



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AU AND THE FUTURE OF AFRICA

U. Joy Ogwu and Wale O. Adenuga

This book addresses some of the major issues confronting Africa in the 21st century. Against the background of the fact that the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), now the African Union, has achieved its main objective of the liberation of Africa, we find that the continent is presently faced with rather more serious developmental issues. Some of these are poverty and the efforts towards its eradication, debt burden, conflicts and environmental capacity for its management, as well as issues and mainstreaming, especially those that relate to health and HIV/AIDS in the continent. Undoubtedly, this book is an important contribution to the specific examination of the challenges they pose for the future of Africa. Scholars, statesmen and students will find this book useful.



TECHNOLOGY - DEVELOPMENT

ARE WE GETTING IT RIGHT?

RE: PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT

Engr. Chukwumeobi J. Aduke

This book examines the operation of the petroleum industry in Nigeria in order to determine the impact of technological development in the country. It looks at the impact of technology development on various sectors of the economy, such as transportation, agriculture and commerce. The author, exchange and interest rates, investment, trade and globalization, political meltdown and corruption are some of the issues facing technology development in the country. The book recommends that government should fund Research and Development until technology is developed to the point of mass production, commercialization, and passed on to private organizations. It opines that since leaders decide the allocation and utilization of resources, they should decide where they want to lead the country. It concludes on the note that the abundant natural resources endowment in Nigeria places the responsibility on her not only to raise the technology development, but also to ensure that African countries in technology development.



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Myths, Ends and Means: Prestige and the Management of Nigeria's External Relations

Aremu Fatai Ayinde Ph.D*

Abstract

The nexus between domestic and external affairs was glaringly manifested in Nigeria's sudden de-ostracization after the 1999 democratic transition. Key global actors which had sought to isolate the country during the excruciatingly long era of military dictatorship began to re-engage the ensuing democratic dispensation as illustrated by an array of international personality endorsement that high-profile state visits and other spotlight events such as the CHOGM and the All African Games suggested. While the gains of the post-1999 democratic restoration to international reckoning remain a subject of debate, certain basic attributes and trends (in the management of Nigeria's external relations) have endured which serve to simultaneously propel and constrain the attainment of foreign policy goals. One of such enduring pattern is the quest for prestige that the leadership elements have always coveted and pursued, sometimes, to the detriment of the more primary goals of economic security and prosperity of the average citizenry whose interest foreign policy is expected to serve. A combination of the myth of continental leadership with the ends of prestige that flow from it as well as the obfuscated means not only mystify the management of Nigeria's external relations but further alienates it from the public good it was supposed to engender. This article is an attempt to explore how the Nigerian state has negotiated the tenuous connection between myths, ends and means in the management of its external affairs.

Introduction

Quite a few would contest that Nigeria's external relations has not been generally remarkable in terms of its productivity and overall impact on people's well-being. This is particularly palpable when assessed in the context of the economic dividends it has yielded by way of opening new foreign markets, attracting foreign investment or even capturing some of the rapidly spreading business process outsourcing opportunities that is generating huge wealth and employment and immense poverty reduction effects elsewhere.

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Neither has it yielded much political dividend even in Africa where greater diplomatic investment has been made for decades. Consequently, there seem to be less agreement by analysts and observers on whether (or the extent to which) the time-tested afrocentricism should continue to constitute the core value (or one of the core values) of Nigeria's external relations. Probably because the Africa-as-centerpiece principle which has been the hallmark of Nigeria's foreign policy (justifiable as it were) serves primarily the prestige objective that flows from the perceived continental leadership, the philosophy, objectives as well as the management of Nigeria's external relations have become subjects of debate and provocative discourses in policy establishments, intellectual circles and the media. Understandably, the general issue areas include the dividends (or its lack thereof) of Nigeria's investment in afrocentricism on the one hand, as well as the burden and real benefits of continental leadership especially as it relates to multilateral diplomacy in African context (of which Nigeria's quest for a permanent seat in the proposed UN Security Council enlargement forms an important part) on the other. Basically, it is plausible to argue that these and other related issues come under the narrow prestige domain that has dominated the conduct of Nigeria's external relations to the neglect of what should otherwise have been the core of modern rational foreign policy calculus.

Elementary foreign policy literature would classify foreign policy objectives into primary, secondary and tertiary goals. Primary objectives concern those interests that relate directly to the security and survival of the state (or any part thereof) and its nationals irrespective of their domicile. Of course, the security and survival of the state and its people defined broadly or not, would include the physical security and economic well-being of the citizenry. These are interests over which the government may not be willing to compromise and are indeed ready to deploy all the necessary resources and instruments towards its attainment (including war). Secondary objectives comprise of interests which a state may pursue with vigour but could be amenable to certain degree of compromise. They include objectives over which the government might be prepared to negotiate some trade-offs and are less likely to deploy *all* the resources of the state in its pursuit. Tertiary objectives, on the other hand, consist of goals that states pursue to enhance their status, visibility and prestige in the international system. The last category of objectives, under normal circumstances, ought not to exert much pressure

on the diplomatic resources of the state since they should ideally occupy the lower echelon of interests and may even flow, if tangentially, from the effective pursuit and delivery of the primary and secondary objectives. The economic success of the East Asians, for instance, simultaneously bestowed more or less reasonable degree of deference without much diplomatic grandstanding by the governments of those states.

However, it is obvious that the classification remains nebulous and may not fit neatly into the extremely complex and kaleidoscopic world of diplomacy. Trade, for example, may fall within the secondary category of objectives for certain group of actors while, to others, it may be the primary goal over which no effort is spared. Indeed, world history is replete with trade-instigated or trade-related wars.¹ Regardless of the problematic nature of the simplistic classification, it goes without saying that prestige objective, in so far as it relates to the quest for international respect, recognition or leadership, need not occupy the epicenter of a nation's diplomatic agenda especially when the more pressing primary goals are yet unattained. A cursory focus on Nigeria's foreign policy would reveal a seeming inversion of the objectives in which national prestige, at least in the mindset of the governing elite as indicated by pronouncements and policy statements, takes precedence over other more pertinent goals of firm economic targets that would reverberate in greater economic opportunity and prosperity for the people and the state. Therefore, the quest for international prestige (and a benign neglect of other primary goals) which is fed by the perception of continental leadership that has been coveted among the Nigeria's leadership elements, has generated huge deficits in overall Nigeria's foreign policy over the years. This probably explains the revival and the potency of the debates on the re-invention of Nigeria's external relations. In this paper, we contend that the quest for prestige in or via multilateral diplomacy is illusory and the claim to continental leadership a *myth*, hence a mismatch between the *means* and *ends* of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Origin and Sources of the Prestige Illusion

It is not uncommon for analysts to ascribe the strong afrocentric bent in Nigeria's external relations which derives from and is fed by the prestige of continental leadership to the legacy of the 'radicalization' of the

¹ Conybeare, J., *Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1987; Kennedy, P., *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*, London, Fontana Press, 1993.

1970s². However, while the mid-70s undoubtedly offered a major turning point in Nigeria's African diplomacy and international relations in general, evidence of Nigeria's grand aspiration dates back to the immediate pre- and post-independence years. Almost immediately after independence, Nigeria began to display some firm posturing in championing the cause of Africa which crested with the suspension of relations with France in 1961, ostensibly to protest the French atomic tests in the Sahara³.

Nevertheless, one obvious source of the prestige illusion (if not obsession) derives from Nigeria's role in offering and mobilizing support for the liberation struggles across southern Africa in the mid-70s and beyond. Whether Nigeria's support was actually decisive in shaping the eventual outcome and/or the extent to which Nigeria's support was *really* valued or appreciated by the recipients is yet to be fully established in literature.

The huge petrodollar windfalls of the 70s that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war provided another major source of confidence that propelled and propped the radical and essentially anti-Western posturing in Nigeria's external relations. The seeming international respect that trailed the massive inflow of resources, provided a major boost to the nation's prestige in the international system. It is possible that the governing elites of the era, some of whom got recycled back and forth mainstream Nigerian politics afterwards, together with fractions of the informed public, still share the nostalgic attachment to that 'golden' era of Nigeria's foreign policy. Whether or not the huge wealth that accrued to the country in the 'golden' years and afterwards had enduring positive impact on the well-being of the generality of the citizenry remains questionable. Nonetheless, the prestige of being described as the 'giant of Africa' is traceable, if in part, to the brief 'golden' era of Nigeria's diplomacy.

Population size offers yet another major source of the prestige illusion that characterizes the approach to Nigeria's external relations. By virtue of being the most populous African (or black) nation, it is usually assumed almost complacently that Nigeria's leadership should be incontrovertibly evident. Often, in making cases either for foreign investment or representation to the

² Salu, H. A., "Nigeria's Policy Towards Africa: Some Reflections", in Akinterinwa, A. B. (ed.) *Nigeria and the Development of the African Union*, Ibadan, Vantage Publishers, pp. 265-285, 2005; Obaze, O., "Rethinking Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century", in Nwaneri N. Angela (ed.), *Nigeria: Visions for the Future*, Ibadan, Macmillan Publishers, 1998, pp. 173-192.

³ Aremu, F.A., "Nigeria's Relations with the West: A Focus on France", *Alore: Journal of Humanities*, Vol. 15, , 2005, pp 171-183; Akinterinwa, A. B., "The Termination and Re-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with France: A Study in Nigeria's Foreign Policy Decision Making", in Olusanya, G. O and Akindele, R. A (eds.) *The Structure and Process of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria*, Lagos, NIJA, 1990.

nascent African Union Pan-African Parliament or the proposed UN-Security Council enlargement, the country's population size is usually presented as one of the justification for Nigeria's position⁴. It is rarely noted that huge population, if Nigeria's population of about 140 million, can be described as such, is double-edged and could hardly be a reliable part of a nation's power credentials. If, for instance, a significant proportion of the population is well-educated and well-trained, it could be the engine of growth and development and, by extension, a veritable diplomatic bargaining tool. The potentials for huge market, business process outsourcing and other collateral economic activities of the *post-modern* age would necessarily endear the country to the international community as the experiences of resurgent China and India suggests. On the contrary, huge population could be a burden when, as it seems in Nigeria, a sizeable portion of the population operates off the margins of survival without sound education. Neither would a huge population size offer much market value that could attract investment, much less serve as valuable diplomatic tool, when the greater bulk of the people battle poverty in sprawling urban squalour and rural areas.

Therefore, the pride surrounding the whole idea of being the most populous black nation seem to be tenable only in the thinking of the leadership and probably some sections of the *un-informed* public. Not surprisingly therefore, the total foreign direct investment (FDI) into the non-oil sector, which has greater multiplier potential for employment generation and poverty alleviation, *expected* by the Federal Government of Nigeria in 2006, was about \$3 billion⁵. Compared to \$41 billion and \$50 billion *actual* investment by Toyota and Nissan respectively to renew production facilities in Thailand or even ¥27 billion invested by Toyota in South Africa in 2005 alone⁶, the total anticipated non-oil investment in Nigeria pales out as insignificant even if it were realized, and reveals the wide gulf between the potential of population size and its actual value in international political economy. Thailand and South Africa each has less than thrice and less than half of Nigeria's population respectively.

Again, Nigeria's record of participation in peace keeping operations tends to form part of the rhetoric on international prestige claims. At the United Nations, continental and sub-regional levels, the record of Nigeria's contribution to international peace keeping and peace building initiatives

⁴ Ad'Obe Obe (ed.) *A New Dawn: A Collection of Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo*, Vols. I, II & III, Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 2001.

⁵ *ThisDay* (Nigeria), July 7, 2006.

⁶ *JETRO White Paper on Trade and Investment 2006*, Tokyo, Japan External Trade Organization, 2006.

appear to attract some credits for being one of the top contributors of troops to peace missions. However, in addition to the acknowledgements, there had been intermittent reports of unethical behaviour by some Nigerian contingents that serve to blemish Nigeria's participation⁷. Besides, it is common knowledge that contributors of troops to UN peace-keeping operations are usually paid per soldier and there are insinuations that the pecuniary motivations, rather than altruistic motivations, may be behind the frequent deployment of troops. Above all, the credits for peace-keeping can hardly be claimed by the contributors of troops alone to the exclusion of the financial contributors to the peace-keeping account of the world body. With respect to financial contributions to international organizations, it is hard to claim much prestige since only recently did Nigeria offset its arrears in international organizations. On the whole, hardly could peace-keeping in particular or Nigeria's engagement in international organizations offer much reliable claims to international prestige.

As a corollary to the above, Nigeria's foreign policy strategy has traditionally attached high premium on multilateral diplomacy. Consequently, membership and participation in international organizations like the OAU (now AU), ECOWAS, OPEC and United Nations and some others with questionable contemporary relevance like the Non Aligned Movement and G.77, have occupied the central part of Nigeria's external relations. The reason for emphasis on these institutions is not far-fetched. It might have been assumed that effective participation in multilateral institutions could serve to legitimize Nigeria's leadership position as the voice of Africa, hence, a source of prestige. It could also have been thought that multilateral visibility and rhetorical declarations are in themselves sufficient to achieve the foreign policy goals. Ironically, it would not be too surprising to see that while Nigeria's leaders were busy promoting NEPAD as a development strategy in various capitals across the globe, South African and other African leaders were selling their respective domestic development strategies and initiatives.⁸ The question of whether or to what extent multilateral strategy has yielded, at the minimum the prestige objective, and at a higher level, the regional leadership claim, would be examined in a later section of this article. Suffice to say, for the moment, that these are some of the sources of the obsession with prestige illusion associated with the claim to continental leadership that has persistently

⁷ "Our Congo Shame" *This Day* (Nigeria), September 22, 2005; and "Nigeria Police in Congo" *Daily Champion* (Nigeria), September 30, 2005.

plagued the execution of Nigeria's external relations under successive administrations.

Continental Leadership and Regional Hegemony as *Myth*

Having explored the origin and the veracity of the prestige question, the next question is how accurate or valid is the perception of continental leadership? By extension, to what extent has the prestige objective, which derives from the above, been achieved? The two questions are as interrelated as they are mutually reinforcing. Meanwhile, addressing the questions may be somewhat tendentious in the sense that facts and figures are difficult to come by in foreign policy analysis⁹. This problem is particularly acute when dealing with a case study where foreign policy, both the input and outcomes, is seldom in the public domain. However, it is still possible and desirable to conduct some evaluation even if that is not the primary goal of this research. To do this, we try to assume that the continental leadership (if real) should imply that other African countries support or respect Nigeria's position on issues of common concern. If in most cases Nigeria's preference is upheld, then continental leadership as a cardinal objective of Nigeria's foreign policy is *real*. On the other hand, if in many cases, Nigeria's position is challenged and/or overturned by other African countries, then it may be possible to argue that Nigeria's continental leadership is a *myth*. To further probe the reality (or otherwise) of continental leadership, and possibly why other countries hardly take Nigeria very seriously, some basic indicators are considered in order to locate Nigeria's position in the ranking to establish the (in)congruity between the claim to and the reality of the leadership. In other words, this is likely to reveal whether Nigeria's claim to leadership is rooted in provable exemplary foundation or on illusory attachment to the 'glorious' past only polished occasionally with rhetorical finesse.

As a prelude though, it might be useful to note that the balance sheet for the past decade or so suggests a mixture of gains and losses in Nigeria's external relations in general and its African diplomacy in particular. Among the key breakthroughs was the eventual conclusion and subsequent exit from the Paris Club debt overhang¹⁰. Also notable was the seeming international endorsement of Nigeria's re-entry into global reckoning after the lull of the

⁹ Rosenau, J., "Probing Puzzles Persistently: A Desirable but Improbable Future for International Relations Theory", in Smith, S. et. al (eds.) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 309-317; Adrio, J. S et. al, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June), 1975, pp. 160-198.

¹⁰ *The Newscor* (Nigeria), July 18, 2005, pp. 20-25.

outsourcing (of which employment and technology transfer are important), the huge deficits in Nigeria's external relations could not be less palpable. Compared to Ghana or India whose leaders have far less foreign trips but has attracted more global attention in terms of investment and opportunities associated with globalization of production, Nigeria's record of external relations and its trickle down effect on the ordinary people remain highly contentious. In addition, records of undignified treatment of Nigerians even by African countries and Nigeria's lackadaisical and ineffectual responses to critical issues of periodic murder of Nigerians abroad, including a Nigerian consul within Nigeria's Embassy premises in Czech Republic¹⁶ raise significant questions on the ends of Nigeria's foreign policy.

At another level, it might also be necessary to consider Nigeria's real status using some selected indicators to see the validity or otherwise of the leadership on the continent. First, based on market value and equity turn over (in US\$), the *African Business* 2006 ranking of top businesses in Africa shows that the highest ranked Nigerian firm was in 44th position and only four Nigerian companies made the top 100 companies in Africa.¹⁷ South African companies occupied the top ten positions, while 68 companies of the top 100 African businesses are South African. Egypt has 18 of its firms among the top 100 while Morocco has seven. The 2007 ranking by the same magazine reveals a similar pattern. Of the top 100 African companies, 62 are South African, 18 from Egypt, 9 from Morocco while Nigeria has seven. Meanwhile the highest ranked Nigerian firm occupies the 46th position¹⁸.

An almost identical pattern was manifest in the ranking of African universities. The Webometrics survey indicates that the top eight universities in Africa are South African. Of the top 100 African universities, 21 are South African, 13 Egyptian, Algeria and Morocco has 9 apiece while Kenya has eight. Nigeria and Tunisia tied with four each followed closely by Ghana and Tanzania with three of their universities among the top 100 in Africa. In the survey, the highest ranked Nigerian university, Obafemi Awolowo University, occupies the 44th position followed closely by Mogadishu University at 45th.¹⁹ Considering the centrality of the role of universities as both the harbinger of innovation and driving force of development as well as a symbol of pride of

¹⁶ Akinterinwa, A.B., "Nigeria as Africa's Powerhouse", *ThisDay* (Nigeria), February 24, 2003.

¹⁷ *African Business*, April 2006, pp.32-33.

¹⁸ *African Business*, April, 2007: 16-20.

¹⁹ *African Business*, April, 2007: 16-20.

a nation's level of modernization and advancement, Nigeria's ranking does seem to not support the prestige and leadership that is often bandied around.

Finally, we examined a number of other indices and considered Nigeria's position *vis a vis* some selected African countries (across the sub-regions) to establish whether or not Nigeria's leadership in Africa has exemplary basis beyond a nostalgic attachment to the 1970s (*a la* support for liberation and anti-Apartheid struggles), oil or 'large' population. The other countries are Algeria, Benin Republic, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. The table shows that among the selected countries, Nigeria has less than remarkable Agriculture (value added) as a percentage of GDP between 2000 and 2005 comparable to the "giant" status of African leadership claims. Figures in the table indicate the net inflow of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP over the same time frame. It reveals that Nigeria's figure is not quite distinguishable compared to other 'less endowed' countries. The table also contains the numbers on GDP per capita for the selected states. Again, Nigeria's position appears to be unremarkable compared to other African states. Indeed, Nigeria's average for the years, \$416.4, is far lower than South Africa's \$3176.6 and Egypt's \$1543.3. From the foregoing, suffice to say that there seem to be a huge gap between the claim and the reality of leadership in Africa. There seem also to be a wide gulf between what Nigeria think (or wish) she is, and what other countries think (or believe) she is. This leads us to revisit the question of how Nigeria's external relations have been managed.

Some Basic Economic Indicators of Selected African Countries 2000-2005 (Average)

Country	Agric. Value Added (% of GDP)	FDI (% of GDP)	GDP/Capita (Constant 2000 US\$)
Algeria	9.738353	1.285795	1938.985
Benin	33.69847	1.715954	321.1238
Botswana	2.285545	3.298076	4021.517
Egypt, Arab Rep.	16.08962	1.727551	1542.217
Ethiopia	44.44586	3.905843	130.2809
Ghana	36.27332	1.721821	266.2962
Kenya	29.67128	0.346963	422.6281
Morocco	15.36854	1.860533	1277.475
Nigeria	25.73828	2.846725	389.2113
South Africa	3.353384	1.817934	3183.119

Source: World Development Indicators Database (Various Years).

Ends, Means and the Management of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

The *end* of Nigeria's foreign policy, one can plausibly posit, has been more or less concerned with a relentless quest for prestige and a desire for continental leadership which, as argued in the previous section, is a *myth*. It might equally be necessary to ask: what are the *means*? In order words, how has Nigeria's external relations been managed in the past eight years? An obvious pattern in the management of Nigeria's external relations is personalized diplomacy. The presidency (or the President to be specific) monopolized the direction, content and orientation of external affairs. Shuttle diplomacy became the prime instrument which took the leader to various world capitals in order to 'sell' the administration and the country to the world as a responsible actor. The merits, efficacy and the limitations of shuttle diplomacy falls outside the scope of the current study²⁰. But the objectives of shuttle diplomacy include mobilizing support for debt cancellation and to attract investment not only for Nigeria, but also for the whole of Africa through NEPAD.

Another common pattern in the management of Nigeria's external affairs was that a very high (perhaps, exaggerated) premium was placed on the mechanism of multilateral institutions. Nigeria's prominence in the initiation and popularization of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was a particularly significant case of seemingly exaggerated emphasis on the utility of multilateral initiative in achieving foreign policy goals. Although the ultimate result of such an approach can not be explored here, it is nevertheless noteworthy that while Nigeria's leader(s) was busy promoting NEPAD as a development initiative for Africa, other African leaders were canvassing international support for their domestic development initiatives as noted earlier. Since the first law of nature is self-preservation, the approach of other African countries tends to have some logic. In any case, multilateral diplomacy through NEPAD, G.77, the South (or South-South), if anything at all, could only be complementary to a sound foreign policy that is anchored on firm domestic people-centered interests as well as emanate from it *ab initio*.

Perhaps, because of a lack of substantial domestic input in the management of Nigeria's external relations coupled with a weak institutional foundation, together with a desire to maintain the perception as 'giant of Africa', there has been a continuity of the 'Father Christmas' diplomatic approach as a

²⁰ Salju, H. A. "Perspectives on Nigeria's Shuttle Diplomacy", in Salju, H. A. (ed.), *Nigeria Under*

means to attaining the *ends*. An editorial by the *Ghanaian Chronicle* titled: "On Honoring Obasanjo: A Valiant Son of Africa (2)" eulogized Nigeria's tradition of generosity thus,

The Chronicle makes bold to say that on the facts available to this paper and other Heads of Government in sister countries, President Obasanjo has not been exactly biased in his relations with neighboring countries... It was not only Ghana that benefited from the 90,000 barrels of crude offered on an extended 90-day credit. La Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso were also offered products on equally favorable terms... Nigeria's big brother status has never been in doubt²¹. (*Ghanaian Chronicle*, March 12, 2007). (*Emphasis mine*)

It is important to note that the leader, not the nation *per se*, was deemed worthy of appreciation for the assistance which speaks to the outcome of the personalization of external relations stated earlier. Also noteworthy is the fact that the usual beneficiaries of Nigeria's periodic diplomatic largesse, except Ghana especially through some sections of its media, rarely expresses public support for Nigeria's ambitions for the UN-Security Council bid²². Whether Ghana and other recipients of such assistance would eventually endorse Nigeria's bid remain in the conjectural realm. Meanwhile, in line with the tradition, the Guinea Bissau leader, Henrique Pereira Rosa visited to solicit Nigeria's financial assistance to offset the salary arrears of its civil service²³ while the Beninois President Boni Yayi also, in a visit to President Yar'Adua, described Nigeria as "our caretaker"²⁴. Whatever that implies, it must have sound appealing to those that covet the prestige that flow with the aura of being described as the 'African giant'.

On the whole, a common trend in the management of Nigeria's foreign policy has been that the *means* are essentially *ad hoc*, piecemeal and generally based on 'disjointed incrementalism' with fragile (almost non-existent) institutional framework. There has been very limited institutional involvement in the foreign policy process leading to fundamentally short-term strategic goals with obfuscated means. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is supposed to be the hub of the foreign policy complex has been largely marginalized. The crisis within the Ministry itself is worth noting. From its

²¹ *Ghanaian Chronicle*, March 12, 2007.

²² *Public Agenda* (Ghana), June 27, 2005.

²³ *ThisDay* (Nigeria) October 18, 2003.

²⁴ *Daily Sun* (Nigeria) June 1, 2007.

framework of the foreign policy establishment through integration and coordination of the input of the various stakeholders in Nigeria's external affairs.

Therefore, the debate over 'Nigeria-as-center-piece' or 'Africa-as-center-piece' is essentially irrelevant. Both can be simultaneously pursued in a complementary and concentric pattern without contradictory or conflicting implementation. In reality, the call for the former is usually loudest whenever the country is momentarily 'defeated' in a contest within continental (or sub-regional) multilateral institutions. Such periodic emotional responses, sometimes from the high-level officials²⁷, could not yield much long-term strategic trajectory in foreign affairs. Rather, a strategic rethink should focus on a re-definition of the *ends* and the *means* in the management of Nigeria's external affairs which, in all intents and purposes, has not reflected the enormous transformations in contemporary international political economy. In that context, people-centered interest would necessarily need to substitute the hegemonic mindset.

²⁷ *ThisDay* (Nigeria), August 15, 2006.

Enhancing Nigeria's National Security Interest Through International Relations

Charles Dokubo*

Abstract

National security is in most cases state-centred, while International relations is related to the behaviour of states and their interaction with other states. While most governments would accept the fact that the maintenance of national security is a fundamental duty, the satisfaction of which is directly linked to their claims of legitimacy and public loyalty. Thus if the security of the people is viewed as the supreme law and defence and survival as the core of external policy, then the search for security becomes one of the imperatives of International relation. This article attempts to interrogate the simplistic notion of security as deriving either from the power of the power or from the establishment of trust and order in the international system. This mindset should, however, be replaced by a more complex appreciation of how state behavior and the international system interact. National security cannot be achieved by either individuals or states acting solely on their own. It cannot be created by individual actors, nor can it be created by centralizing all the power and responsibility at the upper levels of government. Thus an integrative approach to security, which would diffuse power throughout the security system from the individual to civil society, through the Nigerian government, the sub-regional organization and even the Gulf of Guinea community, would therefore seem to be the most appropriate bases for enhancing Nigerian national security policy.

Introduction

Security is a contested concept, hence little wonder that the lexicon of the twentieth and twenty-first century politics is littered with various usage of the concept such as national collective, common, cooperative, regional, integrative comprehensive, legitimate and equal. Surely, few of these are easy to define. Many are of rhetorical rather than of analytical value. All however, are testimony to the fact that security is generally regarded as a

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