VIOLENT CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICE IN RWANDA

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Abstract

Rwanda witnessed devastating conflicts leading to genocidal attacks in 1994 with active participation of the police in the pogrom. Various reports implicated the police in high-handedness, torture, extra judicial killings, intimidation, rape, and other heinous crimes during the conflicts. The police force was reformed for optimal performance. This paper examines the impact of the post-conflict reconstruction of the police on internal security management in Rwanda. Findings from the study, which relied on secondary data, are that reform impacted positively on the performance of the police, sharpening its skills in crime detection and prevention and leading to improved security for lives and property in Rwanda. Over-reliance on dwindling external sources and dysfunctional equipment still undermines maximum performance by the police. There should be adequate provision of advanced security devices and better funding of the police for the optimal discharge of their constitutional mandates of securing lives and property in Rwanda.

Introduction

Within the international system, violent conflict has remained a primary tool of societal destruction and the object of conflict management, peace-building and global socio-economic and political reconstruction.[1] For instance, in the first half of the 20th century, European countries witnessed wars of territorial domination along with two world wars and totalitarian regimes, which profiled the geo-political zone as the most violent region of the world. With the establishment of the Marsall Plan as a post-conflict reconstruction program in 1947, Europe became politically and economically secured and remained a prosperous region within the contemporary global world order. Many African countries have also witnessed protracted conflicts of different dimensions while some are still battling with such internal turmoil over one form of marginalization or the other. Much of the conflict issues in Africa revolve around struggle against colonial domination while others originate from development frustrations, economic

1. Forges Des Alison, "Call to Genocide in Rwanda: The Roles of Radio", in Thomson Allan (ed), The Media and Rwanda Genocide (Kigali: Justice Publishers, 2007), 28.

marginalization, suffocating brutality against political oppositions, political exclusion, and weak ethno-religious configuration, among others.

Beyond the above underlying causes of conflict in Africa, the patrimonial nature of political leadership, which is largely characterized by a politics of patronage rather than services, is constantly at the heart of political violence and conflicts in many African countries. In spite of their internal diversities, sources of conflict in Rwanda and other African countries in the Great Lake region are very similar and could be classified into three categories: unfavorable colonial heritage, chronic bad governance by indigenous rulers, and conflict-generating political systems.[2] The Rwanda conflict in particular is a reflection of the presence of antagonisms among competing ethnic entities, which originate from perceived political and economic marginalization among the two leading ethnic groups; the Hutu and Tutsi. The antagonistic tendencies between the two ethnic groups borders on violent competition for economic resources, strong attachment to ethnic identity, erosion of self-esteem and hindered socio-political and economic opportunities for human development in the country.

Such perceived marginalization and antagonism eventually led to an outbreak of tribal war and genocidal attacks in the country in which approximately 800,000 Rwandese were brutally massacred within 100 days in 1994.[3] It is estimated that in four months, about 1.75 million people, or a quarter of the country's pre-war population, had either died or fled the country. In fact, only the 1970s killings in Cambodia and the 1971 Genocide in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) saw a greater level of genocide that surpassed that of Rwanda.[4]

In relation to the Rwanda genocide, John (2002) posits that:

> "The conflicts in Rwanda are extremely tenacious because the conflict issues revolve around the fundamentals for human survival: land, food, safety, security, identity, recognition, self-esteem and unhindered opportunities for human development as a whole"

Though Rwandan society was dangerously dichotomized due to the politicization of ethnic affiliations, which led to the genocide of 1994, the Rwandan police, along with other security personnel, actively participated in the pogrom against

2. Billy Batware, "Rwanda Ethnic Conflicts: a Historical Look at the Root Causes", M.A Thesis, Peace and Conflict Studies, (European Peace University, Austria, 2012), 14.

3. Amnesty International, "Rwanda and Burundi: Refugees' Return Amidst Rumours and Realities," (February 26, 1996), 8.

4. Amnesty. 24

the Rwandan people they were employed to protect. There were many reports of police high-handedness, torture, extra judicial killings, intimidation, rape and other heinous crimes during the civil war. Conversely, the security sector was also involved in the maintenance of post-conflict reconstruction programmes in the country, having been saddled with the responsibility of sustaining the peace enforcement programs and restoration of law and order.

Prior to the security sector reforms in Rwanda, there were a number of security challenges in the early post-conflict settings in the country which the police were expected to tackle. These challenges included high crime rates, a traumatized and polarized society with mutual suspicion, and a tendency toward revenge and criminal conspiracy between contending parties. There was also the proliferation of small and light weapons and illicit ownership of arms and ammunitions in Rwanda. The country equally witnessed a breakdown of family values and weak social institutions which overwhelmingly undermined law, order, and security. Thus, the post-genocide situation in Rwanda presented overwhelming challenges to the efforts of the police at ensuring a reasonable measure of community security, which led to jungle justice and huge personal and community insecurity in Rwanda. Weakened by emotive ethnic partiality, indiscipline, poor control structures, and dysfunctional equipment—all coupled with accusations of direct killing of perceived enemies—it became necessary to re-organize the police after the restoration of law and order in Rwanda. How to carry out such a reorganization to restore confidence in the security sector became a major challenge for the government because many people had lost confidence in the police to maintain law and order as ethnic suspicion intensified. This paper examines the conflict issues in Rwanda and assesses the impact of the post conflict reconstruction programmes in the country on the Police performances and its implications for security of lives and property in the country. While major studies[5&6] were concentrated on the causes and consequences of the conflict in Rwanda, far fewer studies have been done on the post-conflict reconstructions of the security sector in general and the police in particular. Rwanda occupies a unique position in the middle of the heavily populated western Great Lakes region as a frontline producer of agricultural products. Even though the development process in Rwanda was severely impeded by civil war, the current government is presumed to have achieved post-war stability and economic growth. An exposition of the relative success stories of the reconstruction strategies and the

5. See Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence*, (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2012), 24.

6. See Prunier G, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) 15.

processes in Rwanda's security sector may be replicated in other violent conflict-affected states in Africa. This study adopts a descriptive research design, using secondary data.

Operational Definition of Terms

Violent Conflict: This refers to a form of friction, or discord of the highest order characterized by intense physical warfare, arising within a group or between one group and another.

Reform: Making necessary changes in order to improve something.

Police: This is a security outfit charged with the responsibility of upholding safety, law, and order in a state in order to guarantee the security of lives and property. Police as used in this study is a security institution whose duty is to keep order, arresting people who break the law.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Post-conflict reconstruction is the consolidation of peace and security and the attainment of sustainable socio-economic development in a war-shattered country. The concept is broadly used in this paper as a complex, holistic and multidimensional process encompassing effort to simultaneously improve security, restoration of law and order, upholding all-inclusive political governance, economic rehabilitation, and a social condition of fairness and reconciliation of conflictive parties.

Geographical Boundaries and Socio-Political Profile of Rwanda

The Republic of Rwanda is a sovereign state in the Central Africa sub-region, which achieved its independence in 1962.[7] The country has a land mass of 26,338 square kilometers, consisting of land area of 24,668 square km and water area of 1,670 square km, and a population of about 12 million people, with women constituting about 8,000,000 people . Rwanda's population density of more than 450 people per square kilometer is the highest in Africa.[8] Located in the South of the equator; Rwanda is bounded in the East by Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, to the South, Uganda to the North and Tanzania to the West. Rwanda

7. ATLAS Encyclopedia on African Countries and their Development Indices (Lagos: Atlantic Press, 2011).1

8. ATLAS Encyclopedia, 13.

is part of the African Great Lakes region and she is highly elevated because her topography is dominated by mountains in the West and savannah to the East with numerous lakes in most other parts of the country.

The climatic condition in the country is of high temperature, with two rainy seasons and two dry seasons each year. Rwanda is predominantly characterized by rural population, which is drawn from one cultural and linguistic group; the Banyarwanda, from where three sub- ethnic groups: the Hutu, with 84 percent of the population, Tutsi and Twa with 15 and 1 percent of the population respectively are drawn. The Twa are forest-dwelling pygmy people that were documented to have descended from Rwanda's earliest inhabitants but scholars disagree on the origins and differences between the Hutu and Tutsi having opined that the differences between the three tribes are derived from the former social castes within a single people, in which the Hutu are mainly agricultural laborers while the Tutsis were their landowners, yet other scholars submitted that the Hutu and Tutsi arrived in the country separately, and from different locations. However, both the Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language and practice similar religions of Christianity and Islam, though the Christians are in the majority while they also intermarry.[9] The main language spoken in Rwanda is Kinyarwanda, with English and French serving as official languages while the population coalesced first into clans and then into kingdoms.

Rwanda has a female majority of the ratio of 57 percent as against men's 43 in her national parliament.[10] The Rwandan economy is based mostly on subsistence agriculture, but coffee and tea are the major cash crops for export. The country's economy suffered heavily during the 1994 genocide because people could not produce food crops optimally, leading to poverty and famine. Similarly, after the war, there were massive deforestations, which led to droughts and famine. Tourism, which is now the leading foreign exchange earner in the country, is a fast-growing sector. Rwanda lies at the centre of a very densely populated region that encompasses Rwanda, Burundi, the Kivu region of the Eastern Congo and South-Western Uganda, which shares very similar languages, common culture and a long history of socio-economic and politico-military interactions. Because of the inter-country geographical and cultural affiliations, Rwanda's stability is intimately linked to the stability of this broader region and vice-versa.

9. Lemarch Rene, "A History of Genocide in Rwanda. *The Journal of African History* No. 2 (March, 2007) 307-311.

10. Luc Bonneaux, "Rwanda: A Case of Demographic Entrapment", *Lancet Review*, No 17 (April4, 1994) 4

Rwanda has a Presidential system of Government while the current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) came to office in 2003. The country adopted a multiparty system, which has continued since the 2003 presidential and Parliamentary elections. The Rwandan Patriotic Front is the ruling party. The party was an important actor in the political discourse throughout the transitional period and has continued to play this role since the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections.

These elections marked the conclusion of the nine-year transition to open party political activity at all levels. Rwanda currently has a low corruption index compared to her neighbouring countries, although human rights organizations still report of suppression of opposition groups, intimidation, and restrictions on freedom of speech.

Review of Related Literature

As noted in Newbury Catherine's journal article, "Background to Genocide in Rwanda", violent conflict still remains a major hallmark in African socio-political history. As a radical departure from the previous inter-state conflicts of the cold war era, the author came up with the finding that most of the contemporary conflicts in Africa are characterized more by internal conflicts, especially between different socio-ethnic groups and ethno-religious divides. Newbury further establishes the rampant nature of conflict in Africa having found that out of the eighteen United Nations Peace Keeping Missions across the world between year 2000 and 2013, twelve Mission interventions actually took place or is taking place in Africa. The countries where violent conflicts have or are still taking place as catalogued by the author include Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia and Sierra Leone, among others. In *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, Prunier Gerald identifies conflict Issues in Africa to revolve around violent competition for scarce resources, irreconcilable differences over values, ideologies, politics and religious intolerance, among others. As posited further by the author, conflict has destroyed many African children who would have been future productive adults, and halts sustainable development in the continent as they equally observe that civil wars have negative effects on the economic growth, food production, and infant mortality rate along with school enrolment in the continent due to forceful disruption of socio-economic activities and productive venture.

In *Recovering from Violent Conflict: Regeneration and (Re-) Integration as Elements of Peacebuilding*, Fischer Martina argues that the sustained conflict in Africa has taken its toll on the world resources which ought to be used for developmental purposes in the continent. As indicated by the author, the United Nations Organization (UNO) spent about $82 billion on peace support operations in Africa alone in 2004 while close to $16 billion has been spent on peace building, conflict resolution and demobilization of soldiers between 2004 and 2014 in the continent by other donor agencies, an amount that ought to have been use for developmental projects in the continent. The author posits further that about $460 dollars of the global resources, in the form of direct and indirect foreign investments, have eluded Africa due to perennial conflict in the continent while manipulation of group identity for socio-political and economic aspirations has remained a primary a source of many conflicts in Africa. There is, for example, continued tension between blacks and Arabs in Sudan, and there is a crisis between the Christians and the Muslims in Chad. The manipulation of these identity-based issues by the elites in Africa has thus brought about deep-seated disaffection and suspicion. The result of ethnic manipulation, Adelman Adam and Astri Suhrke argue in *The Rwanda Crisis and Path to Genocide: from Uganda to Zaire*, has been the rise in identity-induced conflict as a platform to compete for the scarce resources. more often than not, bad leadership and authoritarian regimes in Africa have survived on patron-client ties and ethnically and regionally induced divisions amongst the people.

In his thesis, *Rwandan Ethnic Conflicts: A Historical Look at the Root Causes*, Billy Batware argues that complex colonially-induced conflict issues in Africa are being reinforced by border disputes among African countries as witnessed between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Algeria and Morocco, Niger and Chad, and Nigeria and Cameroon. Some of the factors that are responsible for border problems according to the author are attributable to arbitrary partitioning of the African continent without respect for people's culture and history by its former colonial masters. However, since loyalties to ethnic identities are often stronger than those to the state, the attempt to reclaim land earlier ceded to other areas during colonialism by the locals has prompted many conflicts in Africa.

Raji Shittu and Hamzat Ade Ayinde, "The Impact of the Nigeria Police Force on Crime Control in Cross River State," establish the nexus between violent conflict and society policing. As noted by the authors, the central responsibilities of the police towards the society are to prevent, control, and combat violent conflicts and acts of criminality in order to maintain social order, but these tasks have not

been optimally achieved due to internal factors which include low funding of the institution, low wages, and dysfunctional equipment, among others.

Many African citizens have lost faith in the ability of the police to adequately control violent conflict owing to the above factors, among others. Mayan Dogo, in *Focus on the Nigeria Police: The Untold Story* posits that the incapacity of the police to adequately curtail conflict has forced many financially buoyant citizens to take precautionary measures by investing huge financial resources in the construction of heavy security gates and in the hiring of private security personnel in order to wade off criminality from such environment.

Dambazzau Abubakar, in his work *Criminality and Criminal Justice in Nigeria*, submits that there are many stimulants for committing crime in the society, which has raised the difficulty of policing such a society. These stimulants include drug abuse, excessive alcohol intake, and use of hard drugs like cocaine and heroin, which are responsible for most of the serious crimes in Africa, including assaults and rape. Kamali Theophilus in his thesis "Police Reforms in Post Conflict Countries: A Case Study of Rwanda National Police," addresses issues relating to police reform in countries transiting from war to peace and notes that the extent to which a war-torn community is able to establish a security sector that is legitimate and loyal to the state determines the success or failure of the entire peace process.

What has been distilled from the above review is that there are so many factors responsible for conflict in Africa and that police reform for optimal performances is very central to the reconstruction process in any war torn country. However, concerts of internal factors have curtailed the capacity of the police to perform with optimal efficiency in many post conflict reconstructed states.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored in the frustration-aggression and motivation theories. The Frustration-Aggression theory as proposed by John Dollard, Neal Miller Neonard Doob and Robert Sears (1939) as cited in Johan Vander Dennen[11] argues that aggression is often as a result of frustration. The thrust of the theory is that every aggressive behavior is premised on the existence of frustration which always leads to some form of aggression. The theory is an offshoot of the Need Theory, which is premised on the fact that every human being has his primary needs; food, housing clothing and secondary needs; love economic opportunity,

11. Johan Vander Dennen, "Ethnocentrism Revisited: The Badges, Bonds and Boundaries" (Groningen: University Press, 2017), 13.

gainful employment and inclusive political participation to function optimally in the society, and that once those needs are denied, frustration and aggression sets in. Such frustrated minds thus produce instigation to a number of different types of responses, one of which is aggression and violence. In this paper, the recorded conflict in Rwanda is presumed to be a reflection of the presence of antagonisms among competing ethnic entities, which originates from clash of interests and perceived political and economic marginalization between the two leading ethnic groups; the Hutu and Tutsi over intense competition for scarce resources and ethnic values and identity. Thus, the conflicts in Rwanda are extremely tenacious because they revolve around the fundamentals of human life: land, food, safety, security, identity, recognition, self-esteem and unhindered opportunities for human development as a whole. Within this theoretical foundation, the Hutu who have the majority of the population are presumed to have been frustrated and marginalized from the government by the minority Tutsi, who had the initial opportunity to rule Rwanda. Hence, there was the aggression and violence of the frustrated latter tribe towards the former, whom it feels was responsible for its underdevelopment.

The Frusration-Agression theory as adopted for this study is complemented by motivational theory of optimal performance as expanded by McGregor Douglas[12], Mitchell Terence[13] and David McChelland[14], which posited that optimal performance in any task is a function of the interaction between an individual's motivation, ability and work environment.

Motivation also has a psychological orientation which relates to the strength and direction of behaviors when it is stimulated positively or negatively. Thus, people who are highly motivated to achieve certain objectives by being equipped with necessary working tools tend to work hard to achieve such objectives. A less motivated person, who is denied the basic requirement to succeed, often displays less enthusiasm towards achieving the targeted objective of the organization.

In a work context, employees who are underpaid and who can hardly afford to eat properly will be more concerned with earning money elsewhere in order to eat optimally than dedicate their optimal energy to the development of their primary organizations leading to divided loyalty. It would also mean that once employees are reasonably paid and have sufficient job security, they are likely

12. McGregor Douglas, "The Human Side of Enterprise" (New York: Management Review, 1957), 11-13.

13. Mitchell Terence, "Motivation: New Directions for Theory, Research and Practice" (New York: Academy of Management Review, 1982), 14 -18.

14. David McChelland, Human Motivations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 22.

to do a good job and could be motivated to do more. Major defect of motivation theory is that it is rigid and sees every individual's needs as the same. Various factors such as social background, upbringing, standard of education and state of mind affect people's level of needs and motivation. In spite of the limitations, the motivational theory is capable of establishing the nexus between the reform of the Rwandan police and its effects on the performance of the force having presumed that the pre-genocide police force was motivated to participate in the 1994 pogrom because of poor welfare by the central authorities which pre-deposed them to participate in the genocide to amass war booty for personal resource sufficiency. However, this paper presumed that the post war reconstructed personnel of the Rwandan police were well motivated as part of the reconstruction programme, which in turn is presumed to have brought about their improved performances.

Causes of Violent Conflicts in Rwanda

The Rwandan civil war dated back to the colonial rule of 1884-1962, which enthroned antagonistic and dissimilar divisions between the two principal ethnic groups; Hutu and Tutsi in the country[15]. From 1884 until the end of World War I, Rwanda, along with Burundi and the present-day Tanzania, was part of German East Africa. Belgium claimed the territory thereafter by becoming the administering authority of the geographical entity from 1924 to 1962. During their colonial tenure, the Germans and Belgians ruled Rwanda indirectly through Tutsi monarchs and their chiefs. The colonialists developed the Hermitic hypothesis or myth, which held that the Tutsi and everything humanly superior in Central Africa came from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia.

The Europeans regarded Hutu and Twa—about 3 percent of the population—as inferior to Tutsi. Sixty years of such prejudicial fabrications inflated Tutsi egos inordinately and crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex. As revealed by Mahmood, during 1933-34, the Belgians conducted a census and introduced an identity card system that segregated the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa ethnicities. The identity card was determined by patriarchal lineage as all persons were designated as having the ethnicity of their fathers, regardless of the ethnicity of their mothers. Until its abolition by the 1994 post-genocide government, this practice had the unfortunate consequence of firmly attaching a sub-national identity and consciousness to most Rwandans and thereby rigidly dividing them into categories, which, for many people,

15. Billy Batware, "Rwanda Ethnic Conflicts: A Historical Look at the Root Causes": Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies, (European Peace University, Austria, 2012) 28

carried a negative history of dominance-subordination, superiority, inferiority, and exploitation-suffering of other tribes by the Tutsi. In their "Hutu Manifesto" of 1957, Hutu leaders referred to the identity card categories as "races," which thereby evinced how inflexible these labels had become in their minds. In fact, Hutu and Tutsi spoke the same language, intermarried and practice similar religions, which made the Hutu to feel that there was no need for any form of discrimination between the two ethnic groups. In November 1959, the pro-Hutu (PARMEHUTU) party led a revolt that led to a bloody ethnic clashes and the toppling of King Kigri of Tutsi descent. By 1963, the attacks by the Hutu had led to thousands of Tutsi deaths and the flight of about 130,000 Tutsi to the neighboring countries of Burundi, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Uganda. The land and cattle that the fleeing pastoral Tutsi left behind were illegally claimed by horticultural Hutu. Supported by the Tutsi-dominated government in Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo, Tutsi refugees in the two countries launched unsuccessful attacks on Rwanda.

These invasions were followed by brutal Hutu reprisals against local Tutsi for allegedly collaborating with their kit and kin in Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo against the Rwanda government. The Hutu government used a failed 1963 invasion by Tutsi rebel from the Democratic Republic of Congo as a pretext to launch massive wave of repression against the Tutsi between December 1963 and January 1964, in which an estimated 10,000 Tutsi were slaughtered[16]. Many surviving Tutsi politicians still living in Rwanda then were executed[17]. In July 1973, Major Juvénal Habyarimana, a Northern Hutu, overthrew Kayibanda, a Southerner, and declared himself President of the second republic. Over the next few years, his security forces eliminated former President Kayibanda and many of his high-ranking supporters as part of a plan to eradicate serious political opposition. Habyarimana's kin and regional supporters filled high level positions in the government and security forces. Close relatives of President Juvénal and his wife dominated the army, gendarmerie, and the Presidential Guard. Habyarimana's Rwanda became a single-party dictatorship. He relegated the Tutsi to the private sector while government regulations and policies prohibited Hutu army personnel from marrying Tutsi. Habyarimana also maintained the "ethnic" identity card and "ethnic" quota systems of the previous regime. By the mid-1980s, the number of Rwandan refugees of Tutsi descendants

16. Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 364.

17. Prunier Gunel, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*,(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) 38.

in neighboring countries because of suffocating brutality at home had surpassed 1.5 million people. Thousands more were forcefully dispersed to Europe and North America. Habyarimana adamantly refused to allow their return, insisting that Rwanda was already too crowded and had too little land, jobs and food for them. However, the surrounding countries were also poor and had insufficient resources to accommodate both their own citizens and large refugee populations from Rwanda. Rwandan Tutsi refugees of Rwandan origin in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and committed themselves to return to Rwanda. Between 1990 and 1993, the RPF troops conducted a number of military assaults into Rwanda from Uganda in unsuccessful attempts to seize power. The fighting caused the displacement of over 200,000 Tutsi. Habyarimana retaliated by heightening internal repression against the Tutsi within. From 1990 to 1992, Hutu ultra-nationalists killed an estimated 5,000 Tutsi.

According to John and Carol Berry[18] owing to European pressure, especially from France, the Rwandan government allowed political parties and press freedom in the early 1990s. Despite strong opposition from the growing Hutu Power movement, Habyarimana's government signed series of agreements, including the Arusha Accords with the RPF that agrees on a power-sharing government, which allowed for the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, and the integration of Tutsi into the armed forces. The RPF was to constitute 40 percent of the integrated military forces and 50 percent of its officer corps. For most Hutu elites, the Accords amounted to a political suicide while Hutu Power brokers saw this agreement as treason. If the Accords were implemented, many Hutu elites in the government and the military would lose their privileged positions. Within days of its signing, *Radio Milles Collines*, a new, private station, began broadcasting anti-Accord and anti-Tutsi diatribes from Kigali.

The immediate cause of the genocide in Rwanda was linked to the unfortunate incident of the 6th of April 1994, when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down at Kigali airport, killing him and the Burundian President as they returned from Arusha. These events unleashed planned genocide; beginning with the first massacres in the city of Kigali, which was led by the Presidential Guards and involving the FAR Army troops, the National Police and the Hutu militias.

Within eight days after the incident, over 100,000 people, who were mainly Tutsi and moderate Hutu, had been killed. Less than half an hour after the plane crash, roadblocks manned by Hutu militiamen, assisted by gendarmerie (paramilitary police) and military personnel were set up to identify Tutsis.

18 John Berry and Carol Pott Berry, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory*. (Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1999) 42 .

Later, the Rwanda Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect her were murdered by Rwandan soldiers in an attack on her home. After the massacre of its troops, Belgium withdrew the rest of its force while the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) reduced its force from an initial 2,165 to 270. In June 22, 1994; the UN Security Council authorized French-led forces to mount a humanitarian mission in Rwanda. The mission, Operation Turquoise, saved many civilians in southwest Rwanda but was also said to have allowed soldiers, officials and militiamen involved in the genocide to flee Rwanda through the areas under their control. Radio stations played important roles in inciting citizens to take part in the massacre of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Two major stations, which included Radio Rwanda and Radio Television des Milles Collines (RTLM), were documented by Raji and Abdulkadir to have transmitted hate propaganda, especially to the illiterate masses.

One particular program from the RTLM radio station referred to the Tutsi as human cockroaches that should immediately be exterminated from the earth. Radio Rwanda; the official government owned radio station, was barred from continuing to disseminate hate propaganda in the second Arusha accord by all conflictive parties. This ban on the official radio station to transmit hate speeches led the Hutu power brokers around President Habyarimana to establish the RTLM as a private radio station. The station, which largely encouraged phone-in and participatory radio program, was used by Hutu leaders from October 1993 to late 1994 to advance an extremist pro-Hutu positions and anti-Tutsi propaganda. The propaganda, spread the fear of Tutsi genocide against the Hutu, and identified specific Tutsi target areas where they could be found and attacked. The RTLM exhort the Hutu to rise up in self defense against their Tutsi neighbors. The station broadcast racist rhetoric, which justifies violence against Tutsi. In spite of the Arusha accord, which banned the broadcast and transmission of hate speeches by radio stations in Rwanda, Radio Rwanda began to advance hate messages in April 1994, speaking for the national authorities and issuing directives on how and where to found and kill Tutsi while congratulating those who had obeyed this order to kill. In practice however, killing of the Tutsi gave the opportunity to the militias to loot Tutsi homes, farms, offices, businesses, churches, and so on. Thus, theft was one of the principal weapons used to bribe the Hutu into betraying and killing their neighbors.

To curtail violent uprising in Rwanda, a transitional Government of National Unity (GNU), established after the genocide of 1994 took extensive crisis prevention measures in the spirit of collective security as it introduced fundamental changes

that eventually led to the reconciliation of the aggrieved parties and helped the country to build a new nation whose citizens has been living in relative harmony. The reconstruction programme also focused on the reforms of the security sector generally and the Rwanda Police in particular with the primary aim of optimal improvement of the security of lives and property in Rwanda.

Post Conflict Reconstruction and its Impact on the Socio-Economic and Political Development in Rwanda

The political and socio-economic profiles of Rwanda, especially after the 1994 genocide, were negatively affected while the country continued to deal with the consequences of the uprising. To start with, the pre-war Rwanda state system was characterized by poor and undemocratic governance, and politics of exclusion, especially of the majority Hutu population from decision-making processes by the minority Tutsi. There was also the problem of concentration of political and economic powers in the Centre, to the detriment of the development of the subordinate political units. There was little participation by women and youth in the political economy processes to advance their personal and group development aspiration optimally. Prisons were overcrowded with people languishing in the cell for years without charges or trial. Corruption was rife while organized crime took control of much of what was left of post genocide Rwanda. Landmines posed continuing danger, inhibiting freedom of movement and economic activity. These challenges were very protracted in the immediate post war Rwanda. To address the above lapses, a transitional Government of National Unity (GNU), which was established after the genocide of 1994, has taken extensive crisis prevention measures in the spirit of collective security as it introduced fundamental changes that eventually led to the reconciliation of the aggrieved parties. To promote all inclusive political governance, Rwanda adopted a multiparty system, which has continued since the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. These elections marked the conclusion of the nine-year transition to open party political activity at all levels. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was an important actor in the political discourse throughout the transitional period, is the ruling party. The post genocide government of Rwanda has also addressed issues of political marginalization at local level by decentralizing political power from the central government to the subordinate units in year 2000, which made it possible for the subordinate units to have their own legislative, executive and the judicial arms of government and elect their local officers. Originally, the decentralization process was conceived for a period

of 15 years and was to be implemented in three consecutive phases, consisting of institutional set-up from year 2000 to 2003, consolidation phase from year 2004 to 2008, and the optimization phase from 2009 to 2015. Because of resource and capacity constraints, the implementation schedule was revised where the first phase of devolution of power from the central government to the local levels from 2001-2005 was devoted to decentralization of general administration while the second phase from 2006-2011 focused on decentralization of local tax collection and its utilization and control by the local administration. The third phase of governance reform slated between 2012-2018 consolidated and strengthened administrative capacities for good governance at the local level through staff training. A Common Development Fund was also established between the central and local administration to finance developmental projects of the decentralized entities while the central government channels 15 percent of the national budget to the districts for its special needs and releases the statutory funds earmarked for the districts promptly. The Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities was also created to represent the interests of the districts at the central level, thus promoting participatory governance in Rwanda.

While Rwanda has made remarkable progress in the democratic process, the process has matured further by empowering political parties through training and financial aids to run for elections. Women have also been reasonably incorporated into the Rwanda's political and administrative structure with impressive percentages of their numerical strength of more than 50 percent. They now occupy more than half the seats in the National Assembly where they are in the majority while also having almost one third of the portfolios in the post conflict reconstructed government. To address the legacy of the 1994 genocide and the armed conflict that preceded it, which has weighed heavily on the socio- economic recovery of Rwanda, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) of 1995 has reasonably dealt with the conflict within the Rwandan society leading to relative unity and genuine reconciliation among conflictive parties[19].

Between 1999 and year 2000, NURC re-integrated over 300,000 orphans with their extended families countrywide. Their re-integration reduced social stress and psychological depression of losing close relatives to the war. The establishment of Gacaca courts, which were established to prosecute and punish those involved in political crimes and genocide of 1994 has restore confidence in the justice system in Rwanda. The reconciliation committee equally organized

19. Kagame Paul, "*The Unity of Rwandans: Before the Colonial Period, Under Colonial Rule and within the First Republic*", Presidential Speech, Kigali Review (August, 2014) 4.

reconciliatory meetings between many released perpetrators; including release prisoners, and their victims to forget the past and forge ahead in unity an unreserved love for one another. This effort has positively transformed th mindset of many Rwandese from confrontation to collaboration for nationa development. Rwanda has also made a remarkable transition of her war- torn economy to a robust one. The 1994 genocide had earlier destroyed Rwanda's fragile economic base, along with a large share of its human capital while also wiping out her ability to attract private investment because of the prevailing state of insecurity in the country then.

Close to eight hundred thousand economically productive Rwandese died and many fled the country. This negative scenario increased poverty dramatically, particularly among women, reaching 78 percent in 1995. In her reconstruction programmes, the government of Rwanda has focused more on rebuilding her economic institutions, which led to significant improvements in economic outcomes and positive socio-economic indicators in the country. Consequent upon extensive post conflict economic and governance reform measures, which was taken between 1995 and 2008, Rwanda recorded an annual GDP growth rate averaged of over 8.6 percent since 1999 while; the proportion of poor people had declined from 90 percent to 47 percent in 2013. Child mortality, which had reached more than 300 per 1,000 live births after the genocide decreased to 103 per 1,000 in 2013. Substantial progress has also been made in stabilizing and rehabilitating the Rwandan economy. By 1998, the country's GDP had recovered its pre-1994 level, with the post-conflict reconstruction programmes being responsible for an initial boom. In this boom era, GDP growth rates averaged 10.5 per year between 1996 and 2002. As the economy moved into the full recovery phase, an annual growth average of 7.1 percent between 2003 and 2013 was recorded while inflation has remained relatively lower at 6-7 percent per year between 2004 and 2014. Rwanda has made substantial progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNDP, 2014) as primary school enrollment reached 95 percent in 2014, from 67 percent in 1990, and completion rates increased to 55 percent in 2014. Rwanda's Immunization rates at 98 percent are among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa as of 2014. The HIV prevalence in the country, which stood at 3 percent in 2013, recorded a decrease from the 9 percent rates of 1993 during the civil war. Over the past four years, the percentage of the population with access to safe water has almost doubled from 44 percent in 2003 to 84 percent in 2013. The achievements recorded in the political and socio-economic sector helped to facilitate successful reforms in the security sector in Rwanda because of the relative political stability, which

provided a peaceful reform atmosphere and a relative buoyant economy to fund the security sector reform.

Post War Reconstruction of the Security Sector in Rwanda

Many security personnel participated in the genocide against the Rwandan people they were employed to protect. The first major massacres in the city of Kigali immediately after the death of President Habyarimana in a plane crash, was led by the Presidential Guards, the Rwanda Army troops and the National Police, which led to the killing of over 20,000 people who were mainly of Tutsi descendants within six days. The security sector was also involved in the reconciliatory and reconstruction programmes in Rwanda as they were used as peace enforcer within the reconciliation program. Prior to the security sector reforms, there were a number of challenges in the early post conflict Rwandan settings that overwhelmed the state security apparatus. There was virtual breakdown of security institutions both in discipline and institutional capacity to manage and prevent crime with dire consequences for law and order. Thus, the post-genocide Rwanda presented overwhelming challenges to efforts at ensuring any reasonable measure of justice and respect for human rights, which led to jungle justice and huge personal and community insecurity in the country. There was also the problem of rural- urban migration during the war due to the prevailing state of insecurity in the rural areas as many people migrated to the capital city[20].

Since most of the forced migrants to the cities could not be employed to earn decent living, urban crime; such as robbery, drug trafficking, theft, prostitution, among others increased. Large numbers of weapons remained hidden among the population while genocide survivors lived under constant fear of being killed in reprisals attack and as a way of destroying evidences. Under the tensed situation, Insurgents were still roaming in parts of the country, criminal activities were still intense; guns still proliferated in the population resulting in a relatively high level of insecurity. There was continued sorrow, hatred and genocide ideology, leading to further continuous killings of many genocide survivors. The war had devastated the country and this came as a challenge to both security agencies and the government. Due to the above security challenges, among others, the Rwanda National Security Strategic Plan (2004-2008) was inaugurated to design

20. Kamali Theophilus, "Police Reforms in Post Conflict Countries: A Case Study of Rwanda National Police (1994-2005). Master Thesis. Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) (University of Nairobi, Kenya, 2015) 22-34

and carry out the security sector reform in the country. The strategic plan cent on the reforms of the Rwandan Military and the Police and it revolves aroun the resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants back into the society. Othe central foci of the security sector reforms included the recruitment and trainin of new security forces, introduction of community policing, demilitarization an civilization of the Rwanda security personnel, and structural reorganization of th Command structure of the security forces. While the legacy of the genocide attack of 1994 still remains an unfavorable historical antecedent in the security secto and the country at large, Rwanda has made good progress toward the resettlement, demobilization and reintegration of her ex-combatants into the society as about 15,000 members of the rebel army have been integrated into the Rwandan National Army. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) entered its 3rd phase between August 1, 2009 and June 30, 2013.

The program demobilized up to 5,500 combatants from armed groups, including approximately 500 child soldiers while there was another demobilization of 4,000 members of the Rwandan Defence Forces (ISSAT, 2013). Each combatant receives an initial sum of RwF 60,000 (approximately US$ 95) while individual combatant become eligible for Recognition-of-Service and permanent Allowance after one month based on their former rank on discharge. There was also a reintegration grant of RwF 120,000 or about $380 designed to assist individual ex-soldiers in setting up a livelihood. All members of armed groups and the RDF receive this grant three-month after demobilization.

As part of the security sector reforms, the Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) offered training and research programs relevant to post-conflict challenges in the country, whose goal was to enhance regional capacity for conflict prevention and management. In 2012, the RPA hosted a SSR course that drew 30 participants from regional military, police, and civilian institutions in Rwanda (RPA, 2012). The above measured helped to refocus the Rwandan police on their primary responsibility and constitutional mandate of securing lives and property in the country.

The Post War Reconstruction of the Rwanda Police

The Rwandan National Police was created by the Presidential Order 105/04 of 1962 and was placed under the command of the Ministry of Defense and Police. There was also the creation of the Communal Police (Police Communale) in Rwanda in November 23, 1963 to police local communities. In 1973, the Police was amalgamated for efficiency and reduction in the running cost, by collapsing the National Police Force with the Communal Police to form the National

Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), by the decree of January 25, 1974. To complement the efforts of the Gendarmerie was the establishment of the Rwandan Municipality Police Force in the same year to secure Kigali and its environ. The Code of Organization and Judicial Competence (COJC) in Rwanda also created a body of Police Inspectors of Judicial procedure (called the Judicial Police Inspectors) in 1980 to work under the Ministry of Justice with the responsibility of probing criminal offences and gathering evidences for the prosecution of offenders by the Public Prosecutor. The year 2000 witnessed the establishment of the Rwanda National Police, which merged the Gendarmerie and Judicial Police Inspectors. The Government combined the work of the Municipal Police, the National Gendarmerie and Judicial Police in order to strengthen and co-ordinate the process of policing the country, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The formation of the new National Police had five primary objectives of proper utilization of the human and material resources, harmonization of administrative and operational procedures in the police, uniformity in training, and harmonious approach to the fight against crime; and, greater efficiency and productivity in providing police services to the community. The formation of the new Rwanda National Police was therefore one of such reforms that the government undertook to promote efficient and harmonized police services in the country through coordinated command and amalgamated crime management strategy.

Apart from the general security sector reforms through the 2004 action plan, the Rwanda National Police Strategic action plan (2004-2009) was specifically designed to promote efficiency in the Force. The processes of police reform included consultations among various stakeholders to suggest how best the police could perform optimally. In the strategic plan, the vision of Rwanda National Police was identified to include making Rwandans and foreigners feel safe from security threat and to provide safe and crime free environment for all. This strategic plan was to guide police interventions in security management for optimal performances. By the lapse of the five years of the national police security action plan in 2009, critical evaluations were made to improve the plan of action. In this improved Strategic Plan, a number of new intervention programmes were identified to include crime reduction strategies, improving road safety, combating terrorism, enhancing democratic community policing and ensuring security in Gacaca courts. However, the entire National Police Strategic action plan of 2004-2009 revolves around strategies bordering on recruitment and training, community policing, demilitarization and civilization

programme, command and organization structure and improved staff welfare. They are discussed further below[21].

In the areas of recruitment and training, the civil war in Rwanda had led to the death of over 4,000 police officers, demobilization of close to 1,000 injured police personnel and increased crime rates from the pre-war figure of about 26 percent to the post war rate of 87 percent. The above post conflict security profile in Rwanda underlined the dire need to increase the number of police personnel and their skills through continuous recruitment and training, which made the police to recruit about 2,000 officers in 1995. By the end of 2004, 900 recruits underwent training. As part of the reform agenda also, police recruitment emphasized representation from the Rwandan regional and ethnic diversities and gender sensitivity, with recruitment drives targeting the whole country. The Rwanda Police Statute and Presidential Order number 30/01 of 09/07/2012 also emphasizes gender considerations for recruitment, for which the Rwanda National Police has continued to promote. The initial training mainly aimed at providing the basic skills necessary for police officers to execute their general duties. However, it was soon evident that further specialized training was required to enhance skills to provide for specialized police duties. These duties included road traffic security management, Canine police services, fire fighting and various branches of criminal investigations such as homicide and arson.

Furthermore, there was the training of middle level security managers within the rank and files of the middle range officers. The National Police took advantage of the bilateral cooperation between Rwanda and other countries to send its officers abroad for advanced managerial skills. As part of the bilateral training programme, 56 officers were trained in Zimbabwe in the year 2000 while about 160 other officers went for training in Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, Canada, Germany, Sweden and the United States.

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) initially assisted in training the recruits and the cadets before the National Gendarmerie took full mantle of training and equipping the police with the necessary skills in 2009. During that period, 919 gendarmes and 750 police officers received training. The UNDP was also instrumental to the training of the Rwanda police as part of the country reconstruction programmes[22]. There were two levels of training with the assistance of the UNDP. The Rwanda Police Academy offered cadet officers a specialized training in various aspect of policing with financial

21. Rwanda National Police, "Towards Optimal Security in Rwanda" (Third Quarter Police Report, 2007), 4.

22. Rwanda National Police Report, 6

assistance from the UNDP while the Basic Police Training School at Gishari trains the constables and offers refresher programs to Non-commissioned officers with UNDP technical input. The UNDP had helped in rehabilitating Gishari Police Training School and also bought classroom equipment for the school. The Program also assisted in training 26 Trainers of Trainers and also trained 2,500 additional Communal Police with special emphasis on respect for human rights, lawful treatment of detainees and arrest procedures in accordance with the laws of Rwanda and international protocols.

The UNDP funded the provision of uniforms and ID badges to ensure easy identification and accountability of all police officers in Rwanda. Within the post conflict reconstruction programmes also, efforts were initiated to refocus and repackage community policing towards the protection of national interests unlike the parochial ethnic interests of the past. The communal police was re-established in 1995 under the Ministry of Interior and Communal Development while the Rwanda Constitution of 2003, as amended, sets out police principles which form the basis for community policing. Article 170 of the Constitution stipulates that the National Police must collaborate with the community to serve the people on the basis of harmonious collaboration between the National Police and the community which it serves. The total number of communal police personnel had risen from the 586 of the pre war era to 1,750 as of 2013 and their focus is to detect crime in their local community and prosecute suspects.

The police was also mandated to collaborate with the local communities in detecting and controlling crime. The National Police equally decentralized police command structure and posting procedure to enable them work with the local community in seeking solutions to their particular security problems. While recognizing that security is indispensable for national development, the National Security Policy Paper (2004) designed that cooperation between security bodies and the community should form the core strategy for crime prevention in Rwanda. It also emphasizes the need to enhance public sensitization, engage the community in the maintenance of security apparatus through public and private funding of its operations while also encouraging and expanding private security industry with a responsibility to scrutinize its functions.

The post-conflict security reconstruction in Rwanda also featured a program on the demilitarization and civilization of the police as part of its reform agenda. In the reorganization process, over 6,000 officers and men of the former Gendarmerie who were certified as largely unfit into the new police structure were transferred to the Army while 3,000 others, especially the seriously injured and physically deformed officers and men who could not fit into the

army were demobilized. In addition, the sophisticated arms and ammunitions that were owned by the Gendarmerie police, which did not fit into the roles of newly civilianized vision of democratic policing, which centre on protecting the populace with minimum force, were handed over to the army. As part of the civilization program too, police personnel are being prosecuted and tried by civil courts system rather than military martial laws of the war era. However, in the case of treason charges, the police Gendarmerie are prosecuted in the military courts along with the Army as part of the post conflict reformed Rwanda. The National Police personnel now wear civil police ranks as part of the civilization process. For instance, a Gendarmerie Major in the pre-war years now carries the Rank of Superintendent of Police (SP) while Captain carries the rank of Chief Inspector of Police (CIP). There was also a change in the uniform and insignias of the Rwanda police while a Department of Community-Police Relation has been established in virtually all police divisions as an avenue to complain of human right abuses against the police by civilian population.

Where the National Gendarmerie police structure of the pre-conflict period was highly hierarchical, the post-conflict structure in the Rwanda National Police was less bureaucratic, as some urgent decisions could be made at lower administrative levels. The organogram of the Rwanda police as restructured in the post conflict reconstruction programme comprise the Commissioner-General, who is the chief crime controller in the country, and he is assisted in this task by the Deputy Commissioner- General, and Commanders of different police units. Each regional police unit was sub- divided into district police units, police stations and police posts. Every level of territorial unit had a commander and other staff officers. These were the Crime investigation officer, Traffic police officer, Crime intelligence officer, and General duty police officers. Each specialized or unit commanding officer is being assisted by his second in command, intelligence officer, commanders of different squads and commanders of sections. They were also assisted by, commissioned and non-commissioned officers and police constables to carry out technical and operational tasks. Administrative staff, including Directors and support personnel in the administrative and technical units also supports the police at the national, regional and unit levels as well as in the police schools. The welfare of officers and men in the police were also enhanced as the least paid Rwanda police officer earns a monthly salary of $150 compared to their pre-war salary of $70. In line with the National Policy on gender promotion, the Police High Council, which handles the employment, discipline and promotion of officers, was empowered to initiate special promotions for female officers before their statutory years of promotion. The police officers also

have free access to barrack accommodations while their children are enrolled in Police Schools virtually free of tuition fees. The Rwanda government has also rebuilt over 700 police infrastructures damaged during the war, which included building of police stations and police barracks in 2003 while the UN provided funding to build additional classrooms and student accommodation for 100 officers. DfID also funded additional 30 Hostels at the cost of US$2.4 million for 300 police students in training (DfID, 2010). Financial support was also given to the Police Hospitals to construct additional administrative units. Necessary furniture racks and cupboards for the store and other office requirements were supplied by DfID. Most existing police buildings in Rwanda were repainted while computers, photocopiers, television sets, video cameras and generators, among others were provided to facilitate better working condition for the police in most stations. In 2001, DfID supplied vehicles and communications equipment and technical assistance to support police operation in Rwanda. It should also be noted that in 1998, the German Government provided 20 jeep vehicles to the Rwanda police to aid their beat patrol, which ultimately increased police visibility and improved police response to crimes in Rwanda.

The Impact of the Reform of the Rwanda Police on Service Delivery

Following the reform of the Rwandan police, the public image of the institution and its service delivery have improved with overwhelming loyalty to the country unlike in the pre- war era when many police personnel were loyal to their tribes. There is improved security in the country, which has increased the confidence of both local and foreign investors to invest more while such sense of improved internal security has greatly improved tourists to the country, leading to a favorable growth rate of a ten-year annual average of 7.9 percent.[23] Welfare issues have been pertinent in the post conflict reform of the Rwanda police as over one hundred increase in their salary and barracks accommodation, transportation, health insurance and soft loan, among others have boost their moral, leading to improved performances. The strategy of looking beyond the Rwanda borders for the training of its police officers has created a cluster of local training capacity for the Rwanda Police to effectively carry out its own training programmes, which were locally managed largely by the pool of Rwanda officers trained abroad. The National Police started training its own cadet officers locally at the Rwanda Police Academy in Egena where it graduated the first set on September 28, 2002.

23. Rwanda National Police Report, 10

The provision of ICTs gadgets as part of the reform efforts has overwhelmingly improved the response capacity of the Rwanda police to crime control. With the availability of forensic laboratory, the Rwanda police currently have the capacity to confirm criminal acts very swiftly. The introduction of technology into policing in Rwanda as part of the reform process has also minimized crime in Rwanda. On the average the crime rates have overtime been controlled by 10 percent reduction as of 2014. The Rwanda National Police has over time expanded ICT applications both in coverage and usage while most Police stations in the provinces are now connected to the Police Headquarters through a Wide Area Network (WAN) having taken advantage of the Government policy of increasing ICT coverage in the country through the installation of broad band fiber optics. In general, internet penetration dedicated specifically for police duties along other security agencies has grown from less than 1 percent in 1994 to 13 percent at the end of December 2013. In addition to the existing ICT infrastructure, investment in a 4G LTE network has increased security monitoring in Rwanda to at least 75 percent by the end of 2016.

The Police Wide Areas Network (WAN) has improved timely information sharing between the police stations and the Police Headquarters; this enhances the process of decision making and swift reaction to acts of insecurity. The use of ICT by the police continues to be a useful tool in fighting crime in Rwanda. For instance, social media has become a platform for disseminating particulars of criminals, including their photos so that any time such criminals are seen by the citizens, police is immediately informed leading to their consequent apprehensions. ICT has also continued to be helpful in traffic management by the Rwanda police, especially in the area of driving license record management, traffic exams management, communication between the traffic department and citizens being examined on line, among others. After the introduction of police reform in Rwanda, general crime rates have progressively reduced from 213,956 cases in 1994 to 82,024 in 2014. The community policing as introduced as part of the reformation of the police in Rwanda has promoted all inclusive participation in security management at the local level through a decentralization process, whereby local communities are empowered in the decision making process concerning their security needs. The strong partnerships between the police and the community and the consensus problem solving approach applied by the police with the communities have been paramount in re-building police–public trust that was lost during the time of genocide.

Community policing was successful, especially in fighting domestic violence because of their relative closeness to the families at the village level. The

wandese have now been mobilized against domestic violence to such an extent at virtually every citizen took it upon himself/herself to intervene and question y neighbor who is seen to be molesting other family members, and if need be call for police intervention. Hotlines were provided to Rwandese for police to e alerted on such issues, for example police emergency hotline - 112, Criminal vestigation, and Gender-based violence hotline - 3512. The creation of the spectorate Services Unit in the Rwanda National police to check corrupt ndencies within the force has enhanced transparency and accountability in ublic policing in Rwanda.

Challenges Confronting Police Reform in Rwanda

A major challenge that confronts police reform in Rwanda borders on lack of adequate constitutional framework, conceptual and implementation gaps between the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the broader governance framework and lack of adequate institutional mechanisms for making the reform process accountable to the Rwandese. In addition, there is inadequate parliamentary oversight to check the excesses of the police while there is inadequate civil society involvement in the security sector reform process to monitor the essence of its optimal performance. The Global Conflict Watch (2013) found that even though the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, and reintegration of former police combatants in Rwanda is an essential part of the post war reconstructions, this programme became difficult to attain due to the devastation of the resource base of the war torn country. Under this difficult circumstance, many war combatants, with free access to arms and ammunitions have eventually transited as cross-border terrorists and armed robbers, thereby posing more security threats to many adjoining countries to Rwanda. Although training of police personnel is an important aspect of police reforms in post conflict situations, most of the assistance given in post conflict settings in Rwanda by development partners was more of training than provision of requisite equipment. This challenge has curtailed optimal implementation of the training programme. For instance, many officer got specialized training on collection of evidence at the scene of crime but do not have enough forensic equipment to confirm such evidences for optimal accuracy; thus, the skills so attained were largely rendered redundant. Even though their wages have been doubled, many police personnel in Rwanda still see their salary as not being adequate because of ever increasing inflation in the country. This situation has continued to aid corruption in the police service and has continued to have negative impact on crime prevention in the country.

Even though Police members are trained to serve the population with integrity, there are some individual officers and men who are deviants. The role of the Inspectorate Department include receiving complaints from the public against the police members and punished erring officers to promote high standards of honesty, integrity and ethical behavior. However, the challenge so identified with Human rights and police discipline is the very fact that such acts of indiscipline are being investigated by fellow police officers with bias tendencies to shield their colleagues in many instances. The above challenges have negated the post war reform of the Rwanda police and curtailed its optimal performances.

Conclusion

This paper examined the impact of post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda on its Police Force. It was confirmed that about one million people were murdered and over a million more were dispersed as refugees in the country in the 1994 genocidal attacks with the participation of the Rwandan police along other security forces in the pogrom. To reposition the Police for optimal performance as the primary institution responsible for internal security, it was reformed as part of the overall reconstruction programme in Rwanda. The study concluded that the conflict in Rwanda was ignited by antagonisms among competing ethnic entities in the country, which originated from violent and ceaseless competition for economic resources between the two leading ethnic groups; Hutu and Tutsi. Other identified sources of conflict in Rwanda included strong attachment to ethnic identity, erosion of self-esteem and hindered socio-political and economic opportunities for human development. The police reforms in Rwanda was characterized by replenishing the police strength through recruitment and training that emphasized the restoration of human rights ,improved security atmosphere and restoration of trust between the police and the communities. The reform has improved the initiative of the Rwanda police on crime management and sharpened their skills on crime detection. The study concluded that the reform of the police in Rwanda was reasonably successful but with challenges that included dwindling funding of its operations.

Recommendations

Though the reformation of the Rwanda police has yielded positive result, a massive deployment of resources should be undertaken to support the program. Such resources are needed in the area of further training of the Force

and education of the civilian stakeholders on their responsibility towards the police. The government should provide sufficient materials such as more utility vehicles, communication gadgets. Regional cooperation in fighting cross border and organized crimes should be intensified between Rwanda and her neighbors to curtail cross-border crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and car hijacking. Similarly, Community Policing should be intensified to curtail crimes from the grassroots levels in the country.

More modern equipment should be provided to enhance optimal operational efficiency in the country. Specifically, more Closed Circuit Cameras (CCTV), which monitors criminal tendencies, should be provided. There should be acquisition of more Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), and acquisition of an Automated DNA Profiling System to aid prevention of crime through easy finger identification of criminals. The implementation of the above recommendations could improve the performances of the Rwanda police to the optimal level.

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