

50 Years of The Nigerian Project: *Challenges and Prospects*



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Chapter Six

The Nigerian Military in Defence and Security in a Rapidly Changing World

by

Omede, A.J. Dr. (Mrs.)

Abstract

The Nigerian military, since the attainment of political independence in 1960 till the present (2010), has been involved in the pursuit of activities aimed at promoting order and stability within the country. The task of ensuring Nigeria's national security and territorial integrity, which involves the continuous "x-raying" of both the various internal and external threats to the nation's sovereignty, has been both arduous and daunting. To understand the complexities, intrigues as well as the impact of the various challenges that the military have had to deal with, this study undertakes a journey into the murky waters of defence and security of Nigeria. In our expedition, the study observes that the high incidence of military intervention in the governance of the nation's polity and the prosecution of the 30-month Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), which posed serious threat to the continued existence of the country as an indivisible entity, provided the military with the impetus for achieving national integration in Nigeria. In addition, other challenges such as the military's engagement in internal security operations engendered by incessant civil uprisings and religious violence capable of destabilizing the country, as well as the upsurge in the activities of armed militia groups coupled with the issue of how much money is dedicated to the military expenditure, not to mention, the imperatives of a civilian control of the military under a democratic setting and the highly volatile controversial issue of an existing (or otherwise) of a concise, and codified defence policy, has long been a contending factor in the military's task of keeping Nigeria as one indivisible and indissoluble entity.

6.1 Introduction

Nigeria is a conglomerate of several nationalities. The ethnic composition consists of the Yoruba's in the south –west to the Ibos in the east and the Hausa-Fulani in the north, to a multitude of other minorities like the Tivs, Edo's, Efiks, Ijaws, Ibibios, Nupes, Jukuns, e.t.c. spread across the length and breadth of the country.

The task of keeping the people of these nations together as one Nigeria since independence in 1960, has been daunting and challenging as “keeping dogs, goats, cats and rats under one roof”. The political crisis during the western regional crisis of 1959 and the civil war of 1967 - 1970 that almost tore the nation into “shreds, bits and pieces” are examples of the threats to Nigeria’s national security in the 1960s. Couple with these, are the various military coups that relegated the ethos and values of democracy into the back burner in Nigeria’s political history. In addition, the incessant civil and religious uprisings, the rise of armed militia groups clamouring for “their share of the national cake” and often resulting in violence and the loss of human lives and properties are issues that continued to impinge on the attempt to keep Nigeria as one indivisible entity.

The complex task of keeping Nigeria one, and of protecting the nation from external aggression and attacks undoubtedly rest primarily on the Nigerian Armed Forces that is, the Army, Navy and the Air Force. Between 1960 when Nigeria secured its independence from Britain right to the present, 2010, when the country is in the process of consolidating the gains of democracy it started in 1999, the journey into the “tortuous terrain” of defence and security of the nation’s territorial integrity from internal and external threats in a rapidly changing, complex albeit an unpredictable environment, has been both challenging and onerous for the nation’s military.

It is therefore not surprising that the Nigerian military, which is composed of the Army, Navy, and Air force, is the most potent element of Nigeria’s national security. With a total strength of about one hundred and thirty-three thousand (133,000) men, with no official reserve, the Nigerian armed forces has over the years, acquired considerable stock of weapons of offense and defence, and has also been engaged in series of military exercises aimed at boosting the combat readiness and war preparedness of its officers and men. The primary purpose of the Nigerian military, just like those of other nations, is to defend their nation from external attack and deter or attack would-be enemies. The realization of this function primarily entails the preservation of the territory, peoples, culture and the national security of the nation. In Nigeria, the functions of the military is enumerated as (Federal Government of Nigeria: 1989 :105):

The protection of the country against all forms of internal and external danger/threat or attack is a primary responsibility of government performed through the armed forces in collaboration with the civilian population. Subversion of government policy from within or without, religious intolerance and fanaticism, ethnic antagonism and class

struggles, unemployment, hunger, perceived inequality and social injustice, etc. are the major sources of internal threats to security, while the grave forms of external threats are aggression or actual attack on our territorial integrity, both of which represent an assault on our very survival as a people.

The Nigerian military, for instance, in protecting the territorial integrity of the nation, had since the attainment of political independence in 1960, been engaged in the analysis of threats to Nigeria's national security. Through such analysis, it has been able to come up with certain military strategies that have helped to bring to focus such threats. One of such strategy is the continuous build-up of the nation's military capabilities, which is one major way of dealing with threats to a nation's vital interest and response to threats whose interplay defines a nation's level of security. According to McKinley (1989:110), in most cases in international relations, states reasonably assess the military capabilities of other states and interpret them as very real or potential threats. In response to these assessments, other states do increase their own military capabilities. From this perspective, one can then say that states utilize military capabilities as both the source of response to threats and as a means of reducing insecurity.

The essence of this study implicit from the foregoing analysis is to examine, review and assess the impacts of those challenges confronting the military in the pursuit of peace and order, as well as maintaining the territorial integrity of Nigeria from 1960 to the present, 2010. Occurrences such as military coups, the civil war, the series of civil and religious uprisings, the handling of the Niger-Delta crisis, issues involved in high defence budget/military expenditure, defence policy and the effort at subordinating the military to civil authority under a democratic dispensation, are some of the topics to be discussed in this paper.

6.2 Conceptual Clarification:

In order to make the study more meaningful, the concepts of - national security and threats will be clearly defined and their relevance to the study will be well articulated. Our intention in this study is to operate from a multi-dimensional conceptual framework taking the dynamics of nation-states interaction into consideration. This method in effect goes to justify the assertion that, the international political system is "eclectic" in nature and is composed of diffused entities – nation states, which is full of complex and interrelated actions and policies.

The national security approach is, in many ways, a conservative and realistic approach to the study and analysis of world politics. It focuses on political realism,

which in international relations implied that the sober and rational calculation of interests and power capabilities of nation - states, is a central activity that states engage in (Lippman, 1943: 5). This is the more reason why each state is concerned mainly with the pursuance of its national security and the defence of its national interests. States from this perspective, struggle to acquire power (military and economic) to assure their individual security. By so doing, emphasis is further placed on the importance of force - (the acquisition of the threat to use and the actual deployment of both defensive and offensive weapon systems), as a useful tool in ensuring the continued survival of the nation-state.

National security is a concept that is primarily concerned with the preservation of sovereignty and the independence of nation-states. National security is closely related to, often equated and juxtaposed with, and in fact has evolved from the idea of national interest. This combination in Wolfers (1968:249) view is necessitated by the singular fact that:

Since we are living in an era of constant crisis, conflicts, competition, rivalry and threats of external aggression, the formula of national interest has come to be practically synonymous with the formula of national security.

Security is indeed a dynamic condition. It involves the relative ability of states to counter threats to their core values and interests. The security so concerned with by states, is multifarious. It might be military, economic, ideological or cultural. Accordingly, the security for any state embodies a notion of order, or of the conditions necessary to maintain the smooth functioning and reproduction of an existing society. According to McGrew (1988:101), the security of a nation is predicated on two central pillars. On one hand, it entails the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order in the face of internal and external threat. On the other, it entails the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimizes the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order.

Significantly, the definition of national security connotes two trends of protection from external dangers (Abdul_Monem, 1985:17). One, the preservation of independence and sovereignty of nation-states by the military, (tagged the “strategic view”) and the other, the economic non-strategic view which is concerned with both the maintenance of the vital economic resources and the non-military aspect of national security. Fundamentally, the concern of every state and the focus of states interaction in world affairs is practically the holistic emphasis on national security. Evidently, the concern about national security is

manifested in the armed forces of each nation and thus, made more pronounced by the maintenance of large and costly military establishments (Padelford and Lincoln, 1962:234), which has become a necessary evil in the defence and security of nation states. The relevance of defence and national security, was once again emphasized by Lippman (1943:5) when he opined that:

A nation is secured to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values (national survival), and if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged, to maintain them (the core values) in victory in such war.

Furthermore, in the context of Lippman's analysis, national security is designated as an objective policy, distinguishable from other policies, basically for its emphasis on the protection of nation-states from danger to its territorial integrity. The preoccupation with national security in this regard therefore, often and always creates an apprehension over security that tends to generate military activity regardless of the nature of threats. This accounts for the use of armed forces as the only defence of the body politic and its interests.

It is important to stress that the contemporary thinking about national security is an all-inclusive concept, which connotes the element of development: economic security, social security, environmental and food security, the equality of life and technological security. Indeed, security is seen as a holistic concept embracing both hard (military) and soft (socio-economic, cultural) elements. It is this broadened approach to the conceptual analysis of security that have empowered scholars who continued to reiterate that security is not only military force, but an embodiment of both the traditional state-centric notion of survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression as well as non-military notion. To buttress this point, Nwolise (2006:352) explained that security is an all-encompassing holistic concept which implies that the territory must be secured by a network of armed forces: that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government, which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the people themselves, the people must not only be secured from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals, unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution cum socio-economic injustices.

In his analysis of national security in Nigeria, the Chief of defence staff, Air Chief Marshal Paul Dike, (in a lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institute, London, March 26th, 2010), affirmed that Nigeria's security is based

on a holistic view which sees the citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. For instance, Nigeria's national security is seen from a grand strategy perspective, which provides that:

- National security in Nigeria is an ensemble of two (2) broad elements, that is, state security and human security
- The primary objective of national security shall be to strengthen the federal Republic of Nigeria, to advance her interest and objectives to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development progress and growth, and improve the welfare and well being and quality of life of every citizen.
- National security entails the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country's integrity and its interests.

Threats and Threat Analysis is another major activity embarked upon by the military since independence. The concept of threat itself involves the declaration or intent to inflict harm. It further involves the perception of an imminent danger of attack on a nation's territorial integrity. According to Robert Purnel (1973:129), one of the factors to be taken into consideration, when reaching and carrying out decisions of military power, is both the perception of external threats to a state's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the assessment of hostile intentions of perceived enemies. Wilbur (1977:126), in a similar manner contended that armed forces of nations are constantly engaged in threat analysis in which they make inferences concerning military and other capabilities of their adversaries to damage them vitally in some national struggle, their intention to do so in some cases of scenario being assumed. From this assertion, we can then define threats primarily as (Purnel, 1973:129) the "declaration of an intention to inflict punishment, injury, death or at least loss upon someone in retaliation for or conditionally upon some actions or course."

Threats from the perspective of this study have two major dimensions namely external and internal threats. External threats occur when a state perceives an intolerable situation development in its environment as a result of action by another state or states. It may be intolerable for a variety of possible reasons; for example, it is threatening to the state's external or internal security, its economic viability or affronts its national dignity and prestige. At any rate, the state perhaps after just attempting unsuccessfully to reverse the situation by non-coercive

discussion and bargaining or low-level pressure, decides that it must resort to strong coercion. It then issues a demand backed by a threat, which constitutes the challenge aimed at correcting the intolerable condition (Rosenau et. al., 1976:686).

Internal threats on the other hand, involves changes internal to the country, that is, changes in the values and perceptions of leaders, or a change of the balance of power between factions within the regime, or a change of the regime, economic crises, political upheaval and religion uprising. Under these circumstances, state leaders come to perceive opportunities for change by coercion and consequently places a high value on such changes (Rosenau et. al., 1976:686).

As will be revealed in this study, the Nigerian Military have had to contend with both external and internal threats to the nation's defence and security. Incessant attacks and forceful collection of taxes by the military of neighbouring countries (e.g. Cameroon, Chad, Niger), on Nigerians living in villages along the nation's border, illegal smuggling, piracy on Nigeria's territorial waters, the civil war, incessant military coups, the rise of armed militia groups, ethnic and religious violence culminating in political instability and upheavals, unemployment, trafficking in illegal arms, pipeline vandalism and wilful destruction of public property, are some of the recurring internal threats to Nigeria's national security.

Having discussed at length the centrality of threats and national security as a foundation for this study, it is crucial at this stage to emphasize that the state represented by the military is assumed to be an actor. What has been said here is that personality is attributed to the Nigerian military and by so doing, the armed forces – the army, navy and the air force are treated as an individual that has a sense of purpose and direction and who is also capable of taking rational actions geared at defending the sovereignty and security of Nigeria. Based on this, one would posit that in comprehending the full import of this statement, the following core elements which must at all times be at the back of our mind (especially in this study). These elements and basic principles stipulate that (Omede, 2001): (Kegley and Willopf, 1981:17):

- a. The primary obligation of every state is to promote its national self-interest and security. This is defined in terms of defence, security and the acquisition of military and economic power.
- b. National self-interest is best served by doing anything necessary to ensure self-preservation.

- c. Self preservation requires the state to perceive threat and undertake an analysis of threat to its sovereignty and national security.
- d. The pursuit of National security necessitates that the military involves itself in activities that will promote order and stability within the country.

6.3 Challenges Faced by the Military Between 1960 to the Present (2010):

Since the attainment of independence in 1960, the military have had to contend with various challenges in the performance of its duties. Some of these challenges are torturous and provided a litmus test for the military's capability to defend and protect Nigeria's territorial integrity. Among these challenges are the Nigerian civil war, Military coups and the involvement of the military in politics, the formulation of a viable defence policy, the control of the military by civil authorities, high defence budget and military expenditure, defence of the nation against armed militias and religious insurgents, as well, dealing with threats from recalcitrant neighbouring countries in particular Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsular.

6.4 Military Coups in Nigeria:

One major challenge that the Nigeria military have had to contend with in the history of defence and security of Nigeria, is the high incidence of military intervention in the governance of the nation's polity. Although military intervention is seen as 'an aberration, which should only be endorsed only in an emergency', yet, it became a norm and a "recurring decimal" in Nigeria's political history. In fact, between 1960 and the present 2010 (a period spanning forty (40) years), the military ruled for twenty years (50% of the period under review). Truthfully, the critical, productive and developmental stages of the country, 1966 – 1999 (with a only a break between 1979 - 1983) were under the control of the military. During these period, the economy was at an all time high characterized by oil boom, massive influx of foreign and local investments, manufacturing was rife and there was a flourishing business in the exportation of agricultural and cash products. The military between 1970 and 1984 contributed significantly to maintaining a commendable level of political stability particularly since the end of the civil war in 1970. This political order in turn, facilitated rapid economic growth (Oyediran 1984:47).

In spite of the booming nature of the country's economy, the various military regimes were in their respective ways engaged in an orgy of recklessness. Massive foreign exchange earnings from oil wealth, was expended on unproductive "white-elephant" projects that had little or no impact on the lives of the masses. There was also high level of corruption, nepotism and tribalism. All these, are the features and legacies of military intervention in Nigeria. To fully comprehend the import of military coups and its attendant implications on the nation's polity the following highlights of the various and successive military coups in Nigeria are explicitly narrated and analysed by (Dudley, 1985:80), (www. state. Govt / Nig.mht/ USA May 12, 2010 Bureau of African Affairs), (Panter-Brick, 1978), (Oyediran, 1984) and (Eminue, 2006) .

The various analysis of the military coups in Nigeria by authors listed above showed that the military continued to intervene in the nation's governance even when it is a known fact that a military government is a major set-back for any nation and should be avoided at all costs (Madeibo, 1980:387). It is therefore no wonder that the recurrence of military coup and intervention in Nigeria is made expedient by certain political and environmental factors which are germane to Nigeria politics and by extension, the people's psyche. These are best captured in the following illustration (Financial Times, 1981:120):

Once the army has tasted power, there must always be a danger that some group within it will want to try again. It is perfectly possible to envisage a time when some officers might think politicians are unable to cope. If there was a failure of leadership at the centre, and politicking got out of hand, if corruption continued unabated but the country's oil wealth declined or was squandered; and if at the same time groups of officers felt themselves disadvantaged within the army: these are the sort of conditions which could provoke another military intervention.

6.5 The Nigerian Civil War—(1967–1970)

As the military took over in 1966, the economic situation in the country worsened and ethnic tensions broke out. The resultant effect was the killing of up of 30,000 Ibo civilians in the struggle for power with the Hausas and around 1 million refugees fled to the Ibo homeland in the East (BBC News Online: Jan 13, 2000). On May 1967, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu head of the Eastern region (under the Gowon administration) unilaterally declared the "independent Republic of Biafra. This led to the 30-month Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). The prosecution of the civil war posed serious threat to the continued existence of the country

as an indivisible entity. The civil war indeed provided the Nigerian military with a litmus test for the defence and security of Nigeria.

The strategy and tactics adopted by the federal Government hardened and effectively led to the timely and successful security of the nation. Although faced with a lot of challenges, the federal war policy was riddled with a lot of challenges, some of the strategies employed by the federal government in the prosecution of the war included (Atofarati, 1992).

- (i) The massive recruitment, of civilians who were trained in civil defence duties. Also, ex-service men were re-drafted.
- (ii) The adoption of slogans and propaganda aimed at justifying the prosecution of the war. Slogans such as “To keep Nigeria one is a task that must to done” and Go on with one Nigeria” – became strong propaganda and ignited the fire and fighting spirit among the populace.
- (iii) The purchase of arms and equipment and its delivery to the various Army command around the country
- (iv) The adoption of a four-pronged approach to the execution of the war that is, the delineation of the strategy of four phases in which the war would be won within one month. These phases are (a) Capture Nsukka (b) Capture Ogoja (c) Capture Abakaliki (d) Capture Enugu. This is a military strategy of encirclement and enveloping the enemy with a zero tolerance for enemy escape.
- (v) The Nigeria Navy was mandated to ensure the total blockade of the Eastern region with no access to the sea (The Atlantic Ocean) thereby preventing shipment of arms, equipment food and other war material and services into the East.
- (vi) The Nigerian air force also ensured the control of the airspace over the entire country. In addition all flights to the Eastern region were cancelled and the international community was informed that no flight would be allowed into the region except with clearance from Lagos.
- (vii) The overall federal government approach to the war was a combination of armed mechanized infantry divisional attack from the north and an amphibious operation by another division from the south with the aim of “crushing the Biafan army in between.

It should be noted that all the tactics highlighted in points iii to vii were also adopted by the military in the face-off between Nigeria and Cameroon in the 1980s and 1990s during the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsular crisis. Some of the tactics are also being adopted in quelling the uprising in the Niger-Delta. This having been said, it is also noteworthy, to examine the issue of national interest and reliance on foreign countries for the supply of vital military equipment and munitions during the civil war.

When the civil war erupted in 1967, the Nigerian government in ensuring that it boosted and built up its defence capabilities to the level where it can conveniently curtail and contain the Biafran threat, embarked on the massive purchase of arms from the British, Russian and American 'friends'. Unfortunately, these 'friends' did not respond as swiftly, appropriately and as expected by the Gowon administration. It is a known cliché that in international politics, there is no permanent friends or enemies but permanent interests. Nigeria learnt this lesson the hard way between 1967 and 1970 while the war raged on with all its attendant fury. Irrespective the disappointment from them during the Biafran War Nigeria still depended on the USA and Britain for her arms imports. The country does not have a viable defence industry. Almost all the heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers, missile defence systems, rocket propelled grenades, fighter-aircrafts, etc. are imported with the exception of few rifles and ammunitions assembled by the Defence Industry Corporation.

The consequence of the reliance on arms imports during the civil war was ominous for Nigeria. Britain and the United States of America refused to sell arms to Nigeria and it was only the USSR that agreed to supply the federal government with the aircraft it considered necessary for preserving the integrity of the country" (Stremlau, 1977:8). The USSR in fact supplied Nigeria with "a squadron of twelve re-conditioned MIG-17 fighters and another twenty-nine trainers and 12mm artillery" (Stremlau, 1977: 79). Because Nigeria had no trained expert pilots with considerable experience, Egyptian pilots were employed to fly the air force MIG 17 fighters and B-28 bombers (<http://Wikipedia.org>)

The British who initially refused to sell arms to Nigeria (even though being her erstwhile colonial master) later had a change of heart. Since Biafra had control of the oil region (South-East), which is to the interest of Britain, the country had no inclination to provide arms that will alter quickly, the 'game-plan' in Nigeria's favour. This situation however changed dramatically by a certain turn of event, which saw the British making an, 'about turn' to supply Nigeria

with some lightweight arms. The event that changed the minds of the British occurred when (Stremlau, 1977:76):

The federal naval amphibious task force captured the Ocean-liner terminal intact at Bonny – Nigeria's major petroleum outlet. The victory at Bonny convinced the British government and Shell-BP of where their true interests laid.

Even with the turn of events, Britain only sold infantry and other lightweight field equipment required by the federal government and only necessary to crush the Biafra rebellion. To justify the British action, the then Britain labour foreign secretary – Michael Stewart explained that Britain decided to sell arms to the federal government of Nigeria in order to discourage the principle of tribal secession and its attendant regional instability and with all the misery that it could bring to Africa in the future (BBC; Online Jan, 2000).

The point must also be made that the Biafrans on their part employed certain strategies and tactics that made the civil war drag on for the period it lasted. Biafra succeeded in securing arms and ammunition from France, Spain and Portugal. They also embarked on such strategies as: employment of mercenaries and guerrilla tactics, Information Gathering and heavy reliance on Propaganda, Strategic bombings of major towns and military installations among others.

Although, the British support was late in coming, yet, the arms provided the federal forces with the hardware that enabled it launch their final offensive code-named operation “Tail – Wind” on 7 January 1970 with the 3rd marine commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st infantry Division to the North and the 2nd Infantry Division to the South. The federal government won the war and it embarked on series of measures to bring all the warring parties together again. To achieve this aim of oneness, General Gowon – the then Head of State in his speech to end the civil war in 1970 declared:

Our objectives in fighting the war to crush Ojukwu's rebellion were always clear. We desired to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of Nigeria. For, as one country, we would be able to maintain lasting peace amongst our various communities, achieve rapid economic development ... We fought the war with great caution, not in anger or hatred, but always in the hope that common sense would prevail ... we must together rebuild the nation anew.

Regardless of the positive intentions of Gowon's speech, the consequences of the civil war cannot be wished away just like a speck of dust. The impact of the civil war just like any other war of such magnitude and scale resulted in a massive loss of lives hunger and diseases. It awakened the spirit of ethnic differences and religions tensions in the psyche of the Nigerian populace. It

also led to a series of coups and counter coups and the cantankerous issues of mutual distrust, marginalization, and awareness of injustices that accompanied a federal structure of governance. These effects have remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. This is the more reason one would agree with Stremlau (1977:387) when he observed that though:

Military victory in January 1970 may have eliminated the threat of succession and established a viable federal system unfortunately it was not the end of Nigeria's domestic strife, but only a major step in the long struggle to achieve national integration.

6.6 Internal Security Operations

The military's involvement in internal security operations became prominent after the 1967 –1970 civil war. The civil war largely caused by internal political, ethnic and tribal antagonisms brought to the fore, the struggle to achieve national integration in Nigeria. Decades after the conclusion of the civil war, the nation is still plagued by threats of ethno-religious intolerance and political violence, corruption, mass unemployment, poor economic growth, arms smuggling and proliferation of small arms as well as an unprecedented upsurge of ethnic and armed militia groups. These threats “have led to a weak, volatile and unpredictable internal security situation, which has, more than ever, resulted in heavy military aid to civil authorities”(National Defence Policy, 2006:16).

In the late 1973's to the present (2010), there have been persistent outbreaks of civil uprisings (the 1978 student riots “Ali Must Go Riots”, 1986 A.B.U. Students unrests and the 1989 S.A.P. riots) and ethno-religious violent attacks across the country. Notable among these are: the Maitasine riots of, 1978 (Kaduna) and the same Maitasine uprisings of 1980, 1981 and 1984 in Kano, Yola and Maiduguri. The Musa Mankini riots in Kano in the 1980's, the military attacks of 1999 Odi and 2005 in Odioma (Bayelsa state), the 1999 and 2000 Kaduna sectarian riots, the September 2001 Jos riots and the Army 2001 reprisal attacks in Zaki-Biam, The Army Operation cordon and search in 2005 at Ohorhor (Delta State).

The October 2001 riots in Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa states, the 2002/2003 Tarok farmers versus Fulani herdsmen riots in Jos, the 2004 Telwa Christians/ethnic Tarok versus ethnic Muslim Hausas in Central Plateau state, the 2004 Christian attacks on Muslims and the April 2005 riots in Jos (<http://www.globalsecurity.org>), the Boko Haram uprising of 2009 and the recent Hausa

Fulani versus indigene Christians sectarian massacre in March 2010 at Dogo Nahawa South of Jos.

All these crises in military parlance are regarded as internal security and low intensity conflicts (IS-LOC), which is the primary responsibility of the Nigerian Police Force and other paramilitary forces. As experience have shown however, the paramilitary forces (Police) have had difficulties in curtailing and containing these civil disorders and disturbances in the past hence, the intervention by the military whose secondary constitutional responsibility requires it to “assist civil power in times of civil disturbances, insecurity, as well as conduct counter-insurgency operations as authorized by the President”(National Defence Policy, 2006:18) (The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). The point must be stated that the conduct of IS-LOC operations by the military had in many instances generated heated debate among Nigerians about the amount of force deployed, the response time and the handling of civilians who are combatants in the uprisings. Notable example will suffice.

The handling of students uprising across the nation in 1978 student riots in which at least eight (8) civilians lost their lives, have made some scholars such as Vogt (1986:464) for instance, to comment that the “students riots of 1973 has exposed the vulnerability of the military government to the impotence of elaborate military strategies in the face of revolt by the people”. The military response to the maitasine uprisings of the 1980’s even though swift, on-time and successful, was still criticized as an overwhelming show of force and killing of civilians by an army whose duty is to protect them. Nigerians also had their misgivings about the military’s handling of the 2009 Boko Haram case. Many wondered why it took the security forces so long to discover the activities of the Boko Haram sect. Again, questions were raised about the “brutal killing of Muhammad Yusuf – the alleged Boko Haram leader who was brutally killed in Police custody after being arrested by the army” (<http://oxfordjournals.com>).

The Joint military task force’s attack on civilians in 2001 in Odi Bayelsa state has been widely criticized as an excessive use of force even when the action was a reaction by the military to the killing of policemen who were drafted to ensure peace in the area. In a similar vein, the military’s response (Operation-no-living-thing) to the killing of nineteen (19) soldiers who were abducted and killed by local Tiv militia groups in Zaki Biam and Vaase – Benue State, 2001 is also a case in point (Human rights Watch, December 22nd 1999), (The Punch, Nov 7th

1999), (This Day, October 23rd 2001), (The News, Feb, 23rd 2004) (bbcnews.co.uk / November 5th 2001), (www.wsws.org-october 2001).

The most controversial and challenging of the military IS-LOC experience, is the recent March 2010 crisis in Jos. The issues involved in this particular case is a kind of eye-opener on how the military will adapt to the task of ensuring peace, political-order and stability and other emerging threats to Nigeria's national security in a rapidly changing citizen conscious world we live in. This particular incident clearly exposed the imperatives of civil-control over the military (particularly in a democratic setting) and the pervasive problem of ethno-religious colouration of public office holders in Nigeria. Although the military has been commended for the rapid response and the success it recorded in quelling the violence, yet, other issues about the military's handling of the March 2010 Jos ethno-religious crisis remained as worrisome as any that has ever reared its head since independence. Some of the pertinent issues that arose centred on certain issues that the military:

- Did not respond appropriately by nipping the crisis in the bud;
- Was unable to stop attackers from reaching villages on smaller roads, despite being on duty on major roads in and around Jos (<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org>);
- Compromised the security of the state by showing bias in their handling of the crisis; and that they
- Reacted slowly to the crisis and are therefore, part of the (sectarian) problem in Jos.

An insightful account of the Jos test case and, which best capture the situation was the one given by Nuhu Gagara (the Plateau State Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs), who claimed that (<http://www.elombah.com> March 2010):

The massacre (March 2010 in Jos) happened for several hours without any military intervention...Soldiers who were belatedly drafted to the scene curiously freed several of the arrested assailants... The soldiers were also withdrawn immediately... Hence, the government (of Plateau State), no longer has confidence in the military to maintain peace in the state.

Military authorities have reacted to the issues generated in their involvement in the various internal security operations examined above. Most of the civil uprisings and religious violence are according to the military, capable of destabilizing the country. The killings of policemen and soldiers reflect the

high level of disregard for constituted authorities. The military's deployment to flash points in Bayelsa and Delta states is predicated on the need to rid the area of illegal arms and weapons in circulation in the hands of civilians in the Niger-Delta especially as these weapons are being freely used for armed robbery and kidnappings. Above all, the problems encountered during the March 2010 crisis has been attributed to a "communication breakdown" between the governor and the military commander of the 3rd Armoured Division in Jos. Obviously, the preceding analysis is a classical example of breakdown in civil-military relations in Nigeria.

6.7 The Military Response to Militia Groups in Nigeria:

The Nigerian military since 1966, have had to contend with breaches on the nation's security engendered by the upsurge in the formation and activities of armed militia groups within the country. In retrospect, the phenomenon of militia groups had its historical antecedents in the January, 1966 Isaac Boro led a revolt against the Nigerian state. With one hundred and fifty nine volunteers, Boro proclaimed the Niger Delta Peoples Republic of Nigeria and launched a guerrilla war against the federal government. Boro also established the first ethnic militia in the Niger Delta known as Niger Delta Volunteer Force that engaged the armed forces of Nigeria in a bloody battle. Although Isaac Adaka Boro was defeated by the federal troops, he awakened in the Ijaws the need for action against oppression and exploitation (Joab-Peterside: 2007).

Between 1966 and the early 1990's agitation for equitable resource allocation and a viable federal structure assumed more of political and diplomatic dimensions resplendent in the form of protests and demonstrations, demand for constitutional re-engineering of the polity, discussions and the like. However, the advent of dictatorial military regimes of the 80's and 90's, coupled with series of ethnic unrests and conflicts of the late 1990s (such as those between the Ijaw and Itsekiri), as well as the prevalent influx and availability of small arms and other weapons, led increasingly to the militarisation of the Delta. Consequently, the demand for resource re-allocation and the fight to end the economic marginalisation of the oppressed people (particularly in the Niger-Delta) assumed a much more military dimension which resulted in the formation of ethnic militia groups across the country. These militias were not only meant to be the militant organs of expression of defiance against the oppressive rule of the Nigerian State, but also represented a form of reaction to the failure of

the Nigerian state, the lack of equity in its distribution of power, resources and the absence of social justice in its relationship with its constituents (Babawale, 2001:1)

6.8 Impact of Militia Activities on Nigeria's Security:

Militia activities have taken several dimensions inimical to the security and continued survival of the Nigerian nation as one sovereign entity. The conflagrations spurred violent acts against the local population, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread displacement. Daily civilian life was disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down and resulting in widespread property destruction. The militants have repeatedly bombed pipelines, sabotaging and attacking oil operations with their characteristic vandalism of oil-pipelines and attacks on oil wells triggering an international increase in the cost of oil, disruption of oil supply, which contribute to fluctuation in oil prices and instability within the country (<http://Wikipedia.org>: 2008). They have also abducted and kidnapped (Osaghae et. al., 2007:18) foreign oil workers, Nigerian nationals, as well as children and people not associated with the oil industry. They are also engaged in the hijacking of ships and the abduction of crew- members.

The most serious of all the activities and which constitute grave concern for the Nigerian military are the firepower (capabilities) and the tactics employed by the armed militias. It is now an open secret that the militias have long been engaged in the possession of small arms and the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry. Most of the militants particularly the movement for the emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) and the Niger-Delta volunteer force (NDVF) had over the past decade engaged in the acquisition of weapons and firearms (<http://www.pbs.org>: 2007) such as “expensive machine guns from the Czech Republic instead of the old AK-47 assault rifle commonly used by other armed militias”. They also possess modern speedboats, assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers among others (Osaghae et. al., 2007: 23) (<http://www.csmonitor.com>: 2006).

The military capabilities of the militias are as overwhelming as those of the Nigerian armed forces that, one does not find it difficult, to contend that, “the militias are now evenly matched with the Nigerian military which was dispatched to the region in 2003. The result of the conflagration has been a stalemate (<http://www.usip.org>). The tactical manoeuvring of the militia particularly those of the MEND had also become a clog in the wheel in the resolution of the Niger-

Delta crisis. While the Nigerian military employs the 'highly predictable' tactics such as the; search and rescue operation, cordon and search, aerial bombing and counter insurgency operations, the MEND's attacks involve substantially more sophisticated tactics than those of previous militant groups in the Niger Delta. MEND's recent tactics have included (<http://Wikipedia.org>: 2008):

- Swam manoeuvres: guerrillas are using seed boats in the Niger Delta's swamps to quickly attack targets in succession. Multiple, highly manoeuvrable units have kept the government and Shell's defensive systems off-balance defending their sprawling networks.
- Radically improved firepower and combat training: allowing guerrillas to overpower a combination of Shell's Western-trained private military guards and elite Nigerian units in several engagements. (One of Shell's private military operators was captured as a hostage.)
- Effective use of system disruption: targets have been systematically and accurately selected to completely shut down production and delay and/or halt repairs, and the guerrillas are making effective use of Shell's hostages to coerce both the government and the multinational.

6.9 State Response to Threats on Security by Militia Groups:

State responses to militia activities in the country, has generated mixed feelings among the populace. Some segment mostly from the military sector argued that the activities of the militias constitute breaches to the nation's national security hence, the need for decisive action to repress and deter future and similar actions. The other segment coming mostly from civil societies and human rights groups have on their part, called for a more civilized that is, political cum diplomatic approach where all stakeholders will be able to dialogue and discuss in an enabling environment acceptable to all. The government on its part, particularly the Abacha regime (1993) and the Obasanjo administration (1999), opted for a more repressed and fire-for-fire approach. The Yar'Adua government (2007) for its own part adopted the 'carrot and stick approach'.

The government had on several occasions explained its role in deterring and curtailing the activities of the armed militia- men. For instance, the former spokesman of Joint Task Force (JTF), Col. Rabe Abubakar, explained that the Nigerian troops were deployed to rescue hostages, free hijacked ships and fish out the hoodlums who attacked military personnel on legitimate duties. In sum, one would not be too wrong to assert, that the military still need a lot of

convincing to do. Nigeria is under a democratic dispensation and citizens are wont to criticize governmental actions that are at variance with democratic norms and civil ethos. This is the more reason that this study is in agreement with the view, which affirmed that (Joab-Peterside: 2007):

State response against these popular pressures assumed the forms of arrest, detention and trial of activists on trump charges and execution the aim being to silence opposition voices, and deployment of military forces that operate more like an army of occupation to demobilize the people. State's approach to security is dominated by the character of deterrence exhibited by unrestrained willingness to show maximum force at the slightest hint of insecurity. Operation Sweep, Operation Fire-For -Fire, Operation Hurricane No.1 and No. 2, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Flush 1, 2, and 3 are examples of high profile security initiatives that mirror the repressive mood and tendencies of the state . . . Unfortunately, military might dramatically escalated violence as militant groups emerge resorting to the use of arms ostensibly in self-defence provoking bloody clashes with federal troops deployed to contain violence, to drive home their point of deprivation and marginalization.

6.10 Military Expenditure /Defence Budget (Milex) in Nigeria:

The controversy over the Nigerian defence expenditure has become much more intense because defence allocation (like that of other African countries), is seen as a reflection of the interplay of many variables which are perceived by different people in different ways. However, as controversial as the defence budget may be, a state evaluates its security requirements on a variety of geographic, demographic, and economic grounds, hence, the tendency to relate economic wealth and growth to security problems (Emile, 1973: 4). Moreover, since the Nigerian leadership is subjected to rapid changes either through military coups or through the normal democratic process, the perception of threats as well as what constitutes the optimum defence spending is often subjected to reviews by these different administrations.

Despite the changes in administration, various Nigerian leadership since the period of independence (in 1960) up to the present, have constantly allocated the lion share of the overall federal budget to the defence sector. The greater share to the defence sector is premised on the fact that the armed forces are the overall protectors of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Nigerian nation, which includes the protection of the totality of the states' economic, political and socio-cultural interests. Although defence cannot be considered as productive in the economic sense it is nevertheless believed that a strong and efficient armed force, strong enough to guarantee national peace and security is indispensable

for the economic progress of the nation. Thus, the crucial role of the military as stated above, has often endeared an increase in the resources allocated to the armed forces for the procurement of arms, the provision of logistic backup, and military welfare needs (Third Nigerian National Development Plan).

The issue of how much is dedicated to the military expenditure has long been a contending factor in Nigeria's defence and security since independence in 1960. Undoubtedly, defence takes a substantial share of the country's total budget. This fact is substantiated by Nigerian scholars in the field (Imobighe, 1987), (Omede, 2001), (Omitoogun, 2003), which all came to the conclusion that there has been a systematic rise in the amount allocated to defence between 1960 and 2009.

Historically, military expenditure in Nigeria has vastly expanded since the military first came into political governance in 1966. In fact, the whole process of high defence expenditure between 1961 and 1975, could be summarized thus (Adekson, 1978):

In 1961, Nigeria's total expenditure was ₦4 million, rising to ₦25 million on the eve of the civil war in 1966. The size of the military during this period was just less than 11,000 men. The war effort tremendously increased the size of the army and the defence budget started to grow rapidly. By 1969, it stood at approximately ₦360 million. There was a marginal decline in the immediate post-war years (1970/71), but it started to rise again in 1972. The ₦1 billion mark was attained in 1975. Defence expenditure actually doubled between 1974 and 1975 although the civil war had ended almost six years before . . . During the pre-military era, defence constituted only 6 per cent of government expenditure. This rose to an average of 33 per cent between 1967 and 1970 . . . By 1975, 7.6 of real GDP were taken by defence.

Imobighe (1987:21) in his analysis pointed out that total provisions for defence spending took a substantial share of the country's resources especially after the civil war. In buttressing his analysis, Imobighe (1987:23-26) claimed that:

Under the first republic the average share of defence was 8.96%. During the civil – war years, this increased to 18.43%, while in the post civil –war years, defence share further rose to 21.3%. The increase during the period under review has been attributed to the prosecution of the civil, which resulted in the “purchase of equipment, meeting up with existing commitments and coping with additional inescapable expenditure. Between 1968 and 1977, Nigeria's defence budget exceeded the average for the African continent. The amount expended on defence by the federal Government during this period was 21.6% - a substantial part of the total budget.

The defence sector even after the civil war till the present (1970 - 97) continues to absorb a substantial share of the country's resources. For instance, in the 1970

- 74 plan period, total provisions for defence were ₦156 billion, while the overall budget was ₦3.192 billion. Between 1975-80, defence recorded an increase of 91.8 per cent over that of preceding plan period. Defence provision in 1975-80 stood at ₦2.828 billion while the total provision was ₦30 billion (Imobighe, 1987:21).

In spite of the huge amount expended on defence, one can point out that most of the allocations are spent on personnel and overhead cost social welfare services construction of buildings (barracks) and other civil engineering projects as against the purchase of equipment to boost the firepower and capabilities of the three arms (Army, Navy and the Air force).

In his analysis of the trends in and level of military expenditure, Omitoogun (2003:91) explained that the typical high military expenditure experienced a decline in the 1980's, and increased only once in 1983. This decline were based on two major factors namely (Omitoogun, 2003: 91)

The general decline in the oil revenue, which the government depended for nearly 90 percent of its annual income and two, the depreciation of the currency. The increase in defence spending in 1983 was as a result of the general election in that year and the investment by the civilian president on military equipment and improved salaries for the military in order to nip military intervention in the bud.

The nation's military expenditure (MILEX) resumed "its downward slide by 1984 and declined both in terms of the share of total government expenditure and a share of G.D.P, to 3.1 percent and 0.6 percent respectively in 1989 "(Omitoogun, 2003: 92) by 1990 however, when Nigeria stepped up its peace support operations (ECOMOG) in Liberia, MILEX started increasing in real terms till 1990. For instance in 1983, MILEX increased by more than 100 percent in nominal terms and about 35 percent in real terms over that of 1992.

Omede (2001), also pointed out that between 1984 and 1987 Nigeria's MILEX witnessed a "downward plunge," however, it suddenly took an "upward drive" in 1988. The fall (between 1984 and 1987) however can be attributed to the economic crisis in the country. The rise in 1988 on the other hand indicates that there exists a higher threat perception in the country (frequent border clashes and peace keeping operations), coupled with a slight improvement in the country's economic fortunes. Defence takes a substantial share of Nigeria's resources especially since the conclusion of the civil war.

In order to tone down the perennial increase in defence expenditure, the Federal Government of Nigeria came out in 1991 with a Rolling Plan Programme that was to span a period of four years: 1991 - 1994, with a revised edition of 1993 - 1995. In the rolling plan period, the resources allocated to defence were to depreciate as the years rolled by. In short, the aim of the rolling plan was to ensure that the sectors that yielded higher economic value or productivity were accorded higher priority. Defence allocation was to be reduced as the years rolled from 1991 to 1994 to an appreciable level that will positively correspond to the allocation and the distribution of resources to the other sectors and sub-sectors of the entire society (Omede, 2001). See Table 6:1 for selected Sectoral Allocations in the 1991-94 Rolling Plan.

Table 6:1 Selected Sectoral Allocations of The Federal Rolling Plans 1991 - 1994 (₦-millions).

Ministries	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total
AGRIC	277,919	307,695	255,101	170,819	733,838
EDUCATION	328,868	314,223	312,923	318,134	943,248
DEFENCE	888,900	850,000	785,150	702,040	2,338,196
FIN/ECO DEV	155,060	73,061	73,383	73,060	220,604
INDUSTRIES	147,694	325,500	330,306	10,500	993,300
SCIENCE/TECH	90,204	78,015	84,013	93,066	254,092
MINES & STEEL	42,800	279,800	254,200	250,200	784,240
EMP. LAB/PROD	161,419	191,625	226,550	240,940	659,115
HEALTH	171,156	192,000	186,000	175,400	553,400

Source: Omede, A. J. (2001), Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of Lagos. Lagos, Nigeria. See also: The Federal Rolling Plan Programme 1991.

In spite of the attempt to cut down the defence budget as the federal rolling plan of 1991 - 94 indicates, it was evident that the government could not cope with the decline hence, the promulgation of a new rolling plan (1993 - 95) see

Table 6:2. In this plan, allocation to defence increased from ₦1.546.30 billion in 1993 to ₦17,890,184 billion in 1995.

It must however be noted that in 1991 and 1992, up till 1995 budgetary (sectoral) allocations, defence retained its esteem position by incurring the highest share of the federal Government expenditure. As shown in Table 6:3, the higher allocation to defence further indicates that there was no significant departure from what obtained in 1988, 1989, and 1990; instead, resource allocation to defence in 1992 surpassed those of the previous years already shown in Table 6:1. departure from what obtained in 1988, 1989, and 1990; instead, resource allocation to defence in 1992 surpassed those of the previous years already shown in Table 6:3.

Table 6:2 National Rolling Plan (1993 - 95): Summary of Allocation To selected Federal Ministries & Agencies (Figures in ₦-Million Phasing. (Grand Total ₦55,594,000.00)

Ministries	1993	1994	1995	1993/95 Plan allow
AGRIC/WATER RES.	1,470.000	3,140.174	3,108.974	7,719.148
EDUCATION	633.020	585.874	568.059	1,786.993
FIN/ECO DEV.	457.560	259.481	260.117	977.158
DEFENCE	1,546.300	1,123.178	1,089.148	3,758.826
INDUSTRIES	903.650	684.500	670.550	2,258.700
POWER	401.500	435.950	396.900	1,243.350
STEEL	493.050	735.270	670.540	1,898.860
EMP/LABOUR/PROD.	389.150	351.450	340.350	1,080.950
HEALTH/HUMAN SERVICES	352.920	362.650	325.580	1,041.150

Source: Omede, A. J., (2001), Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of Lagos. Lagos. Nigeria. See also: The Federal Government of Nigeria National Rolling Plan (1993 - 95).

Significantly, in 1994, the defence sector received a vote of ₦7.031 billion or 10.2 per cent of the total recurrent and capital expenditure. This allocation represented an increase of 35.2 per cent above that of 1993 which had a total allocation of ₦55 billion.

TABLE 6:3 FEDERAL BUDGET (SECTORIAL ALLOCATIONS) 1988–1992 (₦Billions) Selected Ministries

Ministries	1988 Sectorial allocation	1989 Recurrent expenditure	1990 Recurrent expenditure	1991 Recurrent expenditure	1992 Sectorial allocation
DEFENCE	830,000,000	1,122,208,580	1,410,493,300	1,834,180,930	2,023,417,570
EDUCATION	248,207,840	1,082,478,030	1,126,664,140	429,223,870	1,997,752,840
AGRIC/NATRES.	54,324,600	88,139,600	208,101,800	121,094,440	309,750,580
FIN/ECO DEV.	54,832,940	37,568,300	89,361,770	118,085,790	N.A.
HEALTH/HUMAN SERVICES	259,938,460	359,658,700	401,136,101	619,392,500	N.A.
INDUSTRIES	38,761,280	41,617,990	51,937,750	52,329,500	269,516,150
EMP/LABOUR/PROD.	134,669,600	139,150,690	148,210,120	136,966,920	N.A.
MINES/POWER/STEEL	14,202,290	19,652,040	33,521,610	41,452,170	161,268,990
SCIENCE/TECH	102,326,780	125,107,000	141,679,800	171,580,490	N.A.
N.U.C.	500,000,000	575,000,000	655,145,040	655,145,040	N.A.
N.B.T.E.	54,122,230	77,654,740	91,123,710	91,123,170	N.A.

Source: Omede, A. J., (2001), Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of Lagos. Lagos, Nigeria.
N.A. = Not Available due to Rationalization of Ministries.

In fact, the pattern of the share of defence under actual recurrent and capital expenditure in the period 1992 to 1995 does not depict any considerable shift from the ones already described above. For instance, in 1996, the defence budget was ₦18.8 billion, out of the total government expenditure of ₦83,707 billion. In 1999, the upward shift of defence was evident given the total amount of ₦16.755 billion allocated to defence out of the total budget of ₦124.502 billion.

Insightful account of the factors responsible for the sustained increase in MILEX in the 1990's are given by Omitogun (2003: 92-93) as follows:

- The Abacha coup of 1993 made serious attempt to enforce an exchange rate mechanism. Special exchange rate given to the military (₦22 to 11) as against the general rate of ₦84 to 11 which "meant essentially that the declared milex especially the capital component of the budget was four times the figure reported
- The Abubakar's regime's commitment (came into power following the demise of Abacha in 1998) to re-professionalise the armed forces and the financial resources committed to the quick conclusion of the military's peace support operations in Liberia and Sierra-Leone.
- The regime requested and was allocated money to refurbish military air craft and

Evacuate, Nigerian troops from free-town. Consequently in 1999, total MILEX increased by 87 percent in real terms over that of 1998 to make up 4.8 percent of government spending and 14 percent of GDP.

In spite of the debate on the high allocation to defence, the military on its own part has expounded that the Federal Government shall continue to accord the sector the level of funding it deserves bearing in mind however, the global suggestion that defence budget should be 1.5% - 3% of a nation's GDP (National Defence Budget, 2006).

6.11 The Nigerian Defence Policy

In Nigeria, the issue of an existing, concise, and codified defence policy is a highly debatable and controversial one. The furore over an articulate military policy stems on one hand, from a perspective, which contends that the armed forces of Nigeria lacked a well- documented (Alli, 1994: 2 & 3) defence policy and firm posture in responding to threats of territorial violations from her neighbours. In her own analysis, Vogt (1986:473) posited that there is a lack of clarity and understanding of the political factors that should dictate the nature

of the defence policy. Consequently, this has led to the pursuit of diverse and often contradictory policies by the various arms of the defence establishment.

On the other side of the coin, however, is the military perspective, which expounds that the acts of the Nigerian Armed Forces, and the Sections of the Nigerian Constitution (1979) on Foreign Policy and Responsibility of Government, contain certain provisions, which are translated as Nigeria's defence policy. The main objectives of which are enunciated as:

- a. The defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
- b. The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of independence and territorial integrity of all African countries, while at the same time fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development.
- c. The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world.
- d. The defence and promotion of world peace.

Similarly, the Nigerian Defence Policy, which is a framework for the realization of the nation's Foreign Policy objectives, was according to former Head of State Gen. Sani Abacha (1992:3)—then as Minister of Defence and Chairman Joint Chief of Staff succinctly enumerated as:

- a. Defence of our nation's territorial integrity and preservation of Nigeria as an indivisible, indissoluble nation.
- b. Contribution toward the general development of the nation and effective management of national emergencies.
- c. Ensuring security in the West African sub-region in particular and Africa in general by promoting a collective security system through bilateral, sub-regional and continental cooperation.
- d. Contribution towards peace and stability as a whole.

In pursuance of her defence policy, the Nigerian Armed Forces had over the years, attempted to achieve a state of combat preparedness through both engaging in vigorous military training, and the acquisition of modern sophisticated military weapons. In addition to combating internal threats and protecting the territorial integrity of the nation, the Nigerian military has also been faced with the task of responding to challenges within the West-African sub-region and the world system as a whole. In order to meet up with these challenges, the primary role of

the Nigerian Armed Forces has been “redesigned and restructured to provide for a powerful land, sea, and air force, through which the government can exercise direct control over its citizens, while at the same time conducting very successful land operations” (Wushishi, 1987:53-70).

The military has also extended the nation’s military role of threat deterrent to the West-African sub-region. This development is premised on the assumption by the Nigerian military authorities that any threat to peace, security and order within the region, will be perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Hence, the military presence of Nigeria in Liberia, under the auspices of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), has been described as the pursuit of the nation’s foreign policy, which makes Africa its centrepiece. General Ibrahim Babangida, a former Nigerian Head of State (The African Guardian, 1991:13), argued that the aggressive pursuit of Nigeria’s foreign policy in Liberia was a new thrust in Nigeria’s foreign policy but, which was based on the fact that Nigeria has evolved to a point of acceptance of the reality that the conduct of our international relations and foreign policy may, at times, involve certain contractual military and other obligations beyond the nation’s borders. Babangida (The Soja Magazine, 1991:10), further argued that the deployment of Nigeria’s superior military might in Liberia, engendered by the threat to peace and security in the sub-region, was:

Perfectly consistent with the Nigerian military’s role and functions of the defence of the nation’s territorial integrity and sovereignty which must be seen in a wider context of our (Nigeria’s) sworn allegiance to secure our nation’s internal security against real or potential threats.

In order to consolidate the nation’s defence policy, military authorities came out in 2006 with a document entitled the “National Defence Policy”. This document based on the analysis of Nigeria’s strategic environment presents the government with a short-term policy framework for defence. The defence policy also analyses the risks and challenges (national interests and threats) facing the Nigerian military and the scenarios for the deployment of forces. It specifies the defence policy objectives (same as those enumerated in the preceding paragraphs) as well as the management and organization of the armed forces. Furthermore, it highlights the various aspects of resource support such as defence infrastructure, research and development, defence budget and reform signposts in the armed forces among others. In addition, the policy enumerated the import of civil-military and media relations in peace and in times of war. This particular aspect

according to the defence policy (2006) is an overarching goal, which not only emphasize the consolidation of civil control over the military, but which is also one of the characteristics of a truly democratic society.

Obviously, the Nigerian defence policy is based on a careful assessment of the national objectives, interests and the nation's perception of both internal and external threats. These factors, one must bear in mind, are political decisions, which are dependent on both the country's national interests and its foreign policy stance. Most important, one can surmise, that Nigeria's defence policy in all its ramifications and based on the various sources consulted, is an attempt by the armed forces to:

- a. Seek new status of military power.
- b. Determine, identify and contain all forms of threats to Nigeria's security.
- c. Design and structure the military to provide for a powerful land, sea and air force in order to exercise direct control over its citizens, resources and thus, conduct successful land operations.
- d. Pursue Nigeria's foreign policy – an effort, which has been expanded to involve certain contractual military obligations beyond the nation's borders.
- e. Pursue Nigeria's national interests in a wider context of the military's sworn allegiance to protect the country's security.
- f. Create a compact, highly mobile, well trained and highly motivated armed forces.
- g. Adopt the policies of - the Flexible Offensive Doctrine, Forward Backward Posture and the Rapid Deployment Force, Force Projection Policy and the Policy of Massive Armoured In-depth.
- h. Train officers in the art of military tactics and warfare in order to be prepared and self-reliant and, diversify the nation's sources of arms procurement; seek rapid and significant changes in the military and the entire national life.

6.12 Civilian Control of The Military in a Democratic Society

Before 1999 and with the exception of the period (1979 – 1984), the military ruled Nigerian without the proper regard for democratic norms and values. It also goes without saying that military rule itself is an aberration. More often than not, one has had to wonder whether the military is above the nation's constitution. With the advent of democracy in Nigeria since 1999 however, the military has been inundated with calls to conform to democratic norms and value.

Civil control over the armed forces simply refers to the hierarchy of authority between the executive, the parliament (national assembly) as well as the armed forces. It involves the supremacy of the constitution, the imperatives of democratic norms and ethos, civil-military relations and military professionalism.

The assumption underling the concept of civilian control over the military lies in the fact that if the military is not properly managed and if not democratically controlled or that if it (military) is not fully integrated into the fabric of the society, it can pose a variety of threats for democracy. Some of the threats the military might pose include (GDCAF, 2003: 149) (National Defence Policy, 2006):

- Exercising unconstitutional influence or even staging military recurrent coup and rebellion
- Practicing unauthorized military or commercial activities and politicisation of the military
- Consuming excessively high levels of resources which are needed for other sectors of society
- Misusing public funds
- Violating human rights (looting, harassing civilians, rape, robbing and using illegal violence) etc.

In order to avoid the threats of coups and politicisation of the military, the Nigerian government since 1999 (with particular reference to the Obasanjo administration of 1999-2007) have made several efforts to re-orientate the military. Mechanisms such as the parliamentary oversight and civilian control over the armed forces and raising awareness of and respect for the nation's constitution have also been embarked upon (Omede, 2004). Some of the specific efforts made are the appointment of a civilian defence minister, the establishment of a defence committee in the senate, the appointment of three chiefs of staff for each of the arms – army, navy and air-force, conducting conferences and retreats on democratic norms and ethics and inculcating the importance of

the supremacy of the constitution as well the need for the armed forces to be absolutely loyal to the constitution and the President cum Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian armed forces. In addition to these various.

6.13 Concluding Remarks

The military is one the most consistent sub-sector of the Nigerian federal structure. From the period of independence in 1960 to the present period of democratic rebirth of 2010, the complex task of keeping Nigeria one, and of protecting the nation from external aggression and attacks undoubtedly rest primarily on the Nigerian armed forces - army, navy and the air force. It is therefore not surprising that the military is the most potent element of Nigeria's national security. The military in protecting the territorial integrity of the nation, has been engaged in the analysis of threats to Nigeria's national security. Evidently, Nigeria's security is based on a holistic view which sees the citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. It involves the element of development: economic security, social security, environmental and food security, the equality of life and technological security.

As shown in this study, the Nigerian Military have had to contend with both external and internal threats to the nation's defence and security. Incessant attacks and forceful collection of taxes by the military of neighbouring countries (e.g. Cameroon, Chad, Niger), on Nigerians living in villages along the nation's border, illegal smuggling, piracy on Nigeria's territorial waters. The civil war, incessant military coups, the rise of armed militia groups, ethnic and religious violence culminating in political instability and upheavals within the country, unemployment, trafficking in illegal arms, pipeline vandalism and wilful destruction of public property, are some of the recurring internal threats that the military have had to contend with.

One other recurring challenge that faced by the military was the high incidence of military intervention in the governance of the nation's polity. Our analysis revealed that the military continued to intervene in the nation's governance even when it is a known fact that a military government is a major set back for any nation. Again, the thirty-month Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) indeed provided the Nigerian military with a litmus test for the defence and security of Nigeria. The civil war largely caused by internal political, ethnic and tribal antagonisms brought to fore, the struggle to achieve national integration in Nigeria. In addition, our examination of the military's role in internal security operations

revealed that such actions are fraught with a lot of issues and controversies. Military authorities in reacting to the issues have argued that the series of civil uprisings and religious violence are capable of creating insecurity, disorder and instability in the country.

The study also analysed the litigious issue of high military expenditure in Nigeria. This has long been a challenging factor in Nigeria's defence and security since independence in 1960. Undoubtedly, defence takes a substantial share of the country's total budget. In spite of the debate on the high allocation to defence, the military on its own part has expounded that the Federal Government shall continue to accord the sector the level of funding it deserves bearing in mind however, the global suggestion that defence budget should be 1.5% - 3% of a nation's GDP.

A major revelation by the study is the effort made by the government to consolidate the nation's defence policy. To achieve this feat, the study recorded that the military authorities came out in 2006 with a "National Defence Policy" based on the analysis of Nigeria's strategic environment, which analyses the risks and challenges (national interests and threats) facing the Nigerian military and the scenarios for the deployment of forces. Obviously, the Nigerian defence policy is based on a careful assessment of the national objectives, interests and the nation's perception of both internal and external threats.

Finally, the study also highlighted the imperatives of civil control over the armed forces. It examined the importance of the hierarchy of authority between the executive, the parliament (national assembly) as well as the armed forces. Finally the study posits that for the armed forces to continue to be relevant in a rapidly changing democratic environment that Nigeria is currently passing through, then its officers and men must be ready at all times to subjugate themselves to the supremacy of the constitution, the norms and ethics of democracy

as well as embark on aggressive and productive military training that will ensure a higher state of their combat readiness and military professionalism.

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