuntal paramouncy*' by Fuglestad. Most Hausa states that later became the Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate (especially the centralised ones), before the Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio had developed measures to balance dual authorities between the *Wangarawa (sing. Wangara)* descendant *Sarkuna* and the leaders of the aboriginal populace (*Durbawa*).

Fuglestad's work dwells much on the pre-Jihad Hausa history, though his argument and analyses fit so well into the situation that obtained in Ilorin after it was proclaimed an Emirate. The Jihad resulted in the centralisation of political power and authority in the hands of the Emir in the Emirates and the Caliphate authority as a whole. The work however fails to give the exceptional case of Ilorin where even though the Emir remained the overall central authority, the Balóguns still commanded great influence because of their military roles, which enabled them to capture territories for the Emirate and for themselves. The advent of an Emirate system therefore brought about contrapuntal paramouncy. Fuglestad was analytical about other Emirates, but silent on the particular nature of Ilorin. Pardonably, his work was on

the pre-Jihad Hausa political configuration. His analysis of contrapuntal authority happens to be the script as played in post Jihad Ilorin. This makes it a relevant work reviewed for this research endeavour.

Theses and Dissertations

The Ilorin Textile Industries 1850-1960: A Case Study in the History of Technology, by R. A. Olaoye, is a study that explores the origin, growth and trends in the development of traditional weaving textile in Ilorin up to 1960. The work, which is a study in indigenous technology, examines issues relating to sources of materials, production processes, the tools of producton, the people involved in production and the types of loom used by Ilorin weavers. The study also emphasises the prospects of indigenous weaving and identifies the main features of the vocation as that which is not capital intensive but labour intensive. This work was found very relevant to the current study as it provides useful guide on the nature of indigenous technology in Ilorin, particularly in the Nineteenth Century, which is the focus. The study also reiterates that indigenous weaving may have been brought to Ilorin by migrants from Old Oyo in the early Nineteenth Century, which helps to illustrate the impact of warfare and the collapse of the empire on movement of people to Ilorin. [101]

However, even though the work is on indigenous technology, aspects of military technology enjoyed little coverage, understandably because this is not the focus of the study. Thus, R. A. Olaoye's work has provided a foundation on which further research into aspects of military technology could be based, specifically, the role of blacksmiths in weapons production in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin.

The Defence Policy of the Sokoto Caliphate, 1804-1903, by A. M. Muri, maintains that the caliphate was faced with four major antagonists. These were the dissenters, bandits, apostates and unbelievers. These four elements, according to the thesis, constituted constant internal and external challenges to the Sokoto caliphate. The study upholds that the success of the Caliphate in meeting its defence commitments however depended on four critical variables: geopolitics, geo-strategy, economy and ideology, which invariably became major constraints in the defence capabilities. The high point of the study is the establishment of *ribats* (frontier stronghold) as a defence mechanism.[102]

However, Ilorin's case as a unique Emirate in the caliphate system was not given adequate coverage in the study. The Emirate was one of the frontier Emirates in the caliphate because it emerged in Yorubaland; hence it faced strong resistance from the Oyo group, which had hitherto held suzerainty over the area. Therefore, since the caliphate was a vast state, comprising many varied Emirates and peoples, a specific analysis of defence mechanism in the major frontier Emirates, including Ilorin, would have given greater credence to the study. Indeed, defence was not only a priory for Ilorin Emirate in the early days of its establishment but also during its period of consolidation and expansion.

H.O. Danmole's work, *The Frontier Emirate: A History of Islam in Ilorin*, gives an elaborate analysis of the trends in the establishment of the Emirate system of administration and the nature, development and impact of the Islamic religion, and Emirate political system on Ilorin and its environs in the Nineteenth Century and beyond.[103] The relevance of this work to the current study rests on the fact that the military was a potent instrument in the establishment of Ilorin Emirate and the extension of its influence among the southern Yoruba groups. However, because the focus of the study was the establishment of Islam in Ilorin, issues of military technology were not given adequate coverage, which further justifies this work as a way of contributing to existing knowledge.

A. O. Banwo's study, *The Colonial State and Ilorin Emirate Economy, 1900-1960,*[104] evaluates the impact of British colonial administration on Ilorin Emirate economy. The author used a number of theoretical models to emphasise the economic motive in British annexation and eventual colonisation of Ilorin in the late Nineteenth Century. The work further examines various aspects of the Emirate's economy such as trade, both in commodities and slaves, its role as a transitional commercial exchange post for goods coming from both southern and northern part of what later became Nigeria. Other themes evaluated in the study include crop production, colonial tax policy, colonial labour force, judicial system and indigenous industries as they affected Ilorin Emirate economy during colonialism.

The study's relevance to the current work rests on its recognition of the economic motive as being responsible for the British conquest of Ilorin in the late Nineteenth Century. This is particularly significant because by the late Nineteenth Century, Ilorin's attention shifted to wars of defence as against her expansionist mission being pursued for the greater part of the century. However, since the study focused squarely on the economy, its examination of

technology and military was merely nominal; more so it examined events in Ilorin from 1900 to 1960, which leaves out the pre-colonial period and thus justifies this new study.

S. Y Omoiya's study, *The Balógun Institution in the 19th and 20th Centuries of Ilorin: A Study in the Dynamics of Emirate System*, provides foundational information on the evolution of the Balógun institution in the Ilorin Emirate especially as an integrating apparatus among the diverse groups, which made up the cosmopolitan community in the early days of the young Emirate.[105]

This study is relevant for an understanding of the diplomatic moves made by Emirs Abdulsalam and Shitta, in enlisting the loyalty and support of major groups in Ilorin, particularly the military commanders, known as *Balógun,* in the early period of Ilorin Emirate. However, this new study explores military events beyond the Emirate's establishment, to assess the effectiveness of physical, metaphysical, diplomatic, inter-group relations and other strategies employed in ensuring the survival of the state, given its heterogeneity.

I. A. Jawondo's thesis titled: *The Place of The Mosque in the History of Ilorin Emirate, 1823-2000,* examines the role of the mosque in the development of Ilorin Emirate in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. The study emphasized the importance of the mosque in the intellectual, political, social, economic and religious life of Ilorin Emirate in two centuries. The work describes the mosque not only as a building for supplication but also as the congregation of the entire Muslim community geared towards fostering the progress of the Islamic faith. [106]

The relevance of the thesis to the new study rests on the mosque being a centre of unity among various sections of the Muslim society in Ilorin, which enhanced the process of evangelism and socialization among them. Thus, the royalty, chiefs, warrior, merchants and the general public in Ilorin society all converged in the mosque to worship and learn the ways of Islam.

However, this new study explores how the mosque became an important instrument in Ilorin's *Jihad* campaign through the provision of spiritual support to the warriors, which was not emphasized in Jawondo's thesis. In this regard, the use of Quran verses in fervent prayers in the mosque became quite fundamental in Ilorin war effort.

R. A. Lasisi's study titled: "Dynamics of Culture: A Study of the Development and Impact of Islam in Igbominaland in the Twentieth Century"[107] explores the origin, pread and impact of

Islam in Igbominaland in the Twentieth Century. The study gives the nature of traditional religion in the Igbomina society before the advent of Islam and the various challenges the new religion faced from the traditionalists. Several factors which eventually favoured the pread of Islam were discussed in the study. These included efforts of Muslim traders from the north, proximity of Igbominaland to Ilorin, Bida and Lafiagi where the Islamic influence was already very strong by the late Nineteenth Century, the persuasive tendencies of the Muslim scholars and the liberal nature of the religion, the potency of Muslim spiritual charms and the favourable disposition of some members of Igbomina royal family towards the Islamic religion.

Lasisi's work is quite relevant to this current study because at a point in Ilorin emirate's wars of expansion, Islam became a factor used for propelling the campaigns. However, the work failed to emphasise the connection between military and evangelism in the Nineteenth Century. It imperative to emphasise this link because at a point in the Ilorin campaigns, the army was used for evangelism on one hand and Islam was also used to propel military campaigns on the other. However, it can not be concluded that Igbominaland surrendered to Islam because there were evidences indicating that some Igbomina rulers accepted Islam not out of free will but in order to protect their positions as rulers of their communities.

Notes and References

1. M.A.D was a popular Cold War slogan, which means Mutually Assured Destruction, used to describe the condition of parity between the United Staes and the Soviet Union in the design, production and deployment of Nuclear Weapons. M.A.D reflects the idea that one's population could best be protected by leaving it vulnerable so long as the other side faced comparable vulnerabilities. In short, being the first to shoot does not save any of the opposing sides, rather, it implies that whoever shoots first, dies second because the two sides have equal destructive capability.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE MILITARY AND ILORIN EMERGENCE AS A POLITY UP TO 1823

2.1 Ilorin before *Ààre* Afonja

The ancient Ilorin, that is, the Ilorin of the pre-war years or the Ilorin of the time of Ojo Isekuse, Emila and Laderin (Afonja's Great grandfather), was a small village, some 104 kilometers to the South of Old Oyo, otherwise called Oyo-Ajaka or Oyokoro or Oyo-Oro or Katunga or Eyeo, the ancient city built by Oramiyan (or Oranyan).[1] It lied in the Ẹkùn-Osi, one of the four provinces into which Yorubaland was divided; others being Ẹkùn-Ọtún, Èpo and Ìbọlọ Provinces. The chief town of Ẹkùn-Osi was Ikoyi, but Ikoyi itself, was under Old

Oyo, which also lied within the same Ekun-Osi Province. The main towns of Ẹkùn-Osi were: Ikoyi, the chief town, Kisi (then known as Kihisi), Igboho, Igbeti, Ilorin, Iwere, Ogbomoso, Igbon and some others.[2]

Traditions about the origin of Ilorin have remained subjects of historical debate, largely as a result of different positions and claims on the founding of the town.[3] These controversies can be examined from two perspectives; (i) who founded Ilorin? (ii) how did the name of the town evolve? The controversy is due mainly to historical conjectures, claims and counter claims, which have appeared in various sources. Indeed, the history of Ilorin before Afonja's era is still largely wrapped in obscurity as evidence for reconstructing that period is still quite scanty. However, a number of popular traditions on the founding of the town have been examined.

The most popular tradition is the one, which relates the founding of Ilorin to Ojo Isekuse, an itinerant hunter, believed to have come from Gambe, near Oyo Ile.[4] At that time, the place, now known as Ilorin, was characterised by stones, which Ojo used in sharpening his hunting instruments, somewhere in the heart of the town, at a place known as Bamidele compound, near Idi-Ape. It is said that the act of sharpening iron, that is *Ilo-irin* later become the name of Ojo's town. Ojo was later joined by another hunter, Emila, who hailed from Ela, in Oyo. The arrival of Ojo and settlement in the area is said to have attracted other settlers into Ilorin. In another claim to Ilorin's foundation, one Asaju, a hunter cum farmer, had been mentioned. It is said that Asaju's arrival in the area had encouraged other people to converge in the town. The name, Asaju (the leader) attests to the foremost acts of the man in hunting and farming in the area at this early period.[5]

The second tradition relates to the name of the town. This mythological explanation suggests that Ilorin is a derivative of *Ilu-Erin,* which literally translates as "the town of elephants". This tradition claims that Ilorin was a game field for hunters from various parts of Yorubaland. According to this myth, hunters were attracted to the area because big animals, particularly, elephants, were found there. For this reason, the area was referred to as "*Ìlú-Erin*" (elephants abode), which was later corrupted as Ilorin.[6]

Also there is the third tradition which claims that the town's name was derived from *Ìlú-Irin,* (town of iron). This tradition claims that people were attracted to the area by smelting activities, and that the name of the town, Ilorin, was a derivation from the two Yoruba words, *Ilo-irin,* which literally translated as smelting of Iron.

An analysis of the traditions above leaves much to be desired in their claim on the origin of Ilorin. From these claims and counter claims, it is difficult to conclude on the authenticity of any of the traditions as there has not yet been ample evidence, either, cultural or material to substantiate them. However, the tradition of Ilorin being founded by Ojo Isekuse has enjoyed wide acceptance among historians.

On the naming of the town, *Ilo-rin*, *Ìlú-Erin*, or *Ìlú-Irin*; there is evidence on the possibility of iron implements being sharpened on the rock at Bamidele compound, and the fact of Ojo Isekuse, whose place of abode was around the location, to have used iron instruments as a hunter. Banwo indicates that there was some concentration of iron ore in Ilorin metropolis and some other Igbomina areas of Ilorin environs. He believes this factor was very significant for the practice of blacksmithing in the town. Meanwhile there is no strong archaeological evidence or cultural remains in Ilorin as in Nok, Daima or Oyo,[7] where evidence of iron smelting had been amply discovered through excavations. However, the fact that Ilorin's early history emphasises the role of hunters and iron weapons provides the basis that the town's name may have come from a vocation related to iron-smelting and hunting.

Lastly, the tradition of Ilorin being a corrupted version of *Ìlú-Erin* (town of elephants) is lacking in evidence. Apart from the reported killing of an elephant in 1824, on the outskirts of the town, which probably must have strayed into the area, no further evidence to buttress the presence of wild animals or elephants in such substantial number abounds to have justified the naming of the town *Ìlú-Erin* or town of elephants. It is however pertinent to state that the 1824 incident may have resulted in the naming of a section of the town *Oko-Erin*, which has remained a reminiscence of the incident.

However, all these traditions with their divergent claims, and indentified weaknesses, suggest that Ilorin inhabitants in the early period included hunters, who probably settled in scattered bands in different locations, unaware of each other. It is certain, however, that the town had been in existence before 1800, and that until 1817, the territory formed the northernmost part of Yoruba domains, under the political authority of Old Oyo and that the Aláàfin had sent his representative there long before the era of Afonja.

Religious Practices in ancient Ilorin

Apparently, since Ilorin was under Old Oyo Empire, it follows therefore that her religious beliefs and practices were in line with what obtained in the empire. Thus, in ancient Ilorin, traditional religions existed. The main ones were *Yemoja*, (the chief religion), *Ifá, Òrìsàálá* (*Obàtálá*), *Sàngó* (headed by *Ìkólàbà*), *Oro* and *Egúngún* (headed by the *Alápinni*).[8] These traditional practices were popular in ancient Ilorin, especially in the Yoruba quarter of Idi Ape, throughout the pre-Fulani rule. Indeed, reminiscence of traditional religious practices in the Afonja domain of Idi Ape was indicated by the song which states:

Iyemoja lo n' Idi Ape,
Iyemoja,
Ogunmo Yee Yee Yee Iyemoja.
Meaning: *Iyemoja*, the great diety that thrive in Idi Ape, we hail thee.

However, in the outlying areas of Gambari, Gaa and Oke-Suna, Islam was widely practised before Sheik Alimi's arrival in Ilorin. In fact, Oke-Suna was known throughout Yorubaland as the home of several Muslim divines popularly known as the Sheiks of Oke-Suna .[9]

Initially, this religious dichotomy did not have significant impact on inter-group relations in the city because the two groups lived quite distant from each other; the Yoruba traditionalists being in the mainstream of the city in the Idi-Ape quarters, while the Muslims predominated the outlying portion, specifically Oke-Suna. However, as events unfolded, religion would play a part in the crises between these two groups.

2.2 Oyo Influence on the Evolution of Ilorin Army

Old Oyo military influence on Ilorin predates the ascension of Afonja as *Àare OnaKákánfò.*[10] Oyo's military strength was responsible for a massive territorial expansion, which was sustained by a well laid administrative mechanism for policing the outlying territories and vassal states to ensure their loyalty to the *Aláàfin*. For instance, there are indications that the *Aláàfin* appointed ambassadors to pay diplomatic visits to, and possibly reside in Dahomey in the latter part of the eighteenth century in order to collect tribute due to him, and to report any Dahomean military successes so that he might demand a share of the spoils. In the same vein, the Oyo government stationed agents (*Ìlàri*) in Egbaland, while it was tributary to them, a relationship which was probably broken towards the end of the eighteenth century.[11]

Earlier, *Aláàfin* Ojigi's desire in the seventeenth century to save the Igbomina people, whom he regarded as his kith and kin, from the Nupe rulers, who used the place as a slave reservoir, must have encouraged him to first establish his authority in Ilorin in order to ease the extension of his control over the area. Through this act, the scattered settlements in the area were united with the sending of a resident (*Ajẹlẹ*) to protect the *Aláàfin*'s interest. Laderin, Afonja's Great-grand father, was the first Oyo Empire's *Ajẹlẹ* in Ilorin. In turn, the empire's *Ajẹlẹ* in the town passed from Laderin to his son, Pasin and then to Alugbin, Afonja's father, and later to *Kákánfò* Afonja himself.[12] It could therefore be argued that Ilorin's military role in the later period was possibly encouraged by Old Oyo's military tradition, since the area was for a long time, part of the territories under the empire's control.

It should be emphasised that Oyo's might and influence during this period rested squarely on its military and warrior tradition. Indeed, *Aláàfin* Onigbogi's reign was bedeviled with disaster as a result of the relaxation of Oyo's warrior tradition. The *Aláàfin* fled into exile following the invasion and defeat of Old Oyo by the Nupe. It is also recorded that the exile of the Aláàfins lasted for 75 years. While in exile, the *Aláàfins* revived their warrior tradition, restoring eventually, the military might of the empire and re-occupying Old Oyo around A.D 1610.[13] Some of the Aláàfins during this distressed time included Onigbogi during who's reign the *Tapas* (Nupe) raided Oyo; his son, Ofiran, who took his subjects to the Bariba country; Eguguoju, who built Oyo Igboho and Orompoto, who re-enacted Oyo's military prowess.[14] Perhaps, it was in furtherance of this military renaissaxzznce that Aláàfin Ajagbo, one of the earliest and most renowned of Yoruba Kings in the middle of the 17th century, created the position of *Àare OnaKákánfò*.[15]

Ajagbo bestowed this tittle on a warrior-friend of his, named *Kòkòròǵàǹgà*. He also instituted the system of sending out four expeditions at the same time, one under the *Basorun,* another under the *Agbakin,* the third under the *Kákánfò* and the fourth under the *Asipa*. In fact, the *Kákánfò* was expected by tradition to go to war once in three years to whatever place the *Aláàfin* named, and dead or alive, to return home victorious, or be brought home a corpse within three months. This tradition meant that wherever the *Kákánfò* was stationed would wield a soldierly outlook and could develop into a military state. This eventually happened in Ilorin.

After the death of *Kankafo* Oyabi, during whose tenure, the highly dreaded Basorun Gaa, was slain, Afonja of Ilorin demanded the title. Meanwhile as a prince (through the mother), the title

was below his rank, for the *Kákánfò* ranks after the *Basorun*. However, being the highest military title, it suited Afonja's restless nature, and so he obtained it from *Aláàfin* Aole.[16] Therefore, Afonja's ascension to the position of *Ààre OnaKákánfò* came as a continuation of an established Oyo's tradition of positioning the most powerful of the *Esos* (guardians of the Kingdom) in the most menaced and vulnerable part of the empire, which at that material time, was Ilorin, to check the perceived and imminent threat of Nupe invaders. Earlier in a similar way, *Kákánfò* Oyabi had been stationed in Ajasse to check Dahomey excesses.

Afonja, whose praise name "*Laya Loko*", describes him as "the brave warrior with the spear", had an initially peaceful relation with *Aláàfin* Aole, until the situation turned sour, eventually resulting in animosity. The circumstances which led to the revolt by *Ààre* Afonja have enjoyed adequate commentary in Yoruba history and should therefore not be the concern of this study. However, it is pertinent to emphasise that the Iwere episode[17], served as a strong motivation for the *Ààre*'s resolve to establish himself in Ilorin. This was against the extant tradition of the empire, which required him to report back to the *Aláàfin* after every military campaign.

With this act of defiance, *Ààre* Afonja sought to rid himself of Oyo's authority, and embarked on the more important mission of achieving independence and sovereignty for Ilorin, his own enclave in the empire. To achieve this onerous task, he needed to expand his military base. Thus, aside from the soldiers the Ààre controlled as the Commander-in-Chief of Oyo army, a considerable proportion of his army during and after the rebellion came from the Hausa slaves. Before the crisis, Ilorin and her surroundings had attracted a large number of Hausa and Hausa slaves, most of who were engaged in various vocations in the area.[18] Many of these slaves were employed as barbers, cattle-rearers and rope makers. Some of them were enslaved by non-Muslims and used as domestic servants at home and on plantations. It is possible to suggest that the Muslim slaves were not satisfied with their position possibly because their masters did not treat them well. Apart from that, they must have abhorred their being slaves of non-Muslims. It could be stated therefore that the slaves were in a state of discontent and were eager to embrace a change in leadership that would improve their condition.

Therefore, as from the death of *Aláàfin* Aole *c*.1796, powerful men collected individual armies and started attacking various towns, not with the intention to protect the citizens or maintain peace, rather for personal enterprise. Opele, the *Baale* of Gbogun and Afonja, the *Ààre OnaKákánfò* in nearby Ilorin, played the most prominent roles in the destruction episodes.[19] There were probably countless other bullies, whose names have been lost in history, and who,

then fearing no possibility of punishment by any lawful authority, roamed the countryside creating terror and panic. An example was the formation of *Ogo Were* (translated as the Jackals or Young Glories) formed in the *Epo* (present Osun). To get their individual armies, they encouraged slaves to rebel and assert their freedom and enlisted free citizens, who were hardly better treated than slaves, and who were groaning under the tyranny of the ruling classes. Opele died early in this rebellious phase, leaving Afonja as the sole powerful man, who then went ahead and cowed down the whole Igbomina and what is now the Osun area (then called Epo), into subjection.[20]

However, a most enduring legacy of *Ààre* Afonja on Ilorin was perhaps the achievement of independence for the town and incorporation of several scattered settlement into it. Ilorin is often spoken of as Afonja's Ilorin because he was the most renowned of her rulers in the early period and also because it was Afonja who made it into a large settlement before the Emirate period. In doing this, he had incorporated a number of previously scattered settlements into the town. There were several towns and villages around, at no very great distance from Ilorin such as Kanla, Oke-Suna, Ganmo, Elerinjare, Idofian, Oke-oyi, Ibare, Igbon, Iresa and so on, most of them, this restless warrior captured one by one and settled around Ilorin so as to make it into a big town that it later became. He enrolled the able bodied men in his army and sold several others into slavery in order to have the wherewithal to maintain and supply arms to his war boys. Thus, the *Ààre* was able to lay a military foundation in Ilorin, which was inherited and transformed after the establishment of the Emirate.

2.3 Al Salih's Invitation and Influence on the Emerging Army

Having garnered enough support through his army, which comprised largely of runaway slaves, Afonja sought to boost his enterprise with the invitation of Al-Salih (known in Ilorin as *Sheik Alimi*), a Muslim preacher, who had visited several towns in Yorubaland.[21] The towns he visited included, Oyo, Ogbomoso, Kuwo and later Ilorin. As Al Salih's fame increased, and news of his spiritual talent spread, he became a hotcake demanded by all, including the poor and the rich, the governed and the rulers in Yorubaland. In response to one of such numerous demands, he went to Ogbomoso as a guest of Toyeje, the Baale of Ogbomoso, who was Afonja's friend and the then deputy *Ààre OnaKákánfò*. Sheik Salih was said to have been so impressed by the hospitality of his host that he buried some charms round the town and specifically prayed that Ogbomoso would never be subdued military.

Ààre Afonja's belief in the efficacy of the Sheik's spiritual powers must have encouraged him to invite him over. Moreover, the *Ààre* was in search of new spiritual powers that would be different from the ones he had acquired in Oyo, which he believed, could be neutralized on account of his insubordination and rebellion. Thus, through the *Baale* of Ogbomoso, Afonja made overtures to the Sheik, requesting him to come to Ilorin to give spiritual succor in the face of hopelessness due to imminent and dreadful military invasion by the *Aláàfin*'s forces.[22] When the Sheik arrived in Ilorin, he lodged with Olufadi, the head of the pastoral Fulani and was housed behind the present location of the *Emir*'s palace. Yoruba leaders in his entourage such as the progenitors of *Balógun* Ajikobi, *Magaji* Seeni and *Magaji* Oju-Ekun, were hosted by the Ala'asa family at Idi-Ape, whose progenitor was Ojo Isekuse, the first Yoruba settler in Ilorin.[23]

Afonja also invited to Ilorin a rich and powerful friend at Kuwo named Solagberu, who quartered himself at the outskirts of the town. Johnson also reports that all Hausa slaves in the adjacent towns hitherto employed as barbers, rope-makers, and cowherds, now deserted their masters and flocked to Ilorin to joined Afonja, the *Kákánfò*, and were protected against their masters. Meanwhile, under Solagberu also flocked Mohammedans (Muslims) from Gbanda, Kobayi, Agoho, Kuwo, and Kobe. All in his quarter being Moslems, he named that part of the town Oke-Suna, that is, the quarter of the faithful. They held themselves separate not only from the pagans, but also from *Fulahs* or Fulanis, their co-religionists.[24]

Nonetheless, Al-Salih's arrival coincided with the slave revolt and had significant implication on the history of Ilorin. His presence must have increased the momentum with which the slaves carried out the revolt, although there is no record that he encouraged them. For the Muslims, it was a golden opportunity to practice their religion. Secondly, the revolt by the Muslim slaves was also the beginning of the process which turned Ilorin into an Emirate six years later. Bands of Hausa and Fulani from the North, known as *Jama'a* also came to the town and enlisted in the *Ààre*'s army, following Al-Salih's arrival in the area.[25]

Afonja was thus encouraged by the might of his military as to have openly defied *Aláàfin* Maku, who reigned after Aole. The newly enthroned king had sent him (Afonja) a message: "*The new moon has appeared*". To this, Afonja insolently replied: "*Let the new moon quickly set"*.[26] The *Ààre* is said to have further encouraged Al-Salih to also send for his children to join him in Ilorin. In complying, the Sheik seems to have made it clear to Afonja that "he would find them more ambitious than their father". It is possible that Al-Salih quietly prepared

the ground for his son's ascension to power. Abdulsalami and Shitta arrived in due course. Alimi had two other sons, one Abubakar Daudu Saloja, whose ruthlessness later earned him the nickname, "*Beribepo*," and the other, Daniyalu, who was born at Ilorin, and Asiata the only daughter. Abubakar Daudu Solaja became the District Head of Malete and Daniyalu, was favoured with the District Head of Ejidongari, for these two brothers preferred territorial aggrandisement to succession to the throne.[27]

Meanwhile, the *Àare'*s new military arrangement had thus placed enormous power in the hands of the Fulani–Hausa stock, who constituted the majority in his army. This new army however did not go without a challenge from the Oyo group. Afonja's open defiance of Aláàfin Maku undoubtedly amounted to a declaration of war on the Old Oyo. The first major test of the Àare's new army came from Ojo Agunbambaru, one of the surviving sons of Basorun Gaa. Ojo had escaped to the Bariba country during the general massacre of Gaa's children and relatives during the reign of *Aláàfin* Abiodun. Hearing of the present state of the country, he thought there could never be a more favourable opportunity for him to avenge his father's death, and also to obtain his title without opposition. It is also significant to state that like Afonja, Ojo Agunbambaru also relied largely on soldiers from outside the kingdom, having recruited his army among the dreaded warriors of Borgu.[28]

He thereafter returned from the Bariba country with an immense army, entered Oyo and under the pretext of espousing the king's cause, began to execute his plans. Ojo's realisation that it was only Afonja who could stand in his way in his attempt to achieve his objectives promoted him to declare war on anybody who allied or made friend with the Àare. He put to death indiscriminately, most of the influential citizens who were named as Afonja's friends and allies. On the whole, about 100 chiefs were dispatched, who were either his father's enemies or who might have opposed his main plan. Ojo's action had thus further worsened the kingdom's internal problems as most Oyo chiefs and subject trembled with insecurity and uncertainly about their lives. This contributed to the already precarious state the kingdom was and put it in more troubles. Ojo's army had been further swelled by recruits from all Yoruba towns, who feared his vengeance should he be vicarious in his effort.

However, this support from the Yoruba chiefs was not wholehearted as they had secret plan to desert him at the height of the campaign. This treachery was formed between the chiefs and the Onikoyi because of Ojo's excesses in the Empire. When eventually the battles ensued, Ojo initially recorded victories on three occasions, routing Afonja's army with the *Àare* retreating

precipitately to Ilorin to fortify the town against the approach of the conqueror. Indeed, Ilorin was besieged and was nearly taken as Afonja's courage was failing from repeated reverses, when private messages from the enemy's camp were sent to encourage him to hold out a little longer. At last, the final decisive battle was to be fought, Afonja and his army had pressed on every side, being shut up within their forts, and the town was on the point of being taken when Adegun, the Onikoyi and his accomplices suddenly gave way in the heat of the battle, and the great conqueror, Ojo Agunbambaru, irretrievably lost the day.[29] Having been deserted by his allies, whose cause he claimed to be espousing, Ojo considered himself unsafe and thereafter returned to the Bariba country with the remnant of his army.

With this victory for Ilorin, which was partly facilitated by the support given by Al Salih's followers, and largely by internal conspiracy and treachery among the Yoruba chiefs against Ojo Agunbambaru, Afonja secured the town and Oyo's move to reclaim it was postponed to another time.

2.4 Demise of Ààre Afonja

The defeat of Ojo Agunbambaru proved a great boost for *Ààre* Afonja's efforts at building Ilorin into a big locality. He thereafter followed up by subduing the *Ogo Were* (the jackals), who emerged among the *Epos*. This group, headed by Aresa, had imitated Afonja, though without a clearly defined objective. The *Kákánfò* received the news with mixed feelings of jealousy and suspicion; he therefore sent for and enquired from Toyeje, the *Baale* of Ogbomoso, his Otun (Commander of the Right) what he understood by that movement, but the *Baale* too did not know much about the group. Afonja thereafter declared war on the Epos and several towns in that province were taken, only Ogbahagbaha and Iwo amongst the principal towns escaped. Ilobu and Ejigbo, amongst the Ibolos were also taken, and the *Ogo Were* was suppressed. Thus, *Ààre* Afonja was now the sole power in the empire, the king and the capital were left to manage their own affairs by themselves.[30]

In another perspective, the reforming movement of the Fulani preacher, Usman Dan Fodio in the opening of the Nineteenth Century, had swept through Hausaland, transforming the Muslim farmers there into a holy army bent on carrying the *Koran* to the sea. The downward spread of the Jihad mission from Hausaland soon reached Ilorin, which was already pacified for the reforming group by the prevailing conditions in the town in particular, and Yorubaland in general. For instance, the slave revolts, Al-salih's arrival with his Jama'a and continuous

breakdown of Old Oyo's political and administrative traditions, all served as catalysts for the new wind of religious change in Ilorin.

Eventhough, the Jihad in Hausaland came to an end in 1809, fighting for the establishment of Emirates as part of the wider caliphate continued in places throughout the first half of the Nineteenth Century. Nupe and Ilorin were among the Emirates established much later in the Jihad period.[31] Meanwhile, Islam had already penetrated among the Yoruba, and thus the Fulani joined co-religionists and sympathizers as they rode southward.

For Ilorin, Oke-Suna under Solagberu, had earlier been illustrated as a Muslim enclave in the town while Al-Salih's group was also multiplying steadily. Islam thus provided a solid platform for unity of purpose for the *Jama'a*, who now constituted the larger chunk of Afonja's army. They therefore saw themselves as an important element in the survival of Ilorin as an independent entity. This *Jama'a* thus resorted to committing atrocities and rapacity to the extent that Fagbohun, the Left Wing Commander of the army had to draw the Àáre 's attention to the implication of these excesses of the slave-soldiers, who were commonly referred to as *Àáre* 's servants. Johnson writes of the excesses of the Jama'a thus*:*

> To further illustrate the gross licenses of these Jama'a, slaves, who had deserted their masters often returned to the same town and even to the very house as a Jama'a, making their former master's house their headquarters for their rapine; masters who were kind to them formally were now repaid by protection against the rapacity of their comrades; but the unkind ones were now treated with heartless revenge. These fellows were not regarded now as slaves but as the Kákánfò's servants.[32]

There was thus, a big challenge of keeping a harmonious relation between these ethically and religiously divergent Ilorin inhabitants. Relation between Al-Salih and Afonja, it was said, remained cordial but there was increasing tension as the number of Muslim immigrants in Ilorin continued to increase and their religious activities also increased. Local tradition maintains that *Alimi* (Al-Salih) took no active part in these happenings; that he had no personal ambition, and even refused an invitation from Afonja to become a chief. It is said that he exerted himself to restrain the *Jama'a*, and that, when they would not listen to him, he contemplated returning to Sokoto in disgust. According to this account, Alimi to the end was only an influential Mallam, who exercised no political power and, who died after living for six years with Afonja and making charms for him.[33] It must be added that this account does not agree with the Oyo version, according to which Mallam Alimi was an ambitious adventurer, who conspired to kill Afonja.

Nevertheless, the followers of Afonja became apprehensive and intolerant of the alarming influx of the Muslims into Ilorin. The Muslims too, as their population grew and interaction between them and other members of the community inevitably increased, became intolerably irritated by the heinous aspects of the pagan customs of the aboriginal Yoruba. This situation, coupled with the already precarious scenario occasioned by the excesses of the slave soldiers, eventually ignited a serious friction between the two groups. It was said that a masquerade was provoked by a Muslim boy from Sheik Alimi's household and the boy was pursued right into the Sheik's residence by the *egungun*.[34] This was considered an abominable act by the Muslims, who stripped the masquerade naked before sending him out of the Sheik's residence after a brutal assault. In the same vein, *Ààre'*s followers and traditional religion adherents considered the Muslims action on their sacred tradition unpardonable. This therefore triggered a riot between the two groups. However, the numerical advantage of the Muslims saw them victorious, leaving the Egungun protagonists with heavy causalities and humiliation.

With this reality, both sides began secret preparation for war. Unfortunately for Afonja, his brother Agborin, the Baba Isale and Lasia, one of his most reliable military commanders, died while this preparation for war was on. Under this circumstance, Afonja had to seek external assistance, especially as the Muslims and non-Yoruba in Ilorin then had greatly outnumbered his own followers and kinsmen and even constituted an appreciable proportion of his own army. He therefore sent a private message to the Onikoyi and other powerful chiefs in the country, inviting them to make their appearances in Ilorin immediately, and to assist him in annihilating these *Jama'a*.[35] This attempt was however too late as the *Ààre* had lost the friendship and support of all the powerful chiefs in the Kingdom, including his former friend and ally, Solagberu of Oke-Suna.

Regardless of this precarious condition, the *Ààre* still went ahead with his plan to dislodge the *Jama'a*, but this secret soon got out. When he found himself overwhelmed by numbers, he dispatched Bugare, his new head slave, to solicit aid from Solagberu, who detained him; saying "*your master had hitherto looked down upon us as his menials, and why does he now require our aid*?"[36] The *Kákánfò*, thus had no more choice than to face the insurgency with the remnant of his faithfuls within the walls of his house, but when the house was set on fire, he rushed out again into the streets. Afonja himself in the midst of his supporters fought desperately until he fell like a hero. So covered was he with darts that his body was reportedly supported in an erect position upon the shafts of spears and arrows showered upon him.[37]

It is significant to emphasise that the *Jama'a*, whom *Ààre* Afonja relished their support in his enterprise to sever Ilorin from Old Oyo Empire, and establish the town as an independent polity, eventually precipitated his death. It is also imperative to ask whether the curse placed on the rebels, who toppled *Aláàfin* Aole, had come to pass! In any case, Afonja's reign in Ilorin, even though short-lived, left an enduring legacy in the history of the town and, indeed, Yorubaland. Apparently, it si for this reason that the town is often referred to as *Ilorin Afonja,* which immortalises the generalissimo in the town.

2.5 Emergence of the Emirate System in Ilorin

Ààre Afonja's demise, following his arduous attempt to dislodge the Fulani in Ilorin, ushered in a new era in the town's history; a change of dynasty, in which leadership in the community devolved on his former allies (mercenaries). It is said that after Afonja's departure, Alimi consolidated his religious leadership of the whole town, assisted by his two sons, Abdulsalami and Shitta. Because of the Sheik's piety and intellectual superiority, the heads of all the communal groupings in the town, namely Olufadi of the Fulani, Bako, the Sarkin Gambari and Solagberu of Oke-Suna submitted themselves to his leadership and acknowledged him as the "*Amir ul-Muminin*" (Leader of the Faithfuls). This religious factor had enhanced the Sheik's influence in the town, having been able to enlist the loyalty and trust of the vast majority of the people. He enjoyed this advantage by concentrating on matters bordering on religion while leaving his son Abdulsalami to preside over non-religious matters.

Sheik Alimi's death was however followed by a tussle for the leadership of the town. Interestingly, none of the contending candidates was a Yoruba man. Rather, the struggle was between Abdulsalami, the Sheik's first son and a number of individuals, who were, themselves, leaders of their respective groups. These were Bako, the Sarkin Gambari and Solagberu, head of the Oke-Suna Muslims, himself, a Kanuri from Borno. Bako's claim to the leadership was hinged on the fact that he had been established as the *Sarkin Gambari* (Head of the Hausa) before the arrival of Sheik Alimi in Ilorin.[38] At the time, two men, who played important roles in the local affairs of Ilorin were *Sarkin* Gambari and *Sarkin* Gobir. These two personalities exercised authority over Hausawa and Gobirawa, a large number of whom had followed Alimi to Ilorin.

The birth place of *Sarkin* Gambari is said to be Zamfara.[39] When Alimi continued his travels further south to Ogbomoso and to other important Yoruba towns, including Oyo (where he had several audiences of the Aláàfin), Sarkin Gobir accompanied him, while Sarkin Gambari

remained at Ilorin and acquired considerable power. His importance is attested by the possession of *Kakaki* and *Tambari* (trumpet and big drum), which were paraphernalia of royalty. For this reason, coupled with his advanced age and his status as Sarkin Gambari, which he had been since the days of Afonja and the arrival of Sheik Alimi, he considered himself more qualified. Abdulsalami however emerged victorious. His victory was largely due to the unflinching support he received from the numerous disciples of his father and those who followed his father to Ilorin as students, as well as others who were his kinsmen. The Sheik's charisma and intellectual qualities came to play for his son and he eventually obtained the position as *Sarkin* Ilorin.

However, Solagberu outrightly declared his opposition to and rejection of Abdulsalami's assumption of leadership over Ilorin. He insisted that the acceptance of Sheik Alimi's leadership by himself and the entire people of Oke-Suna was not a surrender of the autonomy, which the community enjoyed in the days of Afonja to Alimi's family. He argued further that the Sheik's children had no automatic or hereditary entitlement to the leadership of the Ilorin conglomerate. He was thus, very determined to preserve the autonomy, which Oke-Suna, his own enclave of the town, enjoyed, prior to Sheik Alimi's arrival. It is said that Abdulsalami employed tactical diplomacy in dealing with this looming insurgency by distancing the rest of the community from Oke-Suna, thereby limiting Solagberu's sphere of influence. The impression was thus given that Solagberu was being inordinately ambitious and egoistic. [40]

On the other hand, Solagberu, it was said, did not employ much tact in dealing with the situation. Rather, his uncompromising position on the issue was based on the historical fact that he and his Oke-Suna quarters had been autonomous before the Sheik's arrival. Furthermore, he argued, considering his own depth of Quranic knowledge as well as his Islamic missionary achievement in establishing Oke-Suna as an exclusively Islamic community within the otherwise pagan Ilorin environment, and in promoting Islam in northern Yorubaland generally, he was the most qualified and eligible as the *Amir-Muminin*. He therefore formed an alliance with Toyeje, the Baale of Ogbomoso against Abdulsalami, and the object being to dislodge the emerging Fulani hegemony in Ilorin. Solagberu's alliance with Ogbomoso did not however yield good results as it led to his death in the hand of forces loyal to Abdulsalami. He was put to death at his enclave in Oke-Suna after much fighting. Oke-Suna was completely destroyed while its inhabitants that surrendered were granted amnesty and permitted to settle inside Ilorin under the watchful eyes of the *Emir*.[41]

Thus, Abdulsalam's ability to successfully remove this internal opposition as epitomised by *Ààre* Afonja and later Solagberu, ultimately led to the emergence of the Emirate system in Ilorin and it ushered in a new era in the city's political leadership. His next move was to put the Emirate on sound foundation in line with the procedure laid down by the caliphate.

2.6 Validating the Emirate System in Ilorin

With the demise of Solagberu, Abdulsalam embarked on the next serious mission of legitimizing his rule as Emir in Ilorin by seeking the recognition of Gwandu, under whose domain, his territory was in the caliphate system. This became expedient given the precarious position the Emirate found itself at this early period. In the first place, a Fulani dynasty in Ilorin, which was originally under Oyo's suzerainty, was regarded as an aberration by the Yoruba. Furthermore, Ilorin as a frontier Emirate of the caliphate, was far away from the other main stream Emirates in the northern part of what later became Nigeria and as such was quite vulnerable to adversaries.

Second and more importantly, unlike the other Emirates in Hausaland, which were founded by people, who had obtained flags from Sokoto or Gwandu, Ilorin did not obtain a flag for its Jihad expedition. Rather, the Jihad was amply favoured by the precarious nature of Yoruba society of the period. Indeed, the letter written by Abdulsalami to the *Emir* of Gwandu clearly buttressed this point. In an extract from the letter, the *Emir* had implored Gwandu not to listen to "*slanderers and trouble makers*" in Ilorin.

This letter was written to denounce all those who might have been trying to establish links with the Gwandu authorities, and at the same time asking for Gwaudu's recognition. This was necessary as it would give Abdulsalami political advantage over his rivals. Furthermore, the Emir envisaged the enormous diplomatic benefit such relationship would bring to his authority and administration in Ilorin. For instance, as a recognised leader, he would be in a position to enter into official communication with Gwandu. He could equally seek assistance for the protection of the Emirate in case of attacks from the Yoruba, who as expected were not ready to give up Ilorin without stiff resistance.

This foresight through the letter, yielded positive results and the objectives for which it was sent were achieved. The *Emir* of Gwandu, in the reply to Abdulslam's letter, recognised and acknowledged him as "*Emir of Yoruba* and assured of support by the Sokoto Caliphate". The reply, in part, reads thus:

> Then we have understood your letter and have pondered your excellent message in which you inform us that you are under our supervision and judgment, and in which you tell us of your origin, or, if not your origin, of how your line emerged. Indeed we do not listen to slanderers; for among the people there are both good men and trouble makers. You also tell us that you will never defy our command, and that you pray God to prevent you from deviation in this regard. This is the substance of your message. Know therefore with certainty, my brothers, that we accept unreservedly all you have spoken of in your letter…[42]

This letter amounted to the conferment of emirship of Ilorin on Abdulsalam. That was about the year 1823, which marked the formal beginning of Fulani rule in Ilorin and the incorporation of its Emirate into the Sokoto caliphate. However, this arrangement was a clear departure from the *modus operandi* of the caliphate in appointing the *emirs*. Flags, signifying the symbols of authority were given to *Emirs*, who represented the Caliph as *Amir-Muminin* in their respective Emirates. Typical of such letter of appointment was the one given to Ya'qub on his assumption of responsibility as the *Emir* of Bauchi.[43] Nonetheless, Gwandu's recognition had authenticated the Fulani rule in Ilorin. This new found friendship and acceptance would later prove invaluable in Ilorin's war of survival against Oyo forces.

Meanwhile, the emergence of a Fulani dynasty in Ilorin, using the *Jihad* as a catalyst, is quite in congruence with historical antecedents in a number of societies. For example the Sayfawa lost their control of Borno to the El-Kanemi group in the Nineteenth Century, an event, which followed a similar pattern as the Ilorin episode. The seizure of Ibadan from the Egba group by Oyo fugitives, following their emigration from Old Oyo, also attests to the fact that the emergence of Fulani leadership in Ilorin was not a new development in history. Elsewhere, the annihilation of the Red Indians in America and the displacement of the Maoris in New Zealand further buttress the fact that change of dynasty is part of the lessons of history.

2.7 Abdulsalam's Effort to Sustain Ilorin as an Emirate

The moves by *Emir* Abdulsalam to sustain Ilorin as an Emirate within the Sokoto caliphate can be viewed from two dimensions. The first being the survival of the young Emirate in the

face of adversaries from the Oyo Empire, which hitherto held suzerainty over Ilorin. The second, which is closely linked with the first, was the security of the emir's position as the undisputed leader in the town amidst internal opposition from other groups. The competition between Abdulsalam, Bako and Solagberu for leadership has been examined in the preceding section and how Abdulsalam emerged victorious.

However, the *Emir* did not rest in his mission to consolidate his authority as the political leader in Ilorin. Thus, he made moves to ensure that all paraphernalia of authority and leadership in the Emirate were traceable to him. For instance, on the death of Bako, the *Sarkin* Gambari, who was one of the contestants in the tussle for leadership in Ilorin, in 1831, the son seemed to have gone to Abdulsalam to confirm or support him in his office. Abdulsalam, by means of a trick, deprived him of his *Kakaki* and *Tambari*, both symbols of royalty.[44] As a result of this, much of the powers of the *Sarkin* Gambari changed hands. This was part of Abdulsalami's moves to ensure that he remained the only supreme ruler of Ilorin.

Indeed, he had earlier in his letter to the Emir of Gwandu, employed subtle diplomacy to misrepresent Bako, the *Sarkin* Gambari. Abdulsalami had highlighted the fact that the *Sarkin* Gambari was a Prince from Zamfara, which was hostile to the Fulani generally, and to Usman Dan Fodio in particular, during the early days of the Jihad mission. This reference to Zamfara was intended to portray the *Sarkin* Gambari as an enemy of the Sokoto Caliphate, a point, which was well taken by Gwandu.[45] Thus, the seizure of those items of royal accoutrement was to further reduce the status of the *Sarkin* Gambari, and indeed, the Hausa in the town, and elevate his own status as the Emir of Ilorin.

In another perspective, the killing of Solagberu, a renowned Muslim scholar, and subsequent destruction of his Oke-Suna Muslim community, had left a scar on the sanctity of the Jihad mission in Ilorin and indeed, Yorubaland. In fact, Oke-Suna had been the home of several Muslim clerics, known throughout Yorubaland as the "Sheiks of Oke-Suna".[46] Thus, Abdulsalami was under obligation to pacify the community, particularly, the non-Fulani groups.

The Emir therefore employed internal diplomacy to calm wounded nerves within the Emirate. He appointed four warlords with the title "*Maiyaki*" (*Balógun*). Gambari (Hausa), who is said to have come from Katisina; Fulani, whose family had been settled in the Yoruba country (Iresa) for sometimes; Ajikobi who had previously lived at Isehin, and Alánàmú, who came to Ilorin from Reke through Kuwo.[47] Leaders of these major linguistic groups were coopted as

members of the Emirate council and as war commanders. They were accorded military and administrative responsibilities in the re-organised structure of the young Emirate.[48]

This move must have been conceived for two reasons. First, the consideration that Ilorin was historically a Yoruba locality, under the authority of the Old Oyo Empire, in which there would be some disgruntled elements with grievances against a Fulani leadership in a Yoruba environment. Secondly, the move was to forestall internal insurrection and provide a strong military base for the sustenance of the authority of the young Emirate. This was a showcase of diplomacy in the internal consolidation of the Emirate. It was also imperative as a preparatory strategy for anticipated attacks from Oyo, under whose authority Ilorin was, prior to its emergence as an *emirate.*

Furthermore, the *Balógun* system served as an integrating apparatus among the diverse groups, who contributed to the emergence of the *Emirate* system in the town. It was a means of keeping their loyalty in the face of any attacks. Henceforth, each of the *Balóguns* was expected to raise an army among the people of his domain. This internal cohesion was crucial to the survival of the young Emirate so that the diverse groups can unite and face any common enemies that emerged. It did not only lead to a significant increase in the size of Ilorin army, but also improved the army commanders' loyalty to the *Emir*. In fact, various attempts by Oyo to regain Ilorin were frustrated due to this internal diplomacy.

Notes and References

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2. *Ibid.*
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4. Jimoh, L. A. K. *Ilorin: The Journey So Far*. Atoto Press Ltd, Ilorin, p. 18.
5. Interview with Baba Eleran, Abayawo Area. Ilorin, Aged 87 years, on 1st June, 2015.
6. Sheik Ahmad bn. Abi Bakri (Abu-Ikokoro), *Tailif Akhbar al-gurun min Umara bilad Ilorin.*
7. Iron smelting and iron working remains had been discovered through archaeological excavation at Nok, Daima and Oyo, dating back to different periods in history. Such evidence has not been discovered in Ilorin.
8. Jimba, S. *A Chronicle of Ilorin*. Samaki Publishers, Ilorin, 2009, p. 33.
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12 Johnson S. *History of the Yoruba*…, pp. 188-192
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14. Johnson, S. *Histroy of the Yoruba* …, pp. 188-192.
15. *Ibid*, p.200.
16. Smith, R. *Kingdoms of the Yoruba.* James Currey Ltd., London, 1969, p. 114.
17. *Ààre* Afonja was sent to attack Iwere, which Johnson, S. succinctly describes as an impossible mission considering the fortified nature of the town and the futility of simple

weapons of those days aginst the town. Indeed, Johnson believs that the choice of Iwere for the attack was a political strategy by the Aláàfin's counsellors to get rid of *Ààre* Afonja, who they felt was gaining more popularity. For details on the Iwere attack see Johnson, S. The History of the Yoruba, pp. 224-227.

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34. Jimoh, L. A. K. Ilorin the Journey so Far…, p. 56.
35. *Ibid*, p. 57.
36. Johnson, S. *History of the Yoruba*…, p. 235.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Elder Dempsey's *Gazetteer of Ilorin*, on page 65 contains the claim that *Sarkin* Gambari had been established in Ilorin before Sheik Alimi's arrival in the town.
39. *Ibid*, p. 66.
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46. Jimba, S. *A Chronicle of Ilorin*…, p. 34.
47. Dempsey's *Gazetteer of Ilorin*…, p. 69.
48. Omoiya, S. Y. "Diplomacy as a Veritable Instrument of War: A Study of Ilorin Wars of Survival*"* in *Ilorin Journal of History, Vol. 1 No 2,* 2006, pp. 73 – 84.

CHAPTER THREE

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: ILORIN WEAPONRY AND CAVALRY SYSTEM FROM 1800

3.1 Sources of Weapons in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century

The notion that wars are probably won more often by superior organisation and morale than by superior weapons may not be entirely applicable to all war situations. Even though organisation and management of troops are very critical elements in warfare, weapons played fundamental role in the success of many campaigns in prec-colonial African societies. In the opinion of T. High, weapons are merely tools used to facilitate the practice of war.[1] This supposition seems to depict more of a delusion than reality because whether in traditional or modern, colonial or independent, African or European societies, weapons or implement of war hold a prime position in determining the success of campaigns. This, perhaps, is why R. Smith posits that these "mere tools" (weapons) are of first importance in forwarding success in war because the result of a battle or a campaign can turn upon them, and often too, they hold the balance between peace and war. Moreover, the weapons and accoutrement of the warrior reflect the technological achievement of a society, and are an index to its art and culture.[2] Wars cannot be fought without pre-war readiness and a critical aspect of an army's preparations include being well equipped with sufficient number of capable militia, who are in good possession of physical and metaphysical weapons.[3]

R. Smith maintains that the range of basic weapons, which were in use in pre-colonial warfare in West Africa was as wide as that used by Western European armies before the onset of the Nineteenth Century.[4] This fact of similarity in African pre-colonial weapons and those in Ancient Europe was further buttressed by the work of Archer Jones titled: *The Art of War in the Western World*, where his description of Europe's ancient warfare, as exemplified by the Greeks, depicts great semblance with African pre-colonial approach and weapons system.[5]

Two important factors contributed to the sources and weapon system of Ilorin military in the Nineteenth Century. First was the cosmopolitan nature of the city, comprising Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Kanuri and Bariba. Secondly, by the time of the Ilorin campaigns, major wars, in the main theatres of the *Jihad* in Hausaland, had been concluded which paved the way for greater number of people to participate in the southern campaigns.[6] The *Jihad* in the main theatres of war in Hausaland came to an end in 1809, but fighting for the establishment of *emirates* as part of a wider caliphate mission continued in some places throughout the first half

of the Nineteenth Century. For instance, in the 1820s, the Emirates of Nupe and Ilorin were established, a decade later, Misau and Jama'are Emirates emerged and finally, Kontagora Emirate was founded in 1859.[7]

Ilorin's location in the transitional zone between the north and south of what later became Nigeria, put her at a vantage position to attract weapons from various people, who had migrated into the area, and also others, whose proximity enhanced the flow of weapons into the town. Ilorin, as we have noticed in the preceding chapter, was a military outpost of the Old Oyo Empire[8] and thus, the paraphernalia of Oyo military, including its weaponry had been present in the town. For instance, there is the possibility that through *Kákánfò* Afonja and his military entourage, traditional Yoruba weapons of war in use in Oyo, found their way into Ilorin during the period of the *Àáre*'s break up from the empire. Further still, it is reasonable to believe that Afonja's effort in capturing people of surrounding villages and towns in Ilorin[9] to populate his new creation also contributed to the sourcing of weapons and military technology in the town. This fact is plausible based on the *Àáre* 's strive to increase his military base for anticipated attacks from Old Oyo, having declared Ilorin independent in defiance of both *Aláàfins* Aole and Maku. Thus, a major primary source of Ilorin military weapon in the Nineteenth Century was Old Oyo. Furthermore, because the founding of Ilorin has been linked with hunting expeditions as Ojo Isekuse, the acclaimed founder of the town was reported to be a hunter, it is possible that his vocation influenced the town's weapon system.

Hunting implement also served, in many societies, as weapons of war. A considerable proportion of pre-colonial armies actually comprised the hunters, who were familiar with the terrain, and were well-grounded in the skills of handling weapons and assailing animals. The hunting implements thus formed a veritable source of weapons to the army. Consequently, there is evidence in Ilorin's history of the roles played by the hunter-warriors in the various wars of the town.[10] The hunters did not only have a good mastery and use of physical weapons but they also had great deal of metaphysical weapons, which aided their hunting expeditions against wild animals. All these were brought to bear during warfare. Aboyeji and Adebayo in the work titled "the Role of Hunters in State Formation" buttressed this point.[11] The authors listed some towns which were either founded by hunters or aided in their progress by hunter-warriors. Few of them are Ede, Ijaye, Ogbomoso, Abeokuta and Ilorin. Indeed, by the time of Emirs Abdulsalam and Shitta, the various *Balóguns* in the town had been mandated to

organise warriors under their command, a considerable number of whom were hunters, who engaged in hunting during peace times and became fighters during war.

Another significant source of weapon for Ilorin military in the Nineteenth Century was trade. The trade was both intra and inter regional in scope. Locally, the Gambari quarter in Ilorin was a popular trade centre, which attracted merchants from the north. Indeed R. J. Gavin describes Gambari in the Nineteenth Century as an international market, where northern caravans discharged their goods.[12] There, they found the lodging house-keepers, the brokers, the dealers and the mallams, who saw to their wants, directed them to buyers, provided finance as required, helped to find return cargoes and advised the merchants generally about the local environment. This polyglot city was prompt to cater for the needs of any group of wealthy strangers.[13] This influx of traders of northern origin also provided opportunity for weapons and other accourtrement of war to be obtained by Ilorin's local population, particularly, the warriors.

The arrival of Al-Salih in Ilorin, at the invitation of *Ààre* Afonja, also attracted large number of Fulani and Hausa settlers, who also favoured the 'holy mission', into the town. Meanwhile, *Jihad* goes beyond physical fighting and armed confrontation to include all acts aimed at improving the practice of the Islamic religion through the removal of barriers against the faith. Thus, the first attempt by Mallam Al-Salih after arriving Ilorin was to unite the fragmented Muslim communities in the area. Before his arrival, eventhough, a good number of the inhabitants were Muslims, they still practised Islam in sparate quarters based on ethnic lines. There were the Fulani quarters under Olufadi, the Hausa quarters, which were the home of traders, with Bako as their leader, the Muslim Yoruba-Bariberi quarters at Oke-Suna under Solagberu (Solabairi), and lastly that of the traditionalists Yoruba, under *Ààre* Afonja.[14] Thus the first move for Al-Salih was to unite these Muslim communities into a strong *Ummah* (congregation) to face the future challenges. This does not indicate that the Muslims had any rift amongst them but they were hitherto scattered until the arrival of Al Salih.

As Islam provided a platform for these diverse groups to unite, so did their weapons continue to provide backing for the *Jihad* efforts in Ilorin. The weapons were individually obtained but collectively organised during warfare. It is difficult to conclude that the weapons were the same because each group had weapons, which were peculiar to it.[15] However, what can be said

with a measure of certainty is that although the weapons were comparatively similar and had the same uses, they had different names while some varied in physical appearance.

Aside from the weapons sourced among Yoruba warriors, who formerly fought in the *Aláàfin*'s army, there were those from the Nupe warriors under Umar Nagwamatse[16], one of the grandchildren of Usman Danfodio, in his campaigns in Northern Nupeland in Kontagora area. These were people from Ibito, who had the knowledge of the weapons used by Nagwamatse. Some of them came to assist Ilorin army during war. With time, a local weapon manufacture emerged, initially with the blacksmith essentially repairing damaged war implement and later, using the imported prototype to imitate and produce new weapons.

3.2 The Blacksmith Industry and the Ilorin Military in the Nineteenth Century

Blacksmiths played prominent roles in military technology in pre-colonial Yorubaland. They were so important in the Nineteenth Century that they formed themselves into guilds. They also enjoyed considerable protection from the leaders of their various localities. They worked on iron, producing iron points for arrows, lance heads (long spears), swords, knives and cutlasses. Blacksmiths worked in close cooperation with the armies replacing exhausted stock of arrows, mending damaged spears and swords, fabricating iron bullets from pieces of waste iron and repairing guns.[17] The remains of blacksmith sheds in few locations in Ilorin buttress the pervasion of the art in the town in the Nineteenth Century.

The smiths played significant roles in Ilorin military technology, as in most societies of this period. This is because of the industry's transformative effect on the society through the provision of tools for the exploitation of the environment as well as stimulating the emergence and development of other industries. It is said that knowledge of iron-working in West Africa dates back to the first millennium BC.

> By about the fourth century A.D, iron implements, chiefly hoes, cutlasses, iron clubs, knives, spear-heads and swords, marked a great advance on stone and wooden tools. They improved the efficiency of hunters; they made it easier to clear the forest; and they placed more power in the hands of the builders (and destroyers) of towns and states.[18]

It is evident that early empires of West Africa owed (to a great extent) their successes to the use of iron weapons and tools. The Soninke of ancient Ghana Empire for example, are said to have acquired the use of iron weapons and tools from the Barbers in about A. D. 300.[19] In

Nigeria, the virility and resilience of the indigenous technology manifested in the Nok culture complex and in such civilizations as Benin, Ife, Kororofa, Borno and many others, whose glories were met and reported by the Portuguese in their first contact in the 15th Century.[20] Indeed, the tool industry remained so potent a force in the civilization of most African societies that E. U. Ikoku believes that African technology, by the 15th Century, was not inferior to those of other parts of the world. He writes:

> Most scholars now agree (however grudgingly) that man started his history in Africa, and that the continent was not only the cradle of early cultures, it was above all the undisputed mother of tool-making man…. The metal revolution, which first introduced ferrous technology and generated a variety of monumental changes that were crucial and cumulative in their effects on mankind, was of African origin. Thus, the first step ever in man's technological history was apparently taken in Africa.[21]

The significance of the blacksmith industry to the Nineteenth Century military in Nigerian society rests on the fact that most weapons were made of iron, and were locally fabricated and repaired by the smiths. It is reported that around Oyo, a complex of highly specialised mining villages flourished during the pre-colonial period, which indicates the strength of the iron industry in the area.[22]

Even though the exact period of emergence of blacksmithing in Ilorin is still obscure, it is certain that by the Nineteenth Century, the craft was one of the prominent vocations in the town. Oral sources trace the emergence of blacksmithing in Ilorin to the period of migration of groups into the area. One source maintains that the craft could be traced to Ile-Ife, the cradle of the Yoruba. From Ile-Ife, the craft is said to have moved to Old Oyo, from where scores of its practitioners later migrated first to Kuwo, a suburb of Ilorin, before finally arriving Ilorin in the early Nineteenth Century.[23]

Another source, given by one Baba Elegbeji, claims that his forefather, Baba Ijesa Jakota Alagbede, popularly known as Ijesa, migrated to Ilorin following constant encouragement from the Magaji Oju-ekun. Before then, Baba Ijesa, being a professional blacksmith always supplied iron implement to Ilorin people from Ijesa, in what later became Osun State. In addition to his smiting activities, Baba Ijesa was reported to be a powerful hunter, who had great metaphysical powers.[24] This perhaps was in congruence with the tradition of blacksmithing being popular among hunters. For instance, Ogun, the Yoruba god of iron, was

also a hunter and warrior. Gradually, blacksmithing craft spread to different parts of Ilorin and became embrced by many. Some of the earliest blacksmith locations in Ilorin are *Adangba, Oju-ekun, Sefura, Okelele, Oloje, Pakata, Isale Koto, Awodi and Baruba*.[25]

Generally, blacksmithing in Ilorin, like in other pre-colonial Nigerian societies, served as a tool factory for other industries by producing implement, which facilitated their activities. Thus implement such as hoes, cutlasses and knives, helped in agriculture; weavers also relied on the blacksmith for iron implement like iron-spindle, iron-rod (pegs), creel or warping stick, pulley and so on. This was in addition to the fabrication of other home utensils for domestic activities. However, the prevalence of warfare in the Nineteenth Century, placed a greater task on Ilorin blacksmiths for the production of iron weapons for the warriors and the repair of damaged ones. Most of the weapons used by the Yoruba armies and indeed, Ilorin soldiers were made locally by skilled craftsmen. This made the blacksmiths a very important group, as far as Ilorin military was concerned. It is reported that weapons were produced by these smiths in line with the needs of the warriors.

Thus a strong working relationship existed between the smiths and the warriors. They worked on iron, producing iron points for arrows, lance head, swords, knives, and spears popularly known as *Masi* in Ilorin, cavalry accessories, daggers and cutlasses. Blacksmith worked in close co-operation with the army, replacing exhausted stock of arrows, mending damaged spears and swords, fabricating iron bullets from pieces of waste iron, and repairing guns. Blacksmithing therefore became an important appendage of Ilorin military like in many societies in Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century. The vocation, for instance, occupied a prominent place within the Ekitiparapo camp during the Kiriji war (1877-1886). This is confirmed because the smithing site is still easily recognisable as it is marked by a large collection of disused forges and stone anvils.[26]

Specialization was also visible in the activities of the Ilorin blacksmith. For example, the Bariba smiths (corrupted in Ilorin as Baruba) in the town were known for the production of household utensils like local lamps, sieve, knives, and cutlasses. They also produced armour and other body protectors for the soldiers. Smiths in Awodi, on the other hand, were noted for fabricating cavalry accoutrements like saddles, stirrups, helmets, shields and horse trappings.[27] The importance of this branch of blacksmithing increased in Ilorin after the town became an Emirate and having to rely more on the cavalry in its wars of survival, expansion and

consolidation. Blacksmiths also formed themselves into guilds because their job was a highly specialised one. Most of them worked in their family compounds with the protection of the Chiefs. Indeed, blacksmithing was a vocation, according to the smithing tradition, meant only for people born into the business.[28]

Another important aspect of the Ilorin smiting industry was that it had the opportunity of fabricating both Yoruba weapons and those of other groups. The arrival of Hausa, Nupe, Kanuri and Baruba groups in Ilorin meant that weapons, which originated from these people started to penetrate the town and soon found their ways into the blacksmith sheds either for repairs or imitation. The smith, most times, relied on description and photo-type brought by warriors to them for the fabrication of new weapons. In this regard, a strong relationship existed between the smiths and the warriors; they keep close contact in order to be acquainted with the needs of the army. On the source of iron for the blacksmith, it is reported that places like Jade Ale, Jabata, Isinland in Igbomina area, were important sources of pit iron for Ilorin smiths. This also buttresses evidence of relation between Ilorin and these areas as sources of raw material for the smiths.With the advent of gun in the later part of the Nineteenth Century, blacksmiths engaged in the fabrication and repair of guns. [29]

Another group, which contributed to Ilorin weapon system was the *Ásúde* smith in Okelele area of the town. The name, *Ásúde*, was coined from their vocation, which revolved around the fabrication of various items from metal substances ranging from iron, brass, bronze and copper.[30] They engaged in the making of accessories like rings, gourd, shackles, chains and metal statues of various sizes, to which herbal preparations were added to enhance their spiritual potency in battles.

Strength of the Materials Used in Weapons Production

The material used in making the weapons determined its weight, strength and durability. Those made of wood like clubs could be affected by weather condition such as rain or high humidity, which may cause them to decay and disintegrate over time. Indeed, to the archaeologists, wood is an organic material that perishes easily in antiquity because it would eventually be affected by environmental condition regardedless of its strength. Also weapons made of stones were heavy and irregular in shape, which often made them less effective as weapons of war.

However, with the discovery and use of iron, military tools became transformed in most societies. In fact, unlike wood or stone, evidence of iron weapons are quite bountiful in human history due to its ability to withstand environmental conditions for a longer time. Thus, weapons in Ilorin, like in most societies in pre-colonial Nigeria, were made of iron (*irin*), bronze (*bàbà*) and brass (*idẹ*).[31] All these are subsets of metal with outstanding durability and portability compared to wood and stone weapons. One Issa Asude maintained that swords, bracelets, spears, daggers, lances, arrow and spear heads and variety of rings were made of these materials. It was also argued that the high level of durability of these iron implements could be adjudged by their availability in spite of the long date of their manufacture and usage.[32] Meanwhile, before the final production of weapons, certain processes were carried out by the smiths; these were mining and smelting.

Mining - iron was one of the materials which found extensive usage in pre-colonial societies. The first basic step was to obtainh the ore, which was done through open cast or grubbing. Other essential materials needed for mining were adequate fuel, water and wind. The fuel could be in the form of charcoal or chamber. Thus, iron mines were always located close to a forest for sufficient supply of firewood, or where there was adequate water and a steady wind for blasting.[33]

Smelting - the iron ore was first prepared before being smelted. Ore with low iron content needed to be cleaned on the guage clay sands limestone before smelting. The ore was pounded to small particles and then washed up in a running water. It was then roasted to dry the water, which had been chemically combined with oxide to render the ore pure. For the smelting, the temperature needed to work iron was between 1100^0 C-1150^0 C.[34] Better result could be obtained when the fuel, especially charcoal, was well broken and evenly distributed in a furnace as well as if there was adequate oxygen with the absence of carbon. Impurities such as Silica present in the iron ore combined with continual change to form a slag. It is about the most frequent artIfáct obtained at a smelting site. After smelting, the furnace was allowed to cool and the mass of iron known as bloom was removed from the slag and other impurities were detached.[35]

The iron ore obtained after the processes described above was then used in the fabrication of various objects in the blacksmithing sheds, including agricultural tools, implement for other local industries as well as weapons of war. Thus, the transformation to the use of iron in the

production of weapons had far reaching impact on military technology, and Ilorin also benefitted from the change.

3.3 Physical Weapons

Weapons of war in Ilorin can be broadly grouped under two headings. These are the physical and metaphysical weapons. The latter will be exhaustively discussed under a separate sub-heading. Physical weapons in this study refer to all implement of war, which can be handled and used to attack an opponent in war, by hitting, stabbing, cutting, thrusting, throwing, hurling or shooting, either leading to his death or rendering him defenseless and be subdued in war situation. Physical weapons can be further divided into long range, otherwise known as projectile weapons and the short-range, otherwise known as shock weapons. These can be further divided into long and short range weapons. Long range (projectile) weapons include, throwing spear, bow and arrows (*offa*), catapult (*akatampo*), bat and sling, and *Masi*, a broad-bladed throwing spear, with deeply penetrating impact on the enemy. The projectile weapons required the warrior to aim and throw his weapons on the enemy from distance. The short range weapons were knives, stabbing spears, swords (*ida*) of different sizes, clubs (*kumo*), lance, dagger and bracelet.[36] Short-range (shock) weapons required the warrior to engage in close fighting with his opponent.[37]

In the opinion of R. Smith, the region of West Africa had abundance of woods, which were hard, pliant and workable, and of craftsmen skilled in carving and carpentry. Bowyers, shield-makers and similar artificers practised their crafts usually in family compounds, which were under the special protection of town chiefs, and they had their own gods and rituals.[38] An important example of this was the *Ògún,*[39] Yoruba god of Iron, who was a blacksmith and believed to hold great powers in Yoruba warfare, especially on iron implement. Indeed, hunters and warriors, in Yorubaland, always embark on their expedition only after their sacrifices to *Ògún,* had been accepted.

When weapons of war are relatively simple and can be obtained by the warrior at low cost from local artificers, or even made at home for his own use and ownership, an army, composed usually of militia, can be quickly and cheaply raised; such an army, however, is not readily susceptible to central control. That many West African weapons were of this simple type seems at least in part to account for the instability of the armies described by early European observers on the coast, and especially for their inability to sustain a campaign in adverse conditions or beyond the end of the dry season. This weakness was, to some extent

countered, in the more centralized states, by the storage of weapons and other munitions, poisoned arrows for example, o v cv cv 89 arsenals.[40]

The demand for better-quality and more complex weapons, such as swords with steel blades, firearms and other equipment and means of war, especially horses, had other results. These were expensive items, usually imported from great distances, which were beyond the means of the ordinary soldier. In some cases, and particularly perhaps, as Goody has suggested, where fire-arms were concerned, this contributed to the power of the central authority since the king not only owned the arms but retained them under his control in his palace. In other cases, and particularly those of cavalry horses and armour, the expense of providing war materials might be met by the great men of the kingdom, at least in part, so that a decentralized government of a feudal type tended to emerge.[41] This became a common practice in Ilorin from the time of Emirs Abdulsalam and Shitta, especially with the emergence of the *Balógun* system in Ilorin from which period they were saddled with the responsibility to defend the young Emirate. This duty also permitted the Balógun to assemble soldiers and weapons from their various domains through their lieutenants.

Some Physical weapons and related accessories common in Ilorin

Offà - arrows also used for both offensive and defensives purposes.

Àpò-Offa - casing for arrows.

Idà- swords for close fighting with its casing.

Machete - could be the single or double edged machete, used for continuous attack both from the front and from the back, since its' both edges are sharpened.

Ewu Ogun - war garment was a specially prepared garment worn by the soldiers. It was designed with the aim of allowing for free movement during battles. So, it consist of a short sleeved shirt and a short. Such garment was, in some cases charmed for offensive and defensive purposes. It sometimes also included a cap.

Bàntẹ Ogun – a special under-wrapper used by the soldier with charms and preparations for defence and attacking the enemies.

Àpòdùkẹ Ogun - a special bag carried by the warrior and used to house several weapons and other items of war. In it items like *Okini/abere* (niddles) used for removing thorns, and other items accidentally inflicted on the warrior during warfare. The bag also contained *Ajo – owu ori fìfila*, for lighting; *kondoro* – water tank for use when resting after every battle; *Ahaya, Etu*- armonitions for loading the gun.

Ìbon-ogun – this was useful in alerting the soldiers; in finding the enemies and in attacking them once they showed their face. Guns were used occasionally and was of varied types; the long and short riffle. They were used according to rank and a soldier may carry more than one gun.

Ọkọ - the spear was a very popular weapon among Ilorin soldiers. Spears were of various types according to the nature of the bladders at the top. Some spears had broad blades which were made in contrasting or zigzag direction so that when it stuck to the opponent, any attempt to remove it would destroy his flesh. It could be long or short.

Kùmọ - Club, either of wood or metal, was perhaps one of the oldest fighting instrument of man. It consisted of a wood or metal with a heavier head and sometimes barbed to inflict injuries on the opponent when used to attack him.[42]




Fig. 1: Prototype of Nineteenth Century Club (*kùmọ*) used by Ilorin Warriors.

Source: Drawn by the Researcher based on descripiton of informants.




Fig. 2*:* Catapult (*Palaka*) used as a long range weapon by Ilorin warriors.

Source: Drawn by the Researcher based on observation and descripiton of informants.


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Fig. 3: Prototype of Nineteenth Century Swords in their sheath

Source: Armoury at the Emir's Palace, Ilorin, picture taken by the Researcher on 9th June, 20017.



Fig. 4: Assorted swords commonly used in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century.

Source: Picture taken by the Researcher at the abode of Nupe Cavalry Accessories Smith in Pataki area, Ilorin.




Fig. 5: *Doge* a short-handled fighting weapon with a barbed iron blade and wooden handle.
Source: Drawn by the Researcher based on descripiton of informants.




Fig. 6: Arrow-heads with different blades

Source: Online search at *http://google.com/African Traditional Technology*. Retrieved on 8th October, 2016, 3: 58 pm.





Fig. 7: An assortment of spears fixed on a shield made of elephant hide.
Source: William Weir, 50 *Weapons that Changed Warfare.*



Figs. 8: Yoruba Accoutrement and weaponry

Top row Swords: (a) and (b) *idà;* (c) *agedengbe*; (d) ceremonial sword, Ijebu-Ode.

Middle row Harness: (a) and (b) bit; (c) and (d) stirrup; (e) head-band.

Bottom row Spear- and arrow- heads**.**

Drawn by Denis Williams. Source: R. S. Smith, *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa*, London, James Currey, *1976, p.67.*

War Garment and Body Protection

Basically, the outfit of warriors in pre-colonial Africa with elaborate equipment, which would include body armour and shield, was most common with societies that were well organised. For instance, the Egyptians used body armour, while the Mende of Sierra Leone proceeded to the battle field without any body protector. Since most body armours were technologically difficult to construct, with the exception of leather vest, it was unlikely that societies with low social and economic set up would opt for the accortrement. However, armours were obtained through local and international trades or sometimes captured from defeated enemies. Examples of these were available in the Sokoto Caliphate, Oyo Empire, Ancient Ghana, Kanem Borno, to mention but a few.

Body protection for Ilorin warriors in the Nineteenth Century comprised mainly of a special cross-belt made of strong ropes and worn by the warrior across his chest. This was put over the garment already worn underneath and used to tighten all other outfits of the cavalry man to keep him firm on his horse when speeding. Ilorin's participation in the long distance trade between the southern and northern territories of what later became Nigeria provided her ample opportunity to obtain war garment, shields, and leather armour from groups in other parts of the country. Furthermore, few blacksmiths were able to fabricate metal body armour, even though this was always quite heavy on the body.[43]

However these quilted armours worn by the cavalrymen had its limitations especially when faced by archers equipped with poisoned arrows. The quilt particularly those made from silk cotton material easily succumbed to penetration under persistent firing, worse still, when faced with incendiary arrows. The quilt was easily set ablaze by the flame of the arrow.Prototype of these implements were kept in the Emir's palace, compounds of *Balóguns* and other warriors in Ilorin.

3.4 Armoury

It was also common in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin to find armoury in the houses of the warriors, especially the war commanders. Such armoury was a special room reserved for keeping weapons of war. Armoury was also kept for the state centrally, where the whole state soldiers took their weapons during campaigns. Apart from this central state armoury, individual soldiers had personal armoury for keeping weapons. In Ilorin, the *Balóguns*, in line with their duties as defenders of the state and the requirement of further extending its influence, kept an array of weapons and designated certain portion of their residence for

keeping these items, some of which were considered sacred, particularly, for the spiritual weapons.[44]

Indeed, such rooms were highly restricted because of the importance attached to the war weapons therin. For instance, legends on military personalities in Ilorin give account of the powerful armoury of *Balógun* Gambari Danmurogo, whose weapons room was highly fortified and circumscribed, such that only himself could enter and make use of the items therein.[45] Investigation also revealed that because of Ilorin's cosmopolitan nature, weapons housed in the armoury were diverse as dictated by the people who made them. However, the most common were swords of various sizes and types, bow and arrows with different pointed edges, spears of various types and sizes, the most popular was known locally as *masi*, which could be of single or multiple blades and cavalry accessories of various kinds.

3.5 Spiritual Elements in Ilorin Military

Africa's belief in the efficacy of metaphysical elements found extensive expression in their warfare. The traditional religion, which had been the main source of faith in most pre-colonial societies, gave the people strong belief in spirits, gods and ancestors in determining the affairs of the living. In pre-colonial Yorubaland, this belief held a prime position; hence, belief in spirit, magic and metaphysics was an important factor in their social, political and economic life. Metaphysical weapons involved different kinds of incantations, invocations, and the use of spirit to attack the opponent.

Magical art or metaphysical element represents potent offensive and defensive weapon during warfare in pre-colonial Yorubaland. This is an art or activity of expression, which creates a deposit of actions or habits in the agents. These created habits become "things" utilizable by the agents for ulterior ends. Art has always been functional in human life. It serves as catharsis.[46] Art to the African in general is functional (utilitarian) as well as sacred and magical. Art, so referred to as magical, is aimed ultimately at producing certain states of mind in certain persons. Yoruba traditional religions are closely associated with the creative arts. The religions equally have beliefs and practices that are sacred and magical. These two, art and magic, are inherent in Yoruba traditional life and society, and are indistinguishable from each other. Lucas comments thus:

> To understand how completely the belief in magic penetrated to the whole substance of life, dominating popular custom and constantly appearing in the simplest acts of household routine…. It constituted the very atmosphere in which the men of early oriental world lived. Without the saving and salutary influence of such magical agencies constantly invoked, the life of an ancient household in the east was unthinkable.[47]

The Yoruba have firm belief in the reality of the unseen spirits and in the use of magical arts to control the phenomenon of nature, the physical world and the mental world. Magic is used by the Yoruba to secure contact with the invisibles; and to seek favour from the unseen spirits through such practices as charms, incantations and sacrifices. In Yorubaland, magic could work either positively or negatively; when it works negatively, it becomes a taboo but when it works positively, it is said to be therapeutic.[48]

During war, magical practices are often displayed. In all the Yoruba wars, magical displays played significant roles in winning and in surviving.[49] The terms magic and art are employed here to denote certain practices current in Yoruba warlike people. Magical practices invariably are not peripheral but are central elements in Yoruba warfare; such include charms, incantations, masking and masquerading, war songs and dance, carvings, modeling and so on. They involve artistic activities, which later function in two ways: as means to a pre-conceived idea and as agents to arouse emotions.

In military perspective, Yoruba reliance on the metaphysical weapons began with adequate preparation for every campaign through divination. An essential aspect of Yoruba pre-war activities was to consult the *Ifá* oracle. This was necessary to ensure that the right decisions were taken concerning the war. Permission or consent of the priestly diviner must be sought before a campaign was embarked upon. The typical Yoruba army was, thus, invariably accompanied by a contingent of priests and traditional doctors. While in camp, the *Ifá* oracle was regularly consulted every morning.[50] An ancient Oyo King, who relied heavily on oracular guidance was *Aláàfin* Ajaka. Tradition has it that he had a retinue of powerful medicinemen in his service as he prosecuted his expansionist wars with as many as 1,060 of his chiefs and princess.[51] In Ibadan, there was the example of Balógun Ibikunle, who was the commander-in-chief of the Ibadan army during the Ijaye war. He was known to have consulted the *Ifá* oracle regularly; for this purpose he had a special spiritual stool.[52]

Ifá divination evidently played a significant role in the process of establishing several kingdoms all over Yorubaland. For instance, it is recorded in Old Oyo tradition that every second year, the *Aláàfin* launched a military expedition under a member of the royal family. The commander always took along with him a *Babaláwo* (diviner) to serve as his counselor. Such a diviner also took with him *Ifá* accessories such as *Opele*, *Iroke*, *Ogere Ifá* and *Opon Ifá*. Usually, before setting out, the commander would consult the Ifá oracle for advice. If the expedition eventually succeeded, the commander would then inquire from the oracle concerning the site, size and destiny of the new settlement. The oracular response was usually based on a particular *Odu Ifá*, which specified the ritual sacrifices to be offered and the customs to be adopted by the inhabitants of the new settlement.[53] Even when individual hunters, aggrieved princes or banished army commanders or chiefs decided to found their own settlements, the same process of *Ifá* divination was adopted. This was why most Yoruba towns had *odu-Ifá* which established them.

Important *Ifá* divinations in the military circle in pre-colonial Yorubaland were *Oyeku* (long life) and *Ọsẹ* (success), and these had impact on the warriors' accomplishment and the founding of new communities. For instance, the *Ọsẹ méjì* was the *Odù Ifá* used to establish Ibadan apparently because of the city's military disposition. In line with Yoruba tradition, when Lagelu established Ibadan, he consulted the oracle and *Ose meji* was divined for the city. Therefore, Ibadan was regarded as the hometown of Ose.[54] It is presented as

Eríwo yà!
Àyà gbó
Àyà tó
Àyà je.
This Ifá divination is represented as follows:
I I
II II
I I
II II

This above *Odù* of *Ọsẹ* implies victory, success or accomplishment in the mission being embarked upon. *Ọsẹ* means overcome, victorious, triumphant and so on. *Ọsẹ* on the right and *Ọsẹ* on the left implied total victory. If it came up during divination, the diviner then cast

twice more to inquire whether it came with *ire* (good) or *ibi* (bad) and then determine the kind of *ire* or *ibi* determining yes or no answers of each. If it was *ire*, there were verses which indicated it, and if *ibi*, there were also verses. Thus, any time the diviner asked how the day was going to be and the *Ọsẹ meji* with *ire* came up, then it would indeed be very good, but if it came with *ibi*, it was a strong warning to be careful. In both cases, the advice of the *Ifá* priest must be strictly followed.[55] The basic message in the *Odù* was that life is mixture of victories and defeats which was represented by either *Ọsẹ* (success) or *Okanran* (failure).

Ilorin's background in traditional religion strongly supports the fact that these *Ifá* practices may have had an impact on her military activities in the early Nineteenth Century, particularly, before the establishment of the emirate. This was made stronger by Oyo cultural influence and the continued migration of various Yoruba groups to Ilorin in the wake of the collapse of the empire. Indeed, it was revealed that the success of the Islamic evangelism within Ilorin metropolis and its environs was partly facilitated by the efforts of some former practioners of the traditional religion who, having accepted Islam, supported the new religion. A sterling example was the turbaned scholars in Ilorin, popularly known as *Makondoro*,[56] who were actively involved in Islamic evangelism in and around Ilorin city.

Also *Ifá* practices survived in some areas outside the Ilorin metropolis even after the emirate system had been established. These included Ojugbede, Awe, Alagogo, Yowere, Odegiwa, Ipaye/Mejida, Ilota and Kere.[57] There were annual Ifá celebrations and Egungun festival in these areas. The occasion was usually for seven days in most of the communities with participants from various adjoining villages also in attendance. Announcements were constantly made to inform the people as the festival approached because elaborate preparation would be involved for the pomp and pageantry with food and drink in abundance. It was common to find masqurades with different names and oufits. These included *Egungun Eleru, Egungun Alatika* and so on. During the festivity, prayers were offered for the people and the communities.

Masking and masquerading (*egúngún*) were used in wars as spiritual weapons. In some communities, masquerades were part of the security and law enforcement agents. They were used to purnish offenders by either banishing them from the town and also to prescribe the appropriate sacrifices to be offered by anyone who violate the norms in order to appease the gods or the ancestors. For instance in Oroland, the *Egúngún Pàká* was used to banish

offenders from the community. In one such incident, a man named Abisi Ogun was said to have given a friend of his an herbal substance after which the man died. It was later comfirmed that Abisi actually poisoned his friend. Consequent upon this incident, Abisi was sent out of Oro with the use of *Egúngún Pàká*. In a related incident, another man known as Baba Ijesa, after violating the rule of the society, was banished from Oro using the same procedure.[58]

Thus, it was this security functions that underscored the significance of masquerades in pre-colonial military organization of Nigerian societies. Primarily they were to mimick ancestors coming from heaven to help bail their living children out of trouble. Many important *egungun* were associated with warfare. Examples are *Alápánsánpá* of Ibadan, *Abobiakuro* of Edun abon and *Onimogala* of Moro to mention a few. These masquerades usually incorporated into their *ago* or *eeku* (costumes) dangerous charms like *àfòse* or *àwíse*, which is normally put in deer horn; *oruka ere* (charmed ring) and *epe* (curse), which are put in cylindrical wooden containers, called *apó*.[59] The *Oloje* in Ilorin was reported to be strong practitioners of the masquerade element of the traditional religion. The ancestors of the *Oloje*, one Omololu came to Ilorin from Old Oyo after a royal tussle and his failure to secure headship of his community. Omololu, on account of his spiritual powers, became a formidable force in Ilorin warfare and pitched his station somewhere in the outskirt of the town along Ilorin-Kaiama road.

In view of this prevalence of the traditional woship and practices, the spiritual element became quite visible in Ilorin military and its weapon system particularly in the early Nineteenth Century. Evidently Yoruba spiritual weapons used by Ilorin warriors included *àfòse, èpè, òkígbẹ* and *ìsújú*. Others were herbal bullet proofs like *asaki ibon, afobon* and *ayeta*. Spiritual weapons like *egbé* and *àféèrí* helped the users to disappear at will. *Ìsújú*, similarly used to conceal the user's physical presence from the enemies, while *eyin-lo-lobe so*, ensured that the enemies missed their mark. All these were used by the bearer for protection against enemy attacks and to make him invincible. Some of the offensive metaphysical weapons were *Òògùn Ìfọjú*; supernatural means of inflicting blindness on the enemy; *apeta* (invocation shooting on the enemy), amulets-bindings such as those worn around the waist, neck and arm, known as *ìfúnpá, ìgbàdí* and so on.[60]

Ilorin's geo-ethnic factor as a location between Yorubaland and the northern part of what later became Nigeria, as well as a city, which attracted different groups in the Nineteenth Century,

played a prominent role in its access to and use of metaphysical weapons of various kinds. Ilorin's proximity to Old Oyo and several Yoruba communities gave her access to some of the metaphysical weapons enumerated above, even though with time, the influence of Islamic religion discouraged her people from most of the traditional practices.

Furthermore, the personality of *Ààre* Afonja as a military leader, who achieved independence for the city, as well as populating it with people from neighbouring communities, attracted spiritual military weapons to the town. We have already enumerated some of the villages, which the *Ààre* captured and resettled near Ilorin in Chapter Two. However, by this act, Yoruba inhabitants with the paraphernalia of military, culture, tradition including their metaphysical element contributed to Ilorin's weapon system.

The *Kákánfò* himself relished the efficacy of spiritual weapons as an important ingredient in fortifying him as the commander-in-chief of Oyo army. By tradition, the title (*Kákánfò*) was given to the most distinguished military personality in the empire, and thus, further fortifications and empowerment were always carried out on him to render him invincible in keeping with the requirements of position he occupied. For instance:

> Like the *Ìlàris*, at the time of his assuming office, he (Kákánfò) is first to shave his head completely and 201 incisions are made on his occiput, with 201 different lancets and specially prepared ingredients from 201 viols are rubbed into the cuts, one for each. This is supposed to render him fearless and courageous. The *Kákánfò* always shaved, but the hair on the inoculated part is allowed to grow long, and when plaited, forms a tuft or a sort of pig tail.[61]

Thus, *Kákánfòs* were generally very stubborn and obstinate. They have all been more or less troublesome, due, it is supposed, to the effect of the ingredients they were inoculated with. In war, they carry no weapon but a baton known as the "king's invisible staff".[62] With this type of preparation, Kákánfò Afonja was spiritually well armed and this was consolidated by the Ààre's continued search for greater powers in the period. It can therefore be argued that the spiritual element in Ilorin military began in the period of *Ààre* Afonja.

After the Ààre, the spiritual component continued to feature in Ilorin wars of survival, consolidation and expansion under the Fulani leadership. For instance, evidence of

metaphysical and spiritual weapons were given in the accounts of the military escapades of *Balóguns Gambari, Alánàmú, Maiyaki, Zarumi Ogbondoroko* and other warriors in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century.[63] For instance, One *Yusufu Baale*, the ancestor of the present *Alánàmú* family, was a great warrior, renowned for his special whip which he used against his opponents.[64] Yusufu always beat the enemy with this whip before capturing them, hence, he received the name *Alana-mu*, which literally translates as "beat and capture the enemy". The Baale, who had just arrived in Ilorin from Reke, before the *Eleduwe* war, also put his herbal medicine to test by preparing a concoction, which healed the wound inflicted on Shitta, one of the sons of Sheik Alimi during the war against the Oyo-Borgu forces at the battle of Ita-kudimo.[65]

A similar metaphysical instrument was the *Kaho*, a special charm-coated horn, usually blown to weaken the enemies and to make them defenceless. *Kaho* was particularly popular with, and a specialized military weapon of the *Mayaki* (*Maiyaki* or Warrior) family of Ilorin. This weapon, the horn, is said to date back to the period of Sheik Alimi, and was fundamental to Maiyaki's war efforts. The progenitor of the *Mayaki* was said to have migrated with the Sheik to Ilorin. They are said to have come from Gobir in Kebbi area.[66]

Another notable personality was Danmurogo, who was said to have powers with which he spoke with spirits at the Sobi Hills in the outskirt of Ilorin, he was feared by many people due to his spiritual powers.[67] These people brought their skills and powers to bear on the Ilorin army at various times and have become immortalised as great warriors, who contributed to the making of the Emirate.

Furthermore, *Zarumi Ogbondonroko*'s progenitor, Janju, migrated to Ilorin from the north (origin not specified) but settled first at Edidi, from where he moved to Ilorin. Janju was initially an entertainer of the Ilorin authority with magics to turn to different forms. With time, his magical gift found application in military enterprise, where he joined the Emir's army in several battles and as a devout soldier, got rewarded with the title of *Zarumi Ologbondroko,* whose role was to first lead the cavalry out at any given battle.[68]

Because the town comprised many groups with different religious backgrounds, especially before the *Jihad*, it was not impossible to find traditionalists, who believed in the efficacy of

charms and employed them as fortifications during warfare. A cross-section of respondents comprising blacksmiths, traditional title-holders and aged people in Ilorin made the following submission in respect to spiritual weapons used by Ilorin warriors in the Nineteenth Century. Indeed, the potency of spiritual weapon in Ilorin wars came to the fore during the hunter revolt in the early Twentieth Century in the Oke Moro area of the emirate. It also proved effective during the revolt against British taxation in the 1950s, popularly known in Ilorin as *Poun Meji La'san.*

Common Spiritual elements in warfare

Àjesára - special preparations taken to fortify the soldiers. Such preparations were made with different infrichents consisting of herbs, concoctions to increase the physical strength of a warrior and to also give him spiritual powers.

Arína - this was used to spiritually defect dangerous preparations, already embedded in the location by the enemies. These might include harmful elements such as charms, invocations and other related items that could affect the warrior. With *Arína,* one could easily detect these dangerous items and avoid them or use other powers to render them harmless.

*Afeer*i - a charm used when the army or soldier was about to be over-powered by the enemies; this would make a warrior to become invisible to the enemies.

Pètupètu – a charm used by a soldier to change to different forms usually into animals to either intimidate the enemy/opponent or disguise during battle. Normally, the warrior who turned into a more powerful animal would carry the day.

Àfòsẹ - was used for commanding the enemy to do the bidding of the bearer.

Egbé - for disappearing from the battle field and appearing at a different location. This was usually used when the soldier was about to be overpowered.

Ilèrukànmi - was used to command the ground to take the warrior to an elevated place or bring him down from the high locations like trees, mountains.

Kánàkò- was used to shorten distances during battles to catch up with an escaping enemy or to escape from a dangerous location.

Òpá-Ogun - war staff signified the war insignia, which represented the identity of the Ilorin army. Thus, it was usually a specially prepared staff with charms and wrapped in white garment and carried to the warfront.

Ilù-Ogun - special war drum made with certain spiritual elements and used to initiate the battle.

Òrùka- rings of various sizes were fabricated by the *Ásúde* smiths and used for different purposes, including battles. These rings were broadly categorised into four, according to the materials used for their production. These were *Oruka Ide, Oruka Baba, Oruka Oje* and *Oruka Kúsanrín.* All these rings could be used for combat during warfare, depending on the choice of the user. The rings were prepared by *Ásúde* smiths made available to the users, who then added further herbal preparations that would give the desired spiritual powers. In this regard, traditional charms-makers were the chief patrons of the *Ásúde* smiths.[69]

Òrùka was not only popular with the Yoruba, but also among different groups in pre-colonial Nigeria. In Ilorin, the Yoruba populace believed in its efficacy as protection, fortification as well as weapons of attack against their enemies. When the ring was finally ready, it could perform different functions ranging from making the bearer to become invincible, it could make the bearer's body impregnable to weapons like machete, swords and other piercing weapons, it be used to hit the opponent and make him fall; this was popularly known as *Òrùka-àlùwó.* A ring could also be used to detect dangers ahead in an intended campaign; in this sense, it played the role of both warning and protection.
Meanwhile, in the array of rings fabricated by the *Ásúde* smith, the *Kusanrin* was the most sought after because of the efficacy of herbal preparations on it.

Àdó-gourd made of brass, bonze or copper and was of different sizes. *Ado* was a container with some powdery herbal preparation known locally as *ebu,* which was intended to give the bearer extra strength and power when used. Sometimes, a warrior could drop some portion of the powdery content on his palm and swallow to give the desired effect, or the entire gourd could be swallowed with its content to give permanent effect.

Edan- a mini human statue prepared with herbal condiments used for attacking an opponent in battle. It could be sent to attack the person physically or the statue itself could be attacked so that the effect would be on the person whose spirit was used to prepare it.

Àbbà- is a U-shaped structure used to clip or tie the the opponent spiritually. *Àbbà* worked in the same way as *Sekeseke*, which was a chain-like weapon used to tie or trap an opponent and prevent him from running away. This same mechanism was used in *Emu*, which was also employed to capture the opponent. Technically, the trio of *Àbbà*, *Sekeseke* and *Emu* were instruments used by smiths to perform similar functions. Spiritually however, they were used to capture the enemy without being physically present; instead, some invocations and incantations were involved. This is buttressed by the popular Yoruba incantation: *sékésekè mu, àbbà mu, èmú kìí mú nkàn tì lágbède*, which simply translates as nothing could escape the grip of the blacksmith, once these three instruments were available.

Bàntẹ- charmed underwear usded by the warrior.

Gbéríoko- Magical Vest and various incantations.






Fig. 9: Samples of Amulets and Bindings (*Ifunpa*) used as protection in Warfare.

Source: online at www.pinterest.com//African Charms, talisman, and sacred symbols. Retrieved on 5th May, 2018.

3.6 Influence of Islam on Ilorin War Efforts

The Islamic religious became quite a strong factor in Ilorin wars after the establishment of its emirate especially from the period of Emir Abdulsalam (1823-1842). Meanwhile, certain injunctions from the Quran govern the conduct of warfare in Islam. Fundamentally, the Muslims were expected to defend the fold of Islam, but not to attack other groups if they were not first attacked. In other words, *Allah* permits Prophet Mohammed and his followers to fight against those who attacked Islam and the Muslims; indeed, most of the wars fought by Prophet Mohammad were defensive wars to protect the congregation of Islam. For instance, in *Surat Bakarah*, which is Quran Chapter 42, Verse 190, Allah says: "*And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but transgress not the limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors.*"[70] It is perhaps in line with this provision that Islam became a strong consideration in Ilorin's war efforts particularly during the wars of expansion. Investigations revealed that before the outbreak of the Jihad, Islamic scholars in Ilorin lived in scattered settlements in such places as Oke-Suna, *Ikokoro, Ojagboro, Akalanbi, Agbaji,* only hearing of one another.[71]

However, from the arrival of *Sheik Alimi*, Muslim scholars in Ilorin began to unite, particularly, in the course of practising the religion. Meanwhile, the scholars neither carried swords nor lances or other weapons of war. Rather, they engaged in spiritual activities to protect Islam and to spread the religion to other parts of Yorubaland. Their efforts were mainly geared towards giving spiritual supports to the warriors through fervent prayers for the success of Ilorin army. Islam thus became a strong factor in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin society in the bid to ensure the practice of the religion in its pristine form and this was extended to its environs through her wars of expansion.

Indeed, it must be emphasised that religion played a prominent part in the zeal with which people joined the Ilorin army in the early Nineteenth Century. For example, within six years of *Al-Salih's* stay in the town, Afonja's influence declined considerably because most of the slave-soldiers he used to sever Ilorin from Old Oyo switched allegiance to the Muslim scholar and his sons, *Abdulsalam* and *Shitta*. This shift of loyalty could not have been unconnected with the freedom which Islam preached at the period. After Al-Salih's death in 1823, it was easier therefore for Abdulsalam to turn Ilorin into an Emirate, of course with the support of Hausa, Fulani and Yoruba Muslims, led by Solagberu.[72]

The slave-soldiers must have been enthusiastic about the establishment of an Emirate in Ilorin for two main reasons: firstly, to consolidate their freedom from slavery; and secondly to be

free to practice the Islamic faith. As contained in *Uthman Dan Fodio's Bayan Wajub, Al Hijira Ala-L-Ibad,* the Muslim slaves participation in the Islamic revolution in Ilorin should legally confer on them their freedom.[73] Religious considerations thus swelled up the Ilorin army after Afonja's demise as wars of consolidation and expansion were embarked upon.

Furthermore, migration on the basis of religion had positive impact on the city's military as some of Ilorin warriors of the period were attracted to the town by Islam through Sheik Alimi. For instance, Ajia Gajo was a migrant from the vicinity of what later became Sokoto. Gajo and his younger brother, Kure Ahmeeda, were members of the entourage which accompanied Sheik Alimi to Ilorin. The two brothers lived at *Ile Olayomi* near Balógun Fulani's residence before they moved to Gambari area and settled in a place subsequently called *Ita Ajia,* where their descendants continued to live.[74] Gajo, who was a principal lieutenant of Ali Balógun Gambari and an accomplished warrior was appointed *Ajia* by Emir Abdulsalami. When he died, he was succeeded by Kure, his younger brother. However, by the time Kure died, there was no direct male descendant of his or of *Gajo,* his late brother, who was of age to assume the title of Ajia. The title was therefore, conferred on Opele, who was a Yoruba in-mate of *Ajia* Gajo's household.

Opele came to *Ajia* Gajo in Ilorin at the instance of *Esinkin Agbenawo-Oju-egun* of Omu-Aran. As an in-mate of the household, Opele was faithful to Ajia Gajo. He was also a dependable lieutenant to the *Ajia* in battle.[75] These two attributes endeared him to the entire Ajia household and stood him in good stead for appointment as the *Ajia* Opele in succession to Ajia Kure Ahmeeda. The title since remained with the Opele lineage while Kure Ahmeeda family, retained the title of Kure.

Usman Ajikobi, migrated to Ilorin as a follower of Sheik Alimi from Iseyin, he was also a steadfast follower and got rewarded with the Balógun Ajikobi title.[76] The progenitor of the *Maiyaki* also came with the Sheik and participated in many battles, having migrated to Ilorin from Kebbi area. Yesufu Alánàmú, migrated to Ilorin from Old Oyo, first settling at Reke before eventually joining the army being raised by *Emir* Abdulsalami to face the joint Oyo-Bariba insurgents, who were making frantic efforts to re-capture Ilorin.[77] Zarumi Ogbondonroko's progenitor, Janju, migrated to Ilorin from the north (origin not specified) but settled first at Edidi, from where he moved to Ilorin.[78]

Muhammed Yahaya, popularly known as *Oju-Ekun*, was another military man of great valour and strength, who is said to be of Kanuri stock from Borno. He migrated to Ilorin from Kuwo,

having reached the place from Old Oyo and also participated in many battles. From his name, *Oju-Ekun nsẹjẹ*, which translates as "one whose face is terrifying like that of a lion",[79] there is no gain saying that his military expertise was one of the high points of the early period in Ilorin. These people used their military skills to assist the Ilorin army at various times and became immortalised as great warriors, who contributed to the making of the Emirate.

Apart from the movement of military personalities to Ilorin in the period, there was the influx of Islamic scholars who contributed to the city's military enterprise on one hand and scholarship on the other hand. For instance, *Al-Ilorĩ* in his work titled *Lamhatul-'l-Ballur*, emphasises the mass importation of '*Ulamã*' from Katsina, Kanuri, Sokoto, Gobir and Borno areas to Ilorin during the period of *Sheik* Alimi and his sons Abdulsalam and Shitta. These scholars contributed greatly to Ilorin war efforts and the propagation of Islam through the teaching of Arabic and Islamic studies. Indeed, *Al-Ilorĩ* classified the following individuals as first generation scholars in Ilorin*: Sheik* Abubakr Bube who was of Gobir descent and arrived Ilorin around 1828; *Sheik* Ibrahim *Qabru-'l-'Ulûm* (popularly known in Ilorin as *Kuburu Karatu*, which means: the "Pit of Knowledge"). He arrived Ilorin during the reign of Emir Shitta around 1842; *Sheik* Ibrahim *Al-Attãr* (*Baba Turare*) from Oyo-Ile who settled in Ilkorin around 8170; *Sheik* Ibrahim Bature *Al-Akdazĩ* came to Ilorin during the reign of Emir Abdulsalam; Sheik Badmus Ibn Musa *Al-Arbaji* (*Agbaji*) arrived Ilorin during the era of Emir Shitta.[80]

Furthermore, with the widespread practice of the Islamic religion in Ilorin and Yorubaland, the role of Quran in warfare became very prominent in the Nineteenth Century. Faith-based weapon became a formidable element in Ilorin military as Muslim clerics were approached for spiritual guidance and support during campaigns. Verses in the Holy Quran were drawn to assist in Ilorin's offensive and defensive warfare. It is said that the Quran is a complete manual for mankind to use in all aspects of life. Thus, Ilorin relished this position by employing Quran chapters and verses in fortifying his troops during warfare as well as in the city's defence mechanism.[81]

Physical instruments of war such as swords, spears, lances and so on, were sometimes immersed in substances prepared with Quran texts to increase their potency on the enemy. This was in addition to prayers that were organised by scholars specifically to seek Allah's favour in any prospective battle. Such prayers were offered fervently by Muslim *Ummah*

before every encounter, and were continued throughout the campaign. It needs to be emphasised that most military leaders believed in the efficacy of this Islamic spiritual element in warfare, in spite of other weapons and accoutrement of war in their possession. Quran texts were sometimes written on leather, papers or other similar surfaces like leaves, clothes and wrapped, and were either fastened to the body of horses, weapons, or kept in the pocket of the warrior himself for protection. All these point to the level of reliability of the warriors on the Quran as a spiritual weapon in warfare.[82]

Indeed, the war standard carried by the war leaders is said to bear very strong spiritual significance. The staff, an elongated piece made of wood or metal with a wrapping of white cloth at the top, was the symbol of war command. It also symbolised the leadership of the war commanders in battlefield.[83] This staff is said to have also contained Quran verses and chapters inscribed on its top and wrapped in white cloth, all aimed at giving divine guidance, protection and victory to the warriors in their encounters.

Quran chapters and verses, the warriors believed, also served as back-up to their physical weapons. Thus, warriors used bindings, amulets and other related items with spiritual content as protection during encounters. This inter-dependency between warriors and Muslim clerics also enhanced the level of socialization among the diverse groups in Ilorin at the period. Muslim clerics thus became important aid to the warriors and were prominent in the city. It has been emphasised, for instance, that Muslim charms were also highly prized by Yoruba warriors in general. Indeed, it was for this reason that *Ààre* Afonja had to establish connections with as many different categories of people within the *Aláàfinate* as possible, particularly, the Muslims, and to endeavour to obtain their help in the subversion of the *Aláàfin*'s power. It is also possible that Afonja was interested in contacts with the Muslims of Nupeland. Furthermore, some Muslims from *Oke-Imole,* Ilorin, also claim that their ancestors came from Old Mali to settle in the town.[84]

Apart from spiritual element of warfare, Islamic religion equally featured in the production of talisman; spiritual water (***hantu***), which involved the writing of Quran verses either on wood (***wala***) or other similar surfaces and rinsed in water to be drank to fortify the warrior. Few examples of verses from the Holy Quran used to fortify worriors for offensive and defensive purposes were Surat *Al- Fathia, Al-Baqara, Qursiyy, Al-Nas, Al-Falaq, Quraish, YaSin,* and *Qaf.* The full texts of few of the Quran chapters are captured below. Sura 1, (***Al-Fathia***) reads:

Bismillahi r-rahmani r-rahim---In the name of Allah, the most beneficient, the most mercifull

Alhamdu lillahi rabbi l-'alamin---All praise be to Allah, Lord of the worlds

A-rahmani r-rahim---Most beneficient, most merciful

Maliki yawmi d-din---King of the day of jugdement

Iyyaka na'budu wa iyyãka nasta'ĩn---You alone we worship, and to you alone turn for help

Ihdinã s-sirat al-mustaqĩm---Guide us (O Lord) to the path that is straight

Sirãt al-ladina an'amta 'alayhim gayril magdûbi 'alayhim walãd dãllĩn---The path of those You have blessed, Not of those who have earned your anger, nor those who have gone astray

Sura 113 (***Al-Falaq***) reads:

Bismillahi r-rahmani r-rahim---In the name of Allah, the most beneficient, the most mercifull

Qul-audhu bi rabbil falaq---Say: I seek refuge with the Lord of rising day

Min sharri ma khalaq---From the evil of what He has created

Wa min'sharri ghasiqin idha waqab---And the evil of evening darkness when it overspreads

Wa min'sharri naffa thati fil u'qad---From the evil of sorceresses who blow incantations on knots

Wa min'sharrihasidin idha hasad---From the evil of the envier when he envies

Sura 114 (***Al-Nas***) reads:

Bismillahi r-rahmani r-rahim---In the name of Allah, the most beneficient, the most mercifull

Qul-audhu bi rabbil naas---Say: I seek refuge with the Lord of men

Malikin naas---The King of men

Ilaahi naas---The God of men

Min sharri waswasasil khannas---From the evil of him who breathes temptations into the minds of men

Alladhee yuwaswisu fee sudururin naas---Who suggests evil thoughts to the hearts of men

Minal jinnati wa naas---From among the jinns and men

Sura 105 (***Al-Fil***) reads

Bismillahi r-rahmani r-rahim---In the name of Allah, the most beneficient, the most mercifull


Alam tarakayfa fa'alarabuka bi as'ãbil fīli---have you (O Muhammed (Peace be upon him) not seen how your Lord dealt with the Owners the Elephants? [The elephant army which came from Yemen under the command of Abrahan Al-Ashram intending to destroy the *Ka'bah* at Makkah

Alam yaj alkaydahun fī tajlīli---Did He not make their plot go astray

Wa'arsala alayhim tahiran Aba'bīla---And sent against them birds, in flocks

Tar mīhim bi'jaratin min sijjīlin---Sriking them with stones *Sijjil*

Faja alahun ka'asfin maakulin---And made them like an empty field of stalks (of which the corn has been eaten up by cattle) [85]



A



B



C

Fig. 10 : A - the Holy Quran believed to provide complete protection by Muslims scholars.

B - wooden and metal slate for inscribing texts from the Holy Quran.

C - Locally made Ink (*Tadawa*) used by Muslim scholars.

Source: picture taken by the researcher during field work.

There was also fortune-telling (***ìwosé***) which Muslim spiritualists employed to inquire about the likely outcome of any proposed campaign so as to make necessary preparations. Portions of the Quran were also inscribed on paper or other soft surfaces and wrapped and then tied to war garment, weapons or kept in the warriors' pocket for protective purposes. This was popularly known as ***tira*** generally in Yorubaland but in Ilorin it was specifically referred to as ***àsírí,*** which indicated that it was not every Muslim cleric that had knowledge of the secret for making such spiritual items.

Another important aspect of Islamic influence on Ilorin military and her society in the Nineteenth Century was the srenghtening of the mosque as both a place of worship as well as a center of unity. Indeed, all sections of the Muslim congregation were represented in the Ilorin mosque. These included the royalty as epitomized by emir, Imams, chiefs; the warriors as typified by the *Balóguns* and other military personalities; and the citizens. Thus, the mosque provided a formidable platform for increased solidarity among the various sections of Ilorin society, particularly, after the establishment of its emirate. This had positive impact on Ilorin's ability to institute the *Sharia* within its metropolis as well as to extend its influence to new areas. According to Jawondo, there was mutual respect and understanding among the principal officials of the mosque. At any occasion, be it political, social or religious, they were always together and did things in common and for a common interest.[86]

The Ilorin military benefitted from this cohesion. For instance, to underscore this relation between the mosques, the leadership and the warriors in Ilorin, Ferryman in 1889, reported a colourful procession of the Emir and his chiefs to the *Jummat* Central Mosque. According to him, "a number of men on foot armed with flintlocks, moved ahead, then followed a crowd of gaily-dressed chieftains, mounted and carrying spears and then the Emir himself….attended by an immense bodyguard of functionaries on foot".[87] Crowder also maintains that the mosque became a strong, united and focused organ of governance in Ilorin Emirate until the infiltration and its eventual coquest by the British in 1897.[88]

Islam therefore provided formidable ground for the Ilorin military to thrive as it also enhanced the political and social interaction among its inhabitants. This was largely facilitated by the feeling of brotherhood and trust, which the faith emphasised among its adherents.

3.7 Significance of the Cavalry in Ilorin Military Expeditions

The cavalry gave a distinct military advantage to its possessor in pre-colonial warfare. Cavalry includes the use of horses, camels and elephants in combat. However, horses were the most commonly used of the cavalry arsenals in pre-colonial Nigeria. It should be emphasised that if horses were used merely to transport warriors to the battle field and not deployed in the battle itself, cavalry is not considered to have been employed. Horses' tactical significance in battles marks them out for consideration. Soldiers, who rode on horseback to battle constituted a distinct unit known as cavalry. For quick movement, effective command and control, commanders of infantry units and their orderlies rode on horseback.

Horses served as important items of commerce and vehicles in military in pre-colonial Nigerian societies. This was based on their role in slave raiding and capture of more lands. For instance, Thomas King, a member of the 1841 British Niger expedition supplied information on the tactical importance of the horse in slave raiding activities. He observed that "parties of about ten horsemen and some foot soldiers would lie in wait in the 'bush', near a village, and at daylight, when the unsuspecting natives go to their work in the fields, they are seized and hurried off to their camp".[89]

> This buttresses Robin Law's point that the connection between the horse and slave trade lay in their relation to war. Horses were valued primarily for their use in warfare, and were perhaps especially useful in the pursuit and capture of fleeing enemies, that is, in securing slaves. Slaves, conversely, were most readily obtained through capture in warfare. The exchange of horses for slaves therefore, tended to become, it is often suggested, a 'circular process': horses were purchased with slaves, and could then be used in military operations which yielded further slaves, and financed further purchases of horses. Trade and war fed upon each other in a self-sustaining process which reinforced the domination of the warrior aristocracies - producing what Smaldone has christened the 'war complex' of the Western Sudan.[90]

The cavalry constituted a fraction of the armed forces in some pre-colonial Nigerian states. For instance, the Sokoto Caliphate's balance of forces gave the cavalry about one-tenth of the total strength of its army.[91] Similarly, the cavalry contributed greatly to the success of Old Oyo Empire during her hey days. Oyo Ile, the capital of the empire, was situated in the open grassland of Yorubaland, close to the states of present day northern Nigeria. Oyo forces regularly imported large number of horses from across the Niger. Thus, the empire became

famous for its cavalry, which played major roles in her expansion to the coast; a distance of over 200 miles (about 320 kilometres).[92]

After the fall of the empire, and the consequent shift of its population into the forest of the south, her use of cavalry diminished considerably but not completely, for as at 1881, Ibadan horsemen still had an opportunity to prove their mettle. These horsemen, who had been left to guard the city while the main army was engaged by Ekitiparapo forces on the forest in hills of Igbajo, charged and completely routed an Ijebu force, which had persistently carried out menacing raids on Ibadan farms. The horses were an unaccustomed and terrifying sight to the Ijebu troops.[93] Apart from the incident described above, not much use was found for the cavalry by the Oyo group in the Nineteenth Century.

The cavalry occupied an important position in Ilorin military history because of its role in the successes recorded in the various battles against the Oyo group. Indeed, cavalry had been a factor in the Fulani revolt against Oyo since the dying period of the empire. Clapperton for instance refers, several times, to the troubles in the Oyo Kingdom. At Assula, twenty six days' journey from Badagry, he found that the inhabitants had newly dug a ditch round the town 'on account of the existing war'- almost certainly meaning events at Ilorin; and three days later, he wrote: 'a war is now carrying on only a few hours' ride from us; not a national but a slaving war'.[94] At Shaki and Enkoosoo, he learnt that his journey was being interpreted as a mission to make peace between the *Aláàfin* and his Hausa slaves. He was told:

> The Hausa have been in rebellion these two years and possess a large town only two days journey from Katunga (Oyo), called Lori (Ilorin). The Yorubanis (sic) are evidently afraid of them; they say they have a great number of horses, and have been joined by many Felattahs (Fulani).[95]

Both from the wording and the context, these remarks seem to describe the overthrow of Afonja and the establishment of Ilorin as an outpost of the *Jihad*, and the significant role of the cavalry in Ilorin's attack on Oyo. To the north of the empire, the Fulani had occupied and overran most of the Yoruba proper, and their cavalry continued to raid in all directions. But the forests of the south proved as great an obstacle to their progress as the regrouped remnants of the Yoruba armies. Thus, it was southwards, towards these forests that many of the inhabitants of northern Oyo fled for shelter. The towns in this area became *Ìlú-Àsálà*, (that is,

towns of refuge), expanding their sites and their farmlands to accommodate the newcomers. One of these was Osogbo in the Ijesa Kingdom, where the influence of refugees was so great as to give it the character and allegiance of an Oyo town.[96] The Ilorin army used the cavalry extensively because of the savannah nature of its environs. The state derived considerable advantage from this geo-strategic characteristic of its location, which favoured the mobility of her well-mounted horsemen. Ilorin's victories at the *Ogele* and *Mugba-Mugba* (locust fruit) battles for example, were due to this cavalry advantage.[97]

The cavalry fought in a variety of ways: at a distance with throwing spears, at close quarters with thrusting spears, or even occasionally dismounting and fighting on foot. Sometimes, the horses had protection. However, men mounted in this way made a weapon system distinctly inferior to infantry and therefore could not expect to charge heavy infantry successfully because the men on foot had better weapons for shock action and a more secure fighting platform, the ground. Equally, the mounted men had a disadvantage in engaging light infantry with missiles. Even though foot soldiers' superior fighting platform gave them a distinct advantage because they could fight better than those mounted since they had only one task, to fight, unlike men on horseback, who had to first control their mounts and then fight.

However, the cavalry's superior mobility gave it one formidable advantage over the infantry. Though a group of cavalry might lack subdivision and any articulation, it could use its mobility to attack the flank or rear of the enemy formation. The horses themselves would have a tremendous psychological effect, coming as it did from an unexpected direction against troops not arranged to meet it. The horses themselves would add another cause of demonstration, for they would look large and menacing. A Greek general sought to dispel this fearful aspect of cavalry by telling his infantry that:

> No man ever perished in battle from being bitten or kicked by a horse. The foot soldier can strike harder and with truer aim than the horsemen, who is precariously poised on his steed, and is as much afraid of falling off as he is afraid of the enemy.[98]

Notwithstanding the comment above, the cavalry's superior mobility and ability to go into action without dismounting set it out as an offensive troop in assailing the enemy's vulnerable flank and rear. But the cost of horses and the general accoutrement of keeping the cavalry force made the cavalry an expensive weapon system in the Nineteenth Century. In Ilorin, the

cavalry, which represented the elite corps of the *Emir*'s army, was recruited largely from the ranks of officialdom and its dependents. Titled officials and their free chiefs, and selected slaves composed the bulk of the horsemen. Mercenaries and men of wealth, who could afford to mount themselves also contributed to the ranks of the cavalry.

The significance of the cavalry force in Ilorin warfare cannot only be attested to by the army's successes in her wars already mentioned, but also the prevalence of horses in the compounds of the elite group in the town in the Nineteenth Century.[99] Indeed the impact of the cavalry on Ilorin wars and her society was further reinforced by the royal attachment it had in the Emirate. For instance, there was an officer in charge of fending for horses and training them in preparation for battles. His compound was thus referred to as *Ilé Akẹsìnrìn*, which translates as abode of the trainer of horses. This officer was also responsible for selecting the horses to be used by the *Emir* because of his sound understanding of the psychology and strength of the horses under his care. This officer was also recognised as the leader of the cavalry contingent in battlefield as he stayed in front to direct the movement of the mounted soldiers.



Fig. 11: A cavalryman wearing a coat of chain mail with his spear in the right hand. From Deham and Clapperton *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (1826). Source: R. S. Smith, *Wafrare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa*, James Currey, London, 1976, p. 46.

3.8 Sources of Horses for Ilorin Cavalry in the Nineteenth Century

Ilorin obtained horses for its cavalry force from the north, particularly from Sokoto, headquarters of the caliphate. This was possibly in line with the latter's motherly role in supplying logistics to facilitate the expansion of the caliphate to the south. Ilorin, being one of the southern frontier *emirates*, was a strategic destination for Sokoto's supplies during the campaigns. Furthermore, in the Nineteenth Century, Ilorin took over much of the trading role of Old Oyo, including its function as an entrepot between north and south.[100] It shared the ecological advantages of Old Oyo and was in a good position relative to Niger crossing and its situation between Hausaland and the Yoruba states.[101]

These advantages were eagerly exploited by its government and people in sourcing for, and obtaining horses for its cavalry force. Therefore, Sokoto remained an important source of horses for Ilorin as for most of the *emirates*. It is therefore necessary for this study to examine the caliphate's efforts in horse's procurement. The importance of horses as war animals became more visible in the life of the *caliphate* and its Emirates as time progressed in the *Jihad* period. For the Sokoto *Caliphate*, as for the classical Sudanic states, the acquisition of horses for cavalry was a paramount concern. J. P. Smaldone maintains that during the Nineteenth Century, there were three principal means by which horses were obtained: through direct appropriation as taxation and tribute from subject people or as war booty from the vanquished; through selected and systematic local breeding; and through both inter-state and inter-Emirate commerce.[102]

In the early period of the *Jihad*, the Muslim insurgents acquired many horses as booty from successful raids and campaigns. After the victorious Muslims had seized control of the Hausa states and extended their territorial domain, horses were demanded as part of the taxation or tribute accruing from the subject population. Perennial wars of consolidation against recalcitrant peoples also provided additional horses as booty. Sokoto itself sometimes received horses as part of the annual tribute forwarded by its subordinate emirates.[103] Even though taxation, tribute and booty must have provided a considerable number of horses for Sokoto and its emirates, positive action had to be taken to ensure an adequate supply. *Caliph* Muhammad Bello (1817-1837), for instance, recognised the need for more and better cavalry mounts and took appropriate steps.

Bello's military requirements were exceptional. In his twenty year tenure, he conducted 47 major campaigns. To protect the newly organised cavalry, he introduced (*lifidi)* quilted armour, and at the same time made efforts to augment the available reserve of war-horses. Bello also took some political actions to encourage the production of horses. For example, he bestowed the title of *Banaga* on the leader of a group of Fulani horse breeders for a regular supply of horses. He also made a major attempt to induce nomadic Fulani and Tuareg herdsmen to adopt sedentary habits and to raise horses and camels for the Sokoto army. Even though, this policy proved unsuccessful among the Tuareg, many Fulani groups abandoned their migratory habits for residence in permanent settlements. Bello provided them with tools, an agricultural programme, and war captives to do the farm labour. Moreover, he instructed them to reduce their cattle herds and to emphasise instead, the breeding of horses and camels.[104]

This strategy by *Caliph* Bello supported the high prize the *caliphate* accorded the cavalry force, and yielded positive results for the state in particular and the *emirates* in general. The *caliphate*'s defence was enhanced by this increase in horses supply, particularly in the newly settled areas; there was economic prosperity, territorial control and general security in the *caliphate,* which enhanced sedentary life among the Fulani.

The third and perhaps the main source of horses was trade. The best horses in Hausaland were imported from the area north of Adamawa, and in particular, from Borno, which country, claimed Lander, "supplies every other in the interior with that useful animal; and these are handsome, powerful beasts". These were probably the Dongola horses, which were highly prized in Borno, where they had been imported and bred for centuries. Another important source of horses was the Sahel region to the north of Hausaland, especially Azbin, where Tuareg breeders raised a local variety of the oriental. One such northern breed, known in Hausaland as the *Sulebawa,* was considered by the British to be "closely akin to the English thoroughbred".[105] Other areas from where horses entered Ilorin were Jau and Megatare both in the present Jigawa State.[106]

It is impossible to determine the number of horses involved in this commerce. What is clear however is that the trade in horses was closely regulated and well monitored because of its obvious military value. The *caliphate*'s realisation of the strategic advantage of the cavalry in facilitating swift movement of men and materials in battle fields must have informed Bello's

policy of encouraging self-sufficiency in horse production. This move could also have been related to a Borno embargo on the trade in horses, imposed perhaps during the *Jihad* when the Borno capital was sacked and its western provinces detached. In 1854 however, the embargo was lifted and as the horse trade again gravitated westward into Hausaland, the price of horses in Borno itself increased sharply.

Sokoto also regulated the horse trade to deny its enemies a source of cavalry mounts. In 1850s for example, *Caliph* Aliyu Baba (1842-1859) prohibited the export of horses and swords to Nupe and Ilorin, fearing that these military supplies might fall into the hands of Umaru Nagwamatse, a grandson of Sheik Usman Dan Fodio, whose independent conquests in southwestern Zaria and northern Nupeland were undertaken without official authorization.[107] As mentioned in the preceding section, Ibito and Kontagora areas in northern Nupeland, which were then under the forces of Nagwamatse, were important sources of weapons and soldiers for Ilorin. Therefore, this embargo on the supply of horses and swords in the middle of the Nineteenth Century must have had some negative impact on the Ilorin army particularly its cavalry at that time.

Even though the *caliphate* obtained horses through foreign trade, it seems that from the time of Bello onward, the Sokoto area itself became the most important internal source of horses for the other *Emirates*. By the early 1830s Laird and Oldsfield noted that the finest horses in Nupe were brought from Sokoto by Arab traders. Two decades later this horse trade between Sokoto and southern frontier Emirates of Nupe and Ilorin was still flourishing.[108]

There is also evidence that Ilorin possibly obtained horses from Nupeland based on relations between the two and the availability of the animal in the area. For instance, the Nupe had a long martial cavalry-based tradition as Tsoede, its founder-king, was said to have owned no less than 5,555 horses; and stirrups supposed to have belonged to him are preserved at Gbagede in Nupeland.[109] Traditions of Nupe neighbour, like the famous Yoruba Empire of Oyo, bear evidence of Nupe effective use of the cavalry.[110] Nupe maintained a valuable and important trade in horses with Kano and Borno and was actually the principal supplier to the Oyo Empire in the period up to the start of its internal wars.[111] Moreover, there is indication that Nupe may had bred horses, besides importing them from its northern trading partners.[112] This made Nupeland another likely steady source of horses for Ilorin Emirate in the

Nineteenth Century especially based on the diplomatic relations between the two occasioned by the *Jihad*.

With time, Ilorin inhabitants imbibed the tradition of raising horses. Even though this was very limited in scale compared to the number imported, it certainly reflected the social status of the Ilorin elites of the Nineteenth Century. Horses were kept for both their military value and as paraphernalia of royalty and affluence. Indeed most Ilorin royal families employed people to fend for horses in their compounds.

3.9 Cavalry Accortrement and Horse-Keeping Technology in Ilorin

The significance of cavalry as a force in Ilorin military was further strengthened by the emergence of horse-keeping tradition and the manufacture of horse trappings in few locations in the town, the *Awodi* and *Pataki* areas, to be precise. While the smiths, who fabricated iron implement for the warriors were mostly Yoruba of Old Oyo extraction, those who made equipment and cavalry accourterments were mostly of Nupe origin. Blacksmithing had a geographical spread in Ilorin because its products were of a general nature, which served both agricultural and military purposes. However, the cavalry technology, being a more specialised aspect, was restricted, and thus engaged by people in specific locations in the town, mostly Nupe people, found in Gambari area of the town.[113] Smiths in Pataki, Isale Gambari area, were noted for fabricating cavalry accoutrements like saddle, stirrups, helmets, shields and horse trappings.[114] The importance of this branch of blacksmithing increased in Ilorin especially with the town becoming an emirate and having to rely more on the cavalry in its wars of survival, expansion and consolidation.

In cavalry, both the rider and his mount often wore protective armour, manufactured from loose fibre of the silk-cotton and were fitted to the horseman's body in pieces; the quitted armour covered the loins, thighs and abdomen. Such quilted armour was used by horsemen either alone or in combination with chain mail. The war horses themselves were sometimes outfitted with breast plates. Other protective devices and essential gear of the cavalry men included helmets, shields, saddles and horse trappings. The helmet was a padded headpiece made of bound rags, sometimes covered by a tin of brass receptacle or chain mail, and decorated with the feathers of an ostrich or other highly coloured bird.

The shield carried by the heavy cavalry men were of two basic types; either large circular shields, about five feet in diametre, or large rectangular implement, about five feet high by two or three feet in width. These shields were made of tanned hide of elephant, buffalo, antelope or

other suitable animals. They were extremely durable, light and supple, yet superior to metal or wood in proportion to their weight. A variety of saddles was used, the common one being high-peaked before and behind, employed by both heavy and light cavalry. Along with these items went a remarkable assemblage of horse trappings, including bridle and bit combinations, spurs, quilted saddle covers and lighter decorated outer covers and stirrups.[115] The latter existed in two general forms; either small toe stirrups or large shovel shaped instruments with sharp edges. These served not only to protect the riders' legs from scrub and brush but were in themselves weapons of offence and defence. This was known in Ilorin as *Bàtà kẹmí*.[116]

The main offensive weapon of the cavalry men was the heavy metal lance, about six feet long. Its butt end was shaped like an axe head and rested in the stirrup; the head was about eight inches long and barbed. The shaft was inlaid with brass and sometimes bore a brass knob about two thirds of the way down to balance the weight of the head.

Ilorin heavy cavalry also made use of a variety of swords, war clubs, and battle-axes, especially when fighting at close quarters. Offensive and defensive armament of the light cavalry also included a variety of javelins or throwing spear, swords, cudgels, maces or battle-axes, knives or daggers, thrusting lances and shields. If spears (either with single pointed edge or barbed edge commonly referred to as *Masi* in Ilorin) were carried, the horseman would normally have two or three. These were hurled as soon as the enemy troops came within range. The lances and swords were the principal weapons for close combat; swords *(Idà)* were slung over the shoulder by the sling, and daggers carried in a sheath affixed to the left forearm. Large round shields up to five feet in diameter, or small shield between two and three feet in diameter completed the outfit of the light cavalry men.[117]

The horse itself was decorated with a variety of items to give the rider balance and transform the animal to a partner in the war mission. In Ilorin, these items included the following:
Gàárí (saddle) a seat strapped on the back of the horse for the rider. This was made of a combination of several items including leather, wood and iron. The saddle is a structure, which combined the works of blacksmiths, woodcarvers, tanners, and onarment designers, who would put the finishing touches to the outfit. The structure also had pads usually stuffed with grasses and sometimes dried horse droppings to give the rider a comfortable seat when riding.

Likafa (stirrup) a metal loop supporting the horse-rider's foot. This could be made of brass, bronze or iron and enhanced the rider's sitting position as he controls the horse's movement.
Kemi- this refers to cavalry man's foot pedal. This was made of leather with a plate of sharp pointed iron affixed to its back used for hitting the horse to prompt the animal to move faster and could also be used for attacking the enemy by hitting him. In Ilorin, this was sometimes called *bata kemi*

Okùn-Ìjánu- usually a combination of leather and some ropes fastened to the head through the mouth of the horse for controlling its direction of movement. This was a sort of steering, which was held by the rider to give him support as well as function to ignite a horse's movement and as its brake.

Ikodi-Majayi- a rope, which connects the trapping from the head of the horse to its chest. *Alalafa* was the name given to the rope that comes from the mouth of the horse to support the saddle so that the horse would not move in awkward direction.
Tefendi refers to the first garment used for covering the horse before the saddle and other accessories were added.[118]



Fig. 12: Prototype of Nineteenth Century Shield, Lances and Body Armour

Source: Armoury at the Emir's Palace, Ilorin, the picture was taken by the Researcher on 9th June, 2017.



Fig. 13: Body Armour made from strong threads and worn on the Warrior's chest and headdress for the warriorSource: Armoury at the Emir's Palace, Ilorin, picture taken by the Researcher on 9th June, 2017.




Fig. 14: Different weapons and cavalry accessories preserved in the Armoury.

Source: Armoury at the Emir's Palace, Ilorin, picture taken by the Researcher on the 9th June, 2017.




Fig. 15: Prototype of Nineteenth Century Saddle (known as *Gàári* in Ilorin) with Bow and Arrows for the cavalryman.

Source: Armoury at the Emir's Palace, Ilorin, picture taken by the Researcher on 9th June, 2017.



A





B



Figs. 16: A- Iron stirrup supporting the Cavalryman's foot.

B- Iron bit fastened to the mouth of the horse for controlling its movement.

Source: Picture taken by the Researcher at the abode of Nupe smith in Pataki, Isale Gambari Area, Ilorin on the 7th January, 2017.



Fig. 17: (*Gàárí)* Prototype of Nineteenth Century Saddle locally made by Nupe Smiths in Ilorin.

Source: Picture taken by the Researcher at abode of Nupe Cavalry Accessories' Smiths in Pataki area, Ilorin on the 7th January, 2017.




Fig. 18: Central Sudan type of Saddle. From Deham and Clapperton *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (1826). Source R. S. Smith, *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa,* James Currey, London, 1976, p. 69.

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CHAPTER FOUR

WAR STRATEGIES AND FIELD OPERATIONS OF THE ILORIN ARMY UP TO THE 1890s

4.1 Military Strategies and Tactics in Ilorin Warfare

History has amply indicated the pivot role of strategies and tactics in the military exploits of pre-colonial African societies. Indeed, in order to ensure greater military achievement, few military leaders carried out reforms to strengthen their strategies and tactics in field operations. A popular example was King Shaka of the Zulu nation who introduced some innovations in weaponry and fighting techniques in his army. For instance,

> Shaka introduced the broad bladed short handled stabbing spear to replace the traditional long javellins (old *assagai*) whioch often left warriors defenceless in close combats. In line with this new weapons, Shaka then trained his soldiers to use big shields in hooking away their shields, thus renderind then defenceless. In term of formation, he changed the traditional methods of warfare from face to face confronation to the use of 'horn formation' tactics. This tactics was designed to circle the enemy with many troops in the centre and the reserves at periphery. Those at the flanks thus circled the enemy and killed them as they concentrated on the Zulu forces at the centre.[1]

The above description represents parts of the military ingenuity of pre-colonial Afican military leaders and also underscores the significance of strategies and tactics in field operation. Ilorin's involvement in various wars of survival, expansion and consolidation at different periods in the Nineteenth Century justifies the area as a city of warriors like Ibadan in the same period. Akinjogbin maintains that between 1826 and 1840, no less than eleven battles were fought between the Oyo and Ilorin armies in pursuit of various motives. These, according to him, included the *Ogele, Mugbamugba* and *Kanla* battles, which were initiated by the Oyo authorities. Other battles were the *Pole* battle, *Eleduwe* battle and the last against Ibadan was the Osogbo battle, in which Ilorin was defeated in 1840.[2] Apart from the battles against the Oyo armies, several wars were fought with different communities to entrench the Jihad and expand Ilorin's influence to other parts of Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century. For instance, the war against Idofian, Asaba and Osi; the Yagba War against Yagba people of present Kogi

led by Ali *Balógun* Gambari; Ijeru War, Otun War against the Ekiti, Opin War, Offa War, Ilobu War, Otin War and Erinmope War are some of the popular encounters Ilorin had with groups in southern Yorubaland such as the Igbomona, Ibolo, Ekiti and Yagba.

However, it is pertinent to explore the tecnhniques involved in these battles since they were initiated at different periods and against different opponents. Because war is a huge venture, the conduct of its operations may conveniently be treated under the twin aspects of strategy and tactics. Even though, these two components of warfare become blurred in the course of time in military encounters, they can usually be clearly differentiated especially in societies, which have reached the level of political organisation labelled statehood. Thus, strategy and tactics played significant role in Ilorin's military escapades in the Nineteenth Century.

Strategy, the art of war in its highest manifestation is, according to Clausewitz, 'the continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means'.[3] Tactics, the conduct of war in the field corresponds to the work of the diplomatist as he carries out the directions of his government. In strategy, the objectives are long-term and arrangements for their achievement must be based on an assessment of the relative powers, including the will-power of the protagonist himself and of his enemy. Tactics were associated with the leadership of troops in contact with an enemy in a campaign or battle, and had shorter-term ends like the destruction of a specific group of armed enemy, the gaining of a tract of land or fortress. This however, required equally careful and original planning, local intelligence, and ability in the use and combination of weapons.

In line with the description of strategy above, Ilorin's military relations with the Old Oyo Empire up to the 1840s, the struggles with Ibadan in the long standing rivalry for dominating Yorubaland after Oyo's fall, and the various battles, which ensued between them, all involved war strategy. These were essentially long term plans with the aim of achieving independence for Ilorin, and to make the town one of the dominant forces in Yorubaland. Thus, every battle requires planning and painstaking execution since warriors should anticipate and prepare for peculiar experience in any prospective encounter. Therefore, Ilorin used tactics in response to the requirement of specific battles, so the success achieved would be contributing to the general objective. For instance, in the days of her struggle against Oyo, her tactics revolved around either making friend with or plotting different Yoruba groups against one another.

Strategy and tactics depend more on the motives of the war, which range from booty and wealth, trade, territorial expansion, political control and ideology. These motives were inherent in Ilorin's long term war plan in the Nineteenth Century. To achieve these objectives, long term planning and preparation as well as political and diplomatic moves were needed. It should also be emphasised that strategic objective in either political or military term changed according to the success or failure of the original plan and the exigencies of the contemporary condition at the given period. For instance, Idris Alooma's wars in Hausaland gave reliable evidence on which we can base our argument for Ilorin's change of strategy. Borno's campaigns against the people of Kano possibly originated as a response to the latter's incursions into Borno territory. This, Ibn Fartua alleges, seem to have been first intended to set up a secure and defensible frontier in the west.

This was a limited objective, which having become successful, changed to a more elaborate ambition to dominate Hausaland itself. In similar fashion, the five year war conducted against the Bulala in Kanem seem to have been actuated by the desire to dominate a people, whose dynasty had a vague relationship with that of Borno, the Sayfawa, and on whose territory the Mai had some claims. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Sikki, this demarcated the boundary between Borno and Kanem, evidently in Borno's favour, Ibn Fartua records that "all our commanders and captains rejoiced at our increase of territory." Finally Idris Alooma's policy of denying access to their grazing lands of certain Tuareg groups who had raided his country is an interesting example of deliberate ecological dislocation; although one which should perhaps be classed as tactics rather than strategy.[4]

Change in the long term military objective in Ilorin was similar to that of Borno highlighted above. In the days of *Ààre* Afonja, Ilorin's main military objective was to achieve independence and political sovereignty from the old Oyo Empire and this motive was largely aided by dissension among the states in Yorubaland. Howewer, this became more expanded after the establishment of the Emirate. Thus, Ilorin authority adopted internal and external diplomacy, and fortification as strategies to defend its territories and consolidate, while cavalry, reconnaissance, divide and conquer were some of the tactics adopted for expansion.

4.2 Internal Diplomacy and Cohesion in Ilorin

For success in the field operations, the first major step taken by Ilorin leadership was to build a strong united front among its diverse groups at home to ensure harmony and solidarity when the army set out for military expeditions. In doing this, diplomacy was paramount as an

instrument of the Ilorin political leadership. Diplomacy, like warfare, was an instrument of state policy in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin Emirate administration.[5] The art of diplomacy for which Ilorin was well known among the Yoruba was equally important to the ability of the Emirate to survive. Indeed, the employment of diplomacy by rulers of Ilorin could be traced to pre-emirate period, when *Ààre* Afonja made some efforts to increase his military base in the town. This motive prompted him to enlist the support and loyalty of the Hausa slaves and Ilorin's surrounding villages.

Diplomatic ploy was employed by the first Emir in the early days of the *Emirate* to consolidate his position. Abdulsalami used a combination of diplomacy and military force to deal with his rivals.[6] Whereas he empolyed tact and diplomacy in dealing with Bako, the then *Sarkin* Gambari at Ilorin, he combined diplomacy with force against Solagberu, the Yoruba Muslim leader at Oke-Suna.[7] With time, the strategy was broadened because Ilorin henceforth pursued a greater objective of extending her influence to new areas of Yorubaland. The *Emirate*'s leadership therefore, embarked on both internal and external diplomacy.

Internally, leaders of the major linguistic groups were co-opted as military generals *(Balógun)* and members of the *Emirate* political structure. The Ilorin leadership regarded this as expedient considering the strategic importance of the non Fulani groups in the survival of the young *Emirate*. For instance, Fulani leadership's adoption of *Balógun,* which is a Yoruba title for army general, is apparently in recognition of Yoruba role in the establishment and consolidation of the young Emirate, and was in itself, a strategy for cohesion. This was also extended to the other groups to enlist their loyalty for the Fulani leadership. Indeed, one unique element in Ilorin military was the emergence of different military titles with various names depicting the multiplicity of groups in the city. For the record, while *Balógun* was a Yoruba title referring to military commanders and was adopted in the Emirate, possibly because of the numerical strength of the Yoruba group, there was an array of Hausa titles, which also indicated the contribution of the group to Ilorin military in the early period. Some of the titles are *Maiyaki, Madaki and Ubandawaki*.

These military positions afforded the bearers the opportunity to partake in political decisions of the Emirate and they also became partners in the land holding hierarchy of the Emirate and by extension, had territories and people under their watch. This new strategic cum diplomatic arrangement resulted in greater measure of success for the Fulani led Ilorin and enhanced her

victories in the battles against Oyo, which climaxed with the latter's eventual defeat at the *Eleduwe* (Borgu) war.

This strategy also accorded the Yoruba greater measure of recognition based on their numerical strength in the Emirate leadership and administration. Through this strategy, Yoruba loyalty for the Fulani authority increased and they saw the Emirate as an entity, which they must support to succeed, especially as they also had benefits to reap from its survival. It is however significant to mention that during the Ilorin wars of expansion, the *Balóguns* attached greater interests to war booty and economic gains than the Jihad and Islamic evangelism, which the Emirate pursued at the beginning. Also with this internal diplomacy, the *Balóguns* were expected to raise warriors within their domains anytime there was a campaign. In summary, two things, which were fundamental in the Ilorin Emirate's internal cohesion were achieved through this move. The first was loyalty of the other groups to the new authority as headed by the Fulani, and the second was a boost in the Emirate's defence capabilities.

4.3 External Diplomacy and Alliances in Ilorin War Efforts

Aside from the internal arrangements, Ilorin war strategies also encompassed friendship and alliance with other groups outside, particularly after the establishment of the Emirate. A sterling diplomatic move was the letter sent to Sokoto, through Gwandu, in which AbdulSalam reiterated Ilorin Emirate's undivided loyalty to the caliphate and sought her support. With Sokoto's recognition of the Ilorin Emirate, through Gwandu, under whose watch the southern Emirates fell, Ilorin began to relish the support of the caliphate in terms of military assistance, which comprised the supply of soldiers, logistics including weapons as well as diplomatic relations.[8]

As a frontier Emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate, part of the functions of the Ilorin Emirate was to ensure further extension of the sphere of Islam. Thus, Islam provided the justification for the series of territorial conquests and annexation by the Ilorin political elite in this early period. These chain of conquests were described by Zubair, the third Emir, as attempts by Ilorin to dip the *Koran* into the sea.[9] Sokoto's goodwill was counted upon as impetus in expeditions embarked upon by the Emirares including Ilorin.

In the course of the wars, Ilorin sometimes received support from other Emirates like Lafiagi and Gwandu.[10] The Emirate of Gwandu was in charge of all other Emirates south of the caliphate. Apart from supporting wars, Gwandu often offered suggestions to Ilorin on Islamic jurisprudence and administrative matters.[11] In acknowledgement of this role, Ilorin sent presents and gifts to Gwandu annually.[12] With this grandiose external relations, by the 1850s, the Emirate had expanded, covering several hundred square kilometres. It shared common borders with some major states like Borgu to the northeast, the rest of Yorubaland to the west, south and east, and Bida, Shonga and Lafiagi to the north.[13]

Another veritable aspect of Ilorin diplomatic efforts in the Nineteenth Century was her relationship with the Nupe authorities at different periods. Ilorin made herself relevant in Nupe politics for more than four decades through diplomacy, and where diplomacy failed, she resorted to military expeditions. In as much as Ilorin was interested in warfare, she did not close the door to diplomatic avenues if such would achieve the same objective. Ilorin's diplomatic relations with the Nupe aristocrats, was also facilitated by religious factor, to be specific, the Jihad, which provided a strong basis for comradeship among certain factions of the contenders for the Nupe leadership.

Following the Nineteenth Century outbreak of the Nupe war and its subsumption into the Sokoto Jihad after which the Nupes were incorporated into the Sokoto caliphate, Nupeland was divided among five Emirates. These included Rabah/Bida, Lapai and Agaie, all to the north of the Niger, and Shonga and Lafiagi, to the south.[14] Temporarily at least, a new king in Majiya, and a new capital at Raba, emerged in Nupe. Jimada's son, Idirisu, the heir to the Gbara throne, and Makolo, late Jimada's military commander, together with some supporters, sought refuge in Ilorin.[15] Majiya determined to establish himself unchallengeably and to wean himself away from his powerful Jihadist allies whose leader was a Muslim cleric called Mallam Dendo. He sent his forces against the latter and expelled them from Nupe, at which point they fled to llorin where another Muslim cleric, Al-salih (*Alimi*), had established a considerable political following.[16]

At Ilorin, the refugees entered into a rapprochement with Idirisu, heir of the late *Etsu* Jimada and became allies in opposition to *Etsu* Majiya. In a bid to pre-empt the danger brewing on his southern border, Majiya sent a large expedition against the Muslim forces in Ilorin. His attack failed, his enemies counter-attacking and eventually driving him back across the Niger, and

out of Rabah, the Nupe capital.[17] This left the Muslim forces of Mallam Dendo and their allies, the Nupe who supported Idirisu, as the most powerful political group in Nupe. The Muslim forces thus became ever more powerful as their support seemed clearly to determine which local royal line and its supporters had the upper hand in the struggle for central Nupe *etsuship.* As the *de jure* kingmakers and the predominant ruling force in Nupe, they made their ally, Idirisu the new *Etsu* Nupe in place of Majiya. Ilorin's role in the emergence of Idrisu as the Etsu Nupe meant that she could also count on their support in subsequent campaigns.

A good example of such accord was the co-operation between Ilorin and Nupe on slave raids in the Nineteenth Century. Prior to 1900, the joint slave raids of Nupe and Ilorin on Yagbaland resulted in the presence of Yagba people in Ilorin. Masaba, one of the contenders to the throne of Nupe Kingdom while on campaign in Yagbaland to acquire slaves between 1833 and 1840 had to abruptly put an end to the campaign due to revolt in Lafiagi to force him out of Lade, his base capital. He escaped to Egbe, a Yagba community where he raised army to regain his capital, which he reoccupied in about 1845.[18] Between 1850 and 1857, another rebellion by Umar Barbushe forced Masaba to flee to Ilorin. From there he intensified his military campaigns in Yagbaland with the collaboration of Ilorin brought about by the Islamic revivalism of the Nineteenth Century that resulted in the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate.

The Fulani of Ilorin were thus imbued with the idea of spreading the religion of Islam. Hence, there were joint Nupe-Ilorin attacks on the Yagba communities. Apart from this religious motive, Yagbaland was attacked in order to collect tributes and acquire captives to cultivate crops thus, the forceful influx of Yagba people into Ilorin. The joint Nupe-Ilorin attack brought about oppressive systems that gave little in turn for the burdens imposed on the subjects. In fact, Nupe-Ilorin domination of Yagba communities with its excessive taxation forced many of the Yagba people to abandon their towns for inaccessible hills.

With this prevailing situation, Ilorin had made herself quite relevant in Nupe politics and took adequate benefits from the friedship. Indeed, as time went by, a good number of people of Nupe origin began to move to Ilorin to settle. These included warriors, spiritualists, horse-tenders, blacksmiths and Islamic scholars.[19]

In a similar fashion, a fundamental aspect of Ilorin war strategies was to capitalize on the prevailing lack of unity among Yoruba leaders. The precarious situation of Yoruba society of the period is adequately reported by Johnson, who states:

> The power of the Fulani (Ilorin) was now great and they aimed at nothing short of the subversion of the whole Yoruba country and short-sighted Yoruba chiefs were playing the game for them by their mutual jealousy of one another. One expedition followed after another and the result was the devastation and depopulation of the country…Jealousy and rivalry among the chiefs prevented unity of purpose. Allegiance was no longer paid to the King, not even in the capital.[20]

One such occasion, which Ilorin adequately profited from was the conflict between Toyeje, the *Kákánfò* at Ogbomoso and Adegun, the Onikoyi, two of the most prominent Yoruba war chiefs, who could have united to save the country. Indeed, when their petty jealousy eventually resulted to open war, the Ilorin authority found a better ground to further aggravate their differences, since the two states were now independent with the fall of Old Oyo. Thus the Kákánfò formed an alliance with the *Oluiwo* of Iwo, the *Timi* of Ede and Solagberu of Ilorin and besieged the *Onikoyi* in his city of Ikoyi.

With this heavy host, Ikoyi was nearly taken when Asegbe, the *Olofa*'s Ìlàri, whose master was then a refugee at Ikoyi, came up with a cunning diplomatic tact, which saved the city. Asegbe took a message to Abdulsalami that Ikoyi was besieged because the *Onikoyi* declared his alligience for the Emir. With this message, the Emir at once ordered the withdrawal of Ilorin troop from Ikoyi. Eventhough Solagberu, on account of personal vendetta with the *Onikoyi*, refused to heed the Emir's instruction, Ilorin used the opportunity to enlist the *Onikoyi*'s loyalty. Ilorin thereafter organised a powerful force which eventually raised the siege on Ikoyi. Prominent Yoruba leaders who fell in this war were the *Timi o*f Ede, the King of Erin, chief Aina-Abutu Sogu, and Awope.[21] Meanwhile, Solagbru was allowed to return to his Oke-Suna quartres in Ilorin, it was only a matter of time before he was besieged and killed. The implication again is that through this strategy, the Ilorin authority further weakened the cohesion among the Yoruba leaders to prevent any formidable opposition.

Throughout the long struggle between Oyo-Ibadan and the Fulani of Ilorin, the former were always handicapped by internal dissension and petty jealousies. This schism, the Fulani were not slow to exploit. Disaffected Yoruba chiefs often betrayed the plan of campaign or else deserted at critical moments. For instance, on one occasion, certain Oyo chiefs sent to the Emir, a symbolic message of soap, flesh, and camwood used for preparing a bride for wedding

night.[22] The significance of this message, we are bringing the bride (in this case the *Aláàfin*) to her husband, was not lost on Ilorin.

The astute policy of fostering and taking advantage of dissension in the ranks of the opponents was also followed in dealing with the Nupe, as we have earlier discussed. Indeed, the extent of success, which Ilorin had in the Nineteenth Century Yorubaland was a result of her open door policy to diplomatic avenues as long as such would provide positive results. In reality, Ilorin was ready to take sides with Ibadan, her bitterest foe in Yorubaland when she felt necessary and was prepared to abandon the alliance whenever it was thought fit to do so. Few examples will help to illustrate this point.

At the Batedo war (1844) and Opin war in the 1850s, Ilorin allied with Ibadan.[23] However, during the Ijaye war (1860-1865), Ilorin fought against Ibadan with a view to acquiring more areas of Yorubaland.[24] The behaviour of Ilorin during the Ekitiparapo war (1878-1886) was also not different. She suspended the overtures of friendship with Ibadan for a more profitable motive of benefitting from the war. However, her political and diplomatic efforts to extend the frontier of the Emirate were not successful because Ijaye was completely destroyed in 1865 and colonial government's intervention made the Ekitiparapo war inconclusive.[25] There was also a combined Ilorin-Ibadan expedition against the Igbira and Akoko peoples, always a fair game for Yoruba, Nupe or Fulani but it was not long before the ill-sorted allies fell out again. It is significant that in these joint expeditions, Ibadan, not Ilorin, seems to have taken the lead. The important point here again, is that Ilorin always capitalised on the division among the Yoruba groups to promote her own interest.

Still in continuation of its diplomatic ploy, Ilorin was involved in the alliance system during the Yoruba civil wars. Generally, the Yoruba states hardly fought their wars alone but in alliance. The preponderance of wars during the Nineteenth Century also precipitated the emergence of more alliances. Perhaps the most elaborated of the alliances were the Ife-Ijebu Alliance against Owu in 1821, the Ijaye Egba Alliance in 1860 and the Ekitiparapo Grand Alliance against Ibadan in 1878.[26] For Ilorin however, the Ekitiparapo Grand Alliance seemed more significant because of its motives. It was essentially intended to weaken Ibadan, which had, in the course of its expansion, subdued several Yoruba kingdoms. Ilorin also considered enlisting in the alliance as a means of obtaining booty in the ensuing battles. Ilorin's more important motive in the Ekitiparapo Alliance, however, was to re-impose control on her

former Igbomina vassals and to bring the Ekiti towns under her political sphere. This intention had been subtly expressed in Ilorin's message to *Ààre* Latoosa, ruler of Ibadan in 1878 in this: "*if a man's wife deserted him and afterwards repented and came back to him, is not the husband justified in receiving her back*".[27] By Ilorin's calculation therefore, this alliance was part of the diplomatic maneuvers to regain her lost territories among the Igbomina and Ekiti groups.

4.4 Reconnaissance and Knowledge of the Opponent

Information about the opponent was an important aspect of Ilorin war strategy throughout the Nineteenth Century. Having adequate knowledge of the opponent determined the best tactics to be employed in dealing with them. Here, character, strength and military intelligence sometimes counted more than weapons and logistics. The view is strongly held that success in war depends more on superior organisation, tactics and morale than superior weapons. An army's successful use of these war elements however depended squarely on adequate information about the opponent. In 1726 for instance, the Oyo cavalry, armed with lances, defeated the Dahomean forces, armed with muskets due largely to adequate knowledge of the opponent. Apart from the noise of the Dahomean guns, which frightened the Oyo horses initially, new and superior as they were to Yoruba warfare, the guns did not appear to have helped the Dahomeans avert defeat. Also in 1829, a large Ijebu army, equipped with snider rifles and abundant cartridges, was defeated by a small British led force. Furthermore, during the Kiriji wars from (1878-1886), the Ekitiparapo possessed superior fire power yet they were unable to defeat the Ibadan.[28] These instances buttress the point that sometimes, military organisation and tactics were far more important determinants of success at battles. However, for effective military strategy and tactics, adequate information about the enemy was required.

The Ilorin army's tactics depended on reconnaissance and knowledge of the opponent. The method employed involved finding out the strength and weaknesses of the opponent in relation to the size of its army, weapon system and its defence mechanism. In this regard, Ilorin warriors sometimes had friends within the ranks of the opponent so that through them, information could be obtained; this was further strengthened with the use of spies and espionage to study enemy camps. An advance army was sometimes sent to the battle front to distract the opponent. More often, the nature of opponent's defences determined the tactics to

be employed in the attack. Clapperton in 1829, as quoted by R. Smith, made the following documentation of an attack by the Fulani (Ilorin) on an Oyo community: in 1825, the Fulani, Clapperton was told, mounted an aerial incendiary attack against a group of Yoruba villagers near Oyo-Ile. Clapperton writes:

> Algi consists of three walled villages and before it was burnt down, had been of considerable size; they pointed out a rock close to the south of the town from whence the Fellatas (Fulani) flew the pigeons to set fire to it. The mode of doing it was by making combustibles fastened to the tails of the birds, which on being let loose from their hand immediately flew to the tops of the thatched houses while the Fellatas kept up a sharp fire of arrows to prevent the inhabitants extinguishing the flames.[29]

This description, it seems more likely, also relates to attack by incendiary arrow, a method well known to the Fulani. This also goes to suggest that there was no single tactics that was most effective in all situations; rather the approach to every battle was dictated by the prevailing circumstances at every campaign. The fact that the village was walled apparently prevented the Fulani soldiers from gaining entrance, hence the use of incendiary aerial attack, which merely entailed sending combustibles from afar into the enemy territory.

The use of espionage through making friends with some members in the enemy camp was also employed by Ilorin in her campaigns as witnessed during Ilorin's 10-Year siege of Offa beginning in 1878. It was reported that vital military intelligence were obtained by the Ilorin camp led by *Balógun* Karara, who had friends (informants) among the Offa group during the siege. However, this breach of Offa security intelligence by Ilorin has been attributed to disunity among Offa people in the course of the campaign. According to Abdulrahman, the discord was due to the protracted nature of the war as well as the imposition of *Oba* Adegboye Atoloyetele, who was chosen to replace *Oba* Okunoye.[30]

Following these developments, a section of dissatisfied Offa, led by *Ojomu* Orisasona, was in close relation with the Ilorin army under *Balógun* Karara. They served as Ilorin's "*eye*" on Offa military strategies and were reported to have divulged vital military intelligence to the Ilorin camp. Indeed, *Ojomu* Orisasona was reputed for his visits to *Balógun* Karara's camp amidst his supporters to announce the withdrawal of Ibadan soldiers from Offa. This was a strategic information in Ilorin's campaign against Offa and *Balógun* Karara was said to have capitalised immensely on this hint.

Meanwhile, Ibadan soldiers' eventual withdrawal from Offa was largely due to this constant security loop-hole in Offa society and failure of efforts to forestall its recurrence. In fact, this security breach led to Ilorin's ambush of some Ibadan war lords like Enimowu, Salako, Winkule and Malade and ultimately prompted Ibadan War Council to withdraw from Offa.[31] Sometimes, the static warfare tactics or laying siege was employed, which involved waiting at the gate of the opponent when entrance was not possible due to impregnable walls. This method was adopted in the Offa campaign led by *Balógun* Karara.

Field Tactics of the Ilorin Army

The exigencies of the various battles Ilorin was involved called for the adoption of different tactics in dealing with the opponents. These included conversion of defence to attack as used in *Ogele Battle*, which yielded huge success. Trapping the enemies within the city walls: this tactic was adopted during the *Eleduwe War* when the Ilorin troops retreated after a heavy attack. A tradition records that one major tactic employed in the *Eleduwe war* was distraction which involved Ilorin's involvement of naked women strategically positioned in the front line of its army so that the unlooking enemy army was caught. Even though, the invaders initially appeared to be winning, this tactic was said to have saved the day. Ilorin city walls also assisted the army in the defence of the city. Another tactic was encycling the enemies from different flanks. This was used in the *Mugbamugba War* also to Ilorin's favour. The last was Siege or Static Warfare as used in the *Offa* Campaign.

4.5 Fortification and City Walls as Defence Mechanism

Either in war situations or periods of peace, serious attention was paid to the security of life, territories and properties among pre-colonial societies. This was imperative because of their nature at the period, most being conquest states.[32] States were always alert to the possibility of being attacked by others and this concern always determined the siting of settlements in areas considered to offer the best security advantage. Therefore, the first main consideration was given to physical cum geographical features like mountains, hills, caves, trees and forest that could serve as protection from perceived or real enemies and their attacks. However, when these natural features were not available or inadequate, deliberate efforts were made to put structures in place to ensure the protection of the community. Such fortification would safeguard the army, common men, slaves and their lands, from attack and encroachment.

The widespread and numerous remains of fortifications, in particular, the mud-built walls around towns, were recurring and sometimes conspicuous feature in the pre-colonial landscape of Nigeria. The walls not only provided defence, they also served notably, as boundaries, demarcating a town from its farmland, regulating trade and enabling tolls to be collected from travelers. Thus, many town walls, as observed today, follow a course, which seems to ignore tactical opportunities offered by the nature of the ground. Nevertheless, what can be deduced about the evolution of towns strongly bears out the assumption that in origin, the walls were of military significance, providing defence against the enemy and shelter for the inhabitants.

There is abundant evidence too that walls continued to be the salient features in defensive warfare. That in most cases, they covered what seemed from the tactical point of view, a dangerously large area, was noticed by several European travelers, but the open farmland and gardens enclosed within them served to feed a town during a siege and also enabled the defender's army to be drawn up and rallied for battle behind the walls. That many, probably most, towns originated as military strongholds, cannot be proved, but there is much evidence for such a contention, both in the sites chosen and in the recorded history of some comparatively are recently founded towns.

Two outstanding examples are Sokoto, which was first inhabited in 1809[33] as a camp formed by Muhammad Bello, and Ibadan, which evolved from the camp of the shattered Oyo armies about 1830.[34] The camp was located on a ridge of hills near the edge of the forest, hence the name "Ibadan"- a Yoruba contraction of *eba odan* – (near the forest). Indeed, Ibadan developed from a military camp occupying the summit and slopes of a range of hills. Further examples can be seen in the Egba town of Abeokuta, built among rocks and protected on the west by the River Ogun, which informed the name (*Omo abe Olumoh* - people under the Olumoh rock). A similar example can be seen in the Ekiti region, where the advantage of natural topography was relished to the fullest in the mountains that pervaded the area.[35]

The formation of a fortified camp distinct from the parent town was usually the first step by the army when it first advanced into the battle field. Such camps were usually on temporary basis, naturally lasting for the period of the encounters. The war leaders were sheltered in tents or by walls of mats while the soldiers slept under such shelter as they could find. Camp followers and auxiliaries such as those who supply fighting implement and other needs of the

soldiers soon added to the population and semi-permanent quarters for all were quickly erected according to the varying local patterns. Thus, the military camp acquired the appearance of an ordinary town or village settlements, which often later became permanent and eventually civilianized.[36]

Ilorin had no city wall during the days of Afonja because there was no compelling need for such. The community did not experience any serious threat of military attack except towards the end of *Afonja*'s era, when Ojo Agunbambaru, a son of the deceased *Basorun* Gaa of Old Oyo, abortively attempted an invasion of the city. Indeed, during Afonja's era, Ilorin was still an expanding community, as the *Ààre* made deliberate efforts to incorporate several adjoining settlements into the town to populate the area. Even with Afonja's deviance of the Old Oyo, Ilorin was still considered an Oyo province until the Fulani proclamation of the area as an Emirate.

The Fulani authority themselves realised that declaring Ilorin an Emirate meant an invitation of war from the Oyo authority. Thus, it was this declaration, which prompted the Ilorin leadership, to begin the process of putting defensive mechanisms in place, including the erection of walls round the town. Indeed, it is reported that the combined Yoruba forces on five consecutive occasions invaded Ilorin. These invasions in sequence were known as the *Ogidi War,* the *Ogele War*, the *Mugba-Mugba* War, the *Kanla* War and the *Eleduwe War*.

The significance of defensive frontiers, specifically, walls, in the various battle in these wars cannot be overemphasised. In the first war of aggression against Ilorin led by Ojo Agunbambaru, a son of Basorun Gaa, tagged the Ogidi War, Ilorin had not yet been walled. Thus, she had to make do with temporary fortifications, made of logs of locust and shea butter trees *(igi igba and igi emi)* which were hurriedly reversed or loosened when Ojo's massive army arrived.[37]

The need to further fortify the city came after the first series of wars such as *Ogidi, Ogele* and *Kanla* wars. This was because experiences in those campaigns showed the need to fortify the city against future aggression; thus, the erection of walls round the city became expedient.
The first Ilorin city wall was consequently built in 1823 by *Emir* Abdulsalam (1823-1842) encompassing Gegele, Enu-Odi, Amule, Asunara and Ago. As the city expanded, the wall was shifted to accommodate the increase in population.[38] The second city wall built by the *Emir*,

went through Ode Onikijipa in Omoda to Ojuekun, Ojagboro, Isale Ajanaku, Ita Kure, Alapata, Ita Ogunbo back to Omoda. The third wall extended the city to Baboko, Pakata, Alore, Abayawo Pakata, Aluko stream and Isalekoto. The fourth and last wall was built in the early 1830s, shortly after the Warukura war. It extended in a southern direction from the bank of the Asa River to Odo-Okun across Old Yidi road. *Emir* Zubair Aiyelabowo I (1860-1868) also attempted to extend the city wall but Ilorin's preoccupation by the encounter against Ibadan made the project to be abandoned in 1864. The *Emir* died four years later, leaving the project for his successor, Emir Aliyu, who, even though, revived it towards the end of his own reign, could not build the wall before his death in 1891.[39]

Therefore, by the time of the *Eleduwe War*, the Ilorin city walls had been erected and served as great advantage to the army in its withdrawal and retreat tactics. Ilorin suffered series of setbacks in this expedition and its forces were beaten back to within the walls of the city. So massive was the Yoruba army, which invaded Ilorin on this occasion that it established an unbroken battle line stretching from Ogele through Bala to Ogidi. The plan was to stretch the siege further to Shao. At a point, it seemed Ilorin was going to be taken as the odds increasingly counted against its army. The Ilorin cavalry unable to withstand mounting pressures at the war front, tactically retreated into the city and shut the gates to gain respite. But commanders of the advancing and seemingly victorious Yoruba troops pursued their victory too far till they met with disaster.

The Ilorin approach to warfare in the wars of invasion showed the significance of withdrawal and retreat tactics, which was enhanced by the presence of walls in her city. The walls served two primary military roles for the city: First, it assisted in warding off invasion through alert, which was normally raised by the guards at the gates as soon as enemies were noticed. Secondly, these walls protected the city from being attacked from distance, and when aggressors entered the city walls, they could be easily captured, as witnessed in the *Eleduwe* war, in which the great Borgu warrior, *Worukura* was slain. City Walls indeed gave Ilorin a tactical advantage over her opponent during the invasion and was strategic to the defence of the Emirate against the Oyo-Bariba army in the *Eleduwe* War.

In addition to the construction of city walls, soldiers were stationed at the major enterances to the city to raise alarm about approaching enemies and keep other warriors adequately

informed of any impending attacks. One location noted for playing this role of alarting the city of enemy attack was a place thenceforth called *Alore* (Yoruba term, which means announcement)in Ilorin. The significance of *Alore* in Ilorin military came to fore during her battles against Old Oyo as warriors from the empire passed through Ogidi through the spot later coined *Alore* before entering Ilorin city.

4.6 Force Structure and Deployment of Troops

Two major corps, the infantry and the cavalry, operated in the Ilorin army, especially after the stablishment of its Emirate. The infantry was made up, mainly, of the archers and swordmen while the cavalry consisted of heavy and light armed horsemen. However, the foot soldiers had numerical egde over the cavalry and was more flexible and effective during battle because of their ability to maneuver in every nook and cranny of the region. The infantry was able to operate where and when the cavalry was handicapped. As one of the southern frontier emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, Ilorin was expected to further extend the Jihad influence to new areas in Yorubaland and this objective had an impact on the structure of its forces. Because the emirate was established among the Yoruba with a mixture of other groups, she faced the twin challenge of internal cohesion and the defence of its outlying terriotries.

J. P Smaldone in his study on *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, submits that a broad distinction can be made between the southern frontiers of expansion and the northern "frontiers of defence". Unlike the northern Emirates of Katsina, Daura, Kano and Zaria, where a pre-Jihad Islamic tradition existed among the Hausa states, the eastern and southern emirates of Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Muri, Southern Zaria, Nupe, Ilorin, and Kontagora were founded in non-muslim areas characterised by cultural and ethnic fragmentation.[40]

While the southern emirates expanded progressively at the expense of multifarious framgmented pagan people, the northern emirates became locked in the perennial defence of relatively fixed frontiers against hostile states. Sokoto, Katsina, Daura and Kano were periodically invaded by armies from Maradi and Tessawa, the successor states founded by skilled loyalist of Katsina.[41] However, either for defence or expansion, the common denominator in all the emirates was the organisation of a force for prosecuting their missions.

In Ilorin, there was a hierarchy of titled officials appointed by the Emir. Most of these titled officials were remunerated by a share of the annual taxes collected from the fiefs that were attached to their offices. Each fief holder (*Daudu*, *Alangua* or *Magaji* as they were variously known in Ilorin) was assigned several military responsibilities, including the requirement to

maintain a small armed force to serve in the Emir's army on specific campaigns, and to ensure the construction and periodic repairs of the walls of towns under his jurisdiction for defence purposes. Even though these were the basic military requirements of the *Balóguns* and other fief holders in Ilorin, the training of soldiers was less emphasised because the warriors and their families already knew that warfare was their responsibility and were always prepared and alert to that duty before other volunteers would join them to increase the numerical strength of the army.[42]

Archery: bow and arrows provided great utility and outstanding result in the Ilorin wars of the Nineteenth Century. This was perhaps due to its simplicity and affordability which made it a common weapon. Since archery was already a formidable element in hunting, it was easier to incorporate it into warfare. Indeed, Usman Dan Fodio emphasised the significance of the bow and arrow in warfare during the Jihad, describing it as unsurpassed as a weapon.[43] A bow consisted of a "bent stave of pliant wood (*orún*) and a string (*isán*) of a sufficient elasticity", the strings tied to the stave were of twisted raw hide cut into throngs.[44] The string is threaded through holes at the two ends of the stave and then bound and tied. The arrow on the other hand was of light wood or reeds, which formed the shaft with the arrow head barbed and embedded by a long point or tang. Arrows were carried in a tube-like container known as quiver (*apó*), which could hold between forty to two hundred darts. Rabbah archers, for instance, carried about a hundred arrows in their quivers, while those of Abuja and Nupe carried about two hundred.[45]

Archers used thumb guards and leather bracelets to protect the thumbs and arms against bruises when the bow was constantly pulled during battle. String of a bow when pulled might reach up "to the level of the right ear with the right hand and left extend full holding the middle of the bow".[46] During battles, archers preferred the long shafted arrow to the short one because it had more weight and provided balanced shots and greater accuracy. Its weight gave it support so it was not easily deflated by wind when in motion. Most arrow darts were barbed with two or more ears on their edge.[47]

In Ilorin, the barbed arrow darts were common some with two or three ears so that when used against an opponent, it penetrated and caused grave injuries. The bow's range could be between two to three hundred metres. Certain factors made bow and arrow to be pervasive in

Ilorin Emirate in the Nineteenth Century. These include its simplicity, availability of materials for its manufacture and the prevalent of local artisans like blacksmiths, carvers and tanners. Indeed, local artisans worked in family compounds for the production of bow and arrows making the weapon to be easily accessible to Ilorin warriors. The bow and arrow was a projectile attack weapon which was less cumbersome to handle and thus required little training to master the skills of its application in warfare. This made it to be widely used in Ilorin and most other emirates in the caliphate.

Poisoned Arrows: in Africa, the use of poisoned arrows originated with the hunting of animals by traditional people. Since most animals in the region are comparatively bigger than those in the other continents and there were no guns then, hunters had to device a method to kill such large animals, using poisoned arrows. Indeed, poisoned arrows killed bigger animals faster than ordinary arrow. In Africa, venoms from snake, spiders, toads, scorpion, plants, grubs and many other ingridients were used to make poison. Some were quite poisonous while others were employed due to their magical effect. With time, poisoned arrows were introduced to warfare. In pre-colonial Nigeria, Bauchi and Daura were noted as places where poison of various brands were produced and from where other emirates in the caliphate got their supply. The *Zabgai* poison from Bauchi was found to be the most lethal, hence the Hausa epithet, *Zabgai mai kare dangi* (*Zabgai* which wipes out the family).[48] Usually, the arrow was poisoned close to its tip by deeping it in a poison brew and allowed to dry. Great care was taken to prevent the poison from touching the pointed edge of the arrow to avoid accidental poisoning in case the handler got a scratch from the arrow.

Two kinds of poisons are said to be common in West Africa, the *stropanthus hispidis* and snake venom. *Stropanthus hispidis* is a kind of shrub that grows about five metres tall and bears flowers. It was popularly used for arrow poison in West Africa, specifically in the coatal regions of Senegal, Gambia, Guinea and Gabon. [49] It is plausible to argue that the techniques of poison making could have been universal in Africa since her people had long heritage of the knowledge of plants, herbs and animals. Poisons could also have been parts of the items of trade in the long distance commerce across West African sub-region. Thus Ilorin possibly had access to poisoned arrows through the caravan trade and also from herbalists and other traditional healers in and around its environment.

Arrows, whether poisoned or not, had a major obstacle during battles. This was the difficulty in penetrating the chain mail and heavy defensive coats worn by warriors, particularly the cavalry. However, once the arrow was poisoned, all that was required was a scratch on any part of the body so that the deadly substance it carried could touch the blood and then circulate in the blood stream to result to instant death. Only on very few cases were victims of poisoned arrow able to survive the attack. This was perhaps because no immediate anti-dotes could be provided to nuetralise its lethal effect, or because the poisons completely defied available anti-dotes. Nonetheless, there was a sterling example of Prince Shitta of Ilorin who was hit by a poisoned arrow in the *Eleduwe War* during a joint Oyo/Bariba invasion of Ilorin in the 1830s. Shitta's herbalists was said to have prepared and administered an anti-poison herbal substance which saved his life.[50] Similarly, elsewhere in the battle of Konya, Caliph Bello was wounded in the neck with a poisoned arrow, following which Ben Gumsu, a North African Merchant from Ghadames was ordered by Bello to prepare some medicine for him. Ben Gumsu was reported to have written some verses on a wooden plate, which was washed in a calabash. Bello drank the substance and recovered shortly after.[51]

Another important arm of the archery was the use of incendiary arrows which were found quite effective against the quilt armour worn by the cavalrymen because the quilt was often made of silk cotton material which easily caught fire when struck by a burning arrow. Incendiary arrows were also found effective when shot at thatched roofs of the enemy; they were used to set houses ablaze to break resistances of the occupants. The Fulani (Ilorin) was reported to employ aerial incendiary against Algi, a village near Old Oyo with the use of combustibles fastened to the tail of birds and released to the thatched roof of the buildings in the village.[52] This strategy represented a traditional African projectile weapon, which was used to achieve the objective of modern day ballistic or scud missile in battles.

Spearmen: this was a unit of the infantry which principally targeted the enemy cavalry as soon as it came within range. This category of warriors had greater ability to deal better with the opponent cavalry. The spears were strong and could be used to tear the armour or leather shield of the enemy unlike the arrow, which had limited success against the enemy cavalry. There were various kinds of spear-heads, shapes and sizes depending on the function they were meant to perform in battle. The bigger ones with thicker shaft and broader heads were for thrusting against the enemy in close combat. Others with narrow heads were used in the form of projectile weapon as javelins against the opponent. Either in the broad or narrow spear, the shaft was made of wood or metal. In Ilorin, the broad-headed spear popularly known by the

Hausa name, *masi*, was the most common.[53] The spears, like arrows, were also sometimes poisoned to enhance its effect on their victims. Some weapons which served secondary functions were also carried by warriors. These included fighting bracelets, axes, maces and clubs.

4.7 Command and Coordination of Troops

The *Balógun* were responsible for the general administration of military affairs in Ilorin, the maintenance of the army and its logistic requirements, and the planning and direction of wars. Each *Balógun* also coordinated other warriors within his own domain including the assemblying of variety of weapons to be used in prosecuting a battle. It was they, who assumed command of the army when the "feudal" contingents of the entire emirate assembled for campaigns. The *Balógun* were also expected to keep a regular army within their jurisdiction. Individual fief holders also maintained their own contingents and a corps of subordinate titled officials with specialised military roles. While the fief holders had general military functions in the military organisation of the emirate, they did not actually command their troop in battle. When forces were mobilized by the *Emir* for specific campaigns, the territorial fief holders acted as liaisons between their own officers and the *Emir*'s commanders. The fiefs' contingents were commanded by the military officials of their areas, who were subordinated to their respective counterparts in the *Emir*'s professional officer corps led by the *Balógun* from the capital.[54]

Similarly, the *Emir* himself rarely took personal command of the army in the field. The functions of military leadership were usually performed by the *Emir'*s officer corps. With this arrangement, commanding obligation of *Jihad* was considered to be a conjoint duty of the Muslim community as a whole. However, the sick, lame, blind, women and children were exempted from military service, except to defend Muslim territories from an unexpected attack. Normally then, the obligation of military service was universal and compulsory only for adult male believers.

As part of Ilorin's strategies to beef up its military arsenal and ensure loyalty, conquered areas were also required to contribute soldiers during expeditions. Military service was used as a mechanism for supervising the outliying territories and to assess their level of allegiance to the Ilorin authority. For instance, it is reported that during the *Eleduwe War* of the 1830s, Offa supported Ilorin. The then *Olofa*, Oba Anilelerin deployed his soldiers led by *Balógun* Ajayi to increase the numerical strength of the Ilorin army.[55] Offa also brokered peace with

Ilorin/Ogbomoso on one hand, and Ikoyi on the other during the *Pamo War*, in which the Ilorin group was victorious.[56] Indeed it was Offa's refusal to make her regular contribution of soldiers to support Ilorin campaign against Ibadan in 1878 that resulted in suspicion, which eventually led to a 10-year hostility between the two in 1878. Since Offa came under Ilorin's authority, she could no longer boast of an organised army because the *Balóguns* of Ilorin were directly in charge of war expeditions in the *Emirate*.[57] The same military obligation was expected of the other non-metropolitan areas under Ilorin's control in the Igbomina, Ibolo and Ekiti areas.

The Emir's army and its reserve consisted of cavalry and infantry equipped with a large assortment of offensive and defensive armory. This weaponry was variously employed by specialized units of the army according to their tactical functions and organisational principles. Heavy and light cavalry constituted the mobile striking and shock forces, while light infantry units provided fire power with missile or projectile weapons, smaller heavy infantry units complemented and reinforced the foot soldiers with weapons designed for shock and piercing effect in close combat. Most warriors (*Mayaki*, or *Ologun* in Yoruba) in both the cavalry and infantry alike, wore protective gear.

In the Nineteenth Century Ilorin, certain considerations determined the force structure and deployment of troops. These include status, proficiency in the use of specific weapons and the number of soldiers available to prosecute particular campaigns. The Ilorin army essentially comprised of elites, professional soldiers, freeborn volunteers and slaves all drawn from the metropolis and the conquered territories. Even though the military contingent was always directed by the commanders, militias (unprofessional but trained civilian soldiers), slaves and volunteers were always in the advance section of the army to be followed by professional soldiers and then the elites while the *Balógun* came in the rear. This was to ensure that the strongest collection in the army was not easily given away to the enemy. The distribution of weapons also took cognisance of the technical ability and proficiency of the soldiers in using different fighting implement.

In this regard, Ilorin's cosmopolitan nature also had impact on its soldiers' use of specific weapons. For instance, the Yoruba fought with variety of weapons including swords, lances, bow and arrow; the Hausa were strong in the use of spear, bow and arrows; the Fulani were good in swords while the Nupe and Bariba combined excellence in swords, spear and arrows. The Bariba were particularly renowned for their marksmanship in archery and they brought

this to bear in the battles they participated for Ilorin. According to a respondent, Suleiman Yahaya, Bariba gift in the use of bow and arrow was so great that at times during encounters, their archers would merely shoot arrows into the air and the opponents would be struck.[58] This was made possible because the arrows were embedded with spiritual subbstances both at its blade and the base so that when released, they would find an opponent to hit.

This fact was buttressed by Captain (later Lord) Lugard, when he visited Borgu (Baribaland) in 1894 for the purpose of making treaties on behalf of the Royal Niger Company. He emphasised Bariba people's belief in the use of spiritual element in warfare describing them as a "fetish people". In his address to the Royal Geographical Society in 1895, Lugard attributed the successes of the Bariba in warfare to two causes. First, their reputation for a knowledge of witchcraft and of deadly poisons, which rendered their poisoned arrows very dreaded. Second, was their fighting tactics.[59] So far from dreading to separate their forces, their practice, when they fight, was to make a feint of attack simultaneously on the front and rear, reserving the bulk of their strength for a strong attack on the centre of a long caravan. This mode of attack by ambush would succeed in dividing their enemies' forces and inducing panic on them.[60] Thus, the Bariba warriors brought these qualities to help the Ilorin army in its wars.

4.8 Ilorin Wars of Survival, 1800-1840

Àáre Afonja's declaration of independence for Ilorin was considered an act of treason by the Old Oyo authority; this was compounded by the emergence of Fulani leadership in the area after Afonja's death. With these trends, Ilorin was in a precarious situation; the city was susceptible to invasion and attacks from the Yoruba groups, beginning with Old Oyo. According to Jimoh:

> Combined Yoruba forces on five consecutive occasion's abortively invaded Ilorin. These invasions in sequence were called the Ogidi war, the Ogele war, the *Mugbamugba War*, the *Kanla War*, and the *Eleduwe* (*Woru-Kura*) *War* respectively. While the *Ogidi War* occurred during the days of Afonja, and was the first attack on Ilorin from Oyo, the rest occurred during the reign of Oba (Emir) Abdulsalami. However, shortly after the death of Afonja, in the days of Sheik Alimi, Majia, the Pagan Nupe King, also attempted an invasion of Ilorin.[61]

These wars can be categorised as Ilorin's wars of survival because they were initiated by her adversaries. Ilorin's main objective and strategy in the wars were to defend her independence and maintain her sovereignty. For instance, in the days of *Ààre* Afonja, Ilorin was invaded by Ojo Agunbambaru, a surviving son of late *Basorun* Gaa, in what was known as the Ogidi war. Ojo's motive for this attack was to retaliate against Afonja for the role Alugbin, the *Kákánfò*'s father, played in that uprising. Afonja's grandfather, by name Pasin, the son of Laderin, had earlier on publicly condemned Basorun Gaa for his despotic and tyrannical usurpation of the power and authority of the *Aláàfin*. This condemnation of the *Basorun* by Pasin happened during the reign of *Aláàfin* Majeogbe, the immediate predecessor of Aláàfin Abiodun, who was the fifth enthroned by Gaa in an unbroken succession. "Pasin was a valiant chief".[62] He was courageous and out spoken, particularly against injustice and tyranny. For these attributes, he was disliked by the *Basorun*, who ensured that he was eventually killed at Olla.[63]

Meanwhile Ojo, who fled to Baribaland during his father's execution, returned with vengeance against all those who had a hand in the mutiny against his father's household. It is reported that he murdered several chiefs, who were either his father's enemies or potential obstruction to the realisation of this objective. The Awota was the first victim of his ambition and revenge. On the whole, about 100 chiefs were dispatched, who were either his father's enemies or who might have opposed him in his main plan.[64] Inspired by the easy success he achieved in Oyo, Ojo set off for Ilorin to measure strength with Afonja, the powerful *Kákánfò* whose father was one of those who contributed to *Kákánfò* Oyabi's army for the overthrow of his father, *Basorun* Gaa. These were his grievances against Afonja, but besides these, Afonja was the only person in the land after Opele of Gbogun, who might have opposed him in his designs.[65]

Thus, Ojo's attack on Ilorin was born out of personal grievance and ambition to reclaim his father's title, it was directed at Afonja, who at the period was building the town into an independent community from Oyo. Therefore, Ojo's claim of espousing Oyo's interest, was merely a means to achieve his own personal end.

Meanwhile his army was so great that on his way to Ilorin, he commandeered all provincial Yoruba Chiefs and their armies, with able-bodied men in such towns and villages trooping to join his army, not out of love or loyalty but our of fear. Ilorin had not been walled, and there was no time to think of doing so now, so he had to extemporize fortifications, erecting

stockades with the locust and shea-butter trees.[66] At last, the final decisive battle was to be fought, Afonja and his army were hard pressed on every side, being shut up within their forts, and the town was on the point of being taken when Adegun the *Onikoyi* and his accomplices suddenly gave way, in the heat of the battle, and the great conqueror irretrievably lost the day.[67]

A combination of exceptional courage and endurance, unshakable faith in the efficacy of prayers being offered at the rear by Sheik Alimi and his associates coupled with the superlative military expertise of Afonja, himself, were the factors, which ensured victory for Ilorin in these battles.

The Nupe Invasion

The second attempt to attack Ilorin occurred about the year 1808, shortly after the death of Àáre Afonja. The attempt was made by Majia, the Nupe warmonger. He and his army invaded Ilorin in pursuit of Idirisu, his rival for the Nupe throne and the Fulani Jihadists, who fled from his domain to Ilorin. The fugitives included Dendo, Manzuma, Maliki, Baba and their followers. Sheik Alimi was their host in Ilorin.[68] Majia was determined to crush the Jihadists and thus, pursued them to Ilorin. He was hell-bent on capturing Idirisu. He considered the asylum given to Idirisu by Sheik Alimi as an act of aggression and invitation for war from him. Majia delt with all obstructions on this way to Ilorin. Among his victims was the *Baale* of Oke-Oyi, whom he beheaded on his way to Oke-Ose,[69] which was deserted before he reached the place. However, Shao collaborated, probably terrified by the fate, which befell Oke-Oyi. She gave the Nupe invaders not just an easy passage but also food and other vital supplies.[70] The Nupe invaders thereafter encamped at the foot of Sobi Hill. From there, Majia sent an emissary to Sheik Alimi demanding that Etsu Idrisu and the other (accompanying) fugitive Jihadists from Nupe be expelled or released to him unconditionally. This demand was declined on the ground that it would be against the doctrines of Islam to surrender innocent Muslim to a *Kafir* (Pagan). Secondly, he said Dendo, Malik and Manzuma were his kinsmen and comrades in the *Jihad*. Thirdly, he considered the ultimatum issued by Majia infradig (*infra digitatus*, that is, belittling) to him.[71]

In spite of these explanations, Majia still resolved to attack Ilorin. His army thus, advanced towards the town but were met half-way between Sobi Hill and Awodi market. Ilorin forces were initially beaten back and forced to retreat across the Amule stream at the bank of which a new defence line was established while waiting for reinforcement. The Ilorin army at the time

was not a unified force but a confederacy of troops contributed by each ward and separately commanded by respective *Balóguns* of the Wards. Troops from the Fulani Ward were commanded by Jagbara; the ones from Ajikobi by Usman; those from Alánàmú by Se'eni, and the ones from Gambari Ward by Doshe. The four commanders thus, became the first set of Balógun appointed in Ilorin after the death of *Ààre* Afonja. Doshe was appointed overall commander of the army by Sheik Alimi and charged with the responsibility to chase Majia until he was either killed or driven back to Nupeland. The fugitive Fulani Jihadist, *Mallam* Maliki also ordered his Maiyaki, by name Amadu, to take command of his people and join the army under Doshe (*Maiyaki* to *Mallam* Alimi), which was preparing to pursue *Etsu* Majia.[72]

In the decisive encounter at the periphery of Awodi market, a reinforced Ilorin army halted the invaders, broke their defence line and forced them to retreat. The retreating Nupe forces were pursued till they reached Jebba, where the final battle took place. In a desperate bid to halt the pursuit at Jebba, and to enable his troops cross the River Niger safely, Majia kept his pursuers at bay till his troops followed by him crossed the river. Fearing that the Ilorin army might cross the river and continue the pursuit, Majia and his troops fled to as far as Anbara in the Kemberi country (in about 1808-9).[73]

However, in the final battle at Jebba, Balógun Doshe was killed and for a while Mallam Manzuma took over the command of the combined forces. This was temporary move as Maiyaki Ali, thereafter, stepped into the late Balógun Doshe's position to put the command of the army back in Ilorin's hands. The cavalry played a prominent role in this battle because it was not a static encounter, rather an engagement, which required continuous pursuit of the Nupe warrors.

The *Ogele* War

Kákánfò Afonja's death shook the whole Yorubaland because he was himself a symbol of security for the nation, given his military prowess. Perhaps the Yoruba hoped that Afonja's pally with the Fulani would be temporary; they still had great regard for him in spite of his action in the land. Thus, Afonja's death was to be avenged because he was the Generalissimo of Oyo army whose exit meant a big loss to the entire Yorubaland. Secondly, with the *Kákánfò*'s departure, Ilorin had passed into the hands of the Fulani, whom the Yoruba feared would eventually expand their authority to other parts of the land. Indeed, the Yoruba discovered that the fate of the entire nation was trembling in the balance as it were".[74]

The Yoruba therefore decided to avenge the death of *Kákánfò* Afonja and recover Ilorin from the Fulani. To this end, a conference of the entire Yoruba nation was summoned to appraise the situation and map out a common strategy to meet the challenge. Consequent upon this conference, Toyeje the *Baale* of Ogbomoso and commander of the late Kákánfò Afonja's right wing, was promoted to the position of *Kákánfò*, and the whole nation was united under this standard to expel the Fulani from Ilorin.[75] All provincial Chiefs contributed troops, which some of them personally led, towards this mission to drive the Fulani out of Ilorin. This invading army converged in Ogbomoso under Toyeje's leadership, from where it was to invade Ilorin.

Meanwhile, by this time, Ilorin's unified army had come of age. The experience gained in the war with the Nupe had been of tremendous benefit. In addition, the cavalry had been developed as an important unit of the Ilorin army. The Yoruba forces encamped at Ogele, a village some fifteen kilometers from Ilorin. Yoruba choice of Ogele for the camping was probably due to its strategic advantage, a location overlooking Ilorin, from where attacks could be launched on the city. The advancing Yoruba army was however halted by Ilorin cavalry. The resultant encounter was gruesome as:

> A sanguinary battle was fought in which the Fulani were victorious. They routed the Yoruba and followed up their victory, which resulted in the desertion or destruction of a great many towns in the Ibolo province. The only important towns left in that part were Offa, Igbona, Ilemona, Erin and a few others.[76]

A number of Yoruba soldiers and their commanders were killed in this battle but Toyeje, the *Kákánfò*, and a handful of his troops managed to escape back to Ogbomoso. As the defeated troops fled and were being pursued, towns and villages along the route were deserted with their inhabitants fleeing to seek refuge elsewhere. Such was the ensuing panic that the refugees could only carry few of their personal effects, which could be snatched away in a hasty flight as Ilorin horsemen kept hovering in the rear. They found temporary refuge in any walled town with a powerful chief; there, it may be, to await another siege by the conqueror.

Ilorin's tactic in this battle was to pursue the invaders, even after they had been defeated far off in their flight from the town. The cavalry played a big role in doing this and yet again, the Yoruba had lost in their bid to reclaim Ilorin. With this tactic, Ilorin transformed defence into attack against the Yoruba forces and the Ogele battle was a huge success for her army.

The *Mugba-Mugba* War

After a short respite following the Ogele war, the Yoruba again regrouped and resolving to rid the country of these hordes of marauders, the *Jamaa*, made an alliance with Majia, the king of RÀbbàh, that he may help them to extirpate the pests. This war took place somewhere between March and April at the time when the locust fruit was ripe for harvest.[77] This looming war thus constituted another major challenge in Ilorin's strive for survival and independence against Old Oyo. Indeed, Ilorin's effort at this period was largely to ensure a defensive mechanism that could dispel enemy attack, just as she did in the Ogidi and Ogele wars.

In this expedition, Ilorin's front commanders were Ajayi Opele and Gbaagba.[78] These two commanders strategically deployed the Ilorin troops in two divisions; the first was hiding in the bush while second was fighting with the Yoruba forces in front. During the engagement, the hidden forces came out and made a surprise attack on the opponents from behind.[79]

With this strategy, the Yoruba forces were trapped in the middle, having been encircled by the Ilorin forces, one in the front and the other, from the rear. Meanwhile the country was already devastated by the previous wars, many towns were left desolate, and consequently there were no farms for foraging. The food left in the Ilorin farms were soon eaten up, and both the besiegers and the besieged were without provisions and had to live on the locust fruit (*Igba*), hence, the war was termed *Mugbamugba*. The Yoruba were unable to cope with Ilorin cavalry in this battle. Indeed, J. F Ade-Ajayi attributed Ilorin's success in the *Mugbamugba* encounter to her advantageous use of the cavalry. He writes: "the Fulani derived considerable advantage from the mobility of their well-mounted horsemen; their victory in the *Mugbamugba* (locust fruit) war was due to this superiority".[80]

On this occasion, Ilorin attacked the allies to advantage. They hid their horses in the rear of the allied armies and while a party of horsemen engaged them in front, the main body of the cavalry suddenly bore down upon them from the rear and routed them. Majia, who was the main ally of the Yoruba in the battle, fled precipitately to his own country, leaving them at the mercy of the victors. The Ilorin army followed up their victory and swept away all the towns in the direction of Offa, Erin, Igbona and so on. The *Olofa* with Asegbe, his favourite and wise *Ìlàri* escaped to Ikoyi.[81]

Meanwhile, when the *Mugbamugba* expedition was being planned by the Yoruba, the *Olofa* was said to have secretly collaborated with the allied army of Yoruba and even supplied them with men, materials and intelligence information.[82] Therefore after the war, Ilorin descended on Offa for her complicity in the Mugbamugba war. The town was sacked with the Olofa escaping to Ikoyi. The *Olofa* lived in Ikoyi till the town was later besieged by a faction of the combined Yoruba army led by the *Onikoyi*'s archrival, Toyeje, the *Ààre OnaKákánfò,* who was also the *Baale* of Ogbomoso. That siege and the resultant battle, which was fought at Pamo became known as the Pamo war.[83]

The *Kanla* War

Inspite of the successive defeats suffered by the Yoruba group in their wars of invasion against Ilorin, they did not relent. Rather, every defeat seemed to have brought them back to the drawing board to restrategise on the next line of action to dislodge the Fulani in Ilorin. Soon after the *Mugbamugb*a and *Pamo* wars, the Yoruba regrouped to plot another military assault on Ilorin. This time, the gang-up was at the instance of *Aláàfin* Amodo, a grandchild of Ajampati the twin brother of *Aláàfin* Ajagbo. Chiefs throughout the country were encouraged to unite and rid themselves of their common enemy in Ilorin. Apparently they were united, but between the capital and the provinces, the spirit of dissatisfaction and jealousy was strong. It was understood full well that the King's policy was to use them together to rid himself first of the common enemy, and then to subdue the rebel Chiefs one after another by force of arms.[84]

Once again, with this feeling of reservation, the support given to *Aláàfin* Amodo was half-hearted. They perhaps wanted the Fulani out the Yoruba territory in Ilorin, but were wary of what could be their fate if the *Aláàfin* became powerful again as in the pre-Afonja days. With this pessimism, the cohesion, which could have propelled a victory against the Fulani in Ilorin seemed to have been lacking, even before the campaign. The Ilorin, on the other hand, were more diplomatic. In order to facilitate their plans, they made friendship with some of the Yoruba chiefs who were men of power and who if united, would be able to oppose them (Ilorin) successfully; such were Prince Atiba of Ago-Oja, Edun, Chief of Gbogun, the most powerful Yoruba general of the day, and Adegun, the *Onikoyi*, the premier provincial king.[85]

The condition above thus favoured Ilorin's defence objectives as the solidarity, which Aláàfin Amodo obtained from his Yoruba Chiefs was merely superficial. This divide and rule strategy in diplomacy was relished greatly by the Ilorin authority in dealing with the Yoruba. Whenever there was war with Ilorin, these chiefs usually acted against their own national

interest, either by betraying their nation and people, or by giving their backs to the enemy without shooting an arrow during battles, and thus allowing the Ilorin horse the advantage of outmaneuvering their foes.

Consequently, when Adegun, the *Onikoyi* was indisposed and was really unfit to take the field, his rival, Edun of Gbogun forced him to go to war, having secretly planned with the Ilorin that he would give way in the heat of the battle in order that Adegun mighty be taken alive. As planned, Edun carried out his act of treachery, the *Onikoyi* was therefore surrounded by the Ilorin horse, but fought bravely and fell like a hero.Thus the Aláàfin's army was routed and the people fled away in confusion. It was at the time when the rivers overflowed their banks, and a number of people were drowned at the River Ogun. The most notable chief drowned on this occasion was Oja the founder of Ago (the present Oyo). Prince Atiba, one of the rising powers, narrowly escaped being drowned. Ilorin diplomatic maneuover proved successful in this encounter, having broken into the ranks of the major Yoruba chiefs prior to the campaign.

The *Eleduwe/ Worukura* War

This was the last in the series of wars of survival fought by the Ilorin against Old Oyo. Without any doubt, this war which was fought in 1837, was the most important war Ilorin ever fought.[86] This war is variously named. To the Yoruba, it is known as the *Eleduwe* War because Worukura, who led the Bariba allies of the Yoruba during the war, was called *Eleduwe* by the Yoruba. To Ilorin, it was known as the *Ikoko* War because Worukura was a gluttonous eater of roasted mutton, who made sure that he devoured all the goats in any town his troops entered before they moved out. But to others like the Nupe and the Fulani, it was simply called the *Worukura* War (*Worukura* meaning "*Woru,* the heyena" also because he was a meat glutton).[87] The Eleduwe war was more formidable and overwhelming than all the previous encounters.

The remote cause of this war was the divide-and-rule tactics, which Ilorin masterly employed against the Yoruba nation. Chiefs were set against each other and towns against towns to provoke and propel a devastating internecine war among them. Thus, provincial chiefs rebelled against the *Aláàfin* and the powerful among them used their military might to dominate the weak and new towns emerged.

> The outcome of the rebellion of the chiefs and the revolution was the foundation of modern Ibadan Abeokuta and Modakeke; the occupation of Ijaye by Abemo; the destruction of the city of Owu and the fall of many ancient towns in the plain and above all, the ascending of Ilorin under the ravaging foreigner.[88]

It was in this state of disintegration that Oluewu succeeded Amodo as *Aláàfin* Oyo. His first preoccupation therefore, was to re-unite the Yoruba nation and free it from Ilorin's bondage. Meanwhile, Abdulsalami was now supreme at Ilorin and was growing daily more powerful. His name soon became known far and wide in Yorubaland. Having conquered powerful Yoruba towns such as Gbogun, Edun, Ikoyi and Oyo, account speaks of him as having "subdued all Yoruba proper".

Meanwhile, when *Aláàfin* Oluewu was summoned to Ilorin, and was eventhough treated with the respect befitting a powerful king, he keenly felt the humiliation.[89] The Gbedu drum, which was a symbol of royalty beaten before him to usher him, was confiscated by the *Emir*, claiming that: "there cannot be two kings in my dominion but one only, and that is myself".[90] However, during the visit, the *Aláàfin* was received into the palace with pomp and ceremony enlivened with drumming and *Waka* songs which however contained insinuation like this:

> *Keferi ke ke ke, egbafun Oluwa, Keferi ke ke ke egbafun Oluwa Eri Aláàfin Oyo to gba ti Anabi Keferi ke ke ke egba fun Oluwa*. Meaning: Minor infidels, submit yourselves to the will of God (2ce) see how the Aláàfin of Oyo has accepted the triumph of the Holy Prophet (Muhammed), Minor infidels accept the ways of the Lord.[91]

This scenario was quite demeaning to the personality of *Aláàfin* Oluewu and the Oyo Empire, which once controlled the entire Yorubaland, including Ilorin. The injury of the *Aláàfin* was further compounded when the *Emir* of Ilorin sent Jimba, his head slave after him to ransack the palace at Oyo and bring away anything of value he could lay his hands upon so that Oyo may not be said to have anything, which Ilorin had not. This Jimba did, and among other things removed were the 100 brass posts in the long corridor of the palace erected by King Aganju. This humiliation was so great that a little later when he was invited to come to Ilorin, he plucked up courage and declined.[92]

Thirsting for revenge, the *Aláàfin* now sent round to all the Yoruba chiefs an urgent request to join him in a supreme effort to throw off the Fulani yoke. To this end, he also invoked the aid

of the Bariba (*Borgawa*), who had no love for the Fulani.[93] Among Yoruba chiefs, who responded to *Aláàfin* Oluewu's call were Oluyole of Ibadan, with several Egba war chiefs, Kurumi of Ijaye, Ayo of Abemo and Timi of Ede. This mighty host had gathered in Ogbomoso, where they remained for about six months apparently deliberating on their mission. They were holding councils almost everyday as to how best they might attack Ilorin with success. But here also the future of the expedition was foreshadowed and the doom of the allied kings was sealed. Johnson identified two principal causes for this; the rapacity of the Bariba soldiers, and the imprudence of the Aláàfin and his Bariba allies.[94]

The Yoruba chiefs feared that going by the excesses of the Bariba soldiers, they were more likely to pass from one hegemony to another; that is to gain freedom from the Fulani only to be dominated again by the Bariba. The country was literally being ravaged by them, they considered themselves licensed to all the goats in the country. Even when kept in the inner apartment of the houses, they would get at them and devour them. They were also in the habit of stripping and depriving helpless ones of their clothes; at length they spared not even men though they might be armed. Sometimes, organised bands would attack and deprive men of all their valuables.[95]

These and other heinous acts of the Baribas made the Yoruba chiefs to be pessimistic about them and thus had reservation on the impending encounter with Ilorin, as in the previous attacks. Worse still, the Oyo could offer little or no resistance as the Bariba were already considered the "saviours of the land" and thus were held sacred. Furthermore, the two Kings (Oluewu and Eleduwe) were indiscreet enough to betray their feelings about the Yoruba chiefs, whom they regarded as allies of the Fulani. It leaked out that after the conquest, of Ilorin all refractory Yoruba chiefs, who had usurped the king's prerogative would be murdered with the help of the Bariba King; and the kingdom would again be one under the *Aláàfin*.

Meanwhile, earlier, with the aid of the Bariba led by *Eleduwe, Aláàfin* Oluewu was able to punish both the *Asipa* and *Basorun* with death for their insubordination and betrayal. He went further to attack Ogbodo and razed down the town. In this battle, the Ilorin army and its allies were defeated; they were pursued until they ran into the flooded Ogun River, where most of them were drowned. It was this victory, which naturally elated and encouraged Aláàfin Oluewu and his Bariba allies to embark on the impending large scale attack on Ilorin.

However, the Oyo chiefs who were left to guard the city were kept informed of everything that transpired at the Ogbomoso camp. They were sure the offended chiefs would take revenge and wreck the army of which they formed a part.

Consequently, they sent messages to advise the king not to advance to Ilorin direct from Ogbomoso but to come by way of Ikoyi, Iwo, Gbogun and Saho making the attack from the north so that having the capital and the Niger provinces behind him, they might in case of defeat, have safe places within easy reach to retire upon.[96] Knowing the stubborn nature of their kings, they even, in order to give strength to their message, represented it as the express advice of the god of *Ifá* by divination. To give further credence and authority to their message, it was sent through the Bariba King, who they believed their king (Oluewu) would listen to, but as anticipated, not even from the Eleduwe would he brook any such advice. He was for marching straight on Ilorin from Ogbomoso.[97]

This huge host left Ogbomoso in December 1830, encamping first at Aduin, where they remained for nine days. (Ilorin is but one good day's walk from Ogbomoso). On the tenth day they advanced to Jayin, thence to Ogele and from Ogele they encamped at the farm of one Ajiya of Ilorin. Never before was Ilorin threatened by so large a force. Consequently, the consternation there was great, and vast preparations were made for both offensive and defensive battle.[98] Ilorin's defeat at Gbodo had not been forgotten, secondly, the military credentials of the Bariba, led by their king, Eleduwe was quite dreadful. They were part of the army, which Ojo Agunbambaru used to invade Ilorin at the Battle of Ogidi; the Baribas were also good archers and their efforts helped Oluewu in raising the siege, which Ilorin placed on Gbodo; and lastly they were employed by the *Aláàfin* to deal with internal dissidents like *Asipa* and *Basorun*, earlier. Thus the Emir was desperate to avert this impending calamity on his territory and people. Indeed, *Eleduwe* the commander of Oyo army, was highly dreaded in Ilorin; he was referred to as *Ikoko* (hyena) by the natives. He was said to have several heads during campaigns, because of his metaphysical powers.[99] The *Emir* therefore made equally elaborate preparation for this looming encounter, employing both internal and external strategies.

Externally, *Emir* Shitta sent for assistance from the *Sultan* of Sokoto, his suzerain. Ibrahim Khalif, the third *Emir o*f Gwandu was reported to have personally led a joint force of Sokoto and Gwandu warriors to aid Ilorin.[100] A similar appeal was sent to the Fulani Emirs of

Nupeland. They all responded positively and promptly. The *Sultan* sent 17 kings under Esugoyi of Rabbah to his aid and they came with such as overwhelming force that those of the two kings were as a mere handful before them.[101]

Meanwhile, shortly before the *Eleduwe* war, one warrior named Jimba Dan Gwari, had accompanied Umaru Nagwamatse, founder of the Fulani dynasty in Kontagora, to Ilorin. Nagwamatse was the son of *Sultan* Abubakar Atiku, the third *Sultan* of Sokoto. Because of his restless and adventurous disposition, he was entrusted with the command of a post on the *Sabon Birul-Isa-Kaura* road to prevent the Gobirawa from raiding Zamfara through this route.[102] When Nagwamatse was impressed by the young man's courage and adventurous disposition, he was admitted into the entourage as a personal aide to the Prince and,

> not long after this, he visited Gwandu and hearing of the civil war ranging in Nupe, he ventured there. When he arrived, Masaba's *Beriberi* general, Umar had just revolted; Nagwamatse's assistance was refused, and so he passed on to Abuja, where he stayed for two years. But on the subsequent defeat of Umar Majigi, Usman Zaki and Masaba, he made friends with his kinsmen, and having attached Umar's defeated followers to himself, he assisted Umar Zaki (now Emir of Nupe) to subjugate the surrounding country.[103]

All through these adventures, the youthful Jimba was with Nagwamatse. After some time, following Masaba's ascension to the throne, Nagwamatse sought permission to establish himself at Bogi (near Wushishi) where he stayed for many years living on the spoils of his foray.[104] Before the permission was granted, he was advised by Masaba, the Nupe king, to go to Ilorin to obtain the *Emir*'s consent for the request, the Emir of Ilorin, being the mentor of Nupe *Emirs*, in the period. Nagwamatse did as advised. He arrived Ilorin with Jimba but did not return to his base with him. Jimba impressed the *Emir* of Ilorin as a bold and courageous young man, the type Ilorin needed very much for its cavalry. *Emir* Abdulsalam therefore requested Nagwatmatse to leave Jimba behind in Ilorin. The request was granted and Jimba joined the Ilorin cavalry on the eve of the impending Eleduwe war.

Further preparations were made by Ilorin in the form of internal diplomacy. These involved the identification of groups of people among the Yoruba, with grievances against the *Aláàfin* of Oyo. He was able to locate one Yusuf Baale, the projenitor of the Alánàmú family of Ilorin. Yusuf was a renowned warrior specifically known for the manner in which he subdued his

enemies. He physically beat the enemy to capture them, and was therefore fondly referred to as *Alana-mu.* Yusuf Bale or *Alánàmú* considered his invitation to join the Ilorin army against the organised team of *Aláàfin* Ouewu as a good opportunity to avenge the unfortunate circumstances under which he packed out of Oyo town and settled at Reke, a village not far from Ilorin.[105] He supported Ilorin with his army and was also involved in the diplomatic game employed by the authority in Ilorin to play the chiefs against one another.

Apart from Ilorin's internal and external diplomacy to strengthen its army, and to weaken Oyo's host, the atmosphere within the camp of the Aláàfin also favoured the Fulani. Indeed, some of the Yoruba chiefs made up their mind to undermine the proclaimed interest of the joint Yoruba forces against Ilorin. At the heat of the war therefore, prince *Atiba* of Ago Oja, and *Timi* Bamigbaiye of Ede, deliberately left the wing of their command, to make the penetration of Ilorin army possible. It was Oluyole of Ibadan alone, who seemed not to have been apprised of the plot, for he fought for sometime on the road leading to Oke-Suna and pressed the Ilorin's hard towards the town wall. The town was taken behind them and fired before the kings were aware of the treachery of the Yoruba chiefs. There was no alternative now for them but to fight desperately in defence of their lives.[106]

In the decisive battle, which took place at a place within the Ilorin city wall, Aláàfin Oluewu, and his heir-apparent together with several Yoruba chiefs were among those killed, Sarkin Kaiama, *Sarkin* Wawa and many other Bariba chiefs were also slain. Worukura himself, was captured and held prisoner for a while at the site thenceforth called *Oke-Kura* where the Ilorin Native Authority built a prison yard many years later. When Worukura was executed later, his headless body is said to have been buried in the compound of *Sarkin* Karuma. The spot where the invaders perished, near a large locust tree not far from the Pakata market, was thereafter named *Ita Ikudimo* (meaning "the arena of death") that is *Ita ti iku di won mo,* where death captured the enemies.[107]

Another version of the account of the Eleduwe war claims that the Ilorin pushed forward a naked woman in the forefront of its army, carrying a calabash of charms and shouting: *a i wo o, eewo, a i woo, eewo, ewoo omode ki i wo hoho iyaa re!!!* Meaning: "don't look at it, it is a taboo, don't look at it, it is a taboo the child doesn't look at his mother's nakedness!!!... whereupon the enemy collapse wholesale.[108] The heads of *Aláàfin* Oluewu, Worukura and

Sarkin Kaiama, which were cut off, were buried on the spot, where three tambari posts were later erected in front of the *Emir'*s palace.

Again, dissenssion in the camp of the Yoruba forces prevented them from achieving victory against the Ilorin group, who were always eager and fast in capitalising on this, indeed the Bariba attributed the defeat to the cowardice of the Yoruba, some of whom were in secret alliance with the Ilorin. The *Eleduwe* war was largely won with the use of diplomatic maneuover, rather than military strength. Ultimately, disunity among the Yoruba, the stubbonness of *Aláàfin* Oluewu and the apparent domineering tendencies of the Bariba in the wake of the campaign, are among the fundamental factors responsible for the defeat of the Yoruba forces in the war. All these elements worked in favour of the Ilorin army and thenceforth, Ilorin became free of Oyo. This encounter equally proved an unparallel disaster for Bariba and Kaiama, from which they did not recover for years.

The death of King Oluewu and Eleduwe worsened the confusion in Old Oyo and led to the exodus of many of its inhabitants, who feared that Lanloke, a chronic enemy of Oyo, and an active ally of Ilorin, might be reinforced by the Fulani for an attack on the city. The great metropolis thus became deserted with some of its inhabitants fleeing to Kishi, some to Igboho and some even to Ilorin. As envisaged, Lanloke, thereafter proceeded to plunder the city and carried away what was left by the citizens. The great metropolis, Oyo or Katunga, thus went into ruins.

4.9 Ilorin Wars of Expansion and Consolidation from 1840

Ilorin's victory in the Eleduwe War sealed her encounters in the series of defensive wars against Oyo, and the town entered another phase in her military campaigns; the wars of expansion. Success at the Eleduwe episode boosted Ilorin's confidence and she embarked on the mission to capture more territories. Naturally, Old Oyo's fall meant a relief to Ilorin and expansion became plausible. The Emirate's main target in the quest for expansion were the southern Yoruba groups. Thus, the first Osogbo war was predicated on Ilorin's aim at bringing the town under her suzerainty and thereby securing an effective foothold in the eastern territory of the Yoruba nation. Ilorin's strategy here was to lay a siege on Osogbo and compel

its authority and inhabitants to surrender. The choice of Osogbo in Ilorin's expansionist mission was perhaps informed by the town's strategic location from where easy access could be gained to other southern Yoruba towns. At this time, Ilorin army was under the command of a brave and experienced General, Ali, the Hausa *Balógun* of Ilorin.[109] Meanwhile, an important development in Yorubaland in the first half of the Nineteenth Century was the rise of Ibadan into prominence.

A Brief on the Rise of Ibadan

Ibadan is said to have been established in the days of the Old Oyo Empire by Lagelu, a commander of Oyo army (*Jagun*).[110] The *Aláàfin* ordered Lagelu and some of his best men in Oyo, Ilesa and Ogbomoso to protect the empire from the attacks of the Ijebu, Ado and Egba Kingdoms. *Jagun* Lagelu and his men settled in Awotan, in Apete (presently located in the Ido Local Government of Oyo State) and established a peaceful city, named *Eba Odan* (the city at the edge of the Savannah). The presence of hills made the site of the city easily defensible, while its location close to the boundary between the forest and grassland made it a melting point for people and products of the two zones. By the 1820s, Ibadan was settled as a camp by soldiers from Ife, Ijebu and Oyo, after they had successfully destroyed the neighbouring kingdom of Owu. After the attacks on Old Oyo by the Fulani raiders in 1826/1827, and the empire's eventual fall, refugees from several Yoruba towns and villages fled down to Ibadan and settled in the city, now being seen as a sanctuary because of its location, economic and military power.[111]

By 1829, Ibadan had grown extensively into a popular hub of commerce. The high point of the city's fame however was its military might, which enabled her to dominate the political scene in Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century, perhaps filling the vacuum created by the fallen Oyo Empire. Ibadan then emerged as a kind of republic, where access to office and promotion within the chieftaincy hierarchy was based largely on qualities of leadership shown especially in war irrespective of ethnic status, or background.[112] The possibility of a mere war-boy rising to become an important chief attracted many talented people from all over Yorubaland to Ibadan to learn the art of warfare and to seek a career. Ultimately therefore, the Ibadan system proved superior and successful in Yorubaland, which enabled her to grow rapidly as a major city geared to war and military expansion.[113]

Meanwhile, unlike Ijaye, which pursued her expansion towards the upper Ogun and thus, came into conflict with the *Aláàfin*'s territorial claims, Ibadan pushed southward for the control of the Ibolo (now Osun) district, which put her in constant collision with the Fulani in Ilorin. This clash of interest made the two communities to become bitter rivals in the course of the Nineteenth Century. The highpoint was that Ibadan, thereafter, assumed the role of defending Oyo and indeed Yorubaland, even though also gradually building an imperial state in the process.

(i) Osogbo War and Ibadan's Tactical Response Against Ilorin

Ilorin soldiers hoped for success in the Osogbo campaign, banking on the successes recorded in the previous battles of survival against the Oyo group. When the king of Osogbo found the Ilorin too strong, he sent to Ibadan for help.[114] It now devolved on Ibadan as defenders of the north and northeast to meet the coming danger. They sent them more auxiliaries under the leadership of one Obele alias Mobitan, and Alade Abinupagun. Oluyole, the ruler of Ibadan, who had then been appointed *Basorun* by Atiba, the Aláàfin, sent the entire Ibadan army under the command of *Balógun* Oderinlo, to Osogbo with only him (*Basorun)* and Elepo, remaining at home.

The Ibadan contingent held several war conferences and eventually decided to attack the Ilorin camp in the afternoon of a chosen day. The plan was that afternoon attack would allow them time to hold on until dusk when the Ilorin would no longer be able to use their horses to advantage or if defeated, the shades of the night would assist them in their retreat. This was an excellent double edged plan, which accommodated both the probability of victory as well as the possibility of defeat. But the Ibadan contingent made a tactical change in their earlier plan. Under the cover of darkness in the night, the combined Yoruba armies encircled Ilorin troops. This sudden change in the plan was adopted at another war conference and was kept secret with an instruction to the vanguards to arrest anyone suspected to be a spy on their movement. About a mile from the Ilorin camp, they halted and arranged the order of the attack. The watch word was *Elo ni owo odo*? (the fare of the ferry?). The river Osun had to be crossed in entering Osogbo from the South. Anyone who could not tell was known to be an enemy.[115] The first camp attack was that of the *Elese* and as soon as they rushed in, they set it on fire. The *Elese* was one of the Ilorin Commanders in the battle and was shot as soon as he came out to see what was happening. The Ibadan army also attacked other Ilorin camps where they

killed their commanders like *Olobo* of Obbo, *Olota* of Ilota and Chief Latijo. Confusion erupted in the Ilorin camps and they could not therefore wait to give battle to the Ibadan army but rather took to flight.[116]

Ibadan captured many of the Ilorin front commanders, the most well known of them being Lasaki Jimba, the son of *Dauda* Ologun Salihu Jimba, surnamed Omololu, *Magaji* Abudu Olateju Bada and the then *Balógun* Ajikobi, Usman. Both Magaji Abudu Olateju Baba and *Balógun* Ajikobi, Usman, were subsequently executed on the order of the *Aláàfin*, to whom the Ibadan army took them, on the ground that they were Yoruba; Olateju Bada and *Balógun* Ajikobi being natives of old Oyo and Iseyin respectively, and had, by their connivance with the Fulani of Ilorin, betrayed their root.[117] On the other hand, however, Lasaki Jimba who was not Yoruba was released and sent to the Emir. Besides large number of captives, the Ibadan captured numbers of horses but very few of them were brought home. They cared very little then for the luxury of riding on horseback; what they cared for more was the horses' tails upon which to tie amulets as preventives against bullets in war. These were always part of their war kits.

By attacking at night, the Ibadan army had employed the surprise element in war to Ilorin's bewilderment. The tactic, which comprised three elements, had shown that the Ilorin army, with their cavalry, was not invincible after all. The first lesson was that the use of the cavalry was not possible at night due to poor visibility; secondly the soldiers had to contend with darkness and thirdly, the soldiers were asleep and were thus, completely rattled and overwhelmed. J. F. A. Ajayi describes the Ibadan victory at Osogbo as a turning point for Yorubaland in the series of wars in the Nineteenth Century. According to him:

> unlike some other notable battles, where decision on the field affected little, the subsequent situation, like the defeat of the French by the Spanish imperialists at Pavia in 1525, and in the Yoruba Wars, Ibadan victory at Ikirun in 1878, that of Osogbo brought about profound military and political changes. The Fulani were decisively checked and Ibadan emerged as the leader among the states claiming to succeed to the power of Oyo. This then was one of those "turning points" dear to historians. [118]

Ibadan's victory at Osogbo had a far-reaching implication on the nature of relations in Yorubaland during theNineteenth Century. First, it signified the emergence of Ibadan as a dominant power in the defence of the nation against, what Yorubas considered the aggression

of the Fulani on Yorubaland. Secondly, it ushered in a new dimension in Ilorin – Ibadan relation, that of rivalry. The two powers henceforth antagonised each other in their territorial aggrandisement and struggle for dominance in Yorubaland.

(ii) The Jalumi War (Ikirun War, 1878)

The *Jalumi War* also called the battle of Ikirun, took place on 1st November, 1878 in the northeast of Osogbo, when the rivers and streams of that region were in spate from the rains of the wet season then drawing to a close. It was part of the larger conflict, tagged Ibadan War. *Jalumi,* meaning "Plunging into water", derived its name from the misfortunes, which befell the Ilorin cavalry retreating from the warfront at Osogbo. The *Jalumi* war initially began as a local conflict between Ikirun and the Ekitis. Early in 1878, a number of the Ekiti rulers had taken advantage of Ibadan's preoccupation with the hostile Egba and Ijebu in the south to rebel against her predominance over them. This domination had been encouraged by *Aláàfin* Atiba's strategic dispositions 40 years before, and had developed into a form of empire since Ibadan's success against the Fulani at Osogbo and the Ijaye war.

The Ekiti began their revolt by murdering the Ibadan *Ajẹlẹ* (political agents) in their towns. They were joined in their revolt by the people of Illa, and more reluctantly, by the Ijesa of Ilesa, and by June, the Ilorin had also entered the alliance.[119] Thus, as the crisis assumed a wider dimension, two important alliances emerged. These were the Ekiti/Ijesa Alliance and the Ikirun/Ibadan Alliance; in a bid to increase their chance for victory, both alliances sought external assistance. The Ibadan sought help from the Egba while the Ekiti/Ijesa alliance appealed to Ilorin for assistance. While the Egbas did not quite respond to Ibadan's request, Ilorin accepted the offer of the Ekiti and placed a contingent of its army at their service.

The Ilorin authority saw this alliance as an opportunity to realise a long term ambition of extending its territory to Osogbo; put differently, "dipping the Quran in the sea". This move was important for two reasons. First, Osogbo was a strategic location in Yorubaland, where many refugees of the shattered Yoruba communities had converged to pick up the pieces of their lives; thus the town was tagged Osogbo, *Ilu asala* (meaning Osogbo the town of refuge or a place of solace). Secondly, the town was an important location in the Ilorin-Ibadan contest for supremacy in the Nineteenth Century. Thus, Ilorin's acceptance of the call of the Ekiti was predicated on the actualization of the long term ambition to extend her rule to the southern Yoruba groups.

In June, 1878, word came to Ibadan that the Ilorin had joined the Ekiti and Illa in the alliance against them. Ekiti and Illa, now joined by the Ijesa, laid a siege on Ikirun. The *Emir* of Ilorin sent his forces led by *Ajia* Opele to join the allies around Ikirun. They suffered a setback at Otan, but were reinforced and joined the siege when news reached Ibadan; they were unable to send help until their army returned in October, 1878 from an expedition to Meko.

For the better part of the war, the Ekiti-Ijesa alliance, backed by a contingent of the Ilorin cavalry, under Ajia Opele, was victorious. It forced the Ikiruns and their allies to retreat and remain within the city wall pending the arrival of reinforcement from Ibadan. Thereafter, *Balógun* Ogboriefon was deployed to aid the Ikirun. It was the peak of the rainy season, and many Ibadan soldiers drowned crossing the Obba and Osun rivers.[120]

Balógun Ogboriefon had to share command with the *Osi Balógun* of Ibadan, Ilori Oshungbekun. By the end of October, 1878, Ikirun had been pressed back and had to fight within their own town walls. *Balógun* Ajayi Ogboriefon entered the town with his relief force. The attacking forces at this time were in three groups. The Ilorin army under Ajia were to the northeast, near the Ikirun farms; the Illa under Prince Adeyala; and the Ekiti under Fabunmi were camped together nearby. The Ijesa were to the east led by Ayimoro and Ogunmodede, encamped in the small town of Olla.

On 1st November 1878, the three besieging forces advanced against Ikirun. *Balógun* Ogboriefon, left the Osi Ilori and his followers with the Ikirun to fight Ilorin, Ekiti and the Ila while he took his soldiers to fight the Ijesa. Fortunately for the Ilorin army, they made very early and most significant gain in the war by capturing Ilori Oshungbekun alive. However, their complacency and negligence for the commander of the Ibadan forces, *Balógun* Ajayi Ogboriefon, led to a defeat for the Ilorin contingent. Like *Balógun* Oderinlo at Osogbo before him, Ogboriefon launched a surprise night attack on the Ilorin camp.[121]

Meanwhile, after successfully defeating the Ijesa, *Balógun* Ogboriefon returned and bounced on the Ilorins, who as at this time, were said to be relaxing leisurely after their capture of Ilori Osungbekun, the Osi Balógun of Ibadan. The Ilorin troops suddenly heard Ogboriefon's war drums: *kee e fori sole ogun de! Kee e fori sole ogun de!! Kee e fori sole ogun de!!!* Meaning

dash your heads against the ground, war has come! Dash your heads against the ground, war has come!! Dash your head the ground, war has come!!! Even though, Ogboriefon was unable to rescue Oshungekun because the Ilorin group had killed him before he came, his arrival threw the Ilorin army into total disarray. The Ilorin soldiers in a desperate move to escape from looming death rather than give battle to the enemy, ran into the Otin River, which at the time was already overflowing its banks and with its bridge already destroyed, they were drowned in droves. Very few Ilorin soldiers managed to return to Ilorin alive to tell the tale of the tragedy. This war was an absolute defeat and disaster for Ilorin.[122]

Once again, the surprise attack element was adopted by the Ibadan contingent against Ilorin. Ibadan's strategy in this war could be described as a combination of diplomatic and technological tacts, which climaxed with the destruction of the Otin Bridge. Thus, they were pushed into the flooded river by the victorious Ibadan army, and many Ilorin soldiers and horses drowned. The *Jalumi War*, although ended in a calamity for the Ilorin cavalry, both sides suffered casualties and loss of important soldiers. Several Ilorin soldiers perished in the battle but *Ajia* Opele, who commanded the Ilorin troops survived. On the side of the Ibadan, Ilorin Osungbekun, the *Osi Balógun* of Ibadan, Prince Adeyala of Illa, and other notable Ibadan and Oyo war chiefs lost their lives in the war. Ajayi Ogboriefon, the *Balógun* of Ibadan, who also commanded the Ibadan army equally survived and led the victorious Ibadan contingent home. Again, Ibadan's intervention prevented Ilorin's southward expansion into Yorubaland and deepened the rivalry between the two states. This war however brought a new dimension to Ilorin relations with Offa, which was accused of complicity in the *Jalumi* incident at the Otin River.

(iii) The Offa Campaign

After the *Jalumi* disasters, troops of Ilorin army who survived, regrouped at Ojoku and pondered over their misfortune, particularly the mysterious disappearance of the bridge across Otin River. Offa was suspected to have a hand in the incident. This was based on her stance on previous encounters between Ilorin and the Yoruba. For instance, Offa's complicity in the *Ogele War* in which *Kákánfò* Toyeje of Ogbomoso led a combined Yoruba army to invade Ilorin only to be crushed at Ogele, was a case in point. The second was an alliance of Offa with the other Yoruba group during the *Mugbamugba War*, in which a combined force of the Yoruba under the leadership of Adegun, the Onikoyi, abortively invaded Ilorin. Indeed, it was Offa's complicity in the *Mugbamugba War*, which resulted in the first sacking of the town by

Ilorin at the end of that war. This led to *Olofa*'s asylum in Ikoyi for years until he was pardoned by the Emir.

Therefore, the *Jalumi* episode and Offa's alleged sabotage, was considered an unpardonable crime. Ilorin soldiers and their cavalry therefore mounted a siege on Offa, which lasted 11 years from 1878 to 1889 under the command of Karara, the *Balógun* Gambari of Ilorin.[123] According to an Offa account, the Olofa was invited by the Ilorin authority to join the expedition at Ikirun. This, they would not do at first, disaproving of an attack on Ikirun. But eventually they agreed to send a detachment. However, Ilorin blamed Offa for the defeat, alleging that their support had been half-hearted. Worse still, shortly after the *Jalumi* War, Offa's involvement in the plan against Ilorin appeared to have been buttressed by her declaration of independence at the instigation of Ibadan.

> The Olofa of Offa, always ready to seize any favourable opportunity to revolt, owing to the machinations of an Ibadan man, by name Kaniki, thought this was an excellent time to throw off the Ilorin yoke. Thus, as soon as Ibadan promised to assist, the Olofa declared his independence [124]

This unilateral declaration of independence immediately after the Jalumi disaster betrayed the *Olofa*'s disloyalty to Ilorin. While the Ilorin army was under the leadership of Karara Abukakir, the *Balógun* Gambari of Ilorin, the chief Offa General was Obadioke.[125] In the early stages of the campaign, Ilorin was encamped at Ojoku, some ten miles distant from Offa. There they moved nearer to Idiagowo, and eventually to Iyanago, in the later stages.

Ilorin army employed the siege tactic, which effectively cut off the supplies of foodstuffs to Offa from the south of the town and her inhabitants were seriously affected. With this increasing pressure, Offa sent to Ibadan and Ogbomoso for assistance and both towns sent strong contingents. However, while Ibadan treaded carefully knowing the strength of the Ilorin army, the Ogbomoso group acted quite tactlessly and rashly by attacking Ilorin forces immediately on their arrival at Offa. This, they paid dearly for. Indeed, so high was the casualty figure of the Ogbomoso troops in the war that the sad news could not be directly broken to the town.

The means employed to break the news was the appearance of a masquerade proclaiming: "*ẹniti ẹ ko ba ti ri mo, oti bogun lo ni, ẹni ti ẹ ko ba ti ri mo, oti bogun lo ni*", meaning whoever you have not seen has perished in the war! Whoever you have not seen has perished in the war.[126] Meanwhile, the Offa army fought heroically until they could no longer withstand the onslaught of the Ilorin forces, especially after Ibadan had withdrawn its troops due to the prolonged nature of the campaign, and the heavy casualties suffered by Ogbomoso also dampened their support for Offa in the war. Thus, Offa's allies had practically disappeared, compounding her stress in the campaign.

4.10 Efforts to End the Offa Campaign

Several unsuccessful efforts were made to get *Balógun* Karara to lift the siege on Offa. In fact, British Colonial Officials in Lagos even visited both Ilorin and Offa to join in the effort for the siege to be lifted. The British did so because the Offa war was already hampering the flow of trade between the hinterland and the coastal areas, thereby negatively affecting the commercial interests of the colonial administration in Lagos.[127] The first colonial officer sent to negotiate terms of settlement between the two belligerent groups, that is, the Ilorin and the Offa-Ibadan armies, was one Reverend C. Philip. He arrived at the war front in Offa on 1st April, 1886 and was joined a day later by two other representatives of the Governor of Lagos. The negotiation was protracted and it involved Reverend Philips shuttling between the two camps for weeks. However, not much was achieved by these negotiations because *Balógun* Karara insisted that the Ibadan troops should withdraw from Offa as a precondition for lifting the siege.

Further efforts were made to end the Offa campaign. In the same 1886, an emissary from Gwandu visited Karara in his camp to intervene in the war. Later in 1889, Macdonald went to Ilorin to have an interview with the *Emir*. The latter seemed to have been sympathy but Karara, who was on bad terms with the *Emir* and doubtless, feared the reception he would get at home if he did not return victorious, was resolved to continue the campaign. He treated the various envoys to him, including Captain Ferryman, with scant respect, and demanded as a condition of peace, that Ibadan should not only retire forthwith from Offa, but also hand over all Ekiti country.[128]

At another meeting with representatives of the Governor, Balógun Karara, with whom were the other three *Balóguns* and some princes, including Prince Momolosho, who later became the Emir, explained in detail why the Ilorin army would not lift the siege on Offa until Ibadan troops withdraw from the town. In his explanation as reported by Reverend Samuel Johnson, who was present on the occasion, *Balógun* Karara maintained that Ilorin had been masters of several towns in the Oyo and Ekiti Provinces and had their *Ajẹlẹs* (Political Residents) in them; but Ibadan had ousted them from every one of them and would like to oust them from Offa also. That he would agree to the armistice of six months only on condition that the Ibadan withdrew their contingents from Offa.

He stated however, that the Ibadan were remarkable for their treachery, "but could they equal the Fulani for wiliness and cunning? The Fulani have seven different tricks, they have only used one as yet against Offa and Ibadan; before they have made use of the remaining six, Offa will be taken. Two years ago, the *Sultan* (sic) of Gwandu sent his envoy here to mediate between us. We observed the armistice for five months. Not only did we suspend hostilities, but we also allowed traders on both sides to carry on between Offa and Ilorin, and even beyond. Unexpectedly, the Ibadans shut their gates upon our traders, they refused to release them even though we sent back their people to them". He went on to say that the Ibadan's were the common enemy of all, even the *Aláàfin*, their king was on friendly terms with Ilorin and had exchanged presents with the King of Ilorin. If the Governor would interfere at all, let him bid the Ibadan to retire from Ekiti and Ilorin territories.[129]

All these allegations were, however, denied by the *Olofa*, who maintained that they were fabricated against Offa and Ibadan. He emphasised that Ilorin was the real aggressor and that Ibadan got involved in the war just to protect Offa. He cautioned that any precipitated withdrawal of Ibadan troops from Offa might expose the town and its people to annihilation by the Ilorin troops. Thereafter the delegation returned to Ilorin camp in the afternoon to resume discussion with *Balógun* Karara. At the meeting, the *Balógun* began by introducing the Ilorin representatives to the delegate:

> Sitting on my left are the Balógun of the Fulanis: Ajikobi, the Balógun of the Yoruba and last in order, the Balógun of the 4th Standard, of the Ilorin army, I myself being the Balógun of the Gambaris. Sitting before me are the Balógun of Offa who deserted to me at the rebellion of the king of Offa; next to him is Ogunmodede, the head of the Ijesa contingents here. Sitting on my

> right are Princes, the king's brothers. Now go on to deliver your message.[130]

However, the party could not reach a compromise as *Balógun* Karara accused the British delegation of taking sides with Offa. He thereafter ordered them to return to Lagos, giving them the following warning: If you choose to remain at Offa, you shall see what we can do. In a few days we shall take Offa, and you, if you remain here, will be taken. If you loiter on your way back to Offa the horsemen will be upon you.[131]

With this, it is clear that all efforts to raise the siege had collapsed and the Ilorin army, under *Balógun* Karara remained resolute in their grip of the town. The main bone of contention here was Ibadan's involvement, and her encroachment on areas considered to be under Ilorin's authority. True to Karara's words, the next day, the Ilorin cavalry attacked Offa and sacked the town. Several people were killed in the gruesome encounter, which was reported as follows: "when Offa was eventually captured in 1891, wholesale slaughter took place and the town was deserted, *Olofa* and survivors, fleeing south to Ido-Osun. There, they built a new town.[132]

From the evidences at our disposal so far, the Offa campaign was largely an extension of the vendetta between Ilorin and Ibadan in their struggle for supremacy in the Nineteenth Century Yorubaland, as it was in the Osogbo and Jalumi encounters. Indeed, this fact became more obvious with *Balógun* Karara's efmphasis on the withdrawal of Ibadan from Offa as a precondition for Ilorin's withdrawal from the town.

4.11 Ilorin-Ibadan Rivalry over Ekiti Areas in the Nineteenth Century

While Ilorin broke away from Old Oyo and even engaged the latter in several wars of survival (the *Ogele, Kanla, Mugbamugba and Eleduwa Wars*), Ibadan remained under Oyo but with the guise of espousing the empire's interests, appeared to have created a chain of vassal territories under her command with the appointment of political representatives known as *Ajẹlẹ* in such areas. For instance, between 1844 and 1877, Ibadan had through intervention in local feuds and also under the pretence of fishing out Ilorin forces, conquered many Ekiti, Ijesa, Igbomina and Akoko kingdoms and brought them under her political control.[133]

On the other hand, Ilorin, after surviving Oyo's wars of invasion, began a policy of expanding her influence southward into other Yoruba areas. As discussed earlier, Ilorin's southward

expansion was halted by Ibadan in the Osogbo war *c.* 1840 and the Ikirun war of 1878. Ibadan also gave her support to Offa in the subsequent encounter during Ilorin's siege. Indeed, Ibadan's emergence as a strong power, which succeeded Old Oyo in Yorubaland, was largely based on her role in stopping Ilorin's influence further among southern Yoruba groups.

Meanwhile, after the establishment of the Ilorin Emirate in 1823, Emir Abdusalami (1823-1836) and his lieutenants immediately began the expansion of the Emirate through diplomacy, absorption and outright conquest of towns and villages around Ilorin. The leaders of Ilorin directed their expansionist plans southwards and after a few years of the foundation of the Emirate, some Igbomina towns such as Igbaja, Omupo, Ajase, and the Ibolo territories of the Old Oyo Kingdom, namely Offa and Erin, had become part of the Emirate.[134] In her conquest of these territories, the Ilorin army operated on familiar terrains. But the further south they went, the more difficult it was for them to operate because the success of their army depended on the ability of their cavalry, which became largely ineffective in the forest region.

Even though Ilorin's political authority was not total on the areas aforementioned, she was able to successfully bring some Ekiti towns under her control. For instance, Otun an important Ekiti metropolis and the first headquarters of the Ekitiparapo army during the Kiriji Wars, was attacked by the Ilorin army during the reign of Emir Shitta (1836-1861).[135] The attempt by Ilorin to subdue Otun was seriously repulsed, although available evidence suggests that Otun sued for peace with cowries, loads of kolanuts and palm oil.[136] However, some accounts insist that Otun was never subdued by the Ilorin army. For instance Atolagbe posited that Otun was brought under Ilorin hegemony by sheer diplomacy.[137] David May, writing in 1858, stated that Otun was attacked and was partially destroyed by Ilorin, but that the Ilorin army failed to subject the town to her rule.[138] According to Akintoye, Otun was able to resist Ilorin because of its location in a hilly area and of the menace of tsetse fly, which made it difficult for the cavalry forces used by the Ilorin army to penetrate.[139]

However, in spite of the positions above, there is ample evidence to believe that Otun was conquered, perhaps after a strong resistance, and that Ilorin succeeded in placing an *Ajẹlẹ* there, probably at the beginning of the *Kiriji/Ekitiparapo War*.[140] This fact was further buttressed when Lugard visited Otun later in December of 1894, he found an Ilorin Ajẹlẹ there.[141] Lugard's evidence also suggests that the *Oòrè*, the king of Otun protested that the

town was neither under the Ibadan nor the Ilorin, but Lugard maintained that the *Ajẹlẹ* from Ilorin should remain in the town.[142]

Furthermore, the Ilorin army carried their warfare to such other Ekiti towns as Obo, Osi, Idofin, Odo-Owa, Ilofa, Isapa, Eruku, Aye-Ekan (now-Aiyedun) and various villages under the Oore of Otun.[143] Archival evidence also suggests that Osi was burnt down and many slaves were caught and taken prisoner to Ilorin. The *Olósí* was initially brought to Ilorin but was later allowed to return to his throne, and a certain Ajibade was appointed the Ilorin *Ajẹlẹ*. He collected tributes and paid to Ilorin through the *Balógun* Gambari, who was the *Bakakakere*.[144] Similarly, when Obbo was attacked and brought under the political authority of Ilorin during the reign of *Emir* Shitta (1836-1861), an *Ajẹlẹ* named Dangana was stationed in the town.[145]

With this picture above, the Ilorin Emirate had a stake in the Ekiti country and was prepared to defend such interests. Apart from the political influence, Ilorin had vested economic interest in the area in terms of collection of tributes in agricultural products and other valuable items. Indeed, the economic factor was quite strong in the wars of the Nineteenth Century in Yorubaland as it determined the nature of relations among states. In the case of Ilorin, as soon as a new territory was captured and annexed to the Emirate, its local ruler was allowed to retain his title in as much as he accepted the political authority of the Emirate, although he was carefully watched by Ilorin *Ajẹlẹs*. He was then required to pay tributes to the town with agricultural products of his area, which in the case of Ekiti towns and their environs, included palm oil, kolanuts, ropes and slaves.

However, Ilorin and Ibadan were involved in struggles for the acquisition of more territories in the Ekiti areas, where they engaged in several battles, with Ibadan gaining the upper hand.[146] Indeed, in almost all the major wars fought in Yorubaland before the *Kiriji Wars*, Ibadan and Ilorin were always in opposing camps. For instance, the Ilorin army and the forces of Ibadan clashed at Otun in 1858 and 1864 to Ilorin's discomfiture. The two states, having become bitter rivals, constantly searched for the best strategy to outwit each other. Ibadan seemed to have recorded sweet victories over the Ilorin group on critical occasions, with the Osogbo War *c.* 1840 and the Jalumi War being indelible catastrophes for the Ilorin army.

Therefore in 1878, when the Ekitiparapo was formed with the sole aim of liquidating the power of Ibadan in Yorubaland, Ilorin seized the opportunity to ally herself with the alliance.

Ilorin joined this alliance not because she was friendly with the Ekiti group before that date; rather, she was ready to take over Ekiti and replace Ibadan as the controlling power whenever there was the opportunity. Even when Ilorin was joining the Ekiti to rid it of Ibadan imperialism, she (Ilorin) still held tenaciously to her territories in the parts of Ekiti during and after the Kiriji wars.[147] That Ilorin's support for the Ekiti group in the alliance was laden with ulterior intention seemed to have been amply shown by events after the *Kiriji Wars*. For instance, soon after the *Ekitiparapo* army lost to Ibadan at Ikirun in the *Jalumi War*, Ilorin, perhaps because she was the most hit in terms of casualties, was prepared to negotiate peace with Ibadan so that her soldiers captured by Ibadan would be released.[148]

If Ilorin had been truly involved in the *Ekitiparapo Alliance* for the sake of the Ekitis, she would not have made conciliatory move towards Ibadan, which was considered a common enemy, soon after the *Kiriji Wars*. Although this attempt was rejected by the Ibadan because the victory at Ikirun, like that earned in Osogbo in the 1840s, increased the morale of not only its army, but also the town's leadership.

As expected the leadership of the *Ekitiparapo* was disturbed by this peace moves towards Ibadan, because Ilorin was considered a formidable ally. They therefore made efforts to bring Ilorin, back to the path of the *Ekitiparapo*. One of such efforts was the sending of a delegation of the *Ekitiparapo* to *Emir* Aliyu (1869-1891) of Ilorin. Even though, the Emir was not convinced that he should continue with the war against Ibadan, his most senior military commander, *Balógun* Karara, was in favour of continuing the war.[149] Ilorin maintained that an exchange of soldiers was already in existence between her and the *Ekitiparapo*, which was a symbol of their relationship and could not be easily broken.[150]

Furthermore, throughout the period of the *Kiriji War*, the Ilorin army under *Balógun* Karara, was encamped at Offa, which meant that her participation in the war centered largely around protecting her Ibolo District of Offa and Erin, rather than in joining the Ekiti subjects of Ibadan to fight for independence. Besides, even though Ilorin was well placed through her Ekiti territories to send contingents to the *Ekitiparapo* army, she left the initiative to join the *Ekitiparapo* army with her individual Ekiti subjects, which further proves that the *Ekitiparapo* friendship was merely a means to an end for Ilorin. Neither did Balógun Karara show any respect for Ogedengbe, the leader of the *Ekitiparapo* army, when efforts were being made to achieve permanent peace in September 1886, after the intervention of the British agents had resulted in a peace accord with the Ibadan over the war.

Ogedengbe was worried over continued hostilities in Offa either because of the Ijesa contingent that was with *Balógun* Karara or because of his conviction that without peace in Offa, it would be difficult to effect the peace treaty. He therefore sent messages to Karara to intimate him that peace had been achieved at *Kiriji*; that hostilities should cease and that the *Ekitiparapo* contingent at the Offa front should be released as the Ilorin soldiers at the *Kiriji* camp would soon be allowed to go home. Because *Balógun* Karara had not achieved his ambition of revenging the defeat at Ikirun, he simply refused to recognise the peace agreement.

Therefore, the saying that there is no permanent friend in politics but permanent interests can be employed to explain Ilorin's position in this alliance. The halfhearted friendship with the Ekiti evaporated soon after the allied army was defeated and it became clear that Ilorin merely intended to use the alliance to weaken Ibadan in a bid to promote her (Ilorin) expansion to the south.

4.12 British Intervention in the Ilorin-Ibadan Crisis From 1890s

As from the early 1890s, the British became increasingly interested in the conflict between Ilorin and Ibadan because the imbroglio was already affecting their trade interests. The British presented Ilorin as the main aggressor, which must be subjugated if the continuous "threat to trade and peace" within the region was to be overcome. An economic blockade was therefore organised against the Emirate in 1896. This strategy was adopted by the British to suffocate Ilorin's trade and commerce, which largely depended on the inflow of traders from other regions. In the course of this blockade, the Mulims in Lagos were persuaded to visit Ilorin and convince their fellow brethren on the viability of British presence and control.[151]

With the economic blockade, trade from Ilorin into the interior of the rest of Yorubaland and the coast was disrupted. This certainly had an adverse effect on Ilorin's economy, particularly the individual benefits that accrued to the Ilorin aristocracy at the period, especially the *Balógun*. This increased anti-British feelings in Ilorin. The worse hit section of the metropolis was the Gambari ward, where the Gambari market, the major centre of transnational trade was located. The blockade led to an economic downturn in the fortunes of many of the traders. As a result, some of them were ready to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the British.[152]

In order to give effect to this blockade and prevent Ilorin from its raids to the South, Carter, the Governor of Lagos, stationed a British Constabulary at Odo-Otin, and in 1894, a boundary was fixed by Captain Bower (representing Lagos) and Captain Lugard (who represented the Niger Company). Consequently in 1896, the *Ajẹlẹs* of Ilorin were driven out of Otun, Ishan, Ikole, and Aiyede.[153] The result naturally was that these places ceased to pay tribute to Ilorin. This means that the blockade not only affected the Ilorin authority's economic benefit internally but also their revenue from some southern communities ceased to come. There was thus frustration and anxiety among Ilorin's political class, which resulted in their resolve to attack the British.

The *Emir* or perhaps, Alánàmú thus sent an army to retrieve the fortunes of Ilorin under the four *Balóguns* in these areas. The army encamped at Iloffa; the Otun army at Erinmope under Oore AdIfála, who sent to Captain Bower at Odo Otin for help. This attack was on 31st March, 1896 and the Ilorin forces were repelled, losing about fifty soldiers in the process. Another attack was initiated three months later. This was also not successful, and more men were lost by Ilorin forces.[154] With this defeat, the Ilorin forces retreated.

Meanwhile, a major offensive war was carried out in January, 1897, which involved some of Ilorin's most notable warriors like *Balógun* Alánàmú, Gambari, Ajikobi, and Gata *Ikoko*. However, this expedition even proved more disastrous than the earlier encounters with the British, inspite of the presence of Ilorin's best warriors. In this war, particularly in the Battle of Erimope, Ilorin forces were routed, losing about one hundred and fifty men in the process. Captain Bower sent twelve men and one gun to assist the *Oore*. Indeed, Adamu, the *Balógun* Gambari, son of Karara, was shot in the battle. The Ilorin army fled, leaving horses and booty behind, but burying Adamu on a hill nearby. [155]

Therefore, the British had gradually become involved in the struggle between Ilorin and her opponents by the late Nineteenth Century. This was also in line with the resolution of effective occupation of the areas under their sphere of influence as agreed at the Berlin Conference of 1884/85. The main motive for their involvement was however the need to ensure peace so that trade and commercial activities could thrive in line with their economic interests. This was imperative given Ilorin's strategic location in the transitional zone between the north and south of what later became Nigeria. With the British involvement, Ilorin's military objectives gradually changed from expansion to defence because of this new opposition.

4.13 British Conquest of 1897 and its Implication for Ilorin

As part of Governor Carter's effort to translate the imperial objectives of the British government into reality in Nigeria, he was seriously committed to stopping the inter-tribal wars that had been ravaging the entire Yourbaland. This was aimed at ensuring that the trade routes in the hinterland were free and safe for the promotion of 'legitimate trade'. The efforts of Captain Bower, British Resident in Ibadan in 1894 on the instruction of Governor Carter, to intervene in the rivalry between Ilorin and Ibadan, which had always resulted in communal clashes, was a major factor in the conquest of Ilorin in 1897.[156]

Earlier in the boundary demarcation of 1894, the Ilorin leadership considered Bower to be bias because he was the Colonial Resident in Ibadan, and at the same time he represented the Governor of Lagos in the boundary delimitation. The *Balóguns* were therefore openly rude to Bower, who thereafter filed a report about his encounter with Ilorin to Lagos. Both the resident in Ibadan and the Governor in Lagos were infuriated by what they considered as "confrontational attitude of a local African state" to the colonial power. Therefore, the governor sent a report to the Colonial Office in London, arguing that Ilorin was traditionally part of Yorubaland, and therefore was supposed to be under his control. He argued further to justify why he should be given the mandate to subjugate Ilorin to be able to realise the set objectives of the colonial government.[157]

Following this report, the Colonial Office in London, investigated the allegation by requesting the Royal Niger Company to respond to Governor Carter's charges against Ilorin. Sir George Tubman Goldie, the head of the Royal Niger Company, who, at that period, had no strained relationship with Ilorin, however, absolved the town of these charges of insubordination and confrontation with the colonial authorities. Sir Goldie, indeed, concluded his response to the colonial office in London by stressing the cordial relations between Ilorin and the company.[158] This impressive report by Sir Goldie, initially appeared to have saved the city, until it was strained by Ilorin attack on the Lagos Constabulary Force stationed at Odo-Otin, which had been dispatched to assist the Otun people in 1896. This attack thus, destroyed the cordial relationship, which was initially reported between Ilorin and British officers.

The Royal Niger Company was therefore instructed to forcefully occupy Ilorin and make it obey the instruction of the colonial authority. The company this time was not given the opportunity to comment but to carry out the instruction of the Colonial Office in London. Furthermore, by 1897, the position of the Royal Niger Company at Lokoja was precarious, and to defend themselves and the neighbouring pagans, an expedition was decided upon against Bida and later, Ilorin. Bida was first attacked, then Ilorin, the troops crossing the River Niger at Jebba on their way from Bida to Ilorin. With this looming attack, the Ilorin army hurried back from Erimope to defend their city.

On the 15th of February, 1897, forces of the Royal Niger Company arrived Ilorin for the impending attack. The Emir was ordered to surrender the town but he refused. Fighting broke out and it lasted until the following day, when the *Emir* and the *Balógun* fled to the outlying villages.[159] Messages however were sent out recalling the Emir and Balóguns and a treaty was signed by which the *Emirate* became a vassal of the company. By this new arrangement, Ilorin was compelled to accept the boundary initially fixed with Ibadan in 1894, on the authority of Lagos.

It is significant to emphasise that the defeat of Ilorin army by British showed the limitation of traditional weapons. It also brought a new dimension to Ilorin-British relations because the town henceforth witnessed two categories of people; those in favour of confrontation against British rule, which they considered foreign and unacceptable; and those who favoured cooperation and collaboration, believing that power and authority were transient. It is this state of affairs that directed subsequent events in the town up to the close of the Nineteenth and opening of the Twentieth Centuries.

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43. Uthman, B. Fodio. *Bayan Wujubul-Hijrat alallbad*. Translated and cited by F. H. El-Masri, Ph.D. Thesis. Ibadan, p. 214
44. Smith, R. *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-colonial West Africa*. Second Edition, James Carrey Ltd, London, 1989. P. 98
45. For more on Rabbah archers see Laird, M. and Oldfield, R. A. K. Narrative of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa by the Niger, 1833, 1833 and 1834, Vol. II, Frank Cass, London, 1970. P. 69.
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53. This was buttressed by a number of respondents in Ilorin including some blacksmiths in Ilorin. (I) Mallam Ajikobi Amidu, No. 22, Ajikobi Compound, Ilorin, a Correction Officer in the Nigerian Prison Service. Aged 59 years. 28th September, 2016; (ii) Ayuba Alagbede Pakata Area, A local blacksmith, Aged 72, on 30th March, 2015; (iii) Interview with Baba Elegbeji, a local blacksmith in Adangba area Ilorin, Aged 68 on 25th May, 2015; (iv) Interview with Taiye Alagbede Pataki, Ile Oloyin, Isale Gambari Area, Ilorin. Aged 60 years. 5th January, 2017, and Baba Busari Alagbede in Ogidi Compound, Ilorin. Aged 85 years. On 14thApril, 2015. Interview with Suleiman Yahya, Magaji Akaraje, Akesinrin Compound, Isale Koto, Ilorin. Aged 75 years 18th June, 2017.
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CHAPTER FIVE

IMPOSITION OF COLONIAL RULE AND ILORIN REACTION, 1897-1920

5.1 Administration of Fiefs in Ilorin before Colonial Conquest

Fief-holding was an important factor, which demonstrated the mutual relation between the *Balóguns* and the *Emir* in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin. There was relative harmony among the Ilorin aristocracy since each got a fair share and some returns from the lands it held under the fiefholding rights. Indeed, the town was divided into five wards. The first was the Emir's own but the others were placed under the four *Balóguns*, the main military leaders representing the major ethnic groups in the Emirate. The two largest wards, headed by *Balóguns* Ajikobi and Alánàmú, were Yoruba populated. *Balógun* Fulani headed the third ward, which included many of the Fulani residents of the town, while *Balógun* Gambari controlled the fourth, largely Hausa and the centre of the northern trade. Faced with these powerful chiefs, successive Ilorin Emirs were unable to retain as much personal control as their counterparts further north. The four *Balóguns* continued to gain more lands and power such that by the late Nineteenth Century, they were in effective control.[1]

However, in spite of this situation, the manner in which the administration of the fief was shared between the *Emir* and *Balóguns* illustrated some level of mutual understanding and respect in the administration of the Emirate.[2] With the involvement of the Ilorin Emirate army in the Nineteenth Century warfare in Yorubaland, the *Balóguns* became the central figures in the affairs of the state. As discussed in chapter four, diplomacy and the use of cavalry enabled Ilorin to record victories against the Yoruba forces in different encounters. Such conquered areas automatically became the territory of the war commanders or Balóguns that led the contingent.[3] This in turn increased the influence and power of the *Balóguns*, and they became more interested in the pursuit of military conquest for further economic, social and political gains.

These military commanders often appointed residents to administer such conquered territories on their behalf. Among Hausa and Fulani *Balóguns*, Fief Heads were known as *Alangua* (owner of the area) while the Yoruba *Balóguns* called their appointed residents *Baale* (Head of the land).[4] Because of the prevalence of war at the period, notable warriors, who distinguished themselves at battle front were appointed as *Alangua* or *Baale* of the conquered areas. In other

words, war became more profitable and the warriors were the front-liners in the political structure and administration of Ilorin Emirate.

Parts of the Ibolo and Igbomina areas of present Kwara State were under one Ilorin *Balógun* or the other between 1832 and 1897, after which the District system was introduced by the colonial administration. Indeed, as a demonstration of mutual respect and interest, some of the areas acquired or conquered by the respective war leaders were given as tributes to the *Emir*, who in turn appointed members of his family as *Daudu* for the areas.[5] The title of *Daudu* was commonly used for the appointees of the *Emir* to illustrate that they were his relatives. In some cases, persons or families that lost in the succession bid to the throne of the *Emir*, were compensated with appointment as *Daudu*.[6]

The major role of the *Alangua, Baale* or *Daudu*, as the case may be, in the conquered areas, was to represent the interest of his benefactor, who remained in the metropolis to receive periodic updates about the area. He collected royalties on behalf of his master and passed instructions from the lord in Ilorin to his subjects. A local Resident was also expected to raise an army from able bodied men within his domain to join the *Balógun* during military expedittions.[7] All these privileges were direct consequence of the *Balógun*'s military enterprise during Ilorin's wars of expansion.

Table 1: Land allocation in Ilorin Metropolitan Districts in the Nineteenth Century

Settlement	***Alangua* (Custodian)**
Onire	*Magaji* Ojuekun
Gamon	*Magaji* Ààre
Okutaila	*Magaji* Akiale
Zaki	*Alfa* Zaki
Oko-Erin	*Magaji* Erin
Alapa	Lawani Giwa
Lanwa	*Magaji* Adenlalu
Igborin	*Sarkin* Gambari Bako

Source: NAK ILOPROF Ilorin Emirate – Reorganisation of Districts 4/1 A. M 829/1911

Table 2: Land Allocation: Incorporated Settlements of Ilorin Emirate in the Nineteenth Century

Settlement	***Babakere* (Custodian)**
Otun	Jimba (Warrior and headslave of Emir Abdulsalam)
Ile	*Balógun* Afin
Osi	*Balógun* Gambari Ali
Afon	*Magajin* Gari
Isan	*Balógun* Fulani
Iye	*Balógun* Fulani
Obo	*Balógun* Fulani
Ikole	*Ajia* Gaju
Ojoku	Basambo (Lieutenant of one of the *Emirs*
Ilofa	*Ajia* Opele
Ekan	*Ajia* Opele
Eruku	*Balógun* Gambari
Shao	*Ajia Kekere* (slave of *Emir* Shitta)

Source: NAK ILOPROF Ilorin Emirate – Reorganisation of Districts 4/1 A. M 829/1911, also in Banwo, A. O. "The Colonial State and Ilorin Emirate Economy: 1900-1960" Ph.D. thesis, University of Ilorin, 1998.

5.2 The Balógun and Ilorin Political Economy

Military role had increased the power and influence of Ilorin war chiefs so much that they drew income both from the Ilorin metropolis through control over trade and markets within their respective localities, as well as tributes coming from non-metropolitan communities under their watch. This economic power was further boosted by their membership of the Emirate Council and opportunity to partake in the selection of a new emir.

For instance, by the time Emir Shitta died in 1861, the four Balóguns and the *Imams* (Islamic scholars and leaders) representing the three main linguistic groups were automatically responsible for the selection of a successor to the emirship.[8] Furthermore, by the time Emir Zubair (1861-1868) was appointed, a formal administrative structure had evolved whereby the *Emir* and the *Balógun* shared political responsibilities in the emirate, while *Imams* were left to handle religious affairs. With each of the Balóguns exercising full authority over administrative responsibilities in his unit of control referred to as wards within metropolitan Ilorin, and controlling areas he conquered or acquired outside the city as his fief, the powers and influence of the *Balóguns* became dominant in the general administration of the *Emirate*.[9]

The *Balógun* also had better access to wealth through their control of the city gates, where they collected tolls in the form of money or goods from caravans moving in and out of the metropolis. Their supervision of these gates was based on the security responsibilities, which they held as custodians of the Emir and the emirate. However, there were no fixed rates of toll charged; rather, the rates depended on the quality and quantity of goods the merchants were carrying. In 1893 for instance, it was reported that tolls collected from traders varied from twenty to a hundred cowries.[10] There may also have been variation in the rates in other smaller entreport towns as was the case in Eruku, where the *Ajẹlẹ* of the *Balógun* Gambari Ali supervised toll collection.[11]

This control over trade and trade routes made the *Balógun* to benefit hugely in the process of extraction and appropriation. Thus, (as early as) from the 1860s, the *Balógun* began to subvert the *Emir* in the distribution of the proceeds from the tolls in the form of money and goods collected from merchants. They therefore accumulated so much wealth in the process because the practice was extended to other sectors of the economy. The *Emir,* for instance, was also

denied a substantial part of the proceeds from the incorporated settlements. These were largely in the form of taxes, tributes, slaves, war booty and other surpluses as a result of which the *Balógun* became more prosperous and influencial in the Emirate.

This was an important point in the struggle between the two groups: the Emir and his war chiefs. As the Emir was increasingly being denied access to the source of power and wealth, his influence in the *Emirate* began to reduce in the same proportion as those of the Balógun increased.[12] With this state of affairs, the *Balógun* apparently, as from the 1860s, began to openly exert more political power within the Emirate. In 1861 for instance, an American traveller, Robert Campbell, noticed in Ilorin, the increasing power and influence of the Balógun. He reported how one of the *Balógun* (Inakoju Ali Alanamu, then the leading figure in Ilorin) openly threatened to remove the Emir and his supporters from power.[13] This struggle between the two groups dominated Ilorin's political economy as from 1870. By 1896, the *Emir*'s loss of power and control had become so apparent that a British colonial officer, Captain Bower observed that the Emir had become powerless in the hands of his war chiefs.[14]

An indication of the *Balógun* insubordination was sufficiently recorded during the Offa campaign with the continued stay of the Ilorin troops under *Balógun* Karara at war camp in defiance of the Emir. This stubbornness initially aroused fears and suspicion in Ilorin about the Balógun's real intention as there were rumours that he was planning to make himself an *Emir* in Offa. This rumour strained relations between him and Emir Aliyu (1868-1891). This is more so because *Emir* Aliyu and *Balógun* Karara, who at the period was the *Balógun* Agba, held divergent views on the Offa campaign. While the Emir openly expressed his desire that Ilorin should not attack Offa, the *Balógun Agba*, Karara, was in favour of the expedition. In fact, the *Balógun* had to openly caution the *Emir* not to emphasise his view and that if the Emir defied his instructions, he would depose him and enthrone his younger brother, Momo.[15] Perhaps this was the case reported by the American traveler, Campbell.

Therefore, going by the indifference of the two over the Offa campaign in the first place, the rumour being peddled around had a strong basis. But soon after this development, Emir Aliyu died and Prince Momo, who was at the battle front with *Balógun* Karara in the Offa campaign, was chosen as the new *Emir*. The *Balógun* was indeed instrumental to Prince Abdulsalami Momolosho's selection, being his friend and a comrade in arms at the Offa war. Karara hoped that the new *Emir* would be favourably disposed towards the Balógun and even support war.

He (*Balógun*) therefore made very elaborate arrangement for Momo's triumphant entry into Ilorin for his installation. Emir Momo (1891-1895) was said to have returned to Ilorin with an escort of 20,000 footmen and 20,000 horses.[16]

However, soon after the new *Emir's* installation, *Balógun* Karara's hopes in him regarding favourable disposition to war, became displaced because *Emir* Momo had a different view of war and armed conflict. He seemed to have been more predisposed to conciliatory option rather than confrontation.

> Momo, being the son of a Yoruba woman from Isehin, adopted a much more conciliatory attitude towards Oyo than did his predecessors. On his accession he exchanged valuable presents with the Aláàfin. So too he welcomed the Governor of Lagos on the occasion of his visit with Captain Bower in 1893 and terms of peace were arranged, each side withdrawing on an agreed day. Unfortunately, there were many prominent men in Ilorin, who did not take such an enlightened view of the situation, and trouble was destined soon to break out again.[17]

The new *Emir* condemned Karara's intransigence and hard-line posture on the issues of allowing Offa refugees at Ido-Osun to return to their home. Shocked and disappointed by Emir Momo's pacifism, *Balógun* Karara began to make preparations to return to Ilorin but died mysteriously at Idofian where he passed the night on his way home.[18]

With *Balógun* Karara out of the picture, *Emir* Momo intensified his pacific romance with the Oyos and the British administration in Lagos. Karara's demise must have been a big relief for the Emir in his mission to reconcile with both Oyo and the British and thus embarked on the conciliation on higher pedestal. This angered the remaining *Balóguns* and the other war chiefs, who, with the Late *Balógun* participated in the numerous wars between Ilorin and the Yoruba. They considered the *Emir*'s softness towards the Yoruba and the British, treacherous. Indeed, the implication of such a conciliatory move was that they (the Balóguns) would begin to lose the areas they had conquered as military commanders and their influence in the political structure of the *Emirate* would be reduced.

Given the position above, it is clear that the *Balóguns'* military role was largely stimulated by their ambition to acquire as much land as possible under their fief-holding privilege, thereby

increasing their economic and political influence in the *Emirate*. Thus, *Emir* Momo's romance with Oyo-Ibadan and later the British, was considered by the *Balóguns* as counter productive and injurious to their individual interests. Indeed, the working relations between the Emir and the *Balóguns* had been that of first among equals, whereby, they saw themselves as partners. There was mutual respect among them and their collective determination was to ensure the survival of Ilorin *Emirate*. However, growing responsibilities of war (both offensive and defensive) imposed on the *Balógun* in the course of defending the Emirate and acquiring more territories for it, conferred on them some measure of dominance and more powers in the administration of the *Emirate*. Perhaps this why is S. Y. Omoiya, maintains that the *Emirs* before the British conquest of Ilorin, merely reigned, while the Balóguns ruled.[19]

Thus, when *Emir* Momo ascended the throne in 1891, he decided to embark on schemes to change this week status of the Emir in the administration of Ilorin by forging personal relations with the Colonial Governor, Carter, in Lagos. The *Emir* initiated direct communication with the Governor, which eventually led to the meeting of the two men.[20] In the meantime, with the demise of *Balógun* Karara, the position of *Balógun* Agba (the senior war commander) passed on to *Balógun* Alánàmú, Inakoju Ali. He was a man of great ability and had acquired unlimited powers in Ilorin. He joined forces with the *Balógun* Gambari, the next senior chief, and soon tore away the remaining power from Momo, who became a mere figure-head. These two *Balógun*, it was said ran riot over the country, seizing and selling slaves and acting in a most outrageous fashion.[21]

In 1895, Alánàmú intrigued with Alege, a brother of Momo, for the *Emir*'s removal. Alege leapt at the idea, and very soon had broached the proposal to the other chiefs, who were only too willing to follow any course, which Alánàmú proposed. The *Emir* was besieged in his palace, nearly the whole town joining against him. For nearly a week, he succeeded in defending himself but eventually, seeing the haplessness of further resistance, blew himself up with his head slave.[22]

Thus, by the 1890s, the Balógun had wielded enormous economic and political influencial in the *Emirate*. This was largely facilitated by wealth coming from trade, trade routes and tributes from conquered territories. Even though the Emir shared in these booties, he was seriously subverted by his war chiefs, who were at the centre of tolls and revenue collection.

5.3 Resistance to British Rule Led by Balógun Ali Inakoju Alánàmú in Ilorin

From 1897, struggles in the political leadership in Ilorin Emirate had taken a new dimension with the emergence of the British. Two factors can be identified for this turn of event. Firstly, prior to the British conquest, Ilorin Emirate's major opponents were African states, mostly the southern Yoruba towns, with Ibadan coming to their aid as Ilorin's main rival. This essentially changed as from 1897; Ilorin's influence in the outlying territories was threatened since her opponents now counted on the British for protection. Thus, her expansionist policy gradually changed to defence. Secondly, prior to 1897, the Emirate's authority as represented by the *Emir* and his *Balógun*, had a relative measure of concensus in the campaigns against their opponents; even though, opinions differed on few occasions, they still found areas of common grounds as long as the campaigns would benefit the *emirate*.

However, from 1897, division became visible in the political edifice as a result of British involvement in Ilorin political and administrative arrangement. Thus, the situation became largely struggles between the pro-British as epitomised by *Emir* Suleiman, and the anti-British as represented by the *Balógun*, this time, *Balógun* Alánàmú Ali Inakoju. Ilorin's warfare, therefore, changed to internal feud between the two principal units of her political class.

Meanwhile, the British embarked on gradual occupation of the Nigerian areas through means, which included threat of the use of force, tricks and treachery, signing of treaties of protection and outright military conquest as witnessed in Ilorin and several areas in the Nigerian areas. Others were termed "diplomatic relations" which, in the surface, loosely appeared like friendship with the African states but in practical terms, seemed more like the handing over of traditional authority and sovereignty of the African leadership to the British.

From 1898, the British government sought to establish and maintain a colonial state in what later became Nigeria.[23] This long process involved a number of important measures, including the removal of all visible African opposition to the imposition, expansion and consolidation of British central authority over the territory later known as Nigeria.[24] In doing this, the British employed diplomacy or force where necessary in Yorubaland and the Sokoto Caliphate, both being areas, which Ilorin *Emirate* had connections with. This was necessary in view of the unequal amount military personels at the British disposal in the different regions. For instance, where the conquering power held only limited military means, as with Carter in Yorubaland and Lugard in Hausaland, greater diplomacy was essential. Diplomacy was also employed

partly due to the attitude of the officers toward their mission. Carter and Lugard, thought in terms of a protectorate in which they would change little in the indigenous system, but would merely establish British authority. For instance:

> In 1892, Governor Carter of Lagos created an incident with the Ijebu, which led to a crushing and spectacular military victory designed to overcome resistance, as well as to emphasize its futility to other Yoruba Kingdoms. Since the Awujale (the Oba of the Ijebu) claimed that he had advocated peace but had been overruled by his chiefs in council, it suited Carter's purposes to confirm him in his position, as a direct hint to other Obas that cooperation would not go unrewarded.[25]

This was a sterling example of the British readiness to give allowance to cooperating traditional leaders in Nigerian communities, so that their position as rulers could be secure, provided they were ready to obey colonial dictates. As discussed in the preceding section, the conquest of Ilorin by the British in 1897 placed the community in the hand of the British. In line with the episode of the *Awujale* in Ijebu, the *Emir* of Ilorin, Suleiman (1895-1915) was called back after the bombardment of his palace and a treaty was signed recognising the over lordship of the British.

However, while the *Balóguns* preferred a subservient Emir that would offer little or no resistance to their activities, especially the conquest of more lands for economic gain, the *Emir* was more comfortable with the British authority since it would protect and favour him as the sole traditional authority in the Emirate. For instance, the choice of Suleiman as the successor to *Emir* Momo was based on the *Balóguns*' hope that he would be easy to manipulate when he became Emir. Hermon-Hodge Gazetteer of Ilorin Provine, for instance records:

> Alánàmú, recognising the fact that Suleiman, the son of Aliu, the 4th Emir, was without influence or power, decided to have him made Emir so that his own power might increase in inverse ratio. Alánàmú, thus became more arrogant than ever and virtually ruled Ilorin.[26]

Consequent upon the prevailing circumstance, a dichotomy existed between the Emir and the *Balógun*, each bloc promoting the course of action, which was considered best for safeguarding its interests. As discussed earlier, Ilorin's defeat by the forces of the Royal Niger Company led to the immediate break away of quite a number of territories hitherto paying allegiance to her among the southern Yoruba groups. The *Balóguns* were the most affected by this loss of territories because areas, which they had captured and brought under their own control during the Emirate's wars of expansion, gradually asserted their independence following Ilorin's loss to the British.

Therefore, while the *Emir* was cooperating and friendly with the British, his *Balóguns* vehemently repulsed foreign rule. *Balógun* Ali Inakoju had become the most powerful personality in the town and directed affairs in the Emirate. Indeed, he was very instrumental to the enthronement of *Emir* Suleiman after Momoh had been eliminated in a palace coup. Therefore, Balógun Ali Inakoju had been powerful since the demise of Ali Karara, the Balógun Gambari. In fact, Inakoju Ali could safely be described as the first Yoruba man to dominate Ilorin since the departure of Afonja. He practically ruled Ilorin during his time as *Balógun Agba*. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, Inakoju had become, according to P. Dwyer, almost the actual ruler in Ilorin, having supreme power.[27]

Thus, by the time the first Resident of Ilorin, Honourable D. W Carnegie, who was killed by Tawaris in Kotonkerfi on November, 27th, was appointed in 1900, a woeful condition of affairs existed. The *Emir,* Suleiman, was a mere puppet in the hands of the *Balóguns*, especially, Alánàmú, who was the actual ruler and bitterly hostile to the new government, which he opposed in every way, warning the people that the stay of the 'white man' would be short, and that on their departure, summary vengeance would be meted out to anyone, who dared disobey him. It was also reported that crime was rampant in the city, gangs of robbers entered houses in day light, took what they wanted, and did not hesitate to commit murder. No road was safe for man, woman, or child; no caravan was allowed to pass down to Lagos, neither were traders from the Lagos hinterland allowed to enter Ilorin. The larger towns had been broken by the Royal Niger Company, and the more important chiefs started to raid the smaller ones.[28] This state of affairs certainly had started to affect British interest and they realised the power and influence of the *Balóguns* were too enormous to the disadvantage of the *Emir*, who was cooperating with them.

Thus, the *Balóguns*, headed by Alánàmú, saw the British rule as a direct attack on their authority and influence in Ilorin and were ready to resist such at all cost. Ali Inakoju, the *Balógun* Alánàmú, being the most senior and influential figure at the that time, led the other *Balóguns* in their opposition to the imposition of British imperial rule on Ilorin.[29] Meanwhile *Emir* Suleiman's tolerance for British colonial rule was largely to safeguard his position as the Emir, having been aware of the superior military strength of the British.

5.4 Emir Suleiman's Collaborative Approach towards the British

During the British conquest and occupation, the ability of African traditional authorities to safeguard their territories and retain their positions as leaders was somehow dependent on the

approach they employed against the impending foreign rule. Emir Suleiman of Ilorin was among the very few leaders in the *Caliphate*, who were able to retain their positions after the bombardment of their territories by the British. For the records, quite a number of Emirs were either killed, banished or deposed, following their territories' subjugation. Some of them include Abubakar, *Emir* of Nupe, who was deposed in 1897; Ibrahim, *Emir* of Kontagora, who fled to Zaria in 1904; Zubairu, *Emir* of Yola, who was killed in 1901; Kwassan, *Emir* of Zaria, deposed in 1902; Muhammed Attahiru, *Emir* of Bauchi, who was deposed in 1902; Aliyu, *Emir* of Kano who was deported to Lokoja in 1903 where he died in 1926; Muhammed *Sarkin* Gwandu was deposed in 1906 and Muhammadu, Emir of Hadeija was killed in 1906.[30]

Therefore, *Emir* Suleiman's diplomatic disposition towards the British assisted him in safeguarding his office as Emir of Ilorin after the conquest. For instance, in August of 1900, when Bida was hard pressed by the imperial forces, she sent to the *Emir* of Ilorin for military assistance.[31] However, while the Balóguns and the people of Ilorin were willing to assist Bida, the *Emir*, not only refused to assist but also reported the incident to the Colonial Resident. The *Emir* feared that if the resistance of the people *Balóguns* and people of Ilorin to drive the colonial authority away, which might jeopardise the protection of Bida against the British was successful, they might equally grant assistance to the he had been enjoying from them. The *Emir* also feared that his collaboration with the British would be considered as treachery and could become a case against him.[32]

The *Emir*'s loyalty to the British was so strong that during the 1902-3 Sokoto-Kano expedition, a messenger arrived from Sokoto suggesting that Ilorin should create a diversion in order to help, but the Emir would not listen to the suggestion.[33] The Emir, this time, received a letter from the *Caliph* in Sokoto to cause a disturbance in Ilorin so as to divert the attention of the British army from attacking Sokoto at the time. The *Caliph* possibly made this request in order to have ample time to prepare for the attack of the British, more so Ilorin, being a frontier Emirate, would provide a formidable resistance because of her distance. This was the strategy behind the *Caliph*'s request.

Moreover, it was incumbent on the Emirate to assist in whatever way possible in the defence of the *Caliphate*, under whose umbrella all Emirates were. Furthermore, Ilorin *Emirate* has benefitted from such comradeship and solidarity in the early days of its formation during her wars of survival. It should be recalled that in the 1820s, Abdulsalami, the first *Emir* of Ilorin, in a *watiqat* (message) to the Emir of Gwandu, had reiterated Ilorin's unbridled loyalty to the

leadership in Sokoto and to the cause of the caliphate. He emphasized the Emirate's readiness to do the bidding of the caliphate whenever requested to do so. Thus, the Caliph was confident of Ilorin's support now that the British came calling.

As custom demanded, the *Emir* read the Caliph's letter aloud to the people but as he did in the case of Bida, sent the *Caliph*'s messenger with the letter to the British Resident in Ilorin.[54] However, the *Emir* was not ready to do anything that the British would consider as repugnant to the agreements they reached in the treaty after Ilorin's conquest. His refusal to assist Sokoto in that expedition clearly demonstrated the changing nature of diplomatic strategy of the Ilorin leadership, particularly, the *Emir*, from the opening of the Nineteenth Century. This further widened the cracks between the Emirs and his *Balóguns* who were not in support of collaboration with the British.

After the conquest of Ilorin *Emirate*, the next plan of the British was to initiate a programme for effective administration in line with the political programme of the British government in colonial Nigeria, as clearly illustrated by Lugard's Political Memoranda.[34] The new order was to ensure the preservation of African indigenous political institutions for as long as these institutions did not threaten the process and smooth running of colonial administration. This also became expedient given the unwillingness of the colonial administration to make huge financial commitment to their colonies in Africa.

Furthermore, the availability of elaborate traditional political structure, particularly in the northern part of what later became Nigeria as typified by the *caliphate* and its *Emirates*, provided a solid platform, which favoured the introduction of what the British termed the Indirect Rule system. Indeed, it was more in the interest of the colonial authority to maintain the existing structure, at least to reduce the cost of administering its vast territorial possession in the Nigerian area.

Apart from this, Frederick Lugard, who took over the administration of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from January 1, 1900, immediately realised that the Hausa/Fulani institutions and the Islamic ideas represented by the Sokoto *Caliphate*, needed to be preserved, since these institutions would aid the entrenchment of colonialism in the region.[35] Thus, it is not surprising that the British authorities did not in any way interfere with their religion, that is Islam, and acted with the intention that the *Emirate* institutions would be preserved for peace and stability of the protectorate. Furthermore, the British intent to employ the Indirect Rule, was best suited by the peace and harmony among the vast traditional structure and their

institutions scattered across Northern Nigeria, which had been built by the caliphate and its numerous Emirates.

It was in line with these ideals that the Ilorin *Emirate* was indeed preserved, contrary to the initial fears that it would be destabilised. The first major move, which pointed to British interest in preserving the *Emirate* was the recall and reinstatement of Emir Suleiman after the bombardment of Ilorin in 1897. As Hermon Hodge, Resident of Ilorin Province up to 1918 has remarked, the *Emir'*s power increased considerably and indeed transcended what obtained in the Emirate during the Pre-British era.[36] As noted earlier, the *Balóguns* were quite powerful in the political structure of Ilorin *Emirate* during the Nineteenth Century. Their position as warlords favoured their increasing fame, power, influence and wealth in the Emirate. Furthermore, they had realised their increasing influence in the enthronement and removal of the Emir in the Emirate. *Emir* Momoh, who was, for instance, enthroned by *Balógun* Karara, had his tenure terminated in a conspiracy masterminded by *Balógun* Ali Inakoju, who thereafter favoured the selection of Suleiman as the next *Emir*. Under this kind of arrangement, the *Balóguns* dictated what the *Emirs* could do or could not do. More importantly, the *Balóguns* favoured the continuation of Ilorin's expansion because it was a source of their power and influence in the *Emirate*.[37] They exercised their powers in such a manner that practically, in political terms, placed the Emir in a secondary position.[38]

Their actions, for instance, forced Emir Momo to commit suicide in 1895. His successor, *Emir* Suleiman was indeed regarded as a weakling by the Balógun. In fact, before British conquest, the *Emir* could have readily submitted and avoid open confrontation with the British but for the Balóguns, who insisted on engaging the Europeans militarily. Indeed, having seen the reality of the situation, the *Emir* was to later welcome the invading troops, assuring them of Ilorin's "cooperation within the limits permitted by Islam".[39]

It was only natural that the *Balóguns* resisted European rule because they enjoyed enormous economic benefits from their fief-holding rights over the territories, which they had acquired through conquest. They also used the economic power and influence to sustain their position in the socio-political structure of the *Emirate*. Indeed, the Balóguns and their families were highly respected and revered in the scheme of events in the *Emirate*. All these privileges they knew would reduce drastically as soon as the British rule began, this they were not prepared to accept.

This prevailing reality did not favour the British colonial enterprise because they desired a traditional leadership, which would cooperate and be ready to implement colonial instructions. But the Emir at that material period, apparently, did not possess such overwhelming power and authority because of the enormous influence of his Balóguns.

Consequently, after the conquest, there was the urgent need to address the lopsided status of the political authority structure of the *Emirate* in order to reduce the over bearing powers of the *Balóguns*. This need was further strengthened by the way in which the inhabitants of the non-metropolitan districts happily received the intervention of the British. To them, British rule would reshape the political structure within and outside metropolitan Ilorin and restore the dignity of not only the *Emir*, but also the village heads, who had in the pre-colonial period, been suppressed through the influence of the Balógun and other title holders constituting the Emirate's central authorities.[40]

Therefore, from 1902, the British colonial administration embarked on moves to reduce the powers of the *Balóguns* so as to make the *Emir* superior in rank and authority in Ilorin Emirate. While the *Emir,* as from this period, was placed in the First Grade,[41] the *Balógun* Fulani, Gambari, Alánàmú and Ajikobi, as from July 1903 were placed on the Second Grade by P. M. Dwyer, the Resident of Ilorin Province. Meanwhile, rulers of some towns like Offa, Igbaja, Ajase-Ipo were not graded until 1919.[42]

The singling out of the *Emir* of Ilorin, Suleiman for grading to a First Grade Rule, amply attests to the fact that the British were out to increase the powers of the *Emir* as against the power and influence of the Balóguns, who were deemed to have constituted stumbling blocks in the smooth running of the colonial administration in the Ilorin Emirate.

This friendly disposition, protection and elevation, which the British accorded the *Emir* was not without a reciprocal expectation. The colonial government empowered the *Emir* in order that he could exercise authority on his people and the chiefs to ensure peace and stability in the *Emirate* for their policies to sail smoothly. He was expected to be obedient and display unbridled loyalty to the dictates of the Resident and the British government. In the same vein, the British authorities in Ilorin Province mandated the Balógun and the District Heads in the non-metropolitan areas to abide by the rules and instructions that guided their appointment, especially those of general district administration, tax collection, supervision of road construction and the maintenance of law and order in their areas of jurisdiction within the province in the metropolitan Ilorin; the *Balóguns* were expected to serve in advisory capacity

on the *Emir*'s council and also to ensure that the ideals of the new colonial administration were clearly adhered to in their disposition and were strictly followed by the inhabitants of their respective wards in the town.

This was a complete departure from the Nineteenth Century scenario, when the *Balógun* enjoyed unrestricted influence and authority in the political affairs of the *emirate*. The British colonial government had succeeded in curtailing their powers. With this change of tide, the *Emir*, having become shielded by the British, felt secure and acted with some measure of authority. Hermon Hodge reports that the *Emir*, finding himself backed up by the Resident, broke away from the constraining hands of Alánàmú and other chiefs and began to act up to his position in a way which showed that he realised how the tide had changed. No longer was he a figurehead shaking in his shoes with dread of a sudden death, but an Emir supported by the government, who insisted on the payment of tributes.[43]

5.5 British Divide and Rule Tactics and Imposition of Colonial Rule on Ilorin

By the end of the 1899, the British government decided to abrogate the charter establishing the Royal Niger Company and appointed a High Commissioner to take over the administration of the Nigerian territory. The High Commissioner was to be responsible to the Colonial Secretary in London.[44] From this time, the British government assumed full control over what later became Nigeria. This sudden change in British colonial policy was probably prompted by the perceived extension of influence by some other European powers, specifically the French and the Germans, to parts of the Nigerian territory. These European powers seemed to have decided to challenge the British because they had been claiming a total control of the territory without actually being in control. Thus, in order to act up to the claims, and to effect the agreement reached among the European countries in Berlin between November 1884 and February, 1885, the British government assumed full control of the area.[45]

Another important reason, which necessitated the change of British colonial policy was her economic interest in Africa. The British government, more than ever before, was determined to be involved in dictating the economic situation in their areas of influence in Africa.[46] To do this effectively therefore, there was the need for political administration of the areas. Consequently, the establishment of administrative mechanism that would be used to supervise the traditional administrative system was imperative. This was expedient because the British government had the plan to employ the Indirect Rule system in their administration of the Nigerian areas.

Captain Fredrick Lugard was thus, appointed the High Commissioner over the new Protectorate.[47] As an experienced army officer, who had served the Imperial British East African Company and played a major role in bringing about the British occupation of Uganda and later joined the imperial army of the Royal Niger Company, his appointment clearly demonstrated that the British government was ready to use force, if necessary, to achieve its aim of controlling the areas, which later became Nigeria.[48]

Thus, on January 1, 1900, in the presence of some one thousand troops, commanded by three Colonels; Willcocks, Morland and Lowry Cole, as well as his civilian staff, Lugard proclaimed a Protectorate over the Niger territory at Lokoja.[49] Lugard's public proclamation of Protectorate over the area around and north of the River Niger, was intended to send a powerful message to indigenous rulers in the areas and to cow them from any form of resistance. He was not unaware of the likely reaction of the people, being a predominantly Muslim area. In the bid to create awareness that power had shifted to the Europeans, Lugard translated the proclamation into Arabic and sent copies to the Caliph in Sokoto and the *Emirs* in the *Caliphate.* This message was a call on Muslims to accept the authority of the British, which the people considered as infidels. Lugard was aware that his action would be resisted but he was prepared to enforce the British rule on the *Caliphate.*

His first action, which demonstrated British government intention to rule the people was the appointment of David Carnegie as the Colonial Resident for Ilorin. This was an important development in the history of the *emirate* as it gave the British the opportunity to intervene in the power play among Ilorin's political institutions and to entrench colonial rule. Thus, when David Carnegie arrived in Ilorin in June 1900, the *Balógun Agba,* Ali Inakoju Alánàmú, fully supported by the other *Balóguns* jointly expressed their resentment against him and his authority in the area. On the other hand, the *Emir,* Suleiman was warm towards the colonial Resident.[50] Carnegie observed that the Emir was powerless and that the actual rulers of Ilorin *Emirate* were the *Balógun*; they actually enjoyed good following of the people.[51] There was thus, the need to change this weak status of the *Emir* because even though he was cooperating with colonial officers and their policies, he was not in effective control of the Emirate; the *Balóguns,* who were actually in control and powerful did not support the British.

The Colonial Residency therefore put pressure on the Colonial High Commissioner, Lord Lugard to, as a matter of necessity, support the *Emir* against his chiefs. Carnegie, however died shortly afterwards and was replaced by P. Dwyer. The new Colonial Resident indeed

reported to the High Commissioner that to his personal knowledge, *Balógun* Ali Inakoju Alánàmú was the actual ruler in Ilorin within the immediate past six years. The report was made in July, 1900.[52] The Resident suggested the deposition and deportation of Ali Inakoju, the Balógun Alánàmú, who was spear-heading the resistance against the British rule in the *Emirate*. Dwyer opined that this act would serve as a lesson to the other Balóguns and deter them from further resistance of British rule in the area. [53]

From the foregoing, it is clear that a new dimension to the power tussle had emerged. Before this period, *Emir* Sulaiman threaded softly and acted within the limits of his power, considering the fate, which befell his processor, *Emir* Momo from the *Balóguns*. However, with this new found friendship with the British, the *Emir* seemed to have achieved the much needed support to protect his office. The *Emir*, realising the British interest in him, consolidated his loyalty to them using every opportunity available at the period.

Furthermore, aligning with the British had been of considerable benefit to the *Emir* and he was not ready to allow the power and authority, which had earlier eluded him and his immediate processor to desert him again, having been restored by the colonial authority. The *Emir* was prepared to align with the British, even though it would be to the detriment of his *Balóguns* and his "kinsmen" in Sokoto or elsewhere.

5.6 Deposition of Balógun Ali Inakoju Alánàmú in 1902 and its Impact

In line with the suggestion of the Resident, P. Dwyer that Ali Inakoju the *Balógun* Alánàmú be deposed, the British government began schemes to actualise the plan. Meanwhile, in the reply to P. Dwyer's letter, the High Commissioner, Lugard advised the Resident in Ilorin to tarry in the move against *Balógun* Alánàmú until the arrival of the British forces from Asante. This was to enable the colonial government to have enough military personnel on ground in case of any form of resistance and disturbances in reaction to their proposed action. The Resident was also advised to keep a constant watch on Alánàmú so that he could be charged with an offence that would justify his arrest and also provide rational grounds for his deposition and deportation.[54]

Thus, there began the moves to arrange his arrest, strip him of his traditional title and deport him from Ilorin. The belief of the colonial government was that its action would not only remove the opposition but would also deter other dissident elements or groups from opposing colonial rule.[55] By 1902 therefore, the stage was set and Inakoju Ali, the *Balógun* Alánàmú, became the first victim of the colonial government's schemes to subjugate and subordinate the

Balóguns in Ilorin. S. J. Hodgen narrates that Alánàmú was napped by the traps set by the colonial government. The Balógun was immediately arrested and deported to Jebba, where a contingent of the colonial army was already waiting in preparation for any eventuality that could attend the deposition order.[56] This incident was reported differently in the Gazetteer of Ilorin Province compiled by H. B. Hermon Hodge 1929, where it was stated that:

> Alánàmú's time had come. At an enormous meeting outside the Emir's palace he was judged to be unfit to hold his position, was publicly deposed and stripped of his farms, and left Ilorin for Ogbomoso, where he lived till his death in 1910.[57]

It is worthy of notice that this man, who had ruled Ilorin for nearly twenty-five years, was deposed and disgraced without a single riot or the use of troops. For a man of such power and influence to have been peacefully removed from office only showed the enormity of support, which Emir Suleiman had garnered from the British.

Meanwhile, after the Balógun's deportation, large number of his followers from Ilorin visited him in Jebba to demonstrate their support and loyalty to him, this was more so with the presence of colonial army. Indeed, it was to avoid unnecessary bloodletting that Balógun Inakoju Ali was thereafter moved from Jebba to Lokoja.[58] By this reaction from the people, it was clear to the colonial authority that there was more to the resistance than what could be solved by mere deportation of the *Balógun*. Their initial postulation that his deportation would forestall any further opposition, therefore, soon became displaced. Henceforth, the other *Balóguns* instructed their people to ignore both the Colonial Resident and the Emir by not obeying colonial instructions.[59]

Therefore, in spite of British support, the *Emir* still could not muster enough power needed to control the people, who still held to their trust in the *Balóguns*. It was this scenario that prompted the British to begin to reconsider their policy about forcefully subjugating the *Balógun* to the control of the *Emir*. The reality was that the *Balóguns* too must be carried along, for the British to succeed in their control of Ilorin. It was for this purpose that the British government decided to award some of the *Balóguns* second class (II) chieftaincy status, while the *Emir* was awarded First class status.[60] The Balóguns also reacted to the plan of the British to make the *Emir* the sole authority to whom all the other political institutions in the Emirate would be responsible. This was done by referring all matters relating to the Emirate only to the Emir and the position taken by him on such, was supported by the colonial

administration. In the same manner, all instructions by the colonial administration were only passed through him.

This arrangement completely negated the traditional structure that had been in place in Ilorin *Emirate*, whereby collective leadership rather than sole authority was in operation, which had sustained Ilorin as an entity before the arrival of the British. Through the process of political development and changes in Ilorin Emirate before the arrival of the British, the Emir merely reigned, while the Balóguns ruled.[61] Unlike most emirates in the caliphate, where the emirs were largely the sole authority, only giving part of their powers to their subordinate chiefs, Ilorin had operated a political structure based largely, on a confederacy in which power and authority were shared among the various linguistic groups in the emirate. For instance each of the four *Balóguns* had an administrative unit within the town, while the fifth ward was that of the Emir. The *Magaji* Gari administers the Emir's ward within the Metropolis. At the territorial level, the areas captured or acquired by each of the Balógun automatically fell within his authority, while the territories controlled by the Emir outside the metropolis, were the ones given to him as tributes from the respective Balóguns that led an expedition to acquire the area for Ilorin. In such territories, the *Balógun* or the *Emir*, as the case may be, appointed loyal representatives from among his family members.[62]

With the administrative structure described above, it is clear that the *Emir* and his *Balóguns* had been partners in the administration and ruling of Ilorin Emirate, with the former being the overall head. Indeed, in areas outside the metropolis, the Balógun were in effective control, because they had greater stakes than the Emir. Apart from the political and social influence, which this arrangement brought for them, they enjoyed enormous economic benefits in terms of land tenancy, farming activities and payment of royalties from the benefactors of the lands. With such a scenario, British plan to introduce a sole authority (in person of the emir), in Ilorin *emirate* would affect the privileges, which the *Balóguns* held and enjoyed from their territorial possession. This accounted for their opposition of the plan and apathy towards the British.

Meanwhile, the colonial government remained resolute about its plan to make the *emir* supreme in Ilorin. This would be more in tune with British policy of ruling through the local authority otherwise known as the Indirect Rule. Thus, apart from insisting that the Emir was the only authority from whom it would receive advice on matters relating to the *emirate*, it also ensured that it was only through him that instructions to the people would be passed.[63]

5.7 Reforms and District Administration From 1908

In order to realise their plan of evolving a single supreme authority in Ilorin Emirate, the colonial government, by 1908, had concluded arrangements to reorganise the territories under Ilorin Emirate. The territories were grouped into eighteen (18) units called Districts. These Districts were Akanbi, Afon, Owode, Ajasse, Igbaja, Offa, Otun, Onire, Osi, Shonga, Share, Iponrin, Lanwa, Ejidogari, Oloru, Ipaye, Malete and Onire.[64] This new colonial arrangement henceforth superseded the initial structure; therefore, some of the areas hitherto under the control of the *Balóguns* were taken away by the new structure, all in a bid to increase the status and powers of the *Emir*.

As Hermon Hodge, Resident of Ilorin Province up to 1918 had remarked, the Emir's power increased considerably beyond what obtained in the pre-British era.[65] He was made the head of all the indigenous political institutions and his authority covered the entire Province including the non-metropolitan districts. It was for this reason that some *Obas* and Chiefs in the Southern districts of Ilorin Emirate failed, later on, in their agitations to be integrated into the main-stream Yoruba group of south-western Nigeria. Based on historical antecedent of the fact that they had been under the control of the Ilorin Emirate, the colonial government insisted that their districts be kept within the jurisdiction of the *Emir* and the Ilorin Provincial authority.[66]

Meanwhile, the colonial government soon saw the need to make further reforms in the area of district administration. By 1916 for instance, the Acting Resident of Ilorin Province, Philip Lansdale, informed the Secretary of the Northern Provinces that agents, who represented the interest of the Emir and his chiefs in the districts of Ilorin such as *Ajia, Mogaji, Daudu, Alangua,* as they were called, were not conducting the affairs of these districts in a manner that would benefit the British Crown. The request of the Acting Resident was based on series of political crises experienced in Ilorin Province at the period, which were mainly caused by the excessive activities of the provincial agents. Hence, to make these Districts Heads more responsible to the colonial administration, the Acting Resident requested that it was necessary to redefine their functions and responsibilities in line with the desire and policies of the British colonial government.[67]

With these resultant disturbances over the attitude of the District agents, (the most prominent being the one at Onire district, where the local population violently attacked the Ilorin agents and other officials of the districts owing to their over-bearing attitude in 1916), the Northern

provinces came up with a proclamation, which stated, among others, that: One, only responsible and loyal individuals should be appointed as district agents in any of the Northern Provinces. Two, such agents should be made to be resident officers in their areas of jurisdiction. This implied that the district agents of the Emirate would henceforth reside in the districts where they had been assigned, unlike the pre-colonial situation when they were non-resident officials. Three, the agents would be made accountable for their roles in, and management of the affairs of their respective districts. Four, they would be responsible for general the administration of the districts and their activities would be closely guided or supervised by British officers whose decision would be binding on these district agents. Five, the colonial agents would co-operate with the village and district heads to ensure that agriculture, trade and commerce were promoted, maintenance of law and order was ensured, and taxes and other colonial exactions or levies were duly collected from all taxable adults residents in these districts and promptly sent to the provincial headquarters for the effective running of the administration.[68]

For Ilorin *Emirate*, these reforms in district administration brought about some improvements in the running of the provincial administration. It certainly brought the agents closer to the people since they were now resident in their places of assignment, which in turn gave them better understanding of the disposition and character of the local populace. It is also observed that, as a result of the reforms, the powers and authority of the *Balógun*, most especially in the area of district administration, became seriously checked.[69] Fundamentally, the 1916 reforms provided ample opportunity for the colonial government to further reduce the powers and influence of the *Balóguns* with regard to exercising authority over territories outside metropolitan Ilorin.

Through these reforms, not only was the political authority of the Balóguns affected, as the jurisdiction they previously held became seriously reduced, they also lost enormous economic gains in those areas. It became quite difficult and in most cases, impossible, for the Balóguns to derive tributes from any of those areas of the *Emirate* without the consent of the Emir. The *Emirate* equally began, through the process, to bear the direct burden of British District administration in the province. This was a complete departure from what obtained before the reforms of 1916, when the *Balóguns* enjoyed unrestricted political and economic control over areas, which they acquired through military conquest. Furthermore, the reforms made the resident agents to be more responsible and loyal to the British administration.[70]

Table 3: Reorganisation of Districts and Villages in Ilorin Emirate under Colonial Rule in 1910

District	No. of Villages	District Head
Akanbi	8	Ahmadu Dan Alege (*Balógun* Alánàmú)
Afon	9	Dasuki (Son of *Balógun* Fulani)
Owode	10	Not known
Ajasse	16	Ahmadu (*Olupo* of Ajasse)
Igbaja	7	Not indicated
Offa	11	Baiya (*Olofa*)
Otun	7	Sani (*Ore* of Otun)
Omu	7	Abdulkadir
Osi	5	Yesufu
Iporin	8	Atairu (*Sarkin* Gambari)
Lanwa	13	Abdulkadir
Ejindogari	14	Not indicated
Oloru	5	Haruna
Paiye	7	Moma Jimoh
Oniri	9	Abdulkadir
Malete	7	Not indicated

Source: Banwo, A. O. "The Colonial State and Ilorin Emirate Economy: 1900-1960" Ph.D. thesis, University of Ilorin, 1998. NAK ILOPROF A. M 345/1911 Ilorin Provincial Report No. 55, December Quarter 1910 by Resident George Anderson, NAK ILOPROF SNP10, 458p / 1907, Ilorin Province Half Yearly Report No. 84, June Quarter by K. V. Elphinstone. Also

5.8 Colonial Taxation and Reaction of Ilorin People

The British colonial authority paid a considerable attention to the collection of taxes from its territories because this was fundamental to the running of its government in Nigeria. The administration of tax policy in Ilorin *Emirate* was done with the use of indigenous administrative structure and the Native Authority's officials. This was important because the colonial government, by default made the people of Ilorin, and indeed other provinces of Northern Nigeria to be responsible for financing the running of the government.[71] This tax policy was in line with the British colonial policy of making colonies to be self-sustaining and responsible for the cost of their administration.

Meanwhile, prior to the intervention of the British, the *Emirates* of Northern Nigeria, especially during the Nineteenth Century, were largely familiar with tax payments by their inhabitants. For instance, in each of the classical Emirates, various forms of taxes such as *Jangali*, that is cattle tax, *Jizya*, poll tax and so on, were levied on the people by the respective *Emirates*.[72] In the Ilorin Emirate of Nineteenth Century, the situation was similar to what obtained in the other *Emirates* with regard to taxation, where taxes of various kinds were imposed on the inhabitants. Since the Ilorin Emirate's aristocracy was not directly involved in production, it virtually depended on taxes, booties and tributes from others in the society.

Scholars on Ilorin history like R. J. Garvin, A. O' Hear, and A. O. Banwo, have made similar submissions on the contribution of taxes to the Nineteenth Century Ilorin economy through both internal and external trades. The authors noted that in the Ilorin metropolis, every occupation had its own "*Babakekere*," who was in charge of collecting taxes and tributes from those involved in the job. Vocations such as weaving, beads-making, blacksmithing and pottery stood out as important crafts, which enjoyed the patronage of these *Babakekere* in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century. In the opinion of Banwo, the *Balóguns*, who were in charge

of each ward in the city where most of these productive activities were undertaken, also used their administrative control to extract surplus from the people.[73] In fact, O'Hear and Lewiston maintain that everyday business of government and commerce in Ilorin required the establishment of relations of clientage. These brokers constituted an unofficial extension of the political system and were agents through whom capital was syphoned off from the productive sector into the hands of the political elite.[74]

With these highlights in taxes in the Nineteenth Century, Ilorin *Emirate*, no doubt, had been familiar with taxation before colonial administration commenced in the area. The people had been used to one form of exaction or the other in the form of market dues, tolls at the city gates from caravans moving into, and out of the metropolis, and taxes paid by craftsmen on their wares.

However, with the commencement of colonial rule, a new dimension to tax collection emerged in Ilorin. The Emir's toll stations at the city gates were dismantled and in their place, colonial administrative officers were given the mandate of collecting dues and reporting directly to the Resident.[75] Taxes were therefore levied on various economic groupings such as tailors, weavers, kola-nut sellers and so on, based on estimated income.[76] Beginning from 1903, the colonial government, under the authority of the Resident, mandated all village and district heads through their District Officer (DO), to open tax register in every community or compound, which should contain the list of all taxable adults.[77]

These registers were to be used for only one year while new ones were to be opened for every subsequent year. The colonial government also put measures in place to minimise tax evasion. To achieve this, eligible tax payers were encouraged to engage in profitable economic ventures, such as cash crop production, which would naturally enhance their economic status and invariably provide them enough returns in terms of profit through which they could easily pay their taxes. To this end, farmers paid less tax as a way of encouraging them to be more involved in cash crop production.[78]

Meanwhile, disturbances were recorded over the payment of taxes in some places in the *Emirate*. Earlier in 1907 and 1913, incidents of disturbance had been recorded in Ilorin over the payment of taxes to the new colonial government. In 1907, peace was threatened when *Balógun* Ajikobi, Biala, *Magajin* Gari and Ajayi Ogidiolu, the last representative of the old raiders, held very great powers, their followers, outnumbering those of the Emir and other

Balóguns.[79] By passive resistance, these three men had always constituted a stumbling block to progress, viewing with intense dislike the attempts of the Emir to assert his authority. All efforts to win over these agitators as loyal supporters of the Emir and government resulted only in the prevention of open acts of hostility. At the end of 1906 and the beginning of 1907, frequent murders were reported at Olofinganga and Bode Saadu; over twenty men and women being shot down in broad daylight by the hunters at the instigation of these three men. The *Emir'*s and Resident's messengers were openly flouted and threatened. According to the Hermon-Hodge:

> The hunters, some 600 in number then collected in Ilorin city, and the whole town was in an uproar, the three ringleaders urging the hunters to attack the Residency, throughout, the Emir, though powerless to put down the riot, remained absolutely loyal to the Government.[80]

Eventually seventy-five rank and file, under Lieutenant Dillon, arrived at Ilorin and this largely allayed the excitement. The three individuals were arrested and sentenced to deportation, and a large number of the hunters were tried for murder, three being convicted. The reason for this riot could not have been unconnected with the stern resistance to the colonial rule, particularly, British policy to increase the powers of the *Emir* much to the detriment of the *Balóguns*.

Another resistance to colonial administration's policy worthy of note was recorded in 1913. The early part of that year was marked by somewhat alarming disturbances in and around Ilorin town, ostensibly due to the increase of the urban taxation.[81] The new arrangement of the *Emirate* into coordinate districts had not yet effectively taken the place of the old family organisation; the power of the "*Baba Kekere*" had been largely broken, but not properly replaced by district machinery. Biala, *Balógun* Ajikobi, had been allowed to return to Ilorin during 1910, and in order to try and regain his lost power, had been engaged in incessant disaffection among demoralised anti-Fulani Yoruba sections. Rioting occurred at Onire, and all the district chiefs fled to Ilorin city for protection. According to the documentation of Hermon Hodge, in the spring of 1913, writes another highly-placed eye-witness of the events:

> The town of Ilorin refused to pay tax, and two District Officers, one in Ilorin and one outside in the districts, were mobbed and pelted with mud and stones. The reason for this violent reaction was that the populace in general did not approve the manner in which funds of the Native Treasury were being expended, and therefore refused to pay tax, that is to contribute the money from which such expenditure was made.[82]

This agitation over taxation provided ground for some aggrieved members of the Ilorin political class to vent their dissatisfaction with prevailing arrangement, where some people felt they should be part of the new structure under the British. For instance, the chief complaint in the 1913 riot was that many members of the ruling Fulani dynasty were receiving handsome salaries, whereas none of the old Yoruba families, who assisted in establishing the *Emirate* held any office or received any salary from the public Treasury. It was felt that, though the Fulani were in some sense conquerors of the country, they had in fact received great assistance in founding the Ilorin *Emirate* from Afonja and other Yoruba chiefs, who had seceded from Old Oyo at the time of the Fulani Jihad. In addition to this, Native Treasury money was being spent on buying horses for European officers to hire and use when on tour. These horses usually died very soon, and thus, as a matter of fact, the Ilorin Native Administration was bearing expenditure, which should rightly have fallen on the Government.

5.9 British Reaction to Grievances over Taxation and Expenditure

In political term, the areas hitherto controlled by the *Balóguns* had been restructured in the 1916 reforms; consequently, the tributes and royalties, which came from them, had also stopped. Most of the areas, by colonial arrangement, were now directly under the authority of the Emir, who in turn carried out colonial instructions in them for the British. Thus, this new political arrangement brought economic loss to the *Balógun* and other individuals, who held authority in the areas before. As earlier explained, grievances over this system largely accounted for the reactions of Balóguns Alánàmú Inakoju Ali and Balógun Ajikobi Biala, who were deposed and deported respectively in 1902, and 1907. Those grievances over colonial taxation climaxed in the 1913 Tax Riot, which brought the British colonial government and the Ilorin populace into conflict.[83]

Among the remote causes of the 1913 tax riot was the dissatisfaction of some sections of the Yoruba in Ilorin, particularly the ex-*Balógun* Ajikobi, Biala, who remained disgruntled over the treatment he got from the colonial authority; having been deposed in 1907 but later pardoned and allowed to return to Ilorin. He maintained his anti-colonial posture and took advantage of the prevailing resentment of the people against the tax imposed by the colonial government to encourage civil disobedience. Furthermore, Biala condemned the Fulani hegemony, which he blamed for collaborating with the British in imposing a harsh tax regime on the people. [84]

Another remote causes of the grievances could be seen in the reaction of Islamic clerics, who at the period in Ilorin, held a prime position, due to their level of scholarship and the respect, which they commanded in the society. The scholars opposed the tax system, which they saw as contravening the elements of equity and fairness as enshrined in the *Sharia*.[85] According to Hermon-Hodge's documentation in the gazetteer of Ilorin Province, one Imam Omali appeared to be the leader of the non-payment of tax movement. He was said to have enjoyed great influence in the town at the period, and was alleged to be at the bottom of the whole trouble.[86]

To arrest this situation, the British authority devised a means to pick the man considered to be the kingpin of the agitation, *Imam* Omali (also referred to *Liman* Omali). It was apparent that if the person of this *Liman* Omali could be secured without serious fighting or riot in the town, the situation would be considerably eased. This was effectively carried out by Mr. (later Colonel) Burnet, C. B, who abducted the *Liman* from his bed at night and took him to the Government station without anybody in Ilorin knowing anything about it.[87] This forced the Ilorin people to reconsider their stand on the non-payment of colonial tax. On necessary assurance being given, taxes were, henceforward, successfully collected, and an inquiry was made by the commissioner for Native Revenue as to the grievances, which had caused the outbreak.

This means that the Colonial Government had succeeded in tactically and forcefully imposing its tax system on Ilorin. They had, once again, displayed their skill in dealing with local resistance to their policies by targeting influential personalities who were considered antagonists of colonial policies in the Ilorin, so that other potential dissidents would be intimidated.

Another important step taken by the colonial authority in reducing the tension caused by these grievances, particularly as it concerned ethno-political relations, was to appoint some members of the Afonja lineage into the Fulani-led administration. Part of the grievances, was that none of the Yoruba families, who assisted to form the *Emirate* held any office or received any salary from the Public Treasury. Thus, the Colonial Government, following the inquiry into the grievances, recommended and approved that the House of Afonja, represented by Mogaji Are and Baba Isale, should always form part of the *Emir*'s council, and receive adequate salaries from the Public Treasury.[88] The colonial government achieved this with the creation of *Magaji* Are in 1913 with an instrument of office that gave the holder the deserved

status. The *Mogaji* Are, like the *Emir*, was placed on an annual salary and was empowered to administer certain sections of Ilorin such as *Idi-Ape*, *Sabo-Oke*, *Isale-Asa* and so on.

This action of the British was significant, given the historical antecedent of the Yoruba group in the foundation of Ilorin and its *emirate*. Unlike the *emirates* of the north, Ilorin was a heterogeneous community, in which the Balóguns, two of whom were Yoruba, played an important role in its formation. Generally, the Yoruba group in whose environment the Ilorin *Emirate* emerged, contributed greatly to its success. Particularly, the Afonja family was not represented in the administration of the *emirate* for the greater part of the pre-colonial period, which was part of the complaints to the colonial authority. Thus, the 1913 reform for the restructuring of the *Emir*'s council was fundamental in balancing the ethnic composition of the Ilorin *Emirate* leadership and helped in quelling further agitations, which relatively promoted better inter group relation and harmony.

5.10 British Involvement in the Struggle for Succession in Ilorin Emirate

One of the high points of British colonial activities in Ilorin was their involvement in the local politics in the emirate. Already, they had used divide and rule strategy to aggravate the crack among the ruling class in the emirate in order to facilitate their colonial objectives. As paid agents of the colonial authority, the *Emir* and his chiefs soon realised that for as long as they lived up to the expectations of the colonial administration, they would conveniently retain their positions and possibly determine the set of individuals that would succeed them into such offices.[89]

This implied that the British had become a major participant in the appointment of traditional rulers in Ilorin, a departure from what obtained before the conquest in 1897. More fundamentally, the traditional authorities had realised the prestige and importance of their position, and from that point began intense rivalry and competition with other eligible candidates both during the selection and also to retain such positions for themselves and their lineage. This largely took the form of rigorous lobbying of kingmakers as well as colonial officers. This indicate that unlike the pre-British period, when the selection of a new *Emir* was exclusively the duty of the Emirate Council, the process henceforth became strongly influenced by the British in consideration of the candidate that would favour the realisation of their colonial objectives. This development further increased the division among the ruling houses and further reduced the strength of opposition against British rule in the Emirate.

For instance, in 1915, when *Emir* Bawa (1915-1919) was to ascend the throne, he, as a Prince, engaged in serious underground campaign among the principal kingmakers and indeed convinced the then Resident of the Province that he would live up to the expectation of the colonial government if chosen as the *Emir*.[90] Bawa had earlier demonstrated his readiness to serve the colonial government, when in 1913, he was appointed by *Emir* Suleiman to head the team that engaged in the distribution of commodities in the metropolitan Ilorin as a result of the serious famine, which ravaged the entire Northern Nigeria in that year.[91] This assignment gave Bawa the opportunity to prove his managerial and administrative capability, which made him to be liked by the Resident. Thus, at the demise of *Emir* Suleiman in 1915, Shuaib Bawa had become the best known and most popular prince in the Abdulsalam lineage, whose turn it was to be the new *emir*. His selection as *emir* was therefore unanimous.[92]

However at the death of *Emir* Bawa, whose reign was short, the British intervened in the succession arrangement, which had since, remained a reference point in the Ilorin *Emirate* history. Succession to the position of Emir had earlier been alternated between the Abdulsalam and Shitta lineage, the two being the prominent sons of Sheik Alimi and by right, the heirs to the leadership of the Emirate. With the demise of Bawa, who belonged to Abdulsalami's line, it was expected that a prince from Shitta's line would easily be favoured for enthronement, but this was not to be. On the death of *Emir* Shuaibu Bawa in November 1919, the collateral succession from house to house was broken and Abdulkadir, Bawa's son (at that time District Head of Lanwa), was chosen in preference to a prince of the Suleiman lineage.[93]

Meanwhile, by the time of *Emir* Bawa's death in 1919, a prince Muhammadu Woru of Shitta's line expected that his candidature for the position of Emir was certain and incontestable based on the collateral house to house succession. However, his selection was not supported for certain reasons. First, it was alleged that Woru was instrumental to the unpleasant treatment meted out to the *Oke-Imole* based Muslim leaders during the 1913 tax riot.[94] The then Acting Resident, K. V Elphinstone further maintained that Woru's administrative style as District Head was a negation of colonial expectation in the district administration. In fact, Woru was deposed as the District Head of Lanwa in 1913, based on the unfavourable report prepared by Elphinstone.[95] Even with these allegations against him, Woru was still hopeful of being enthroned based on the usual traditional arrangement on ground.

The Colonial Resident was however pleased with the son of late *Emir* Bawa, whose tenure had witnessed considerable level of cooperation between Ilorin aristocracy and the colonial

government. The British had been impressed with the peace and good-will, which late Emir Bawa had cultivated with the colonial authority and would want somebody that would sustain the trend. For these reasons, the Resident, in total disregard of the existing formula of rotation, recommended the candidature of Abdulkadir, son of Emir Bawa, to occupy the throne.[96]

It would be safe therefore to argue that the prevailing situation in Ilorin since the British conquest, strongly indicated that the nature of relations continued to change in line with colonial interests and dictates. The town's "*warfare*" or better still, conflicts, became further internalised between the two leagues of authority that controlled the *Emirate*. These were the *Emir* and his chiefs; and relations between the duo was largely that of suspicion. The British were amply favoured by this deteriorating condition in the initial mutual relation between the Emir and his chiefs, and they employed their strategy of divide and rule much to a resounding success.

As they did in many parts of pre-colonial Africa, British strategy in Ilorin was to speedily use their colonial mechanisms, policies and proclamations to become involved and relevant in the traditional administration of Ilorin *Emirate,* including determining who became the *Emir* as witnessed in the enthronement of Abdulkadri, son of late *Emir* Bawa in 1919. Abdulkadri was made to succeed his father, in spite of the standing rule of succession, courtesy of Colonial authority's interest in him.

This shows the prime regard the British henceforth gave to colonial consideration in the affairs of the *Emirate*. It also indicates that even though the British employed the Indirect Rule system, its operation was fundamentally a colonial arrangement, with passive participation of African leaders to carry out colonial instructions. Thus, the British selected only cooperating Africans as traditional leaders regardless of the extant rules of succession, as witnessed in the Ilorin *Emirate* in that period.

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74. O'Hear, A. and Lewiston, L. Y. "Political and Commercial Clientage in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin" in African Economiic History, No. 15, 1986, in African Studies Programme, at the University of Wisconson Madison. http//www. Jostor org/stable/360154o. Accessed on 14/07/2017, pp. 69-83.
75. *Ibid*.
76. *Ibid*.
77. See NAK ILOR PROF, NO. 702/1912, "Tax instructions, Ilorin Province, 1910-1912" Pp. 2-5.
78. Banwo, A. O. "The Colonial State and Ilorin Emirate, 1900-1960", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ilorin, 1998. P. 221.
79. *Ibid.*
80. NAK/SNP/1511 H.C. to P. Dwyer, September, 1900.
81. *Ibid*.
82. *Ibid*.
83. Jimoh, L. A. K. *Ilorin: the Journey so Far*…, p. 237.
84. Hermon-Hodge, H. B. *Gazetteer of Ilorin…*p. 78, see also Olumoh, A. L. *Managing Ethno-political Relations in Nigeria the Ilorin Example 1823-2003.*
85. For details of the Tax Riot of 1913 in Ilorin, see L.A.K Jimoh, *Ilorin: The Journey so Far*…, p. 237.
86. Hermon-Hodge, H. B. *Gazetteer of Ilorin…* p. 80.
87. *Ibid*.
88. *Ibid*, p. 81.
89. Olumoh, A. L. "*Managing Ethno-Political Relations in Nigeria*…., p. 223.
90. Interview with *Alhaji* Abdullahi Ajia, *Magaji* Kijan Compound Oke- Apomu, Ilorin. Aged 82 September, 2016. Also see Olumoh, A. L. *Managing Ethno-Political Relations in Nigeria…*, p. 224.
91. Jimoh, L. A. K. *Ilorin: the Journey so Far*…pp. 241-245, also in Hermon-Hodge, H. B. *Gazetteer of Ilorin*…p. 81.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*
94. Olumoh, A. L. "*Managing Ethno-Political Relations in Nigeria…* p. 225.

95. For details of Elphinstone's report on Muhammadu Woru, see NAK ILORIN PROF "Assistant Resident's Turning Notes, Ilorin Province, 1913".
96. *Jimoh, L.A.K. Ilorin: The Journey so Far…,* p. 244.

CHAPTER SIX

IMPACT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY MILITARY AND WARFARE ON ILORIN

6.1 Impact of Migration and Ethnic Plurality on Ilorin Military

Ilorin's description by some writers[1] as a "cultural melting point" is largely connected with the migration and settlement of different groups with distinct cultural backgrounds in the town. Indeed, Ilorin's multi-cultural setting had great impact on her economic, social, political, technological and military spheres. This argument is based on the reality that several personalities, who dominated the town's history in the Nineteenth Century, migrated there from different locations. The peculiarity of Ilorin lies in the cohabitation of Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Arab, Kemberi, the Bariba and Kanuri; and with time, the emergence of a single language and culture among these ethnically different groups, even though each group still made passive reference to its origin for historical purposes.

Ilorin's inhabitants have been categorised into four groups. The first group comprises natives of those villages that are collectively known as Ilorin like Idi-Ape, Okelele, Oko-Erin, Oloje, Ogidi, Oke-Suna, and Gambari. They are mostly Yoruba, Hausa and Fulani. The second group comprised natives of the villages surrounding Ilorin, who migrated into the area to swell her population, especially after Abdulsalami's assumption to power as *Emir*. The category

included mostly Yoruba natives from nearby villages such as Amoyo, Kuwo, Reke, Laduba, Ogele, Ejidogari, Ila-Oja, Ogbondoroko and several others in what later became Asa and Moro Local Government Areas of Kwara State. These were people, who supported the town during the military struggles against Old Oyo. It is pertinent to state here that this second category of people was largely incorporated into Ilorin to beef-up the town's military strength. Indeed, part of the strategies employed by *Ààre* Afonja, was to populate Ilorin with people of surrounding towns in a bid to build a formidable military base in the town. This strategy secured most of the areas in the second category and during wars of defence and expansions, the Balóguns consolidated the gains by sustaining the areas under Ilorin suzerain.

The third group comprised those who followed Sheik Alimi and his two children, Abdulsalam and Shitta to Ilorin, and those who migrated to join them later. This category was of mainly Hausa, Fulani, Gobir, Kanembu, Bariba and Nupe origin. Few of them were however, Yoruba and even non-Nigerians like Malians, who resided at a place, called *Oke-Imole* in the town. The fourth group encompassed Yoruba who had come to settle in Ilorin mainly from the towns of Old Oyo Empire such as Iseyin, Saki, Ikoyi, Igboho and Oyo itself. For example, the first *Balógun* Ajikobi had followed Sheik Alimi to Ilorin from Iseyin, his home town, while the first Magaji Ojuekun came to meet the Sheik when he had already settled at Ilorin from Kuwo, his village. Some of them were captives from previous war between Ilorin and the Yoruba, while several of them were adventurers to Ilorin. This group included Yoruba-speaking people from nearby Igbomina, Ekiti and Ibolo areas.[2]

This categorisation and conglomeration of ethnic groups found expression in Ilorin's military system of the Nineteenth Century. Since the days of Afonja, Ilorin's mission to break away from Old Oyo, had great impact on its people. Weapons and styles of military enterprise of the Yoruba, who constituted the major fraction of the population, had been prevalent in Ilorin. These were probably combined with the weapons and tactics of the other tribes to achieve military advantage over their opponents. Furthermore, even though weapons of warfare among pre-colonial Africans, for the greater part of the Nineteenth Century, remained largely uniform, variations were noticeable in their style of manufacture and usage. It is for this assortment in weaponry that ethnic plurality was of great advantage to Ilorin military. For instance, Nupe's martial arts, Bariba skills in Archery, Hausa ability in the use of swords, Borno (Kanuri) excellence in spears and lances were all combined with the military potentials of the Yoruba to enhance Ilorin success in several battles.

In the same vein, it was not unlikely that the military secrets of the different groups might be leaking to the Ilorin authorities through their people, who migrated to Ilorin, particularly the Yoruba. Various spiritual elements like amulets, bindings and other related aids for warriors were also made available in Ilorin due to the multitude of ethnic groups in the town. The spiritual weapons of each tribe found usage during warfare. This improved the spirit of interdependence in military weaponry, because, each time there was an encounter, warriors would pool weapons and charms to prosecute the battle. Ethnic consideration also had impact on the Ilorin military leadership system in the Nineteenth Century. For instance, two of Ilorin's military commanders (*Balóguns*) were appointed from within the Yoruba groups, these were Balóguns Alánàmú and Ajikobi, while *Balógun* Gambari represented the Fulani. This is in addition to numerous fief-holding privileges accorded several people to maintain the ethnic balance in the *Emirate*.[3]

Ethnic diversity also had significant impact on Ilorin's military technology in the early period. For instance, blacksmithing, a popular Nineteenth Century craft in the town, was traced back to the migration of groups into the town. Several blacksmiths in Ilorin give accounts of their progenitors' movement to the city during the days of *Ààre* Afonja and the period of Sheik Alimi and Abdulsalami. This became more noticeable with the establishment of the *Emirate* system and Ilorin's military enterprise at the period. Smiths started first, with the fabrication of farm implements and later, with constant warfare, weapons of war such as spears, lances, swords, arrows and so on, became more pronounced. Some of the earliest blacksmith locations in Ilorin are Bamdele compound near Idi-Ape, Ojuekun, Sefura, Oloje, Pakata, Awodi, Isale Koto, Okelele, and Ásúde. Indeed, the vocation survived into the period of colonialism and even beyond and thus, remained a popular heritage of these families.

Furthermore, with the cavalry becoming a distinct and dominant feature of the Ilorin military, nurturing of horse and its accoutrement became a more visible aspect of military technology in the town. While the smiths, who fabricated iron implements for the warriors were mostly Yoruba of Old-Oyo extraction, those who worked on horse tending equipment and cavalry accoutrements were of Nupe and Hausa origin. Indeed, blacksmithing had a geographical spread in Ilorin because its products were of a much more general nature, which served both agricultural and military functions. On the other hand, the horse (or cavalry) technology, being a more specialized aspect, was a more restricted art, and thus engaged by people in specific locations in the town, mostly Nupe people found in Pataki, Gambari area of the town.[4]

Moreover, the influx of different groups motivated the widening of the scope of indigenous technology generally because every new group came with its style and skill, which ultimately stimulated the growth of their activities. Specifically, blacksmithing grew into a popular vocation in Ilorin with this influx. Like in most parts of Yorubaland, it served as an important support industry to warfare in the supply of iron weapons to warriors in Ilorin. Indeed, each society had its own peculiar style of blacksmithing, at least for the supply of farm implement and other needs. With time, Ilorin became a popular destination for the supply of these iron implement to farmers in the neighbouring community, especially those who worked on the Ilorin farms located outside the metropolis. Paraphernalia of military like the spiritual and metaphysical weapons, charms-makers, herbalists, clerics and the likes, also became pronounced in the town, due to the prevalence of warfare and multitude of groups.

Islamic clerics were patronised for protective items based on the use of Quran verses and chapters, which warriors believed served as effective spiritual back-up to their physical weapons. This inter-dependency between warriors and charms makers also enhanced the level of socialisation among the diverse groups in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century. Muslim clerics and charms-makers made brisk business from the patronage they enjoyed from warriors and they were quite prominent in the city. It has been emphasized, for instance, that Muslim charms had been highly prized since the days of Afonja and this tradition continued among Ilorin warriors throughout the Nineteenth Century.

Likewise, from the political point of view, it was important for the *Kákánfò* to establish connections with as many different categories of people within the Aláàfinate as possible, and to endeavour to obtain their help in the subversion of the *Aláàfin*'s power. It is also possible that Afonja was interested in contacts with the Muslims of Nupeland. Some Muslims from Oke-Imole, Ilorin, claim that their ancestors came from Old Mali to settle in the town (Ilorin).[5] Riyan believed that commercial network of the *Males* may have extended into Old Oyo Empire through which they helped to carry Islam into Yorubaland.[6] For instance, Solagberu, the Yoruba Muslim, was described as a rich man and a chief, who first settled at Kuwo and later at *Oke-Suna*. It is possible that since 1817, the majority of the Muslims of present town of Ilorin (which include the site of Oke-Suna), have been Yoruba.

A large contingent was contributed to this Ilorin Muslim population by the *Imale*. According to Danmole, the name *Imale* in the context of Ilorin's early Nineteenth Century history, seems largely to apply to those Yoruba whose allegiance to Islam could be traced back to the Muslim

communities that had lived in some cases possibly for several generations, under the authority of the *Aláàfins*.[7] However, it seems likely that after the beginning of the internal crisis in the *Alaafinate* and in the new situation created by Afonja's powerful challenge to the *Aláàfin*, certain sections of the *Alaafinate*'s Muslim traders could not but review their traditional attitudes. They therefore considered the option of movement out of the Old Oyo, with the possible hope that Afonja would be victorious. In the same vein, it was also in Afonja's interest to maintain good contacts with Muslims for the benefits he stood to gain from them. From the military point of view, for instance, Muslim trade was a source of horses and Muslim slaves from the north had traditionally provided skilled cavalry men and grooms to Oyo's army.[8]

Therefore, aspects of Ilorin military such as recruitment of soldiers and weaponry were positively influenced by this relations with the Muslim traders and slaves. Furthermore, the dwindling fortune of Old Oyo, to some extent, contributed to the peopling of Ilorin as part of its inhabitants were said to have migrated in different directions, some to the south, some to Igboho, while some migrated to Ilorin to begin a new life. Ilorin's military strength in the Nineteenth Century was thus, largely enhanced by this heterogenous nature of her society, which not only increased its numerical strength through recruitment but also influenced the supply of weapons to beef-up its military arsenal.

6.2 Migration and Military Leadership

There is ample evience to support the significance of immigration and permanent settlement of persons, who contributed immensely to Ilorin military in the Nineteenth Century. For instance, *Ajia* Gajo was a migrant from the vicinity of what later became Sokoto. Gajo and his younger brother, Kure Ahmeeda, were members of the entourage, which accompanied Sheik Alimi to Ilorin. The two brothers were said to have lived at the present site of *Ile Olayomi* near *Balógun* Fulani's residence before they moved to Gambari area and settled in a place subsequently called *Ita Ajia* where their descendants continued to live.[9] Gajo, who was a principal lieutenant of Ali *Balógun* Gambari and an accomplished warrior was appointed Ajia by Emir Abdulsalami. When he died, he was succeeded by Kure, his younger brother. However, by the time Kure died, there was no direct male descendant of his or of Gajo, his late brother that was of age to assume the title of Ajia. The title was therefore, cenfered on Opele, who was a Yoruba in-mate of Ajia Gajo's household.

Opele came to *Ajia* Gajo in Ilorin by the grace of *Esinkin Agbenawo-Oju-egun* of Omu-Aran. As an in-mate of the household, Opele was faithful to *Ajia* Gajo. He was also described as a dependable lieutenant to the *Ajia* in battle. These two attributes endeared him to the entire *Ajia* household and stood him in good stead for appointment as the *Ajia* Opele in succession to Ajia Kure Ahmeeda. The title has since remained with the Opele lineage while Kure Ahmeda family, retained the title of *Kure.*

Usman Ajikobi, migrated to Ilorin as a follower of Sheik Alimi from Iseyin, he was also a steadfast follower and got rewarded with the *Balógun* Ajikobi title. The progenitor of the *Maiyaki* also came with the Sheik and participated in many battles, having migrated to Ilorin from Kebbi area. He was also rewarded with the title of *Maiyaki* and relished the use of Kaho, a special horn with spiritual content blown to render their opponents powerless.

Yesufu Alánàmú, migrated to Ilorin from Old Oyo, first settling at Reke before eventually joining the army being raised by *Emir* Abdulsalami to face the joint Oyo-Bariba insurgents, who were, at the period, making frantic efforts to re-capture Ilorin. Alánàmú, who was so called for his special whip, which was a spiritually prepared weapon for capturing the enemy, par+ticipated actively in the battle of *Ìtakúdímí* in the Eleduwe War, where the dreaded Bariba war Monger, *Worukura* was slain. He thereafter got rewarded with the title of *Balógun* Alánàmú. Yesufu also had spiritual healing powers with which he healed Prince Shitta, who was hit by an arrow during the battle.

Zarumi Ogbondonroko's progenitor, Janju, migrated to Ilorin from the north, even though his origin was not specified in oral accounts. He was said to have settled first at Edidi, from where he moved to Ilorin, first as an entertainer, who's magical and spiritual gifts caught the attention to the Ilorin authority. With time, Janju's magical gifts found application in military enterprise, where he joined the Emir's army in several battles and as a devoute military man, got rewarded as the Zarumi Ogbondoroko and his role was to first lead the cavalry out at any given battle.[10]

Muhammed Yahaya, popularly known as *Oju-Ekun*, was another military man of great valour and strength, who is said to be of Kanuri stock from Borno. He migrated to Ilorin from Kuwo, having reached the place from Old Oyo and also participated in many battles. From his name, *Ojú-Ekùn ńsẹ̀jẹ̀*, which translates as "one whose face is terrifying like that of a lion",[11] There is no gainsaying that his military expertise was one of the high points of the early period in Ilorin. Another notable personality was Danmurogo, who was said to have metaphysical

powers with which he spoke with spirits at the Sobi Hills in the outskirt of Ilorin, he was feared by many people due to this spiritual powers and was said to have a highly restricted special charms room within his residence.[12]

Other important groups, who came to Ilorin and supported its military were the Bariba and Nupe. The former were famous for their physical and spiritual contributions to Ilorin army. Indeed, the Bariba's military prowess had been adequately illustrated in Johnson's *History of the Yoruba*, where he gave account of their role as mercenary at different times in the fading days of the Old Oyo Empire. They provided great support to Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century. Indeed, the significance of the Bariba group is attested to by their location in a plcae, henceforth, referred to as Baruba, near Idi-Ape, where they manufacture various home utencils from metal. However, their most significant military contribution in the Nineteenth Century was in the aspects of infantry and cavalry. Here they used their spiritual potentials to assist the Ilorin army at different battles.[13]

The Nupe, like the Bariba, were also great warriors with both physical and spiritual powers. Ilorin's development into an entrepot between the Savannah north and the forest region to the south was instrumental to its attraction of the Nupe group. In the opinion of Suleiman, slave merchandise was an important factor, which brought the Nupe to Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century. This was because the town had the largest slave market in the region and the Nupe slave merchants preferred to settle in the vicinity of the slave market.[14] This category of Nupe settlers, were however, added to by Nupe captives following the abortive invasion of Ilorin by Majia, in which heavy fighting took place near the Sobi Hill. This pool of Nupe settlers was further increased by waves of migration and settlement in Ilorin in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even though all Nupe settlers in Ilorin did not migrate from the same location, most of their ancestors were from Bida.[15] Meanwhile, the main vocation of these early Nupe settlers in Ilorin were scholarship and spiritual activities. For instance the first Nupe migrant of Gbodofu Familiy, Mallam Hassan was a scholar invited by Sheik Al-Salih/Alimi.[16] They brought this spiritual endowments to bear in assisting Ilorin warriors. Apart from fighting in the army, they were engaged in the cavalry technology in Ilorin, and this gave them unique relevance in the *Emirate* in the Nineteenth Century.

Immigration was therefore an important factor, which enhanced the growth of Ilorin military in the Nineteenth Century as different groups brought their skills and powers to support the army. This conglomeration not only increased the army's numerical strength but also enabled

warriors to have access to variety of weapons from different people. Indeed, this unity in diversity was one unique strength of Ilorin army and descendants of great warriors always recount the progenitors' exploits to the making of the Emirate. Aspects of the military such as recruitment, weaponry, technology (blacksmithing), cavalry accessories, spiritual element, mercenary, tactics, and diplomacy, were all stimulated by the migration of different groups into Ilorin at the period.

6.3 Economic Impact of the Military on Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century

Material benefits remain, according to the Marxists, a fundamental driving force behind every action of man and it is also the motivation for the continuation or termination of such action. Military enterprise in pre-colonial period was often motivated by economic gains, tax, tributes, and booties inclusive, especially the control of land, trade, trade routes, raw materials and most times, slaves. The Old Oyo Empire was a typical state geared towards these factors and the *Aláàfin*'s impetus for many expeditions, revolved around this material cum economic consideration.

Oyo owed its rise partly to its position. The soil around it was fertile, and farming was its most important occupation. But apart from farming, Old Oyo became the leading trading centre south of the Niger. She traded with all parts of the Yoruba country and there were well-known trade routes connecting it with all the most important markets of those days. These routes were guarded for security and traders gathered at agreed times and places and travelled together in caravans. The state became an important centre for gathering the produce of the rainforests to sell to people of drier savannahs.[17] The Empire's prosperity in trade soon brought her into contact with people from far distances in Kano, where they met with people from Gao, Timbuctu, and Jenne. It was this long distance trade that enabled Oyo to obtain horses, which transformed her military. It was during the era of *Aláàfin* Orompoto that horse men were used in large number.[18] Therefore, it could be safely contended that economic prosperity triggered the need for a solid military, while in a cyclical form, the military also contributed to the economic prosperity of Old Oyo.

In a similar fashion, Ilorin's economic prosperity in the Nineteenth Century partly had its roots in her location in the savannah like Old Oyo, and also in its military strength from the beginning of that century. This impact of the military on Ilorin's economy in the Nineteenth Century has been emphasised by scholars. Garvin, for instance, maintains that:

> The major original source of the pre-colonial wealth of the city of Ilorin, situated toward the eastern frontier, where the Old Oyo Empire marched with the Nupe State and a cluster of semi absorbed Igbomina city states and chiefdoms, was without doubt, the war and plunder, which between 1817 and 1840 turned Afonja's rebel camp on the river Asa into a great and bustling metropolis under the dynasty of Fulani Emir, who fought for and then displaced and killed its Yoruba founder.[19]

In another description, Mabogunje, referred to Ilorin as the first Nineteenth Century "super city" in Yorubaland to be followed by Ibadan, Ijaye, Ogbomoso and others, ensconced with their dependent hamlets and farming tentacles on extents of territory where scores of smaller walled cities with smaller compounds and households had previously flourished.[20] Having cleared its vicinity, around 1840, Ilorin switched from absorption to subjugation and continued its campaign of conquest southward and eastward reducing whole towns and districts to the status of tributary groupings, their existing authorities left intact but subject to the watchful eyes of resident *Ajẹlẹs.* From the imperial capital, she controlled their external relation and directed the disposable surplus toward the metropolis.[21]

From the submissions above, economic motive was undoubtedly a fundamental consideration in Ilorin's expansion since the gains accruable from the tributory areas were exploited by the Emirate. These included land, slaves, agricultural produce such as kolanut, palm oil and ropes. Ilorin's military power created the urban complex, concentrated wealth within its walls and underpinned its continued existence. However, this did not remain the only prime source of the city's income as it largely did in a city like Ibadan; instead, the military provided the base on which economic enterprises thrived in Ilorin. More important was the city's function as a place where commercial transactions were effected. Ilorin merchants were almost as wealthy as her soldiers and land-owners, some of them had houses nearly as large and imposing as those of the city's rulers who in turns drew part of their earnings from the city's trade.[22] In other words, military and commercial activities complemented one another in Nineteenth Century Ilorin society.

Another major economic consequence of the military on Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century was the increase in the scope of local technology and craftsmanship. More people were involved in the production and maintenance of war weapons such as knives, daggers, slings, lances, swords, bows and arrows and iron clubs. Blacksmiths not only produced agricultural implements but also war weapons in great number. Several blacksmiths migrated from Old Oyo, and established their trade in Ilorin. Numerous blacksmith locations emerged in the town

such as those in Idi-Ape, Ojuekun, Ogidi, Sefura, Banni, Pakata, Okelele, Baruba, Pataki, Isale-Koto, Oloje to mention but a few.[23] These smiths became formidable assistants to the military enterprise, fabricating various weapons. Furthermore, charm-makers (*Onisegun*) also emerged, producing protective charms and curatives drugs for soldiers. Ilorin's location in the middle belt, especially its role as a commercial meeting-point between different ecological zones, made it easy for weapons and charms from different areas to be obtained by its soldiers at the various markets in the city.

There was a strong connection between the military and commercial activities in the city and outside the metropolitan Ilorin. This was because the soldiers provided security for traders that visited the town for commercial activities. R. J. Garvin, and Ann O' Hear have emphasised the roles of the soldiers in the economic prosperity of Ilorin the Nineteenth Century. As the military was expanding, it equally provided security at the city gates for trade and commercial activities to thrive. Ilorin was well placed to perform the function of an entreport between different zones with variety of rich products such as Nupe brass, glassworks, textiles and leather goods and high grade mats.

Adamawa and Benue valley with its tin antimony and ivory, powerful textile tailoring and leather working industries; to Ilorin's south lay the old markets of Benin with its brass work and red camwood dyes, and the new markets in the super riches of Yorubaland, where rising new classes created a growing demand for luxurious goods and who had their own kolanuts, rich textiles, iron work and indigo to offer as well as the light textiles and specialised goods ranging from needles to guns that they bought with palm oil at the coast from the agents of industrialising Europe.[24] The role of the military in bringing Ilorin to this state of commercial significance cannot be overemphasised in the provision of security for traders and their merchandises, while its role in ensuring strict compliance with the terms of trade, especially, payment of appropriate taxes at the entrance, was equally vital.

A considerable proportion of Ilorin city's economic wealth came from areas outside the metropolis. This was in the form of royalties or tributes paid on land by farmers, who had been allowed to use such on rent. Such payment was made through intermediaries or representatives called *Babakekere*. They were often changed by the farmers when more powerful ones were found. These men disturbed the town with their jealousy and claims, and sometimes caused the District Head endless trouble. The *Babakekere* were very keen to get farmers to come to them as each visit probably means a dash.[25]

It is from these fief holding that the *Balóguns* in particular, drew the bulk of their income as landlords in the conquered territories. For instance, the *Balógun* Gambari had fiefs in Oloru, Ejidogari, Akanbi, Ajasse and Osi Districts. While Ajikobi controlled Iponrin, Apado, Banni, Megida, Bakase and so on.[26] As more areas were conquered, the *Balóguns*' economic power and influence increased. They retained some of the lands for farming, where their slaves became important source of labour while the remaining lands were given out on rent to trusted people for periodic returns on them. Indeed, the wealth of the Balóguns increased tremendously due to this advantage of land, which their position as war-commanders afforded them. They also got tributes from the conquered areas, which further contributed to their economic power and that of Ilorin city at large. However, after the British conquest in 1897, this system was considered inappropriate by the colonial authority and they saw the need for reforms in district administration in the *Emirate.*

6.4 Social Impact of the Military on Ilorin

One of the social impact of the Nineteenth Century military on Ilorin was the pervasion of the Islamic faith in the city following the outbreak of the *Jihad*. While *Ààre* Afonja's motive was to make the town an independent community from Old Oyo, which he did successfully with the help of Al Salih, the latter's son, Abdulsalam, used the religious factor to enlist the support of Islamic religious pundits to sustain Ilorin as an Islamic state. Thus, a lasting social legacy of the Nineteenth Century military enterprise in Ilorin was the transformation of the city to an Islamic urban centre for scholarship and evangelism.

Before the *Jihad*, Islam had been established in Ilorin with Solagberu at Oke-Suna as a prominent scholar. However, the arrival of Al Salih and the subsequent participation in the Jihad movement transformed the town into an emirate, a status, which thereafter became a reference point. Ilorin became a frontier emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate and a centre of Islamic civilization. Her status as a renowned centre of Islamic religion led to the emergence of eminent scholars whose activities in evangelism and scholarship transcended the town. This is more significant in view of Ilorin emirate's location in Yorubaland and its community drawing from people of differet ethnic backgrounds.

From the period of its establishment as an emirate, Ilorin metropolis became a prominent Islamic stronghold, where several Muslims within and outside Yorubaland received Islamic education and the required training for Islamic clerical activities. Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, Muslim clerics of Ilorin origin were highly revered. Ilorin had acquired

this unique status as a centre of Islamic education since the middle of the Nineteenth Century, especially among Western Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. By the time of British conquest in 1897, the town had become a major centre of Islamic training where people from different parts of Yorubaland visited for Islamic learning and scholarship.[27] Thus, Ilorin clerics were credited with the introduction and growth of Islam in Ekiti and Ondo towns which included Ikere, Aramoko, Ado-Ekiti, Akure and Akoko.[28]

Internally, within Ilorin city, traditional religions like the worship of *Ogun*, *Sango*, *Obatala Egungun* practices, gradually gave way to Islam and the town became known as a centre of Islamic culture. This indeed is depicted in the praise of the town: "*Ilu to'yi, ko ni egungun, ẹsin l'egungun wọn ọkọ ni oro Ibẹ*", which translates as "a big town without masquerade! They celebrate their powerful horses and the spear represents their culture". This signifies Ilorin's role in the propagation of Islam and indicates her warrior tradition in the pre-colonial period.

Another discernable social impact of the Nineteenth Century warfare, especially in the aspect of inter-group relation in Ilorin was the cultural influence of the Yoruba inhabitants on the other groups in the aspect of cognomen and praise names. This became quite conspicuous with non-Yoruba inhabitant taking Yoruba appellations, especially among the royal families. This could further be a strategy for cohesion and integration since Ilorin has a predominant Yoruba inhabitant, unlke the other Emirates. One can therefore see this cultural influence in the Fulani royal family itself, where the Emirs bear Yoruba names, cognomens and agnomen. While we may not be able to state categorically whether the early Emirs had cognomens, what is certain is that from the period of the 8th Emir, Abdulkadir Kelani, cognomens became attached the names of Ilorin Emirs. For instance, Abdulkadir the 8th Emir bears Atanda Opo, the 9th Emir, Sulu Gambari bears Alabi Opo, the 10th Emir, Aliyu Abdulkadir, was Alabi Opo while the incumbent Emir, Ibrahim Sulu Gambari bears Ishola Opo. Furthermore, all the Emirs of Ilorin so far, have taken Yoruba agnomen either by assumption or inheritance as follows:

Abdulsalami	-	*Oba Digi Aye*
Shitta	-	*Oroganloye* I
Zubair	-	*Ayelabowo* I
Aliyu	-	*Oroganloye* II
Momo	-	*Ayelabowo* II

Suleman	-	*Oroganloye* III
Bawa	-	*Ayelabowo* III
Abdulkadir Kelani	-	*Ayelabowo* IV
Sulu Gambari	-	*Ayelabowo* V
Abdulkadir	-	Aiyelabowo VI
Ibrahim Sulu-Gambari	-	*Ayelabowo* VII

This Yoruba cultural influence with respect to agnomen also extended to the non-Yoruba *Balóguns* of Ilorin. Well known are the Balógun Gambari, a family of Hausa origin and *Balógun* Fulani, which is of Fulani origin. The Balógun Gambari for instance, has many branches and took different agnomens. The agnomen of *Balógun* Karara, for example, is *Edu* while that of Danmurogo is *Elo***.** The most well known Yoruba agnomen in the *Balógun* Fulani Family is *Iji.*[29]

In the military cycle, cognomens and praise names played a significant role especially in eulogising an important warrior when taking off for expedition. This aspect of Yoruba culture was conspicuous among the Ilorin warriors. An example of such cognomen is about Abubakar Karara, the fiery Hausa *Balógun* Gambari of Ilorin. Karara's short Yoruba cognomen (*Oriki*) is *Iyanda Edu*, the latter, representing the section of the *Balógun* Gambari Family to which he belonged. His Yoruba agnomen (*Alaje*) is *Igbalajobi*, but his full Yoruba cognomen which in many areas, revealed his bravery and activities during his military engagement in Offa, is as follows:

> *Ìgbálájobí, onígbàwo o gbari, Lánlęgę okoo labiwon, Karara okoo Mayi. O pa kekeeke 'badan, o koi bon won dele. Nwa nretii Asubiaro (Are Latoosa) babaa won, Tasu loru, o tese alosi bo okoo Offa. Bo bagun idandan nii pa ara Ogbomoso, Boba gun Maago ni i pa ara Ede. Paaka lo fi tu Iragbiji. Agogo ode lofi tu Iyapa. Okanjuwon okunrin, oyanu pamu ogun. Papa bata, a wuwo bii apaboo beere. A begun apa lo bii serin. A boogun danidani lapo. Nibo lode nlo ti ko mu apo lowo? Nibo ni algbede nlo ti ko mu ewiri? Lanlege, agbongbe okun. Alagabalugbu Osa. Iku perin o pa owaja erin merila, iku p ajanaku o pa ajelii re, Igbalajobi, Ajanaku lo tuu loju alaja. Karara, Iyanda lo tuu loju Ilorin. Igbalajobi, o ku abo o! O sun lo ni?*

Meaning:

> Igbalajobi, onigbawo o ogbari (Karara's cognomen), Lanlege husband of Labiwon, who killed the small ones of Ibadan and sent their guns home. And began to wait for Asubiaro (Latoosa) their father. He lay Iyapa desolate with the hunter's flute. One man too many! As heavy-set as a well erected roof! Where would the hunter go without a knapsack? Lanlege (another agnomen of Karara) the undriadable ocean! The fathomless lagoon! Death that killed the elephant and killed the elephants' fourteen tusks. Igbalajobi the elephant went away unchallenged in the dog owner's presence. Karara Iyanda went away like that in the presence of the people of Ilorin. Igbalajobi, welcome! Are you asleep? [30]

The example above indicates the extent of Yoruba cultural impact on the social life of other groups in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin and how that tradition would most likely penetrate further into their original culture in the later period.

Horse Race (*Berende*) or Durbar of Horsemen

Another lasting legacy of the military in the social life of Ilorin town and the Emirate, is the horse-race, known in Ilorin as *Berende*. Horsemen dress in their gleaming custumes and jewelries, while their horses are clad in rich costumes and decorations. Their riders are also adorned with swords, lances, polished in elaborately rich traditional robes and headwear. This elaborate horse *regatta*, gives a reminiscence of the military engagement of the cavalry force during Ilorin's warfare in the Nineteenth Century. The horse *regatta* largely represents memories of the heydays of military engagements of the warlords and had since been used to showcase the strength of Ilorin cavalry force. This horse race was normally held during *Eid el Fitr* and *Eid el Kabir* celebrations and other important festivals in the *emirate*.[31]

The *Berende* Durbar has since remained a glamorous event, which records heavy participation of colourfully dressed riders and horses. On the occasion, people of royal descent including princes, important title-holders especially the *Balógun* and their lieutenants in their various localities align their horses in groups during the race to entertain the *Emir* and the populace. Other military officers are always on parade. This has been one of the socio-cultural impact of the nineteeth century *Jihad* on Ilorin because the practice possibly came to the town from among the Hausa and other groups found in what later became northern Nigeria.





Fig. 19: Durbar Procession in Ilorin. Source: Emir's Palace. Up: 2015 and Down: 2016 Dubar Celebrations.



Fig 20. An Officer of the cavalry force with his horse dressed in full ceremonial outfit ready for a Durbar procession in Ilorin, picture was obtained from Magaji Akaraje, the Akesinrin of Ilorin.

Impact of the Military on the Naming of Compounds

The emergence of different compounds with names associated with military enterprise strongly indicates the strength of the warrior tradition in Ilorin and the significant impact of warfare on the history of the town. Several compounds' names in Ilorin represent the roles of their forefathers in the military campaigns of the Nineteenth Century. These compounds took on names, which portrayed them as warriors or as people related to warfare. Ilorin, like most other Yoruba communities, adopted the *Agbo-Ile* concept in naming its compounds. Names of compounds usually portray the vocations of the ancestors of the people of the areas. These names have also become ancestral monuments of their people since the early period.

Thus, in Ilorin, there are names of compounds such as *Ile-Ologun,* which translates as the house or abode of the warriors; *Ile Esinrogunjo*, which translates literally as house/ward of the dancing war-horse; *Ile Olesin Matidi loju Ogun*, which was later shortened to *Olesin*, this means house of fearless cavalrymen, which signifies the fundamental role of horses in the cavalry in Ilorin; *Ile-Mayaki*, which combines Yoruba and Hausa expressions, meaning the house of warrior, *Ile Oloko Ide*: house of the people with brass spears, *Ile Alagbede*-house of blacksmiths.[32] In addition, there are several *Ajias*, which also depict the compounds of warriors, who participated in Ilorin wars. *Magajis* and *Daudus* are also names associated with some warriors. These names could be found in different locations in Ilorin, which indicates that warriors were widespread in the town.

Furthermore, an important segment of Ilorin army in the Nineteenth Century was the hunters' group. Having participated in the various wars, they also took on compound names, which suggested their hunting and military roles in the *emirate*. Names such as *Ògún-Òká*, *Ile-Ode, Ile-Oluode, Ile Ogunniyi, Ile Ologun,* and so on, signify the vocation of these people as hunters in the pre-colonial period, and this continued in the *emirate* after colonialism. It must be mentioned that the strength of the hunters group was brought to bear on the British colonial authority early in the twentieth century, when they protested against the colonial taxes in 1906 and 1907.[33]

6.5 Impact of Ilorin Military on the Non-Metropolitan Areas

One of the lasting memories of Ilorin military expeditions is the impact it had on the territories outside the metropolis. To begin with, the revolt of *Ààre* Afonja against Old Oyo and the independence of Ilorin under the Fulani Jihadist radically changed the social-political characters of some Igbomina localities around Ilorin. This same impact was witnessed in the Ekiti area, where a number of towns were conquered by the Ilorin forces. With the rise of Ilorin, the dialect, the political system and socio-cultural organisation of this region, which composed Idofian, Afon, Iponrin and so on, changed in a way remarkably different from other Igbomina and Yoruba people. Apparently these were areas originally known for Igbomina culture and tradition before the rise of Ilorin. This region, even though, having a tradition of being part of Igbomina in the past, became socially, economically, and politically integrated into the Ilorin cultural values. Thus, the Nineteenth Century warfare transformed Ilorin to the most dominant centre of power in the region.[34]

Besides detaching large area of Igbomina from the main subgroup and giving it a new character, Ilorin also had far reaching impact on Igbominaland in another way. Following Ilorin's conquest of Igbomina areas, several individuals and groups from Ilorin, mostly Fulani, flocked into Igbominaland, where they established permanent settlements. This proliferation of settlements became pronounced in the second half of the Nineteenth Century as more Fulani and Yoruba farmers and adventurers went in different directions and established new settlements in some parts of the region. These new settlements were generally small both in size and in population and without highly centralised political systems. Throughout the Nineteenth Century however, they remained in a constant state of flux.[35]

Meanwhile, the conquest of parts of Igbominaland by the *Jihadists* from Ilorin and Lafiagi did not result in the complete religious conversion of the people. There is no evidence to indicate that either the people or their rulers abandoned their traditional religion for Islam during this period. Fundamentally, the conquerors, particularly the *Balóguns* of Ilorin, who spearheaded the conquest, were primarily interested in the spurs of war; that is, the economic and political gains of their conquests, than in any forceful conversion to Islam. That notwithstanding, Islam was a vivid aspect of Ilorin military impact on other societies within the emirate in the Nineteenth Century as indicated by the spread of the religion and its practces. For instance,

even though trade contributed to the spread of Islam in Igbominaland through the efforts of Muslim traders from the regions of what later became Northern Nigeria, Ilorin wars of expansion seem to have stronger consequence on the spread of the religion among the people. Muslim traders and their companions were commonly found in Igbomina areas of Ajase, Share, Oro, Ila, Omun-Aran, Ganmo, Idofian, Oke-Ode, Igbaja, Arandun, Oke-Onigbin, Ora-Igbomina and so on.[36] These Muslim diviners gave preventive and curative devices and substances such as *tira* (amulets) and *hantu* to the early Igbomina converts to Islam to solve certain problems. This quest for spiritual healing had initially attracted some Igbomina traditionalists to Islam, which believed could provide succor to problems like poverty, illness and other related issues. In addition, the Muslim Clerics were always contacted in periods of drought and famine to offer prayers to God for rain. These attempts were acclaimed to be successful in most cases which further increased the belief in the new religion. For example, at a time when there was a drought in Oro, one Alfa Kuranga was contacted and he offered a prayer for rain (Salat Istiqah) in the outskirts of the town after which rain fell.[37]

In spite of the above efforts by the Muslim traders, there were ample evidences that Ilorin military activities prompted some Igbomina rulers to accept Islam. The motivation for such acceptance, however, was in most cases, the need to be at peace with the Ilorin authorities and save their positions as rulers rather than a wholesale convertion of their entire communities or the desertion of their traditional practices. This fact has been supported by evidence of the convertion of some members of Igbomina royal houses to Islam. For instance, *Olupako* Oyadeyi of Share was converted to Islam by *Alfa Kokewukobere* from Ilorin; *Elesie* Babalola *Egunjobi I* was converted by Alfa Yusuf Abolarin; *Elesha* Salih of Oke-Ode was converted by *Alfa* Uthman Dikko; *Oloro* Ayangusi of Oro was converted by Emir Zubair of Ilorin and *Olomu* Durotoye Abegunde of Omu-Aran was converted by Emir Zulkarinaini Gambari of Ilorin.[38]

However, many of the Igbomina rulers paid tacit allegiance to Islam while they continued with their pre-*Jihad* ways of life. For instance, the acceptance of the Muslim turban by Igbomina rulers such as the *Olupo* of Ajasse-Ipo and the *Elese* of Igbaja, did not indicate a religious conversion of these rulers or their people. According to H. O. Danmole, this may be regarded (merely) as an exercise of political authority rather than a determination to convert these traditional rulers as there is no other exact evidence to suggest that it was a conversion ceremony. The turbanning ceremony was the instrument used by the *Emirate* authorities to signify the acceptance by a people, of Ilorin rule.[39] Indeed, there is evidence in areas outside

the metropolis of the Ilorin emirate that traditional practices survived even in the face of threats from foreign religions of Islam and Christianity. In Igbominaland for instance, there continued to be traditional healers and custodians of traditional religion such as priests and diviners who took care of the objects of worship. To underscore the strength of traditional worship in Igominaland, songs were composed thus:

Imole k'ope k'eni ma soro,
Egungun ma l'oro ile wa o.
Igbagbo k'ope k'e'ni ma soro,
Egungun ma l'oro ile wa o.

Meaning:

> Islam does not forbid one from celebrating Oro (festival), egungun is our family's festival. Christianity does not forbid one from celebrating Oro (festival), Egungun is our family's festival.[40]

Besides, the pervasive state of insecurity of the Nineteenth Century and the excesses of Ilorin agents and representatives did not work to the advantage of Islamisation in the region. Indeed, allegiance to traditional religion remained very strong. When, for instance in the 1860s *Oloro* Ayegusi, in a bid to please the *Emir* Zubair of Ilorin, adopted the religion of Islam, against the wish of his people, he was deposed and exiled. A new *Oloro,* committed to the sustenance of traditional religion, came to the throne.[41]

The point being stressed here is that in spite of the pressure from Ilorin on the Igbomina society, one aspect, which remained strong was the traditional religion of its people. Even though, there were converts to Islam, such did not put a halt to the traditional religious practices as would have been expected of a society where a religious revolution (Jihad) had taken place.

However, parts of Igbominaland were seriously affected, in political term, as there are ample evidences to support the presence of political agents of the Ilorin authority in their various communities. This was largely made possible because of the absence of a single political authority in the region prior to the Nineteenth Century crises. The nature of their political existence before this period was, to a great extent, that of mutual co-existence and

independence. As Hogben and Kirk-Greene noted, the Igbomina, with their numerous leaders were never a very cohesive unit.[42]

Moreover, Igbominaland had been truncated into three; the Southwestern section under the Fulani based in Ilorin; the Northeastern section under the Fulani headquartered at Lafiagi, while Illa remained precariously under Ibadan's influence in the Southeast.[43] The subsequent efforts of the Igbomina to free themselves from the Fulani hegemony and join their kith and Kin in the South created turbulent political crises during the twentieth century, in spite of the British presence.[44]

Ilorin's authority over Igbominaland in the pre-colonial period was further buttressed by some archival evidences. For example it is reported on page 178 of the 1929 edition of the Gazetteer of Ilorin Province that G. M. Dwyer, who was Resident of the Province from 1901 to 1913, wrote as follows in his 1908 Annual report:

> When crownland was required in Ilorin province, I was directed to draw up an agreement in which the Emir granted so much land to His Majesty, His Heirs and successor, and so on, and for which he received certain sum of money.[45]

This evidence shows the extent of land that Ilorin Emirate had acquired before the arrival of the British and the magnitude of their authority in those territory to have warranted them being approached for land so acquired. Indeed, as another evidence in the archive further indicates, Ilorin may have had authority over Igbominaland to as far as Ila-Orangun in the South-east and Share in the North-west. This is because these places were either Ilorin's fiefs or vassals of the Ilorin authority.

The 1921 edition of the Gazetteer of Ilorin Provinc also provides elaborate evidence about how the Ilorin armies conquered these Igbomina areas. According to the gazetteer, two men's names stood out as leaders of the armies; these were *Ajia* Gaju and Ali-Balógun Gambari. To these men, the Olupo of Ajasse made submission as well as the *Olora* of Oke Ora; they conquered the town of Yarra and the *Orangun* was taken as prisoner to Ilorin but was allowed to return and build a new town named Illa between Yarra and Akpa.[46]

In the same manner, Ekitiland was not speared of this marauding expeditions of the Ilorin armies. The Ekiti town of Ishan was burnt and Yagba town of Iye. The Yagbas did not, however, return to Iye, but built a new town named Aiede (Possibly Ayede) in the southern provinces.[47] Adefagbadi, the *Oore* of Otun, however was said to have sued for peace, begging Jimba, the head slave of *Emir* Shitta, who was with the main army at Ijoro, a town on the

Ishan-Otun road. This message was said to have been accompanied by cowries, a load of kolas, and a load of palm oil. Following this pleas, an answer was returned that Otun should not be attacked and that Jimba should appoint a man to "sit down" at Otun as *Ajẹlẹ*; Jimba was thus made *Babakekere*of Otun and one of his followers, Otin was appointed *Ajẹlẹ.* The same fate befell Owo, a town now in the southern province. [48]

From the highlights above, it is clear that Ilorin had firmly established its imperial tentacles on parts of Igbomina and Ekiti areas long before the arrival of the British. This conquests, as expected, had some political and economic consequences on the areas.

Impact of Political Representative on the Outlying Territories

In pre-colonial Ilorin, an official, who interceded between the people and the authority was commonly referred to as *Babakekere.* He related with the authority on economic and political basis and his function was defined in relation to either land or occupation of the people. Indeed, for easy and proper payment of tributes or royalties, each occupation, vocation or trade had its own *Babakekere*. These officials and wardheads saw to the collection of tribute from subordinate towns and income taxes of between 5 and 10% on craft workers, hair platter and goldsmiths.[49]

The *Babakekere* might be the tenant's own fiefholder. Alternatively, he might be the most powerful fiefholder in the area as was in Ologbondoroko, where tenants of other fiefholders were under the Magaji Zarumi (one of the Wardheads under Balógun Ajikobi of Ilorin) and gave him presents periodically.[50]

The Babakekere might also be the fiefholder's agent or even his agent's agent.[51] He might be in some other way connected with the fieholder or might be someone else altogether. For example, in Ogele, which was held by the Emir, free tenants looked to the emir's slaves, his sons, or the *Sarkin Dogari* (a major palace official) or *Magaji Baboko* are in the city. It was further reported that in Odo-Ode, tenants paid rent to the fiefholder, who descended from the pre-Jihad landlord, but their *Babakekere* was variously the *Balógun Fulani*, *Balógun Gambari*, the *Magaji Are* (descendants of Afonja) and a son of the *emir*. Furthermore, the Liman Agbaji was Babakakere to many farmers in Oke-Moro, the lands to the northwest of Ilorin.[52]

Moreover, slaves of the Emir, in some cases, served as Babakekere for residents of the city. In 1912 for instance, a British official reported that money from compound tax was handed over to the Babakekere or patron of the *Maiangua*, some slave of the Emir's. Each craft also had its Babakekere, through whose hands the tax passed before reaching the Emir.

Outside the Ilorin metropolis, the military and political importance of the Babakekere institution was amply felt as illustrated by the history of Ajagusi District. In the pre-emirate days, the area was under Old Oyo and the *Alajagusi* paid tributes to the *Aláàfin.* However the land was overran by the Nupe, whereupon its leader fled to Ilorin. The Nupe were driven back by the Ilorin forces and thereafter, the Alajagusi placed himself under the protection of the Balógun Fulani and through the latter's intercession was allowed to return to his land. Through this, other tenant of Alajagusi distict also found themselves beholden to the Balógun Fulani. Hermon-Hogde states that:

> Other men wishing to be granted small fiefs followed a big chief or slave of the Emir….. and when they took up land, asked to get the sanction of the Emir for so doing. This was done and a yearly gift was given to these men for protection's sake, and to furher their interest in the court, should they have occasion to bring in some case for settlement.[53]

It must be emphasized that military service also played role in the suitability of the candidate appointed as *Babakekere* by the fiefholders. Thus, the conquered territories outside the metropolis had *Babakekere* appointed for them, who either administered them directly or appointed his own trusted officials known either as *Ajẹlẹ* or *Daudu* to oversee on his behalf. Such an appointee of the *Babakekere* ensured regular payment of tributes and compliance with Ilorin's instructions, including supply of men and material in period of warfare. He was representative of the *Babakekere* and by extension, of the *Emir* in the conquered territory and by tradition, enjoyed unrestricted access to the resources of the area. Fulani influence on parts of Igbomina and Ekiti areas had been consolidated with the setting up of imperial administration based on political representatives. For instance, the Fulani representatives or District Heads at Oke-Ode, Igbaja and Omu-Isanlu were known as *Shaaba, Maiyaki* and *Ajia,* respectively.

The fiefholder resided in the capital such as Ilorin, leaving his representatives or agents in the District to carry on the local administration. The District Head also had his representatives or agents in virtually all the towns and villages in the District. He exercised his power through these agents. These agents, in addition to exercising their functions as revenue collectors for their masters in the metropolis, were most times in the habit of overstepping these traditional privileges. For instance, local traditions prevalent in Igbomina and Ekiti areas remembered the Fulani District Head system for its oppressiveness and the hardship it brought upon the people.

Well documented is the presence of numerous representatives of the District Heads in the region. In some villages, they are said to have been as many as twenty, allegedly living with and preying on the people, and committing series of atrocities. Their nefarious activities and licentiousness made the Fulani rule (or Ilorin rule) more intolerable and unacceptable.[54] E. C, Duff, who was the Resident for Ilorin Province in 1912, while commenting on the Igbomina area before the advent of British rule maintained that the District Head and his agents "were a terror to the lives of the people. No one was safe from them….They behave with perfect impunity, causing great misery and discontent among the people".[55]

Elsewhere in Offa, the *Babakekere* was reported to have enjoyed unprecedented privileges. He received regular gifts apart from the mandatory tributes and taxes being paid to the *Emir* through him. It was further reported that these agents (*Balógun, Babakekere* or *Ajẹlẹ*) practically took over the administration of the town. The *Olofa* could not coordinate his Ward Chiefs and could not adjudicate in his native court; he became a mere puppet and toothless bulldog.[56]

Regardless of these excesses of the political representatives in the conquered areas of Igbomina, Ibolo and Ekiti, their presence points to Ilorin's political authority in them. In political terms, they were stationed to safeguard the influence of the Ilorin government in the territories. This, in a way, could be likened to the practice in the Old Oyo Empire, of sending representative to distant territories to ensure that adequate tributes and shares of spoils of military expeditions were obtained for the *Aláàfin*. It was common during the heydays of Oyo to find the Empire's *Ajẹlẹ* in Dahomey; and within Nigeria, Oyo *Ajẹlẹs* were common in Egbaland and other Yoruba towns. Ilorin possibly inherited this practice from Old Oyo and refined it to suit her purpose in the Nineteenth Century.

In addition, it was possible that through Ilorin's presence in these areas, aspects of their economic, social and political lives were affected by the Ilorin cultural tradition. Thus, as the crises and warfare were deepening, especially, pressure from Ilorin and other Fulani groups, the Igbomina, who had initially lived in political particularism, began to evolve alliances, which later transformed to political union for stronger security. For instance, it is reported that the leader of the Ajagun group traditionally reputed and deified for its earlier military achievements, emerged as the paramount ruler to be assisted by chiefs selected from the other groups.[57]

Besides, in military term, as vassals, they were required to contribute soldiers to support Ilorin's expeditions and were expected to provide military logistics to ensure the success of such encounters. Perhaps, it was for this obligation that some Igbomina leaders even participated as field commanders in the Ilorin army during her campaigns. An example was the *Jalumi* war in which the *Elese* of Igbaja led a contingent of the Ilorin army in the encounter against Ibadan. In the same vein, the *Elekan* of Ekan, was said to have made concession with the *Emir* of Ilorin during the Ilorin's war with Illa, which substantially assisted the Ilorin group.[58] By extension, they were expected to contribute both physical and spiritual weapons for prosecuting the battles.

We have already discussed the potentials of some Igbomina areas in the production of iron implements in chapter three, and how some of their craftsmen produced iron weapons. Thus, this became an advantage to Ilorin when parts of the region was conquered. Places like Owa Onire, Owode Ofaro, Iwo, Ijara-Isin, and Oke Aba were areas where pig iron was extracted and blacksmiths were common. In addition to the production of hoes, cutlasses and other household utensils, articles of warfare such as spears, arrows, swords and later guns, increased in volume in the face of the exigencies of the Nineteenth Century reality. For instance, the Oro-Ago people, having learnt the art of spear throwing from the Nupe, took to its production on large scale.[59]

From the foregoing, the impact of Ilorin military on the non-metropolitan areas, particularly, parts of Igbomina, Ibolo and Ekiti, was more conspicuous in the economic and social spheres than the political aspect. The main duty of Ilorin *Ajẹlẹs* was to ensure compliance with the payment of tributes and contribution of logistics in periods of war. Even though there were social and political implications, the economic impact was more noticeable.

6.6 Fief-Holding under the British and its Economic Implication

Ilorin was one of the first provinces to adopt in its administration, the district system under resident District Headmen. This system was not however satisfactorily established due to certain problems. In the first place, the new system ran counter to the political instinct of the *Emirs* and to established customs of the peasantry. "There has been some slight difficulties, writes Lord Lugard in 1906-07 in the re-arrangements of the District Headmen, as the fief holders have not yet entered into the spirit of new method of collection; but this will be satisfactorily adjusted. And again in 1907-8: the institution of resident District Headmen had at last been achieved after much difficulty".[60]

According to the Gazetteer of Ilorin Province by Hermon Hodge, the reform was regarded with suspicion by the *Emir,* who feared that it would result to loss of power and dignity. But in spite of his personal feelings, the system had largely favoured him. The scheme, the Gazetteer continues, had some potentials because District Headmen were very pleased with their new status and in some cases gave signs of surprising administrative ability. Thus, it was leading to considerable improvement in the method of collection of revenue. One immediate result was the movement of considerable bodies of people, the followers of the chiefs so appointed and former idlers in Ilorin town, out to the sparsely populated country districts, to the benefit and increase of agriculture.[61] One of the resolutions of the British authority was that District Headsmen be resident in their areas of operation unlike the old practice when *Babakekere* were in charge, who themselves appointed representatives in the areas under them.

However, the British reorganisation, especially the appointment of the chiefs as District Headmen to be resident in the outlying territories, was a move the *Emir* was not comfortable with. Part of the strategy to ensure the security of his position was that these chiefs should remain in the capital with him, where actions could be easily monitored and any unfavourable move would be noticed and checked. Furthermore, they would not have the opportunity to enlist people into their camp against the *Emir.*

Therefore, the *Emir* could not but regard as very threatening to his own authority, the suggestion that important chiefs be sent out and away from the capital to reside in and administer districts with considerable power and influence, which the British regime would give them. For in the other Emirates, the authority of the *Emir* was based largely on a system of organisation highly centralised at the capital. It is true the whole country was parceled out into holdings, or fiefs as they might be called, amongst the numerous chiefs, branches of the ruling house, powerful slaves, or occasionally chiefs of the indigenous tribes, who had accepted the Fulani conquest. Hoewever, these fief holders themselves were usually compelled to live in the capital and to present themselves almost daily before the Emir, or at least attend the regular weekly Friday celebration at the *Emir*'s mosque.

It was in this way that the *Emirs* considered that they could best control their sub-ordinate chiefs. Thus, the residence of the more important fief holders at a distance seemed to deprive an *Emir* much of the pomp and importance of his position and of his capital. It could also enhance the independence of the District Headmen, who the Emir thought would act in direct relationship with the British officials.[62] Apparently, the *Emir w*ould have been more

comfortable with the arrangement that would make him the sole administrator without his subordinate being given such larger roles as District Headmen outside the metropolis; but the British favoured a system that gave broader geographical coverage to their administrative policies in the Emirate.

However, in spite of this new arrangement, the economic motive of the British authority was not satisfactorily achieved. Thus in 1916, the Acting Resident of Ilorin Province, Philip Landsdale informed the Secretary of the Northern Provinces that agents who represented the interest of the Emir and his chiefs in the districts of Ilorin Province, were not conducting the affairs of the districts in the manner that would benefit the British Crown.[63] He had earlier made a similar request in 1913, which was not approved and was followed by some local disturbances, the most prominent being the one at Onire District, where local population violently attacked the Ilorin agents and other officials of the District owing to their overbearing attitude.[64]

Thus, in 1916, the colonial authority carried out further reforms in the district administration of the Ilorin *Emirate*; a move, which had some far-reaching economic implications for the *Emirate*. For instance, after the colonial authority's reforms of the District Administration, in 1916, the powers of the native authority became drastically reduced as they were being strictly monitored through a number of proclamations. They no longer wielded the unrestricted powers of the pre-colonial days; thus, their economic power also became curtailed. Indeed, apart from other conditions, colonial agents were expected to cooperate with the village and District Heads to ensure that agriculture, trade and commerce were promoted; maintenance of law and order was ensured and that taxes and other colonial exactions or levies were duly collected from all taxable adults resident in these districts and promptly sent to the provincial headquarters for the effective running of the administration.[65]

The implication of this was that the *Balóguns* had lost a considerable proportion of their economic influence, since the new agents in the districts were appointees of the colonial authority, who were loyal and responsible only to the colonial authority. This indeed was part of the main causes of the grievance of the *Balógun* and their loyalists against the colonial authority. As we have discussed earlier, the main motivation of the *Balóguns* for continuing Ilorin's wars of expansion in the latter period of the Nineteenth Century, was the economic benefits that were accruing from territorial acquisition in the form of farmlands, agricultural

products, tributes, slaves and other items of economic value. This colonial reforms had thus dealt a heavy blow on this steady income of the *Balóguns*.

The colonial administration's takeover of the revenue also meant a loss of economic monopoly to the Ilorin authority. The Emir's toll stations at the city gates were dismantled and colonial administrative officers were henceforth, given the mandate to collect dues and report directly to the Resident.[66] Taxes were thus levied on various economic groupings such as tailors, weavers, kola sellers and other related vocations based on their estimated income.[67] Stern reactions greeted this development because natives were not used to such direct taxation on their income, and this largely accounted for people's apathy for the colonial government.

As early as 1908, the colonial government had, through the authority of the Resident, mandated all Village and District Heads throug their District Officer (D. O), to open tax registers in every community or compound, which should contain the list of all taxable adults.[68] Such tax registers were to be valid and used for only one year, while they would be updated and a new one would be opened for every new year to ensure a proper record of all taxable adults in the village or compound.

As the colonial authority continued to increase taxation, there followed spontaneous reactions from the people, particularly from the metropolitan Ilorin. This reactions became heightened when the colonial authority began to arrest tax evaders, which eventually culminated in the tax riot of 1913.[69]

Conclusions

This study has attempted to examine the military technology, tactics, diplomacy and trends in Ilorin warfare in the Nineteenth Century. The study's objectives include exploring the nature, sources and types of weapons used by Ilorin warriors in prosecuting their wars in the Nineteenth Century. The work also explored the major tactics employed by the state such as diplomacy, divide and rule, alliances, friendship and so on. Other areas examined were the role of blacksmithing in Ilorin military technology and impact of ethnic plurality on Ilorin military and warfare technology.

Chapters One and two give general introduction; here, the major concepts and theoretical frameworks on which the study rests were discussed, while the foundation of Ilorin army and events which led to the establishment of the emirate were given. Chapter Three explores sources and types of weapons common in the Nineteenth Century Ilorin society, the cavalry system and the force structure of the Ilorin army. Chapter Four examines strategies, tactics and different phases of Ilorin wars in the Nineteenth Century. Chapter Five was devoted to the colonial occupation and Ilorin's reaction while Chapter Six analyses the impact of military and warfare on Ilorin and its conquered areas.

Ilorin's military enterprise began under Àare Afonja after internal crises had rocked the Old Oyo. Thus, the Muslim slaves saw their pally with the *Àare* as an opportunity to freely practise their religion and become influencial members of the society; they therefore became

ready recruits for Afonja's army. This religious factor became more pronounced when *Jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio reached Ilorin in the 1820s and partly accounted for the ousting of the *Ààre* and the emergence of a new leadership under the Fulani.

Ilorin's cosmopolity was a strong factor in her military system as different ethnic and linguistic groups arrived in the city in batches. This influenced the recruitment, weaponry, strategies and tactics of the Ilorin army in the Nineteenth Century. Groups like Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Bariba and Kanuri contributed men, materials and intelligence to Ilorin military organisation.

Weapons of war in Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century could be divided into two broad categories: physical and metaphysical weapons. The physical weapons comprised of long and short range arms used by the Ilorin warriors. The long weapons included spears, bow and arrows, bat and sling, *masi*, and catapult while few of the short range weapons were clubs, knives, stabbing spears, daggers, and bracelet. These weapons were sourced both locally in Ilorin and through external contact. Also, some weapons came with groups, who migrated to the town from the period of *Ààre* Afonja through the time of the *emirate* system. This conglomeration of physical and spiritual weapons assisted in the course of Ilorin military campaigns.

The spiritual element also found adequate expression in Ilorin wars as charm-makers and Muslim clerics also contributed to the weapons through the supply of items like amulets, bands, rings, and various metaphysical elements. The study posits that a strong nexus existed between makers of these elements of the military and Ilorin soldiers. The study holds that like in a typical Yoruba society, the role of metaphysical element in Ilorin wars was significant. This became expedient given Ilroin's multi-ethnic nature. Accounts of the use of such weapons were replete in the exploits of notable warriors in the Emirate; some Balógun even preserved their metaphysical weapons in specially restricted charms room.

Blacksmithing also became widened in scope and its volume of production increased with the prevalence of warfare in which Ilorin was involved in the Nineteenth Century. Indeed, the study discovered that even though, blacksmithing had been an old vocation in Ilorin, possibly pre-dating the Nineteenth Century, increasing migration of groups from the Old Oyo Empire after its fall, and others from the northern part of the Nigerian area in the course of the Jihad,

transformed it to a popular business. Thus, the study discovered that Ilorin smiths henceforth were able to fabricate weapons of both Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani origin. This factor also increased the social relations between the smiths and the warriors.

The study also holds that cavalry arguably accounted for a high degree of success in Ilorin wars, especially in the early period of her *emirate* system. Discussions on cavalry were divided into three main parts: first was the role of cavalry force generally, and on Ilorin and her wars; the second segment explores sources of horses for Ilorin cavalry; and third deals with the emergence of cavalry technology and horse keeping accourtrements in Ilorin metropolis in the Nineteenth Century.

The study discovered that the first major source of horses for Ilorin was Sokoto, the headquarters of the *caliphate.* Other sources, according to findings from the field, were Nupe emirates of Bida and Lafiagi, Adamawa, Borno, Jau and Megatare in present Jigawa State. Cavalry technology also emerged in few loctions in the Ilorin *Emirate* metropolis for the production of saddles, stirups, footgears and other trappings for the horses and cavalrymen. These places included *Awodi* and *Pataki* in Gambari area of Ilorin. The cavalry technology was dominated by Nupe immigrants who came to Ilorin in the early period of the *Emirate* and have since engaged in the trade. They were experts, not only in the production of cavalry accourtrement for warriors, but they also engaged in preparing horses for ceremonial occasions like the *regatta* called *Berende* and other related ceremonies in Ilorin.

Furthermore, Ilorin employed diplomacy to the fullest in her war efforts. Her strategies and tactics were dictated by the prevailing situation. Indeed, in her foreign relations throughout the Nineteenth Century, she was always prepared to ally with even her enemies, as long as such friendship would yield the best result. There were occasions when the *emirate* allied with Ibadan, her bitterest foe in the course of the Nineteenth Century, even if such friendship would be shortlived. Ilorin's diplomatic relations was therefore, changing throughout the Nineteenth Century. For instance, Ilorin's ability to successful wade off Old Oyo *Empire* was partly due to her pally with some Yoruba groups in the 1820s. These diplomatic moves were carried out both within and outside the Ilorin environment. For instance it can be argued that the emergence and development of the military brought about centralized political leadership in Ilorin. Prior to that period, Ilorin inhabitants were scattered in different localities with each recognising specific leader for its enclave. However, with the increase in military activities,

especially the establishment of the Ilorin *Emirate* under Abdulsalam, and the principle of unity, which Islam preached, political leadership was given a new dimension in Ilorin. Indeed, it could be argued that the foundation of the Indirect Rule system, which the British eventually employed in their administration of Ilorin was laid by the Emirate leadership through *Emirs* Abdulsalam and Shitta, who coopted leaders of the major linguistic groups in Ilorin into the political structure of the *Emirate*.

The study also discovered that external diplomatic efforts prompted Ilorin to get involved in the struggles among few southern Yoruba groups in the attempt to pursue and protect her economic cum political interests. For instance, by the 1840s, Ibadan, after her emergence as major power, had sacked Ilorin from some of the areas of her influence, necessitating the need for friendship in the Ekiti areas. Thus, when the Ekiti were coming together in alliance against Ibadan in 1878, Ilorin readily enlisted in the coalition, so that she could rekindle her influence among the southern Yoruba groups, which Ibadan's presence had greatly reduced. Ibadan employed the surpise element in her tactics against Ilorin in the Battle of Osogbo around 1840, and repeated the same feat in the Jalumi War in 1878.

Furthermore, to defend Ilorin city from invaders, particularly after the establishment of its emirate, war commanders were commissioned to raise armies in their respective localities. Thus, every entrance of the city had a war commander in charge of monitoring security situation and taking appropriate steps in case there was a breach. For instance, by the time of the *Sobi Adinimole War*, Ilorin had four Major War leaders, each in charge of troops from different parts of the Ilorin city. Doshe was for the Gambari Ward, the domain of the Hausa inhabitants and he co-ordinted soldiers from that section of the city. Indeed, Doshe led the Ilorin army against Majiya and his Nupe invaders. Other war commanders were Yagbara, for the Fulani troops, Usman for the Ajikobi warriors and Seeni, who co-ordinated the soldiers from Alánàmú ward. This strategy was to ensure that all entrances to the capital was fortified to face any attacks from outside. Therefore, while the Yoruba *Balóguns*: *Alánàmú* and Ajikobi took care of attacks from the north of Ilorin city, the Hauasa and Fulani *Balóguns* defended Ilorin's southern borders. This was similar to Sokoto Caliphate's use of *Ribat*, (defence strongholds), built in sstrategic locations to guard the *Jihad* headquarters against attacks. The major difference was that Sokoto's defence strongholds were located outside the capital while Ilorin's were within the City.

From another perspective, investigation revealed that by the structure of Ilorin political economy of the Nineteenth Century, the Balógun gained enormous power and influence in the *emirate* as a result of their control over trade, trade routes, tributes and royalties coming from the areas which they conqurered through warfare. Therefore, in the course of time, they became wealthier than the *Emir* and this economic power increased their political influence and control in the *emirate*. The Balógun and the Emir soon began to hold contrasting positions on issues, particularly, those concerning military campaigns. This dichotomy, even though had its root as far back as the 1860s when the *Balóguns'* economic power began to increase, became more pronounced in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century with the arrival of the British. While the Balógun favoured the continuation of territorial influence outside the metropolis because it would increase their wealth and power, the *Emirs,* particularly, Momoh and Sulyman, were lukewarm to that option. Indeed, by the time of the British arrival, the nature and dimension of Ilorin warfare had changed and was now largely epitomised by struggle between the Emir and his war chiefs. This provided a perfect opportunity for the British in the process of entrenching their colonial rule on the *emirate*.

It could also be concluded that Ilorin's military tradition greatly strengthened its political structure. This is in line with this study's theoretical position that the military determines political leadership in most pre-colonial societies in the Nigerian area. *Ààre* Afonja's struggles, the establishment of the *emirate* and political unity among the various groups in Ilorin are consequences of the military efforts in the wars of consolidation, expansion and defence. Indeed, Ilorin *Emirate*'s political structure with its elaborate titled officials provided a formidable ground for the entrenchment of the British Indirect Rule system in the opening of the 20th century.

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31	Qomorudeen moyosore	M	73	Ganmo	July., 2017
32	Amosa Iliasu	M	83	Ganmo	July., 2017
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34	Ayuba Agboworin	M	65	Herbalist in Moro	July, 2017
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APPENDIX

NAMES OF EARLIEST MUSLIM CLERICS IN ILORIN

Sheik Tahir Solagberu (Founder of Oke-Suna)

Sheik Sheriff Musa (Founder and First Imam of Agbaji)

Sheik Umaru Matase Okeleru

Sheik Salihu Ojibara

Sheik Tukur Munabau

Sheik Muhammad Usman

Sheik Abdulraman Saura

Sheik Ibrahim Bature

Sheik Badirudin

Sheik Male Bagobire

Sheik Ahmadu Sake

Sheik Muhammad Ibn Sanni Imam Tuka

Sheik Shitta Imam

Sheik Umaru

Sheik Abubakar Dango Garba Al-Hahfiz

Sheik Abdulkadir Alayaki

Sheik Aliyu Ibn Imam Salihu

Sheik Muhammad Buhari Al-Habit

Sheik Abdukadir Onagun

Sheik Muhammad Jodi

Sheik Doti Musa

Sheik Muhammad Aminu

Sheik Abubakar Bube

Sheik Salihu Hanidu

Sheik Imam Aliru Ibn Babalani

Sheik Muhammad Ibn Buhari

Sheik Muhammad Takunti

Sheik Ibrahim Nagori

Sheik Abubakar Fute

Sheik Alikali Ali Mustafa

Sheik Usman Liligari

Sheik Lamba

Sheik Umari Jaji

Sheik Isa Mutarajami

Sheik Umaru

Sheik Muhammad Busari

Sheik Slihu Abdulkadir

Sheik Buhari Ago

ILORIN'S EARLIEST WARRIORS

Afonja Layaloko (possessor of bravery and spear) the sixth and most renowned of the Kákánfò.

Solagberu – led Ilorin forces in the Pamo War

Abdulsalami – was already a notable warrior in Kebbi before coming to Ilorin

Shitta – was involved in Ilorin wars of expansion

Momo – as a Prince and a warrior, participated in the *Offa War*

Suleiman – participated in the Yakuba War which Ilorin lost in 1897

Bawa –as a prince and a warrior, who was captured in the disastrous *Otin War* of 1895

EARLIEST WARLORDS

These were the set of war leaders that defended Ilorin against Nupe invasion. They included:

Doshe

Usman Ajikobi

Jagbara

Seeni

Alli (who relieved Doshe in the Adinimole War)

THE BALÓGUNS

These were the second batch of warriors to defend and extend Ilorin's territories. They were:

Balógun Gambari - for the Hausa, Nupe, Gobirawa, Bariba quarters

Balógun Fulani – for the command of warriors in the Fulani Quarters

Balógun Ajikobi – for Yoruba warriors

Balógun Alánàmú – for Yoruba warriors

FIELD COMMANDERS

Doshe – a Nupe Man from Badeggi near Bida and the first Balógun Gambari

Ojo Eku- paired with Doshe in the *Otefon War*

Alli – a Hausa man from Katsina, concluded the Adinimole War after Doshe's demise at Jebba

Karara – Balógun Gambari and field commander, who led Ilorin contingent at the Offa War

Adamu – Karara's son, became Balógun Gambari but was killed in the Erimope Campaign in 1896

Ajia Gajo – Came to Ilorin from the viscinity of what later became Sokoto and rose to the rank a field Commander in the Ilorin army.

Abdullahi omo opele – Migrated to Ilorin with Gajo and participated as field Commander in Ilorin wars.

Ajanaku – A sub-chief of Balógun Fulani, who prosecuted the Ikoyi War as Ilorin Field Commander

Nasamu – The most famous Ilorin young Field Commander in the Offa, Ilobu and *Otin Wars*

Lasaki Jimba – A strong Field Commander in Ilorin's Campagn against Oyo

Seeni – Fought as one of the four Field Commanders in the Adinimole War

Jagbara – Commanded the Fulani Division in the Adinimole War

Usman Ajikobi – One of Ilorin's four Warlords that fought in the Adinimole War

Mayaki – From the Gobir area, was one of Ilorin's notable warriors.

Other Field Commanders were: Bamidele, Asaaju, Mogaji Ogidi-Agba, Dad Asikuri, Esinrogunjo, Apamadarisi, Akala, Zarumi Ologbondoroko, Ikumejakako, Lanmagada, Magaji Yaba, Bijooro Ita-Goma, Mejindadi Gbaagba, Magaji Akaaba, Magaji Alausa, Magaji Aloba, Magaji Olomoda, Giwa Popo, Afunku, Kongborilojuogun, Ajaya Opele, Egbeedogbon, Ajia Ogbonde, Balógun Aafin Manma Kuri, Magaji Abudu Lateju, Balógun BÀàre , Balógun

Fulani Jonkoo, Gbaagba, Magaji Kure, Mejindadi Okelele, Omo Otin Mejindadi, Jaji Isale-Aluko, First Alfa Isale-Koto, Oloje, Jagaba, Balógun Alli Inakoju, Ajia Ali, Shuaib Danmurogo, Ìlàri Ogun, Afiru-esin-digun, Abiiba, Abibu, Bankubi, Ajayi Asaloffa and several others too numerous to mention in this study.