



ILORIN JOURNAL OF FINANCE

Maiden Edition
Volume I, December 2017

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Ilorin Journal of Finance is a bi-annual publication of the Department of Finance, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. This maiden edition of the journal has nine articles focusing on several topical issues in finance, banking, and related areas in economics.

Specifically, the authors in this edition focus on issues such as institutional shareholding and deposit money banks; investors herding tendency in equity markets; technical efficiency of deposit money banks; stock market efficiency; convergence of stock prices in the banking industry; banking sector development and economic growth; financial inclusion and small and medium enterprises performance; financial sector development and capital market development; and lastly, effectiveness of monetary policy instruments in the Nigerian capital market. The different issues presented in this edition reflect the aim of the journal.

I wish to thank the various anonymous reviewers whose constructive reviews and criticisms ensured the success of the first edition. The unflinching support and efforts of the editorial members of the journal are also acknowledged.

I wish the readers a happy reading.

Dr. I. B. Abdullahi

Editor-in-Chief

Ilorin Journal of Finance

CONTENTS

Causality between Institutional Shareholding and Corporate Governance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria YAHAYA, Khadijat Adenola & LAWAL, Rodiat Yetunde	---	1-11
International Financial Reporting Standards and Investors' Herding Tendency: Evidence from Four European Equity Markets Moh'd Lawal Danrimi	---	12-26
An Assessment of the Determinants of Technical Efficiency of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria Muhammad Aminu Isa & Ali Abdulhamid Badejo	---	27-40
Banking Sector Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from Nigeria Jimoh, Abdulrazaq Taiye; Attah, John Adeyi; Abdulmumin, Biliqees Ayoola & Waheed, Kayode Ismail	---	41-51
Financial Inclusion and Small and Medium Enterprises Performance in Nigeria I. B. Abdullahi, & S. K. Fakunmoju	---	52-64
Testing the Validity of the Weak Form Market Efficiency in the UK Stock Exchange: Evidence from London Stock Market Dauda Abdulrafiu & Abogun Segun	---	65-81
Financial Sector Development and Capital Market Performance Nexus: The Nigerian Experience Bakare-Aremu, T.A. & Ohioze, Wilson. F.	---	82-98
Effect of Monetary Policy Instruments on the Performance of Nigeria's Financial Market Sakariyahu, Ola Rilwan; Ibrahim, Wasiu Oluwatoyin & Abdulmumin, Biliqees Ayoola	---	99-113
Can Stock Prices in Nigeria Banking Industry Converge? An Assessment of the Level of Competitiveness in the industry Bakare-Aremu, T. A. & Ashogbon M.B.A.	---	114-122

Causality between Institutional Shareholding and Corporate Governance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

****YAHAYA, Khadijat Adenola, Ph.D.**

Department of Accounting,
Faculty of Management Sciences
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria.
khadijatadenola@yahoo.com; +2347038595064

and

LAWAL, Rodiat Yetunde

Department of Finance,
Faculty of Management Sciences
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria.
lawalradiat@yahoo.com; +2348063557702

Abstract

Corporate decisions may be influenced by institutional shareholders and the effect on corporate policies may change with the level of institutional ownership. Hence, this study examined the causality between institutional shareholding and corporate governance mechanisms of selected deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study used fifteen (15) deposit money banks quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study employed secondary data which was obtained from Audited Annual Report of the selected banks in Nigeria for a period of ten years (2006- 2015). The data obtained were subjected to Granger causality test to determine the causal relationship between institutional shareholding and corporate governance. The findings show that there is bi-directional causality between institutional shareholding and audit committee independence while there is unidirectional causal relationship between institutional shareholding and board independence/board composition. Based on these findings, the study concluded that there exists a causal effect between institutional shareholdings and corporate governance among deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study recommends that institutional shareholders should use their power within the legal provision to ensure independence of the audit committee in curbing insider related credit abuse which may affect the return on their investment. Banks' board of directors should also ensure independence of the board and audit committee in order to attract more institutional investors to enhance performance.

Keywords: Board structure, corporate governance, institutional shareholding, deposit money banks

JEL Classification: G21, G34

1.0 Introduction

There has been a remarkable discussion over the last two decades among scholars and practitioners on what constitute the best corporate governance practices and the influence the institutional shareholders are having on corporate governance. Corporate governance may be influenced by institutional shareholders and if this is true, then the effect that they have on corporate decisions may change with the level of institutional ownership. The figures released by the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) on percentage of contribution by institutional and retail investors indicated that out of N880.56 billion total market value, institutional investors accounted for N497.86 billion (57%) while the remaining N382.70 billion (43%) was contributed by individual investors (Nkiruka, 2016).

The predominance of institutional shareholders underscores the role they may play in improving corporate governance. Moreover, institutional shareholders have long advocated changes in the board structure of the companies (Monks & Minow, 2001). Their call has been strengthened by many corporate governance reforms such as the role and composition of the board of directors; the installment of board subcommittees (like audit, remuneration, and nomination committees) etc., resulting from major corporate failures. These reforms put great emphasis on formal issues such as board independence, board leadership structure, board size and committees. The lack of vigilant oversight functions by the board of directors, internal control lapses (audit), large non-performing insider related loans and advances and passive attitude of the institutional shareholders

are corporate governance issues faced by Deposit Money Banks (Uadiale, 2010).

The perpetrations of whooping sums of money could not have been possible without lapses in their banks internal control and corporate governance policies. A good example is erstwhile Oceanic Bank (acquired by Ecobank), where the former Chief Executive Officer, Mrs. Cecelia Ibru, pleaded guilty to three of twenty-five counts of fraud and mismanagement in 2009 (BBC News, 2010). Also the former CEO of Fin Bank, the Executive Chairman of Afribank, the CEO of Union Bank and the CEO of Intercontinental Bank were accused of involving in monumental frauds and insider dealings of N319bn, N217.97bn, N682bn and N1.1trn respectively (Nick, 2009).

Recently in 2016, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) also restructured the board of directors and sacked some members of the executive of Skye bank. One of the major reasons was hinged on poor corporate governance of the bank, especially treatment given to insider related credits and manipulation of accounts respectively (Nwosu, 2016). Therefore, it appears logical that if institutional shareholders held a substantial ownership of 5%+ in a company, then they could have effect on that company's governance.

On the other hand, institutional shareholders focus has broadened and not only focus on companies with key financials, but those which provide strong investor protection mechanisms and internal controls by means of corporate governance characteristics of fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility (Chung & Zhang, 2011). Therefore, which firms' corporate governance mechanisms affect

institutional shareholders' portfolio decisions?

The main objective of this study is to examine the causality between institutional shareholding and corporate governance mechanisms (board independence, audit committee independence and board composition). Understanding the relationship that exist between institutional shareholding and corporate governance will be of immense benefit to bank regulators, investors, academics, firms and other relevant stakeholders. The boards will find the information valuable by knowing the importance of institutional investors concerning the governance of the banks. The result of this study can serve as reference for further researchers in this field of research.

To proffer answers and realize the study objective, the following hypotheses stated in their null forms were formulated:

- H₀₁: A causal effect does not exist between institutional shareholding and board independence of Nigerian deposit money banks.
- H₀₂: Institutional shareholding and audit committee independence of Nigerian deposit money banks do not have causal relationship.
- H₀₃: There is no causal relationship between institutional shareholding and board composition of Nigerian deposit money banks.

Some studies such as Ogbowu (2014), Nwaiwu (2014), Theo, Hans and Elmer (2013), Kurt (2012) etc. have examined the relationship between Institutional Shareholding (IS) and Corporate Governance (CG) or Corporate Governance and Institutional Shareholding in other contexts using different kind of data analysis techniques

such as Ordinary Least Square, Multiple Linear Regression etc. None of these studies have examined bidirectional relationship between institutional shareholding and corporate governance using Granger causality test. This aspect neglected by the previous studies is also important and therefore this constitute research gap for this study.

The study focused on the causal effect between institutional shareholding and corporate governance of fifteen (15) quoted deposit money banks on the NSE spanning from 2006 to 2015. As at the time of research, 2016 annual report cannot be assessed. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section two provides the theoretical framework and review the literature related to the phenomenon of interest. Section three presents the methodology, section four analyses the data and discusses the results while section five concludes the paper and makes recommendations.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Background

The theory underpinning the issue of corporate governance is the agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) resulting out of the separation of ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship in terms of "a contract under which one or more persons the principal(s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to agents". Under this theory, the main concern is to develop rules and incentives, based on implicit or explicit contracts, to eliminate or at least, minimize the conflict of interests between the owners and the managers (Akpan & Riman, 2012).

According to Biserka (2007), the issues that appear most prominent in the literature to mitigate this conflict are board composition, board independence, the separation of CEO and chairman positions and the role and responsibilities of the board directors and its committees. Also, institutional shareholders have emerged over the years as an important corporate governance mechanism that can mitigate this agency problem by effective monitoring of managers through its influence on the board and consequently reducing the agency cost (Akpan & Riman, 2012). Institutional shareholders as principals have a fiduciary responsibility to oversee the agents. As agents, they are expected to function in the best interest of their principals. However, there is a principal-agent problem that exists which can result in corporate governance issues. From this perspective, the board and institutional investors are seen as one means of reducing agency problem by ensuring that the board is composed largely by non-executive directors (independent) who will be able to control the activities of managers and thereby maximize shareholders' wealth (Rashid, 2011; Kaymark & Bektas, 2008). Also, an audit committee who helps to alleviate the agency conflicts that exist by improving the quality of financial reporting, reducing the information asymmetry between agent and principals and insider related transaction (Lui, & Lu, 2007).

This study is built upon the agency theory since it focuses on the board as a mechanism for good governance and institutional investor, as owners of large resources, their presence as investors might be of crucial importance to the survival of the company.

2.2 Empirical Evidence

Many studies have examined the relationship between variety of corporate governance mechanisms and institutional shareholding. Some examine only the impact of corporate governance and institutional shareholding mechanisms on performance such as Chung and Zhang (2011), Huang, Wang, Lin and Zhao (2010), Harasheh and Nijim (2010) while others investigate the influence of several mechanisms (discretionary accruals, capital structure, operating cashflow return etc) on either institutional investment or governance like Shehu & Abubakar (2012), Kennedy, Josiah & Nixon (2015).

For instance, Huang et al. (2010) studied the relation between corporate governance mechanism and institutional ownership in 220 exchange-listed companies in Taiwan during 2004 to 2006. They found that the corporate governance mechanism increases ownership of institutional investor. Bianca, Txomin and Amcia (2009) work investigated Italian corporate governance, financial structure and firm performance of 21 non-listed firms. They used multiple regression analysis and found a positive relationship between non-executive directors and institutional shareholders. Kurt (2012) examines the effect of outside directors and CEO turnover on institutional investment of 55 listed companies in Illinois using OLS regression. The result shows that ownership structure and audit independence have significant positive effect on institutional investors. Theo, Hans and Elmer (2013) examined corporate governance on firm performance and institutional investors using OLS regression and found a

negative influence between the board composition and institutional investors. Cheng (2016) carried out a study on corporate governance and performance effect of institutional investors using Two-stage least square method. The study also used financial performance as a proxy for corporate governance and found that institutional investors' holding is significantly positively related to corporate performance. In Nigeria, very few studies were conducted concerning corporate governance structure and institutional investment. Nwaiwu (2014) examined the influence of corporate governance structure on institutional investment of 32 listed companies on the NSE, covering the period of 2006-2010, using multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis; they found that corporate governance structure (board independence, board size, audit committee independence, audit size) does not have influence on value and number of institutional investors. But institutional investors have significant and positive influence on corporate governance structure. Ogbowu (2014) examined corporate governance structure, financial performance and institutional investment of 32 listed companies on the NSE, covering the period of 2004-2008, using multiple regression analysis. The study found that board independence, shareholders representative in audit committee, size of audit committee and audit independence have positive influence on institutional investors.

3.0 Methodology

3.1 Model Specification

To test for Granger causality, the model employed in this study was panel data model proposed by Hurlin and Venet (2001) and applied, among others, by

Hood, Kidd and Morris (2008), Erdil and Yetkiner, (2009). For each cross section unit i and period t , the following model is estimated:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^p \beta_k y_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k x_{it-k} + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where $u_{it} = \alpha + \varepsilon_{it}$ and ε_{it} are i.i.d. (0, σ^2). It is assumed that the

autoregressive coefficients β_k and the regression coefficients θ_k 's are constant for $k \in [1, N]$. Moreover, it is further assumed that parameters β_k are identical for all individuals, while the coefficients θ_k could have an individual dimensions.

The following models are specified from the model above:

To test for causality between institutional shareholding and corporate governance, the study uses the following model:

$$INST_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^p \beta_k INST_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k BIND_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k ACIND_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k BCOMP_{it-k} + u_{it}$$

Likewise, to test for causality between corporate governance and institutional shareholding, the study uses the following model:

$$BIND_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^p \beta_k BIND_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k INST_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k ACIND_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_k BCOMP_{it-k} + u_{it}$$

Where:

- INST = % of institutional investors shareholding (substantial holding).
- BIND = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board
- ACIND = % of non-executive directors in the committee.
- BCOMP = Total number of directors.

Variables

Institutional shareholding (INST)

The study measured the investment behaviour of institutional shareholders in terms of their substantial shareholdings (5%+). Substantial holding is holding more than 5% of DMBs' total issued share capital which must be disclosed in the banks' annual report. This is in line with Lamba and Stapledon (2001) measurement for institutional shareholding.

Corporate governance

The corporate governance variables are: board independence, audit committee independence and board composition. Board independence (BIND) is measured as proportion of non-executive directors to the total number of directors (Prabowo and Simpson, 2011). Audit committee independence (ACIND) is measured as % of non-executive directors in the committee (Nidhi & Anil, 2016). Board composition (BCOMP) was measured as the total number of directors on the board. The study used board independence, audit committee independence and board composition as corporate governance variables based on the fact that they are required to keep in check unscrupulous activities such as insider dealings that may hinder good governance. Also, the presence of non-executive directors goes a long way in

ensuring investor trust (Leung, Richardson & Jaggi, 2014).

This study employs ex-post facto research design using panel data. Ex-post facto design allows for the collection of past and multi-dimensional data which provide basis for the full establishment of the causal relationship between institutional shareholdings and corporate governance of deposit money banks' in Nigeria. The target population is the nineteen (19) deposit money banks in Nigeria where fifteen (15) quoted deposit money banks on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) were sampled using purposive sampling technique. The secondary data of the selected banks had been extracted from their annual reports for ten (10) years.

Panel Granger causality test was applied to determine the causal relationships between the variables. Granger causality test is a method used to determine the direction of relations of causality between variables formulated by Clive Granger in 1969. According to this test, if the inclusion of information on the variable X into the model provides contribution to prediction of the variable Y, then the X variable is the cause of Y. Hurlin and Venet (2001) argued that Granger causality test based on panel data have higher accuracy than those based on individual time series.

4.0 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Hypotheses Testing

Table 1: Hypothesis One – Causality between Institutional Shareholdings and Board Independence

Null Hypothesis	F-stat	P-Value
Institutional Shareholding does not Granger cause board independence	2.6475	0.0763*
Board independence does not Granger cause Institutional Shareholding	3.9148	0.0373**

Note: ** and * indicate rejection of null hypothesis at 5% and 10% significance level respectively

Source: Author's Computations, 2017

Table 1 shows the causal effect of institutional shareholding and the board independence of Nigerian Deposit Money Banks, with the used of pairwise Granger causality test. The result shows that institutional shareholdings has a causal effect on board independence, the null hypothesis was rejected. This means that institutional shareholding Granger cause board independence as indicated by F-stat

(2.6475) with P-value (0.0763) at 10% significance level, while board independence Granger cause institutional shareholdings as indicated by F-stat (3.9148) with P-value (0.0373) at 5% significance level. This indicates that there is bidirectional causal relationship between institutional shareholdings and board independence.

Table 2: Hypothesis Two – Causality between of Institutional Shareholdings and Audit Committee Independence

Null Hypothesis	F-stat	P-Value
Institutional Shareholding does not Granger cause audit committee independence	6.3803	0.0026**
Audit committee independence does not Granger cause Institutional Shareholding	3.1315	0.0484**

Note: ** indicates the rejection of null hypothesis at 5% significance level

Source: Author's Computations, 2017

Table 2 shows the causal effect of institutional shareholding and the audit committee independence of Nigerian Deposit Money Banks, with the used of pairwise Granger causality test. The result shows that there is bidirectional causality relationship between institutional shareholdings and audit committee independence. This means that institutional shareholding Granger cause audit committee independence likewise

audit committee independence Granger cause institutional shareholdings as indicated by F-stat (6.3803 and 3.1315) with P-value (0.0026 and 0.0484) respectively at 5% significance level. This means that audit committee independence and institutional shareholding enhances each other.

Table 3: Hypothesis Three – Causality between Institutional Shareholdings and Board Composition

Null Hypothesis	F-stat	P-Value
Institutional Shareholding does not Granger cause Board Composition	1.5068	0.2272
Board Composition does not Granger cause Institutional Shareholding	3.9781	0.0380**

Note: ** indicates the rejection of null hypothesis at 5% significance level.

Source: Author's Computations, 2017

Table 3 shows the causal effect of institutional shareholding and the board composition of Nigerian Deposit Money Banks, with the used of pairwise Granger causality test. The result shows that there is unidirectional causality relationship between institutional shareholdings and board composition. This means that institutional shareholding does not Granger cause board composition as indicated by F-stat (1.5068) with P-value (0.2272) at 5% significance level, while board composition Granger cause institutional shareholdings as indicated by F-stat (3.9781) with P-value (0.0380) at 5% significance level. This means that board composition influences institutional shareholding.

Discussion of Findings

Result from Table 1 shows that board independence significantly Granger cause institutional shareholding. This implies that Nigerian deposit money banks with more Non-Executive Directors (NED) on the board attract institutional investors. This is consistent with the findings of Bianca et al. (2009) and Ogbowu (2014) but against the result of Nwaiwu (2014) who found that board independence does not have influence on the value of institutional investors. Also, institutional shareholdings Granger cause board independence, which implies that institutional shareholders do have

influence on the proportion of NED to executive directors on the board. Similar view is shared by Nwaiwu (2014).

From Table 2, it shows that audit committee independence Granger cause institutional shareholding likewise institutional shareholding Granger cause audit committee independence; this is consistent with the findings of Kurt (2012) and Ogbowu (2014) but against the result of Nwaiwu (2014). This implies that audit committee independence of Nigerian deposit money banks enhances their reputation thereby attracts institutional investors. Likewise institutional investors have significant influence on the composition of NED in the committee.

Results from Table 3 shows that board composition Granger cause institutional shareholdings; this is consistent with the findings of Theo et al. (2013) and Ogbowu (2014) but against the result of Nwaiwu (2014). This implies that the total number of directors on the board of Nigerian deposit money bank have influence on the investment decision of institutional investors. However, institutional shareholdings does not Granger cause board composition; this is also against the finding of Nwaiwu (2014). This means that institutional investors do not have effect on the number of directors making up the board. The difference in the results against

Nwaiwu (2014) can be attributed to difference in methodologies.

5.0 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The study concludes that there exist a causal effect between institutional shareholdings and corporate governance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. However, when individual components are evaluated, there is bidirectional causality relationship between institutional shareholdings and board independence, bidirectional relationship between institutional shareholdings and audit committee independence and unidirectional relationship between institutional shareholdings and board composition. Thus, if institutional shareholders held a substantial share, they could have significant effect on DMBs governance mechanisms thereby strengthen the company policies. This stands out as a major contribution of this work, with strong advocacy to regulators to provide enabling environment in order to attract more institutional shareholders of DMBs in Nigeria.

Based on the conclusion above, the following recommendations are suggested:

- i. Given the size of their holdings, institutional shareholders should use their power to enhance independence of the board and audit committee in curbing insider related credit which may affect the return on their investment.
- ii. The board of deposit money banks' should continue to enhance the corporate governance variables (board independence, audit committee independence and board composition) in order

to send a positive signal to potential institutional shareholders.

- iii. Institutional shareholders should take corporate governance variables into consideration when taking investment decisions as these can provide strong investor protection mechanisms and internal controls by means of corporate governance characteristics of fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility.

References

- Akpan, E. S., & Riman. H. B. (2012). Does Corporate Governance affect Bank Profitability? Evidence from Nigeria. *International Journal of Contemporary Research*, 2(7), 135-145.
- BBC News (2010, October 9). Former Nigeria bank CEO Cecelia Ibru jailed for fraud: BBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11506421>
- Biserka, S. (2007). The Role of Non-executive Directors in Corporate Governance (PhD Thesis). Australia: Swinburne University of Technology.
- Blanca, M., Txomin, U. O., & Amcia, B. (2009). Effects of Corporate Governance on financial structure and firm performance. *European Economic Review*, 43(6), 1057-1069.
- CBN (2014). Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in Nigeria. Abuja: CBN

- Cheng, M. (2016). Study of Corporate Governance and Performance Effect of Institutional Investors. *European Scientific Journal*, 12(16), 363-382.
- Chung, K. & Zhang, H. (2011). Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 46 (1), 247-273.
- Erdil, E., & Yetkiner, I. H. (2009). The Granger-causality Between Health Care Expenditure and Output: a Panel Data Approach. *Applied Economics*, 41(4), 511-518.
- Granger, C. W. (1969). Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Model and Cross-Spectral Methods. *Econometrica*, 37(3), 428-438.
- Hood, M. I., Kidd, Q., & Morris, I. L. (2008). Two Sides of the Same Coin? Employing Granger Causality Tests in a Time Series Cross-Section Framework. *Political Analysis*, 16(3):324-344.
- Huang, H., Wang, C. H., Lin, K., & Jhao, W. (2010). Does Corporate Governance affect Institutional Ownership and Share Repurchase Decisions? *Global Journal of Business Research*, 4(4), 35-40.
- Hurlin, C., & Venet, B. (2001). Granger causality tests in panel data models with fixed coefficients. processed Paris University Paris IX Dauphines, 1-31.
- Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305-360.
- Kaymak, T., & Bektas, E. (2008). Board characteristics in an emerging market: Evidence from Turkish bank. *An International Review*, 16(6), 550-561. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00713.x>
- Kurt, J. P. (2012). Outside directors and CEO Turnover. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 20(5), 431-460.
- Lamba, A. S., & Stapledon, G. (2001): The Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: Australian Evidence. Australia: University of Melbourne.
- Liu, Q., & Lu, Z. J. (2007). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Chinese Listed Company: a tunneling perspective. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 13, 881-906.
- Leung, S., Richardson, G. & Jaggi, B. (2014). Corporate board and board committee independence, firm performance, and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong firms. *Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics*, 10(1), 16-31.
- Monks, R., & Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance, Blackwell: Cambridge M.A.
- Nick, T. (2009, August 18). Official Fraud Watch Towards Fraud-Free Governance in Nigeria. NigeriaMuse. Retrieved from <http://www.nigeriamuse.com/20090818212714zg/nigeria-watch/official-fraud-watch->
- Nidhi, B., & Anil, K. S. (2016). Audit Committee, Corporate Governance and Financial Performance; Empirical Evidence

- from India. *International Journal of Economics and Finance*, 8(3); 103-116.
- Nkiruka, N. (2016, February 8). Why Institutional investors dominate domestic transaction. Vanguard News. Retrieved from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/02/nse.html>
- Nwaiwu, J. N. (2014). Corporate governance structure and institutional investment: Asian *Journal of Economics and Empirical Research*, 1 (2), 48-56.
- Nwoosu, S. (2016, July 17). Discordant issues of CBN's intercession on Skye Bank [http: Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/business/155671.html](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/business/155671.html).
- Ogbowu, C. N. (2014). Corporate governance structure, financial performance and institutional investment: Evidence from quoted Nigerian companies (Ph.D Dissertation). Port Harcourt: University of Port Harcourt.
- Prabowo, M., & Simpson, J. (2011). Independent Directors and Firm Performance in Family Controlled Firms: Evidence from Indonesia. *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, 25(1), 121-132.
- Rashid, A. (2011). Board Composition, Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. A Paper for Inclusion in the Accounting and Finance Association Australia and New Zealand Annual Conference Adelaide.
- Shehu, U. H., & Abubakar, A. (2012). Corporate Governance, Earnings Management and Financial Performance: A Case of Nigerian Manufacturing Firms. *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, 2(7), 214-226.
- Theo, C., U., Hans, O., & Elmer, M. D. (2013). Corporate governance on firm performance and institutional investment. *Journal of Accounting & Finance*, 23(7), 289-305.
- Wahab, E., How, J., & Verhoeven, P. (2008). Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors: Evidence From Malaysia, *Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance*, 4(2), 67-90.