# Studies in Politics and Society

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Security Challenges and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in Nigeria

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FORWARD

The notion that the universities are centres of excellence, great ideas, innovations and discoveries cannot be disputed. They are so described because of the immense contributions they make towards national and global development. This journal, like any other is to impart knowledge and ideas for societal progress.

In whatever way we perceive academic development, it has to do with concrete improvement and discoveries to the extent that all sectors of the economy get the best chance of facilitating all these. Efforts must be made to sustain the culture of idea generation and updating of knowledge. As such, the Nigerian Political Science Association through its journals and publications does this in fulfilment of its primary mandate of advancing knowledge in all spheres of human endeavour.

It is in view of this, that I readily, without hesitation, write this foreword for the journal with the specific theme: **Security Challenges and Inter-ethnic Cooperation in Nigeria: An African Perspective,** authored by eminent and distinguished scholars and social scientists from various institutions of learning.

I welcome the publication as a unique development, one that would help in academic pursuit and enhancement, especially in such areas that have been dwelt on in the work. I highly recommend the Nigeria Political Science Association journal to the tertiary institutions and the reading public as another positive contribution to national development.

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TENSION IN THE PARADISE: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN URBAN VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

There had been a tremendous increase in the record of urban violence in the past decade and a clear tendency consistent increased. There is an average of ten (10) (reported) incidents of violence per day in each urban city in Nigeria regardless of it magnitude, an average of three hundred and fifty (350) crimes committed across the country per day regardless of it magnitude. This work reveals the effects of violence on development in Nigeria. The motive behind any group conversing for a right is seen as a collective bargaining for the public good. Conversely, this motive had dwindled down the lane taking a strange manoeuvrings and becoming a shift to personal aggrandizement and self glorifying egocentric motives. The Relative Deprivation theory is adopted in this work to effectively buttress the root cause of the problem of violence. This paper recommended institutional remedies and strengthened of internal democracy so as to ensure essential political, economical and social services for the citizenry and to mitigate religious bigotry, ethnic chauvinism and regional sentiments in the polity.

Introduction

Violence within cities had always been in the news and at the wake of the millennium, it intensity had been amplified. It had been in the news for the very ugly reasons of unprecedented political violence, ethno-religious conflict, economic marginalization and other unforeseen imbroglios which have occurred in different parts of the world in different magnitude and impact on every facet of life. Indeed, the trend of urban violence and civil unrest did not elude Nigeria without replicating its own special kind of species.

There had been a huge and tremendous increase in the record of urban crimes in the past decades and a clear tendency of the crime to be on the increased by the day. There is an average of ten (10) (reported) incidents

of violence per day in each urban city in West Africa regardless of it magnitude, an average of fifty (50) across country per day and an average of three hundred and fifty (350) crimes committed across the country per week regardless of it magnitude. This paper underscores the effects of violence on development in Nigeria. Primarily, the motive behind any group conversing for a right is seen as a collective bargaining for the public good. Conversely, this motive had dwindled down the lane taking a strange manoeuvrings and becoming a shift to personal aggrandizement and self glorifying egocentric motives.

The trend in Nigeria is in a vicious cycle which rotates from the west to the east, which moves to the south and finally lying on its belly in the North. In the West, it is seen in the case of the brutal and nasty politico-ethno-religious violence been championed by the Militant Oodua People's Congress (OPC) (Fan, Jummai & Onuoha, 2014). In the East, it was perceived in the solitary movement for secession by the war lords of the Eastern Nigeria under the auspicies of the Biafra (Omaka, 2014). The trend moved to the Southern Nigeria where the oil-lords-militants wreck great havoc on the ecology and the polity of Nigeria by illegal bunkery, kidnapping and deliberate destruction of oil refineries. This is due to the fact that the mainstay of the economy is the crude oil which is drilled mainly from their territory (Omoyibo and Osunde, 2014). The trend currently is at a march-time in Northern Nigeria under the chairmanship of the Boko Harams. Deliberate self harm, suicide bombing, destruction of government property especially educational facility and religious bigotry is their main operational terms (Walker, 2012).

This culture of violence has not only been imbibed and sustained as part of the country's political behaviour since independence; it has been one of the potent causes of the low participation of Nigerians in politics but not in religious activities. Adeniyi (2003) express concern over the situation of politics in Nigeria, when they observed that during the ward congress of the PDP, an intra-party affair, many politicians went to the congress venue armed with assault rifles and acid containers for possible use on opponents.

Political violence negates law and order and peaceful coexistence. In addition to security concerns, it militates against the consolidation of democracy and political development. This in turn impacts on the social and economic well being of the nation and creates imbalances in social relations such as poverty, ethnic or religious grievances which affect the social relationship of the people in the society.

This study adopts the methodology of interrogatory systematology where by the trend of violence in Nigeria is interrogated with the existing literature and empirical realities of the dynamism of the urban violence situations in Nigeria. However, the methodology adopted in this work is the Relative Deprivation theory which believes that no violence will erupt except the people are being aggrieved and deprived in some fundamental things.

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of urban violence on the national economics, politics and social relations. The question that this work seeks to give answers to revolve around what are the issues or circumstances that constitute urban violence in a developed community under the administration of seasoned intellectuals. Conclusion of this work is premised on the fact that as urban areas expounds the institutions and other socio economic facilities are choked up and needs an incremental upgrading so as to avert the outbreak of violence.

Conceptual Clarification

In this section, attempt will be made to carefully conceptualize the term violence and Urban. There had been several views of what violence seems to be by various scholars. Wolf, (1969) conceived violence as the illegitimate and unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of other people in the society. This notion is seen as pro-government agitations. The people have the legitimacy to pour out their grievances and the use of state powers to suppress the wish of the people might be necessary evil to visit in few extreme cases.

Gurr (1970) posited that violence is the collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies. This concept is essentially institutional and lacks merit of some remote factors that stimulate violence in the urban areas unlike the emphasis on political reasons. On the broader sense, violence includes 'crime' against persons such as premeditated and un-meditated homicide, assault and rape. It also includes international deaths and injuries arising as consequences of war including youth violence (Muggah, 2012).

Violence can be mop-up in few lines as a good summary; it is the

2003, when the former Governor of Anambra State Chris Ngige, was abducted in a grand plot to unseat him. This plot was executed by the late Assistant Inspector General of Police, Mr. Raphael Ige, who later claimed he acted on an "order from the above" though the principal actors to such act remain unknown till today (Adeleke, 2012).The trend of violence in 2003 and 2007 partly involves religious, ethnics and communal conflicts which build up to the recent 2014 blood bath across the country.

Trends and Dynamism of Urban Violence in Nigeria

There are various feathers that the issue of urban violence had developed in the recent times in Nigeria thereby creating tension within the paradise. Some of the dynamism in the recent years includes the surge of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the Boko Haram in the North, cultism and various ethnic militias across the geopolitical zones.

Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)

The MEND is the most recent, and most renowned, of the large number of militant groups in the Niger Delta, an oil-rich region of mangrove swamps and creeks in the south-south Nigeria and one of the world's largest wetlands. The militants like the Niger Delta's population at large, object to the environmental degradation and underdevelopment of the region and the inadequate but yet unaccountable benefits the community has received from its extensive oil resources. While there is a revenue-sharing plan in which the federal government distributes roughly half of the country's oil revenues among state governors, these funds do not trickle down to the roughly 30 million residents of the Delta. In 2003, some 70 percent of oil revenues was stolen or wasted, according to an estimate by the head of Nigeria's anticorruption agency. Whereas many residents used to work as fishermen, oil installations and spills have decimated the fish population (Obasi, 2010 and Aver, Nnorom, and Targba, 2013).

"MEND's attacks have hurt Nigeria's oil exports—costing at least eight hundred thousand barrels per day, or over 25 percent of the country's oil output, according to Nigerian officials. A February 2006 attack on two Royal Dutch Shell oilfields accounted for some 477,000 barrels per day of the reduced output. Though the group regularly carries out attacks against pipelines and is responsible for at least two car bombings, its primary tactic is kidnapping foreign oil workers" (Hanson, 2007).

It typically releases these hostages unharmed after a period of negotiations—via intermediaries—with oil company representatives and the government. This taking hostage tactics allows MEND to focus international attention on the Niger Delta and to exploit the blaze of publicity thus generated to announce their grievances and demands of the Nigerian government.

Cultism and Gang Violence

There are over forty-five (45) secret cults groups in Nigerian institutions of learning which are all equipped with an elaborate hierarchy, insignia and distinct attire. Some of the most notable of these secret cults include the Black axe, Eiye confraternity, Vickings, Amazons, Buccaneer, Mafia, and Dragons. The female students are not left as they have their own groups among which are Temple of Eden, Frigrates, Barracudas, Daughters of Jezebel among others (Adewale 2005).

A record of one of the urban violence committed by these groups was the Tuesday May 7 2013 scenarios where a blood birth mass murder of nearly one hundred security operatives in Nasarawa state, North Central Nigeria, by a suspected armed local secret sect known as "Ombatse" (meaning we have arrived) cult group (Onwubiko 2013). They are easy tools in fomenting troubles. Politicians often recruit them, train and empower local secret sect to harass, intimidate and victimize perceived political opponents and opposing views against their political ambition.

Ethno-religious crises

There are over four hundred (400) ethnic groups, belonging to several religious sects in Nigeria. Since independence Nigeria has remained a multi-ethnic entity per excellence (Salawu 2010, Idahosa and Akov2013). While it is true that it is not possible to know the exact number of ethno-religious conflicts due to lack of adequate statistical data on this issue, it is interesting to note that about forty percent (40%) of ethno-religion based conflicts are credited to the fourth Republic of Nigeria. Ethno-religious and communal conflicts in Nigeria, are linked to citizenship within the context of identity, which is rooted in the politics of inclusion or exclusion.

These are tied to claims and counter-claims over identity as a basis for determining who is excluded or included from decision making as well as access to opportunities and privileges under the 'we' versus 'them' cliché
(Kwaja 2008; 2009 Acc_____ 2012 ____ ___ ____ _ ____

2014). These identity conflicts have had far teaching implications for the state. Babangida (2002) lamented that the consequences have been a waste of prestigious human life and material resources in ethnically and religiously inspired violent encounters, clashes and even battles. This is a threat to the security of life and properties and it heightens the fragility of the economy and political process.

Boko Haram

The original name for the sect is The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad, as this is the English translation of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad. It was founded as an indigenous Salafist group, turning itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009. The group was founded in 2001 by late Muhammad Yusuf, in the town of Maiduguri. The residents of Maiduguri adopted the term "Boko-Haram" for the sect. Since 2009, the death of the leader has led to more violent attacks witnessed on regular basis in churches, security establishments and media organizations with huge human casualty that present the government as helpless and incapable of handling the insurgence (Okpaga, Chijioke, and Eme, 2012).

The increasing spread of the insurgence led some political and religious leaders in the north to conclude that the group has now expanded beyond its original religious composition to include not only Islamic militants, but criminal elements and ignoble disgruntled politicians as well. It has been observed that violence often catches the attention of government and the need to ensure security rather than finding lasting solution to problems are the primary considerations (Galtung 2010).

Alao, Atere and Olusegun (2012) also observed that governments often scratch conflict or contending issues at the surface and leave the fundamental issues unattended to. The issues involved are left unresolved, confused, the conflict arena and the numbers of conflicting parties are reduced to two such as government versus Boko-Haram, ignoring the fact that some of government top functionaries, traditional rulers, business magnets and frustrated politicians are interested parties who may also be serving as truce breaker.

The Effects of Urban Violence on Nigeria's Development

No doubt, the aftermath effect of violence leaves a scare to be remembered of on the mind of all and sundry within and outside the polity. A few scholars have suggested the likely effects of violence to be political and geographical in nature (Kendall-Tackett & Giacomoni 2007; UN-Habitat 2007) but in this work the effects will be seen from a multidimensional point of view. Such effect can be seen politically, economically, socially, and an overview internationally.

The political effects; This ranges from menace that urban violence crop up which ranges from instable political regimes, policy somersaults, political process break down and secession threat in some cases. Most cases of violence in the pre election, during election and post election periods have a dent on the development speed of the country. The resultant effect is the placing of square pegs in round holes— unfit political leaders emerging from electoral malpractice victory. The threat of political map break up seen as secession threat is another political effect of violence. The South Eastern Nigeria had made efforts to cut out of the country due to political instability and power imbalance in the polity.

The Economic Effect; the effect of urban violence varies among the following; inflation where a large volume of money can only purchase a little commodities. It is also characterised with a weak economy where people cannot fend for themselves but rather dependent greatly on foreign aid and economic bailout. The relative deprivation of individual and groups in the polity had sparked fatal crises in the polity. The resource control issue had made several fractions of groups in the country to emancipate for their right through violent means. Such group claimed to be fighting for the right of the community against perceived neglect form the federal government despite their economic viabilities. The revenue derivation and sharing formula among the federating units had become a violent issues that had made the polity drain financial strength of the country into private hands and crises management issues. Also, the production and manufacturing sectors are temporarily shut down before the resultant liquidation due to the increasing urban violence in Nigeria.

The Social Effect; The finger of violence grips on the polity had effects on the developmental strategies. The frequent ethnic and religious crises had created a cleavage in the unity of the country. The signatures of violence are seen on the infrastructures breakdown, dilapidated structures and a large percentage of the citizenry are internally displaced while other groups have sought refuge in the neighbouring. The social cleavages had created enmity among the affected groups within the same contiguous geographical location. The level of development and integration are affected and slow down due to violence.

The International Effect; The international image of the state are usually affected due to continuous violence. Other international community will perceived the state as a no go area for investment, trade and other viable corporation. The resultant effect is that the state will be seen as a failed state. Among comity of states, it will be also be seen as a pariah state which may be label as haven for terrorists and gang war lords unsafe zone for foreign investors and international entrepreneurs. The international community will therefore evacuate it diplomatic emissaries and all citizens present in the warring state and at last the state will be deserted of all political progress and economy development.

Recommendations

Urban violence is a contagious virus whose genetic transcription is difficult to decode and interpret. Any society that gets infected of it is potentially paralyzed and calculatedly dead. This might be slow but definitely death in form of political, economical, social, and psychological manifestations. The following are recommended to the government, the civil societies and the individual that have stake in the urban communities.

The government must ensure that the various security agents of the state are properly oriented in the changing trend and dynamism of violence in the urban area. They should be properly equipped and strategically positioned so as to contain any internal insurgency and any external aggressions. Finally, the government should provide adequately for the engagement of the services of the teeming youth populace so as to engage in productive services to the state and not destructive catabolism.

The civil societies are enjoined to collaborate with the government by revealing adequate information to the necessary quarters so as to tame the spread of the virus- urban violence. Also they should support the continuity of morality and statesmanship among fractions within the state by engaging in the right and timely education and sensitisation of the populace on the need to be ones brother's keeper and not a brother's killer.

The individuals in the urban areas are also enjoined to support the 'good' policies of the states and never to pull down the government for filthy lucre and personal aggrandizement but rather in the lawful political institutionalised and constitutionally supported modus operandi. Finally, the individual should not see himself as superior to the state which will make him foment troubles and cause urban violence but as an important component of

the state with invaluable calandos to the progress, stability and development of the same.

Conclusion

Urban violence manifest various ways but in progressive order. It shifts bases from political oriented to economic and further to social oriented violence. It includes; acrimony, assault, assassination, intimidation, harassment, maiming, kidnapping, and killing of all sought which include; suicide attack, homicide, genocide among others. Violence is not native to man but rather a consequence of his fallen nature, his actions against the grains of his nature.

Violence in Nigeria is not peculiar to its polity alone but it cut across all developing countries. The each regions or geopolitical zones have its' own typical violence pattern. The rhythm of violence rotates cyclically as one region gets over its violence, the other region picks it own pattern up in full scale. This constitutes the paradigm shift in urban violence in the country. The East is facing violence emanating from resource control and managements. The South is facing kidnapping, communal clashes and gang violence. The West has ethno violence coupled with religious crises. North is battling with the Boko Haram insurgence and terrorist attacks.

This paper has significantly discussed the trends and dynamism urban of violence in Nigeria which is seen in the light of the MEND, Cultism, Ethno-Religious Violence and the Boko Haram. The effect of this is traced from the political, economy, social and international perspectives using the Relative Deprivation theoretical framework. Urban violence is a contagious virus whose genetic transcription is difficult to decode and interpret. In its aftermaths both its perpetrators and victims are losers.

The perspective taken in this work shows inevitability of violence in the urban area but ways to mitigate and ameliorate the effects is proffered to the respective stakeholders. Considering violence as a political option is considering destruction as inevitable. Considering political hegemony as an option is therefore considering progress and development of the polity.

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LAND OWNERSHIP, POLITICS OF BELONGING AND IDENTITY CONFLICTS IN THE JOS METROPOLIS

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Abstract

The conflicts in the Jos metropolis are not different from other identity conflicts over land in Africa. Studies have shown that dispute over environmental resources is not sufficient by itself to cause violence. When it does contribute to violence, it interacts with other political, economic, and social factors. This perspective draws attention to the social, economic and political contexts underlying environmental resource scarcity's causal role in African conflicts. This is useful for situating the Jos sectarian conflicts within the context of the interplay of political, economic and social forces in the Jos metropolis. The conflicts connect more strongly to a long historical process on the Jos Plateau than some of the immediate problems widely reported in the media. At the centre of this historical process were British colonialism, the growth of the tin mining economy that brought the early Hausa and Fulani migrant labour to Jos, and the struggles over land. The British colonial administration through its policy of Indirect Rule, and the organization of ethnically segregated communities of 'natives' and 'settlers' created the settler-indigene divide. The Berom, Afizere and Anaguta who see themselves as the 'first comers' refer to themselves as 'indigenes' while they regard the Hausa and Fulani as 'later comers' and derogatorily labelled them as 'settlers'. Both the indigenes and non-indigenes have always demonstrated strong emotional appeals to historical factors in their autochthonous claims. This paper examines the role of ethnicity, religion and other primordial sentiments in the Jos conflicts including the politics of belonging and how it relates to land ownership. This paper draws data from the author's close observations of events in the Jos metropolis for a period of over two decades. Informal interviews, events analyses and qualitative data complement historical and contemporary documentary secondary sources on people, economy and politics of the city of Jos. The paper concludes that the resolution of the citizenship question requires national efforts such as putting in place appropriate policies to protect all citizens and guarantee their rights.

Keywords: Jos, environmental resources, identity conflict, indigene, settlers.