

Factors Influencing Board Gender Diversity in the Nigerian Capital Market

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Abstract

This study examines the internal and structural factors that influence gender diversity on the boards of publicly listed companies in Nigeria. To investigate this issue, a sample of 80 publicly listed companies on the Nigerian stock exchange from 2005 to 2015 was examined through ordinary least squares (OLS), Two-limit Tobit and Probit estimation techniques. According to the findings, board size, independence, ownership concentration, company size, and industry are significantly and positively associated with women's representation on corporate boards. However, CEO gender and foreign directorship are negative. These findings suggest that these factors may shape the gender makeup of Nigerian companies' boards of directors. Hence, in a country with weak institutional frameworks like Nigeria, companies themselves can promote good corporate governance through gender. This study sheds insight on internal governance and structural factors influencing women's representation and adds to the body of literature already accessible on ethical and equality concerns for women's representation on corporate boards.

Keywords: Business Ethics, Corporate Governance, Gender Diversity, Ownership Concentration, Social Equity, Nigeria.

1.0 Introduction

A simple way of identifying whether or not a company is serious about corporate governance and business ethics is to look at the appointment of one or more women to the corporate board (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). A few empirical studies have looked at factors that influence the percentage of women serving on corporate boards. However, the geographical scope of most studies has been developed countries, such as Australia (Dimovski, Lombardi, & Cooper, 2013); the United States (US) (Geiger & Marlin, 2011; Hillman, Shropshire, Albert, & Cannella, 2007; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002); and advanced emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC countries) (Saeed, Belghitar, & Yousaf, 2016; Saeed, Sameer, Raziq, Salman, & Hammoudeh, 2019). Likewise, the theoretical explanations have focused more on the economic theories (agency and resource dependence) and institutional theories, with little emphasis on social equity/ethical and strategic choice theories.

Moreover, the social equity/ethical theory contends that having women in the boardroom is morally required of a company by its shareholders and stakeholders since their presence denotes a more just and equal society. Similarly, the social exclusion theories state that the nature of the company may influence women's representation on the board. The strategic choice theory contends that it is the top managers (e.g., the chief executive officer) that make decisions to influence corporate outcomes. Therefore, the goal of this research is to examine the internal corporate governance and structural elements that may have impact on the appointment of women to the boardroom of Nigerian companies.

Investigating this issue matters because there is no explicit or mandatory regulation governing the appointment of Nigerian women to boards of listed companies in the Nigerian

capital market¹. There is also no gender regulation in other areas of public governance, such as federal executive cabinet members, the national parliament, local councils, and candidate lists for elections. Therefore, in the absence of a strong statutory framework to increase the representation of women on boards, their appointment may be contingent on companies' voluntary decisions or the genuine commitment of companies to upholding ethical standards. Similarly, the role of corporations in modern society may be difficult to achieve without the practice of sound corporate governance, especially in a country with weak institutional frameworks like Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015), where gender discrimination is pervasive in both legal frameworks and customary practices (Ajala, 2017).

In addition, if Nigeria is to fulfil its potential of growing its GDP to over \$1.6 trillion by 2030 and expanding its economy by roughly 7.1%, women must be represented in the corporate pipeline. The impact of this could improve Nigeria's position from its current ranking of the 26th largest economies in the world to among the top 20 economy by 2030, surpassing that of the Netherlands, Thailand, or Malaysia, and possibly becoming the largest economy in Africa in the near future (Leke et al., 2014). These make it imperative to look at the factors affecting the representation of women on corporate boards (WOCB) in Nigeria, which is the largest market for goods and services in Africa.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The literature review and development of hypotheses are covered in Section 2. The section on research methods in Section 3 comes next. The paper's discussion and conclusion are presented in Section 4.

¹For instance, a critical examination of the Securities Commission's 2011 New Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies (CGC 2011) merely suggests that public companies take gender into consideration when choosing members of their board of directors (BODs). Section 13 (13.2) of the code states that "the criteria for the selection of the board of directors should be written and defined to reflect the existing board's strengths and weaknesses, necessary skills and experience, current age range, and gender composition" (CGC 2011: 23).

2.0 Literature review and hypothesis development

The case for WOCB has been the focus of several theoretical justifications, including social equity and ethics, social exclusion, and economics. Scholars who approach social equity and ethics from this perspective view that having more women on boards is a vital instrument for reducing discrimination and moral injustice at the top echelon level of companies' management (Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2007; Chijoke-Mgbame, Boateng, & Mgbame, 2020). This is because having more women on corporate boards advances social equity and is a desirable goal for companies. Moreover, socioeconomic diversity must be integrated into corporate governance because companies are expected to represent the society within which they operate (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Consequently, companies that have high proportion of female representation may be seen as good corporate citizens.

Several empirical studies have demonstrated that the presence of women on corporate boards is notably greater in companies with larger boards (Ahmed, Higgs, Ng, & Delaney, 2018; Carrasco et al., 2015; Dimovski et al., 2013; Gregoric, Oxelheim, Randoy & Thomsen, 2017; Hillman et al., 2007; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002). On this note, it stands to reason that women would be more likely to be qualified than men to run for board seats in a company with a larger board. This is because such a company may, by virtue of ethical pressures towards achieving an equitable society and a show of commitment by the board, ensure that the right thing is done and the company's image in the eyes of the public is perceived in a good light. Therefore, one could argue that the size of the board has a significant impact on WOCB. Hence, this study anticipates that:

H1: Board size is positively associated with women's representation on the corporate boards of Nigerian publicly listed companies.

Women may have the opportunity to be appointed to the board since a larger board size may contain more women directors, and a larger board size is likely to be connected with non-

executive directors on the board of companies trying to be ethical. In fact, studies have shown that female directors exhibit comparable behaviours to non-executive directors. This could imply that the appointment of women directors is influenced by the board's independence (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). For instance, Ahmed et al. (2018), Saeed et al. (2016), and Geiger and Marlin (2012) discovered a positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and WOCB. Hence, this study makes the case that the degree of the board's independence has a greater tendency to influence its decisions regarding fulfilling societal norms related to gender equality. This act would demonstrate that the company is acting morally and not short-changing investors. As such, this study proposes that:

H2: The proportion of non-executive directors on the board is positively associated with women's representation on the corporate boards of Nigerian publicly listed companies.

Making decisions that will influence corporate outcomes and shape the company is one of the fundamental strategic responsibilities of the company's top managers, such as the CEO. A decision related to the gender makeup of the board might be an example of such a decision (Ng & Sears, 2017). Because of this, if a company has gender-based similarity, gender-induced entry barriers may be lessened (Berger, Kick, Koetter, & Schaeck, 2013). That is to say, given that the CEO is saddled with the responsibility of overseeing the day-to-day operation of the company and exerts considerable influence in the composition of the board, the selection of a director for the board may be influenced by demographic similarities to the CEO (Brown, Buchholtz, Butts, & Ward, 2019). Women may therefore stand a better chance of getting appointed to the board if the board is chaired by a female CEO (Liu, 2018). On this note, it is possible to argue that companies where CEOs have substantial influence over the selection of board members may exhibit a gender imbalance in the composition of their board. Thus, the following hypothesis implies that:

H3: The gender of the chief executive officer is positively associated with women's representation on the corporate boards of publicly listed Nigerian companies.

The ownership structure of a company is another important factor that could influence the composition of the board. A concentrated ownership structure, for example, concentrates power and incentives for management oversight among owners who are able to discipline managers through concentrated voting rights (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While concentrated ownership has its benefits, some academics contend that high levels of concentrated ownership can result in opportunistic behaviour from controlling shareholders and a principal-principal agency problem. This is particularly so in institutional environments where minority shareholder protection and enforcement mechanisms are lacking (Lins, 2003). Given that gender diverse boards would act as a substitute mechanism for weak corporate governance, such companies need to put in place an appropriate governance structure, such as a gender diverse board (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2012). Therefore, it is anticipated that ownership concentration will positively affect WOCB.

H4: Ownership concentration is positively associated with women representation on the corporate boards of publicly listed Nigerian companies.

Control variables

Other factors that may affect the representation of women on board are company size and industry. For instance, studies have documented that women's participation on corporate boards is considerably greater in larger companies (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carrasco et al., 2015; Esteban-Salvador, 2011; Gregoric et al., 2017; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002). All of these indicate that women have a greater chance of being considered as directors in large companies. Hence, company size tends to be positively associated with women's representation on the corporate board.

Whether a company operates in a masculine or feminine industry may affect how likely it is for women to advance to managerial positions (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). For

instance, industries like construction and manufacturing are generally considered masculine (male-dominated), whereas service industries like healthcare are categorized as feminine (Gipson, Pfaff, Mendelsohn, Catenacci, & Burke, 2017). Additionally, companies operating in industries where women are salient stakeholders (e.g., employees and consumers) would ensure that a representative of these constituencies is on the board (Kirsch, 2018). Therefore, the proportion of women on the corporate board can be influenced by the industry the company is classified in.

Globally connected companies tend to adhere to international best practices on gender equality and diversity management. Studies have demonstrated, for example, that foreign directors make efforts for better corporate governance through measures including increasing the proportion of non-executive directors on the boards (Kim, Eppler-Kim, Kim, & Byun, 2010) and national board diversity (Maturo, Migliori, & Paolone, 2017). Thus, this study contends that the proportion of foreign directors and ownership may have an influence on the representation of WOCB in a country like Nigeria because there are no regulations requiring companies to set gender quotas for women on their boards of directors.

Similarly, women in the labour force are key formal institutions for gender equality. There is some evidence that the engagement of women in the labour force can explain the participation of executive directors (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013). This means that the proportion of women in the labour force participating in the economy may lead to an increase in the consideration of WOCB (Tyrowicz, Terjesen, & Mazurek, 2020). Therefore, this study suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of women in the labour force and WOCB. According to a number of studies (e.g., De Cabo, Gimeno, & Escot, 2011; Gul et al., 2011; Morikawa, 2016), the age of the company is another structurally specific variable that can influence WOCB.

3.0 Research method

3.1 Sample and data

A sample of publicly listed companies in the Nigerian capital market is employed to observe the structural factors influencing the appointment of women on corporate boards. A total of 169 companies are listed as of July 6, 2019 (<http://www.nse.com.ng/issuers/listed-securities/listed-companies>). Of the 169, 59 are categorized as companies providing financial services², and 114 are non-financial companies. Out of the 114 non-financial companies, 80 companies (which is 71% of the non-financial companies) have available data for a longer period starting from 2005-2016, which is the period of data collection for this study. The study period begins in 2005 because it is the year that saw the most listed companies on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) (215), while the lowest number (166) was recorded in 2016.

In addition, two main data sets are employed: corporate governance information (e.g., gender composition of the corporate board) and financial information (total assets and profit before tax). These data are taken from listed companies annual reports and the NSE's FACTBOOK. Particularly, data on the gender distribution of corporate boards and certain other attributes of the board of directors' as well as financial data are handpicked from the annual reports. The data on female labour force participation was collected from the World Bank database.

3.3 Estimation technique

This study tests factors that increase women's chances of being appointed to the corporate board using ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression, in particular the Tobit estimation techniques. The Tobit estimator is considered because the data on the proportion of women's representation on the corporate board is skewed and there are companies with no

² In line with prior studies (e.g., Saeed et al., 2016; Saeed et al., 2018), this study excludes companies operating in the financial service sectors.

women on their corporate boards, as indicated by the minimum and maximum values of 0% and 58%, respectively (see Table 1). By implication, employing OLS in this situation may be inappropriate since it assumes that the projected dependent variable may reside outside the permitted range of 0 to 100% (Ahmed et al., 2018; Tobin, 1958). On this note, this study applies the two-limit (upper and lower limits) Tobit estimation technique in addition to the OLS estimation technique. The Tobit estimation technique integrates the Probit and truncated regressions in a single estimation and is typically applied to censored data (variables that are not defined below zero and above 100%) (Saeed et al., 2018). Therefore, the OLS and Tobit estimations are used for the proportion of WOCB as a dependent variable, and the Probit estimation is utilized when women's representation on the board is a dummy variable. Model 1 presents the regression model for this study, while Model 2 shows the two-limit Tobit model.

Model 1

$$WOCB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BODS_{it} + \beta_2 BODIND_{it} + \beta_3 CEOGND_{it} + \beta_4 PFDIR_{it} + \beta_5 FDIROWN_{it} + \beta_6 OWNCON_{it} + \beta_7 COAG_{it} + \beta_8 LNTA_{it} + \beta_{10} FLF_{it} + \beta_{11} INDUSTRY_{it} + \beta_{12} YEAR_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where WOCB stands for the proportion of women on corporate boards; BODS for board size; BODIND for non-executive directors proportion on corporate boards; CEOGND is a dummy value of 1 if the CEO is a woman, and 0 otherwise; the percentage of foreign directors on corporate boards is known as PFDIR; the percentage of shares held by foreign directors is known as FDIROWN; and OWNCON is the ownership concentration; the company age as of the year of incorporation is COAG; while the natural logarithm of total assets is LNTA; the proportion of female in the labour force is known as FLF; INDUSTRY represents industry dummies and YEAR represents year dummies, respectively; ε_{it} is the random error.

Model 2:

$$WOCB^*_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BODS_{it} + \beta_2 BODIND_{it} + \beta_3 CEOGND_{it} + \beta_4 PFDIR_{it} + \beta_5 FDIROWN_{it} + \beta_6 OWNCON_{it} + \beta_7 COAG_{it} + \beta_8 LNTA_{it} + \beta_{10} FLF_{it} + \beta_{11} INDUSTRY_{it} + \beta_{12} YEAR_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$WOCB_{it} = L_{1i} \quad \text{if } WOCB^*_{it} \leq L_{1i}$$

$$WOCB_{it} = WDP^*_{it} \quad \text{if } L_{1i} < WOCB^*_{it} < L_{2i}$$

$$WOCB_{it} = L_{2i} \quad \text{if } WOCB^*_{it} \leq L_{2i}$$

$WOCB^*$ is when the proportion of women on corporate boards is a latent variable. L_1 and L_2 are the lower and upper limits, respectively.

INSERT TABLE 1

3.4 Empirical results

Descriptive analysis

Table 1 presents figures indicating that the percentage of women on corporate boards ranges from a mean of 7% to a maximum of 58%. Comparably, only 48% of the examined companies have a minimum of one woman on their corporate board, meaning that 52% of the sampled companies do not have a single woman at all. This simply indicates that a greater proportion of Nigerian companies have male-dominated BODs, implying that the presence of women on these boards is merely symbolic.

INSERT TABLE 2

According to the correlation analysis shown in Table 2, there are no extreme correlations (0.80) among variables that could suggest a multicollinearity threat. Similarly, Table 3's column 6 variance inflation factor (VIF) demonstrates that all factors used in the regression analysis fall below the critical threshold of 10. As a result, neither the correlation analysis nor the VIF test demonstrate that multicollinearity is an issue for the regression analysis.

INSERT TABLE 3

Regression results

The findings of the regression model used to look into factors impacting women directors on corporate boards are shown in Tables 3 and 4. To be more precise, Table 3 regression results are without controlling for industry and year effects, but Table 4 adjusted for them in the

regression model. Table 3 shows the OLS results in columns (2) and (3), while the logistic regression results are displayed in columns (4) and (5).

Based on the OLS results in Table 4, BODS and BODIND are found to be positively linked with WOCB, albeit at a weak significance level. Likewise, in the logistic regression, BODIND remains weakly associated with WOCB at the 10% significance level. However, at a significance level of 1%, BODS is found to be positively and significantly linked with WOCB, indicating that companies with larger boards may be able to afford to have more gender diversity on their BODs. The result is in line with H1 and other studies, which suggest that companies with larger boards have a greater level of female board participation (e.g., Geiger & Marlin, 2012; Morikawa, 2016; Saeed et al., 2018).

Consistent with H4, the OLS, Tobit, and Probit regression results likewise show a positive and significant link between OWNCON and WOCB at the 10 and 5% levels of significance. This is in line with Morikawa's (2016) findings that indicate owner-managed companies typically include female directors. Therefore, it can be concluded that the gender composition of the BoDs is influenced by the level of shareholders' concentration.

Conversely, at the 1% significance level, CEOGND is found to be adversely and significantly linked with WOCB. In addition to the OLS results, the Tobit and Probit regressions reveal a significant link between CEOGND and WOCB. In contrast to H3, these results suggest that CEOGND has a detrimental impact on women's prospects of being appointed to the corporate boards of listed companies in Nigeria. This may imply that CEOs might not have a good say in who gets appointed to the boardroom.

INSERT TABLE 4

In the Tobit and Probit regressions, respectively, it is observed that LNTA is positively and significantly linked with women on corporate boards at the 5 and 1% levels of significance. As evidenced by the higher share of women on corporate boards, larger

companies are more likely to embrace diversity. This evidence corroborates prior studies' claim that larger companies have higher likelihood of appointing women to corporate boards (Esteban-Salvador, 2011; Hillman et al., 2007; Saeed et al., 2018).

The gender makeup of the board is also influenced by the industry in which the company operates. Companies in the healthcare industry, in particular, are more likely to have female directors (Hyland & Marcellino, 2002). This is supported by the empirical evidence that a significant and positive link is found between women on corporate boards and healthcare industry dummies. The positive association is not surprising because the goods and services emanating from this industry have closeness with the final consumers.

This is in line with the assertions made by Gipson et al.'s (2017) that the healthcare industry is a female-friendly industry, and Gardiner and Tiggemann (1999) claim that women are more likely to be found in senior positions in the service industries that prioritise customer relations than in other industries. The current analysis also shows a negative effect for ICT, industrial goods, and natural resources companies. This, however, is not surprising given that women are significantly underrepresented in the natural resources, mining, and manufacturing sectors across 42 countries (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2016). Similar findings are reported by De Cabo et al. (2011), who show that service-oriented industries outnumbered technical ones in industries like technology and telecommunications, commodities, construction, and oil and energy.

Since the appointment of women is a critical corporate governance issue, foreign directors tend to be more sensitive to board diversity at both governance and top management levels due to public pressure. By so doing, a positive link is expected between PFDIR and the proportion of WOCB. In contrast to the aforementioned argument, empirical evidence in this study reveals a negative effect of PFDIR on WOCB. Another significant variable is women's labour force participation (FLF), which is negatively associated with WOCB. This is an

indication that stronger participation of women in the general labour market does not necessarily amount to an increase in WOCB.

4.0 Discussion and conclusion

This study investigated the structural factors linked to the advancement of women's appointments to corporate boards. Consistent with social equity and ethical concerns, this study showed that board size influences WOCB. The inference is that companies with larger boards would have a higher proportion of female directors since a greater gender mix among directors should foster diversity of experiences, creativity, and added value. This notion concurs with earlier studies (Carrasco et al., 2014; Geiger & Marlin, 2012; Hillman et al., 2007) that reported that the number of directors in the boardroom would influence the degree of representation of women in such corporate boards. Hence, it can be argued that large boards accommodate women more easily because they have more seats for potential female candidates or because such boards tend to uphold ethical standards and signal to the public that they are practicing good corporate governance and business ethics.

Ownership structure, specifically ownership concentration, is found to be an important factor influencing female directors. This suggests that a company's ownership structure matters when it comes to women's representation on the corporate board. In essence, it can be concluded that ownership concentration affects the makeup of the board because substantial shareholders of a company are likely to have the power to promote and appoint individuals in the boardroom, as well as ensure that the company considers the societal value of gender mix. In reality, companies think it is morally right to have WOCB in order to keep the support of important external stakeholders like investors and customers. Such companies would also ensure that individuals that are seated in the boardroom have specific skills and expertise that help to advise and counsel the management, and female

directors have been found to exhibit such qualities (Hillman et al., 2007). Gender diversity can also serve as a stand-in method to make up for weak corporate governance that may exist in a company with a concentrated ownership structure (Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2012).

The practical implications of the empirical findings are that companies and regulators should take into consideration the various corporate governance and structural characteristics that can be helpful in increasing the number of women on corporate boards and that are accountable for the exclusion of women from the pool of potential candidates for board seats. This can demonstrate how a company takes cognizance of ethical issues and contributes to the equitable representation of women in corporate leadership. The government can also introduce different policy options, increase public awareness, and award to companies that are ethically conscious of diversity. Such policies and incentives might motivate other companies to view the diversity of their board appointments as a critical issue.

Before generalizing the findings, it is important to keep in mind that this study has certain limitations. First off, the study's sample size and time frame may not accurately reveal the makeup of company boards, given that companies have recently been more exposed to concerns of professional groups and the public over gender diversity. Subsequent studies may also examine causes of the lack of diversity on corporate board as well as attributes of women (e.g., education, experience, religion, ethnicity, and tenure) that may impact their appointment to board positions.

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Table 1: Descriptive analysis

Variables	Mean	Med	Max	Min	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
Women Directors % (WOCB)	0.07	0.00	0.58	0.00	0.09	1.84	7.80
Women Dummy (WDD)	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.49	0.09	1.01
Board Size (BODS)	9.08	9.00	18.00	4.00	2.58	0.37	2.50
Board Independence % (BODIND)	0.35	0.37	0.89	0.00	0.18	-0.11	3.62
CEO Gender (CEOGND)	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.24	3.68	14.56
Foreign Directors % (PFDIR)	0.18	0.00	0.78	0.00	0.23	0.79	2.19
Foreign Ownership % (FDIROWN)	0.01	0.00	0.56	0.00	0.06	6.41	43.27
Ownership Concentration % (OWNCON)	0.54	0.59	0.95	0.00	0.24	-0.54	2.44
Company Age (COAG)	39.54	42.00	92.00	1.00	18.74	0.05	2.72
Total Assets (Million Naira “000”)	29360.44	7050	950000	67.31	66368.33	6.09	59.84
Ln Total Assets (LNTA)	15.76	15.77	20.67	11.12	1.82	-0.08	2.60
Female labour force (FLF)	45.70	45.90	46.05	45.04	0.34	-0.83	2.13

Notes: WOCB represents the proportion of women directors to total number of directors on corporate boards; WDD is a binary value of 1 if a woman director is present on the board of directors, otherwise 0; BODS is the total number of directors on corporate boards; BODIND is the proportion of non-executive directors to the total number of directors on corporate boards; CEOGND is a dichotomous value of 1 if the CEO is a female, otherwise 0; PFDIR is the percentage of foreign directors on corporate boards; FDIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by foreign directors; OWNCON is the percentage of shareholdings of directors or institutions with 5% or more; COAG represents the age of the company from year of incorporation; LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; FLF is the measure of female labour force as percentage of the total labour force.

Table 2: Correlation analysis

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
WOCB (1)	1.00											
BODS (2)	0.11***	1.00										
BODIND (3)	0.10**	-0.05	1.00									
CEOGND (4)	-0.14***	-0.10***	0.05	1.00								
PFDIR (5)	-0.08**	0.19***	0.12***	-0.17***	1.00							
FDIROWN (6)	-0.04	-0.13***	0.04	-0.04	0.16***	1.00						
OWNCON (7)	0.01	0.21***	0.08**	-0.04	0.59***	0.15***	1.00					
COAG (8)	0.07**	0.10***	0.14***	-0.04	0.35***	0.05	0.29***	1.00				
LNTA (9)	0.14***	0.54***	-0.05	-0.24***	0.29***	-0.01	0.37***	0.20***	1.00			
FLF (10)	-0.15***	-0.03	-0.13***	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.15***	-0.18***	1.00		

Notes: ***and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5%

Table 3: Regression analysis

Variables	OLS		Logistic		VIF
	OLS	Robust	Tobit	Probit	
BODS	0.00*	0.00*	0.01***	0.09***	1.54
BODIND	0.05*	0.05	0.10*	0.54	1.36
CEOGND	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.22***	-1.36***	1.11
PFDIR	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.17***	-0.99***	1.78
FDIROWN	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	1.07
OWNCON	0.03	0.03*	0.08**	0.73**	1.82
COAG	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.14
LNTA	0.00	0.00	0.01**	0.11***	1.85
FLF	-0.04***	-0.04**	-0.07***	-0.41**	1.34
Constant	2.25***	2.25**	2.93**	15.77*	
Mean VIF					1.45
R ² (AdjustR ²)%	8 (7)	8			
Pseudo R ² %			37	12	
Ramsey test	0.24				

Notes: BODS is the total number of directors on corporate boards; BODIND is the proportion of non-executive directors to the total number of directors on corporate boards; CEOGND is a dichotomous value of 1 if the CEO is a female, otherwise 0; PFDIR is the percentage of foreign directors on corporate boards; FDIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by foreign directors; OWNCON is the percentage of shareholdings of directors or institutions with 5% or more; COAG represents the age of the company from year of incorporation; LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; FLF is the measure of female labour force as percentage of the total labour force. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table 4: Tobit regression analysis with industry and year

Variables	With Industry	With Year	With industry and year
BODS	0.01	0.01***	0.01*
BODIND	0.08	0.08	0.06
CEOGND	-0.25***	-0.22***	-0.25***
PFDIR	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.20***
FDIROWN	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
OWNCON	0.13***	0.08**	0.13***
COAG	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
LNTA	0.01*	0.01*	0.01
FLF	-0.07***	-0.08**	-0.16**
AGRICULTURE	0.03		0.33
CONGLOMERATES	-0.02		-0.02
CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE	-0.02		-0.02
CONSUMER GOODS	0.02		0.02
HEALTHCARE	0.13***		0.13***
ICT	-0.09**		-0.19**
INDUSTRIAL GOODS	-0.07***		-0.10***
NATURAL RESOURCES	0.26***		-0.26***
OIL AND GAS	-0.02		-0.06
SERVICES	0.03		-0.02
2005-2015		Yes (2013)	Yes (2011, 2012, 2013)
Constant	3.17***	-0.28***	-0.16**
Pseudo R ² %	77	38	79

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.