Managing Security
in a
Globalised World

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24 Rethinking Hard-Power Responses to Radical Islamism in Bauchi, Nigeria

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Whether the elephants make war or make love,
It is the grass that suffers' — a Swahili proverb.

INTRODUCTION

The limitations of the sole reliance on hard-power in waging the Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT) and other forms of internal insurgencies by countries around the world is becoming increasingly apparent. The daunting challenges of policing disorderly and violent communities have made the militarisation of the streets inevitable in many countries involved in one form or counter-insurgency or the other imperative. From Afghanistan to Iraq, Somalia and Maiduguri in Nigeria, the increasing presence of the military on the streets present the war against terrorism as seemingly insurmountable. This has led to the phenomenon of terrorised democracies (Eisenstein, 2007) used to describe the rationalisation of the use of anti-democratic practices by the state in responding to different forms of insurgencies. The seriousness of the war against terrorism is seen in its status as the replacement for the erstwhile war between global capitalism and communism. As argued by Eisenstein (2007), terrorism as the new communism has led to the conversion of erstwhile friends or accomplices

to contemporary foes. This is illustrated by the old depiction of old terror networks that were supported by the United States in its Cold War days against the defunct Soviet Union in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran as terrorist outfits. Mamdani (2004) captures it more succinctly and sarcastically that the bad Muslims of today were the good Muslims of the days of the Cold War.

Contemporary manifestation of terrorism dates back to the attack on the strategic installations of the United States on 9 September, 2001. Bauldrillard (2001) describes this as the symbolic defeat of global power albeit temporarily. The response to this was without boundaries or site with national security regaining prominence; surveillance and discipline overrode civil rights in the United States. Personal safety was also eroded based on the Patriot Act which practically meant the reduction of personal privacy. In contradistinction to the spirit of liberalism, responding to terrorism has made government more secretive, more stringent on immigrants, devising new guideline for monitoring suspected individuals and new death penalties. Eisenstein (2007:51) puts it thus: "security is positioned against rights . . . the war was now against civil rights and its laws". This is because, arguably the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States has created new forms of terror, insurgents and dissidents in places where it was hitherto unheard of such as Nigeria.

In Nigeria, it can be argued that the extra-judicial killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 marked the formal confrontation between the Nigerian state and the radical Islamist organisation named *Jama'atu Ahlil Sunnaah Lil-Da'awati Wal Jihad* (People committed to the Propagation of the Teachings of the Prophet and Jihad) but commonly referred to as Boko Haram. Given the socio-political and economic context of the emergence of the sect which has been largely ignored, there has been a preference for reliance on hard-power as the main state response. Albert (2012) explains the militaristic actions of the state and demonisation of the Boko Haram sect as a behaviour intended to make the international community to perceive the sect as a fundamentalist movement from the perspective of the terrorist groups in the Middle East and also to deny them local support from the rest of the country in line with the orthodox responses to terrorism from the West.

The premise of the orthodox terrorism theory is based on the sanctity of state's legitimacy which constructs non-state violence as terrorism while

state violence is deemed to be legitimate. Proponents of this theory concentrate on acts of anti-state violence and view it as illegitimate violence against established authority or states not necessarily by the state (Frank 2009). The argument of this research is that although, Nigeria has a history of repression in its response to demand and dissent, its recent pattern of response is tailored towards the Western understanding of terrorism, rooted in Western freedoms, the rule of law and values of liberal democracy, which sought to criminalise terrorism as a global challenge that require common counter-measures dictated by the West.

Mindful of the implications of treating security challenges with kid gloves, this article is of the view that exploring soft power options can go a long way in reducing the civilian casualties of the current conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram sect and the enhancement of national security. This becomes more compelling given the observation of Bartalott (2011) that since the Boko Haram uprising, Nigerian government still does not have an effective strategy for dismantling the group. This is because the sect relies on the vulnerability of disillusioned Muslims of the north, who are fed up with corruption and have few economic opportunities. Unless this changes, the audacity of Boko Haram's attack on the UN headquarters will only be a prelude to future violence. Also as the world looks back on the 9/11 attacks and reflects not only on its impact but also on lessons learnt, it might be wise for the country to be more ingenuous in approaching the problem.

While no mono-causal explanation can fully grasp the phenomenon of the new wars in Africa since the end of the Cold War Nathan (1998) identifies four structural conditions germane to the understanding of the post-Cold War crises on the continent. These are authoritarian rule and abuse of human rights and freedoms; acute socio-economic deprivations and inequity; the exclusion of minority or majority groups from governance and economic opportunity because of their race, ethnicity or religion; and weak states lacking the institutional capacity to manage normal political and social conflict in a non-violent and consensual way. These conditions render people and states profoundly insecure and give rise to a societal propensity to large-scale violence. This is illustrated in some of the analysis of the emergence of the Boko Haram and its *raison d'être* (Albert 2012 and Danjibo 2009).

So far, precisely tracking the number of casualties produced by the

conflict between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram can prove difficult going by the spate of attacks on state installations and hapless citizens. According to country summary on Nigeria released by the Human Rights Watch in January 2012, the activities of the Islamist sect claimed 425 lives in 2011, which queries the efficacy of government's heavy-handed responses. This underscores the need for the exploration of the plausibility of soft-power in a milieu like Bauchi state in North-east geopolitical zone of the country. Bauchi state is chosen based on the series of attacks on state security personnel and institutions including civilians on one hand and because the state serves as the place of refuge for those displaced by the activities of sect from the rest of core-north and the Jos crises.

Bauchi and northern Nigeria are conceptualised as postconflict communities in this study within the framework given by (Hills, 2009). The postconflict period refers to the period after a ceasefire agreement, a military victory, or a rout, which is usually accompanied by a decreasing occurrence of military operations, killings and overt destruction (Hills, 2009:30). According to her, the periods are 3 months for the immediate aftermath, two years for the short period and three to five years for the medium and up to ten years for the long term. Hence, northern Nigeria and Bauchi qualify as medium term postconflict communities. The challenges of policing such postconflict communities are, indeed, daunting and they include the difficulties of gaining intelligence, distinguishing terrorists from passers-by and the threat of getting bombed at any time (Hills, 2009) all characterise postconflict communities such as northern Nigeria where Bauchi is located.

This article focally explores the plausibility of soft-power approaches against the background of the apparent limitations of the hard power approach so far adopted in Nigeria's "war" against terrorism. The main objectives were to establish the teleology of state hard-power response(s), its implications and suggest plausible alternatives.

RADICAL ISLAMISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
AND STATE (HARD POWER) RESPONSES

Since the fall of the Sokoto caliphate to the British in 1903, several Islamists sects tending to resist western civilisations emerge from time to time seeking to replace the Western system and re-establish the caliphate hood governed spiritedly within Islamic legal system based on the Shari'a

(Ibrahim 2011). Harris (2006) argued that the Muslim belief is that "Islam must inform every dimension of Human existence including polities and law". However, he fails to state that the religion is not abhorrent of plurality and human diversity which are well enjoined in many verses of the Holy Quran and documented practices of the holy Prophet known as Hadith. However, this view might have been informed by the character of radical Islamists who have always wrongly hinged their veiled contestations for power by misinterpreting the verses of the Holy Quran. Amongst the radical groups that have emerged in Nigeria, Maitatsine and Boko Haram have proven to be very organised and violent.

The Maitatsine rebellion in the second republic was among the early manifestation of Islamic radicalism in Northern Nigeria. The founder of the sect "Maitatsine movement" Muhammadu Marwa was an Islamic scholar, who migrated to Kano from Marwa in northern Cameroon in 1945. He was worried that modernisation and the formation of modern state by the colonial system had adulterated Islam. Marwa exploited the dwindling economic situation and the almajeri system to attract large followership among the commoners. These groups who are unable to afford the basic necessities of life became die-hard members of the sect (Danjibo 2009). The Maitatsine doctrine rejected the Hadith (traditions of the prophet of Islam) as a source of law and condemned reading any book other than the Quran. Kasfelt (1989) recounts that in 1979, Marwa declared himself as annabi.[1] He indoctrinated his followers, whom he instructed to attack what they described as corrupt religious practices by the mainstream religious communities in Kano and also rejected the authority of Kano State Government. Military response became inevitable and during one of such clashes the army killed Marwa in 1980 alongside members of his sect in Kano numbering about 4,177 (Isichei 1987). Despite, assurances by the Nigerian state, the Maitatsine resurged in Maiduguri in October 1982, killing hundreds of people before they were crushed. Again, in February 1984 the same group ravaged Nasarawa ward in Jimeta, Adamawa State with devastating consequences (Isichei 1987).

Danjibo (2009: 6) presents a description of the Maitatsine sect which typified its divergence from the mainstream body of Islam:

They prayed while counting their beeds five times a day facing the east, but think Prophet Mohammed was not a breathing image of Allah . . . At worship the other Muslims in supplication to the deity, place their open

arms, facing away from themselves, in upright position, on the sides of both ears. But the Maitatasine in prayer, rest the open palm of both hands on their chest . . . the Maitatsine preach a very strong compulsion to "kill" arna (infidels) who don't believe in Allah, they will go to heaven.

Manderville (2007) describes Islamism as an aspiration to institute a political order that reflects the norms of Islam, and specifically the Shari'a. There are two type of Islamist sects: the moderate Islamist such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt or Jama'ah-Islami in Pakistan which took the form of political parties or social movement. Although some of the moderates have intrumentalised violence purportedly in the name of Islam while veiling real geo-political contests. In this category are groups like the Afghan Mujahideen, Hamas of Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon, and they also have militant agenda, their aggression were geared towards political goals defined in terms of National Liberation and Islamism within a single state (Manderville, 2007). Unlike the moderates, the extremists seek to establish an *Islamic*[2] political order and are willing to use violence to achieve this end. The radicalist understanding of the concept and tactics of achieving the political order differ significantly from non-violent Islamism. Mandaville (2007: 54), sums up the orientation of the radical Islamist as characterised by:

A violent Islamic political order that rejects the legitimacy of the modern state, and seeks to establish a pan Islamic polity or renewed caliphate and/ or an emphasis on violent struggle (Jihad) as the primary or even the exclusively legitimate method for the pursuit of political change.

The radical Islamist rejects the contemporary system of territorially defined sovereignty of nation-state as illegitimate and seeks to replace it with a Shari'a-based pan-National Muslim polity. Also the extremists advocate violent method through jihad which they described as legitimate and a required method to bring about the desired political change.

Since Mohammed Farag, a chief activist in the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt advocated in his manifesto, "The neglected duty" that Jihad should be carried out wherever Muslim lands were under the control of unbelievers (secularists, nationalists) even if crucially these leaders claimed to be "Muslim" whom he described as the "near enemy", a new era of Islamist violence committed against and within nation-state was heralded (Mandaville, 2000:240).

Since then, radical Islamism has been seen as constituting a dangerous challenge to liberal democracy in many parts of the world Nigeria inclusive as manifested by the emergence of Boko Haram. The group, like other modern radical Islamists, adopted political system that rejects the legitimacy of state as they seek to establish shari'a legal system in 12 Northern States of Nigeria, and emphasizes the use of violent struggle, as the primary means of effecting this political change. In fact, to confirm their radical position, the sect's ideology is that any member of the group who fought and died for the cause of an Islamic state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically gain "Aljanna" (Paradise). In an interview the killed leader Mohammed Yusuf told *TELL* (No. 12, March, 21, 2005) the late leader stated the objective of the sect thus:

> The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where othodox Islam is practiced. Orthodox Islam frowns at Western Education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, all institutions represented by Government including security agencies like the police, military, and other uniformed personnel should be crushed.

Clearly, this mission statement has removed all doubts about whether the Boko Haram can be classified as radical Islamists or not. In this respect, this research rejects the argument of Herskovits (2012) that Boko Haram is not a terrorist sect while aligning with Adefuye (2012) on the fact that it is indeed a radical Islamist sect. This is based on the sect's targets, utterances and activities which are starkly spelt out in sustained confrontations with the Nigerian state. This position was further corroborated by General Carter F. Ham, American Military Commander at African Command, in *New York Times* of 15 September 2011, where he listed 3 militant organisations, in African including the al-Shabab of Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) across the Sahel region of Northern Africa and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria (Princeton and Morrison, 2004).

It is on record that the Nigerian state has explored a number of non-militaristic responses such as setting up the Ambassador Galtimare Committee and occasionally waves the olive branch to the sect as a sort of conflict handling styles. However, military engagement of the state seems to have been (in)advertently sustained more than any other approach. The

Federal Government formed a Joint Military Task Force (JTF) and was charged with the responsibility to deal with the Boko Haram insurrections, in kanama and Geidam in 2003. The JTF applied "maximum force" to contain the insurrection, and 18 militants were killed and a number of others arrested (Nigerian Integrated Regional Information Network IRIN 2012). Another joint operation was initiated to deal with the attempted invasion at Gwoza hills along Mandara mountain Borno State. The JTF crushed the invasion, and killed 27 members of the sect before the rest fled.

In a related development, the military crackdown of the sect's uprising of 26-30 July, 2009, demonstrates maximum use of force. During the crackdown more than 800 lives were wasted, mostly Boko Haram members, including Mohammed Yusuf, the sect's leader who was arrested and handed over to the police alive, before he was extra-judicially executed. Albert (2010) describes the extra judicial killing of Yusuf as state terrorism. He advances two plausible reasons for the heinous act; one of which was the assumption by the commissioner of police that killing of such a 'state enemy' will earn him commendation and secondly, was to prevent Yusuf from revealing his connection with members of the ruling class in the north. This is a justification of state violence in line with orthodox legitimisation of state violence.

Apart from the open confrontation with members of the sect, there are other approaches adopted by the JTF that have had psychological effects on residents of the entire core-northern part of Nigeria. Such actions like: stop and search operations, door to door security searches of weapons and sometimes killing of innocent and suspected terrorists, issuance of ultimatum, placement of price tags for notorious members of the sect among others. Boko Haram relies on typical guerrilla warfare behaviour expressed in the use of hit and run, of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), human shields, invasion of homes people suspected to be loyal to the state and slaughtering them in the presence of the members of their household, motorcycle attacks, suicide bombings and car bombings on high profile targets. These acts of violent attacks and the precision with which they are carried out particularly that of 26 August, 2011 bombing of the United Nations building have accorded the sect international notoriety.

Soft-Power

Power is the ability to ensure that others act in ways they would not have acted based on threats of punishment and rewards in order to get the outcome one wants. But there are several ways to affect the behaviour of others. You can coerce them with threats and violence (hard power); you can induce them with payments (economic power); or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want (soft-power). Soft-power has become increasingly important since September 11 because the US is not able to fight terrorism on its own. When Joseph Nye (1990) first introduced the concept of soft-power he pointed out that the U.S. was not only the strongest nation in military and economic terms, but also in what he called soft-power. The keywords in the definition of soft power by Nye (2010) are: ability, attraction and relations.

Soft-power is contrasted with hard-power, which is the use of military and economic might to make others change their position. Hard-power often relies on inducements or threats. Hard-power is not always the necessary or desirable strategy for achieving an aim. Sometimes a nation can achieve its goals without tangible threats or payoffs; it does not rely on hard but soft-power. Soft-power being a country's ability to influence events through persuasion and attraction, rather than military or financial coercion, could be a vital instrument in addressing the challenges of terrorism. Nye (2004) explains that a country can derive its soft-power from three sources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policy (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Wagner (2005) stressed that the concepts of hard and soft-power can be regarded as two poles on a continuum of power.

They also imply different ideas, interactions and institutions for foreign policy when looking at the fields of politics, security, and economy. Ideally hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions in order to enforce national interests resulting in confrontational policies vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. In contrast, soft power strategies emphasise common political values, peaceful means for conflict management and economic co-operation in order to achieve common solutions.

It is a known fact that the United States and its allies have applied an unequalled military and economic power in the fight against terror but yet

defeating it has remained elusive. In the same vein, however, the application of military force has also proved to be inefficient in the management of the Boko Haram. Looking at the gravity of the Boko Haram conflict and its threat to national stability, all efforts should be made towards resolving it and this underscores the case for soft-power approach.

Perhaps it is in the recognition of these consequences and implications that Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan recently after the Kano bombings asked the Boko Haram to denounce violence, articulate their demands and come out for dialogue (Vanguard 26 January, 2012). The views of the President echo the opinion of (Raman, 2007: 16) when he writes that:

> The role of soft power in counter-terrorism is to neutralise the motivation through anger containment and reduction. Use of disinformation is counter-productive in counter-terrorism. For effective use of soft power in counter-terrorism, the causes of anger have to be identified and those, which are capable of being removed, have to be removed. Counter-terrorism itself often adds to the prevailing anger through disproportionate use of force, serious violation of human rights etc. These are tactical causes of anger and can be easily removed through corrections in the counter-terrorism techniques.

Raman further observed that since 9/11 the jihadi terrorist organisations particularly al-Qaeda and its associates have become more adept in their use of soft-power against their state adversaries than their state adversaries in their use against the terrorists. This is perhaps one of the factors, which has contributed to the continued resilience of al-Qaeda and its associates and their ability to draw volunteers and support from the communities from which they have arisen. Similarly, the continued presence and access to the video recording on YouTube of the extrajudicial killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf could be intended to serve such intents. While it seems easy to agree that conflicts produce dire consequences, it is also a truism that effective management of conflict leads to transformation. As Albert (2001) emphasises, conflict is said to be positive when it is constructively discussed by the parties and amicable terms for the settlement reached. The situation becomes more interesting when the terms of settlement lead to mutual understanding and development".

In the light of this, therefore, the objective and focus of the government in its engagements with the Boko Haram should be to "win the peace and

not the war'' just as Nye (2004:37) laments over America's war on terror in Iraq:

> Last year's Iraq war was a dazzling display of America's hard military power. It removed a tyrant, but did little to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism. At the same time, it was costly in terms of our "soft power" to attract others.

This can be said to be the case in the Boko Haram conflict given that its leader and other strong members have been killed but yet it continue to intensify. In this regard, there is the need to look for an alternative solution rather than the hard power which has not succeeded in the resolution of the conflict. Aligning with this, the Ambassador Usman Galtimari led Federal government committee on the Boko Haram clearly asked the government to negotiate with the violent Islamic sect including compensating religious organisations that suffered severe losses. Similarly, the finding of a research conducted by "Cleen Foundation" revealed that majority of the respondents supported dialogue with the highest level of support coming from the North east where 4 out of every 5 respondents (80%) voted for dialogue while the least came from the South east with only 35 percent support for dialogue (*see* www.cleeefoundation.blogspot.com/2011/08/).

In the same vein, the Borno PDP stakeholders' forum while calling for the immediate withdrawal of soldiers also advocated for amnesty to Boko Haram which should include a programme of job, training and placement. The question that one might be tempted to ask however is, does the Boko Haram group disposed to dialogue? This may be answered within the practical sincerity of the parties to a constructive and objective negotiation. Although the Federal government has been making calls for dialogue, its commitment is insufficient to drive the process. The argument in some quarters that the Boko Haram group is faceless may not be efficiently tenable as some of the leaders even appear on television screens and radio platforms. To show this willingness, the group had at a time named one Datti Ahmed, President of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria, as its representative in the mediation with government. But little had the process commenced, it collapsed. Ahmed subsequently blamed the Federal government for violating the terms of the mediation.

The hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Boko Haram crisis were

reawakened when again former President Obasanjo and the Senate President David Mark, renewed calls for the Federal Government to engage the group in dialogue. Mark, while urging security agencies to enhance their pre-operational capabilities to thwart and prevent bombings, noted that these misguided groups are our brothers and sisters and the government should dialogue with them (Radio Nigeria Network News broadcast on 8 May, 2012). This aspiration for peaceful settlement was again reinforced by Vice President Namadi Sambo when he reiterated federal government desire for dialogue at the National Symposium, organised by Nasirul-Lahi-Faith Society of Nigeria (NASFAT), in Abuja (*The Nation*, 10 May, 2012). *See* www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news.

Also, the Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Diocese, Dr. Mathew Hassan Kukah, reiterated his call for dialogue with the Boko Haram sect, even while urging improved intelligence gathering. Drawing examples from the two world wars which ended through dialogue, the best you can do is to talk of limiting the damage and it is not correct for government to continue saying, who are you going to dialogue with"(interview with Kukah, *The Guardian*, 23 June, 2012). In the light of this, the feasibility of dialogue remains a viable option. Cooke (2011) in her "Boko Haram emerging threat to US Homeland" observed that the Abubakar Shekau faction of the Boko Haram which is the more religiously ideological hard element of the group may open to a negotiated settlement with the Federal government. On the impediment that the fractionalisation of the sect could have on the negotiation process, Cooke (2011) notes:

> While Boko Haram remains a relatively new grouping and its leadership and structure in flux, there may be opportunities to peel off factions and leaders more amenable to negotiation and isolate more intractable factions, dialogue is worth pursuing and compromise on objectively reasonable demands, such as, police accountability and community reconstruction warrants testing.

The viability of negotiation is more imminent given that "hurting stalemate'' may had been reached. Zartman (1995) explains that a mutually hurting stalemate is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to them both (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), then, seek an alternative policy or

"way out". In conceptualising such interventions, Nye (2005) opines that hard and soft power should not be seen as opposed to each other because they work best when they reinforce each other.

However, much as soft-power is rooted in international relations, the implication of actual power and perception of power balance can go a long way in altering the cycle of a conflict positively or negatively. This is why the concept has a strong bearing in intra-state affairs. Kernohan (1989) identifies three forms of power that is applicable in the context of adversarial intra-state affairs characterised by a perception of asymmetric power relations like the case of the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram sect. According to Galbraith (1983) there are three forms of social power. These are: condign power defined by physical force and negative sanction; compensatory power characterised by inducement and incentive and conditioned power — when people consider their submission to an authority as their highest preference which sums the human agency perspective of power. This misses the power of social structures to mold the behaviour of individuals. Actions of social structures like the state through its agencies have strong impact in moulding and determining the reactions of organised social entities. This illustrated by the causality of the extra-judicial killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in triggering the current wave of radical Islamism in the northern part of the country.

Methodology and Limitations

The study was carried out using mainly qualitative approaches. This is premised on the fact that no single method can be adequate for data collection and analysis for the accomplishment of the research objectives and questions. While some respondents were reluctant to fill the questionnaire so also some persons targeted to be interviewed did not cooperate despite the assurances that their identities will be kept confidential.

Area of Study

The study was done in Bauchi State which has a total population of 4,653,066 (2006 Census) with 3 Senatorial Zones and twenty (20) Local Government Areas (LGAs). One (1) LGA was selected from each of the zones comprising of Bauchi in the South, Katagum in the North and Misau in the Central Zone. The choice of these areas was informed by the fact

that most of the Boko Haram terror attacks were carried out there and the respondents were purposively selected.

Data Collection Techniques and Analysis

Data were generated through in-depth Interviews with key informants and a session of focus-group discussion. The respondents were purposively drawn from members of the Military Operation Python (*Mesa*), officials of Federal Prisons in Bauchi State, officials of the State Security Service (SSS), two leading traditional rulers from Katagun Local Government and Jarman Birshi of Bauchi Local Government. Also, 3 leading Christian leaders representing the mainstream Christian establishment that is, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and 2 leading Islamic clerics all drawn from Bauchi, Misau, and Azare.

Research Findings: Hard Power Responses to Radical Islamism in Northern Nigeria

In analysing the views of the respondents on the assessment of the responses so far adopted by the Nigerian state in responding to Islamist terrorism in Nigeria, majority of the respondents lamented the use of military force as a strategy, which has manifested in widespread human rights violation, including torture, cruelty and inhuman treatments of citizens. Asked on their views on whether any known pattern of response can be established in the way the Nigerian state has responded to Islamist terrorism, a top ranking officer of the State Security Service (SSS) Bauchi State Command held that he could only speak for the SSS which is his own agency. He further revealed that the SSS has adopted a:

> sustained policy of de-radicalization through counter preaching and re-settlement of the rehabilitated members who denounced the sect through semi-skilled economic empowerment, arrest and prosecution of those who carried out attacks . . . also, the SSS through its Operational Unit intermittently carries out raids on dens of sect. He however maintained that there were no reported human right violations in Bauchi because the security operation in the state used to be through due process of the law and targeted at only criminal element of the sect. However, he admitted that the agency was enlisting the support of locals in its activities.

On his part, another senior operative in charge of the Sects Desk in one of

the security agencies agreed that Government is using both sticks and carrot approach characterised by the use of force while making an effort for dialogue. He added that there are violations of Human rights, by police and military especially in terms of indiscriminate arrests. He expatiated that when they want to arrest a particular target:

All people around the target are arrested and interrogated. Also, during interrogations, there were incidences of torture, using shocking sticks mostly by the police. He also hinted that restriction of movement is another form of violation of rights though sometimes it is dictated by the security situation on ground. According to him, extortions are also common occurrences at the check points.

Similarly, a top ranking member of the Nigerian police in Bauchi state police command believed that police's primary duty is the protection of life and property through the use of different methods such as patrol, stop and search to provide security for the public and have not yet received any reported case of human right violations by any policeman. However, a senior police Officer in Azare, contradicted this position and asserted that use of force is the method adopted. He also believed that there are violations of human rights but it is usually a reaction to the situation, averring that security operatives are more often the targets of attacks and they are not adequately compensated. In the same vein, an officer in Misau Police Division agrees with the option of force as the method of response, but that even if there are cases of human right violations, they are minimal and only intended to ensure security to the majority.

In like manner, a top hierarchy of the military at the 33 Military Brigades revealed that force is used where necessary, citing Bank robbery or when a person bears arms as an instance where force was necessary. He revealed that actually there are reports of Human Rights Violations in terms of arrests. However, he stated that all complaints are investigated and any soldier found wanting is sanctioned accordingly. Also, another intermediary Officer of the military corroborated the use of force as the pattern of response because the security of the public is at stake. He noted that there are some violations, but they are done in the interest of the general public and national security which cannot be completely avoided, especially since the forces do not know who the enemies are during crossfire or at check-points. In his response, a Police Corporal, who was interviewed at a check-point in Bauchi, opined that use of military and other security

agencies to curtail the menace smacks of force. He maintained that what is happening can be likened to war as soldiers must be extremely cautious which informs subjecting people to thorough checks because you do not know who the enemy is. According to him in the process of doing this some citizens' rights are violated but ultimately it is in the interest of national security.

The traditional rulers interviewed from Bauchi and Azare senatorial districts, in emotion-laden tone wondered why the federal Government is still prevaricating on the right approach to use in responding to the Islamist threat. They both bemoaned the lack of a coordinated and comprehensive response to the conflict. They maintained that the use of force is just the desire of security agencies and few others who would not want the problem to end because of what they exploit from the crises. They decried the violations of human rights such as arbitrary arrest before investigation and harassments at check points especially of people who are bearded and dressed in Muslim wears.

On their part, some Muslim clerics numbering ten, during a Focused Group Discussion in Misau agreed that force is the pattern deployed by the government in response to Boko Haram conflict and majority of them described the pattern as a mistake and said there is a need to first know the people who are the enemies, their level of preparation and the root cause of the problem that makes them abhor Western values and constitution before engaging them:

They berated security agencies for considering all Muslim as extremist which makes other people to be even sympathetic to the dreaded sect. The group maintained that there are Human right violations from both sides citing the sect's use of citizens as shield as violation of peoples right, while the Government failure to isolate Boko Haram members from the public is another form of violation. They condemned what they termed as discrimination on the bases of religion by soldiers at check points where dressing in complete Islamic regalia, gives you out for harassment and sometimes torture. In a related response, a well respected Islamic leader in the country based in Bauchi suspected that:

Some people within the corridor of power at the federal level do not want the problem to be resolved, possibly because of the personal gain they stand to make from the huge budgetary allocation to security sector, as well as the desire to destabilize the northern region, which they have

succeeded. His position was against the backdrop of a botched negotiation he initiated with the mandate of Boko- haram sect members foiled by those in government.

Contrary to the views expressed by the Islamic clerics, a senior CAN official in the state was of the opinion that federal government should not negotiate unless the sect shows some willingness to dialogue by coming out in the open. He berated Government itself as being confused on how it wants to respond to the Boko Haram conflict. He noted that government uses force and at the same times calls for negotiation. He maintained that since government continues to claim that they do not know them, how can they use force on people they don't know which is the reason innocent citizens are being killed daily by both Government and Boko Haram. However, he expressed sadness over human right violations which are rampant from both Government and Boko Haram sides. Both of them kill innocent people stressing that Government in the course of protection violates the rights of citizens, arrest innocent, or harass them on the streets. These positions were re-echoed by both the representatives of CAN in Azare and Misau LGAs.

In responding to Islamism and other forms of insurgencies and activities of armed non-state actors, the views of the respondents presented above were drawn from members of the public and security sector. The Nigerian state has responded to the Boko Haram radical Islamism using the orthodox approach to terrorism theory premised on the legitimacy/illegitimacy dualism which constructs non-state violence as terrorist while state violence is deemed to be legitimate. Proponents of this theory concentrate on acts of anti-state violence and view it as illegitimate violence against established authority or states not necessarily by the state (Frank, 2009). African Nations, including Nigeria were apparently led by the nose to hastily adopt this strategy in dealing with internal uprisings. This was based on a policy to contain Islamism within countries of its countries of origin in order for it not to threaten the United States and its interests and not necessarily borne out of the desire to holistically address the crises.

From the preceding, it can be deduced that the federal government of Nigeria has so far interpreted the activities of the sect as a crime to be punished and not a conflict to be resolved. This has foisted what Richmond (2006) describes as victor's peace which is premised on military might and conquest. However, this is not peculiar to Nigeria alone.

Comparatively, premising the fight against terrorism or Islamism on the orthodox approach has not achieved sustainable peace elsewhere. For instance, despite the initial success recorded by the military force adopted in Afghanistan by the USA-led coalition forces in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgency, the relative peace that result from it was not purely due to the efficacy of the approach, but because the focus was more on humanitarian aid provision and the capacity building of the Afghans.

Alden et al (2011) posit that through the UN twin programme called Afghan New Beginning Programme (ANBP) and Disbandment of Illegal Arms Groups (DIAG) the UN targeted about 100,000 former combatants for demilitarisation. These programmes saw participants turning in their weapons and receiving some compensation and opportunities for vocational training or the option of joining the Afghan National Army (ANA) or the Afghan National Police (ANP) as part of a larger plan of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). The crux of this argument is that even America and its Western allies who are the main advocates of orthodox approach saw the need for engagement of the militia rather than driving much emphasis on counter-insurgency that will designate the arms-bearing militias that are found across the length and breadth of Afghanistan as enemies and continue an endless war, similar to the then Soviet Union experience. In the light of this, the need for a rethink on the principles and tactics of engaging the Boko Haram becomes pertinent.

This also underscores the need for the government to reconceptualise the insurgency of the sect as a conflict to be resolved and not as a crime to be punished. This position is informed by the persistent failure that has characterised the use of force in responding to insurgencies and militias especially in many African theatres of conflict (Alden et al 2011). The experience of the Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta has also shown promises of success and can be replicated in the ongoing struggle with the Boko Haram. This is based on the revelations of one of the interviewees who is a prominent Islamic scholar in Bauchi State on the options tabled by the sect for dialogue with the Nigerian state that sequel to a proposal for dialogue by the sect which at a point was acceded to by the federal government with him nominated to serve as the proxy of the sect given the following conditions that:

Boko Haram should announce a cease-fire of 3 months or 40 days while

negotiations proceed and that no member of the sect should be arrested during this period and that the process be kept secret until the there was an agreement. However, the federal government did not keep its own part of the bargain which made the sect to sustain attacks.

From the preceding, it can be safely argued that the potentials for dialogue can be explored in initiating a resolution of the conflict between the state and the Islamists.

Implications of Hard-Power Responses

This is most pronounced in the perception of the state and security agencies held by the citizens. All respondents drawn from the security sector on site in Bauchi were unequivocal in stating that their presence is not without implications for Nigeria's war against terrorism as many of them are perceived as being used by the government to oppress them. This deters them from coming up with useful information that may aid their operations and sometimes conniving with the terrorists to harm them. This speaks to the construction and retention of an enemy-image of the state by the citizens. As observed by Stein (2005) once constructed enemy images especially when based on collective experiences become deeply rooted and resistant to change even when the supposed enemy waves the olive branch. However, these images are not immutable to changes. Such changes usually occur incrementally especially when an adversary considers information contradictory to earlier held notions.

The dire implications of such images portend negativity for state-society relations. As argued by Della-Porta (1995) security agencies are street-level bureaucrats whose conducts determine the perception of the state to be held by the citizens. In order to prevent the association of negative values encapsulated by Tidwell (2003:127) as *enmification* of the state by citizens security agencies face a dilemma in ensuring their own personal safety and conducting themselves properly as street-level bureaucrats whose behaviour would not lead to the *enmification* of the state by the citizens. However, the enmification of the Nigerian state seems to have started given the ease with which respondents recounted series of instances of violations of their rights, creation of widows and orphans and hostile civil-military relations.

CONCLUSION

It is incontrovertible that unlike a defined war, intra-state conflict or insurgencies are peculiar types of engagements with the state by non-state armed actors. The contribution of residents' support to the success or failure of such expeditions cannot be ignored with a sleight of hand. However, based on the mutual suspicion that has defined the relationship between the citizens and the Nigerian state as represented by members of the JTF, enlisting the cooperation of the residents might becomes an uphill task based on the perception of the state and security agencies held by the residents as shown in this article by the residents of Bauchi, Nigeria. This article argues for a shift from the sole reliance on hard-power by the Nigerian state as a first step towards securing the confidence and trust of the residents of Bauchi which is reflective of the core north where the activities of the Islamist sect are most rampant.

NOTES

1. Annabi is an Hausa word meaning Prophet which in Islam refers to someone commissioned with a message from Allah to particular people. However, Prophet Mohammed was unique because the mandate given to him was meant for the whole world and it is one of the six articles of the Islamic faith which qualifies to be a Muslim.
2. By Islamic, this project refers to the narrow interpretation of Islam informed by the narrow objectives of these political organizations and not the orthodox or main stream meaning of Islam.

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