AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 1999-2010

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Being a PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ilorin in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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DECLARATION

I Bonnie Ayodele humbly declare that this research study titled '***An Assessment of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) 1999-2010'*** was carried out in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ilorin under the supervision of Professor H. A. Saliu.

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that this research study titled '***An Assessment of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) 1999-2010"*** was conducted by **Bonnie Ayodele** of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ilorin.

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Abstract
The protracted armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains a major concern to the global community based on its high level of destruction. This had necessitated the establishment of the first mission called the United Nations Operation in Congo in 1960. The failure of the mission in resolving the conflict led to the establishment of the second mission tagged the United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in 1999. Therefore, the study assessed the performance of MONUC in relation to its mandate of resolving the ever-present crisis in DRC. The main objective is to assess the impact of MONUC on the peace process in DRC. The specific objectives are to: (i) identify the political dynamics of the peace process (ii) assess the roles of civil society organisations in the peace process (iii) examine the challenges of the mission in relation to its overall mandate (iv) draw lessons from the mission for future UN's peacekeeping missions in Africa.

The study adopted the realist theoretical framework, and employed qualitative research methodology. Both primary and secondary data were collected for the study. Primary data were collected through interviews using interpreter in some occasions. Secondary data such as journal articles, reports and books were used to complement the primary data. Using purposive sampling method, sixty-five key informants were interviewed. These included one past UN Secretary General, eighteen UN officials who were involved in peacekeeping operation in DRC, ten diplomats representing countries that initially participated in the conflict such as Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe; ten civil society organisations engaging in peace-building in DRC; ten African Union representatives that participated in the peace process; fourteen armed militia members (male and female) from DRC and twelve journalists, who reported on the conflict in DRC. The analysis was done descriptively.

The findings of the study revealed that:
i) The political dynamics of the peace process was complicated by the interest of internal and external interested actors who found the resources in DRC attractive for easy exploitation.
ii) The lack of robust support from civil society organisations led to an increase in the number of active militias from about 12 to 24 groups within the study period. Consequently, the overall success of the mission was minimal due to suspicions among the local populace and lack of robust support for the UN mission.
iii) The mandate of MONUC was relatively underachieved, however, the mission conducted a post-war election but was unable to reduce civilian deaths and prevent further humanitarian crisis. The study concluded that for durable peace to be achieved in the DRC, it recommended that there must be an inclusive political engagement with all actors in the conflict. Establish effective post-conflict natural resources management in the DRC. In addition, the support of the civil society in the DRC is very crucial in earning the trust of the local populace. To reduce civilian death and arrest humanitarian crisis, it is recommended that the mission should formulate a strategic peace-building architecture toward demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants/militia

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The United Nations was created in 1945 after the end of 2nd World War. It succeeded the League of Nations, which was similarly established aftermath of the 1st World War. It was established purposely because of the need for global peace and security. Accordingly, the UN was set up to achieve peace and security and save humanity from the scourge of war and destruction. (UN Charter, 2000). Thus, the Charter presupposes that the union is to assume the responsibility of managing peace and security. All these responsibility constitute the foremost part of its charter (UN Charter, 2000).

Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has remained the major global institution responsible for ensuring that there is no outbreak of another world war and promoting human development at the same time. More than ever, the organisation has continued to play interventionist roles in the management and resolution of conflicts as one of its core roles in the cause of maintaining peace and security globally. In fact, it is stated in the Article 1 of the UN Charter which expressly that the UN is to maintain international peace and security. The organization is charged to prevent possible threat, suppress an act of aggression from any part of the world or from any nation, state or group, promote instrument of co-operation, friendliness and development of all races, groups and states. This must be done in principles of justice, fairness and in corformity with the international laws (UN Charter, 1945). In other words, the UN was to ensure these from two main mechanisms, which are settlement of dispute in a peaceful manner and enforcement of collective security when the peace is breached.

Over the years, the UN has been engaging in settlement of disputes and enforcement of peace through collective security instrument through the institution of peacekeeping operations in many troubled parts of the world. In specific context, its involvement in managing many of the conflicts in African has been quite remarkable. UN peacekeeping missions and interventions in conflict management in Africa dated back to

the 1952 Suez Canal conflict in Egypt (Adebajo and Scanlon, 2006) and subsequent in the 1960s when it deployed a peacekeeping mission in the conflict that engulfed the newly independent Congo, now Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While these interventions were regarded as significant, recent outbreaks of multiple conflicts in the region have led to increasing involvement of the UN in creating peacekeeping missions or engaging in other forms of conflict management in Africa (Annan, 2003). In particular, in the last three decades, after the fall of Cold War since the end of the Cold War, the continent of Africa has repeatedly been challenged by implosions of conflicts with devastating impacts on its development. The volatile nature of such conflicts, dynamics of interests or forces at play and the character of actors involved in the conflicts have made the continent a major discourse in international politics.

Indeed, Africa's endless conflicts have challenged its development in all fronts and led to the creation of many UN peacekeeping missions. The continent is plagued with all forms of crisis that have thrown her into global spotlight and unarguably made it the most endangered continent with half of the most complex emergencies (Cilliers, 2002). For instance, conflicts have erupted into ethnic warfare in the Great Lakes countries of Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Rwanda, DR Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville. The Horn of Africa has also witnessed a number of conflicts. Sudan has been in civil war, while South Sudan, a newly independent African nation from Sudan is witnessing a multitude of displacement and ethnic conflicts. Ethiopia and Eritrea have continued from where they stopped before partitioning. Somalia remains a classic case of a collapsed state in contemporary history. In West Africa, the Mano River countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone are just emerging from prolonged wars, while Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry have witnessed a series of coups and counter-coups (Adisa 1992, Akagbosu, 2002, Annan, 2003). These countries were refered to as ungovernable with some under the control of drug cartels and barons (UNDOC 2009). In the cases of Mali, Niger and Chad, their histories are replete with terrorism in the Sahel region, which also spread to Northern Nigeria. In the time past, Cote d'Ivoire has transited from civil wars to electoral conflicts and Nigeria, the most populous nation in the continent also had her share of serious security infractions. It continuous battle with internal militias and terrorist gangs has remained a major dilemma in her quest to develop. In the Northern

Africa, countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have been in turmoil especially since the explosion of "Arab Spring" in 2011.

Considering these conflicts that had plagued Africa, the UN has demonstrated its roles of ensuring peace by establishing many peacekeeping missions in Africa. Some of these missions have doused and stemmed the conflicts while some of the missions were not without challenges. Its mission in the DR Congo in the early 1960 was in particular successful. However, the second mission in the DRC, which is the focus of this study, was intense, robust and comprehensive and particularly remarkable. The reasons for this would be explained later. Thus, in the late 1990s, the second conflict that erupted in the dying days of President Mobutu Seseseko in the DR Congo was more devastating. It was regarded as the largest, costliest and longest UN mission ever (UN, 2010). The conflict created one of the largest humanitarian crises and recorded one of the largest deaths in Africa. It has resulted in grinding poverty and diseases. In addition, it has led to a huge refugee crisis, displacement, instability, insecurity and underdevelopment of DRC (Annan, 2004). The nature and devastating impacts of the conflict have made some scholars to refer to the state as a failed or withered state (Ayittey, 2003, Collier, 2008).

In particular, the monumental deaths and humanitarian disaster in the DRC depicted the horrendous effects of internal conflicts in contemporary Africa. The implications and spillover of the conflict for the economy and security of its neighbouring African states were also devastating. The conflict's graphic images of brutality and mass starvation, flashed around by the world media, had provoked the international community and in particular the UN to respond to its virulent consequences (Vogt, 1992, Annan, 1997, Ibok, 2000).

It is therefore imperative to provide a brief historical analysis of the DR Congo conflict and United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC). The conflict in the DRC has its trajectory in its past. ONUC, as stated earlier was the first mission established by the UN in 1960 but, with Mobutu's ascension to power and his 32 years reign, DRC was always in crisis. However, it was Mobutu's abuse of power and looting of the country's huge natural resources that defined his regime. He systematically used the country's wealth to enrich himself and with support from the West particularly the US, was contributory to the systematic failure of the state.

By the 90s the regime of President Mobutu was lacking in good health and popular support. He was no longer as strong as age was not his side coupled and with a failing health, things were out of his grip. While the economic challenges and chronic poverty had taken a toll on the DRC citizen, his support base declined rapidly and his grip on power was equally challenged by opposition who had been on his removal, his former Western allies had also deserted. Regionally, civil wars among the nations within the Great Lake region also contributed immensely the regime's collapse. The Rwandan ethnic war and genocide of 1994 in which about two million Rwandan refugees including the Hutu militia that perpetrated the killings were sheltered in Eastern Congo also played a huge role in challenging the Mobutu regime. The remnants of the Rwandan rebels find solace in the Eastern Congo where they repeatedly carried out attack on Rwanda. It was this reason that provoked Rwanda and Uganda to invade Congo in July 1996 in pursuit of Hutu military forces who had continuously constituted a breach to its national security.

President Mobutu was finally ousted by the rebellion that started in the Eastern Congo led by a former exiled Mobuutu enemy Laurent Kabila. He became the President of DR Congo in May 1997 and changed the country's name from Zaire to DR Congo. Unfortunately, the internal and external nature, character and political and economic dynamics of the Great Lake region and even the character and nature of President Kabila's emergence were not divorced from the major interventionist roles of Rwanda and Uganda. It was not surprising that immediately after his emergence, Rwanda and Uganda see themselves as not only the king makers but more of the giver and taker of life to President Kabila's regime. They therefore believe they can decide the fate of the regime.

The continuous inter-regional conflict in the Great Lake region escalated the conflict in the Congo Eastern region as war broke out also in 1998 among the remnants of Mobutu and ethnic militia groups that supported President Laurent Kabila. Having been a 'puppet' of Rwanda and Uganda, President Kabila sought an independence from these two dominating powers. He was however, rebuffed because Uganda and Rwanda were eyeing the rich natural resources in the DRC. President Laurent Kabila inability to play the game of the two countries led to another insurrection that eventually claimed his life. This was not before he had called on the Angola, Zimbabwe and Nambia for help and the

situation degenerated to where as many as eight countries engaged in the conflict necessitating to it been tagged the African World War (Adekeye, 2009)

The UN was first invited by President Kabila when he reported the activities of the Rwanda and Uganda government to the Security Council in 1998, similarly the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) became interested in DR Congo debacle. In particular, the OAU intervention led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1997 between DRC and other major actors in the region. This agreement was used by the Security Council to establish through its Resolution 1723 of 30 November 1999 the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was first an observer intervention mission and was to see to the ceasefire agreement, disengagement of warring parties and groups and maintain contact with some of the parties that were signatory to the peace deal in Lusaka. The UN was to change its observant status to a full peacekeeping mission.

1.2 Problem Stated

The dimensions and impacts of the conflicts on the development of the DRC had provoked debates among African leaders and compelled them to seek a joint regional peacekeeping architecture and UN's peacekeeping solution (Cilliers, 2001, Murithi, 2004, Adebajo, 2006). The DR Congo conflict became one of the most challenging conflicts in Africa. By 2004, the International Rescue Committee reported that since the end of the First War in the Congo in 1998, about 5.4 million people have died (more than 8 per cent of the Congo's population of 66 million). It was also reported that for every month, 45,000 more Congolese, half of them children died from hunger, preventable disease, and other consequences of violence and displacement. It was also stated that well over one million people were internally displace and the country has the largest number of refugges in Uganda, Sudan and among the countries in the Great Lake region

As was reported that more people, the conflict in the DRC had claimed more lives than the 1960 war. It has also been more costlier as close to $9bn have been expended (SIPRII, 2010; (OXFAM, 2010, Guardian, 2010). The report also estimated that the cost of armed conflict to DRC had taken 29 per cent of its gross domestic product. There is no doubt that the real costs of armed violence to DRC could have been much higher if

valued in human terms, perhaps unimaginable. The complex emergencies attending these conflicts seem to be chronic and devastating. The UN claimed it was the largest peacekeeping mission in contemporary times and the most expensive.

In spite of all these figures stated above, the MONUC mission and the DRC challenge were more interesting to understudy. The mission was the most unique of all the peacekeeping operations in modern era. MONUC was not only novel in terms of the UN peacekeeping architecture, it was robust and comprehensive in terms of its mandates and given its expected interventionist roles in the DRC. It was first and foremost an observer mission. It graduated into a peacekeeping operation with specific role to engineer both peace and democratic political social engineering. More so, its mandates include the roles of a peace enforcer with a given mandate to experiment the use of force and parts of the Rules of Engagement (RoE).

Therefore, given the protracted nature of the DRC's conflict, the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) is of significant interest to this study. The UN's peacekeeping operations (PKO) were used as a direct response to many global complex and violent conflicts that erupted including those in Africa (Annan, 2006). For examples, UNPKO were established to intervene in Africa's active war zones as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Rwanda (Zartman and Deng 2002, Agada, 2008). Therefore, in understanding the roles of the UN peacekeeping in Africa's complex conflicts, the UN mission in DR Congo is considered as case study. Thus, the issue arising from the foregoing analysis is: to what extent was the UN's deployment of MONUC successful in the DR Congo? From the foregoing, the following research questions have been set to guide the work.

1.3 Research Questions

These are:

i. How has the nature of the political dynamics in the DR Congo contributed to the creation of second UN peacekeeping intervention in the DRC?
ii. What roles did the local as well as the civil society play in the MONUC peacekeeping intervention?

iii. What were the challenges the mission faced and what was the level of success achieved by MONUC between 1999 and 2010?
iv. What lessons can be learnt from the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo between 1999 and 2010?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

Thus, the study sets out to achieve the following objectives: The general objective is to assess the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo (MONUC)

The specific objectives are to:

i. Identify the political dynamics and the mandates of the MONUC in the peace process
ii. Assess the roles of civil society organisations in the peace process
iii. Examine the challenges of the mission in relation to its mandate
iv. Draw lessons from the mission for future UN's peacekeeping missions in Africa.

1.5 Basic Assumptions

The study will be guided by the following assumptions:

i. That the political dynamics and the intensity of the conflicts in DRC necessitated the establishment of MONUC as UN as a strategy for resolving the DR Congo conflicts.
ii. That the roles played by the civil society and local community was a critical factor in undermining the success or failure of the UN mission in DR Congo.
iii. That the successes and failures of MONUC in DR Congo was dependent on the nature of mandates, operational methods, the co-operation of the warring groups and the support of the local communities.

1.6 Justification for the Study

The UN and peacekeeping missions in Africa have always been an important issue in UN – Africa relations. The justification for this study derives from Africa's multiple conflicts and the quest to find solutions to them.

First, a study of the UN and peacekeeping missions in DR Congo and Africa is desirable following the number and magnitude of conflicts that have engulfed the continent. The intensity and negative effects of the conflicts in DR Congo have provoked renewed calls by the continent to provide a more effective peacekeeping architecture

Second, this study is justified because it is a worthwhile addition to many scholarly works on the contentious issues of peacekeeping operations in Africa. It critically examines MONUC and its challenges and draws lessons for future engagement.

Third, a study on a recurring issue like conflicts in Africa will provide new ideas on conflict management strategies, which should be of immense benefit to academics and international policy makers in understudying the peculiarirties and challenges of the mission for future mission. As a corollary, it is believed that the findings of this work would provoke further academic exercise in peacekeeping and conflict management.

Fourth, the multi-disciplinary nature of the study would be beneficial to the college students studying peace and conflict studies, international relations and politics, political science, international administrators and diplomats. In this wise, the study can serve as a body of knowledge for students who may want to work on wars in Africa and other parts of the world, and for people working in international organizations.

Fifth, the study will also be useful to the body of literature, enrich knowledge in peacekeeping, international relations/organizations, security and conflict studies through its major findings.

1.7 Research Methodology

The study adopted the historical and descriptive research methodology. The method of data collection entailed both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources involved direct interviews with selected actors within the international arena, including Mr Kofi Annan, under whose the mission was established when he was the United Nations Secretary General, scholars, diplomats. The secondary sources of data collection were newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, textbooks, archival materials and library research. Furthermore, data were also collected through analysis of official publications, UN publications, UNPKO data, UN Department of Public Information, Internet resources and websites, the World Bank and memoirs of diplomats.

The interview population was drawn from different many areas that had to do with the DR Congo conflict. The Eastern part of DR Congo was given attention because the conflict started from the area. Population was also taken from the UN official who participated in the peacekeeping in the DR Congo. Journalists, official personnel were drawn into the interview population. Scholars and civil societies in the DR Congo constituted part of the population. These critical groups are considered as stakeholders in the interview method. Structure but open ended question were asked to provide detailed and unhindered access to information in the DRC. The questions generally covered armed conflicts in DR Congo and also probed into the causes, impacts and challenges of the conflicts. It also dwelt on the nature and challenges of UN's PKO intervention in the DR Congo. The interview process targets diplomats, scholars, experts, professionals and other international actors considered relevant because of their knowledge experiences in the field of peacekeeping and international diplomacy. Questions asked gave consideration to the causes, nature and the challenges of UN peacekeeping in DR Congo.

Furthermore, in the case of oral interviews, conscious efforts were made to distinguish facts from personal opinions. This was done by asking the interviewees if the opinions expressed were their opinion or otherwise. In addition, efforts were made to confirm this by checking through the historical or written documents for evidence. In case of lack of written document, the research made effort to contact a witness in confirming the event. In a situation where there were none, an in-depth analysis of the content and context was done in a qualitatively form in order to arrive at a more reliable information. In some instances, the study adopted historic as well as descriptive approaches. Interviews and discussion with esperts, actors within the UN peacekeeping department and other institutions were analysed in a descriptive form. This was because the descriptive method answers the questions of who, what, why, where, when and how? While the data description might be factual, accurate and systematic, it might not describe what caused a situation. Thus, the descriptive research could be used to create a causal relationship where one variable affects another. In other words, descriptive research can be said to have a high requirement for internal validity. In short, descriptive research deals with everything that can be studied. Arising from this, information obtained in descriptive form were essentially analysed qualitatively.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The scope of the study covered the period of the MONUC, which was between 1999 and 2010. This period represented both the second attempt by the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo. While the study generally focused on the UN peacekeeping missions in DR Congo, it however, noted that there were some other missions in Africa, but the DR Congo mission was the biggest and one of the longest in terms of time frame. The UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was established by UNSC Resolution 1279 in 1999 under an African Secretary General, Kofi Anna, a Ghanaian. The conflict was protracted, costly and more characterised by intra-ethnic and resource contestation. The study focused primarily on MONUC's mission. It covered the conflict between 1999 and 2010 and assessed the mandates of MONUC, the levels of humanitarian crisis, assessed the roles played by the civil society and some levels of armed combatants. The study is not extended to the era of MONUSCO (the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo) or the Intervention Brigade Force, which were established in the post-MONUC era. This was deliberate to allow for proper focus.

1.8 Limitation to the Study

While carrying out this research, the study encountered some limitations. One of such limitations was access to the major UN actors and diplomats in the DR Conflict especially Mr Annan whose wealth of experience was much needed. Although, Mr. Annan was eventually interviewed, the time given for the interview was short and only few questions were given attention. Consequently, he referred me to his memoirs and other speeches to fill in the gaps in the interview. Furthermore, Mr Annan's engagements provided this study a unique opportunity to access information from one of the major actors in UN's peacekeeping operations, which was insightful to the study. His speeches, essays, writings and comments were also beneficial to the overall findings of the study. Some of the UN personnel and diplomats were also difficult to pin down for interview. Accessing major militia leaders was also problematic, this was largely caused by the fact that some of them were in hiding from prosecution. This problem was somehow obviated by the link given by people whose identities enjoyed the confidentiality ethics of

research. These people were diplomats, embassy officials, military personnel, scholars, humanitarian workers, refugees and so forth. Time and space were another set of limitations. Diplomats were always economical with information. For example, classified information was not released. However, interview granted by some other actors who participated in the peacekeeping missions, especially diplomats and other state actors were very instructive to this study. With close to sixty international actors made up of different nationalities interviewed, the study was able to make up for the relative short time spent with the main actors. Some of these actors, however, requested anonymity because of the nature of their work and the sensitivity of the issues discussed in the study. Their requests were therefore granted. Another limitation had to do with non-release of vital documents by peacekeeping officials who were contacted for interviews or data collection. Their reluctance and hard posture in releasing official documents were problematic. In other cases, it was agreed that the confidentiality of both their identities and the information provided would be guaranteed and safeguarded. In other words, they were given assurance of anonymity and protection, and that is why some names of the people interviewed (some of these names are provided in the reference) were left out except where the person consented to it.

1.9 Organisation of the Chapters

The study was organized into seven chapters. Chapter one was the introductory part of the study. Chapter two examined the literature and discussed the theoretical framework. In chapter three, the UN organs and its peacekeeping architecture were given attention. Chapter four of the study presented the historical background of conflict in the DR Congo. Chapter five examined the UN establishment of MONUC, its mandates and operations. Chapter six assessed MONUC, highlighted its challenges and lessons of the mission. Chapter seven summarised, recommended and concluded the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, attempt is made at reviewing the existing literature on the salient issues on conflict and UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. In similar fashion, conceptual definition of some major terms is reviewed from various literature perspectives and critical review of these terms with a view of identifying its gaps. This reason for this is to provide an acceptable definition and background understanding to the issues that are germane in the body of the study. Therefore, issues like conflict and its management strategies occupy the content of this chapter. In addition, the chapter further presented the theoretical framework on the realist and power theory of international relations. This theory served as a suitable analytical tool to the study.

2.1 The Concept of Conflict

The recurring crisis and the concerted efforts towards peace have made the field of conflict studies a growing area of scholarship among social scientists. In their attempt to understand the phenomenon of conflict and peace, scholars have employed many approaches and methods to provide an in-depth analysis into why societies and nations go to war and why peace is elusive. As the field of peace and conflict studies in the late nineties continues to grow, the character of the global and domestic conflicts continues to deepen, change and assume a classic study. With a geometric rise in the number of conflicts, efforts at arresting them have contributed to a spontaneous growth in scholarship. The field of conflict studies has thus emerged with scholars and experts evolving new theories, terms and concepts. These terms and concepts are defined within a multi-disciplinary perspective and are sometimes used differently or interchangeably. Thus, it is not unusual to find concepts such as conflict management, conflict prevention, resolution and even peacekeeping used in a similar pattern or differently. However, it is imperative for this study to properly conceptualise these terms for better analytical purposes.

Indeed, experts and writers usually interchangeably use concepts and terms such as conflict prevention, conflict resolution and conflict management, as well as peace

making, peace keeping, peace enforcement and peace building. While this study re-examines these concepts in the context of available literature, first, it attempts to conceptualize conflict, as virtually all the existing literature on conflict prevention, resolution, management, peace keeping and peace building sees them within the prism of conflict. In other words, conceptualising the term conflict is central to the UN and peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The concept of conflict, as stated above, is closely related to peace keeping as a form of conflict management. Conflict, as a term, precedes its management. Conflict can be regarded as an event that result in chaos or disorder. This chaos can be driven by economic or political reasons, it could also be driven by religious or race. When these occurred what we are likely to get is absence of peace. In order to see that chaos or disorder did not erupt, or in case of its eruption, the management of the chaotic order as well as the management of disorder, scholars tend to use the terms conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. These terms are usually used to avoid, resolve and minimize conflicts among groups or persons, organisations or individuals in a socially and political society (Russett, 1998; Tanner, 2000, Swanstrom, 2002). Although, the means and formula of conflict prevention or conflict management may apply different strategies, these may include among others negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and peace making. These terms are, however, used interchangeably in this study to reflect the thematic issue of peacekeeping and peace-building.

It is agreed that human society cannot do without conflict. In other words, conflict is regarded as part and parcel of human society. Conflict is unavoidable and an enduring components of human relations. It is a necessary recurring decimal; it has a negative side and its positive side. Despite the fact that Conflict is destructive, it is also desirable for societal development (Allen, 1996). This position seems correct and reinforces the fact that there is positive conflict as there is negative conflict. With specific respect to nations that have risen from ashes of war, Europe has been the centre statge of two world wars yet, it is still the most developed continent. In Africa, Rwanda remained a classic example, shinning star of a nation that was also ruined by war. It story has validated the positive nature of conflict. In spite of its history of genocide, Rwanda is one of the fastest growing nations in Africa. However, not all nations in conflict rise to become a positive

model of conflict. The DRC is a special case that is yet to see positive value of conflict. Its protracted conflict is still a subject of discourse. The point being made here is that conflict can be regarded as an aspect of value change(Ding, 2005). Considering the position above, conflict is an expression of the different or multiple interests, values and beliefs that may generate social crisis when there is contrating interest (Wallenstien, 2002). This definition has an agreement in the situation in the DRC. As many scholars incontrovertibly agreed that the conflict issues is usually seen as an expression of heterogeneity of interest. However, the foregoing description does not totally explain the concept of conflict even in the specific context of the DR Congo. Rather, it only makes us to understand that conflict is a recurring, interest driven and unavoidable.

From another perspective, the term conflict has thus attracted intense interest among scholars irrespective of their ideological leanings. It has also generated huge literature from both liberal and Marxian theorists. Many have attempted to reconceptualise the term from their respective leaning or ideological persuasions. While these scholars differ in views and methods, there, however, appears to be a common ground in their conceptualisation. As it appears, the common ground from the available literature on conflict is that the definition of conflict begins from the traditional perspective of threat (Coser, 1991). This position is understandable, because conflict, as a term, revolves around threat and contest over an interest or value point which may be resources. This is always between two or more groups. From this viewpoint, there are other attempts to broaden this point of analysis, especially within the context of the current and contemporary conflict setting. As noted earlier, conflict may be as a result of failure to achieve a goal that is competed with by group or individuals (Galtung, 2005; Woodhouse, 2000). In another viewpoint, some see conflict as a violent behaviour or hostile attitude or incompatibility of interest (Galtung, 2005).

There is a presence of two parties seeking a common value or competing for similar value be it resources or otherwise. Scholars like Leung and Tjosvold, (1998); Koko, (2007); Mellbourne, (1964); Swanstrom and Weissman, (2005); Mani, (2007); Paris, (2004) all agreed with this position. Their position is the contestation over a value-based issue or over a scarce resources and how this create crisis between two divergent groups. That is why in many cases, resources are regarded as the major drivers of conflict

especially in Africa and DR Congo. However, it must be stated here that the term resources may not necessarily connote an economic resources, as other material resources may be political or social. From another perspective, conflict is, in some instances is based on emotion, views, rather than on attitudes or behaviour. The point being made here is that some conflicts are basically a confrontation of perceptions, since conflicting intentions are defined according to subjective perception. This kind of subjectivity always informs conflicts or disputes that are rationally defined along ethical values and general principles (Lund, 2008).

2.2 The Causes and Nature of Conflicts

Having focused on the concept of conflict, it is important to examine what causes conflicts especially within the context of the DR Congo. The causes of conflicts in Africa and the world are many and differ across continent. In Africa, the causes of conflict according to some scholars equally manifest in many complex forms. Thus, there have been many scholarly literatures indicating various causes to include ethnicity, marginalisation, external actors, poverty and many more. In particular cases of an armed conflict or internal insurrection, the causes are usually internally driven. They are product of the nature of politics and the resources sharing politics. In peculiar African cases, many approaches and models have been employed to explain the causes of conflicts, especially in DRC. One particular model was the works of Chabal and Daloz (1999), which adopted the use of neo-patrimonialism to explain the causes of conflicts in Africa. The two researchers postulated on the use of social and economic disorder as an instrument of African political elites to undermine the state and pursue their personal interests, resulting in armed conflict, state failure and crises. Their analysis drew an insight into interest, elite and governance. It also pointed out the weakness of the state political institutions.

The position of Chabal and Daloz (2006) found better expression in the nature and causes of African conflicts including the DR Congo situation. The weakness of the state institutions promotes conflict especially when the elites take this advantage to service their interest over the state interest. The regime of President Mobutu degraded the institutions of state to an extent that DRC interest was seen largely as the Mobutu's

interest. In Mobutu's DR Congo, state institution and resources became more of a personal institution resources and there are hardly any institution that can check his excesses. Another model was put to examine the emergence of insurgency movements and general instability in the immediate post-independence Africa was the productive leadership gap. The character of many of the post-independence Africa leadership was not only autocratic, they lacked democratic components with many showing greed for power (Adibe, 2001: 28). As Ayittey (1992, 1997, and 2005) opines, African leaders lacked the democratic values of leadership that accommodate issue-based position, constructive criticism and respect for human rights. While the issue of leadership gap drives conflict, the sit tight and despotic nature of these leaders always fuel dissident view that usually snowballed into conflict. These have played out in many African countries including Liberia, Libya, Uganda and DRC.

Another approach to armed conflict is the *resource or oil curse* syndrome, Collier and Hoeffler, (1997, 2007, 2012) Collier (2007) put up a brilliant position on how resource greed drives conflict in many resource-rich states. It further explains how-huge natural resource endowments, became the foundation of greed and grievances and how it drove agitation to rebellion. This is the case of DR Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In fact, resources of the state become a motivation for conflict rather than brighten the prospects for development. Similarly, in Nigeria many of its security infractions has been traced to stealing and contestation over her poor resource governance and sharing. The case of the DRC is not an exception. The DRC is one of the most resources endowed state in Africa, yet it resources has been exploited for years without any beneficial impact on the lives of the people. In fact the DRC represented one of the saddest tales of resource curse syndrome. Thus, the *resource-war* proposition, though argues that what motivates groups to engage in armed conflict is not grievance, but essentially economic agendas (Obi, 2009: 109).

In recent times, studies have focused on the role of the unavoidability of resources or relative scarcity of resources as a major driver of armed conflict in the individual as welll as on the collective levels. For example, Rupesinghe and Anderlini (1998: 32-33) consider factors that may act as triggers of armed conflicts: (1) stagnation and protracted income decline in poor and middle-income countries (for instance, the cases of DR

Congo); (2) unequal growth and asymmetrical distribution of resources in cases of accelerated economic growth (for instance, Rwanda and Burundi); and (3) structural adjustment policies and changing distribution of resources. In a similar fashion, the analytical perspective of the resources and governance/developmental thesis play critical role in explaining the issue of conflict. The position of Collier and Hoeffler (2000: 12) is instructive here. He argues that for the last half century at least, societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies. This assertion seems to have fit into the main description of many of the conflict in Africa, DRC inclusive.

As Jakkie Cilliers (2000:1) notes, the above approach has been collated into that of-resource-wars and is sometimes advanced as reflecting a new type of war. Collier (2000: 1) has lucidly captured the-power hypothesis with the following words: ... the discourse on armed conflict tends to be dominated by group grievance beneath which inter-group hatred lurk, often traced back through history. I have investigated statistically the African pattern of large-scale armed conflict since 1965, expecting to find a close relationship between measures of these hatreds and grievances and the incident of armed conflict. Instead, I found that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why armed conflicts get going.

The outcomes of a further research in *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, conducted by Collier and others revealed the causes of the conflict in DR Congo to be the failure of economic development (Collier 2000: 53). Expatiating further, these scholars contended that: countries with poor economic development with massive poverty, poor and unequal sharing of resources has potential to get entrap in conflict. These countries are also characterised by poor governance and weak political institutions and are like to be prone to violence (Collier 2000: 53). Thus, there is a tendency for disadvantaged groups to challenge an unsatisfactory *status quo* where there is a real or perceived sense of inequality in gaining access to power and resources (Ostby, 2008: 143). This perspective draws on the human motivation of participants who are engaged in armed conflict, particularly the role of political, cultural and economic factors in influencing and constructing group identities and mobilizing such groups to compete for power (Stewart, 2000: 246-247). Stewart (2000: 247) makes the salient point that group identity is a

product of political leaders, who find group cohesion and mobilisation a powerful mechanism in their competition for power and resources, adopting a strategy of reworking of historical animosities' to engender group identity. However, it is noted that shared group identities may not be enough to mobilise a group for armed conflict, except when the group has a sense of collective deprivation due to marginalisation (Obi, 2009: 111).

Though useful, the foregoing explanation presents the researcher with some difficulties. Consider, for example, the neo-patrimonial dimension and its emphasis on rapacious elites whose mischief lead to state failure. Instead of blaming the many crises in the state on the occasion of elite corruption, it would be more intellectually satisfying and analytically rewarding to attribute them to several complex factors, including the collapse of the post-colonial mode of accumulation that was, in part, linked to the pressures from globalisation and the anti-state market reform agenda promoted by the IMF, World Bank and other donors (Obi, 2009: 111). What about the resource-curse thesis, which largely fails to capture the complex dimensions of the politics and international linkages that underscore armed conflicts in resource-rich DR Congo (Obi, 2000: 47-62). Added to this, the approach is shockingly silent on why wars break out in resource-poor countries. Instead, it exaggerates the role of a single factor, out of many, as the predisposing factor to violence (Obi, 2000: 47-62).

The causal account of armed conflict remains unpersuasive. Bates (2008: 261) has asked a critical question: How can one recognize which institutions are weak, which states are fragile, or which governments are bad 'other than by the rise of political disorder? Further, Bates (2008: 261) argues that-insofar as these causal factors are characterized by their consequences, they add little by way of explanation. They may highlight what has been observed, but they do little to explain it. The political approach, therefore, borders on tautology (Bates, 2008: 261). Bates' question aside, the realist nature of the power theory has also been criticized by Cilliers (2000: 2), thus: …although armed conflict may have both *intended* and *unintended* economic consequences, any analysis that seeks to reduce the study of extensive armed conflict to a single determinant should be treated with care. Therefore, the resource-war power theory, or realist theory,

does not seem to leave an aperture for a comprehensive or robust understanding of contemporary conflicts.

On the economic factors, Bates (2008: 261) argues that it fails to point to the mechanisms that link economic conditions to political outcomes. While pointing to a set of relationships between macro-economic aggregates and political behaviours, it fails to specify the micro-level mechanisms that generate those relationships or the incentives that animate them. (Diverting) our attention to those theories that dwell on the economic incentives for armed conflict, a cursory look at the roots of armed conflicts in DR Congo, suggests several trends. For example, the wars in Rwanda and Burundi were the result of a complex amalgam of historical, political, and economic factors as well as deep seated crises that engulfed DR Congo (Zack-Williams, 1999; Abdullah, 2004). While the horizontal inequality suffices for understanding the root causes of inter-group armed conflict and violence, it still faces challenges in grappling with intra-group conflicts, measuring inequalities (sometimes represented statistically), and dealing with the factor of globalized pressures/actors that deepen existing contradictions and cleavages in DR Congo (Obi, 2009: 112). Despite its appeal, these schools of thought have been disputed by the new political economy/war economies perspective that endorses the view that the possibility of crisis or violence cannot be linke to unequal distribution of wealth (Ostby, 2008: 143).

In general term, the causes are usually rooted in external and internal politics. It encompasses economic, political, cultural and social parameters (Agestam, 2003). Among the international factors, particularly noteworthy are the consequences of globalization and liberalization of the global economy that have generated a sense of political and economic insecurity in Africa (Allen, 1996). On the whole, these internal and external factors have not only contributed to conflicts in Africa but have thereby impacted negatively on her political and economic development.

According to Annan (2005), the external factors have been triggered by a series of interest by countries that have huge ‘stake’ in Africa. Some of these countries have colonial history in Africa and they still have influence in its internal politics. In a similar fashion, internal factors have been important influences in igniting intra-state conflicts. Thus, the history of African conflicts dates back to the colonial period when some of

these nations were either forcefully fused together or arbitrarily partitioned by the colonialists. However, contemporary African conflicts began to manifest in the immediate post-independence era and took a worse dimension in the globalisation era (Saliu, 1999). It is, therefore, no coincidence that Africa, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, which is unarguably the poorest region in the world, has the highest concentration of conflicts (Saliu, 2010). The numbers of conflicts by independence in the early sixties grew from arithmetic to geometric proportion by the nineteen nineties (Omach, 2010). In Africa alone, countries like Angola, Algeria, Burundi, Congo, DRC, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda were engulfed in conflicts (Annan, 1999). At the same time, some countries were engulfed in pockets of internal and political violence which later snowballed to full-scale wars (Mpyisi and Murithi 2007).

Unfortunately, many of these conflicts had a contagious impact as neighbouring states were either dragged into the arena of conflict or the conflict spilled into them (Williet, 2001). For example, the conflict in Somali affected countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. In the same vein, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo were all affected by the conflicts in the Mano River Region. Others like Nigeria were involved in conflicts outside their own borders, Nigeria through peacekeeping operations in West Africa (first in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone) (Okumu. 2007). Yet others, such as Guinea and Tanzania, are suffering from the impacts of conflict in neighbouring states. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Burundi have been drawn into the conflict in the DRC. Yet another group of states has only recently emerged from, and relapsed into, conflicts and remain vulnerable to the legacies of violence. These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Central African Republic and Mozambique. Many conflicts in Africa are of a prolonged nature (Okumu and Ikelegbe, 2010).

Many factors account for African conflicts. Many have traced the history of conflict to colonial conquest. While this may be true, one need to understand that colonialism may not account for all forms of conflict in the continent. By the time the Soviet Union dissolved, many countries in Africa were not left out of the sudden change occasioned in Russia. Former one party and authoritarian regimes started to fall and the attendant was the conflict that broke out in those countries. As regimes fell so also were state institutions. In fact, countries in Africa like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire, CAR, and

many others were also engulfed in crisis. In fact, countries rich in natural resources were worst hit by the intra-state war. The DRC was not left out of the protracted war. Rebel and militia groups were challenging the institution of state. With massive influx of small arms and light weapons gaining entry into these spots of conflicts, the confusion and dislocation began to manifest in humanitarian and social disorder spilled beyond borders. Thus, wide ranging causes have been identified, including colonialism and imperial rule; authoritarian character of colonial state; cultural imperialism; the nature and character of the emerging elites; leadership crisis; ethnicity and tribalism; resources contestation; power and electoral contestation; poverty, underdevelopment and external influence.

These factors have enjoyed wide scholarly attention. However, recent causes have been more of the nature of resources and power contestation. Collier and Hofflier (2007) wrote extensively on this. In Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia, resources were responsible for fuelling war. Conflicts over resources are not limited to the Africa continent only; some of them are connected to external influences. For example, Chinese and American demands for oil led to the deepening of conflicts in Sudan and Libya. From another perspective, external actors were responsible to funding these wars. They (external forces) armed and gave logistical support to rebel movements with the aim of getting favour from these rebel movements (Cilliers, Hughes, Moyer, 2011).

In spite of these causes, conflicts in Africa have assumed different forms and contents. In the immediate post-independence, the nature of conflicts in Africa was inter-state, caused by artificially drawn colonial borders that sometimes separated same groups of people into different states. For example, parts of the Somalis nation were merged with Ethiopia (Derisso, 2008). So also parts of the Yoruba nation in Nigeria were incorporated into the Republic of Benin. Sometimes such partitioning had triggered conflict. However, the contemporary African conflict in the era was notably intra-state and within borders. Besides the wars in Namibia, Western Sahara, and Ethiopia-Eritrea which were civil war, all others were intra-state wars reflecting the changing nature of contemporary conflicts (Adebajo, 2011). Indeed, the types of the conflicts have been:

i. Wars between nations (inter-state)
ii. Civil wars within nations (Intra-state)
iii. Colonial wars/conflicts

iv. Wars of independence
v. Secessionist/Separatist Conflicts (intra-state)
vi. Major episodes of violence, religious (riots, massacres, etc.) Electoral conflicts in African nations

According to Anyidoho (1997), Africa's conflicts take their root from a combination of many factors. Principal among these are the following:

i) issues relating to religious and ethnic differences;
ii) religious fundamentalism;
iii) disputes over traditional boundaries and resource sharing;
iv) inequitable distribution of political and economic power;
v) struggles for the reform and democratization of political and economic systems;
vi) negative legacies of colonial rule; and
vii) ethnic competition stemming from the collapse of the old patterns of relationships that provided the framework for collaboration among the many ethnic groups of which African countries are composed.

Another dimension has been added to the typologies of conflict in Africa. This is the phenomenon of election related conflict. In Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, electoral outcomes have resulted in major conflicts (Davidson, 2010). Conflicts have taken their toll on African countries and the impacts of the conflicts have compelled effort at finding lasting solution. In the attempts to resolving these, the UN peacekeeping mission is very significant in its resolutions.

2.3 International Conflicts Management strategy

The patterns and strategies of managing international conflicts vary in forms and contents. From traditional diplomacy where actors use diplomatic means to resolve conflicts to the use of force or military powers (peace enforcement), the trends and methods have always been dictated by the nature and character of the conflict. However, in the international system, there are methods recognised by scholars as means of managing international conflicts. According to these scholars (Wallensteen, 2002, Weiss,

2007, 2009, Lund, 2003, Zartman, 1997 and 2007), the methods of conflict management has continued to change from the Cold War period of the use of collective security (Wallensteen and Moller, 2004) to the post-Cold War era of peacekeeping and peace-building. It is, therefore, important to highlight some of these patterns.

2.3.1 International (Preventive) Diplomacy

The concept of diplomacy has always been at the heart of international conflict management. Many academics employed diplomacy as a means of resolving conflict between nations. According to the statute of the UN, diplomatic means is considered as the first option in conflict management. However, some tend to view preventive action as same thing as pre-emptive strikes (Swanstrom and Weissman, 2005). This view was in the context of the international politics that was shaped by the politics of West-East blocs. The period also witnessed the use of deterrence power as a preventive action among the powerful countries. As there appear to be a brought major shift in how preventive action can be employed within the international system, it has, therefore, undergone new meaning with emphasis shifted to the peaceful prevention of disputes which is tied to the entire gamut of peacekeeping.

In some ways, preventive diplomacy is designed to micro and macro-managed conflicts. It could be armed or non-armed with an intent to de-escalate or prevent widespread crisis. The UN specifically refers to preventive diplomacy as a process where diplomacy was adopted to counter or prevent the outburst of conflicts or restrict its widespread. Preventive diplomacy may also be used before and after conflict. In a sense, it could be used as proactive measure or trouble shooting mechanism to seemly eruption of conflict. It can also be used in many forum and platform. It may be seen in different form, in public and private arena, preventive diplomacy is a great instrument of conflict management. In modern times, and most commonly seen as diplomacy is found in the work of diplomatic envoys given the roles of ensuring a dialogue or compromise and settling a conflict that was yet to break out that has broken out. In addition, it encompasses the involvement of the international organisation especially the UN institutions, the office of the General secretary, and people with good offices. Other

actors in the international, local or regional arena can also employ the use of preventive diplomacy (UN, 2006).

The first person to used the concept of preventive diplomacy was Dag Hammarskjold, a former UN Secretary General. It was after this that the concept began to gain acceptability and became popular as parts of resolving conflict. These two concept preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention have now been part of peacemaking architecture. They are used as soft and hard diplomacy that include use of subtle threat of deterrence military action to compel aggressor to change her course of action. However, the concept has gained ground in a way to respond to the emerging challenges in and within nations. It is important to further examine the concept of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. These two concepts have been given bolder attention by scholars under the pretence of preventive action: as 'soft' mediation or as 'muscular' diplomacy that includes credible threats of pre-emptive military action. In some ways, these terms connote consensual management of possible social disorder. And to others, it means an appeal that prevent explosion of conflict (Hale 1991, Hoffman, 2006). This position seem to be same to the idea of conflict prevention that many scholars see as preventive diplomacy or to some as sensitivity, early warning and peace-building. This will also be examined later in the course of this review.

Another perspective of preventive diplomacy was contained in the United Nations' 'Agenda for Peace', which was done during the period of Dr Boutros Ghali as the Secretary General. Preventive diplomacy refers to an effort that involve specific action to prevent an outburst of a conflict or a diplomatic trouble shooting that engages a party in dispute to take a different course of action that may not lead to war or preventing it from further degenration (Boutros-Ghali, 2007). Boutros-Ghali was of the opinion that preventive diplomacy is different from peace-making, the former he views resolution through the use of mediation and negotiation instruments (Boutros-Ghali, 2007). His understanding here outline the core goals of preventive action through diplomacy. It must be emphatically stated here that the UN has deployed the use of preventive diplomacy as a mean of resolving or managing conflict throughout the trouble areas of the world.

It is agreed that human society cannot do without conflict. In other words, conflict is regarded as part and parcel of human society. Conflict is unavoidable and an enduring

components of human relations. It is a necessary recurring decimal; it has a negative side and its positive side. Despite the fact that Conflict is destructive, it is also desirable for societal development (Allen, 1996). This position seems correct and reinforces the fact that there is positive conflict as there is negative conflict. With specific respect to nations that have risen from ashes of war, Europe has been the centre statge of two world wars yet, it is still the most developed continent. In Africa, Rwanda remained a classic example, shinning star of a nation that was also ruined by war. It story has validated the positive nature of conflict. In spite of its history of genocide, Rwanda is one of the fastest growing nations in Africa. However, not all nations in conflict rise to become a positive model of conflict. The DRC is a special case that is yet to see positive value of conflict. Its protracted conflict is still a subject of discourse. The point being made here is that conflict can be regarded as an aspect of value change(Ding, 2005). Considering the position above, conflict is an expression of the different or multiple interests, values and beliefs that may generate social crisis when there is contrating interest (Wallenstien, 2002). This definition has an agreement in the situation in the DRC. As many scholars incontrovertibly agreed that the conflict issues is usually seen as an expression of heterogeneity of interest. However, the foregoing description does not totally explain the concept of conflict even in the specific context of the DR Congo. Rather, it only makes us to understand that conflict is a recurring, interest driven and unavoidable.

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failure to achieve a goal that is competed with by group or individuals (Galtung, 2005; Woodhouse, 2000). In another viewpoint, some see conflict as a violent behaviour or hostile attitude or incompatibility of interest (Galtung, 2005).

There is a presence of two parties seeking a common value or competing for similar value be it resources or otherwise. Scholars like Leung and Tjosvold, (1998); Koko, (2007); Mellbourne, (1964); Swanstrom and Weissman, (2005); Mani, (2007); Paris, (2004) all agreed with this position. Their position is the contestation over a value-based issue or over a scarce resources and how this create crisis between two divergent groups. That is why in many cases, resources are regarded as the major drivers of conflict especially in Africa and DR Congo. However, it must be stated here that the term resources may not necessarily connote an economic resources, as other material resources may be political or social. From another perspective, conflict is, in some instances is based on emotion, views, rather than on attitudes or behaviour. The point being made here is that some conflicts are basically a confrontation of perceptions, since conflicting intentions are defined according to subjective perception. This kind of subjectivity always informs conflicts or disputes that are rationally defined along ethical values and general principles (Lund, 2008).

2.3.2 Mediation and Negotiation

International mediation and negotiation can also be classified as part of preventive diplomacy, but in some cases they can also be used as an isolated form of international conflict management. In some obvious exceptions, mediation and negotiation have generally been the preferred means of dispute settlement at the global level since World War II. According to Weiss and Daws (2007), the nuclear brinksmanship eventually yielded to a more business-like relationship characterized by regular summits between the leaders of the US and the old Russian nation; and negotiations on arms control, troop deployments, and other kinds of confidence-building measures were directed at reducing tensions and the risks of escalation of crisis situations. Although adjudication, arbitration, and various judicial means have frequently been used to deal with interstate disputes (Wallensteeen and Moller, 2004), as well as disputes between private actors that cross international borders, the continued importance that states attach to their

sovereignty has meant that the opportunities for judicial recourse tend to be limited. Bargaining and negotiation are thus the default option when disputes arise, and the studies of experts on conflict prevention have centred on understanding these issues.

The UN regards the concepts of mediation and negotiation as part of the components of the pacific settlement of disputes. It recognises it usage before a military action is deployed in a crisis spot. This is also contained in the chapter VI of the UN Charter. (United Nations Charter, Chapter VI, Article 33)1. By this, it is believed that the UN has made significant efforts and also recognises that its organs and institutions offers a range of negotiated and mediation platform for nations and states to engage before matter degenerated into conflict. For example, institutions and organisations like World Trade Organisation, the UN High Commission for Refugees and other platforms allow states and other international actors to ventilate, discuss, engage and arrive at amicable resolutions of their differences. In fact, most nations employ negotiation to further achieve their national interest in these institutions (Peck, 2009).

The UNSG uses its office through its diplomats and other representatives to engage in mediation and negotiation with both state and non-state actors especially when the situation appears to be heading toward conflict. This effort falls under the much-talked Track I and II diplomacy. This is a situation where state institutions involve regional and global organisation in negotiation of their various interest (Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001). The Track II diplomacy developed in the 70s is usually undertaken by non-states actors to press home their demands. It is used by the civil society mostly to negotiate and mediate on issues of interest. In fact, there are evidences on the Track II diplomacy was used by people of good offices, clergy, academics, jurists of repute to resolve conflict situations in many parts of the world (Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001). Actors in negotiation and mediation in this category include both international and local non-governmental organizations.

Indeed, in contemporary peace making, the regional organisation and institution have come to play a major role. Through the use of negotiation and mediation, organisation like the OAU and AU have been engaging in many diplomatic manoeuvring to douse the flames of conflicts in Africa. In fact, mediation and negotiation became critical instrument in Africa because of the OAU's protocol of non-interference in the

domestic affairs of member states. Thus, regional organisations usually deploy the tools of negotiation and mediation as a way of resolving or managing conflict. In some particular instances, the former OAU has a unit called Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, which usually did an ad hoc function of conflict management (Mottiar & Jaarsvel, 2009, as cited in Govender and Ngandu, 2009). The emergence of AU has cemented the use of mediation, negotiation and arbitration as means of resolving conflicts. Its Peace and Security Council fashioned after the UNSC was to facilitate the use of negotiation and mediation techniques in African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (AU, 2002, Article 6.2).

2.2.3 Peace-Making, Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping and Peace-building

In contemporary conflict management discourse, the idea of peacekeeping, peace-making, peace enforcement and peace-building are strongly connected. While it is imperative to note that the peace making process, which involves effort to understand and understudy the already exploded conflict must take into cognisance the framework to bring hostile parties to the negotiating table Therefore, peace-making is part of conflict prevention. It is also a measure of the conflict management process. Peacemakers can sometimes be envoys, governments, religious leaders, statesmen, and individual or concern states, local and regional institutions or organisations, actors or reputable status with good offices. On the other hand, peace enforcement is solely a UN responsibility. It may include the use of a wide range of instruments of violence and sanction, military as well as economic (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). It usuage cannot be deployed without the consent of the General Assembly or the Security Council. In fact, the SC has the singular power and authority to deploy the use of force as an instrument of peace. The Security Council acts when humanitarian situation is reache, this was done in Libya and Syria and many parts of the world. The regional organisation also need to seek the consent of the UNSC in situation where they feel a military action is necessary to restore order, this is in consonance with the UNSC roles.

The concept of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building are mostly linked to the interventions and activities of international organisation like the UN and other regional bodies. Peacekeeping and peace building have their historical and

conceptual linkage to the UN. For example, in defining peacekeeping, Annan opines that peacekeeping is the use of the UN intervention in the arena of conflict with or without the consent of the parties involved (Annan, 2000). Within the context of Annan's definition, the idea of peacekeeping is solely within the purview of the UN responsibility which has gained acceptability since the early sixties.

There is no contestation that peace-keeping and peace-building' are much talked about in the field of peacemaking. In the discourse of international politics and peace development, the issues of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are gaining momentum and relevance. As a matter of fact, Dr Boutros Ghali , a former UNSG, published a document titled '*An Agenda for Peace',* which has become a reference documents on post-Cold War peacekeeping activities (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). The document was written on the request of the SC was to examine the complexities of the emerging security threats and come up wit the modalities of managing or responding to them. It dig more on the traditional cases of wars among nations and emphasised the emerging intra-state wars fought by nations and recommended that the new peacekeeping and peacebuilding must take into mind these emerging disorder.

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Conciliation and Arbitration, which usually did an ad hoc function of conflict management (Mottiar & Jaarsvel, 2009, as cited in Govender and Ngandu, 2009). The emergence of AU has cemented the use of mediation, negotiation and arbitration as means of resolving conflicts.

Even as these terms appear to be similar, one should not confuse the idea of robus peacekeeping with enforcement, as stated in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The term robust peacekeeping usually employs military action as a tactical response with the consent of the SC and the parties involved. On the contrary, peace enforcement requires no consent of the parties in conflict, it is a direct military action authorised by the Security Council. It is used to get compliance to an order of the UN. However, the use of force or military action is usually deployed when necessary or when other options failed. It must be deployed with the framework of certain modalities. These are the mission capability; local consent, humanitarian response. It must be precise and achieve its desire goals as its usage could deepen the conflict. Having review some of the existing literature on the issues of conflict, its management and UN peacekeeping architecture, it is imperative to shift attention to the theoretical framework of this study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several theories can be used to provide the logical explanation for the UN peacekeeping interventions and African conflicts management. In this study, the realist and power theory provides the theoretical framework or theory underpinning of the study. The realist and power theory is one of the theories that have dominated the study of international politics in contemporary times. The realist and power theory was developed from the traditional writings of scholars like Sun Tzu (or Sunzi), an ancient Chinese military strategist, and Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian whose books: *The Art of War* and *The History of Peloponnesian War,* respectively provided insight into the use of power in the affairs of men. However, it was Niccolò Machiavelli, a Florentine political philosopher, whose book: *The Prince,* revealed in classical form, the main thrust of the theory. Similarly, recent writers like Carl von Clausewitz, a 19th century Prussian general and military theorist and Hans Morgenthau developed a contemporary analysis of power or realist theory.

The postulations of these scholars assumed that political realism of political actors' behaviour is informed by the logic of interest and the quest for more power (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981:85). Thus, Morgenthau (1964) provided some assumptions in the context of the realist theory of international politics as following:

i. The international system is anarchic. There is no authority above states capable of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated to by some higher controlling member.
ii. Sovereign nations are the principal players in the global system. Regional and global institutions, non-government organisations, multinational corporations, individual and other sub-state or trans-state actors are viewed as having little independent influence.
iii. States are rational unitary actors, each moving towards its own national interest. There is a general distrust of long-term cooperation or alliance.
iv. The overriding 'national interest' of each state is its national security and survival.
v. In pursuit of national security, states strive to amass resources.
vi. Relations between states are determined by their comparative level of power derived primarily from their military and economic capabilities.
vii. There are no universal principles which all state can use to guide their actions. Instead, a state must be ever aware of the actions of the state around it and must use a pragmatic approach to resolve the problems that arise.
viii. The injection of morality into international relations causes reckless commitments, diplomatic rigidity, and the escalation of conflict.

From the above, it is glaring that state and non-state actors in the international system are guided by power couched in national interest and self-respect respectively. Just as the theory postulates that power is central to state action in the international arena, it is a major determinant of how an international actor can exert influence or pursue its national interest. The power or realist theory further points to the realism of an international system that is essentially anarchical with no central authority above the state. Therefore, the action of states is based on rationality and sometimes mutual respect. Behind these postulations, the power and realist theory views international institutions,

non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or trans-state actors as having little independent influence. States are regarded as rational unitary actors, each moving towards the realization of its national interest. Even in the event of general distrust or long-term cooperation or alliance, the overriding issues are national interest, preservation of national security and survival. In pursuit of these goals, states are not bound by any universal principles that must guide their actions.

Thus, as states seek power and influence to pursue their national interests, the search for influence, domination and power has been extended to the arena of international organization. This is because international organizations are perceived as a stage or theatre where power of states and other actors can be displayed. Thus, international organizations can be regarded as a platform where real politik of states is played. However, what determines the influence and power of international actors in international organizations depends largely on many elements of power, such as its military strength, economic development, etc. International organisations, therefore, present the realistic exposition of the intrigues and dynamics of power politics among international actors. Because international politics prioritizes the survival of actors and their interest, it follows that morality cannot determine the interests of states, rather what determines this is power. In an organization that is expected to perform intervention for development, some states are likely to dominate and influence the decision of others. In other words, powerful nations are most likely to influence and have their way, especially when the organisation was formed to reflect their visions and values.

Therefore, within the context of this study, the UN must be understood as an international organization where states come to express their interests and seek more powers. But more logical is the fact that the states that were privy to its establishment will always show greater influence in the decisions and vision of the organisation. The organisation will mirror the vision and mission of its founders. UN was established by a limited number of nations, but its membership grew over time. Therefore, it is equally logical that states that were not part of the establishment may have limited influence on its policy. Indeed, many of the present African states fall within the latter group; only Ethiopia and Liberia were independent states when the UN was founded; the rest were still under colonial rule. So, it is only natural that these groups of states may not be able

to influence or dictate the thrust of an organization that was not created by them. It is very likely that the organization will reflect the values of those states that created it, and naturally do the wishes and aspirations of its creator usually made up of powerful states.

Even if the motive behind the organization was to achieve peace, security, co-ordinate development and cooperation, yet, the ideals appear very good, the theoretical thrusts of realist theory suggest that peace, security and development will only be pursued at the beck and call of its powerful members. They are likely to determine what constitute insecurity and is likely to shape the character of development. Therefore, beyond the high sounding ideals of any organization, the conduct of its affairs is always determined by very few actors who have power and influence. In addition, the maxim that he who pays the piper calls the tune is a valid reality for actors within the realist orientation in international politics (Saliu, 1999). How much a nation contributes to an organization is crucial to the influence it wields. In an organization where some states are leading financiers, it is expected that they will naturally dictate the trend and pace of the organizations policy thrust.

In cases where states that are very poor and underdeveloped, they can hardly get their wish done in an international which, in most cases have nothing to offer. So what they ordinarily do is to ally with a dominant power and tie their interests with its interests or those of a regional power. More often, the poor countries show poor co-ordination and poor strategies to push their national interest agenda on the global stage. The conduct of the state in the international system has no respect for the equality of states. This principle does not stand; it is seen as mere moral sloganeering. Some states are more powerful than others in times of raw military and economic power. They also show a different level of commitment to organizations affairs from others. In this context, it would be wrong to assume that states will enjoy the same leverage in an organization. Therefore in reality, actors and states given their contributions and supports to international organization cannot, accept the principle of equality in terms of how their interests can be realized.

Finally, international actors, from the viewpoint of the realist school, do not believe that the power equation can be subjected to arithmetic or moral persuasion. For them, all the actions and interests of international actors are within the context of power

acquisition. It must be displayed and applied at all times. Emotion and moralism find no standing (Morgenthau, 1964). Thus, the idea of equality and equal right of member states holds no ground and is mere moral sloganeering. In fact moralism and realism have no meeting point in international politics. Every action of an international actor is grounded on sound logic and power and commitment to international obligations (Kissinger, 1964). The realist and power school therefore offers an analytical insight on how states exercise power and influence and dominate others. And the ability of any state to manipulate others depends largely on the amount of influence and powers it has in the decisions of the international organization (Saliu, 1999).However, the power and realist theory suffers from over-generalization that states only interact because of acquisition of influence and power. The issue of state relations is not and cannot be seen as only a quest for power, some of the actions are based on mutual interest and respect. As it will be demonstrated further in the study, the power and realist theory contributes largely to the understanding of politics of the UN in the management of conflict and deployment of peacekeeping missions. The SC of the UN consists of five permanent (P5) members and these members call the shot; because they also contribute more to its funding they can dictate on the issue of deployment of peacekeeping operations in the world including Africa.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter had review some of the existing literature and also provided the theoretical framework. The aspect of the literature review on the causes and drivers of conflict in DR Congo have been given bolder in the chapter more so the resource curse syndrome, the pattern of its management in respect to the UN peacekeeping architecture is also well reviewed in the chapter. Therefore, the next chapter intends to examine the UN, its organ or structure and its peacekeeping architecture.

CHAPTER THREE

THE UNITED NATIONS: HISTORY, ORGANS AND PEACEMAKING ARCHITECTURE

In this chapter, an historical background and formation of the UN as a global peace making institution is explored. It brings to the fore the rationale, aims and objective of the UN whose main goal is to achieve world development and peace. Likewise, this chapter examines the UN's organs and structure is given attention. It must be stated clearly that this chapter specifically explores the roles of Security Council in ensuring global peace and the peacekeeping operation architecture of the UN.

3.1 The Historical Background: Origination of the League of Nations to the United Nation

World War I of 1914 - 1918 and the World War II of 1939-1945 hasten the birth of the United Nations. The actions of the leaders of the world were influenced by two global wars to provide suitable platform to give room for interrelations of states on the global terrain, in order to engender world peace and security as well as human resource management. However, at the ceasefire of the World War I, the League of Nations was established in 1919. It began activities with 42 countries, within which 26 were non-Europeans and later, the membership increased to 57 countries. It's believed that sustainable peace could be provoked by a world organization of nations thereby preventing a repeat of the horrors and brutality of the war in Europe in 1914-1918, which eventually led to the emergence of the League of Nations

3.2 The League of Nations

Two basic visions predicated the emergence of the League of Nations. One is to engender the maintenance of world peace through collective action. During conflicts, the League's Council would be charge with responsibilities of mediation and appeasement. However, in some situations, the economic later followed by military sanctions could be employed. In clearer terms, members are saddled with responsibility of defending other

members from aggression. Two, the League is structured to promote global mutual aid in economic and social affairs.

Precisely, the Covenant of the league says:

> In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations (Palmer and Palmer, 2007)

The outbreak of the WWII exposed the failure of league to uphold its major aim of preserving the world peace. However, its failure does not exist in a vacuum but came as a result of various factors, some were beyond its control. One, was the fact that some strong countries of the world did not support its establishment. Two, was the fact that the League did not have standing military of its own but rely solely on its members for military strength (Adebajo, 2004; Bellamy and Williams, 2010). The disobliging actions of the members of the league in the executions of decisions reduced its power. In corroboration, the members of league were reluctant to employ economic or military sanctions. Concisely, the League experienced inadequacy in moral and political authority to accumulate the required respect to espouse global peace and security (Anning, 1999; Bercovitch, and Richard 2009).

United States was one of the world powers that never joined the League. However, Germany and USSR were members for only few years. In the 1930s, both Japan and Italy withdrew their membership. Hence, the league relied solely on Britain and France as its major strength, although both were as expected to be cautious in acting compellingly. It became difficult for some countries that were not part of the organisation to function with the new international body. In early 1930s it became clear that the league had lost its clutch on world powers with Germany resurrecting its armed build up.

The outbreak of the WWII cut short the lifespan of the League of Nations in 1939, however, the governments of Britain, China, the US, and the USSR encountered severe advocacy by the media and the society while the Second World War continues, hence, at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC in 1944, in their decision to discuss the niceties of a

post war organization, the delegates of China, the UK, the US and the USSR prepared a proposal for a global organization (Perkins, 2007). Between April and June 1945 towards the end of the war, delegates of 50 countries assembled at San Francisco to strike out the concluding manuscript that would set up the basis of global synchronization. On 26th of June, fifty countries signed the Charter of the United Nations. However, Poland, the fifty one member and also considered as a foundational member, was unable to send a delegate to the San Francisco conference.

At the beginning of the 2nd World War, the leadership of the big powers believed that after the final victory of the Allied Powers a world organisation would be established. The Western leadership realised that the countries would learn from the experience of the harsh outcomes of the two world wars; global depression and deaths. Thus, threats to human freedom and League's experience to be committed to establish a more fair international order with a new world international organisation playing a critical role in the establishment of the United Nations (UN, 2000).

The emergence of the United Nations was primarily directed to achieve prevention of the coming generations from the harsh and horror of war. The United Nation emphasised the believe in human rights, and the human dignity both men and women, in the equal rights of large and small countries, also in essence, promote social progress and good living condition in larger freedom as stipulated in the preamble of the UN charter (UN, 2000, Annan 2004, Adebajo, 2006). In the real sense, the earlier failure and to correct the flaws of the League of Nations led to the formation of the United Nations.

3.3 The United Nations

The Washington Declaration in January 1942 gave the name "United Nations" as used by the Allied Countries that engaged in a conflict with the three Axis Power that include Germany, Italy and Japan (Adebajo, 2010). October 1943, in Yalta, Moscow; the delegates of the United States, Britain, Russia and China decided on the plan of the new world order. Between August and October 1944, the proposal of the UN Charter was written at a conference in Dumbarton Oaks in Washington DC. The membership representation of two of the Russian Republics; Ukraine and Byelorussia, became an outstanding issue. However, Joseph Stalin from the start desired the representation of all

the sixteen soviet republics in a bid to balance the power of the United States and its Latin American allies, as well as Britain and its dominions, in the General Assembly. However, the matter was settled in Yalta conference of February 1945 by Roosevelt, Stalin and Winston Churchill.

In June 1945, in San Francisco, the United States, Russia, Britain, China as well as France imposed the matter relating to peace and security on the other 43 smaller countries, thus became an essential component of the Dumbarton Oaks document sponsored by them. The Axis Powers clearly state the supreme nature of their veto power at the UN, an approach that was not challenged by the small states (Adebajo, 2010). The responsibility of the General Assembly was reinforced affording it the opportunity to examine any matter related to the charter, however, generating an economic and social council as well as reinforcing the stipulations that permits regions to establish individual or collective self-defence to nations experiencing armed attacks. Russia assertions, that the five permanent members of the Security Council should be given the opportunity to veto discussions of procedural matters became a great matter in Dumbarton Oaks. The matter was however settled by an appeal to Stalin to drop the matter (Perkins, 2007). Protection was assured to the smaller powers and some level of autonomy in the social and economic affairs as well as the opportunity to pass the UN budget, this was a substitute for giving permission to the Axis Powers to have special privileges as a result of the deal struck at San Francisco. In order to produce a less Eurocentric world, the "Founding Fathers" of the UN charged the global organisation with the responsibility of checking the matter of colonialism and global socio-economic difficulties, hence, the main modification between the UN and the League of Nations (Diehl, 2005). Without taken into consideration of the poor representation of Africa at San Francisco, the above development was done its favour. After two months of negotiations 50 representatives of 48 states signed the UN Charter. The activities at Moscow, Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks were done to suit the Axis Powers.

Various global conferences were held where concrete planning was made before the establishment of UN. Still, the following as highlighted by Perkins (2007) are the most essential of these conferences along with their outcomes:

i. The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt laid the eight principles on a battleship in the North Atlantic upon which their hope of a better future of the world was placed and this marked the birth of the United Nations.
ii. The United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942. Some weeks after Pearl Harbor, twenty-six countries resolved leave in peace and cooperate in conflicts as well as using the name earlier adopted for the new global body.
iii. The Casablanca Conference, January, 1943. In the North African city of Casablanca, "unconditional surrender" tactics, discussion over terms of peace and the role countries after the war was agreed upon, however, Churchill and Roosevelt planned the invasion of Sicily and Italy in consultation with French representatives.

iv. The Food and Agriculture Conference of May-June, 1943, Forty-four countries of the world examine the matter of the inability to feed the displaced persons and thus provided a framework that births the establishment of Food and Agricultural Organisation in late 1945 at Hot Springs, Virginia.
v. The Moscow Conference, October-November, 1943. In maintaining peace and security the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Russia, and United States, and the Chinese ambassador to Russia agreed that their action in unity would be sustained for the organisation, with a declaration of their knowledge for the importance of establishing an organisation of nations predicated by the doctrine of supreme equality and giving opportunities to small and large states to be a member. However, this is the first time the Soviet Union accepted the decision to create a global organisation after the war.
vi. The Teheran Conference, November, 1943. Large and small nations, in a declaration made by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin would be invited to be a part of the global organisation.
vii. The Breton Woods Conference, July, 1944, the foresight that economic and financial instability would not guarantee for the world a lasting peace, forty-four countries of the world came up with a decision to establish two essential

institutions. One, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and two, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Recently, both institutions are specialized UN agencies.

viii. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D. C., September-October, 1944. The representatives of China, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States outlined the blueprint for a common global organisation as well as the first plan of the Charter of the United Nation in relation to the economic and functional organisation. However, the two documents possess some basic resemblance.

ix. The Yalta Conference, February, 1945. In order to plan for the occupation and control of defeated Germany, also, ensuring order in liberated Europe, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin came together in the Crimea for their second and final Conference. In addition, significant decisions in an undisclosed agreements in relation to the Eastern Europe and the Far East was made, however, agreed on the "veto" formula later stipulated in the UN Charter, thereby demanded a full-scale United Nations Conference to be convened in San Francisco on April 25, 1945.

x. The Mexico City Conference, February-March, 1945. The issue of defence and cooperation between the American republics as well as the conditions with which Argentina could resume her total participation in the American affairs were discussed and the "Act of Chapultepec" prepared for the upcoming conference at San Francisco was adopted.

xi. Committee of Jurists' Meeting, Washington, D. C., April, 1945. Statute of the International Court of Justice was as a result of the amended "Draft Statue and Report" established by Jurists from forty-four countries.

xii. San Francisco Conference, April 25 June, 1945. The conference came as result of various actions, thereby leading to the birth of the new global organisation, hence, the United Nations. The conference and the Charter have been captured in fifteen volumes and huge commentaries (see Perkins, 2007).

The conference was structured into four commissions and twelve committees, however, the committees were responsible for the huge part of the entire work. Moreover, the coordination Committee and a Committee of Jurists organised it in a final document

but a Steering Committee was given the responsibility examine and make resolutions to problems.

The principle of national sovereignty and the veto power bestowed on China, France as well as the big three that afforded them the opportunity to veto on all essential matters were clearly stated in the charter. However, the matter that created a temporal problem includes the admission of Ukraine and Byelorussia, Argentina, and Poland, the relative powers of the Security Council and General Assembly, and voting procedure in the Security Council. Moreover, many imperfections were accepted by the delegates in essence gave room to necessary settlements, hence, the establishment of United Nations (Perkins, 2007). Several structures and ideals of the League of Nations were retained by the United Nations; in essence, it was clearly outlined in the UN charter. The UN aimed at maintaining peace, socio-economic development

In furtherance to the structure of the League of Nations retained by the United Nations, the Security Council being a major organ of the UN to ensuring peace was a rebrand of the league council with China, France, the UK, the USSR, and the US as permanent members that assume veto power; in essence, all decision of the Security Council can be prevented from being executed by them. However, another ten countries are elected for a two years term membership (UN, 2000). The importance for cordial relations among states for preventing instability and ensuring wellbeing was a comprehensive transformation of the leagues of nations principles for the provision for social activities as it was stipulated in the League convenant. Hence, the principles of the league of nation were not absolutely adopted. Within the confines of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council supervise actions of specialized agencies in the areas of labour, education, health, agriculture as well as development (UN, 2001). In order to address racial discrimination and domination, the right for colonized territories for independence and the protection of individual human rights were emphatically stated in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which however set an additional standard to international law (Adebajo, 2004, 2009 and 2010).

3.4 The UN Charter, Objectives and Organs

The Article 111 that was structured in the 19th chapter express the general objectives of the new world body, and Article 1 further stating clearly the general aim of the UN to preserve peace and security in the world, engender cordial relations among states and in providing solution to global economic, social, cultural and humanitarian inconveniences, engender unity of actions among nations and also promote esteem for human rights. Following Article 1 above, the principle of sovereign, equality of states was clearly stipulated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter (UN, 2000). The Charter was opened with a Preamble

3.5 Preamble and Objectives

The United Nations Charter Preamble assert thus:

> We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. And for these Ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims. Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations (UN, 2000).

The aims and values of the UN were stipulated in the Article 1, Chapter 1 of the Charter, this includes:

i. Taking sound actions to checking pressures on world peace and security, reduce employment of hostility and encourage peaceful settlement of disputes in relation to the principles of justice and international law in a bid to preserve global peace and security.

ii. To promote obedience for the equal right principle and self-determination in order to engender cordial relations among countries to reinforce world peace;
iii. To develop unity of action among nation in engendering respect for human rights and freedom devoid of discrimination and also, in settling global economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; and
iv. Serving as a platform for uniting States action for achieving the stated goals.

The modus operandi to admit and expel members from the world body as well as the provision for membership for peace loving states were properly stated in Chapter II of the charter (Adebajo, 2010). Chapter III stated the six main organs of the UN and their functions.

3.6 The Organs of the United Nations

The major organs of the UN in Article 7 of the Charter, (see fig below):

a) General Assembly

All members of the UN are General Assembly's members with no more than five representatives each saddled with the responsibility of examining issues in respect to the powers and roles of other organs of the UN and matters within the jurisdiction of the charter. Also, Article 12 provides that the assembly may advice the Security Council.

Article 11

1. Recommendations are made by the general assembly to its members or to the Security Council taking cognizance of the principles in relation to disarmaments as regulations of armaments in a bid to preserve security and peace in the world. The general assembly is charge with responsibility to investigate matters that involves the preservation of peace and security brought to its knowledge by members or non-members of the UN and may make recommendations to the Security Council on matters perceived to affect peace and security of the world.


Generally, the General Assembly studies and makes recommendations in order to:

a. engender improvement and codification of international law as well as encourage global unity in politics.;

b. provide help in the actualisation of human rights and freedoms devoid of discrimination and to advance global relations in the field of economy, social, culture,

education, as well as health. In relation to the above, the general assembly is charged with the responsibility of modifying any state of affairs that is perceived to affect the wellbeing and the cordial relations among states. The general assembly recommends the situation that grew in relation to the breach of the stipulations of the charter.

Fig. 3.1: The main Organs of the UN



Source: Author's design 2013

b) The Security Council

To upholding the objective of preserving the world's peace and security by the UN, the Security Council was established as an executive agency of the organisation. The council employs negotiation, mediation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means at their own discretion to address parties of conflict who failed to employ techniques for peaceful settlements of dispute. The council consist of fifteen members having Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America as permanent members with ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two years, taking their contribution on

preservation of world's peace and security and towards other UN goals as a criteria for election.

Functions and Powers

The roles and power of the Security Council is identified in Article 24 of the UN Charter. The Security Council is saddled with main responsibility of preserving peace and security in the world acting on behalf of the members of the UN in executing its duties under the above directive. The Security Council engage in the settlement of disputes employing the peaceful measures and checks action that portend danger to the peace of the world and the act of hostilities. Acting in respect to the objectives of the UN in executing its duties, the decisions of the Security Council must be respected by the member states to promote world peace. However, the Security Council in accordance to Article 26, establishes a measures to regulate armaments.

In making decision, the Security Council engage in voting with each member of the council entitled to a vote, however, a decision is made with a vote of nine non-permanent members supported by the votes of the permanent members. Members of the Security Council may be represented by a member of the states government in its periodic meetings with the adoption of self-rules of procedure. A party to a conflict who is not a member of the Security Council may attend to observe the meeting without a vote (Boutros-Ghali, 1992 and 1995)

c. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

The General Assembly elect fifty-four members to be a member of the Economic and Social Council which is another organ of the UN, according to the paragraph 3 of the UN charter, eighteen of the members of ECOSOC are elected for a term of three years.

Functions and Powers

i. Recommendations are made in respect to global economy, social, cultural, educational, health, and other similar matters to the General Assembly and the UN with the agencies concerned.

ii. It develops proposal for the promotion of human rights and freedom.

iii. It presents draft conventions to the General Assembly on issues within its jurisdiction.
iv. On matter within its scope, the council calls for an international conference.

The General Assembly approves any agreement to be entered into by the ECOSOC as a UN organ with other agencies of the UN with clear terms of relationship. However, through consultation with and recommendation to, the General Assembly coordinate the actions of specialized agencies. Economic and Social Council in a quest to perform its responsibilities, established commissions in economic and social fields to promote human rights. The council study and recommend actions on global topics such as medicine, education, economics, and social needs. The activities of ECOSOC is assisted by several functional and regional committees, ten functional commissions deals with issues relating to population growth, narcotics trafficking, human rights, as well as the status of women. Moreover, other committees focus on issues relating to crime prevention, public finance, natural resources, science and technology, and geographical names.

The activities of the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as well as other UN agencies that make available various social and economic services are coordinated by the ECOSOC.

d. Trusteeship Council

This council comprise of the following members of the UN:

i. Members governing trust territories;

ii. Members not administering trust territories that are mentioned by name in Article 23; and

iii. Members are elected for three-year term by the General Assembly, this is to ensure that the membership of the council are shared between the UN members with trust territories and those who do not.

The decision of the Trusteeship Council is subjected to voting and decisions are made through the majority of the members present as at the time of voting, each member are entitled to only one vote. The governing authority of each trust territories make annual

reports of activities to the General Assembly based on questionnaire developed. Also, meetings are organised on the demands of the majority of its members.

Functions and Powers

According to the authority of General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council performs the following functions:

a. It take into examination the reports of the governing authority;
b. In consultation with the governing authority, the council scrutinize petitions;
c. It provides for the period visit to trust territories as decided by the governing authorities; and
d. It takes action in tandem with the terms of the trusteeship decisions.

e. The International Court of Justice

All United Nations members are parties to the statue of International Court of Justice which is the major judicial organ of the United Nations. The General Assembly upon the recommendations of the Security Council, determines the conditions on which non-members of the UN becomes a party to the statue. The rulings of International Court of Justice are bindings on every member of the United Nations that is a party to the case. When party to a ruling failed to execute its duties as ruled by the court of law, options to the Security Council may be adopted by the other party to uphold the judgment. The International Court of Justice on request by the General Assembly provides recommendations on issues relating legality.

F. The Secretariat of the UN

The secretariat is accountable for the day to day activities of the UN as well as its programs and policies. The secretariat consists of the Secretary General who heads the secretariats with other staffs. With the approvals of the Security Council, the general assembly appoints the secretary general. The secretary general is saddled with the same responsibility, as the administrative officers of all the meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. In

addition, it prepares the annual reports of the activities of the UN and informs the Security Council any matter perceived to endanger the world peace.

Instructions are not to be received or sorted by the Secretary-General and the staff from any government or any other authority outside the organization in the performance of their duties. Every action that can affect their position as international officials responsible only to the organization shall be avoided. The international personality with the duties of the Secretary-General and the staff must be respected by each member of the United Nations and in essence, refrain from trying to influence the secretary general and the staff in carrying out their duties to the international organization. As appointed by the secretary general, the right staff are allotted to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and as demanded to other organs of the United Nations and the staffs becomes a part of the Secretariat.

3.7 UN Security Council Roles in Peacekeeping Missions

In situations where the state cannot contain the security and public stability, hence, the custom of invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter that grants the permission for the employment of UN peacekeeping operations in volatile post conflicts atmosphere is utilized (Chesterman, 2005). The invocations of the Chapter VII by the security council is to provide legal basis for its action and a way of bringing the conflict to the recognition of the entire UN members about their duties to execute the security council agreement. Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing countries (PCCs) are guided by the task assigned by the Security Council, having taking critical examination of the nature of each peacekeeping duty as approved the Security Council and the resource to support the activities. Rules of Engagement (ROE) for military element and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component are among the responsibilities of the Security Council.

Wide range of alternatives at the disposal of the Security Council are employed in responding to crisis. Moreover, various factors are considered to organise new peacekeeping operation. These factors include:

i. Whether there is a cessation of hostilities in place and the commitment of parties towards the peace process with the aim to reach a political settlement;

ii. To understand the availability of clear political goal and its ability to be reflected in the mandate;
iii. To know the possibility of formulating a specific mandate for a UN operation;
iv. The possibility of ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel in particular whether, reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the main or factions to this.

Deployments of missions are carried out on the basis of mandates and their duties vary from time to time in respect to the nature of the difference and specific challenges it presents. The permission of the Security Council are required to deploy peacekeeping operations, however, the scope peacekeeping operations, overtime, has increased considering the change in patterns of conflicts and solutions to dangers to global peace. (Anning, 1999; Bellammy and William, 2010). The UN peacekeeping operation are not always the same as they differ in context and content. Peacekeeping operations may be required base on their mandate;

i. to forestall horrors of conflicts and prevent spill over of disputes through borders;
ii. to establish an atmosphere for lasting peace to be enabled and conflict atmosphere must be stabilized after the end of hostilities;
iii. to aid the implement inclusive peace accord;
iv. to lead the states transition to an established government underpinned by democracy, good governance and economic development.

The UN peacekeepers plays critical role in the following peace-building activities:

i. Disarmament, disbandment and reintegration of ex-combatants;
ii. Mine action;
iii. Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities;
iv. Protection and promotion of human rights;
v. Electoral assistance;
vi. Support for the restoration and extension of State authority;
vii. Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

The following includes the thematic responsibilities bestowed on the UN peacekeeping operations:

i. Initial consultation: when the conflict develops, worsens, or reach the stage of resolution, the UN embarks on range of consultations by the international community in order to get the best feedback. All essential UN actors are involved in the consultation includes, the host government and the parties on the ground; member states, states contributing troops and police; provincial and other intergovernmental organizations and other key external actors, hence, the UN may demand a critical analysis to get all possible options for the engagement (UNPKO, 2005).

ii. Technical field assessment: Technical assessment missions are usually deployed by the secretariat to the territory where the deployment of UN Peacekeeping activities is envisaged when the security conditions permits. The assessment mission is subjected to the analysis of issues like; political, security, military, humanitarian, human rights for a possible operation in general. In respect to the recommendation of the assessment missions, the Secretary-General issues a report to the Security Council which provides alternatives to the creation of a peacekeeping operation.

iii. Security Council resolution: the decision by the Security Council that the deployment of UN peacekeeping operation is best action to embark on, helps the official approval by adopting a resolution. The size of the operation's mandate and details of the responsibility charged to perform are predetermined in the resolution. Budget and resources are approved by General Assembly.

iv. Appointment of senior officials: The Head of Mission (usually a Special Representative) with the responsibility to control the peacekeeping operation is always an appointee Secretary-General, therefore make reports to the Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operations at the UN Headquarters. A peacekeeping operation's force commander and police commissioner, and senior civilian staff are also appointed by the Secretary-General. The responsibility for staffing the civilian components of a peacekeeping operation is entrusted on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS).

v. Planning and deployment: for the time being, making plan for the political, military, operational and support, for instance, logistics and administration areas

of the peacekeeping undertaking are responsibility of the head of mission and DPKO-DFS. Planning stage usually sees the establishment of a headquarters-based joint working group or integrated mission task force.

vi. Deployment: considering the security and political atmosphere available, operation deployment commence with immediate alacrity. However, it began operation with establishment of mission headquarters leading to a gradual build-up to include all components and regions. It's an undeniable fact that the United Nations has no personal army or police force, hence, member states are saddled with the responsibility of contributing military and police personnel essential for each operation. The uniform of peacekeepers country is worn and gets identification as UN Peacekeepers by a UN blue helmet or beret and a badge. Civilian staffs of peacekeeping operations are recruited and deployed by the UN Secretariat and are also referred to as international civil servants.

vii. Reporting to the Security Council: the secretary general provides regular reports of the mission to the Security Council, who reviews the reports submitted the secretary general and adjust, if necessary, the mandate until the mission is concluded.

The deployment of UN military spectators to the Middle East in 1948 marked the beginning of the observance of peacekeeping, moreover, peacekeeping operation were not stipulated. The maintenance of cessation of hostility and stabilization became the major objectives of the UN peacekeeping missions during the era of Cold War which involved the provision of political settlement to conflict through the employment of peaceful measures; therefore a lot of the UN ancient peacekeeping operations fit this "traditional" model (Claud, 1996; Deng, 2010). The duties allotted by the Security Council to the Traditional UN peacekeepers are essentially military, that ranges from surveillance, monitoring and coverage, adopting standing point, patrols, over flights or other technical means, with agreement amid the parties with cessation of hostilities being supervised by them. The Traditional peacekeepers make sure that the parties to a ceasefire does not exploit the atmosphere to advance military advantages, hence, monitoring parties commitment to cessation of hostilities by investigating complaints of violations (Clever and May. 1995; Coicaud, 2007; Ghali, 1996).

3.8 UN and Contemporary Peacekeeping Architecture

In the resolution of conflict, traditional peacekeeping missions do not engage directly in political efforts but long-term political measures may be established by other actors, for instance, bilateral partners to the parties of conflicts, regional bodies, and in addition, special UN representatives and this leads to the withdrawal of peacekeeping missions. It takes longer period for a durable political settlement to be attained with the parties of conflicts with the deployment of some traditional peacekeeping mission. The Cold War aftermath birth the tremendous change in strategic context for UN peacekeeping and the Security Council began active promotion of the repression and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts (Brahimi, 2000). Coincidentally, the Cold War aftermath saw over-all reduction in occurrence of inter-state disputes in the world. Internal armed conflicts make up the large of wars in the recent years (Dobin et al, 2005). The world's poorest countries where state power is weak faced the occurrence of these conflicts, and where aggression may be motivated by economic gain, or past grievances (Deng, 2008, Doyle et al, 2007). Evidentially, it has been revealed that many of all civil wars emerged as a collapse of conflict, the risks of which are particularly high in the first five to ten years following a conflict.

Contemporary multifaceted UN peacekeeping operations emerged as a result of the transformation of the international environment. The dispositions of these operations are classically in dangerous consequences of an internal violent conflict, hence, a combination of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the execution of a wide-ranging peace accord are employed (Deng, 1993; 2006 and 2010). At the absence of official peace accord, the UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to aid the transition to legitimate government; however, this is done following an appeal from the national authorities and in some exceptional cases the UN peacekeeping operations take over the legislative and governmental responsibilities of a state with the authorisation of the Security Council to aid the switch from one sovereign body to another, until the issue of sovereignty are resolved totally or aid the state establishment of administrative institutes that may not be in existence earlier (Frazier, 1997). The country may have witnessed the destruction of amenities, displacement of a good number of the citizens. However,

national reconciliation becomes difficult when ethnicity, religion and reasoning are the foundation for societal division. The Multi-dimensional UN's peacekeeping operations are deployed to aid the resolution of conflict enabling a transition to sustainable peace and security. The principal roles of a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping undertaking include the following:

a) Creating environmental stability and security, hence, empowers the state's ability to provide security on the basis of respect to the rule of law and human rights;

b) It promotes dialogue and resolution thereby aids the establishment of legitimate and efficient institution of government;

c) Establishing a structure for enabling that all UN and other global actors carry out their goals at the country-level in a coordinated manner (UNPKO, 2008).

In addition, operational support are provided for the national law enforcement agencies by the multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations, hereafter, the provision of security at major government installations, ports and other essential infrastructure; establish the significant security situations for mobility, goods and humanitarian aid; and provide humanitarian mine action support to monitoring and observing cessation of hostilities, (UNPKO, 2008). Hence, the pivotal role in enabling peace, and making sure that development associates are able to work in a benign environment. Civilians make up the vast majority of casualties of internal armed conflict, (Clever and May, 1995; Gambari, 2003).

Compulsorily, many multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations are charged with duties to protect civilians in any impending threat of physical violence by the Security Council. The planning and conduct of the activities of the UN peacekeeping operation must take cognizance of its duties to protect the civilians. The civilians also enjoy support from the UN humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organization (NGO). While traditional UN peacekeeping operations do not play a straight role in political efforts to resolve conflict, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to find solution to conflict and engender domestic political dialogue and reconciliation as imposed by the Security Council. The multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations enjoy a huge weight over the parties and

enjoy high degree of global legitimacy because it represents the general resolve of the international society. Political accord around the peace procedure, promotion of good governance and maintenance of pressure on the parties to execute key institutional reforms can be built and sustained as a result of leverage enjoyed.

Furthermore, the multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping undertakings plays strategic role in certifying that the actions of the UN and other global actors are checked by a related tactical idea. The UN retain the ability to mount a comprehensive reaction to multifaceted emergencies and the notion of "incorporated operations" has been established to make the most of the holistic impact of its support to countries recovering from a particular catastrophe (Jonah, 2004 and 2006). In bringing these capabilities together, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) heads the multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations saddled with the authority over the activities of the UN in the mission area in general. The body regulating the general activities of the UN peacekeeping operation and those of the UN Country Team (UNCT) is established by the SRSG. A "triple-hatted" -Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) supports the SRSG (UN, 2009). This deputy acts as the main crossing point between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UNCT, leading the coordination effort for humanitarian, progress and revitalization activities; and conveys the concerns raised by the UNCT to the consideration of the SRSG.

Unless programs are designed to frustrate the recurrence of conflict accompanied by the quench of violence with the deployment of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation to stop violence in temporary, sustainable of peace is unguaranteed. However, it has been revealed that, the attainment of a sustainable peace would involve advancement in at least four central ranges:

a) The restoration of the state propensity to maintain peace and security;

b) Engendering the nobility for the rule of law and fundamental human rights;

c) The emergence and support for legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;

d) Promotion of socio-economic development and recovery, in addition, the secure relocation of internally displaced persons and refugees (UN, 2004; Roland, 2007).

As a result of the lack of fund and technical expertise for programs, the Multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations may perhaps be unable to organize effective peace building program but it play a critical role in the; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of fighters, mine action; Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other activities in relation to the rule of law; defense and encouragement of human rights, electoral aid; the re-establishment and expansion of state power as required by the Security Council. It make provision for technical advice; provide disarmament and cantonment sites, demolition of weapons, and other materials capitulated by the ex-fighters.

In the effort to establish a safe and conducive atmosphere for good life, mine actions is required because landmines and unexploded ordinance after the disputes portend a great danger to civilians, thereby, make post conflict recovery difficult. The transformation of the security division and other rule of law related actions are required to consolidation the rule of law. The multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations delineates its exit strategy with advancement of the Security Sector Reform, however, its success largely depends on national security actors. The national police and armed forces are trained by the Multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations, if requested for.

Gross abuse and violation of human rights are direct characteristics of modern conflicts, hence, the most important action to address this is the effort to protect human rights and this is entrusted on all UN entities within their area of operations. The UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are saddled with responsibility of engendering and preserving fundamental human rights, however, investigates rights abuse. The state needs the capacity to govern its territory in a bid to generate fund and make available necessary services to its populace. In the establishment of a legitimate state, the organization of a free and fair election is always an important part of the peace accord that form the basis for a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation, security, technical assistance, logistics and several forms of electoral aids are provided to engender the conduct of a free and fair election.

However, the UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are not established and equipped for long term capacity building actions but may still be required to begin essentials peace building activities. The development actors within the UNCT and outside the UN are charged with the responsibility of longer term capacity building activities as a result of their possessions of the technical expertise required for the activities. However, the UN operations in short term begin the capacity building activities as result of the helpless nature of other actors to lead the operation. The UN peacekeeping operations faced limitations in supporting activities such as the enhancement of socio-economic recovery and delivery of humanitarian aid as well as its little or no role in easing the deeds of the actors in and outside the UN structure. However, in engendering an enduring peace, socio-economic recovery is necessary. Over the years, it has been revealed that the security reform may likely fail in the absence of transparency and solid economic management as well as the citizen's oversight functions. In addition, if sustainable and solid alternative livelihood is not provided for ex-combatants, DDR portend the danger of failure.

The duties of providing and engendering socio-economic revitalization and advancement are entrusted on the development partners within and outside the confines of UN. The UN peacekeeping operations do not have the needed funding to contribute undeviating role to the advancement of the society and economy (UNDPA, 2009). However, the UN peacekeeping operations could exert their influence with national government to engender key reforms, hence, providing assistance for the activities of development partners. In furtherance, the UN peacekeeping operations as a primary responsibility provide security and stability for the humanitarian actors to execute their goals and objectives. It's important to note that relevant UN specialized agencies are charged with the duties of making provision for humanitarian assistance.

The multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations on their part embark on the execution of small scales projects established to make impact on the populations which involves but not limited to infrastructure aid, short term job creation exercise, this projects is usually referred to as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). However, this is not a replacement for humanitarian and development support but it is principally employed by the UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations to support its mission's objectives. In

the administration of QIPs, it is focal to be implemented in consultation and coordination with the humanitarian actors to obviate the conflict of political-military actions with humanitarian activities.

Basic Principles of UN peacekeeping operations

Over the past six decades, the UN peacekeeping activities have emerged extensively. As an instrument of preserving the global peace and stability, three essential values set its operations apart. This includes:

i. Consensus of the parties;
ii. Objectivity;
iii. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

The three crucial values above differentiated the UN peacekeeping operations as an instrument for the preservation of global peace and stability, thus, interwoven and equally underpinning. Essentially, in the conduct of UN peacekeeping operation the relationship to one another are clearly understood by the parties involved. The deployment of UN peacekeeping operations is carried out on the consensus of all the parties involved in the conflict and requires all the parties to be committed to the political process and their acceptance to the peacekeeping operation. Their consent gives the UN peacekeeping operations the needed liberty in taking action politically and physically to carry out its required duties. The peacekeeping operation risks the danger of becoming a party to the conflict when it lacks the consent of the parties involved. However, while carrying out its compulsory responsibilities, the UN peacekeeping operation must certify, it doesn't misplace the consensus given by the parties to the conflict. In assessing the motivations and interest of parties to conflict, it becomes imperative for peacekeeping personnel to have in-depth understanding of history of the mission area.

Lack of trust among parties in an after conflict atmosphere makes consent by parties wear the garment of uncertainty and unreliability. Consent acquired reluctantly through pressure from the international community may be withdrawn in several forms as party lacks commitment to the peace process. However, the pulling out of consensus by one or more of the major parties to a conflict questions the basis for the UN peacekeeping operation. In addition, consent by parties does not necessarily implies or guarantee the

existence of consent at the local level especially when parties suffers internal division or weak in exerting command. It becomes difficult to assert popularly consent in a hot-blooded conditions, with the existence of armed sets that is not under the administration of any parties, hence, peacekeeping operations requires critical analysis of mission area to get indecisive consent (UNDPA, 2007).

In order for peacekeeping operations to manage the unavailability of local consent, political and analytical skills are required in addition to operational resources. Force maybe perceived as the last option under some atmosphere. However, for the consent and commitment of parties to be maintained, the operations of the UN peacekeepers must be devoid of favour, and discriminations to any party but executed with open-mindedness and should not as a matter of fact be puzzled with inactivity. Impartiality of the peacekeepers should not be confused with inactivity. For instance, a respectable referee is unbiased, but will penalize infractions, therefore, actions by the parties that encroach upon the undertakings of the peace procedure or the global norms and principles that a UN peacekeeping operation upholds should not be condoned.

The UN peacekeeping operation ought not to recoil from a laborious application of the principle of impartiality, for fear of misconception or retaliation, but before acting, it is always sensible to ensure that the grounds for acting are entrenched and can be evidently communicated to all. The mission's credibility and legitimacy may be undermined subsequently to the failure to be objective in relations, and could lead to a pulling out of consensus for its presence by one or more of the parties. Transparency, openness and effective communication must be inculcated as to the rationale and appropriate nature of response, when the peacekeeping operation is expected to counter likely breaches. This provides assistance to curtail opportunities to influence sensitivities against the mission and help to assuage the potential consequence from the parties and their supporters. Equally, the greatest and fairest of referees should expect condemnation from those affected negatively and should be in a position to clarify their activities.

The principle of non-use of force, except in self-defense, can be conveniently linked to leading deployment of armed UN peacekeepers in 1956. The impression of self-defense has then come to include resistance to attempts to hinder the peacekeeping

operation from performing its duties under the mandate of the Security Council per the use of force.

The employment of force may become necessary, when acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate, but with the consent of the Security Council. The peace process and the civilians may be prone to undermining and threat with the existence of militias, and criminal gangs. Under this condition, the Security Council has authorized the peacekeeping operations to employ all measures of necessities to protect the peace process from attempt disruption s well to protect the civilians prone to physical attacks, in essence, help the national security maintain law and stability. The UN peacekeeping operations thrived in augmenting security and crafting advantageous atmosphere for peace process. When peacekeeping deals with the usage of force, it must be authorized by the Security Council and consent of the host party of conflict. In contrast, in the enforcement of peace and stability, the consent of the main parties are not necessary, therefore, the employment of military coercion at the international level can be applied, but this must also enjoy the approval of the Security Council.

It must be stated that the major aim for the employment of force was not to seek defeat but to serve as deterrence for spoilers that wants to undermine the peace effort. However, force should only be employed as a final recourse when other peaceful techniques failed. The minimum needed force to achieve a desired goal should be employed while the consent of the mission and its mandate is sustained. While employing force, the peacekeeping operations must however take into cognizance the importance of early withdrawal from violence for peaceful of persuasion.

Use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation is prone to political consequences and unforeseen circumstances. However, various factors must be taken into consideration to make decision on the employment in any of the UN peacekeeping mission. these factors includes; mission competence, public sensitivities, charitable impact, force protection, safety and security of personnel, and most importantly, the effect of the deed on national and local consent for the mission (Zartman, 2007). The mission's wide rules of engagement, (ROE) for the military and Duty of Force (DUF) for the police components of a UN peacekeeping operation usually make clarifications of various stages of force that can be employed in the mission. Also, with the manners of usage of

the stages of force and must be done with the authority of the commanders (UNDPA, 2009). In ensuring the continued credibility and by the UN peacekeeping operations to execute its mandates, the ROE and DUF usually developed must be robustly strong. However, it becomes necessary for all the essential personnel in the mission to have deep knowledge of the ROE.

Concluding Remarks

In spite of the principles and guidelines of the UN peacekeeping operational architecture, there are still some problems or challenges confronting the system. Some of the challenges deal with issues of mandates, the conducts of peacekeepers and other personnel. While the attitudes of the host community can be questioned, the entire is peacekeeping architecture still ne some institutional and operation re-engineering. This will be more elaborated in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

This chapter seeks to provide an historical background of the conflicts in DR Congo. It examines the foundation causes of the conflicts, employing a historical perspective realizing that the conflicts in the DRC have structural relationships with its colonial history as well as the independence era. The chapter provides a brief understanding into the geography, ideological, governance issue and natural resource issues that have continuously fuelled conflict in the country. It likewise gives ample attention to the regional and global dimensions of the conflicts, given that these conflicts have and are always influenced by both domestic and foreign factors and players. Finally it gives an insight into what led to the establishment of the second mission

4.1 The DR Congo: Brief Background of its Economy and Geography

On the African continent, the DR Congo is the second largest country in Africa after Algeria having 2.26 million square kilometres landmass and 2.38 million square kilometres landmass respectively and is literally a geographic with the prospective of been an economic giant. However, it is the fourth most inhabited states in Africa. Although, with about 28 inhabitants per square kilometres, it is also lightly populated, thereby making it the 20th lowest density on the continent. Due to the DR Congo geographical location right on the equator, it possesses a large and dense forest cover. It is privileged to have important advantages of high fertility as well as abundant water. However, it also has some important disadvantages, popularly owing to the large areas and the harsh humid weather, experience difficulty in linking different parts of the country with transportation infrastructures. The DR Congo is endowed with massive in natural resources ranging from minerals, water, forestry and agricultural land. The DRC top the list of global producer of copper and cobalt, and also engage in the production of mammoth of Coltan (Columbite-Tantalite), diamonds, silver and petroleum.

With reference to contemporary estimations, the DR Congo controls 55 percent of the world's Cobalt production with 45 percent of world's reserves; with 21 percent of

industrial diamonds, and 12 percent of tantalum (USGS, 2014). In the year 2012, excavating and processing of minerals represent a significant contribution to the total domestic production with 11.5%, thereby being the major driver of the contemporary growth acceleration. Despite the fact that minerals engender most attention, other sources are in the same way important. Other sources include the enormous water reserves, resulting to a significant property for transport and hydropower generation. The DR Congo is endowed with the potentiality to generate electricity that can feed the entire Great Lakes region and beyond.

Furtherance to being a source of growth and a driver of economic diversification in the country, it serves as a possible pillar and encouragement for regional integration. As a result of the plenteous rains by the whole territory, and the volcanic soils in the country's eastern and northern regions, the DR Congo is also blessed with fertile land. As result, agriculture constitutes a potential catalyst for industrial development, to the extent that sufficient investments in infrastructure and technological innovation are undertaken as part of a coherent domestic industrial development and growth strategy and also to providing a stable basis for food security.

The DRC is boarded by nine countries making it the largest number of neighbours on the continent. As a consequence, the economic development and political stability in the DR Congo have undeviating consequences for these nine neighbouring states and such a planned geographical location opens up opportunities for trading among the states thereby becomes a key benefit. However, several disadvantages are linked with having many neighbours. The major detriment, is that the country risk negative externalities from spill over of uncertainty from its neighbours. Undeniably, rebel movements from Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda as well as Burundi have continued to use the country as staging ground (Kisangani, 2012; Prunier, 2004, 2009). And this has caused destabilization for the country, while undermining its relationships with in neighbouring countries' government. The cause, impact, and duration of the recent wars in Eastern Congo can be linked to all the negative externalities. Explicitly and systematically, satisfactory to understand the causes of the conflicts in the DRC with such geographical configuration and crafty strategies for addressing them and supporting post-conflict reconstruction

entails the adoption of a provincial approach that account for the interests of the neighbouring countries.

Figure 4.1



Description: The Democratic Republic of the Congo Political map showing the international boundary, regional boundaries with their capitals and national capital.

Source:http://www.mapsofworld.com/democratic-republic-of-congo/democratic-republic-of-congo-political-map.html (accessed 6th April, 2014)

4.2 Historical Narrative of DR Congo's Conflicts

Undoubtedly, the colonial occupation of the Belgian King Leopold III can be intricately linked to the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. By 1908, DR Congo became a Belgian colony. The practice of unrestricted individual power, utilization of national resources for private aggrandizement, fierce suppression of the demands of the people for political liberty, and social partitions as a result of ethnicity and regions was encouraged and well-established during the era of colonisation of DR Congo by Belgium (Lemarchand, 1964; Young and Turner, 1985; Kisangani, 2012; Young, 1965). The DR Congo witnessed a thorny and unsteady post-independence period, characterized by secessionist and rebellions wars beginning from 1960 and this

was partially as a result of the catastrophic history of DR Congo (Coquery-Vidrovitch et al., 1987; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Lemarchand, 1964; Young, 1965; Kisangani, 2012; Young and Turner, 1985).

Consequently, the independence in 1960 ushered DR Congo into political instability by the hastily departing Belgian without a formal transfer of power to any political group. The lack of organization of the Belgian departure provides for the new Republic of Congo a political downfall creating political instability, which in the long run escalates into huge political deadlock. As a result of electoral turbulence, the political deadlock incited the Katanga region to attempt secession, thus resulted in an Army mutiny in the 1960 (Edgerton, 2002). The construction of the state, especially the option between federalism and a unitary state among others birth internal incongruities among the political elite was the foundation of conflicts of the early days of independence (Lemarchand, 1964; Kisangani, 2012; Young, 1965; Ndikumana and Kisangani, 2005). Robust antagonisms along regional and ethnic lines characterized the conflict. The unwillingness of the colonial masters forfeit the milk cow, and the geopolitical interests of the Western powers who used the DR Congo as a base in the ideological fight against the growth of socialism in Africa exacerbated the volatility in the young nation. To understand the 1990s conflicts that eventually led to the UN mission in DR Congo it is critically important to have the knowledge of the early conflict. Importantly, there's need to examine the histories and causes of conflicts in the DR Congo.

4.3 Causes of Conflicts in the DR Congo

The sturdy ideological difference between the main political leaders was one of the significant causes of conflicts in the early epoch of independence. However, self-determination became the first major issue of debate. On one side, Patrice Lumumba campaigned for an aggregate ideological autonomy of the country from the Belgium and the West in general. The preservation of strong ties with the West became a concern of the opposing side. Lumumba perceived that, any relationship with the Western world should be on an equal footing, in contrast, his rivals, Moise Tshombe, desire to reserve patrimonial associations with Belgium or community with Belgium (see, among others,

Meditz and Merrill, 1994; Lemarchand, 1964; Kisangani, 2012; Meriam, 1961; Ndikumana and Kisangani, 2005; Verhaegen, 1969; Weiss, 2000).

The pro-socialist advocates, steered by Lumumba were pitched in contrast to the pro-capitalists headed by Tshombe resulting to the second line of confrontation. The Eastern rebellion of 1964-66 was caused by this ideological confrontation which was steered by a pro-Lumumba alliance headed by Gbenye and Gizenga, with other key actor's including Laurent Kabila who later resurfaced as front-runner of the 1996 anti-Mobutu rebellion (Kisangani, 2012; Lemarchand, 1964; Weiss, 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

The major driving force that caused the elimination of Lumumba, and the enthronement of pro-western Mobutu in power was the ideological conflicts that resulted into political chaos following independence. As a result of these events, the country's fate dramatically "sowing the seeds of regional and ethnic disagreement", and the long rule of dictatorial and kleptomaniac regimes were instituted. Disagreements over the constitutional orientation: Federalism, Unitarianism and Secessionism. The constitutional orientation of the country following independence was drawn by Loi Fondamentale (Nzongola-Ntalaja; 2002 Kisangani, 2014). Parliamentary democracy was provided for and reservation was made for substantial autonomy to the provinces in the transitional constitution. In relation to the control of the central power over regional administrations, the transitional constitution left significant ambiguities. These lacks of constitutional clarity were exploited by provincial leaders to advance personal political ambitions. In the formation of the state, whether the country should be organized in the form of a unitary state or a federal system resulted into strong disagreements among political leaders in the era of independence. As a manifestation of accurate national independence, a unitary and centralized state was advocated by Lumumba. In contrast, Tshombe, Kasavubu and Kalonji, advocated autonomy of provinces in relation to the central administration (Kisangani, 2014; Young and Turner, 1985; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). This as a result shaped the foundation of the secessionist movements experienced in 1960s and 1970s.

At the daybreak of independence, ethnicity played vital role in the conflicts and it continues to be central to modern day conflicts. Ethnic dominance of most political parties became a major factor at independence. However, Lumumba's MNC party was the only party which advocated national unity and transcended ethnic affiliation (Kisangani, 2012; Young, 1965; Lemarchand, 1964; Young and Turner, 1985). Undoubtedly, other political parties unequivocally protected the interests of particular ethnic groups against the "threat of foreigners" hence, ethnic-based in outlook. Consequently, it was identified with the overt mission of protecting the interests of "authentic Katangans" (Baluba and Lulua from Katanga) against "strangers" (Baluba and Lulua from Kasaï and Kivu, who were enlisted to labour in the mines by the UMHK). Firstly, the metropolitan mining workers who sort to defend their employment, and secondly, the political leaders (led by Tshombe) in quest to advance their own political agenda fed the xenophobia. These ethnic contradictions contributed immensely to Kasaï secession war of 1960-62 (Kisangani, 2012; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). The nature of the colonial system did not support civil society movement that could promote democratic ethos, unfortunately, many groups found their respective ethnic groups and tribe as a default expression of their political action. Ethnicity became a major platform for expression of political activism. Accordingly of the permutation of the divide-and-rule tactics of the colonial government as vivid in other African countries, ethnicity became politicized in DRC, which was exploited by associates of the national elites seeking suitable way of galvanizing political backing. This process was equally present in other Belgian colony especially in neighbouring Burundi and Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970).

The huge natural resources in the DRC spread across the region, however there are some region with limited resources. For instance, Katanga has more than 60 percent of the country's Copper and Cobalt production. On independence, 75 percent of national output was generated by the province generated and funded about 20 percent of government expenditures (Ndikumana and Kisangani (2005). In similar vein, vast reserves of gem-quality and industrial diamonds reside in the Kasaï region, often referred to as the "diamond state". The Eastern provinces, especially the Kivus, are endowed with huge concentration of Gold, Coltan and Tin.

In the independence early stage, regional leaders were dissatisfied with the administration of resources by the central government, however, began the advocacy for secession, as a result of the feelings that their regions contributes more to the central government's expenditures and in return derived little benefit (Kisangani, 2014; Meriam, 1961; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Meditz and Merrill, 1994). In fact, the first rebellion actually began with the 1960 Katanga secession, this was followed by the Shaba I war in 1977 and Shaba II war in 1978.

4.4 The Natural Resources Curse Factor in DR Congo

The conflicts in the DRC were characterised by the availability of excess of Natural resource and also resource dependence. However, the worst of resource curse has been witnessed by the country, it has driven and sustained most of the conflicts in the DRC. (Katunga and Murhula, 2006; Laudati, 2013; Collier and Hoeffler, 2012).

In a plethora of ways, natural resources are directly connected to conflicts. Primarily, natural resources expose the country to a greater danger which gives rise to secessionist movement which leads to conflicts. Like across country, the distribution of natural resource is not even, also, it might not be evenly spread within countries. The resource rich regions reserve the possibility to demand total control over the resources. But, the uneven spread of natural resources across country does not provide enough bases for the emergence of conflict, at least, Botswana and Canada are resource rich yet free of conflicts.

It becomes necessary to ask to understand the nexus between the availability of enough of resources and the conflicts in the DRC, although not the spread is uneven. The possibility of conflict in DRC being caused by the natural resource availability can be connected to a numbers of factors.

i) One, the resource rich regions felt cheated by the central government as result of the returns from natural resources that is not spread evenly, which however, birth grievances.

ii) Two, ethnicity became a mechanism for secessionism, the distribution of resources across regions is directly perceived as the distribution of natural resources across ethnic groups, hence, the quest for self determination for

ethnic groups as well as the safeguard of ethnic interest against externalities. (Kisangani, 2012).

iii) Three, secessionism was triggered as a result of the discovery of coltan being a high valued resource in the face of international economic exploits leading to increase in the price of goods and services, thus, the bases for asserting the credibility of secession, however, this became vivid in the Eastern regions-the Katanga and the Kasaï regions (Kisangani, 2012; Ndikumana and Kisangani, 2005).

iv) Four, the inability of the state to quench the secessionist agitations and their incapability to provide strong security outfits to fight rebels. Likewise, the state lacks loyalty from its people as a result of its inability to make available basic services to the public.

v) On a final note, the opportunity was created for external agents to take possession of the natural resources as a result of the availability of enough resources under the control of a weak state.

The quests for the control of natural resources by various gladiators triggered insecurity and continually sustain it. Conflicts and natural resource form a nexus as result of sponsoring of wars. Soysa rightly put that, "war is a costly endeavour; it will not occur if those who invest in it do not expect returns" (De Soysa, 2012, p. 440). Huge resources and large number of people are required to engage in a confrontation with the state confront the state, thus, grievances is not enough for the emergence of armed conflicts (Soysa, 2012, p. 440). Nevertheless the financing motive cannot be a satisfactory condition for the connexion between natural resources and conflicts. The relationship between resources and conflicts in DRC can be attributed to two reasons. One, the weakness of the state thus, creating a power space. Two, the uneven spread of returns on natural resources. In a strong state, the possibilities of rebellions are greatly checked with the availability good security, good governance, as well as equal spread of income. However, the vacuum created by the lack of government accountability created another connection between conflicts and resources. (Collier and Hoeffler, 2012).

Good governance breeds effective taxation system and brings about representation, however, as result of resource wealth; revenues were not raised from

taxation. In similar vein, taxation helps to clutch elected administrators answerable to the public. Taxation was avoided by the government because incomes were derived from rents as a result of the resource wealth of the country. Eventually, anti-state rebellions was birth as a result of the absence of accountability. In what way can the facts on the conflicts of DRC be compared to the assumptions of the connection between conflicts and resource? The response is, the relationship amid natural resources and conflicts asserted that, the current conflicts in the DR Congo and unrelieved insecurity are a renascence of the conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, only for multifaceted geopolitical atmosphere that created a more violent and intractable conflicts in the modern era. (Katunga Murhula, 2006; Martineau, 2003; Kennes, 2000, 2005).

However, resource nationalism triggered the wars of the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the fact that different perceptions were held by the leaders of the secessionist insurgences in Katanga, Kasaï and the Eastern region as well as the national leadership in relation to ideological orientation, rebellions was triggered as a result of the desire to exercise control over mineral resources and the drive by opposition redistribute resource commencing from their home regions to the capital Kinshasa. Local leaders in their bid to fight secessionist wars organized combatants as well as procure equipment as a result of the value of minerals. Taken as a whole, the finance derived from resource exploitation as well as grievances triggered the conflicts. However, coincidental geographical configuration of ethnicity and resources fuelled "distributional conflicts".

In the 1980s when the country was free of secessionist wars under the Mobutu regime, a suitable atmosphere was created to accommodate conflicts as result of the system of management of the resource sector. Embezzlement and the sell-out of natural resources to foreigners for self-aggrandisement characterised the Mobutu regime (Kisangani, 2012). The then fourth biggest global copper mining company which became Gécamines, the giant Union Minière and also Forminière, the then largest global industrial diamonds producer, which became Miba was nationalised in 1967 and 1973 by Mobutu respectively. However, Mobutu and his associates benefited financially from these companies at the expense of government finances. Thus, they resisted the pressure to release mining to private investors in the setting of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Rather, Mobutu employed between the domestic companies and foreign

companies that cemented chances for rent extraction, a thick joint ventures and joint contracts. The signing of the contract still persists as at the time of the Kabila-led rebellion. Also, with the absence of transparency, the mining codes was changed by Mobutu, affording excessive amenities to mining corporations, as well as tax holidays and other exemptions.

Under Mobutu regime, the foundation for resource exploitation by a corrupt state and foreign corporations was created. In this regard Mobutu, "King of Zaïre", was loyal adherent of King Leopold II. The anti-Mobutu war brought to the fore the connexion between conflicts and natural resources. Nevertheless, Laurent Kabila regime was a smooth continuation of the regime of Mobutu (Kisangani, 2012; Willame, 1999). Continuity became the mantra of the DR Congo post-independence regimes. However, as the war fulminated, Mobutu and Laurent Kabila engaged in competition in peddling off the country's minerals dispensation to foreign companies in their respective controlled territories (Abadie (2011)). This gave understanding to the capital flight experienced by the country as a result of financial leakages even after the Mobutu regime. Thus, it was projected that the country lost nearly $10 billion through capital flight in the period of 1997-2010 (Ndikumana et al., 2015). It clearly showed that an average of $765 million per year was frittered under the regime of President Mobutu. Issues on mis-invoicing especially on the natural resources exploration and misappropriation of fund are closely associated to capital flight in DR Congo.

Laurent Kabila lost his life as result of the potent foreign economic benefits in the DR Congo's natural resources and was difficult to challenge. The change in the tradition of; lack of transparency in the exploitation of resources caused a major challenge to the regime of Joseph Kabila. The irrelevance of ideology to be employed as weight for international support in the new international geopolitical atmosphere became the major differences to the previous regimes (Kisangani, 2012; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Willame, 1999). The global geopolitics is greatly influenced by economic and financial interests. The atmosphere is dominated by strong multinational enterprises operating in the mineral sector, with the support of the strong politicians (Abadie, 2011), however, it became difficult to exercise modification in the management of the mineral sector. Therefore, to detach the relationship between resources and conflicts becomes difficult, which

remained a chief cause of most shocking conflicts of the country's history, also known as "continental war" (Prunier, 2009).

The inability to create resilient institutions and an efficient structure to regulate the mineral sector are essential to the relationship between conflict and resources in the DR Congo. However, it is not that there is absence of institution and structure but weak. The natural resource sector experienced an attempt to be reformed by successive administration as well as change the mining code, however, it has been perceived that in developing countries the mining codes had been created with bias in order to promote the coming of foreign investments at the expense of lifelong development agenda (Campbell, 2010, 2009; Besada and Martin, 2013). Hence, DR Congo literally fit this trend.

Agreement in relation to the exploration and the distribution of oil reserves situated along territorial borders was signed with Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville as well as Uganda, by necessity is to prevent triggering conflict over resources at the level of region. However, conflict may be triggered as a result of inability to control and manage such treaties. Political harmony in terms of coordination on the side of DRC and its neighbours is necessary for the structures to be efficient and effective in checking the relationship between conflict and resources, else, may exist only in principles and not in practice. Connections of war economies are created as a result of conflicts over resources at the expense of the welfare of the people, hence, institute conflicts. However, DRC must take into cognizance structural reforms to regulate the post conflict reconstruction (see Laudati (2013).

4.5 Prelude to the UN Intervention MONUC: The Mobutu's end and Kabila Emergence

An atmosphere for resurgence of conflict was birth with the installation of a military officer, President Mobuto Sese-Seko occasioned by the Cold war politics brought a centralized government in connection with the intervention of the military, hence, the UN intervention.

Large scale corruption cases, human rights abuse, as well as failure to develop human resources describe the regime of Mobutu thereby influencing the political history of DRC beginning from 1965 to the 1990s. Even though, with the huge resource endowment of

the country, DR Congo under the regime of Mobutu experiences a very poor development in human resource, being one of the poorest in Africa (World Bank, 2010, UN, 2010). The regime of Mobutu lost legitimacy as a result of the prevailing large scale corruption and lack of good governance. Mobutu exercise the ability to have gripped of power, regardless of the regime lack of popularity, however, the living conditions of the people deteriorated to a very low level in relation to human development value. Poor human situation can be linked to various factors. These include the following:

i. Mobutu benefitted the assistance of the Western power throughout the cold war;
ii. The Congo rebellion in the mid-1960s propelled the Congolese people to out of their own volition desist from violent demonstration.
iii. The struggle with the aim to ending the Mobutu regime failed as a result of its failure to secure popular support and failure to result to the use of arms and ammunition as a result of its old and legally minded leadership.

Rebellion led by Kabila emerged in the Eastern Congo as result of the dynamics of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda which on the long run was to put an end to the regime of Mobutu

(Annabi, 2010). The Hutu government suffered a defeat from the Rwanda Patriotic Front which led to the escape of close to a million Hutu populations into neighboring countries with DR Congo (then Zaire) as a major receiver of the Hutus. The international community under the supervision of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established camps close to the Rwanda to accommodate the Hutus refugees, however, this camps were put under the administration of the Rwanda political institution and leadership (ICR, 2000). In addition, guerilla attacks against the Rwanda current government were carried out from the refugee camp. However, the mass movement of refugees into DR Congo projects a huge impact on the local population and on the affairs of politics with ethnic groups principally in the South and North Kivu.

i. The mass entry of Rwandas birth worry and violence as it brought about a balance of power between the Congolese Hutu and others, most especially, the Tutsi.

ii. The influx created economic hardship; Congolese citizens have to leave their homes which breeds anger because the refugee camps benefited immensely from foreign aid at the expense of the Congolese, thus receiving little or no aid from the international community.

iii. The Mobutu regime aided the transfer of weapons aimed for the guerilla warfare who sort to fight the new regime in Rwanda. However, this was as a result of Mobutu being an ally to Habyarimana (i.e. Hutu) regime in Rwanda, and this present a great threat to the Congolese Tutsi as well as the new government of Rwanda.

iv. As a result, the new assemblage of forces was perceived by the local Kivu politicians and administrators as an avenue to fight the Congolese Tutsi. Hence, their eviction from Congo.

The above situations can conveniently be connected with the beginning of the 1996-97 war in Eastern Congo. However, the Rwanda government reiterated its readiness not further to condone the people in the camp at the Rwanda border who orchestrated the genocide and also fighting Rwanda from the UNHCR camps. The Congolese government as well as the international community took for granted the earlier caution thrown by the Rwanda government. Taking for example, the South Kivu Tutsi on their part, were determined to forestall experiencing similar attacks and evictions of the North Kivu Tutsi. However, they began a preventive action against the former Mobutu forces, the FAZ (Forces Armées Zairoises) and the Hutu camps when another stage of ethnic cleansing was arranged. The situation gave the Rwandans the avenue they have long waited for, hence, traversed boundary in making provision to assist the Tutsi and thereby fighting the FAZ as well as the Hutsi camps. The Uganda became a part of the operation for similar reasons. However, the Congo boundary were taken as a suitable place to attack the Uganda government by the Anti-Museveni forces (the Allied Democratic Forces, the Lord Resistance's Army and the West Nile Bank Front) The knowledge of the Uganda President Yoweri Museveni and Rwandan Paul Kagame of guerilla warfare aided the coalition, taking cognizance of the consequence of direct attack (ICG, 2000). Besides, it sort to compromise the Congolese to secure legitimacy for the invasion and be perceived as Tutsi invasion, with the perception that the Tutsi sort to establish a greater

Tutsi or Hima empire which in essence take over a good amount of the lands belonging to Rwanda. However, the conflict was to be given a Congolese makeup, but the absence of opposition to the Mobutu regime created difficulty.

In contrast, several parties and leaders became devoted to his defeat; it became necessary to depend on the exiled groups with little followers but with revolutionary tendencies. This led to the emergence of AFDL which was born as a coalition of four parties - the Parti de la Révolution Populaire (PRP) founded in 1968; the Conseil National de Résistance Pour la Démocratie (CNRD); the Mouvement Révolutionnaire Pour la Libération du Zaire, and the Alliance Démocratique des Peuples (ADP) led by Kabila, André Kisase Ngandu, Masasu Nindaga, Déogratias Bugera respectively. Being the eldest amidst the founder with the history of anti-Mobutu demonstration, he rose to become the spokesman of the coalition. The revolutionary movement received the support of Che Guevara and some Cuban revolutionaries secretly as well as the support of Yoweri Museveni and Julius Nyerere, though, during the Congo rebellion of 1964 and 1965, he was a zonal commander in the South Kivu. The year 1998 saw the uprising with the support Rwanda and Uganda to confront Kabila, on the other hand, African countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, as well as Chad supported Kabila. The country was fractioned into three with Uganda Liberation Movement of Congo (MLC) exercising control over the north, the Rwanda Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) controls the east, and Mobutu controls the remaining part of the country which led to continual internal conflicts (Salim, 2002).

Summarily, the factors that triggered conflicts in the DR Congo is rooted in the various factors. The major ones include the following:

i. Matters in respect to religious and ethnic differences;
ii. Conflicts resulting from traditional borders and resource distribution;
iii. Allocation of political and economic power characterized by inequality;
iv. Agitations for the reform and inculcation of democracy into the political and economic systems;
v. Harmful legacies of colonial rule; and
vi. The contest among ethnic arising from the fall of the old form of relationships that gave a platform for collaboration among traditional ethnic groups in Africa.

The inability of the first upheaval of 1997 to restructure the political terrain in DR Congo, the fear of Ugandan and Rwandan over security, the passion of African powers' for DRC resources and the weak state that permits foreign powers to challenge its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

4.6 Efforts at resolving the DR Congo conflict and the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement

At the beginning of the DRC war, the peace making process commenced, however, the peculiarities of the conflict were not known earlier by the peacemakers.
For instance, in Pretoria on august 23rd 1998, the stakeholders present at the SADC emergency summit asserted their acceptance of the DR Congo government's legitimacy, hence, seeks for an end to hostilities, which will be accompanied by political discourse for the settlement of the crisis in a peaceful manner. Thus Nelson Mandela got the mandate of the summit to organize a truce, having consulted the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

Surprisingly, at the press conference, Mandela made it known that SADC had collectively gave a nod to the intervention of military by its member states in the DR Congo, however, created an avenue for several regional meetings with the involvement of SADC and non SADC that aimed to stop the conflict, hence, regional representatives at the 18th SADC conference that took place in Mauritus 1998, gave room for opinions by SADC and its members states with the aim of providing assistance for restoring peace and security in DRC, popular was the Victoria Falls and Pretoria initiatives (IRIN, 1998; Anning, 1999, Bellamy 2010)

Furthermore, the prompt provision of troops by the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to back-up the government of DR Congo were praised by the leaders of SADC. The Rwanda troops provided assistance to the DRC rebels and this was accepted to be true by Paul Kagame - Rwandan President, with justification on the platter of fear of national security because of the occupation of the Eastern Congo by the Hutu rebel to attack Kigali. However, the SADC appointed the then Zambian President Frederick Chiluba to head the team saddled with negotiation, with the assistance of the presidents of Tanzania and Mozambique. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya intervened in the crisis with a meeting separately with Yoweri Museveni and Laurent Kabila. Subsequently

in early 1999, the five countries that have troops in the DR Congo held a summit in Windhoek, Namibia, where the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola settled to end the hostilities, however, with the absence of Kabila and the non-invitation of RCD, the agreement failed.

Concluding Remarks

With the failure of other meetings, the DR Congo was highly polarised along several regional interests and the process of arriving at a peaceful settlement were made by the same regional leaders to arrive at amicable resolution and other five heads of state were involved in different consultations to reach agreement on the contents of a peace plan championed by former Presidents Chiluba and Namibian Sam Nujoma. They briefed and held meeting with the then President Nelson Mandela of South Africa. In the process, former President Chiluba consulted former President Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda, while the then Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano (the vice-chairperson of SADC) held talks with Angolan President Dos Santos in Luanda, Angola, on ways of bringing peace to the DR Congo. Similarly, the South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and Tony Lloyd, Britain's Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, travelled on separate missions to Luanda at this period. The United States sent Thomas Pickering, the Under-Secretary of State for political affairs to Harare, Zimbabwe, where he met President Robert Mugabe as the first leader he consulted during his five-nation African tour. These efforts gradually began the process of the UNSC call for a peacekeeping mission in DR Congo. The Lusaka Accord was the foundation of the peacekeeping mission. This will form the major part of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UN MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Having examined the issues that led to conflict DRC by tracing its trajectory to its colonial and post-colonial politics and the signing of the Lusaka peace deal in the previous chapter, this chapter highlights the establishment of the UN mission in DR Congo. The Lusaka Accord and recommendation provided the foundation upon which the UN Security Council anchored its intervention on. Therefore, the whole of chapter five is directed at exploring the establishment of MONUC, its mandates, deployment of peacekeepers personnel and other activities given under its mandates.

5.1 Background to the establishment of MONUC

After the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord in July 1999 involving the DRC and five countries (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe), and by the Resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999, the Security Council created the U.N Mission in the DRC (MONUC), primarily to plot for the observation of the ceasefire and detachment of troops and sustain cooperation with all the countries that signed the peace Agreement. Following the sequence of the council resolutions, it extended the mandate of MONUC to the regulation of the execution of the Peace Accord and gives several related supplementary assignments.

Robust UN distress over the absence of improvement in the procedure for peace was earlier demonstrated in April 1999 when the Resolution 1234 was agreed upon by the Council; meanwhile the UNSC had dispensed 3 presidential declarations requesting for the termination of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. And few months after the commencement of the conflicts, this resolution requested "an immediate halt to the conflicts" and demanded the urgent signing of a Peace Accord granting the organized pulling out of all foreign armed forces, the restoration of the power of the administration of the DR Congo all over its terrain, and the demilitarization of armed forces that doesn't belong to the government in the DR Congo, and emphasizes, the necessity for the

commitment of all Congo populations in an comprehensive procedure of political discourse with an outlook for attaining countrywide resolution along with the sustenance of democracy, credible elections, and for the establishment of internal security across the DR Congo borders.

High order actually, but the standings of Resolution 1234 were resonated some months afterward in the Lusaka Peace Accord of July 1999. A significant development was reached April 18 1999 after Museveni and Kabila signed the Peace Accord in Sirte, Libya under the intermediation of Gaddafi. This accord granted the operation of peacekeepers, and pulling out of external armed forces, and the commencement of a nationwide discourse. However, it was accepted by the UNSC, but the RCD and Rwanda overruled it. Nevertheless, later, ex-President Chiluba accepted to join effort with Gaddafi to execute the agreement made in Sirte, whereas Rwanda uphold its acknowledgment to just the Chiluba ceasefire initiative. The ceasefire procedure was made more complex by a declaration that the chairperson of the RCD, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba had been overthrown. There was disagreement between Wamba and the RCD leaders based in Goma on the furtherance of armed conflicts, and had moved to Kisangani where the agents of peace are expected to address three militia groups: Emile Ilunga led RCD in Goma; Mbusa Nyamwisi led RCD in Kisangani; and the Jean-Pierre Bemba led MLC.

Consequently during the war, the Chadian armed forces amounting to 2,000 that have been in support of Kabila commence retreating in agreement with the details of the Sirte Accord. Observers were amazed by the Rwanda pronouncement of an independent cessation of hostilities, suitable to be effected at the wee hours of May 28, 1999. This accompanied by a declaration that a group of professional armed forces from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda would commence the establishment of strategies to ensure the removal of Ugandan armed forces, and that interceding armed forces would be installed to ensure the provision of security for the DR Congo and Uganda border. Nonetheless, the last failed, a group of 62 peacemakers from Libya arrived Kampala.

The Presidents of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe declared the Rwanda's announcement of autonomous ceasefire invalid at a conference of DR Congo allies held in Harare, owing to Kigali having strengthened its armed forces crusade in the East of DR Congo to support the RCD. Nonetheless, the meeting in Harare that the truce made in Kigali was an improvement, and that the chance given by the existing atmosphere needed to be grasped to bargain tranquility. Armed forces condition amidst the Lusaka process became perilous for Kabila. As Lusambo got arrested by RPA military in Kasai Oriental region, and in doing so, promised to occupy the capital of Mbuji Mayi that is endowed with diamond. Rwanda was convinced by global pressure to end its move and embrace peace (UN, 2007). The leader of MLC force, Jean Piere Bemba threatened the Mbandake which worsened the already fragile situation. The fight continued between the Zimbabwe, Nambia and DRC force all of them supporting one alliance or tanother. The alliances of Interahamwe joined to become the Armee de Liberation du Rwanda which were also providing arms and other logistic to the rebel groups.

Ex President Chiluba when given a chance to head the meeting of regional leaders during the swearing in of ex president Mbeki in South Africa centers on new peacekeeping operations (UN 2008). 14 SADC member state were in attendance with the presence of Rwanda, Uganda, Libya, as well as Kenya. Moustapha Naisse, the United Nations special diplomat who is in charge of the DR Congo ceasefire procedure was also present at the meeting which paved the way DR Congo conference planned for Lusaka for peace accord. The Lusaka conference underwent various prolonged interruptions because the foreign envoy faced difficulties to agree on the procedures of a proposed peace accord. All through the week in Lusaka, there were dialogues between the regional leaders and the delegates of the militia groups following failure to deliver a ceasefire strategy. In July, the representatives of the government of DR Congo and three Congolese militia movements finally got into a dialogue in Lusaka, autonomous of their respective allies and the Zambian mediators, for the purpose of achieving some improvement which eventually led to a peace accord signed by the government of the countries that were part of the war but excluding the DRC militia groups.

The Lusaka Peace Accord made provision for the following actions:

i. ending the conflicts and removal of foreign military;
ii. systematic extraction of all foreign forces;
iii. countrywide discourse with resolution;
iv. Restoration of the government of DR Congo.
v. demilitarization of the armed groups;
vi. establishment of a state military; and
vii. Safety standardization across shared boundaries between DRC with neighboring countries.

A number of features concerning the method and the provisions are discoursed beneath. Nevertheless, it is vital to accept that successive UNSC resolutions in relations to the application of the Lusaka Peace Accord reveals UN Security Council's motive and with its explanation of the peace accords viability and often its content as revealed in the peace accord. The first DRC militia leader to accept the peace accord in 1999 was Jean-Pierre Bemba for the MLC. Also, RCD became the second militia group to accede to the peace accord after which a concession accord had been attested to by fifty founding members of the organization. Former President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, the peace procedure facilitator admonished that the peace accord may not engender peace in the DR Congo, summoned the UNSC to grant the use peace building mission with a mandate adequate for the Lusaka peace agreement.

Table 5.1 Peace Agreements in the DR Congo 1999-2010

Agreement	**Place and Date**	**Parties involved**
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement	Lusaka, Zambia, 10th July 1999	Angola, DR Congo, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and MLC
Sun City agreement	Sun City, Rustenburg, South Africa, 19th April 2002	DR Congo government, MLC, Civil societies and Political groups
Pretoria Accord	Pretoria, South Africa , 30th July 2002	Governments of DR Congo and Rwanda
Luanda Agreement	Luanda, Angola, 6th September 2002	Governments of DR Congo and Uganda
Global and Inclusive Agreement on transition in the DR Congo	Pretoria, South Africa, 16th December 2002	The government of DR Congo, The RCD, MLC, the political opposition, civil society, RCD-Movement de Liberation (RCD-ML), RCD-National (RCD-N)

		and Mai-Mai
The Final Act	Sun City, South Africa 2nd April 2003	Participants in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue

Source: Compilation by the Researcher 2016, the table shows the peace agreements reached in the DR Congo between 1999 and 2010. This table is mainly to convey the procedure of dialogue and mediation in the DRC

Conversely, JMC, on behalf of all those who signed the peace accord was created to regulate along with the supervision of the end of conflicts before the use of UN along with AU armed force. The armed forces were charged to carry out the function of peacekeepers until the arrival of the United Nation military to take charge. The selection of a leader, disagreement over RCD delegates with ethics of procedure interrupted the creation of Joint Military Commission. Funding with other logistics hindered its instant activity as well. The JMC encompassed two people each from the confrontational groups, comprising MLC and the two RCD bloc, and Zambia 'impersonal' spectators with the delegates of the United Nation and African Union with its base in Lusaka, Zambia. While the Lusaka peace agreement came to effect within a short period, the UN was summoned to approve a peacekeeping force.

5.2 The Deployment of MONUC and its Mandate

According to the report made by the UN Secretary General in July 1999 to the UNSC, the mandate of United Nations peacekeepers to assist in the execution of the Lusaka peace accord includes the following:

i. Joint Military Commission operating with AU in the enforcement of the peace accord;
ii. Monitoring the termination of conflicts;
iii. probing peace accord with measure to ensure compliance;
iv. administering the detachment rebels according to the provisions of the accord;
v. overseeing reassignment of military to protective locations in war areas as provided by the agreement;
vi. ensuring the protection, provision with the preservation of help to displaced persons, refugees as well as other victims of the hostilities;

vii. informing the parties to the ceasefire agreement about its operations in peacekeeping;
viii. gathering armaments from civilians and safeguarding that the armaments gathered are appropriately accounted for;
ix. planning and administering the removal of all foreign military with JMC and AU's support; and
x. Authenticating statistics and conduct concerning the parties' armed forces.

Remarkably omission the report from Annan missed some delicate issues of the ceasefire agreements; this includes trailing, diffusing the armed militias and subjecting them to possible mass killings and other war crimes. Moreover, the proposal of the United Nations Secretary to the UNSC that the United Nations duty to execute the peace accord requires being addressed in 3 segments:

i. placement of harmless force officials to the centre states of those that signed the accord and, but when security condition legalised, to the rearmost militias centre of operations;
ii. disposition of nearly five hundred armed forces spectators in the DR Congo;
iii. placement of each peacekeeping military (Annan, 2000)

They have remained the foundation of the debate as well as the preparation for increasing the use of United Nations armed forces and the civil workforce in the company of resources, at some point has been referred to as stage I, II, and III of MONUC. The Security Council accordingly permit the employment of nearly ninety liaison armed forces to the head city of the signatories to the peace accord on 6 August 1999. Their duties, as authorised by Security Council Resolution 1258, included the subsequent: (IRIN, 2001)

i. to institute connection, uphold cooperation with the Joint Military Commission as well as all the signatories to the accord;
ii. Help the Joint Military Commission with the signatories to establish measures to execute the peace accord.
iii. offer practical required support the Joint Military Commission;

iv. Make facts available to the UN Secretary General in respect to state of affairs and contribute to filter the ethics of operations for a possible increase in the responsibility of United Nations to execute the peace accord signed by all parties; and

v. ensure teamwork and safety from amidst parties for the potential deployment of military spectators.

The mission was situated in Kinshasa with military liaison officers in places like Kigali, Kampala, Harare, Windhoek and Bujumbura. It also has one in Addis Ababa. Within a short period some of these military officers were deployed to very few locations in DRC.

Moreover, Resolution 1291 (2000) was adopted by the UNSC, being a plan of action to execute the peace accord by the necessary actors and subsequent core purposes were specifically stressed:

i. gathering with authentication of security facts on other armed forces,

ii. to preserve termination of conflicts and also detach and reassign parties' armed forces,

iii. all-embracing disbandment, relocation and re-absorption of rebel groups as provided in the peace accord and the systematic taking away foreign farmed forces;

iv. in the company of the parties ensure freedom for all POWs,

v. foster lasting teamwork amid global actors of humanitarian services and facilitate humanitarian aid and human rights supervision, with specific attention to the defenseless people such as females, kids as well as demilitarized kid army, as reflected on within the expertise of MONUC with satisfactory safe environment, in cooperation with associated bodies, NGOs and other United Nations agencies.

MONUC in accordance to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in its Resolution 1565, the SC decided to deepen the mandate of MONUC and approved the increase in the potency of its armed forces. The Security Council charged MONUC with the following mandate:

i. to ensure presence in the major zones of possible impulsiveness in order to restore of confidence, to dissuade aggression particularly by, dissuading the employment of aggression to terrorize the governing procedure, in addition permit the operations of the UN workforce liberally and principally the East of DRC,
ii. ensure security of the people and humanitarian workforce facing impending danger of physical aggression,
iii. to certify the safety of the UN workforce and apparatus,
iv. to guarantee liberty of migration of its workforce as well as their security,
v. to establish a connection with the UN mission in Burundi as well as the leadership of DRC and Burundi to supervise and dissuade the migration of armed groups across borders of both nations,
vi. cooperating with ONUB to oversee the implementation of strategies imposed on the lakes as appropriate to the concerned states as well as the professionals. The inspection of all the transportation automobiles via seaport, airports, the armed forces base as well as the crossing of borders in the North and South Kivu as well as Ituri was a part of the supervision.
vii. confiscate and dispose as suitable, all weapon as well as other related instruments that breach the stated principles.
viii. To appropriate observation and report, about the existence of militia groups and the existence of foreign armed forces at the main zones of impulsiveness, particularly by supervising the use of landing strips and the boundaries, principally on the lakes.

The Security Council in addition charged the MONUC with following the mandate to assist the administration of state unity and transition:

i. Add to the tactics employed to provide safety of the structure and security for the Kinshasa transition workforce till the police force in Kinshasa is ready to take charge of the duty and support the DRC government to maintain laws in some critical zones.

ii. Assist the refuges and the displaced people who are willing to come back and also add to the advancement of their safety within which humanitarian support is given.
iii. Support the military forces of the DRC to disband external fighters.
iv. Contribute to the detachment and deliberate return of disbanded external fighters and their allies.
v. Support the activities of the country programme to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the DRC fighters and those that relies on them to supervise the measures and provides safety in sensitive zones.
vi. Provide security to ensure successful conduct of election as specified by the international and conclusion of the electoral process specified in the global and the comprehensive accord,
vii. Promote respect for human rights with special attention on women, kids, as well as the defenseless civilians,
viii. Inspect breach on human rightsto end abuse and support the activities to bring to justice those who violate human rights and the global law on humanity in the process running intimately with essential UN bodies.

In addition, MONUC authorized to work within the range of its ability, and execute the above duties without bias as well as make provision for intelligence and support the transitional body, in relation to the pledge of international and all encompassing accord, and also assist the major joint commission to ensure:

i. Indispensable law making, as well as the future laws,
ii. Security sector modification, and the bringing together of the state defense and internal forces with the disbandment, demolisation and reintegration and in particular training and supervising police, while certifying their democratic nature and regards for human rights and basic freedoms,
iii. The electoral process.

Summarily, almost all the resolutions passed by the UNSC were immensely supported by all members of the Security Council. As the table below shows, from 1999 to 2007, the voting pattern on resolutions were supported by the 15 members of the council.

Table 5.2 UN Security Council voting pattern record on DRC Resolutions 1999-2007

Year	Members	For	Against	Abstain	Total
1999	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2000	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2001	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2002	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2003	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2004	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2005	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2006	15	15	Nil	nil	15
2007	15	15	Nil	nil	15

Source: Collated and adapted by the author from SIPRI 2009

Definitely, the key drive of the mandates and resolutions delivered, significantly focused on some crucial issues. The issues are discussed below:

a) **Protection of humanitarian personnel, civilians and United Nations personnel and facilities**

i. The safety of the people, and humanitarian workforce, facing imminent danger of aggression and from the aggression coming from the parties of conflicts must be ensured;
ii. Support the deliberate coming return of people in exile and the IDPs as well as contribute to the advancement of security under humanitarian support is offered;
iii. Provides security for UN workforce, mechanism, as well as instruments;
iv. ascertain the safety and liberty of migration of UN and related workforce;
v. operate patrols in cooperation with the state police and armed forces to enhance safety in the occasion of civil pandemonium;

b) Disarmament, demobilization, monitoring of resources of foreign and Congolese armed groups

i. Dissuade all attempt to employ of aggression to threaten the Goma and Nairobi processes from all rebel movements, both foreign and Congolese, mainly in the East of the DR Congo, with the use of ‘barricade and search’ methods and responsible for all crucial activities to prevent rough treatment on residents and

suspend the armed forces potential of illegal armed groups that continually employ aggression in that zone;

ii. Organize missions with the FARDC incorporated party sent to the East of DR Congo and aid the process led by and mutually designed with the group in agreement with the global law on humanitarian, human rights and refugee with an outlook to:

   i. To disband the adamant local militias to assure their participation in the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the release of children associated with those militias;
   ii. Disbanding the foreign militias to assure their participation in the DDRRR process and the liberation of children associated with those militias,
   iii. Averting the support to unlawful forces as well as the support resulting from unlawful money-making activities;
   iv. Accelerate the deliberate demobilization and repatriation of disarmed external forces and their reliant;
   v. Contribute to the execution of state programme of DDR of Congolese rebels and their reliant with particular commitment to kids, by supervising the disbandment process and provide safety in some critical zones, as well as supporting the tasks of reintegration embarked upon by the government of DRC in cooperation with the UN Country Team and multi and bilateral allies;
   vi. Employ observance with the investigating expertise to prevent the provision of support to the unlawful armed movement in relation to the unlawful deal in natural resources.

c) Training and mentoring of FARDC and the support of security reform

It make provision for armed forces training in the aspects of fundamental rights, the protection of children as well as gender aggression to various members with a part of FARDC combined forces sent to the East of DRC, as one the international community efforts to contribute to security sector reform (SSR). E.U activities, EUSEC and EUPOL and other global allies made effort to support the government of the DRC in strategize the

amendment of the security segment to establish a more solid DRC military and in addition, enhance the skills of the DRC police and other related security agencies.

d) **Territorial security of Democratic Republic of the Congo**

i. Differentiate as well as account in an appropriate manner the place of the militia groups and the existence of foreign armed forces in core zones of insecurity, wholly, by observing the employment of landing strips and borders as well as the water zones.;

ii. It is charged with the duty to supervise the execution of the provisions of paragraph 1 of Resolution 1807, in addition, Resolution 1533 created the investigations of aircraft as well as transportation automobiles via the airports, and the crossing of borders in North and Kivu and ituri with the collaboration of the concerned body and the host of expertise.;

iii. Seize and dispose, as suitable, the weapons and other related tools whose presence violates the provisions of paragraph 1 of Resolution 1807

iv. Support the leadership of DRC in increasing its diminishing competence;

v. Provide support to the skilled customs officials of the DRC in executing their measures;

The UNSC, in addition, gave MONUC the mandate, to work closely with the DRC authorities, UN Country Team and sponsors, to assist the advancement of democracy, its institution, and the rule of law, to:

i. Stimulate nationwide compromise and domestic political discourse, with the provision of good bureaus, and support the strengthening of civil society and multi-party democracy, and give the necessary support to the Goma and Nairobi processes;

ii. Contribute to the advancement and security of human rights, specially focus on women, children and vulnerable persons, scrutinize human rights violations and publish its findings, as suitable, with an outlook to putting an end to impunity, assist in the development and implementation of a transitional justice policy, and

cooperate in national and international efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;

iii. Assist to provide security for the conduct of credible election;
iv. Provide advice to strengthen the institutions of democracy as well as its democratic institutions and procedure across the country, at the province, regions and local zones;
v. Provide recommendations for DR Congo, in line with global associates to reinforce the competence of the legal system as well as the armed force justice system.
vi. MONUC with support of its global associates and the UN Country Team assist the government of DR Congo and the electoral body to conduct local elections;
vii. Contribute to enhance good governance along with respect for the principle of culpability.

5.3 Operational Development and Troops Deployment

Preliminary approval of troop and actual disposition varies in the operation dimension of MONUC. Its first troop disposition of five hundred and fifty armed spectators was predicted, and nearly one thousand and nine hundred military workforce to provide safety for apparatus, supplies and other logistics. Four hundred armed forces were also requested in the two riverside units, and the necessary rotating and fixed-wing air properties. Summarily, it requires the total number of three thousand military workforces. The UNSC reiterated the approval of MONUC in the year 2001, as provided by Resolution 1291, with the authorization of the restructured operational model outlined above (UNSC, 2001).

In accordance to Resolution 1341, the UNSC required all agreements to the Lusaka peace accord be implemented totally devoid of conditional plan for removing with the reassignment of armed forces. Few weeks were given to the warring parties to withdraw by few kilometres away from their leading spots. While the agreement of the government, RCD and FLC to allow MONUC to deploy a detachment of military official was done through a diplomatic effort allowing for the managing of the ceasefire that had been previously violated by FAC and FLC in Bolomba in Equateur province. In addition,

Furthermore, a lot of security breaches were also recorded in the Eastern province that involved RCD forces and civilian that were not signatory militia groups. The rebel group of RPA and RCD-Goma signified their intion to withdraw from the war front which was supervised by MONUC

In furtherance of its activities, MONUC had increased their personnel to two thousand, three hundred and sixty six. This personnel were posted to the capital of countries that were party to the Lusaka peace deal and the situational office of the rebel groups in Bunia, Goma and Gbadolite all in the DRC. There were a number of UN personnel providing logistic to the JMC in Zambia. Other military personnel were stationed in other locations within the DRC. There were also four regional heads with infantry guard unit made available by troop contributing countries. These are; Kalemie headed by Uruguay; Kanaga headed by Senegal; Mbandaka headed by Senegal and Kisangani headed by Morocco.

The MONUC undertook to influence the RCD-Goma to remove its troops from the city of Kisangani. However, MONUC discovered that the duty of relocation of troops was quite secure, that it is important to swing from verification to ensuring the removal of foreign troops. This necessitates the creation of more military headquarters with the deployment of another one hundred military personnel. For the time being, the UN sustained the investigations of all cases of breach of peace accord as well as other issues reported by the parties of the accord, only for the locations where safety concern restricted harmless military observers. For example, MONUC could make little attempts to prevent the invasion of the East by the rebel groups, more importantly the aggression by the RCD Goma as well as the government supported rebel movements, especially, the Mai Mai and Interahamwe that were not a signatory to the Lusaka accord. On the other hand, MONUC cannot sufficiently examines and account for such cases as a result of its poor appearance in the East, the RCD safety assurance for such surveillance are deficient. In relation to the removal of foreign militaries, only Uganda and Angola were able to give information about the strength of their armed forces in DRC. Uganda responded strongly to the account of the Board of professionals on illicit exploration of resources in the DRC. In the report, Rwanda and Uganda were accused for their exploration of the

DRC wealth. The Board provided that the UNSC should without delay announce a provisional restriction on the import or export of various valuable mineral resources from or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. In addition, it was provided that the UNSC should freeze the wealth of the militia groups, leaders and companies, or people that took part in the illicit exploration of the resources of DRC. Jean-Pierre Bemba was accused by the board to be the principal actor in the illicit exploration. Other recommendations of the board was the instant restriction on sales of all military wares to the militia groups and their allies in the DRC. (UN, 2001)

Finally, the removal of foreign armed forces and the disbandment, detachment and reintegration of militias possibly not a good process, but will include irregular improvement on both fronts. Absolutely, the Harare sub-plan made provision for similar condition indicating that: the following requirements must be achieved before a final removal of foreign armed forces can happen:

i. Detachment of Armed Forces.
ii. Disbandment of Rebels Groups.
iii. Allotment of the State Discourse with the creation of a new framework that will ensure the disbandment of illegally armed individuals.

All the signatories to the ceasefire agreement are charged with the duties of drawing the requirement to ensure the deployments of MONUC phase III. The Secretary General noted that the removal and detachment plans established by the JMC and the political committee as provided by the Resolution 1341 would necessitate significant growth and adjustment before they could provide a suitable foundation for a achieving a mandate for the phase III of the MONUC deployment. Specifically, it was asserted that the signatories to the Lusaka agreement had failed to give comprehensive information about the strength of their armed forces in DRC as demanded by the UNSC mission to the Lakes.

Therefore, the discussion on the deployment of MONUC phase III was too early before the realization of the demobilisation and verification phase, and without the benefit of authentic and authorized plans for disbandment, detachment, reintegration or repatriation (DDRR). In contrast, MONUC should not lose the energy gathered by the

substantial demobilisation of troops and the partial removal of foreign armed forces. The MONUC models of operations however was restructured to guarantee adequate resources for the mission and to complete the current phase and get prepared for the multifaceted responsibilities envisaged for the MONUC phase III.

Also, MONUC was reinforced with both the civil and military model to supervise the support for detachment, disbandment, and reintegration of rebel groups. Taking into consideration the Co-ordination Unit is an essential aspect of the change to Phase III, in relation to the indications that MONUC could be called upon at the dawn of the phase to help with the reintegration of ex-war lords sectioned in government camps. The public information proficiency of MONUC was comprehensive to authorize it to elucidate the UN objectives and activities particularly; the disbandment, detachment and reintegration process and the Inter-Congolese discussions are concerned. The MONUC established a radio station transmitting from Kinshasa with other ones at the existing headquarters and at Goma was the principal purpose of MONUC. At the end, the DRC government permitted the presence of the transmitters.

Summarily, the mission established a developmental build-up of potential in relations to workforce, logistics and paraphernalia in order to locate MONUC to reacte in a suitable manner once the parties to the accord commence the process of extraction of all foreign armed forces and the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation or reintegration of the militias. Forecast of a boost of up to two thousand and five hundred military workforce more than the figure of some three thousands approved under the mandate of MONUC, thus remaining within the military strength of five thousands, five hundred and thirty seven permitted by the UNSC in its Resolution 1291.

Concluding Remarks

The concentration of this chapter has been based on MONUC mission, its mandates and the deployment of other logistic issues in the mission. It also inspect several resolutions by the UNSG, the deployment of troops and the aid given to MONUC to prosecute the peacekeeping must be specified here that there were numerous resolution passed by the

UN Security Council endowing the mission. Although, in relations to operational tactic and ensuring peace and stability, the mission was confronted making it grim to achieve the overall mandate. The subsequent chapter therefore, evaluates the challenges that confronted MONUC in the accomplishment of its established mandates.

CHAPTER SIX

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN DR CONGO

In this chapter, we shall attempt would be made to assess the interventionist roles of MONUC based on its established mandates and operational logistics. The idea is to see if the mission was able to fundamentally accomplish its mandates given the circumstances of its operational activities in the DR Congo. In specific terms, the assessment of the mission would be based on some critical parametres such as the nature of the mandate, funding, troop availability, disarmament of militias both local and foreign. In addition, we would examine the challenges, (if any) that might have worked against the mission and finally identify the lessons learnt from the mission.

6.1 An Assessment of MONUC

The deployment of MONUC by UNSC Resolution 1279 which also stipulates the central part of mandate of the operation was highlighted in the earlier chapter. However, the mandate can be explained concisely within the three essential areas. One, to initiate the security of the people, restricts parties of conflict and guarantees the wellbeing of UN personnel and apparatus. Moreover, the safety of the people and humanitarian workforce from the danger of looming physical cruelty, especially ones coming from warring parties and ensuring advancement to the security conditions for humanitarian assistance, however, voluntarily provide support for bringing back expatriate and the displaced citizens as well as guarantee the safety of United Nations workforce, facilities, and equipments was the initial mandate. Two, with the intention of establishing the MONUC involvement in the DDRRR process, the wherewithal of the foreign and Congolese armed groups are supervised and the local militias are disbanded to secure the release of kids linked to them. Three, as a part of the mandate, they helped in carrying out the election and encourage countrywide settlement and political dialogue within the state to reinforce democracy and the rule of law; also, they provide structure for the growth of the civil service. Breaches of human rights are probed and its investigations believing to end the reign of impunity are made available to encourage the respect for human rights especially for women, kids, and defenseless persons.

The five most important areas of the MUNOCs mandates enjoy the focus of this assessment. The mandates include;

i) Deep evaluation of mandates and decisions;
ii) The fund provided for the mission are evaluated;
iii) The disarmament of local armed groups and foreign military groups are evaluated.
iv) The evaluation of the operation of troops and the humanitarian aspects of the mission;
v) Conclusively, evaluate the conduct of election and reinforcement of democracy.

i) A critical assessment of the Mandates and UNSC Resolutions

In the beginning, the UNSC mandate given to MUNOC in 1999 was referred to as an eyewitness order; hence, the kind of order given determines the execution of the operation. The UN official corroborated the opinion of Annan (2009 interview) that observers order does not have the dominant ability to partake in a lingering crisis like that of DRC (Davies, 2009; Chikwanha, 2009 and Ayangafac, 2010). However, they concluded that the UNSC spent over a year when the crises had escalated before they granted them peacekeeping order in DRC. Its failure became apparent with its inability to cover vital areas of peacekeeping especially to disband parties of conflicts. Furthermore, the deployment of four battalion-strong forces with the observers mandates falls short of the Lusaka's call for a peacekeeping force. A limited order in relation to the Chapter VII to provide defense for itself as well as the people prone to the danger of physical aggression (Banzozi, 2009, and Ilya 2013)

According to Carbonnier, (2013) the MUNOC in conjunction with the JMC was ordered to supervise the execution of accord to end hostilities and check any breach and also to aid the humanitarians services and the catalyst of national truce.

The volume of responsibilities confronted makes the extraction of all external militias and disbandment and incorporation of militias difficult as drafted by MUNOC in the realization of the accord by warring parties themselves (Rwabyomere, 2011 and Sharamo, 2010). Alas their use was established on sufficient security as the warring parties cooperated. Hence, deployment requires the approval of warring parties as provided in the UN peacekeeping principle.

The Kampala Disengagement Plan was drafted in the early hours by the JMC representatives and MUNOC which move off leading positions of all forces, thus committing them to an extraction that established a large free area across the Equateur, the Kasais and Katanga provinces. Alas, all forces often saw the plan as an important file to validate their positions on the field (Sheriff, 2009 and Bazonzi, 2009). In similar vein, the operation of MILOBS ended the confrontation between the UPDF and RPA in Kisangani, the removal of the rival forces of UPDF and RPA was as a result of the presence of MILOBS, hence, made provision for the Congolese populations to express their displeasure over the existence of the forces (Zimulinda, 2010). In addition, the international community was able to force combatants to leave Kisangani as a result of the reports of phases of the crisis by the MUNOC which also aided the humanitarian services to the people and aided of the substitution of POWs. From the beginning, the UN decided to give its own understanding of the peace accord in Lusaka. The MUNOC mission was designed by US Americans.

A UN official in a confidential interview revealed that the United States envoy and armed forces designed the MUNOC mission whose competence could guarantee its accomplishment, has had continual cold feet about the Congo intervention particularly contributing troops.

However, the peacekeeping mission in Congo was supported by the world body but the initial funds to contain the state of affairs were denied. The concept of procedure was stated in the Americans authored declaration 1291 and the support of Washington was acquired on the clause that the American plan is accepted by the UN; hence the MONUC idea consists of various deficiencies. One, because the matter of the militias was not tackled thereby make it difficult to achieve the MONUC mandate with the declaration 1291 ignoring the three interconnected though different variety of conflicts which includes conventional warfare, insurgency and ethnic killings that is in existence in the DRC.

MONUC was able to supervise the first but not the second nor the third which present them a greater risk, making no differentiation between them and also charged the MUNOC to develop a course of action to disband rebel which became complicated for the mission to accomplish taking cognizance of the limited human and material resources

at its reach.

Despite the weak order of the MONUC, humble conquest was attained. One, peace was engendered in the Congo with the cooperation of MONUC and the JMC. Initially, the its duty was to execute the Lusaka truce accord as well as engage in the supervising and examining the breach of the accord, the achievement was not free of difficulties. The continuance of the internal conflicts made the operation initiate of the removal of the eight foreign troops in the execution of the first stage of the order an incomplete success. The truce accord at Bunia, North and South Kivu faced continuous danger from the militias groups which includes the FAC, RCD- Goma as well as Forces du la défense pour ladémocratie (FDD), relatively, military data were assembled and confirmed by the MONUC on the rebel groups.

Two, MONUC failed extraordinarily in carrying out its responsibility in relation to its order of providing safety and aiding humanitarian support and human right monitoring, especially attention on the defenseless groups including women, kids and disband child military. Over 3.4 million civilians were dislocated from both Kivu provinces and in the Ituri district between the years 1999 to 2003. Taking for instance, the UN reported that January 2003 to December 2003 saw the dislocation of over six hundred thousand civilians from Ituri only (UN SC, 16 July 2004). The rate of dislocation revealed the absence of safety and calamity towards humanity in DR Congo, although the country saw a reduction in the dislocation of the civilians to 2.3 million (UN, 2004). The effectiveness of the operation was challenged by gross breach of human rights; rape and aggression despite the disbandment and assimilation plan embark on for the rebels which achieve minimal result. Furthermore, the accomplishment of the operation was undermined by the resurgence of hostilities in the Eastern Congo towns of Ituri, Bunia, Kissanga and Kivu (UN, 2004).

By the years 1999-2010, fifty-one declarations were made by the UNSC on DR Congo. The table below revealed that there were five declarations in 1999, accompanied by four declarations in 2000, and the years 2003, 2006, 2007 witnessed higher numbers of declarations.

Table 6.1 UNSC Resolutions on DR Congo

Year	UNSC Resolutions	Mandate	Total
1999,	1234,1258,1273, 1279,1291	Deployment of Peacekeeping mission and Renewal of mandate	5
2000	1304, 1316, 1323, 1332,	Disarmament and Mandate Renewal	4
2001	1341, 1355,1376	Use of force for Protection	3
2002	1399, 1417, 1445, 1457, 1468, 1484	Humanitarian Protection and Renewal of mandate	6
2003	1489 1493, 1499, 1501, 1522, 1533, 1552,	Illegal Arms embargo	7
2004	1555, 1565,	Child Soldiers and Sexual harassment	2
2005	1592, 1596, 1616, 1621, 1628, 1635, 1649,	Disarmament and Mandate Renewal	7
2006	1653 1654, 1669, 1671, 1693, 1698, 1711, 1736,	Disarmament and Mandate Renewal	8
2007	1742, 1751, 1756, 1768, 1771, 1794	Disarmament and Mandate Renewal	6

Source: Compilation from UN Fact book 2013

The Security Council having signed the Lusaka truce accord ordered the MONUC to ensure the execution of the Lusaka truce accord that was realized to conduct election, disbands parties of conflict, and encourages the DDRRR process

ii) An assessment of funding provided for the Mission

It becomes imperative to emphasize on the flow of fund to the MONUC mission as a result of the importance of fund to the success or failure of any armed forces engagement especially peacekeeping operation. Thus the success or failure of MONUC relies on its financial support.

An estimated amount of $55,217 was provided annually beginning from the year 2000 and the year 2010 saw the provision of an estimate of $1 129 624m to the operation annually. This was as a result of the augmentation of the troops and workforce as well as the increase in responsibility and the operating cost. However, with the total bill of $8,73b, MONUC became the most costly UN operation.

It is revealed in our research with the interview conducted the financial support was sufficiently provided for the operation, although, the case of delayed remuneration of troops and workforce were vivid. Finally, within the UN stipulated estimates, the disbursement of financial support to MONUC was just and not inflated. The increase in financial support deployed is represented on the table below.

Table 6.2. Funding and Expenditures: (Thousands of United States dollars)

Year and Period	**Amount**
6 August 1999 to 30 June 2000:	55 271
1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001	246 472
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002	401 302
1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003	508 122
1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004	665 059
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005	940 946
1 July 2005 to 30 June 2008	1 078 498
1 July 2006 to 30 June 2009	1 135 261
1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010	1 129 624
Total	$8.73 billion

Source: Compilation from UNKPO Fact book (2000-2013)




Figure 6.1 Graph showing funding of the mission in United States Dollars

Source: Developed from Table 6.4

The table above revealed the rates at which the financial supports to the operation augment, range from $55m dollar to $1b in 1999 and 2007 respectively. The expansion of the operations responsibility was concomitant with the augmentation of financial support to the operation. MONUC saw the deployment of a total amount of $8.73billion from the years 2000 to 2010 making the average of $1.1billion annually; in essence, finance was not an obstacle because the expenditure of the operation rose from $55m in 1999 and 2000 fiscal years when it was to established to over $1billion by 2010. The increase in finance was as a result of the increase in peacekeeping workforce and other logistics due to the escalation of conflict in the DR Congo. By the year 2006, $1.07billion had been used by MONUC (UNKPOs 2010).

iii) Assessing the MONUC's mandates on disarming local and foreign Militia Groups

The achievement and setbacks of MONUC are largely dependent on the local, regional and foreign peculiarities of war area (Adebajo, 2011). The crisis in the Eastern DR Congo was caused by the refugee crisis in 1994-1995 which erupted as a result of the neighboring Rwanda war that saw mass migration of refugees among which are the Interahamwe to DR Congo, thus creating a new human populations peculiarities in the sub region that spawned another security atmosphere at the boundaries of DR Congo and Rwanda. The condition was however, worsened with the Zairian forces and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire conflict.

The late Kabila with the assistance of the Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan forces led the ADFL rebel group that began the occupation of the Eastern Zaire which in essence destabilized the structure of the regional leaders and the spread of resources. In the beginning, norms were spread through the home based Congolese, predominantly business operations managed by the people but the new authority overtook the traditional structure and new laws emerged along with the new authorities for exploring the resources. The Rwanda and Uganda were revealed by the UN panel on illicit exploration of resources to be a key player in the illicit act.

Using the 'resource trap and resource curse' framework, a major explanation for the possibility of not ending the crises in DR Congo is the natural resources endowment (Annan, 2009; Ajayi, 2014; Collier, 2009).

A good instance was my interview with Mr. Annan when he concisely examined the relationship between resource and rebellion to the era of King Leopold. In addition, related opinion was also associated to the rebellion in 1960 in which the Cold War between the East and West Bloc gave led to the competition for the DR Congo. Mr. Annan opined that illegal exploration of the resources of DR Congo led to the participation of over eight nations in the DR Congo war.


Table 6.2. Foreign Forces and Rebel Groups in DR Congo as at 2000

Groups, Parties and Countries involved	Estimated force deployed
ALiR (Interahamwe and ex-FAR)	30 000-40000
Angola	2 000-2 500
Burundi	2 000
Democratic Republic of Congo (FAC)	45 000-55000
Forces de la défense pour la démocratie(FDD)	16 000
Mouvement pour la liberation congolais (MLC)	6 500-9 000
Namibia	1 600-2 000
RCD-Goma	17 000-20 000
RCD-ML	2 500
Rwanda	17 000-25 000
Uganda	10 000
Zimbabwe	11 000

Source: International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war, Report 26, 20 December 2010, p 4.

In DR Congo, 1999 witnessed the emergence of over eight rebel movements; similarly, eight countries participated in the armed struggle. The war was labeled Africa World War as a result of the participations of many actors (Musifiky, 2010). The years 2006 and 2007 saw a sporadic increase in the number of rebel groups which accounted for about eighteen to twenty groups. However, many African states assumed a minor role, they include Libya, Zambia, and South Africa as well as some Western influences that consist of France, US, Belgium, and others which in essence hinder the peacekeeping operations as these actors provided tactical support for parties of conflicts.

Fig. 6.2 Armed Groups present in the early parts of the armed conflict in DR Congo



Source: International Crisis Group 2003

The map above reveals the growth of the pocket of rebels in the DR Congo.

At the beginning of the crises, estimates of two hundred thousand Small Arms and Light Weapon (SALW) which later increased sporadically by the end of 2010 to two million were in flow amounting to eight hundred per cent arms flow. Hence, it can be said that the MONUC failed in its mandate to disband rebels and mop up arms in circulation. At the beginning, MONUC establishment met close to three main rebel groups, however, as the war raged on, the rebel groups increased exponentially to about twenty two approximately one thousand and two hundred per cent.

iv) An Assessment on troop and personnel deployed and humanitarian aspect of the mandates;

This research acknowledged that the militias were able to discourage the efforts of the peacekeeping operations as a result of the MONUC inability to deploy sufficient troops and workforce for the operation. And this is acknowledged by this study as a main reason for the collapse of the peacekeeping operations in the DR Congo. However, FARC and other rebel movement harnessed the unproductive supervision of their activities by MONUSCO. In corroboration of this point, Maj. Gen. Philip V Sibanda who led the operation while citing the difficulties encountered by the UN peacekeeping operations in DRC. He expressed thus:

> I took over as the mission commander … on 1 October 1995. At that time, about 3,500 peacekeepers, military and police observers, out of the 7,000 approved…had arrived in the country. One of the questions I asked my predecessor, a Nigerian Maj. Gen. was why the number of peacekeepers was so small considering the size of Angola…. The answer I got was that although the mission had requested close to 15,000 troops, the UNSC had declined to authorise this figure…. This situation was made worse by the provision of only a few fixed wing and rotary aircraft...This inadequate provision of resources both in terms of men and equipment, had far reaching consequences for the successful accomplishment of mandated tasks of the mission (Sibanda, 2006).

The failure of quick contributions of workforce can be linked to the issue of remuneration, mobility, and the control system, for instance, some countries may find it difficult to deploy their armed force devoid of foreign assistance (Annan, 2009). Although, the Secretary-General requested for 6,030 forces which is to consist of troops, military spectator and other civilian machinery and was approved by the UNSC between 1999 and 2000 but the MONUC was able to mobilize only just 4,200 by 2002. The shortage of troops created a difficulty for the operation to execute its goals and objectives. However, as the war raged on, the operations were expanded through episodic declaration of the UNSC.

As it was important for MONUC to increase its military workforce, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 saw a sporadic increase in the available workforce of the UN peacekeeping that rose from 472 in 2001 to 21,974 in the year 2010 making it assume the largest UN mission in times past, however, the necessity for an additional troops was as a result of


intensification of the activities of rebels in the Eastern region of Itori, Bunia and other parts of the Kisangani region. As a point of note, DRC is the second largest and the fifth most inhabited nation in Africa, hence, the vitality for more workforce to monitor the activities of parties of conflict.

Table 6.3: Troop Strength from the initial authorization by the UN Security Council Resolution 1291.

Troops and Personnel	**No**
Combat Troop Uniformed	5, 537
Military observers	500
Appropriate civilian component	Unspecified
Total no of T&P	6,037

Source: Compilation from UNKPO (2013)

Figure 6.4 Troop Strength from initial authorization by Security Council Resolution 1291



Source: Adapted and drawn from the table.

Table 6.4 Troops and Personnel Deployed 2000-2010

Year	UN Personnel (troops, Observers and civilian)
2000	472
2001	2729
2002	4200

2003	10415
2004	14498
2006	19247
2008	21972
2010	22016

Source: Compilation from UNKPO (2013)




Figure 6.5 Graph Showing Increasing levels of the UN personnel in MONUC 2000-2010

Source: Adapted and drawn from the above table

In 2000, 2001 and 2002, the force potency was only 2,366 soldiers, with 363 military spectators spread across 22 cities as well as 28 teams supervising the detachment of forces and the body of soldiers estimated 1.869 despite the approval of 5,875 workforce, only 4,200 UN soldiers were in DR Congo. A major difficulty faced by the MONUC was the disparity between the forces on ground and the operation area as well as the UN failure to envisage beyond local instigators of the war (Nseke, 2010),

Table 6.5 UN Personnel Fatalities in DR Congo 2001-2008


Year	Mission	Accident	Illness	Malicious act	others	Total
2001	MUNOC	1	4	1	2	8
2002	MONUC	3	5	-	-	8
2003	MONUC	4	7	3	-	14
2004	MONUC	11	8	3	-	22
2005	MONUC	4	8	13	-	25

2006	MONUC	2	17	9	-	28
2007	MONUC	2	10	1	-	13
2008	MONUC	3	16	2	1	22

Sources: Extracted and Compiled from UNPKOs Factsheet 2012

The table above shows the UN personnel fatalities in DR Congo (2001 to 2008)
However, countries that were ready to assist with military workforce were dissuaded as a result of the fatalities recorded by the UN operations. The table below shows that 140 people among the UN peacekeeping operations died between 2001 and 2008, however but dissuaded the Troops Contributing Countries..

Figure 6. 6: Graph showing UN Personnel Fatalities in DR Congo



Source: Developed from Table 6.2.8

The insensitivity of the military workforce to African culture, tradition, and religious activities resulted into aggressive reactions. Essentially, the war in Africa would adequately be contained with exploitation and utilization of the exotic offices of the community leaders. The inability of the peacekeepers to respect and uphold the customs of the mission area resulted to strain relationship with local communities, civil

organizations, and NGOs. The UN workforces in the DRC were alleged of about 150 principal human rights abuse (Adebajo, 2011).

Various crimes of rapes and forceful prostitution across the countries were committed by the UN workforce are especially those from France, Pakistan, South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, Tunisia and Nepal. The casualties of these crimes are majorly the harmless people, refugees and kids who have been a casualty of war brutality and expected security from the UN. Also, Kofi Annan, the past U.N. Secretary-General attested to that colossal abuse had occurred in DRC. The sexual abuse by the UN workforce in the DR Congo was however depicted as huge, and prevalent (UN, 2010).

The gross misconduct was damned by William Lacy Swing, Annan's former special representative to the Congo who expressed that the UN was astonished by the activities of the peacekeepers that were deployed to ensure safety, importantly for the casualties of sexual harassment, yet creates more afflictions (Banim, 2010). The gross misconduct challenged the supervision of the UN peacekeeping activities and the customs of concealment and absence of amenability that permeate the United Nations. However, it is unbelievable that cruelty of this nature could exist under the UN and it is unthinkable for the executives in New York to claim ignorance of the enormity of such dilemma in the early hours of the crisis. Considering the multiplicity of donating states, the realization of unanimous control by MONUC became complicated.

Pressure and disagreement that permeated the operations in DRC became injurious and was destabilized by the action of France, Pakistan and India who pull out their military assistance. In addition, the disunity over the ethics of procedures hindered the efficacy of the operation to ensure the safety of the civilians. The inability to understand peacekeeping and peace building structure brought about the inability to adequately disband several militias and assimilate them into the states armed forces as an element of political succession. However, an avenue to continue armed struggles was created after which the crisis has formally ended. A professional, who is an expert and an intellectual in the DRC crises, Autesserre explain the division of opinion over certainty and the peace builder’s knowledge of aggression, calmness as well as the involvement of

the global community who hurl the involvement at the local level in opposition to involvement at the national level. She opined a knowledge that portrays settlement of local disputes to become unfortunate and unlawful in their current peace building tactic (Autesserre, 2013).

Strife over land and supremacy contest within the society and probably the exodus that emerged after the Rwanda genocide in the 1990s created community rivalry. None of the officials of the UN and the UNSC that partake in peacekeeping make effort to establish a tactics with the intention of checkmating local instigators of disputes as war rages on or at the end of hostilities. Limited tactics to face the national and regional level with no presence at the local level are employed.

v) Assessing the Humanitarian Issue and Civilian deaths

MONUC was to offer humanitarian assistance to displaced people in DR Congo, which is one of the key mandate of the mission. To ascertain the condition of the mission on humanitarian aid, question of the MONUC operational condition must be asked such as; what is the operational condition of MONUC in this area? There is importance to question the condition in the early phase and towards the completion of the mission. In a long time, the provision of a general idea appears unbearable, not solely because of the vast number of intense incidents and the human concerns involving the area and period, which was of serious humanitarian condition in DR Congo. Humanitarian organisations have interceded immensely in the Kivu province since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, assisting the hundreds of thousands of refugees that are congested into provisional camps. Ever since, due to war and state failure, such actions have continued to multiply, not merely in the east, but also in other regions of the country. Then, the best way to understand the calamity over time is feasibly in terms of the great number of deceases. This massive death rate is, due not so much to the time of the conflict as to the concealed consequences of human rights violations, the devastation of basic infrastructures and great poverty.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) undertook some studies, which have served as a yardstick for other humanitarian organisations and donors at the period of

MONUC intervention. Massive deaths of about 3.9 million since 1998 was estimated by 2004 surveys which only 10 percent were outcome of violence. The latest results of IRC, point to the fact that in spite of the progresses made in attaining peace, the massive death rate has not subsided and has even amplified in the central regions of the country (IRC, 2008). Since 1998, the estimation of 45,000 deaths a month caused by armed conflicts, illness and malnutrition, resulting to 5.4 million deaths in a year. Virtually half of the victims were children below age five. The DR Congo mortality rate is 57 percent higher, paralleled to the average mortality rates in sub-Saharan Africa. Malaria, dysentery, pneumonia and malnutrition are the causes of most death cases. Nonetheless, the methodological rigour of the findings has been probed by some researchers (Roberts, 2002) but the reference line has been followed and used in several literatures.

The emergency verge is less double the excess mortality, as it is usually understood. This is due to lack of medical care and, in general, to the lack of access to medicine, in large sections of the inhabitants. Hostility in the East of South and North Kivu and Katanga, as well as in Ituri, has indeed forced tens of thousands of people to abscond. Voluminous people settled in the wilds with no shelter, water, medical and food supplies, a condition that is deteriorated by eternal uncertainty. Others have taken refuge in villages accommodated by the local inhabitants else, they could basically live in the fields.

The DR Congo has the highest number of different actors of humanitarian service. The United Nations intercedes directly through several of its major agencies (PAM, UNICEF, and in particular HCR). Though, dozens of NGOs work in the field either self-funded or are supported by various public and private benefactors. Conventionally, these organisations were coordinated through the United Nations Office from the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is established explicitly for this purpose within the United Nations Secretariat and at the same time, it is independent of the mission. The presence of integrated missions has occasionally entailed the desertion of OCHA in countries such as Afghanistan and Liberia. Then, the establishment of humanitarian coordination section within the mission was issued, but

generally, NGOs do not interpret it with the same point of conviction. Regarding humanitarian coordination, the situation in DRC is particularly challenging. An active but rather small OCHA bureau existed within MONUC, amid 1999 and 2004. It distinguished itself at the period of the massacres in Ituri in May 2003, by introducing an emergency humanitarian operation in Bunia, entirely staffed by volunteers, at a period when the buildings of the main international organisations had been temporarily vacated. The humanitarian crisis and death tolls equally jumped exceedingly. For instance, the death toll of about 250,000 at the early stage amplified to about 2million to 5million (estimated figure) at the end of 2010. Likewise, no significant improvement was recorded in the humanitarian crisis, which is one of the key reasons for the mission and a major element of its mandate. As the parties at war persist on their ambush on the civilian populace in the Eastern region of Ituri, Bunia, Goma County, Kisangani, the humanitarian crisis degrades. Originally 300,000 displacement in the early period of the conflict was recorded, but in the year 2010, it was estimated to be around 2.5million displacement which was recorded.

vi) Assessing the Mandates on Electoral and deepening Democratic Process

In spite of an inauspicious political environment, the independent electoral commission (CEI, a full Congolese body) execute its mission commendably - to coordinate elections in a country as large as Western Europe which lacks vital infrastructure. There are testimonies to this for the successful coordination of the statutory referendum on 18th and 19th December 2005, the first round of the presidential and legislative elections on 30th July 2006 and the second round of the presidential and provincial elections on 29th November 2006. Hitherto, the achievement of the electoral process can also be accredited to the international community, majorly to the United Nations, the European Union and bilateral associates such as Belgium and South Africa. Although, financial and political support were essential prerequisites for the successful coordination of the elections, they were inadequate to ensure their success. A massive logistical work was required, complemented by a mobilisation of the provincial and local authorities as well as a training curriculum for voters that were executed by civil society organisations. MONUC’s coordination role came to the facade in this situation, as it drew

on the distinctive elements of integration. The DSRSG accountable for assisting the electoral process controlled an electoral division of MONUC personnel with the total number of 168 officials (2006 figures). Similarly, DSRSG was also the Resident representative of UNDP - the key UN agency accountable for supporting elections – in this vein, skirmishes of authority amid the agency and the mission were circumvented. Geographical contiguity and institutional cohabitation between high-ranking civilian and military officials within MONUC prominently smoothed the logistical support delivered by the Blue Helmets. The civilian branches of MONUC are also inclusive in the management of support for the elections, even where this was not their principal function (for example, the sections dealing with civilian matters and human rights, the police and the Quick Impact Projects section). Lastly, the conduct of elections shorn of violence, the great participation rate, and the point that they were democratic and just - as was acknowledged by both national actors and the international community - was an encouraging boost for MONUC and its repute upgraded substantially in 2006. This accomplishment was definitely to the credit of the integrated mission in which a concentration of powers, access to both financial and logistical resources and a more effective circulation of information all contributed to prime operation.

According to the mandate of safeguarding the transition to democratic governance, the attainment level of this mandate was hindered by the problem of incorporating all parties at war. However, the government of national unity was instituted, but the problem associated with power allotment continued to pose huge danger to the peace. Actually, months after instituting transition government, it was incompetent to unravel the problem of national reintegration. The tasks of demobilization, disarmament, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of the entire country made the transition government liable to crisis. The peace process faced overwhelming challenges coupled with the incapability of the transitional leaders to truly unified government and to overcome the persistent atmosphere of cynicism. (UNSC, 2004)

A review of the assessment of MONUC's performance in the DR Congo could be regarded as full of variegated fortune. It documented marginal success in some areas and also revealed some fiascos. At utmost level, the mission was not that successful as revealed by the assessment. Nevertheless, after about five years the mission was capable of certifying comparative stability in the impulsive province of Ituri and Kivu. All the same, the humanitarian crisis seemed sophisticated, limited deaths ensued through military violence, deaths were elicited predominantly through health related maladies. Secondly, the electoral process that ultimately led to government of national unity may perhaps be regarded as one of its few accomplishments. Distant from this, determinations of the government and MONUC to control unlawful exploration of natural resources by the warring groups were marginally successful. The body on illegal exploration of natural resources established by the UN was able to ascertain groups that were associated in the illicit dealing. With the above concerns, the study identified some of the encounters that posed serious barrier to the mission in achieving its objectives.

6.4 The challenges of MONUC

At this juncture, it is imperative to probe the reason MONUC, regardless of the troop and logistic endowment, failed to accomplish its mandates. In another stance, it is imperative to ask the question; why did MONUC nosedived in some area? The subsequent part of this study observes the challenges that worked in contradiction to the mission. This was also grounded on the interview conducted in the field. These challenges are identified below

i) the colonial rule history and the resource jinx circumstance
ii) the civil society groups functions and meager local support
iii) the outlook of troops and UN official peacekeepers
iv) the functions of exterior actors

i) Historic formation of the colonial State and Paradoxical Resource Curse Syndrome: One of the challenges of the UN mission in DR Congo is connected to the ensnaring and contradiction in her colonial state formation in history. DR Congo was vehemently made a state with the ensnaring of ethnic components, similar to any

other African country. Situated in the core of equatorial central Africa with an area of 2,267,600 square kilometers and a present population projected at 70 million. In Africa, the DR Congo is the second largest country in both land mass and populace. From the 1885 violent, Belgian imposition of colonial rule by King Leopold II who regarded the colony as his private estate and christened it "the Congo Free State to the Belgian rule", the history of Congo is insightful with violence. Actually, after some decades, DR Congo is yet to free herself from her faulty history of violence, even after Belgian harried exit. There are more than 250 ethnic groups with numerous languages. In the immediate post-independence era, the brittle nature of the State creation was to lead to a political predicament which led to the demise of her leader, Patrice Lumumba. It also supervened to the succession movement of the Kisangani region in Eastern Congo. The crisis of its post-independence era steered to the intervention of the UN where a peacekeeping mission called UNOC. In an interview piloted, Vines (2010) was of the notion that the impaired historical formation of DR Congo was one of the key causes of its cyclical conflict. When asked advance if there was any correlation amid conflict and population, and ethnic groups and the nature of the DR Congo state, his response was that the character of the state formation was accountable for eruption of armed conflict, (Vines, 2010).

The DR Congo boasts of some of the richest mineral deposits in the world as it's Africa's second-largest country. In the building of atomic bombs, the DR Congo's Uranium was used to launch the atomic bomb into Japan in 1945. At the moment, its colossal Cobalt reserves are used to build electronic devices like cell phones. DR Congo's gigantic natural resources constitute portion of its complications, referred to "Resource Curse". Rendering from the UN Secretary-General's established Board of Expert Panel on the Illicit Exploration of resources and other forms of endowment of the DR Congo of 2000, there was a connection amongst the exploration of the natural resources and other source of wealth in the DR Congo and the persistence of the military force. The panel revealed that illicit exploitation and systematic raiding of the mineral and forest resources of the DR Congo fuels and spurs the conflict (see the map below). Cobalt, Tin, Zinc and Lead, Copper, Diamond, Gold, Manganese, Coal,

Uranium and oil are present in DR Congo (see the map below). Despite the fact that the systemic exploitation of natural resources was perpetrated by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, these resources played vibrant roles in stimulating the armed conflicts in the DR Congo (Jonah, 2004, 2006, Ram 2007). As an involvement in the mandate, the panel was to scrutinize the roles of other actors in the illegal excavating of the resources. Their discovery exposed that the DR Congo resources were either conveyed to the countries directly involved in the armed conflict or traded to international markets by the same external forces and the rebel forces.

Fig 6.5: Map of Natural Resources in DR Congo 2014



Source: http://mondediplo.com/maps/congo2006 (accessed April, 6th, 2014).

The significances of illicit exploitation have been duple which are; colossal accessibility of financial resources for the foreign armies (not UN forces) principally the Rwandan Patriotic Army, the Uganda forces, individual augmentation of top rebel commanders and their civilians' collaborators and the emergence of illicit networks supervised either by top military officers or businessmen. The two elements above form the focal point of the relation amid resources and the persistence of the armed conflict. However, other causative factors exist (UN, 2007). The characters played by some bodies and institutions, and the unscrupulous conduct of some private

companies and prominent individuals, including some verdict fabricators in the DR Congo and Zimbabwe, also challenged the peace mission (Diehi, 2005). This is for the reason that these groups of people were constantly the power behind the rebel groups as they financed and supported rebel movements. For illustration, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye Leader of the Congo rebel Hutu FDD movement, Jogo Baptista De Matos, General Chief of Staff of the Angolan armed forces, SONANGOL Angolan state oil company were all embroiled in the exploration of natural resources to finance and support rebel movements.

Among the ethics of peacekeeping operation the consent of the parties at war is recognised. Nevertheless, obtaining the cooperation and consent of the parties at war and their warlords are sometimes near unattainable. Regardless of the fact that consultation were lengthy, problematic and concealed several of issues, a mission could only accomplish its mandate in an atmosphere of cooperation. In DR Congo, the warlords were obstinate to the peacekeeping efforts (Vogt, 1992 Adisa, 1993; Ato, 2000). The dearth of teamwork and full political obligation by the pugnacious warlords to ceasefire agreement was a challenge to MUNOC.

The Civil Societies and Local Actors: Alternatively, prevalent support was given to the UN mission by the civil society and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) when the mission was established. Indeed, there were nearly 250 civil societies that partook in the Lusaka Peace procedure. The civil society and the Community-Based Organizations were at the vanguard of the outcry for UN intervention. They were supportive and provided logistic sustenance to the UN at every phase of the mission. Also, they operated as intercessors between the peacekeepers and were involved in humanitarian service and intelligence accruing through their reports. As the mission advanced, the civil society and Community-Based organizations began to express critical concern on some of the undertakings of the peacekeeping personnel. For illustration, there were cases of prostitution and proscribed business transactions involving peacekeepers in DR Congo, which was fervidly opposed by the civil society groups. A youth-led organization COJESKI that operates among young people for the development of human rights, peace,

youth participation, justice and workable progress in the DR Congo called for the withdrawal of peacekeepers in DR Congo. They contended that peacekeepers has the shortage of proper understanding of the values and culture of the Congolese populace. Whereas the head of mission, Mr. Hedi Annabi, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, defended some of these allegations conflict amid local groups and UN peacekeepers (Annabi, 2010), this indeed demoralized the peace procedure in DR Congo.

In furtherance to civil society and local community roles, the quest for the consent of the parties at war is a universal principle of the UN peacekeeping. This is to bestow legitimacy and support to the mission. The support confer on MUNOC by the civil society, parties at war and the local communities in DR Congo was comprehended as a form of involuntary support. In DR Congo, the peacekeepers were habitually pounced on by the warring blocs or local troop notwithstanding their agreed consent. Indeed, homicide of the UN forces were verified in numerous armed conflict region in the country. In Ituri, Bunia, Goma and Kivu, Pakistani and Indian legations came under armed attacks. In table six, between 2001 and 2008, the DR Congo armed conflict had terminated well above 140 UN personnel. All the same, not all of these personnel were exterminated during skirmish, but, consistent exterminations of the UN personnel were verified in North Kivu, South Kivu and Itori region. For illustration, the Uganda, Indian, Pakistan and Nigerian legations had remonstrated the exterminations of their armed forces in North Kivu region. In other measure, armed conflict springs from indigenous and the UN personnel when there are fractional supports given to guerrilla leader by the peacekeepers. In DR Congo, there were dyed-in-the-wool cases in which helicopter-backed United Nations peacekeepers were aiding the Army of the DR Congo to dislodge militia in Ituri region, it created suspicion amongst the parties at war, the people and peacekeepers. Moreover, belligerent between UN troops and the Congolese army (FARDC) were verified in the previous parts of the armed conflicts in the resource-rich Eastern region because of the disinclination of the rebel to disarm. Nonetheless they were later to cooperate, initial conflict did not aid the grounds of the peacekeepers.

Abuses committed by the UN Personnel: Personnel from the U.N. Mission in the DR Congo were faulted of, no less than 150 major human rights violations as at 2004 (IRIN, 2004). The transgressions comprised rape and compulsive prostitution of women and young lassies athwart the country, likewise inside the refugee camp in Bunia, in North Eastern Congo. The cases of illicit business, rape, compulsive prostitution and child abuse were also recounted in the cases of peacekeeping in Liberia, Sudan and Sierra Leone, etc. Conversely, in the case of MONUC, peacekeepers were often arraigned of illicit business, just as the case of Liberia where illicit deal in Diamond were proliferating, the DR Congo particularly in Ituri, Bunia and Kisigani region recorded one of the cumbersome cases of illicit business undertakings. This is also akin to the recounted cases of sexual abuse committed by the peacekeepers. The supposed culprits included the UN armed forces and civilian workforce from France, Nepal, South Africa, Pakistan, Tunisia, Uruguay and Morocco. The fatalities were refugees, among who were kids, who had already been dehumanized and intimidated by years of conflicts and who regarded the UN for security.

The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan recognized that gross abuse have taken place (UNPKO, 2006). A UN draft report labeled sexual manipulation by UN workforce in the DRC as noteworthy, prevalent and on-going (IRIN 2004 William and Weiss, 2006), Annan's Special Representative to the Congo, uttered shock and atrocity over the case of rape and sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers who have vowed to assist those in need, especially those who have been victims of sexual assault. This barbarity raises grave questions about UN error of its peacekeeping undertakings and the ethos of clandestineness and dearth of culpability that permeate the UN system. There are crucial uncertainties surrounding the efficacy and scope of the UN's own interior enquiry into the Congo's barbarity, piloted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, supervised by Under Secretary-General Dileep Nair, a confidential UN report acquired by *The Washington Post* discovered UN peacekeepers threatened UN detectives inspecting the allegations of sexual violence in Congo and wanted to bribe witnesses to make alteration on the convicting testimony (UN Yearbook, 2004). Agreeing to an unwavering report from the newspaper, the report also quoted cases where peacekeepers

from Morocco, Pakistan, and perchance Tunisia "were reported to have paid, or attempted to pay witnesses to alter their testimonies". The DR Congo scandal is another string of scandals that have smashed U.N. peacekeeping operations across the world. Certainly, it seems that UN peacekeeping missions recurrently create a vulturine sexual culture with refugees, the victims of UN staff who request sexual pleasure in interchange for food, and UN troops who raped women at gunpoint (Bellamy and William, 2010). Indictments of sexual violence or misconduct by UN personnel spring back to at least a decade, involving operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. Regardless of the previous UN investigations, and Kofi Annan's proclamation of a policy of "zero tolerance" for such conduct, little seems to have been altered in the field. For both UN and non-UN missions, there are haunting questions about how to deal with such circumstances especially where possibly will not be any peace to keep. This has steered to the redefinition of mandates which now often include "peace enforcement" by the use of force, due to past reproach that some earlier missions were futile. This had also led to a rising recognition of a new international order on "Responsibility to Protect" civilian populations who are vulnerable to harm during conflict (Kumalo, 2006). Hitherto, the anxiety and the hazard that peacekeepers may turn out to be just another party at war, had engendered more antiphon.

6.5 Lessons learnt from MONUC experience

Finally, the know-how of MONUC highpoints the effect of procedures of operation, aptitude, mandates and Rules of Engagement, principle, and the training on UN peacekeeping mission with the aim to provide peace, halt armed conflicts, humanitarian assistance, establish statutory order and safeguard the people. The MONUC expertise further recognises models imminent armed forces operation: the characterisations of robust mandates, deficiency of use of force, locality and aptitude, the incorporation of players, lucidity over the usage of force and the role of peacekeeping operations in providing comprehensive safety instead of a country obligation and models of procedure of providing security. Specified the regular inclination to authorize armed forces to safeguard the people, these major areas merit additional deliberation.

One, the United Nations operations with a mandate to safeguard the people from potential danger necessitate a foundational capability, in addition to the power and prospect that peacekeeping operations operate. In the absence of these bounds, most United Nations armed force will discover that mandates to safeguard the people is exterior to their aptitude deteriorating the denotation of mandate. Where war lingers and where signatories to a peace accord provide merely fractional consent to United Nations armed forces, capability is particularly imperative. Overall, well equipped and knowledgeable armed forces in satisfactory population may be capable of providing safety for susceptible inhabitants in a mystifying area; below par trained armed forces in deficient population with inadequate supplies are improbably to ensure more than attendance. Good communication and a vibrant structure of authority are in addition important, as the disastrous situations in Ituri and Bukavu validate.

Two, for international missions such as MONUC, government and leaders of armed forces have to to deliver theoretical lucidity about how the mission should approach its principal mandates. Preferably, this approach has to steadily understand all through the governance of the operations, by the armed forces legations, and inside the UNSC. After battling for years, MONUC formation from observer mission transformed with time to peacekeeping mission however was still poorly fortified operationally. The mission operated better as provided by its Chapter VII mandate. Peacekeeping operations piloted “cordon and search” tactics and operated along with indigenous inhabitants to recognize imminent danger to peace. MONUC commenced the employment of objective of defence as consolidating instruments to incorporate people and armed forces roles. A fresh operation tactic endeavoured to deal with civilian susceptibility athwart the panel, from human rights examination and reporting, to the establishment of charitable cosmos, to aggressive physical defence. No particular perception defined their effort in providing safety for the civilians; relatively, the operation encompassed numerous information and tactics.

Three, MONUC’s involvement validates the necessities for well trained and alacritous peacekeeping operations. Direction to forces about their character in providing

defense to civilians is best specified at the beginning, through pre-deployment training and in country or on-the-ground mission sessions. TCC would profit from having principle for such missions. At the least, TCCs should comprehend that their armed forces may be requested to employ force, specifically if deployed with a civilian protection mandate to fickle regions. Similarly, countries contributing legations for Chapter VII missions need to be clear about how national constrictions on their personnel could controvert the mission's responsibilities and objectives.

For the period of its history, MONUC was a distinctive experiment in UN peacekeeping and, as such, an assiduous supplier of 'lessons learned' for the United Nations imminent operations. It was a versatile mission: it began as a spectator of peace accord and discharger of warring group. It was designed to consolidate peace by organising elections and participating in security sector reform and the DDR, and it also contributes in state-building, through its undertakings to support a homecoming to the rule of law. Concurrently, the mission was a classical and conventional peacekeeping operation with an ingrained vigorous mandate (was later given robust mandate) to engage the use of force to a degree of acting as a buffer force among the militia groups particularly between FARDC and CNDP in North Kivu or implementing the peace by means of vigorous undertakings.

Concluding Remarks

On the optimistic side, devotion must be drawn to the fact that presidential, legislative and regional elections were piloted under the guard of the mission. Furthermore, security faintly developed in most of the territory even in the large cities in the Kivu region acknowledgements to the strengthened troop and their more vigorous mandate. Nonetheless, there were some stumbling block, one was the issue of the DDR miserable fiasco. Fresh militia and brutal forces were to materialized one of which was M23 militia. Pockets of armed militia were still operating regardless of the mandate given to MONUC to demobilize them.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In previous chapters, an historical exploration of the conflicts issues and political dynamics that led to the introduction of MONUC was also explored. It also analyse the interventionist roles of MONUC by measuring its success or failure. Thus, an assessment of MONUC operational activities and its challenges were brought to fore in the previous chapters. On the other hand, this chapter provides a summarizing and recommending aspect of the study. It concludes by offering a short analysis of issues in UN peacekeeping architecture and the Dr Congo search for peace. It also offers some genuine optimism into UN peacekeeping architecture as the most platform of saving human from the scourge of war and violence.

7.1 Summary

There was a high degree of complex issues in the political dynamics, nature, scope and magnitude of the conflicts in the DR Congo. Some key reasons can be attributed as significant either as fundamental reasons or propelling-factors. The first factor is related to the colonial history, poor policies and development. The DR Congo people's needs are yet to be realized and the transformation of the country into a more developed state where their citizen can afford the basis necessary of life. The war in the DRC was effectively prosecuted by the exploitation of the natural resources, which should have been used to better the life of the ordinary citizens of the country. In numerous ways, the poor management of the natural resources also promote the edges of the conflict. The poor governance led to poor economic performance which ultimately created climate of insurrection and instability. The public service delivery system was in comatose and the institutions charged with ensuring security of the people were weak, corrupt and poorly equipped. The military institution was politicised and lacked professionalism and competence to ward off any aggressor within and outside the DRC borders. These situations led to the series of rebellion that engulfed the DRC. The

situation of youth unemployment was to feed the emerging militia group that eventual took over the soul of the DRC nation.

The second factor is concerned with the crisis of the state institutional and governance. The groundwork for inclusion and growth were not provided by the regimes of Mobutu and Kabila. Notably, the state failed to accomplish its basic roles of essential service provision, ensuring law and order, and protecting of the country's nation interest and infrastructural assets interests at the level of regional and global system. Similarly, the state was unable to establish an institution of national unity that can cement its multi-ethnic groups and promote the cause of state development. In an alternative, the state promoted a system invested by corruption, and instability allowing its neighbouring state to feed fat on its huge natural resources at the detriment of her people. The third factor is focused on the regional and international level and geopolitical interests. It seems the dilemma of the state started from the historic colonial background. From the mercantilist drive of King Leopold II and the colonial conquest of the state of DRC to the politics of the Cold War. All these played crucial factor in the post-independence crisis.

Thus, the DRC was a pawn in the chessboard of the international political actors. In fact the regional interest and its neighbour interest was utmost played in the heart of the DR Congo conflict. Therefore the lessons from this must be premised on the need to build and erect long lasting peace on the foundation of national unity and not proffering solution to the regional political dynamics. It must also recognise the need for a well-articulated economic framework upon which the DRC's future development can be realised. This must be able to guarantee equitable distribution of her commonwealth; provide essential services for the needs of her citizen; ensuring good resource management and governance for her huge natural resources to an extent that the people will have a sense of belonging and create employment opportunities for her teeming youths and finally, put the nation on the roadmap of diversification of the economy.

Another issue is the need to find a durable solution to recurring trends of conflicts and militia groupings. The need to come up with a peace and unity agenda that look at the core roots of the driver of these crises must be factor into the national consciousness of the nation. This will serve as a platform where issue of national interest would be

debated. The ethnic groups in the DRC must find a practicable option to the idea of inclusive federal state. Although, the issue of federalism was to give political representation to minority groups that may be threatened by the present political arrangement. These are very tasking and the issues are also challenging, but this can be done within the support of the UN peacekeeping architecture mission.

The establishment of MONUC in the DRC was one of the most definable peacekeeping missions in African contemporary conflict. Since its establishment by Resolution 1279 UNSC, the mission is unarguable the biggest and most expensive mission. While it was still very destructive in terms of human and material components, it was estimated to cost well over $8.7billion and with over 20,000 military personnel. In establishing peacekeeping missions, it is necessary to study and analyse the background to the conflict carefully before passing any resolutions to establish such a mission. Peacekeeping operations must be based on unambiguous resolutions. Having learned from past operations, the international community and all other regional or sub-regional groupings must learn to intervene at the right time, before conflicts escalate beyond control. Conditions that enable successful operations should be carefully weighed. Lack of consent on the part of the various factions could prolong peacekeeping operations, leading to a stalemate in certain cases. Financial obligations must be honoured by member states of the UN, including regional and sub-regional organisations.

Effective logistics support, as an essential element of UN peacekeeping operations, cannot be over-stressed. Without it, contingents will always feel abandoned and unable to operate at their optimum. In this regard, the proposal for the pre-positioning of essential logistics items in the sub-regions of Africa is a step in the right direction. African leaders must show a strong political will in resolving conflicts on the continent. To place every problem at the foot of the UN because it is the world body responsible for peace and security is not a positive attitude. The fact that Africa is the continent most afflicted by conflicts is indisputable. Both past and on-going peacekeeping operations in Africa have exposed some weaknesses in the way conflicts have been and continue to be handled.

Reaffirming his strong support for the efforts and initiatives to make peacekeeping operations more effective and efficient, the establishment and deployment of peacekeeping missions should strictly observe the purposes and principles of the Charter and the principles that had evolved to govern peacekeeping, namely the consent of the parties concerned, the non-use of force except in self-defence and impartiality. In a broader context, the success, credibility and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping continued to rest upon the respect for the fundamental principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States, and non-intervention into matters that were essentially within domestic jurisdiction. Peacekeeping operations were supposed to be provided from the outset with political support, adequate resources, clearly defined and achievable mandates and exit strategies. However, they could not be seen as a universal solution to the problems of international peace and security, nor used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflict. In the final analysis, the deployment of peacekeepers would bring real peace only when the international community maintained close involvement and a supplementary role in finding durable solutions with local and regional stakeholders, and managed to assist national authorities with self-sustained reconstruction, development and peace consolidation.

Prominent peace operations do take place in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and all encounter challenges that impede their performance. One may say in Africa these issues are compounded by serious logistical challenges combined with weak commitments from troop contributors that slowed the pace of peacekeeping growth. The number of UN forces in Africa actually declined in the period between October 2006 and October 2007. While these could be some of the reasons why peacekeeping operation in Africa didn't achieve their goals, other factors may also play a role in peacekeeping in Africa. Though conflict was, in some cases, prevented through intervention, often the solution imposed was a military solution without addressing the underlying issues in African conflicts. International players such as the UN, the European Union, and the African Union are paying too much attention to peacekeeping and peace building, while none seems to pay much attention in the origins of the conflict in different parts of Africa such as disputes

over either grazing land or seasonal water for pastoral communities. Recovering from violent conflict is also neglected by the international community.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure is urgently needed after violent conflict. In recent decades the growth of urban populations has been tremendous in African countries. Water supply, power supply, transport systems, offices and houses are quickly made inoperable or destroyed, but are slow and costly to rebuild. In addition, disruption of roads, bridges, ports and airfields impede communication and distribution, and hinders integration and social unity. Beyond this, conflict destroys the networks for political and social cohesion. In order to re-establish and maintain peace, these also need to be rebuilt.

Finally, since post-conflict peace-building is a new beginning, punishment and pardon must be used carefully, so as not to rekindle flames of hostility. Likewise, reintegration programmes need to promote education, employment and social equity, or they will not have the desired impact. Much of the failure to engage seriously the security problems of Africa or to come up with solutions stems from the failure to deal effectively with human security. A recent example, from Liberia, was the launching of an effort together with 353 schools, colleges and other institutions to provide formal education to 20, 000 disarmed former combatants as part of the country's Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programme. It is designed to reshape their lives, help them get jobs, and give them a chance to be part of a better future for Liberia is a step forward.

Some of the chapters in the study highlight the preceding overview of conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa and brought out a number of lessons which may be learned, and prompts a number of recommendations for the improvement of future peacekeeping endeavours. The more pertinent of these are listed briefly below. Poor governance on the part of African politicians creates fertile grounds for disunity, conflict and coups d'état. When ethnic and religious identity becomes a basis for the struggle for political power, Africans must realise that, unless all the various factions in a society are

willing to share power, peace will continue to elude the peoples of the continent. Warning signals must be heeded, and traditional African methods of solving disputes should be balanced with whatever useful lessons are available from elsewhere.

7.2 Recommendations

From the assessment of MONUC, the recommendation of the study proffers a three dimensional approach to peacekeeping in DR Congo. These are political, institutional as well as operational dimensions. While the political and institutional dimension deal with the primary causes of the conflict, the operational parts focuses on the field related issues in peacekeeping mission. The first one targets the political process in the Dr Congo. The second target the UN institutional peacekeeping and peace-building architecture. The third targets both the institutional, operational and political process.

First, the UN should incorporate civil society in DRC into peace mission to earn the trust of the local populace. The role of the civil society in peace process is considered a major plank of peace. MONUC suffers greatly from acceptability from the civil society groups in the DRC. For example, the atrocities of the peacekeepers in respect to illegal mining and sexual assault of the civil women built enmity between the peacekeeper and the civilian populace. It is therefore recommended that the civil society must be seen as a partner and critical stakeholder in the peace process. In fact, the success of the mission depends to a certain extent on the active participation of the civil society.

Second, the UN should establish effective post-conflict natural resources management in the DRC**:** at the core of the crisis is the underlined problem of resources exploration, remittances and greed. How can there be peace if the DR Congo's rich resources are not properly managed and governed? This study therefore recommends that the UN must fashion out a comprehensive mechanism for resource governance in which all formal and informal stakeholders are involved in the exploration process. This must take into account the legislation, exploration, marketing, and re-investment process. It is hoped that this will likely stem the greed and conflict associated with an ungoverned resources.

Third, the standard process of ensuring peace in any conflict state is an establishment of a post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and

Reintegration (DDRR) process. This process is essential because it addresses the relapse and possible reversal of the conflict. It also ensures that all warring parties are reintegrated to the society life.

Finally, it is important to state here the if the platform of the UN is to be employed as an instrument of peace, it only logical therefore that the actors must take the interests of key political actors, be the permanent members of the UN Security Council has to be aligned with efforts to resolve the conflict in question, along with a willingness to mobilize diplomatic and financial support to the peace processes; the willingness of belligerent parties to cooperate with the UN or the actors to implement peace accords is critical and, sacrosanct in cases where such cooperation is not forthcoming, the development of an effective strategy to deal with potential spoilers who are prepared to use violence to wreck peace processes; and finally the cooperation of regional players in peace processes is important, as well as their provision of diplomatic and/or military support to UN peacekeeping efforts.

7.3 Conclusion

From 1960 to 1999, the history of the DR Congo conflict has been entangled with the United Nations intermediation or peacekeeping mission, ONUC and MONUC. MONUC has been a distinctive peacekeeping trial and, as such, an assiduous provider of 'lessons learned' for the United Nations secretariat all through its history. It was a pervasive mission, owing to the tremendously multifaceted situation in the country: it required to consolidate peace by organising elections and partaking in security sector modification and the DDR, and it also contributed in state-building, through its accomplishments to upkeep a return to the rule of law. Concurrently, the mission espoused the traditional peacekeeping responsibilities, and also operated as a defence force. It compulsory peace by means of vigorous operations of the use of force. The danger of confusion and the danger of errors were too frightening in its operations.

Eventually, the UN devotedly reconsidered its operational subtleties and reflected on the yardsticks for many of its operations such as comprehensive dialogue, facilitating DDR and resource exploration management. Democratic measures was broaden by MONUC as presidential, legislative and regional elections were carried out even if not

totally gulp of trivial contestation, on the optimistic side. Furthermore, security enhanced in most of the territory even in the large cities in the Kivu region, Ituri and Bunia. Although, this has not barred a number of military displeasures from occurring. Undeniably, the list of such hindrances is disheartening: DDR has been ousted for want of money and political obligation; security sector modification has given rise to a new army which has no interconnection, is badly trained and poorly paid and which has commanders who are habitually corrupt and deceitful. Police and soldiers have in fact become the most recurrent source of human rights desecrations, together with the FDLR and CNDP militias. Irrespective of their laudable efforts, the MONUC human rights section has not flourished in making a perceptible effect on this inclination, although it has played substantial role to raising consciousness about the degree of the phenomenon. Few people have been trialled in DR Congo or handed over to the International Criminal Court however, impunity is paramount in majority of crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, it is pertinent to ask questions of; if the integration of MONUC has made it operation more effective, if it has facilitated the undertaking to carry out peacekeeping undertakings and consolidate its advantages more commendably. The response needs to be competent. The integration of MONUC mission has unarguably achieved its most unambiguous accomplishment by organising democratic elections. From different view, it is complex to have a perspective out of all other scopes dealt with in the study.

However, institutional complication between OCHA and the mission has been modelled by humanitarian coordination. It inexorably generates a confused appearance of the mission among the populace, because it is also more exposed to the possibility of being utilized for politico-military purposes. Integration aids the effectiveness of vigorous undertakings, but it posed detrimental effects that ire the humanitarian community and disrupts the smooth undertaking of the mission. Integration has also noticeably aided the volunteer deed in the area of human rights, however the outcome have eventually been modest, since any remedy will be connected to military-political setting and is very much reliant on the long-lasting project of justice conveyance. For the intricate situation in DR Congo and because MONUC did not contribute a noticeable character primarily, the security sector reform is rigid to appraise empirically. Neither

SSR nor DDR have produced exceptional upshots and more time is needed to evaluate the potential effect of integration in these areas in any situation. MONUC's outstandingly extensive directive does, nevertheless, permit the mission's fruition to be evaluated with respect to its public image. The commanders of MONUC do not know DR Congo and MONUC does nothing to find solution to the conflicts in DR Congo. And the depressed people of DR Congo would add, they watch us perish and then they go away to pen their news! Vigorous undertakings have forced some rebel leaders to negotiate and improvement has indubitably been made in the understanding of the territory. However, these deeds are far too insufficient to make the people of DR Congo feel protected. Furthermore, scandals relating to sexual assault and all categories of trafficking have blotted the repute of the soldiers on the peacekeeping mission, with some improvement prominent in the perspective of the Congolese. Miserable and slightly bigoted criticism will remain to be, as long as improvement is not made in the areas of human rights, good governance, health and infrastructure. The utmost tenacious concern is the imprint that a huge fragment of the Congolese political class does not appear to share the significances of the international community, as far as peace, security and good governance are apprehensive. It should be noteworthy that the path to peace in DR Congo is precipitous and dispersed with consequences.

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